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Billie H. Hix

BILLIE H. HIX
Chief, Technical Systems Branch
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1ST ARMY GROUP
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15 ARMY GROUP.

Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)14.

Ref. Demand No. BAF/AI/755.

Reference Map: GSGS 4416, Middle Danube, 1/100,000, Sheet Z-9, "LEOBEN".

Sortie.	Date.	Focal Length.	Quality.	Photographs.
682/1081.	9 Apr 45.	20"	Good.	3021 - 9 4020 - 8

1. Ground Information.

From a captured German soldier : "The Germans are constructing launching ramps for V.1 bombs in the area of LEOBEN, in AUSTRIA, near the DONAWITZ mine". The map reference of LEOBEN is B.5491.

2. Interpretation.

No sign can be seen of V.1 activity or launching ramps on the cover examined.


Appendix "A" shows the extent of cover examined.

3. Distribution.

As for Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)12 dated 12 Apr 45, plus 1 copy to [illegible] Det, HQ, Balkan Air Force. (Demander).

APPENDIX 'A'

GSGS 4416.
Middle Danube.
1/100,000
Sheet Z-9
LEOBEN.



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c/o G.S.I.(a)5,
H.Q. 15 ARMY GROUP, C.M.F.

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12 APR 45

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MAIU(WEST) ADV
15 ARMY GROUP

Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/12

Ref Demand No. MAAF/MI/411 (para 1)

Reference Map: GSGS 4228, ITALY, 1:25,000 Sheet 92-I NE

Sortie	Date	Focal length	Quality	Photographs
23 PS 5 MK 565	4 Apr 45	24"	Fair - Good	4056-4059

1. Ground Information

"Partisan reports 'V' weapon launching site being constructed in mountains North West of SAVONA, in vicinity of LEGINO, at 0.575400".

2. Interpretation

No sign can be seen of the construction of a launching site for V-1 or V-2 weapons at the map reference given in the report or elsewhere on the cover examined.

3. DISTRIBUTION

G2 OI (Photo) AFHQ	3
G2 Section, 15th Army Group	3
HQ MAAF (Intelligence Section)	2
HQ MASAF, A-2	2
HQ MATAF, A-2	2
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MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCE

(TWELFTH AIR FORCE ADVANCE)

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HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCE

INTELLIGENCE SECTION ABI/DJW/ah)

22 January 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO : G-2, Headquarters, 15th Army Group.
(Attention: Major Lloyd Thomas)

1. Reference that attached notes on the V-1, or pilotless aircraft, it is felt that it would be unwise to make much comment on a paper which deals with this complex subject in a very brief form. It is pointed out, however, that para. 4 is not strictly accurate. V-1's are carried by Heinkel 111 and possibly DO-217 aircraft from which they are launched, theoretically, from a height of 1500 feet. In practice, however, we know from P/W that there is considerable variation in carrying out this operation. Launching over the North Sea has been carried out with the aid of Pathfinder aircraft marking the track and point of release, as described in para. 4, although navigation has also been carried out by D/R and W/T means.

2. The reason for the large percentage of V-1's failing even to reach the coast of England is probably not the fault of the height of launching, which sometimes exceeds 1500 feet, but is possibly due to the normal percentage of the V-1 launchings comparable with that experienced from platform launchings.

3. These aircraft can be considered vulnerable whilst making their launching runs as they must reduce their speed to approximately 150 miles per hour.

4. It is believed that the enemy has a maximum of 75 aircraft equipped for carrying V-1. These are at present based in North-west Germany. It is considered very unlikely that, in view of their prior use against England and the Western Front and, to a limited extent, on the Eastern Front, the enemy will be in a position to bring down even a few of these aircraft to operate against targets in this theatre.

5. I am lending you some of our Air Intelligence articles written on the FZG 76 (V-1) and A-4 (V-II). We also have considerable technical data, both on the capabilities, construction etc. of these missiles and should you require a comprehensive report, with illustrations, we can either write this or give you the raw material covering the subject.

Wing Commander,
Chief Intelligence Officer.

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11 February 1945

SPECIAL INTERPRETATION (CROSSBOW) REPORT NO. 14

REPORTED V-2 SITE NEAR VILLACH, AUSTRIA

Reference Map: G.S.G.S. 4396 (YUGOSLAVIA 1/100,000) Sheet 2.

SORTIE	DATE	F.L.	PHOTOGRAPHS
23PS:5MK:175	4 February 1945	24"	4019-20, 4021-23

GENERAL: This report is issued in compliance with demand No. 211 of Target Section, M.A.T.A.F.

A. A detailed sketch map obtained by ground source shows a V-2 Site under construction on the West side of Lake BASKO at point C 913773 and details are as follows: Launching site at B.M. 661, 3 miles S.E. of VILLACH. Road under construction connecting platform with underground bomb dump at C 921763.

Second bomb dump of 10 train loads of bombs above figure 1 of point 661. Third bomb dump in shed at pinpoint C 920764. Weapon dump covered with ground sheets at C 913777. At point C 924755 is the house of National Socialist Organization where women and children are billeted.

B. This report is NOT confirmed.

1. The map reference given lies in a wooded area between VILLACH and Lake BASKO. A few houses are situated within 400 yards of the pinpoint but these were constructed prior to April 1944 and no evidence of track activity is noted on present cover.

2. The pinpoint of first mentioned bomb dump lies in a cleared portion of woods. There is no evidence of bomb storage or of road construction work being carried on.

3. No shed can be seen at pinpoint C 920764 or in surrounding territory.

4. The only access to the reported launching site appears to be provided by narrow twisting roads with sharp turns incapable of traffic of long and heavy trailers.

C. There are some signs of activity in this wooded area as follows:

1. 6 possible vehicles are at pinpoint C 923768.

2. At C 924757 is a group of 11 small barrack huts, which were erected prior to July 1944. The absence of snow on the roofs, particularly near the chimneys indicates that they are in use. Immediately North of this barracks area is a M/T park which has been partially cleared of snow.

3. In open ground along edge of wood at C 903776 are 16 rectangular pits measuring approximately 25' x 15', probably a dangerous stores dump. The pits are, at present, unoccupied. Construction took place between 26 July 1944 and 4 February 1945.

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20 Feb.45 336 P. R. WING SECRET

MEDITERRANEAN ARMY INTERPRETATION UNIT (WEST)

Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/11

Ref. Demand No. MAAF/AI.368/MI.387 (para B)

Reference Maps: CSGS 4228, ITALY, 1:25,000, Sheets 48-II SW and 12-I NW.

Sortie	Date	Focal Length	Quality	Photographs
SA 60/1008	17 Feb 45	36"	Good	3001-33 4001-33

1. Ground Information

(a) Ground sources report:-
"Parts for the assembly of V-2 weapons have been arriving in the vicinity of LAGO DI DOBBIACO since 1 January." (O.S.S./J-3163, para 1).

(b) Geographical co-ordinates of LAGO DI DOBBIACO are 46°43'N, 12°13'E. (Map reference B.6391).

2. (a) There is no visible sign of a stores dump or an assembly area for V-2 weapons on the cover examined, nor is there any unusual activity at DOBBIACO railway station (B.644941).

(b) The only feature of interest in the area is a tunnelled entrance constructed into the mountainside at B.646848: construction took place between 13 Aug 44 and 15 Jan 45. This site, however, does not appear to be suitable for an underground stores (except a very small one) as the track by which it is reached is narrow, and has 2 very sharp bends immediately outside the entrance.

(c) The LAGO DI DOBBIACO lies in a narrow valley with DOBBIACO at its Northern end and CARBONIN (B.635825) at its Southern end. It is possible, therefore, that the ground report refers to the dangerous stores dump at CARBONIN which has been previously mentioned in Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/4 dated 26 Jan 45.

3. Appendix 'A' shows the extent of cover examined.

4. DISTRIBUTION

As for Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/10 dated 17 Feb 45.

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
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MEDITERRANEAN ARMY INTERPRETATION UNIT (WEST)

Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/10

Ref. Demand No. MAAF/A1.373

Reference Map: GSGS 4060, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1:75,000, Sheet 4759, SENEC.

Sortie	Date	Focal Length	Quality	Photographs
SA 60/999	14 Feb 45	36"	Good	3057-3120 4057-4120

1. GENERAL

(a) Ground sources report the construction of a launching platform for V-1 at MAGYARDIOSZEK, 25 miles EAST of BRATISLAVA.

(b) Geographical co-ordinates of MAGYARDIOSZEK (also called MADAR DIOSEG) are 48° 12' N, 17° 38' E. (Map reference T.3303).

(c) The report is NOT confirmed.
There is no sign of anything suggesting V-1 activity at or near MAGYARDIOSZEK.

2. DISTRIBUTION

As for Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/4 dated 26 Jan 45.

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MEDITERRANEAN ARMY INTERPRETATION UNIT (WEST)

Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/9

Ref. Demand No. RAF/141

Reference Map: GSGS 4396, JUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet 2, CELOVEC.

Sortie	Date	Focal Length	Quality	Photographs
682/884	8 Feb 45	36"	Good	3001-39 4001-39

1. GENERAL

(a) Unconfirmed ground reports state that the enemy are building V-2 sites in area of ROSENBACH (D.025711), between JESENICE (D.0361) and VILLACH (C.8880), and that 10 train loads of V-2 ammunition have already arrived.

(b) ROSENBACH appears under the name of PODROSCA on the 1:100,000 map quoted above

(c) The report is NOT confirmed.
There is no sign of anything suggesting V-2 activity in the area examined. There is no unusual activity at ROSENBACH railway station (D.025711) and no ammunition dumps can be seen.

(d) Appendix 'A' shows the extent of cover examined.

2. DISTRIBUTION

As for Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/3 dated 21 Jan 45.

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Sheet 7B TRIESTE.



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16 Feb 45 — 336 P. R. WING — SECRET

MEDITERRANEAN ARMY INTERPRETATION UNIT (WEST)

Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/8

Ref. Demand No. MAAF/MI.376

Reference Map : GSGS 4228, ITALY, 1:25,000, Sheet 61-III NW.

Sortie	Date	Focal Length	Quality	Photographs
SA 60/971	31 Jan 45	36"	Good	3212-82 4212-82
12PR67	10 Jan 45	24"	Fair	3021-47 3074-3102 4021-45 4074-4102
12PR4M1292	12 Jan 45	24"	Good	P.5-15 S.7-15
12PR5M125	21 Jan 45	24"	Good	4001-10

1. GENERAL

(a) Ground sources report:

"It is not thought that there are any launching sites for V weapons under construction in ITALY. The CREMONA bridgehead area, however, is closed to all civilians, and to German military personnel without special passes. This zone has been cleared of its civil population."
I.S.L.D. 174/645. 16 Dec 44.

(b) There is no sign of anything suggesting V-1 or V-2 activity in the area examined.

Ground defences under construction in the area SOUTH of the river might account for the reported evacuation of civilians, particularly as many of the defences are sited amongst farm buildings.

(c) Appendix 'A' shows extent of cover examined.

(d) Map reference of the CREMONA bridge is K.853232.

2. DISTRIBUTION

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GSGS 4230, ITALY, 1/250,000,
Sheet 11 BRESCIA



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12 PR/41 1292
12 PR/51 125

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MEDITERRANEAN ARMY INTERPRETATION UNIT (WEST)

Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/6

Ref Demand No. AI.368/MI.387/A (MAAF)

Reference Maps: GSGS 4228, ITALY, 1:25,000, Sheets 95 II N.W. and 95 II N.E.

Sortie	Date	F/L	Quality	Photographs
683/909	21 Jan 45	36.in	Fair	3162 - 3216 4132 - 4174

1. GENERAL

(a) Ground sources report: LA SPEZIA (44° 05' 30" N. 09° 52' E) — Reported V-2 site in barracks just NORTH of MUGGIANO Seaplane Station. Another at P.SMI(?) 5280925(4) near MAROLA.

(b) The report is NOT confirmed. There is no sign of anything suggesting V-2 activity either at the barracks NORTH of MUGGIANO Seaplane Station (P.696089 - Prints 4147-8) or near MAROLA (P.654086 - Prints 4128-31).

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MEDITERRANEAN ARMY INTERPRETATION UNIT (WEST)

Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No.SR(C)/5

Ref Demand No. MAIU/MI.376

Reference Map: GSGS 4228, ITALY 1:25,000, Sheet No. 94-I N.W.

Sortie	Date	F/L	Quality	Photographs
SA 60/966	29 Jan 45	36.in	Good	3085 - 88 4119 - 30

1. GENERAL

(a) Ground sources report:-

"An emplacement for the launching of V-2 has been established in the vicinity of the "Chiesa delle Grazie" near CHIAVARI. The launching tube is now halted in the rail station. The German command is at the church and there is a tunnel for the concealment of the V-2 apparatus." O.S.S. 26 Oct 44. B-3

(b) The report is NOT confirmed.

Nothing suggesting a launching emplacement for V-1 or V-2 can be identified in the vicinity of the "Chiesa delle Grazie" (P.256372), and no signs of suspected V-1 or V-2 activity can be detected in the area.
There are no stores visible at CHIAVARI Railway Station (P.272359).

The main coast road runs through a tunnel approx. 205 yards long almost directly underneath the Chiesa delle Grazie. Also at P.260369 is the entrance to a very long railway tunnel which, as the railway is inactive, could be used for storage, though there is no sign of it being so used. No other tunnels can be seen.

Adjoining the grounds of the Chiesa delle Grazie, on the seaward side, are two emplacements covered with camouflage netting which completely conceals the contents of the emplacements. The installation has been reported previously as a probable coastal defence bty: study of comparative cover reveals no change in the emplacements or in the surrounding area between 4 Sep 44 and 29 Jan 45.

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MEDITERRANEAN ARMY INTERPRETATION UNIT (WEST)

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Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/4

Ref. Demand No. MAAF/MI.356

Reference Maps: GSGS 4228, ITALY, 1:25,000, Sheets 12-I NW, 12-I SW and 12-IV SE.

Sortie	Date	Focal Length	Quality	Photographs
SA 60/938	15 Jan 45	36"	Good	3026 - 29 3049 - 65 3147 - 53 4050 - 56
683/911	25 Jan 45	20"	Good	4061 - 68

1. GENERAL

(a) Ground sources report:-

"Launching site for flying bombs located MISURINA (46° 35' 03" N, 12° 15' 07" E) ALBERGO TRE CROCI (46° 34' 25" N, 12° 11' 52" E) road. Bombs are reported piled up near MISURINA - CARBONIN (46° 27' 20" N, 12° 13' 02" E) road, slightly SOUTH of MAROGNA bridge (46° 36' 45" N, 12° 13' 27" E) in nearby wood."

(b) Map references of above locations:

LAGO DI MISURINA	B.6678
ALBERGO TRE CROCI	B.622755
CARBONIN	B.635825
MAROGNA bridge	B.642816

(c) The report is NOT confirmed.

There is no sign of anything suggesting a launching site for flying bombs on the cover examined.

No bomb dump can be seen SOUTH of the MAROGNA bridge.

At CARBONIN, the tracks serving the dangerous stores dump (B.637817) appear to have been cleared of snow, but no stores are visible.

2. DISTRIBUTION

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16 Jan 45. 336 P. R. WING SECRET
MEDITERRANEAN ARMY INTERPRETATION UNIT (WEST)

Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/2

Ref. Demand No. MAAF/S6568/Int

Reference Maps: GSGS 4228, ITALY, 1:25,000, Sheet 60-II SW.

Sortie	Date	Focal Length	Quality	Photographs
12PR.4M.1339	14 Dec 44	24"	Good	3085 - 6 - 7

1. GENERAL

(a) Ground sources report:-
"A robomb launching base is reported at SAN SISTO at K.641177. It consists of a large concrete base with a rotating tube about ten metres long and five metres in diameter. The rear portion appears to be hermetically sealed. On the front part on the right, as viewed from in front, there is a pressure gauge. The tube is camouflaged and faces toward the railway switch. Civilian traffic is forbidden in the area and the region is well guarded."
Date of information: 20 Dec 44. Evaluation: B.3.
(Extract from 2677 Regt. (Office of Strategic Services), J.3028. Dated 28 Dec 44).

(b) The report is NOT confirmed.

At the map reference given, there are 3 unemplaced light AA guns. These lie on level open ground between the River PO and a flood wall; on the other side of the wall is a heavy AA site. There is no sign of anything suggesting a bomb launching base at the map reference or in the vicinity.

2. DISTRIBUTION

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12 JAN 45 336 P.R. WING SECRET

MEDITERRANEAN ARMY INTERPRETATION UNIT(WEST)

Special "CROSSBOW" Interpretation Report No. SR(C)/1

Ref Demand No. AI.88, MACAF.

Reference Maps: GSGS 4228, ITALY 1:25,000, Sheet 94-I NE.

Sortie	Date	Focal length	Quality	Photographs
SA 60/912	28 Dec 44	36"	Good	(3087-3149 (4090-4136
682/742	13 Dec 44	36"	Good	(3002-3012 (4001-4012

1. GENERAL

(a) The existence of flying bomb sites has been reported in the SESTRI LEVANTE (P.3230) area.

(b) The report is NOT confirmed: the recent, large scale cover shows no sign of anything in this area which could be interpreted as preparation for the launching of flying bombs.

(c) Appendix 'A' shows extent of cover examined.


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


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
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
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
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
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INTERPRETATION SECTION

SPECIAL PHOTO INTERPRETATION REPORT NO.3

I T A L Y

LOCALITY : SPEZIA

1. SPEZIA.(5PRS/5M156(N) 29.1.45. 2115 hrs. 1/8,000. 12".)

REPORTED LAUNCHING SITE 95/P.653092 AND P.692088.

(i) Night photos show no activity or change since 28th Jan. at either site.

(ii) Due to different angle of shadows, it is seen that the tunnel entrances to the reported C.P. are wider and possibly more used than could be seen in the shaded portion of the photos previously interpreted.

Photos 3001, 4004,05

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
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28th January 1945

SPECIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION REPORT.

I T A L Y

LOCALITY : SPEZIA.

1. SPEZIA. (SPRS/131. 28.1.45. 3/167.)

SUSPECTED V-2 LAUNCHING SITE AT XXX P-65260920.

(i) Excellent photos uphold yesterdays report and in addition the following can be seen:

a) The reported launching site appears to consist of a tunnel with an entrance well protected by a flat mass of well camouflaged cement or else it is a retaining wall with a flat area up hill from it. Immediatly West and up hill from the above described installation are several openings of tunnels that appear unused due to lack of activity.

b) The several small entrances are seen better in the area reported to be the underground C.P. and spoil from the workings is more clearly seen.

c) A small tunnel appears at the crest of the hill with a narrow gauge track entering it.

d) a newly constructed building is seen at the spoils dump, the roof of which has been placed since 3 Jan. A small, narrow gauge car is seen climbing the incline to the spoils dump, a further indication of activity in this particular area.

e) No statement can be made about the reported tunnel for storage other than the approaches appear very inconvenient for large objects.

(ii) It is noted that if the ramp were aimed directly out of the hill at this point it would take a course slightly North of East or an approx 80 degree. Leghorn is South East of this area at about 135 degrees, an angle of fire impossible if the launching point is at or North of the apex of the hill.

(iii) It is also seen that there are numerous small mining activities of similar nature in the hills around the town.

Photos 3038,39,40

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JAN-MAY, '45

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RETURN TO
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army C.G.S.C.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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JAN-MAY
1945

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
2 May '45.

EIGHTH ARMY

Eighth Army is still driving on to complete the destruction of the German forces in Northeast Italy. Prisoners continue to pour in. Over 10,000 prisoners taken in 24 hours. Yesterday 27 Lancers captured 1,000 prisoners.

The part played by Royal Engineers in Eighth Army offensive was of outstanding importance and contributed very considerably to the success of the battle. The terrain between the Senio and Po rivers over which the Eighth Army fought is particularly difficult fighting country intersected by innumerable rivers, canals and ditches with high floodbanks all of which form perfect natural defence lines and tank obstacles. Also the enemy had time during the winter to prepare bridge demolitions in great depth on a scale never before encountered. That we were able to keep up the impetus of our first breakthrough across the Senio was due very largely to the fact that the enemy was taken completely by surprise by our use of the new Ark bridge. This bridge used in this offensive by the 25th Armoured Engineer Brigade enabled our tanks to follow very rapidly to give close support to the infantry immediately they had established a bridgehead.

The Ark bridge is ideally suited to this type of country and is described by the troops who use it as "just the job". The main bridging during the offensive consisted of Bailey and floating bridge equipment. Though less spectacular than the Ark, the Bailey is equally essential to get vehicles and supporting arms across in quantity.

'Sappers' record was the construction of 29 Bailey's in one day with total length of 2260 ft. During first ten days of battle 118 bridges were built with total of 10,750 ft using average 700 tons of bridging per day. Eighth Army's main river obstacles were the Po and the Adige Rivers. The Po is 12,000 ft wide, the same width as the Rhine and is an equally formidable barrier. During last winter R.E. trained a special force to bridge the Po with the result that four floating bridges were built across river in record time enabling the Army to get large quantities of vital material and supplies to our troops North of the River.

The next river obstacle, the Adige, was as difficult to bridge as the Po for it runs wider as fast and has steep floodbanks 35 ft high. Despite these difficulties the R.E.'s put 4 bridges across. Italian watermen of the Po Di Goro area who had been fighting with the Partisans were formed into a coy and some of these took part in the ferrying operations over the Adige.

FIFTH ARMY

Fifth Army troops continue to pursue and destroy the demoralized enemy in Northern Italy, encountering scattered rearguard resistance and mopping up bypassed enemy pockets.

The Germans have set up straggler collecting points and as soon as a few hundred troops congregate, they are easily organized into units and sent out to delay our troops.

Units of the 85th Infantry Division are patrolling and mopping up East of the Adige River.

Our mountain troops have been issued winter clothing and pack animals for Alpine operations.

General Jahn, commander of the Lombardy Corps of the Ligurian Army, surrendered with 8,000 Germans and many Italians, Southwest of Milan. Included in the booty were nearly 300 vehicles and 12 88mm guns. General Schlemmer, commander of the 75 Corps of the Ligurian Army, has refused to surrender his troops because of his oath to Adolph Hitler that he would not surrender while Hitler was still alive. Several hundred SS police were also captured in the vicinity of Milan.

German planes bombed and strafed the Dongo area for several hours the morning of 1 May, apparently in reprisal for the slaying of Mussolini. One bomb hit a hotel in a nearby village, killing between 10 and 15 persons.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
MORNING 1 May 45.

Fifth Army troops relentlessly slashing demoralsied enemy forces into bits, continued their advances and reinforced their blockade of escape routes.

Enemy resistance has ceased to be effective in the West, but East of Lake Garda above Verona on the Brenner Route there was still opposition to our advance. It appears that the enemy is attempting to reassemble his disjointed forces at a point on this route in order to attempt the long tortuous march up into the Alps. Fifth Army operations continued to be directed toward keeping him hopelessly divided and denying him access to the highway.

While Major General WILLIS D. CRITTENBERGER, Commander of IV Corps, was making a formal entry into Milan with a selected task force including elements of virtually all units under his command, his troops were pushing on past Milan and establishing themselves along the Ticino River, which connects Lake Maggiore and the Po River, and forms an important barrier to possible withdrawal of enemy troops from Western Italy.

Farther to the East, the 10th Mountain Division continued its advance at the Northern tip of Lake Garda, moving NE towards Trento and the vital Brenner Line. In the face of sharp enemy fire the 86th Mountain Infantry occupied Riva 5504, Torbole 5702 and Nago 5903.

The 351st Infantry Regiment crossed the Brenta River at 2640, the 363rd Infantry Regiment of 91st Division at 3379 and the 6th South African Armoured Division at 4473.

The amphibious task force of the 10th Mountain Division which crossed Lake Garda to seize Mussolini's villa at Gargnano was commanded by Colonel William O. Darby, assistant Divisional Commander. The party found the villa extremely well camouflaged in green, and on searching it uncovered important documents. Local residents reported that Mussolini had left Gargnano on 25 April.

On the East shore of the lake at Algesino the Division seized the forward HQ of the Luftwaffe, an estate belonging to Ernest Stadelman, an artist whose work was exhibited in New York before the war. Stadelman, now a Luftwaffe Captain, had fled. The last German meal served in the place included roast beef according to a menu on the wall, but the chef in another notice announced that because of lack of kitchen help he could no longer fill individual orders.

Eighth Army

On Route 14 morning 30 April 2 New Zealand Division crossed Piave River, in which operation the New Zealanders took over 400 prisoners. They resumed their rapid advance and were last reported some 15 miles beyond the river. Meanwhile, 27 Lancers struck North from Mestre and passed through Treviso. Continuing their northerly thrust they reached the Piave and crossed by the Route 13 bridge which they found intact. They continue to advance. Number of prisoners taken by Eighth Army during 29 April about 10,000 but difficult to estimate as numbers increasing hourly.

9th Armoured Brigade commanded by Brigadier R.P. Cooke, CBE, DSO has played an important part throughout the Spring offensive. Supporting 56th Division, the Brigade used Buffaloes for the first time in Italy. Crowed by joint U.S. and British force made two landings on Southwest shore of Comacchio taking enemy completely by surprise and thereby turning flank of strongly defended Argenta position. Following up the advance to the Po 9th Armoured Brigade used amphibian tanks and buffaloes in support of 5 Corps and 13 Corps when they forced the Po crossing and also in support of 56 Division and 8 Indian Division for the Adige crossing. In addition to carrying assaulting troops across the rivers, the Brigade continued day and night to ferry supplies across until bridges were built. Forward elements of Brigade entered Padua and Venice with 56 Division. Brigade also transported infantry throughout offensive in kangaroos which were most valuable in keeping up momentum of attack

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3 April '45.

On Eighth Army front about 1000 PWs were taken in capture of PADUA including fighting soldiers and stragglers. Our troops encountered German delaying positions on river BRENTA east of PADUA but after some fighting we broke through and by afternoon 29 April advanced 25 miles.

We also captured MESTRE, important industrial port on mainland opposite VENICE.

South of PADUA - MESTRE road reports are coming in of German units and formations captured or surrendering in toto. The garrison at CHIOGGIA surrendered this morning (29 April) and another battalion surrendered complete in area West of Venetian Lagoon.

It can now be disclosed that 13 Corps commanded by Lt Gen Sir John Harding, KCB, CBE, DSO, MC, has played a significant part on Italian front throughout winter and during spring offensive. During winter months 13 Corps then commanded by Lt Gen S.C. Kirkman, CB, CBE, MC, formed part of Fifth Army and was engaged in fighting under severe weather conditions in the difficult mountain country south of BOLOGNA. 13 Corps came under command of Eighth Army once again and shortly after start of present offensive was given one of the leading roles.

In the battle, it may now be made known that 7th Armoured Brigade commanded by Brigadier Cooper, CBE, played an important part in recent operations from opening of Spring offensive up to fall of BOLOGNA. Supporting 2 Polish Corps 10th Indian Division and 43 Gurkha Brigade, the 7th Armoured Brigade took part in the fierce fighting for the rivers North of Route 9. They crossed the formidable SENIO and SANTERNO and supported Polish troops in the capture of IMOLA. After breaking the enemy's defences on the SILLARO the Brigade took part with the Gurkhas in the capture of MEDICINA from the parachutists and continued in the general rapid advance through the Genghis Khan line on the IDICE river.

On the Fifth Army front, SE of VICENZA, American and South African troops closed up to the line of BACCHIGLIONE River. Troops of the 88th Infantry Division, who captured and cleared VICENZA, have pushed North and NW and crossed ASTICO River. Pockets of SS police are being mopped up in all areas. Among the large numbers of PWs taken was a Czech Brigadier General in charge of a Czech Labor Battalion.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
29 Apr 45.

The First Armoured Division took part in the advance towards BRESCIA and the thrust to Como. The Commanding General of the First Armoured Division is Major General Vernon E. Prichard, whose family lives in St. Louis, Missouri. He was born in Onawa, Iowa. In 1915 he was graduated from West Point and was captain of that year's football team. Later he was Professor of Military Science at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

Fifth Army troops have completed occupation of Genoa and rounding up of prisoners. Peninsula of Porta Fino 1935 cleared of enemy pocket with capture of 55 PWs.

Despite considerable difficulty Eighth Army troops crossed Adige. This was major engineering feat because the lower reaches of Adige flow fast and owing to last 2 days of rain, approaches to River have been very difficult, and enemy rearguards have blown all bridges. Our armoured spearheads have, in some cases, had to advance on foot but made good progress when across Adige. We captured many PWs and moved up to Venetian Line on broad front.

A captured order from 278 Infantry Division, giving instructions for crossing the PO, gives priority to Signals, kitchens, ordinary vehicles and horse drawn vehicles in that order. It adds: "If MDVs cannot be crossed, officer in charge will decide on burning them. Horses will swim across." And it concludes: "No panic. We will defend ourselves with bazookas and pistols".

A prisoner from a Nebelwerfer Regiment taken by 2 New Zealand Division wrote in his diary: "Discipline has deteriorated badly. Again we move our positions six kilometers to the North. Night and day fighter-bombers and shelling. No more mail comes up. Are our parents still alive? When will the battle finish? It is a terrible muddle. No more proper organisation exists. The paratroops keep clearing out. It is senseless to keep on fighting. We are supposed to stop tanks and it is always the same people who make a bolt for it. The Italians are happy that the Tommies are coming. Utter chaos. The breakup of the German Army has begun."

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
28 April '45.

EIGHTH ARMY

On Eighth Army front about 1000 P/W have been captured in last 24 hours up to morning 27 April. Our spearheads are pushing forward and other forces continue to mop up bypassed enemy who appear to have little idea of progress of battle. Our troops have captured Novigo 2921 and we also cleared up many Germans East and West of town. General Heidrich, commander of notorious 1 Parachute Corps, swam across PO from South to North bank and while still dripping he harangued his parachutists, dressed them down and told them "We will stop British somewhere". To help stem our push Germans have brought down fresh troops from German 155 Division not previously committed. General Schwerin was appalled when he heard that this division had to be put in the line. However, parachutists and panzer troops appear to have plenty of fight left in them despite losses and can be expected to put up resolute battle in Venetian Line which is first German defence line since Gothic Line to have concrete defences and dug in panther turrets. These defences are at least two kilometers deep.

It can now be revealed that 6th British Armoured Division commanded by Major General H. Murray, DSO, has played a very important part in Eighth Army's spring offensive. Debouching from the Argenta gap the division captured S. Nicolo Ferrarese and crossed the Po Morto Di Primaro. Driving Northwest they captured S. [illegible] in record, captured and cleared Poggio Renatico taking many P/W from German L of C troops and went on to capture Bondeno. This Northwest thrust cut right across line of withdrawal of General Heidrich's 1st Parachute Corps and forced it to pull back Northwest first over Reno where it lost much equipment, then toward PO crossings East of Bondeno. While one 6th Armoured spearhead pressed toward Finale which Fifth Army was approaching from Southwest, enemy was driven into arms of strong Fifth Army encircling forces which swept round to cut off Heidrich's retreat and rounded up over 7,000 P/W in this very successful joint operation.

Meanwhile main spearhead of 6th Armoured Division swung suddenly Northwest to reach PO and split the enemy's bridgehead South of the river. They were the first Eighth Army troops up to river and with New Zealanders shared the honor of being first across PO.

Since start of offensive 6th Armoured Division has taken over 3,400 P/W including half a MG battalion which surrendered en masse. They also captured much equipment including AT guns.

FIFTH ARMY

North and South of the PO River, Fifth Army troops continued their pursuit of the enemy against light and scattered resistance. In some areas, prepared enemy positions and fortifications were found abandoned. In the greatest advance of the day against little opposition, First Armored Division spearhead raced Northwards more than 50 kilometers to capture the airport near Bergamo 6307. Armored columns made deep penetrations West and Southwest of Lake Garda. While one spearhead sped West from Brescia, other elements captured the town of Ghedi 0052. In taking the Ghedi airport, our troops moved so fast that a German sergeant who had been assigned to blow up the airport installations, was captured before he could accomplish his job.

Troops of the 34th Infantry Division are mopping up pockets around Piacenza 6015, and Southwest of Parma, we have cut Route 62, one of the main enemy escape routes from the Ligurian Coast.

Our reconnaissance planes have observed many enemy vehicles and personnel groups withdrawing Northwards.

Following closely another enemy withdrawal troops of the special task force operating on the Ligurian Coast entered Pontremoli 7240 early 27 April without opposition. Troops advancing on Genoa encountered resistance from isolated strongpoints only. We control the city although the German coastal batteries have not yet surrendered.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
27 Apr 45

Eighth Army

We have crossed Canale Bianco in several places capturing many bridges intact and have reached Adige against moderate opposition including infantry and tanks. Count of equipment captured yesterday now shows we took additional 70 guns and 12 AT guns.

Following statement made by Lt-General Graf Von Schwerin, captured commander of 76 Panzer Corps : "I know the situation for German soldiers in North of Italy is hopeless. Under the circumstances I cannot issue further orders. In full knowledge of the situation I have taken the only way open to a soldier who has been honourably but decisively beaten."

Fifth Army

Sweeping across the Valley of the Po, fast moving Fifth Army troops continued their advance on a wide front 26 April. Although enemy resistance is generally weak and disorganised there are still strong pockets fighting rearguard actions in isolated areas. On right flank, troops of the 91st Infantry Division captured Legnago 8625 on the Adige River and Cerea 8126 against some opposition. 100 Germans were killed by our troops at Legnago and in a fire fight at Cerea they captured many prisoners of war and an enemy supply train, including a tank column that was seeking a route of escape over the river at that point. Among the troops who have crossed the Po River are those of the 6th South African Armoured Division.

Mopping up activities continued in captured Verona. Southwest of the city our troops encountered road blocks and snipers in the vicinity of Vigasio 6040. Resistance also was encountered in capturing Valeggio 4445. To the West Fifth Army armoured columns continued to make progress southwest of Lake Garda. After capturing Parma 1085 our troops maintained their advance to the Northwest astride Route 9 and captured Piacenza.

Another German division commander, General Boehlke of the 334 Infantry Division was captured and our troops continue to bring in large groups of prisoners.

It was revealed today that Colonel William O. (Bill) Darby of Ranger fame commanded a task force of the 10th Mountain Division that yesterday, 25 April, by fast marching, surprised the enemy at Villa Franca and captured the airport before they were able to destroy it.

In coastal sector further advances were made along Route One towards Genoa. Troops who had been held up the previous day by stiff enemy resistance, crossed the Entella River without opposition. Blown roads and bridges delayed advances but forward elements had reached Zoagli against moderate resistance. Enemy resistance was composed of mixed Italian and German troops. The previously active coast defense guns at Portofino remained silent throughout the day.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Morning 26 April '45.

Eighth Army

Eighth Army troops are up to Po along almost whole front. Night 24/25 April enemy evacuated his Po bridgehead East of Ferrara very hastily leaving behind him so much equipment and motor transport that we were unable to count it but he abandoned at least 1,000 motor transport which had either been shelled by us, bombed by Desert Air Force, or fired by Germans themselves. 9th Lancers alone knocked out and captured 10 German tanks and SP guns during fighting night 24/25 April. We also captured numerous PW's. West of Ferrara our troops pushed on successfully from their Po bridgehead and are meeting only few enemy. Main German defence line North of the Po is the Venetian or "Adige" Line. The venetian Line is very strong and runs North-west of the Adige from point 20 miles inland to skirt Monti Euganei isolated hill mass South of Vincenza. Defenses on this line have been under construction for a long time.

Fifth Army

Spreading out to the North after their successful crossing of the Po, Fifth Army troops pursuing a confused and disorganized enemy, made rapid advance 25 April against opposition which was described as slight. Following a pattern common to most of their withdrawals in Italy, however, enemy demolitions in most areas North of the river have been extensive.

Fifth Army has crossed the Po in strength. In a large area in the South bank of the Po practically all Germans have been cleared. Only small isolated groups remain, and they are being rapidly mopped up.

Farther West, we have taken Reggio D'Emilia and Parma on Route 9.

In the mountainous central sector and in the coastal sector, our troops reported almost no contact with the enemy as they move rapidly forward. With our clearing of the area North from Bologna to the Po, the German forces to the West appear to be speedily withdrawing from their remaining positions in the Appenines.

Along the Ligurian Sea on the left flank, we have advanced Northwest of La Spezia. Our troops have reported little arty fire, weak rearguards, few bridges blown and very few or very old demolitions. Aulla 7720 has also been occupied by our forces.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
25 Apr 45.

Fifth Army.

Fifth Army troops continued their rapid advance in the Po Valley Northwest of Bologna, with extensive mopping up operations on by-passed enemy units. There was increasing evidence of disorganisation and confusion, with enemy divisions broken up and battalions more and more operating on their own.

In the mountainous central sector our forces continued to advance as the enemy retired.

In the Coastal sector Fifth Army troops moved Northward following the fall of La Spezia.

Up to noon on 24 April more than 25,000 prisoners of war had been taken by Fifth Army since the start of the present offensive.

The 10th Mountain Division was the first major unit in the 15th Army Group to cross the River Po. It crossed on the morning of 23 April and is now attacking North of the River.

The crossing of the Po by Fifth Army troops was accomplished in the face of a remarkably fierce concentration of enemy fire. At the point of first crossing, the river is about 200 yards wide, with gradually sloping shores exposed to enemy fire. The enemy, sheltered by earthworks on the opposite shore, poured a hail of lead into the assault boats as they crossed the stream. The crossing was the culmination of a thrust of 55 miles in two days which resulted in the capture of several thousand prisoners, the seizure of at least one truck convoy and of one freight train.

Eighth Army.

Eighth Army troops have now crossed the Po River.

To the East of Ferrara the German bridgehead of the Po is slowly and relentlessly being compressed, and the enemy crossings are everywhere within forty range of our guns. In the East we are within 10,000 yards of the Po in the neighbourhood of Corbola 4803 crossing, and to the West Ferrara was taken 24 April. Between these points the enemy holds a strip of land only about 5,000 yards deep, covering the withdrawal of the remnants of 5 divisions which have still to cross the river. To the West of Ferrara we are on South banks of Po on a wide front.

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Intelligence Section
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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Morning 24 April '45.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector our troops pushed on across flooded country and reached Codigoro 5084. North of Lake Comacchio we pushed on towards Massa Fiscaglia 4281. To Northwest our troops cleared Formignana 3085 and advanced beyond town to Northwest.

After overcoming enemy counterattack North of Quartesana our troops pushed North and cleared Contrapo 2086 on Po Di Volano. North of Copparo 2891 where we have troops, enemy is putting up strong resistance to keep bridgehead South of Po while his forces withdraw. We are pressing this in steadily.

After clearing Germans from Ferrara Airfield where there was stiff fighting our troops are now fighting in outskirts of Ferrara. We advanced with several thrusts West of Ferrara and have reached River Po on wide front. In area Bondeno 9692 - Finale 8785 great havoc has been wrought among hastily withdrawing enemy, much transport shot up by our tanks and [illegible] prisoners taken by midday. Many vehicles also taken. Desert Air Force reported big concentration of enemy transport in area but decided not to attack it when they saw it was surrounded by our tanks and was already in the bag.

South of Reno enemy were still fighting at first light but withdrew quickly. Our own troops chased them and whole area South of river is now ours though odd prisoners continue to be taken. At one crossing Northwest of Cento 8574 our patrols found evidence of great slaughter with many corpses of Germans and horses and much enemy equipment scattered in area.

Fifth Army

Additional Fifth Army forces have reached South bank of the Po River, advancing against slight enemy resistance.

Enemy columns retreating North were again attacked by our air forces 23 April, with several hundred pieces of motor transport and horse drawn vehicles reported destroyed or damaged. Our aircraft also harassed enemy as he attempted to escape across the Po on rafts, in boats, and by other means.

In one sector we repulsed German counterattack and shortly thereafter captured 300 prisoners.

In coastal sector we recorded gains of up to 2,000 yards, capturing a mountain and several towns.

Four or Five enemy aircraft appeared over the Army area night of 22/23 April, bombing and strafing.

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CONFIDENTIAL

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Evening 23 Apr. '45

EIGHTH ARMY

Eighth Army troops have reached the Po in several places. In the Coastal sector our troops cleared further localities Northwest of Comacchio 5668 and continued their advance. British troops pressed on Northeast between Lake Comacchio and River Po Di Volano and are now beyond Migliarino 3677. To Northwest our troops advanced from their Po Di Volano bridgeheads at several points. We overcame determined resistance South of Formignana 3085. Enemy launched counterattack North of Quartesana but was beaten off and we pressed on. Despite extensive demolitions our troops are closing in on Ferrara and are now in outskirts overcoming enemy rearguards. Enemy counter-attacked with Infantry and Tanks beyond Poggio Renatico but repulsed and our troops pushed forward. South of Reno we mopped up German rearguards, cleared several villages and advanced on wide front. To Southwest our troops cleared S. Giorgio 9165 and made contact with enemy beyond town, while to West we pushed on beyond Argelato 8964 which is now clear. Enemy casualties have been heavy. On Polish front along 23 officers and 1500 OR's German dead have been counted. It can now be revealed that since start of Eighth Army offensive Italian Friuli and Folgore Groups under command of Eighth Army played an important part in fighting in the difficult hill country South of Route 9 leading up to the capture of Bologna. In fighting immediately preceding fall of the town the Friuli Group on the right established a bridgehead over the Idice in face of enemy MG fire. Folgore Group cleared foothills South and Southeast of Bologna and overcame stubborn enemy rearguards killing many Germans and taking PWs.

Weather: Fair with local showers in mountains.

FIFTH ARMY

Fifth Army spearheads are on the Po River. Elements of our troops have advanced an approximate 75 miles in eight and a half days of the current operation.

Two bridges across the Panaro taken intact. Panaro flows generally Northeast and empties into Po approximately 27 miles due North of Bologna. In Serchio River sector our troops continued to advance North with little opposition.

In Coastal Sector East and Northeast of port of La Spezia our forces advanced slowly against stubborn resistance. Except in this area, enemy resistance South of the Po River has ceased to be effective, and can only be described as spotty.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Evening 22 April '45.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army troops continued their advance to the North in the face of fairly strong enemy rearguard resistance. Our aircraft utilized good flying weather to attack his retreating columns with fighters and fighter bombers, destroying and damaging many vehicles.

Our forces operating North and West of Bologna have crossed both the Secchia and Panaro Rivers in several places. Two bridges were seized undamaged across the Secchia which flows almost due North to join the Po, while the Panaro runs Northeast to meet the same river.

On Route 9, running between Bologna and Modena, we have occupied Castelfranco 6660 about 7 miles Southeast of Modena.

Small groups of enemy troops surrounded by our units have surrendered. In one area elements of a German tank battalion were overrun by our troops, and in another a German Regimental Commander was captured.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector our troops crossed Canale Valetta and despite many demolitions pushed on North of S. Giuseppe 5971 and reached Comacchio 5668 to Southeast and are now in possession of town. Northwest of Lake Comacchio British troops swung Northeast beyond Portomaggiore and reached Ostellato 3774 on North shore of Lake Comacchio while another thrust reached Southern outskirts of Migliarino 3677 on Po di Volano which is being defended by enemy. Our troops pressed on Northwest of Modelana which is now clear, overcame enemy resistance and reached Po di Volano River West of Pinale di Reno 3282 and also opposite Gobbioncello 2885.

British troops pressed on beyond Montesanto 2073 against sporadic resistance and captured bridge intact at Quartesana 2182 and formed bridgehead over Po di Volano 2000 yards West at Cona 1882. We reached Po di Volano on a one mile front Northwest of Cona, and leading elements are now two miles from Ferrara. To Southwest our troops pressed on beyond Fossa Cembaline bridgehead Southwest of Ferrara and attacked and captured S. Bartolomeo in Bosco 1274 against stiff opposition and have since advanced a long way. British troops pushed forward along North bank of Reno.

After stiff fighting with main position of two parachute divisions on line Castel Maggiore 9057, S. Brigida 9856, Cazzano 0157, enemy pulled back Northwest during night and we followed up rapidly to make contact again in area Bentivoglio 9563 - S. Giorgio 9165 9000 yards Northwest of yesterday's line.

Polish troops overcame stubborn enemy resistance beyond Granarolo, crossed Ferrara - Bologna road (Route 64) in two places about five miles Northeast of Bologna, and reached Castel Maggiore 9057.

Weather: Fair with occasional showers.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Morning 23 Apr 45.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army forces continued their advance afternoon of 22 April, reaching points varying from 20 to 35 miles North and Northwest of BOLOGNA. Our troops were still encountering demolitions, strongpoints, snipers, and mortar and arty fire which slowed their advance.

South of the Panaro River in the general area Northwest of Bologna, our forces were delayed by extensive minefields.

Farther West and in the coastal sector, there was little to report. Our patrols were active in both areas.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector we pushed on Northwest from Comacchio along roads which are few feet above surrounding floods. British troops thrust on Northeast from NW corner of Valli di Comacchio. To NW we are strengthening bridgeheads over Po di Volano gained after thrusts North Night 21/22 April. We pressed on North astride Po di Primaro River and are now within 2,500 yards of Ferrara near airfield. Another spearhead penetrated to within 3,000 yards Southwest of airfield.

Germans are withdrawing South of Reno to conform with our advances on both flanks and our troops advanced here to make contact with enemy dug-in infantry on line running Southwest from one mile South of S. Pietro in Casale 9471. To Southwest our troops pressed on against opposition to outskirts of S. Giorgio 9165 and are now up to road running SE of village on 2,000 yards front. We also pushed on toward Argelato 8964.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Morning 22 Apr '45.

Eighth Army

On right flank of Eighth Army front our troops thrust Northeast of Porto Maggiore crossed several waterways and captured bridge intact (area 3078) across Medelana 3178 - S. Nicolo Canal. We pushed on across Canal towards Medelana which enemy are defending strongly and fighting continues in outskirts of town. By 1800 hours we had advanced 4,000 yards from morning's position this sector.

Southwest of Medelana we advanced against sporadic resistance toward S. Nicolo Canal and reached Canal North of Ganbulaga 2575. Enemy made resolate attempt to hold canal but we crossed astride railway to Southwest and after capture of Montesanto and its railway station pushed on 3,000 yards.

Our troops forced crossings over Fossa Gombaline Southwest of Marrara in close contact with enemy who reacted strongly and drove back one of our bridgeheads.

To Southwest our troops established bridgehead over Idice in bend against fierce opposition and pressing on forced enemy out of Mezzolara 0658. We established another bridgehead over Idice Southwest of Mezzolara against determined opposition.

Our troops Northwest of Budrio forced crossing of Fiunicello Canal one mile behind Idice and pushed on 2-3,000 yards beyond to make contact with main enemy position on S.Brigida 9856 - Cazzano 0154 road.

We pushed fwd on wide front Northeast of Bologna, captured Granarolo Dell'Emilia 9757 and advanced another 2,000 yards where we are now fighting hard. It can now be announced that 21 Tank Brigade played notable part in operations carried out by 5 Corps in Argenta Area.

Fifth Army

Elements of Fifth Army, speeding Northwest of captured Bologna in pursuit of retreating German armies evening of 21 April had reached points at least twenty miles Northwest of the city and were moving rapidly on against rearguard resistance which attempted to slow our advance. Our forces were encountering snipers, demolitions, strongpoints, and occasional light mortar and arty fire.

Troops of 88th Division and 6th South African Armored Division were moving steadily ahead, while 10th Mountain Division and 85th Infantry Division moved to North, overcoming strong enemy delaying detachments and capturing many PW's.

Our aerial reconnaissance showed long columns of German transport and men retreating to North and Northwest with roads crammed. In some cases, the backtracking columns reported to be several miles long. Our air attacked these enemy columns but unfavorable weather limited the effectiveness of that action. Possible escape routes to Northeast are being threatened by Eighth Army.

Scores of truckloads of German PW's streamed steadily South over the two main highways, while our supply trucks moved North.

Elsewhere on front our patrols entered Pieve Pelago 3018 against no opposition. Coastal sector opposition continued to be fairly stiff.

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H.Q. 15 ARMY GROUP
Evening - 21 April 1945.

FIFTH ARMY.

Pushing North rapidly on the heels of the withdrawing Germans, elements of Fifth Army, 21 April, advanced to SAN GIOVANNI 7664, approximately 16 kilometres Northwest of Bologna which was taken in the morning.

Only slight resistance was encountered by Fifth Army troops of the 34th and 91st Infantry Divisions and they entered Bologna from the South and West in the early morning. One of the first elements was from the 3rd Battalion, 133rd Regiment, 34th Division which rode on tanks of the 752 Tank battalion into the vital communications hub at the base of the Appenine mountains. Lieutenant Colonel Bruno G. Marchi, Fort Dodge, Iowa, commands the 3rd Battalion and Major Coryton M. Woodbury, Roswell, New Mexico, the tank battalion.

Moving West of Bologna units of Fifth Army encountered spotty resistance with Germans employing SP guns and SA in delaying actions. The situation continued fluid.

Farther West in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force sector, the village of ZOCCA 6033 was captured. Partisans operating under control of IV Corps entered SESTOLA 4220 without resistance. In the Coastal area Fifth Army troops were encountering strong opposition in the only spot in which the Nazis did not appear to be withdrawing.

EIGHTH ARMY

On right flank of Eighth Army our troops pushed on further beyond Scolo Bolognese and are now three miles North of Portomaggiore. We also swung Northwest from the Bolognese and against opposition crossed over Canal which runs from Medelana to S. Nicolo in two places near railway. To West our troops pressed on North and cleared Marrara 1673 on Po Morto Di Primaro.

We also advanced Northwest along North bank of Reno and leading troops crossed Fossa Comballine (Area 0971). Our troops closed up to Idice bend Northeast of Budrio 0452. We strengthened and reinforced our Idice bridgehead Northwest of Budrio and forward elements pressed on to Scolo Fiumicello one mile beyond. We beat off determined enemy counterattack against our second Idice bridgehead Southwest of Budrio and consolidated our positions on far bank.

During night 20/21 April enemy initiated withdrawal North of Route 9 and taking advantage of this, Polish troops continued their advance on a wide front overcoming enemy resistance and crossed Idice at several points North of Route 9, pressing on beyond river. They captured Castenaso 9949 and crossed river beyond town. Pushing on rapidly along Route 9 Poles cleared S. Lazzaro. Crossing Idice they entered Bologna against opposition and reached centre of town early Morning 21 April where they met their American comrades from Fifth Army.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Morning 21 April 45.

Fifth Army

Converging on Bologna from West and South, Fifth Army troops made the most important advances of the Spring offensive 20 April. The enemy offered continued but varying resistance to our multiple attacks along the wide front. There are no signs of a general enemy withdrawal, although considerable movement was noted North and Northwest from Bologna.

Along Route 65 and in high ground flanking highway, our troops pushed forward aggressively against opposition. We have advanced four miles North of Pianoro on the main road.

Between Route 65 and Route 64, our troops advanced, making gains up to three miles during the day.

Tanks of the 6th South African Armoured Division rolled up Route 64 and entered Casalecchio 8346 late afternoon of 20 April. The South Africans captured 300 prisoners during the day. Elements of the 85th Infantry Division assisted the South Africans by attacking from the West and repulsed a counter attack in vicinity of town. Casalecchio is three miles Southwest of Bologna.

Troops of the 10th Mountain Division continued to exploit their severing of Route 9 West of Bologna and the situation in this area remains fluid.

Seeking to maintain contact with the enemy, Brazilian troops occupied Montalto 5929 and moved forward about three miles along their entire line.

Italian partisans, who have been operating under control of 4 Corps for several months, occupied numerous hills, including M. Lancio 4214, a 4,000 foot peak about four miles South of Sestola 4220.

In coastal sector, our forces continued their advance and pushed up Route One to reach Sarzana 7710. Major General Edward N. Almond of Luray, Virginia, is in command of our troops in this sector. There are indications that the enemy is using sailors and former air corps personnel to bolster his depleted strength along the coast.

In coastal area, enemy seems to be disposing of surplus propaganda material evidently printed in 1941. Enemy leaflets fired at our troops said in substance: "The end of the war is near. Why not quit now?"

Eighth Army

On right flank of Eighth Army front we pushed on beyond Scolo Bolognese. Our infantry and tanks pushed on one mile beyond Portomaggiore while to Northwest we advanced 2000 yards beyond Bolognese on the Ferrara road against opposition. In face of heavy shellfire we entered S. Nicolo Ferrarese, key village on Route 16, where enemy is defending canals on far side of village. In thrust to Southwest our infantry and armour cleared Traghetto 1663, crossed Po Morto di Primaro River and pushed on Northwest along North bank of Reno against opposition taking P/Ws.

To Southwest our troops are nearing Idice in bend northeast of Budrio 0353 while Budrio itself was cleared of enemy 20th April and attacking Northwest of town our troops overran strong Idice defences including many mines and wire on both floodbanks but using flamethrowers we established bridgehead against tough resistance and took 30 P/Ws. Our troops also drove enemy back and forced second bridgehead over Idice Southwest of Budrio.

Between here and Route 9 the core of enemy resistance was broken in last 24 hours very heavy fighting and enemy forced to withdraw. Our troops pressed on and reached Idice Southwest of Budrio while to South our infantry and tanks are forcing enemy back and crossing further water obstacles in front of main Idice defences. Immediately South of Route 9 we pressed forward on 3000 yards front.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Evening 20 April 45.

Eighth Army

On right flank of Eighth Army front progress continues. In desperate effort to stem our advance, enemy has thrown in more tanks North of Scolo Bolognese. We reached Canale Diversivo East of Portoverrara 2869 against opposition. Our troops forced crossing over Scolo Bolognese West of Portomaggiore and pushed on in face of determined resistance. Next important obstacle on which battered enemy forces with hastily rushed up reinforcements must take stand is canal which runs from S. Nicolo Ferrarese 1871 to Maddalena 3178. Enemy is also holding Po Morto di Primaro between S. Nicolo Ferrarese and Reno North of Molinella 1561. We have leading elements up to Po Morto di Primaro on wide front and our tanks are just aside key village of S. Nicolo Ferrarese 1871. Our troops pushed Northwards astride Gaiana in area two miles North of main Medicina - Budrio road and are making good progress. Below here our troops exploited bridgehead formed earlier in day over Sanderno River last German delaying position before before Genghis Khan line and made rapid advance of 4000 yards to strike the Idice North of Budrio. On either side of this spearhead our forces are hurrying to conform. North of Route 9 our troops attacked from their Gaiana bridgehead and had exceptionally fierce fighting all day against German 1 Parachute Div. They forced enemy back across further water obstacles despite fierce counter-attacks and made general advance of about 2000 yards on a one mile front. During night 19/20 April enemy resistance weakened and our troops are now advancing all along line. South of Route 9 our troops pushed on conforming with rapid advance in central sector of Eighth Army front. There was fierce fighting between Italian troops and German paratroops for Casalecchio di Conti 0336 in which we came off best.

Weather: Fair.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army troops continued their all-out attack in the hills South and West of Bologna today. Major General Geoffrey Keyes' II Corps advancing against stiff enemy resistance took M. CA'DILL. ALMRO 8937 about 1,000 yards East of Route 65. 91st Division advancing North captured M. Della Capanna 8537 about 2,000 yards West of Route 65.

Other troops, including South African units, are advancing North along Route 64, and in the late afternoon had reached the Southern outskirts of Casalecchio 8346 in conjunction with troops attacking from the West. By late afternoon Major General Willis D. Crittenberger's IV Corps had important elements of the 10th Mountain Division and the 85th Infantry Division, with armour, in the Po Valley, and across Highway No. 9 West of Bologna, and were in the vicinity of Ponte Samoggia 7357. This severed communications between Bologna and Modicina.

Major General George P. Hays, commands the 10th Mountain Division; Major General John . Coulter commands the 85th Infantry Division; Major General William G. Livesay, commands the 91st Division.

In the Serchio River Valley, Fifth Army troops have moved forward against no opposition to occupy Castelnuovo 1208. Our forces in the Coastal sector, advancing against very light opposition, are astride Route One at a point some 2,000 yards Southeast of Sarzana 7510. Route One cuts West at Sarzana and runs on to the Port City of La Spezia.

Information has been received that some of the enemy batteries on Punta Bianca 7702, which have been active against our forces fighting in the coastal sector, have probably been destroyed.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Evening 19 April 45

The enemy has been routed from the Argenta gap. This brilliant breakthrough was carried out by 5 Corps commanded by Lt. General C. F. Keightley, CB, DSO, CBE, with 56 (London) Division commanded by Major General J. Y. Whitfield, DSO, OBE, on right and 78 Division commanded by Major General R.K. Arbuthnot, CBE, DSO, MC, on left. Both divisions were supported by armour of 2nd Armoured Brigade commanded by Brigadier J.F.D. Combe, DSO, who, after escaping from German PW camp, led partisan band until he rejoined Eighth Army. It was 5 Corps who, at beginning of Eighth Army offensive, broke through North part of Senio front. After days of bitter fighting against fanatical resistance these troops overcame the most concentrated defence line yet encountered in Italy and debouched from Argenta gap into the more open country beyond. Keeping up the impetus of their great drive they overran further canals, strongpoints and defensive positions and captured a number of tanks and SP guns intact.

Having captured Chiesa Del Bando 3264 56 Division swung left and in swift drive captured bridge intact area 2964. They pressed on North of canal, reached main road to North and are now driving toward Porto Maggiore.

Meanwhile 78 Division fought their way forward along Route 16 and drove enemy out of Consandolo 2364 by last light 18 April. Fanning out from here in two main thrusts they made spectacular dash North supported by tanks captured bridge over canale Benvignante and reached Scolo Bolognese at two points West of Porto Maggiore night 18/19 April, while to Southwest troops of the same division pressed on up Route 16 and drove enemy out of Benvignante 2068. To Southwest our troops pushed forward across waterlogged country and fierce fighting took place West of Fiorentino.

New Zealanders and Indian Army troops attacked across Gaiana astride railway night 18/19 April and storming very strong enemy dug in positions in floodbanks they crossed over and drove on against tough resistance in face of extremely heavy fire. New Zealanders forced a crossing over Quaderna on one mile front North of railway while Indian Army troops reached Quaderna South of railway. The parachutists who are trying to hold these attacks are fighting bitterly and in spite of the considerable numbers of PWs taken more are having to be killed at their post.

North of Route 9 enemy is very sensitive to our aggressive patrols and raiding parties. South of Route 9 Italian troops of Eighth Army are attacking dominating feature Casalecchio De Conti 0336.

Weather: fair and hazy. Outlook: fair.

FIFTH ARMY

Although the enemy is desperately attempting to delay our advance, Fifth Army troops made further important gains South and Southwest of Bologna. The Germans have thrown in virtually all available local reserves in their frantic efforts to prevent a general breakthrough into the Po Valley, and numerous counterattacks have been launched to regain lost ground.

Astride Route 65, our forces pressed forward, taking hill 357 (Area 8935), reaching the outskirts of Pianoro 8834 and capturing M. Posigliano 8634. Local counterattacks, some supported by mortar barrage, repulsed in this area. One such counterattack took place at Vic None (area 8734).

Between Route 65 and Route 64, our troops advanced a kilometer North of M. Dei Frati (Area 8433), captured M. Baco (Area 7935) and M. Giovule 7933 and reached point on Route 64 due West of M. Giovule.

In Serchio Valley we have occupied Perpoli 1507, M. Paste (Area 1303) and Vergemoli 1002. Along the coast our troops continued to mop up in hills East of Route one, meeting strong opposition.

In first enemy air activity in recent weeks two low-flying hostile aircraft bombed and strafed near Route 64 night of 18 April. No damage or casualties reported.

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Morning 20 Apr '45

FIFTH ARMY

Moving forward against enemy resistance which varied from delaying tactics to heavy, determined opposition, Fifth Army troops again recorded gains from a few hundred to several thousand yards afternoon of 19 April.

In fighting along Route 65 our forces seized high ground East and West of Pianoro and engaged in mopping up pockets of resistance in town itself.

M. Mario 8136, 1500 foot height situated some 1200 yards East of Route 64 and Reno River, was captured.

Northwest of Route 64 and recently captured M. Baco (Area 7935) we continued to advance.

Our forces drove forward several thousand yards in area West of Route 64. M. S. Michele 7442 also captured.

Farther West we have occupied 5000 foot M. Altissino 3603.

In coastal sector North and South of Route One our forces made gains ranging up to 2000 yards.

EIGHTH ARMY

Keeping up momentum of their attack North of Argenta troops of 5 Corps reached Canale Bolognese on a wide front. 56 (London) Division pushed on up road to Portoverrara 2869 and though they found bridge over Bolognese blown, they forced a crossing, cleared Portoverrara and reached Canale Diversivo beyond town.

78 Division continued their advance and captured Portomaggiore bridge over Bolognese intact and drove Germans from town in house to house fighting. Troops of same division in another thrust Northwest cut Portomaggiore - S. Nicolio Ferrarese 1871 road near road junction with Route 16 and took over 70 PWs. They also pushed West and reached Portomaggiore - Traghetto 1763 railway 2000 yards West of Route 16.

To Southwest New Zealand troops strengthened and consolidated their Gaiana bridgehead. Preceded by heavy arty bombardment, Polish troops stormed enemy defences across Gaiana against extremely heavy and determined resistance, captured a bridge intact and established two bridgeheads on 2000 yard front 2-½ miles North of Route 9. Tanks crossed over to support our infantry. To Southwest our troops pushed on and reached Gaiana North of railway and very hard fighting continues. South of Route 9 Italian troops of Eighth Army pushed on in Appenine foothills.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Evening 18 April 45

EIGHTH ARMY

On right flank of Eighth Army British troops drove on across difficult flooded country against stiff opposition and are now one mile beyond pumping station to Northwest. British troops captured and cleared up strongly defended key town of Argenta which had been cut off from main German forces by our very successful outflanking movement on previous day. Keeping up their momentum night 17/18 April our troops smashed their way forward up the gap and captured two canal bridges intact in advance up to road junction 3000 yards East of Boccaleone pushing back German infantry and tanks and taking 70 PWs. Enemy counterattacked but was beaten off.

West of railway we pushed on to within 1000 yards of Boccaleone 2563 against determined resistance and are pressing on. From Boccaleone to Fossa Sabbiosola 3000 yards Northeast and thence along Fossa to Lake Comacchio is third, last and toughest of German defence lines in Argenta gap. This is continuation of enemy's Genghis Khan defence line on Idice River designed to be the strongest line covering Bologna and the approaches to the Po. North of here are further prepared defences along East - West canal through Portomaggiore 2669 and canal from S. Nicolo 1871 to Northwest but country becomes less flooded and constricted than in gap.

To Southwest Indian Army troops with tank support pressed on 4000 yards across difficult and boggy open country, beat off enemy opposition and reached lateral road on 2000 yards front Southwest of Fiorentina 1152.

New Zealand troops forced enemy back behind Gaiana canal on two mile front North of railway but have not crossed canal. Indian Army troops overcame tough German resistance Northwest of Medicina and forcing enemy back pressed on astride Medicina - Castenaso road and reached Gaiana on 1000 yard front with patrols over the canal in places.

To Southwest Polish troops overcoming enemy resistance squared up to Gaiana on wide front North of Route 9 and patrols penetrated across canal in several places. Immediately South of Route 9 Italian troops of Eighth Army pushed on against opposition and reached Gaiana on 3000 yard front. We maintained contact in hills to West.

Weather: fair. Outlook: fine.

FIFTH ARMY

Progress continued on almost all sectors of Fifth Army front 18 April, our forces moving slowly forward against bitter, stubborn enemy resistance.

East of Route 65, our troops made slight advances, fighting to a point approximately 1000 yards Southeast of Lianoro 8834.

San Benedetto (Area 8633) and Colombara (Area 8632), two small villages West of Route 65, were cleared of enemy and our troops continued to mop up scattered pockets of German resistance on the Monterumici feature.

South African troops of Fifth Army have captured Mount Castellino (Area 7629) approximately 1000 yards East of Route 64.

Farther West our troops captured 2400 foot Mount Tramonto 7334 and also seized Hill 569/6634 and nearby village of San Prospero.

In Coastal Sector our forces took hamlet of Villa Dorgia (Area 8206) situated North of Route One.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Morning 19 Apr 45.

Fifth Army

In some of the stiffest fighting of the Italian campaign, Fifth Army troops made significant gains in vicinity of Route 65 18 April and in sector West of Route 64 spectacular advances through difficult terrain were made.

Along Route 65 our troops advanced 1000 yards towards Pianoro 8834 in the face of heavy opposition. After capturing strategic M. ADONE 8431, troops of the 91st Infantry Division pushed Northwards along a ridge for two miles to occupy M. Dei Frati (area 8433). Capture of M. Adone was accomplished after bitter two-day battle in which the 361 Infantry Regiment commanded by Colonel R.W. Broadlow struggled with enemy on steep slopes, employing almost every weapon from hand grenades to direct fire by arty pieces. Our troops encountered thick concrete enemy pillboxes in scaling fortified mountain. The peak, which dominated large sector of Fifth Army front during winter's fighting, now provides friendly observation over vast area of enemy terrain. Our troops planted the National Emblem on mountain's peak to mark this hard-won victory.

To West, our troops captured Badolo 8333, about a mile West of M. Dei Frati.

Troops of the Sixth South African Armoured Division advanced three kilometers North from positions on M. Sole 7829. It is revealed today that M. Sole was captured by the First City Cape Town Highlanders and that the Witwatersrand Rifles-Delarey Regiment captured Caprara.

In the Serchio Valley and in Coastal sector our positions were improved. Stiffening resistance noted on coast and arty fire continues from enemy positions at Punta Bianca.

Eighth Army

On right flank of Eighth Army front British infantry and tanks continued their relentless drive Northwest against very fierce German infantry and armoured resistance and captured important enemy strongpoint Chiesa Del Dando 3164 outpost of his Fossa Sabbiosola line.

Swinging left handed beyond Argenta on the Northern Reno bank British troops on morning 18 April drove enemy out of Baccaleone 2563 and smashing through toughest defence line in Argenta Gap between here and Fossa Sabbiosola our infantry and tanks thrust rapidly on 3000 yards North of Baccaleone overrunning enemy defence lines and capturing enemy tanks and SP guns intact, in some cases with exhausted crews sleeping beside them and are now debouching from gap.

Southwest of here our troops swung North across flooded fields and forced bridgehead across canal East of Fiorentina 1152. We are now up to Gaiana in many places along eight mile front North of Route 9. Our patrols have crossed over in many places and report enemy holding strong defensive positions on far bank with some outposts in East floodbank as on Senio River. Enemy has cleared fields of fire in front of floodbank positions.

South of Route 9 Italian troops of Eighth Army pushed on across Gaiana in two places against opposition. They also drove on through Appenine foothills towards Gaiana Northwest of M. Castelazzo 0434.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Morning 18 Apr 45.

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EIGHTH ARMY

On Eighth Army front our troops continued to fight their way forward against determined opposition and we are now 1000 yards Northwest of pumping station. In day of very fierce fighting our troops have enlarged and strengthened their bridgehead over Marina Canal Northeast of Argenta and inflicted heavy casualties on enemy. We drove on to Northwest both sides of railway against continued opposition and are now 2000 yards beyond ARGENTA which has been cut off from main German forces by this swift outflanking movement. Enemy still holding out in town.

To Southwest Indian troops pushed on and reached Canale Di Medicina, 4 miles Northeast of Medicina. Keeping up momentum of their great drive in Central sector of Eighth Army front New Zealanders surmounted further water obstacles, pushed on another 4000 yards and reached Gaiana canal on 2 mile front North of railway. After capturing Medicina Gurkhas pressed on South of railway and stiff fighting continues about 2000 yards Northwest of town. Our infantry and tanks drove on against opposition between railway and Route 9.

Polish troops fought their way forward along Route 9 against very determined resistance and are now two miles beyond Castel S. Pietro. Fierce fighting continues.

To Southwest Italian troops pushed on through hills and are now about two miles beyond Sillaro on four mile front South of Route 9. We captured 1000 PW in last 24 hours.

FIFTH ARMY

Fighting their way forward against resistance which reached almost fanatical pitch in one sector, Fifth Army troops continued to advance afternoon of 17 April. Opposition particularly bitter along Route 65 South of Bologna, where German forces contesting our advance from scores of tunnels, caves and pillboxes. Enemy laid down intense SA, MG and mortar fire in efforts to halt our attack. German SP arty very much in evidence.

In area East of Route 65 our troops made advances in very heavy fighting.

Farther West elements of our forces fought their way to summit of long-contested Monterumici 8328, 1,900 foot peak situated some 3000 yards West of Route 65.

Southeast of captured M. Sole 7829 South African troops made gains of up to 1000 yards against strong resistance.

In action North of occupied Sperticano 7630 forces of First Armored Division took 1,600 foot Mount D'Avigo (Area 7532), and also Hill 360/7432 to Northwest of D'Avigo. Captured height of D'Avigo overlooks Route 64, 2000 yards to East. Resistance in sector fairly heavy.

Elements of Tenth Mountain Division fought their way over rugged terrain against strong opposition to record advances of more than 1000 yards after capturing M. Moscoso 6935.

In Coastal sector Northwest of Route One our forces advanced more than a mile in area Northwest of Ortonovo 8407. Opposition consisted mainly of heavy enemy arty fire.

The Legano Group, Italian troops now fighting on Fifth Army front, were inspected 17 April by Lieutenant General of the Realm. In this area strong combat patrols probed enemy positions, extensive minefields were located and enemy responded with MG and mortar fire to our every move.

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CONFIDENTIAL

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Evening 17 Apr '45.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army troops made general advances along front as coordinated spring offensive rolled forward according to plan.

Gains made in the face of fanatical enemy resistance. The Germans are making full use of terrain, SA, AW and mortars.

On right flank the attack continued and limited gains made against very heavy resistance and many counterattacks. Heavy minefields continue to impede our progress. Our troops cleared Hill 367 (area 9133) and hold it in strength. Torre (area 8329), Disotta (area 8329), Disopra (area 8328) and Furcoli (area 8328) occupied.

In central sector First Armoured Division troops overcame stubborn opposition to capture M.Radicchio (area 7130) night of 16 April and advanced three kilometers to capture M.Milano (area 7430) morning of 17 April. Four counterattacks on M.Sole repulsed. Collina 7829 also captured. After capturing M.Croce (area 6729) and Bacucchio (area 6732) troops of the Tenth Mountain Division moved rapidly through hills to reach M.Moscoso 6935 and high ground overlooking Montepastore 7135. The successful attack in the M.Moscoso area was made by troops of the IV Corps which is commanded by Major General Willis D. Crittenberger.

On left flank our troops captured Ortonova 8407, M.Tomaggiora (area 8514) and other high ground North of M.Grugola 8312. They have reached a point on Route One due West of Castellaro (area 8505) and West of the highway have advanced beyond Marina Di Carrara 8302.

Eighth Army

On Eighth Army front 56 London Division forced crossing over Marina or Canaletta Canal at pumping station 3362 against some opposition taking PW's and pushed on North of Canal to establish bridgehead. We also drove on across water-logged fields to Southwest and reached Canaletta 1½ miles West of pumping station.

Farther West our troops pushed on against stiffening resistance, bypassed the village of Argenta, and established bridgehead across Marina Canal Northeast of town against very determined opposition, taking many PW's from German 29 Panzer Grenadier Division, fresh and well equipped division committed from reserve in desperate effort to plug gap. Tanks crossed over to support our infantry on North bank. Enemy made initial counterattack against our bridgehead but beaten off. Fierce fighting continues. Our patrols into outskirts of Argenta report railway station 2860 strongly defended.

In main plain North of Route 9 Eighth Army's great drive continues. Indian troops pushed on from their Sillaro bridgehead two miles North of railway and penetrated flooded country beyond, encountering arty and MG fire. New Zealand troops crossed Scolo Sillaro and night 16/17 April in rapid two mile advance reached Medicina Canal North of railway.

Meanwhile Gurkhas advancing South of railway captured Medicina, former HQ of General Heidrich's First Parachute Corps, last night 16/April. Germans had fired town before being driven out. Enemy tried to form a stop line on Canale De Medicina but unable to hold Allied pressure. Our troops now pushing on from Medicina astride railway.

Polish troops after capturing Castel Guelfo pressed on to capture Poggio Piccolo 1142 and we are now continuing to drive on Northwest. Enemy was still defending Castel S.Pietro strongly during night but our leading troops were able to enter the town first thing this morning and passed straight through to push on to Northwest.

Contact maintained South of Route 9 where enemy is conducting steady withdrawal from one hill position to the next in effort to keep up as their colleagues are driven back in the plain.

Weather: Fair or fine. Outlook: Cloudless with good visibility.

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CONFIDENTIAL

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Morning 17 Apr 45.

Eighth Army

Since 1st April Eighth Army troops have captured well over 7,000 prisoners in the fighting in Adriatic Sector, and of these, 6,000 have been taken since attack across the Senio on 9 April. Troops of 56 (London) Division pressed on West of Argenta whilst our troops are also closing in on town from Southeast. Whole of this area is heavily mined and strongly defended. Our troops made further crossing over Sillaro three miles Southwest of Bastia.

Patrols reached Sillaro North of Villa Serraglio 2247. Forward troops of an Indian Division forced a crossing over Sillaro about two miles North of Massa Lombarda - Medicina railway and pushed on 1,000 yards to lateral road beyond. Having broken core of enemy defences astride railway night 15 April. New Zealanders pushed forward and reached next water barrier Scolo Sillaro on front of 3,000 yards Northwest of Fantazza 1044.

43 Gurkha Brigade consolidated their hard won bridgehead 3,000 yards Southwest of railway and pushing on rapidly troops are 2,000 yards Southwest of Medicina.

Polish troops captured Castel Guelfo 1540 morning 16 April against fierce German opposition and advanced Northwest and West of town against some opposition. Poles also cleared further enemy positions East of Castel S. Pietro which Germans are defending stubbornly. General Anders, Commander in Chief of Polish forces has been present during recent successful operations of Polcorps.

South of Route 9 Italian troops crossed Sillaro in face of enemy fire from Castel S. Pietro. Contact maintained in mountains farther West.

In whole of these operations in Romagna plain where rapid exploitation by armour is severely hindered by close network of rivers, ditches and drainage canals, the work of 25th Armoured Engineer Brigade, R.E. is worthy of special recognition. By their efforts it has been possible to throw temporary bridges across these obstacles as soon as assault infantry has gained initial bridgehead, and thus to get armour and heavy weapons up in immediate close support.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army continued it's attack along entire front 16 April. In coastal sector of 1000 to 2500 yards were made.

In central sector South African troops of Fifth Army after taking M. Sole 7829 and Caprara 7728 pushed forward to capture M. Abelle (Area7729) after heavy fighting. American troops moving up Route 64 passed through Calvenzano 7227 and continued to Northeast.

In the high ground West of Route 64 troops of the 10th Mountain Division captured M. Mosca (Area 6930) and town of Tole 6538. Troops of this Division reported 500 PWs. Ten counterattacks against M. Mosca repulsed during enemy efforts to retake this feature.

On right flank limited advances made through enemy defences consisting of heavy minefields and closely coordinated SA and mortar fire.

The 34th Division (The Old Red Bulls) in fierce engagement which took place near church close to GORGOGN.NO 9033 about 1000 yards Northeast of M. Belmonte, celebrated their five hundredth day of combat. Coming out of their foxholes before daylight, they advanced over ground heavily strewn with mines. By noon they were in hand-to-hand conflict with enemy troops around Gorgognano Church and by nightfall took church by assault reminiscent of Hill 609 two years ago in North Africa and the Rapido River crossing.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Evening 16 April

Fifth Army

Fifth Army troops in the area South of Bologna and East and West of Route 65 launched an offensive on 16 April. The attack, preceded by extensive air preparation and a heavy arty bombardment, is progressing against strong German resistance. In advances thus far, our forces have also encountered thickly sown minefields.

Elements of our forces have reached Fazzanello (Area 8429) and LA TORRE (Area 8329), and are receiving intense machine gun fire. M. Sole 7829, 2000 foot dominating peak in area West of Route 65, taken by our troops, who have also reached the town of Caprara 7728, and occupied Hill 444 (area 7628). Enemy mortar fire in this sector has been extremely heavy. Elements of the First Armoured Division have taken M. Pero 6627, 2200 foot height overlooking Vergato 6925. Vergato and Suzzano 6628 clear of enemy.

Troops of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force have taken Hills 876 (Area 5625) and 788 (Area 5725) against some resistance, and have also driven off platoon strength counterattack against Hill 927 (Area 5625).

In Coastal sector our troops are on M. Castellano (Area 8405). Platoon strength counterattack against our forces on Castellaro broken up by mortar fire.

Eighth Army

Against reinforced resistance in Argenta Gap Eighth Army troops continued to drive slowly North. Enemy is still doing all he can to hold this vital hinge. We are still meeting stubborn resistance area of bridge 3382. We pressed on astride railway Northwest of Bastia against stiff opposition and leading troops are now within one mile of Argenta. We captured over 170 PWs this area.

To Southwest our troops established another bridgehead over Sillaro 2½ miles Southwest of Bastia and patrols pushed on to Canale Cuaderna. Night 15/16 April New Zealand troops attacked from their Sillaro bridgehead against infantry and tank opposition and pushed on astride railway beyond PANIZZA 1844. We took 150 PWs including battalion Commander and knocked out 8 tanks, some of them Tigers.

Heavy fighting continued during the night for Sillaro bridgehead 3000 yards Southwest of Massa Lombarda - Medicina Railway. To Southwest after beating off enemy counterattacks against Polish bridgehead South of Castel Guelfo Polish troops enlarged and reinforced bridgehead with infantry and tanks. Troops of the Polish Corps are closing in on Castel San Pietro 0837 while Italian troops advanced from South to within 3000 yards of town and captured Monte del Re 0832. General advance continues in mountains farther West.

Weather: fair. Outlook fair.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
Evening 15 April.

Eighth Army.

On Eighth Army front strong raiding party reached Canaletta Canal at Macchina Idrovora or water pumping station (area 3362), crossed canal and returned with 98 PWs. We advanced West of Filo 3557 and cleared hamlet of Palazzuola 3458 and are continuing Westward towards Bastia.

A parallel thrust along the Menate-Bastia road is now within one mile of Bastia bridge 3156. The whole of the approaches to Argenta gap are thoroughly mined and prepared for defence. Our Sillaro bridgehead astride Massa Lombarda - Medicina railway now strengthened and consolidated.

To Southwest our troops advanced towards Sillaro against enemy rearguard positions. Sasso Morelli 1930 now clear.

Polish troops captured Imola last light 14 April. We pushed on beyond lateral road about three miles Northwest of Imola. In hills farther West patrols pushed forward and maintained contact.

It can now be revealed that when attack went in across Senio Germans met it with 42 Jaeger Division South of Comacchio and 362 Division, 98 Division and 26 Panzer Division down to near Route 9. 4 Para Division subsequently came into battle on left flank of our bridgehead.

Weather: Much haze at first. Patchy cloud later. Outlook: Fair to fine.

FIFTH ARMY

Troops of Fifth Army in the difficult terrain West of Reno River advancing from the Castel D'Aiano 6025 and M. Della Spe (Area 6126) area against strong opposition 14 April seized control of the two mile long Roffeno ridge culminating at its Eastern end in the barren conical stone mass of Rocca Di Roffeno 6327. A 40 minute bombing by our Air Corps and an arty preparation of 35 minutes preceded the move forward by our troops.

Several small villages were taken, including Torre Iussi (Area 6227), which was wrested from the Nazis in intense house to house fighting. Farther West the village of Montese 5524 was captured against scattered resistance.

Some casualties were suffered by our troops because of heavy minefields and fierce SA and mortar fire. More than 325 PWs have been reported taken.

Stubborn resistance was encountered by our troops as they continued their advance East of Route One in coastal sector.

Elsewhere on the front scattered patrolling was reported by both our forces and those of the enemy.

Morning 16 April.

FIFTH ARMY

Continuing their advance against stiff opposition troops of 10th Mountain Division in rugged central sector of Fifth Army 15 April took M. Pigna 6328 and M. Sette Croci (Area 6425) and moved on to Northeast. Many anti personnel mines encountered. Just to East our forces captured village of Casigno 6425 and moved ahead to vicinity of Suzzano 6628.

In coastal sector Allied troops took M. Grugola 8312 and hill 906 (Area 8310) from which enemy had blocked their advance for two days. Number Nazi's captured during this action. Along Route One elements of 92 Infantry Division repulsed counter attack launched by enemy from Avenza 8402. Stiff resistance felt in this sector, as Americans continued their push.

Slight mortar and arty fire received on other portions of front.

EIGHTH ARMY

On Eighth Army front our troops continued their twin advance to Argenta Gap. Driving on NW from Palazzuola 3357 we reached area Cascinone Massari 3158 one mile NE of Bastia village on Southern fringe of floods which cover central portion of gap.

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To South our troops thrusting along Monate - Bastia road crossed railway and reached Bastia bridge 3156. Enemy opposition in the gap is very stubborn and mines and floods make cross country movement difficult.

It can now be revealed that British 56 (London) Division commanded by Major General J. Y. Whitfield DSO, OBE, has played important part in fighting in this sector of Eighth Army front since start of offensive. It was 56 (London) Division which carried out waterborne landings resulting in capture of Monato on 11 April and in landing South of pumping station (at 3362) on 13th.

Farther Southwest we cleared area lying between Conselice and waterlogged meadows to Northwest. We continued to consolidate Sillaro bridgehead astride Massa Lombarda-Medicina railway strengthening our positions against close enemy opposition. Our infantry established another bridgehead over Sillaro 3000 yards Southwest of railway and heavy fighting continued all day in this area with German Spandaus and SP guns.

To Southwest troops of 2nd Polish Corps commanded by Major General Z. Bohusz-Szyszko made a spectacular advance from Imola which they captured last evening 14 April along Route 9 to the Northwest. Against rearguard opposition they drove on and crossed Sellustra river without a check and by evening 15 April were closing up to Castel S. Pietro.

On right flank of this advance Polish troops of 5 Kressowa Division captured bridge over Sillaro (Area 1539) intact. Fanning out on far bank they reached road running Southeast from Castel Guelfo 1540 to river. We had severe fighting in this area and received heavy shelling and mortaring. Many parachutist PWs taken.

On Route 9 itself Poles also captured Toscanella 1135 in a rapid advance of 5 miles. South of Route 9 our troops made further advance on front of some 4 miles Southeast from Imola and have taken M. Bello 1031 commanding feature in Appenine foothills and points on ridge between Santerno and Sellustra Valleys.

In mountains to Southwest our troops advanced and found bridges over river Sellustra blown.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
14 Apr 45.

FIFTH ARMY

Elements of 92 Division, fighting along Route One in coastal sector, continued advance 13 April. Our troops moving forward North of Carrara entered hamlet of Castelpoggio 8510 against practically no opposition. Enemy forces observed Northwest of village dispersed by our mortar fire.

Our troops resumed attack against enemy early 13 April and advanced as much as 1500 yards from South to Southwest of Carrara. Extensive minefields encountered by our forces in advance, though resistance described as scattered.

Enemy arty fire in sector slight.

In spite of pounding they have received from our bombers and heavy arty, coast defense guns on Punta Bianca still active night of 12/13 April though greatly diminished from fire of last two days.

EIGHTH ARMY

On Eighth Army front in fighting North of Reno we had captured 200 PWs by last light 12 April. Our troops made further advances against strong opposition area Filo 3557. Positions unchanged South of Reno along River Santerno. We repulsed enemy counterattacks against our bridgehead over Santerno South of Massa Lombarda and afternoon of 12 April our bridgeheads North and South of Lugo-Massa Lombarda railway linked up. Strong forces of infantry and tanks North and Northwest from combined bridgehead drove Germans back, and encircled Massa Lombarda which we captured before midnight 12/13 April.

At last light 12 April our air observation saw enemy pulling out area Conselice 2749 with guns, tanks and horse drawn vehicles. During night 12/13 April our troops captured S. Patrizio 2746 three miles North of Massa Lombarda and entered outskirts of Conselice where fighting continues. There are still enemy pockets between Conselice and Santerno behind our spearhead.

Opposite our Mordano 2536 bridgehead opposition which had been stiffer during afternoon 12 April lessened and by last light we got tanks across Santerno after British sappers had constructed bridge under close and direct enemy fire. After last light we captured Mordano and reached road 600 yards beyond river on wide front. During night opposition slackened and by morning 13 April we had advanced 2000 yards against light opposition. North of railway our leading troops patrolled across river Sanguino which has been enemy's previous delaying position. Sanguino runs South from Santerno bend (Area 2433). Our leading troops have entered Zello 2231 3000 yards from Imola.

In hills South of Route 9 we made further advances and ran into enemy in positions nearly 3000 yards north of his original Senio line North of Riolo Dei Bagni. Further advances made along the Santerno Valley Northeast of Tossignano, and we occupied Casalfiumanese 0925 and pushed on further 2000 yards along left side of Valley.

Northwest of here we also made considerable gains 4000 yards beyond original enemy positions. Germans still hold original positions in area M. Grande 0032 and it is evident that whole line pivots on this feature.

It is announced that the North Irish Horse played a significant part in these operations.

Weather: Becoming cloudy, risk of rain in mountains.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
13 Apr 45.

Eighth Army

On Eighth Army front our troops who landed on Southern shore of Valli di Comacchio morning 11 April have taken 200 PWs including elements of scratch battalion hastily thrown together consisting of convalescent and miscellaneous personnel collected for this emergency in Argenta 2860. Our troops here linked up with forces advancing along North bank of Reno.

This operation loosened up German opposition South of Reno and enabled us to push on astride Route 16, cross Canalina Canal and reach Canale di Fusignano, next water obstacle. Due West of here we also made considerable advances and armoured elements are up to River Santerno where it turns Northeast (area 3351), 6000 yards Southeast of Bastia 3057. This armoured thrust met slight opposition.

To Southwest in area between S. Lorenzo 3245 and S. Agata 2941 we crossed Santerno in strength evening 11 April. Heavy fighting continued night 11/12 April against enemy infantry and tanks. German tanks attempted to counterattack along road running Southeast to river from Mondaniga 3044, but though enemy is fighting extremely hard here, all counterattacks repulsed and unsuccessful.

Earlier in day 12 April second bridgehead formed across Santerno South of Massa Lombarda 2741 - Lugo road. This attack began during morning when our troops crossed Santerno against slight opposition and took three loops areas 2940 and 2639 between main Santerno and Santerno Morto. These loops are virtually islands and enclose total area nearly one square kilometer. Early afternoon 11 April we crossed main Santerno in force this area against infantry and Tiger tank opposition and established a bridgehead 1000 yards wide and nearly 800 yards deep. South of Lugo - Massa Lombarda Railway.

Enemy counterattuked left flank of bridgehead night 11/12 April but repulsed and we have pushed steadily forward against strong force of Tigers deployed about 1000 yards in front of Massa Lombardo; night 11/12 April further troops crossed the river to widen bridgehead. Armour was able to cross over and is now in action with Tigers.

South of Mordano 2536 our troops formed 3rd bridgehead across Santurno against strong opposition from crack 26 Panzer Division. Despite heavy German opposition we held our positions and have strengthened bridgehead. We reached Santorno 3000 yards Southwest of Mordano and mopped up enemy rearguard companies in area North of Castel Bolognese taking about 50 PWs. At dawn 12 April Polish troops captured Castel Bolognese from strong German rearguard.

South of Route 9 we pushed forward across Senio all along the line against enemy rearguards. Our patrols crossed road on North bank and penetrated into hills beyond and we are established on M. Ghebbio 2024 dominating feature in this area.

Along remainder of front we pushed forward against retreating enemy. We are now established on Gesso Escarpment Southeast of Tossignano 0823. Italian troops captured Tossignano.

During the course of the fighting on the Eighth Army front the North Irish Horse played a conspicuous part.

Weather: fine to fair. Visibility good.

Fifth Army

Pushing forward aggressively Fifth Army troops continued successful attack in coastal sector during night of 11/12 April. Enemy resistance strong in some sectors and considerable increase in hostile arty.

After capture of Carrara Fifth Army troops advanced two kilometers North of city to take mountain villages of Torana 8806 and Gragnana 8709 against light resistance. Our troops captured hamlet of Colonnata 9207 and other high ground in mountain mass five kilometers East of Carrara. All enemy troops have been cleared from Carrara.

To South our troops West of Massa continued attack against strong opposition. Small enemy counterattack with German troops riding on two tanks repulsed. One of our ration trains North of Massa was attacked by 15 enemy but hostile force driven off and all our equipment saved.

Our troops are across Frigido at all points in Coastal Sector. West of Route One forward elements have reached outskirts of Marina di Massa.

Little contact with enemy reported on remainder of Fifth Army front.

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H.Q. 15 Army Group,
10 Apr 45

Eighth Army

No change in Eighth Army coastal sector. German patrol beaten off NE of Fusignano. One of our patrols to Senio North of Cotignola encountered enemy fire and withdrew. Grenade duel occurred this area.

South of Route 9 Germans raided our positions near Tebano 2325. Firefight ensued lasting one hour before enemy forced back. Both sides suffered some casualties. To SW our patrols contacted enemy at several points along Senio. German patrol driven back by our fire SW of Riolo dei Bagni 1823.

Weather: Fine. Outlook: Fine.

Fifth Army

Against stiffening enemy resistance, particularly on right flank, Fifth Army forces fighting in coastal sector East and West of Route One made general gains 9 April and contined to advance.

Elements of 442 Infantry Regiment, advancing North of captured M. Belvedere 9401, captured Altagnana 9403 in heavy fighting. SW of Altagnana forces from same regiment engaged against enemy South of Pariana 9302. Both villages are situated in area NE of Massa 9101, Pariana being approximately 2,000 yards and Altagnana 2,500 yards from town.

By noon 9 April 473rd Infantry operating with 92 Division had fought their way to outskirts of Massa on South, advancing against strong enemy resistance.

West of Route One along flat coastal plain, 92 Division's 370th Infantry moved forward to within several hundred yards of Frigido River, which flows SWfrom North of Massa to Ligurian Sea. River empties into sea South of Marina di Massa 8798.

Our troops met enemy SA, mortar fire and mines in their advance, and road blocks also encountered along Route One. Arty fire, with exception of coastal guns firing from Punta Bianca, was slight. More than 350 PWs taken in fighting so far. Information received indicates that in relation to size of his forces involved, enemy has suffered heavy casualties. Casualties suffered by our forces fairly light in comparison.

On remainder of front patrols active with several firefights reported. Enemy arty fire was of a harassing and sporadic nature.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
9 Apr 45.

Fifth Army

Moving forward against scattered enemy resistance, Fifth Army troops fighting in coastal sector along Route One South and West of Massa continued to advance 8 April.

Elements of 442 Infantry Regiment were pushing ahead from captured M. Belvedere 9401, while troops of same regiment continued to clear enemy resistance in area South of M. Folgorito and East of Route One. Small enemy counterattack NE of M. Belvedere repulsed.

Advancing to Porta 9397 with tank support, 92 Division troops moved on to capture Montignoso 9399, about two miles SE of Massa, and also small town of Strinato (Area 9597) North of Strettoia.

Arty fire in sector slackened considerably though enemy coastal guns at Punta Bianca 7702 still active.

Elsewhere on front our patrols active with several firefights reported. Enemy arty along front generally light. Some hostile flare activity observed in right sector.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector no change on Spit between Adriatic and Valli di Comacchio. Enemy hold Porto Garibaldi 5966 and North bank of Canale Valletta. In SW corner of Valli di Comacchio our troops continued clearing area North of River Reno. Total of 250 PWs captured this area.

To SW normal patrolling along River Senio. South of Route 9 one of our patrols to River encountered enemy fire from North bank. Farther West in mountains strong German raiding party driven off South of Tossignano.

Weather: Cloudy with scattered showers. Good visibility.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
8 Apr 45.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector night 6/7 April enemy raided one of islands 5164 which we occupied night 4/5 April. Raiders driven off and we took 5 PW.

In SW corner of Valli di Comacchio our troops pushed on North of River Reno against stiffening German resistance. We cleared several enemy strongpoints and have now captured nearly 200 PW this area.

Normal patrolling along Senio. We received heavy shelling SW of Cotignola. Patrols clashed South of Route 9. German fighting patrol driven off West of Cuffiano with casualties. Patrols of both sides active farther West in mountains.

Weather: mainly fair. Outlook: little change.

Fifth Army

Despite increasing enemy arty and mortar reaction to our advances, Fifth Army troops pressed forward to take dominating high ground South and East of Massa in coastal sector on 6/7 April.

After mopping up M. Folgorito 9599 American troops of Japanese ancestry of the 442 Infantry Regiment captured M. Belvedere 9401, a 3,000 foot peak 2 miles due East of Massa. Other elements of the 442 Infantry Regiment secured Serreta Ridge 9698 to SE of M. Folgorito.

Other units advanced NW from STRETTOLA 9496 t take high ground East of Route 1 overlooking Porta 9597 and reached points 3 miles South of Massa, where enemy resistance from flanks and front was encountered.

Counter-attack of from 40 to 60 enemy broken up by our arty NE of STRETTOLA. Small enemy groups attempting to infiltrate our positions on M. Belvedere successfully driven off after fire fights.

Fire from enemy coastal guns at Ponte Bianca 7702 received in coastal sector as well as strong arty and mortar fire.

Elsewhere on front normal patrolling continued, but few contacts with enemy reported.

Composed of Americans of Japanese ancestry, the 442nd Infantry Regiment, elements of which served with Fifth Army from Naples to the Arno, have rejoined Fifth Army it was revealed today.

The crack 100th Battalion of the Regiment, which formerly was attached to the 34th Infantry Division, was committed to action in the Naples area and participated in the Volturno crossing, Cassino, Anzio, and the break-through to Rome and the North. On 26 June, the 100th Battalion became an organic unit of the 442nd Regimental Combat team and the Regiment continued Northwards from Piombino to the Arno. Detached from Fifth Army for the invasion of Southern France, the Regiment made the invasion with 6 Corps.

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Intelligence Section
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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
7 April 45

Fifth Army

Action on Fifth Army front 6 April largely confined to terrain along Route One in coastal sector where our troops continue attack launched 5 April. M. Folgorito 9599 outflanked on 5 April has been captured. Elsewhere our patrols active, meeting MG, mortar and SA fire as they probed German positions.

On right flank enemy patrol repulsed by our troops NW of M. Fano (area 9532).

In central sector some mortar and arty fell in our forward areas and our patrols encountered long range MG and mortar fire in their operations.

In coastal area fighting continued. Having taken M. Folgorito, our troops advanced to North of this 3,000 feet feature and were also cleaning out pockets of enemy resistance south of peak. Resistance was scattered.

Heavy enemy fire vicinity of Strettoia 9496 forced slight withdrawals by our forward elements. West and slightly North of town small enemy counterattack repulsed.

Fighters and fighter-bombers continued in support 6 April utilising favourable flying weather to strike at enemy gun positions, troop concentrations and transport. Guns of naval vessels lying offshore were also firing in support of our forces. Between 50 and 60 PW taken in fighting thus far, mainly by troops in the M. Folgorito area.

Eighth Army

It can now be revealed that successful clearing of Spit between Adriatic and Valli di Comacchio was carried out by 2 Commando Brigade. Nearly 1,000 PW captured. Taking advantage of this operation we occupied islands in the Comacchio and also night 5/6 April improved our positions in SW corner of Lake making successful local attack across river Reno NW of S. Alberto and capturing further 60 PW.

To SW our patrols contacted enemy North of Cotignola. We raided German positions on Senio SW of Cotignola and took 5 PW. South of Route 9 near Tebano 2325 one of our fighting patrols attacked German house with grenades and inflicted casualties. Strong German fighting patrol driven off SW of M. Spaduro 0226. Patrol clashes occurred NE of S. Clemente.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
6 April '45.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector after clearing Spit up to Canale Valletta (area 6166) our troops occupied four small islandsin Valli Di Comacchio night 4/5 April on which are situated farms Casone Fosse Di Porto 5263 Casone Callirolo 5164 Casone La Fosse 4964 and Casone Agosta 4962. Loss of these buildings deprived enemy of useful observation posts from which to observe our movements on spit.

We received heavy shellfire opposite Cotignola. Night 4/5 April two German parties raided strongpoints on East bank of Senio SW of Cotignola but driven off with casualties. Same night three enemy raiding parties attacked our positions on Senio near S.Severo but all broken up by our mortar and arty fire. At dawn 5 April Germans raided same positions but again repulsed.

To SW normal patrol activity along river. Farther West in mountains firefight occurred when one of our patrols met German patrol SE of Tossignano 0823. Our patrols contacted enemy SE of S.Clemente 9928. We received some mortar fire area Fossinetto 0131.

Weather: Fine. Outlook: Fine.

Fifth Army

Attacking from positions at Strettoia 9496 and Azzano 9899 through mountainous terrain East of Route One in coastal sector Fifth Army troops on morning of 5 April met enemy opposition consisting of light AA and heavy mortar fire, which stiffened during day. Our attack supported by mortars and arty: Our tactical Airforce rendered close and effective support by heavily bombing enemy installations, strongpoints and bivouac areas.

Our forces advanced 3,000 yards in Northwesterly direction from Azzano and outflanked 3,000 ft M.Folgorito 9599 on East and NE.

Troops attacking from Strettoia made limited initial advances. Strong enemy counterattack near Ports 9397 forced withdrawal of our forward elements from advanced positions in that area. Heavy fighting continues.

Elsewhere our patrols active and several hostile infiltration attempts repulsed with casualties to enemy.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
5 April '45.

Fifth Army

Scattered patrol contacts with a few firefights and sporadic, harassing enemy arty fire again characterized action on Fifth Army front 4 April. A few rounds of large caliber enemy arty fell in right sector.

On right flank enemy patrol repulsed by SA fire in firefight NE of M.Della Vigna 9232. Some German mortar fire fell in our forward areas, and several enemy flares fired over sector.

In central sector patrols reported only light contact with enemy. Our arty activein sector, setting fire to enemy ammunition dump, demolishing three German occupied houses and silencing several hostile MG's and mortar positions.

On left flank enemy patrol driven off in Serchio Valley.

Evidence of Polyglot nature of German forces opposing Fifth Army emphasized recently in survey of PW's taken in single day on one sector of front. Of 33 deserters coming through our lines, 16 German units were represented, and six nationalities: French, Alsatians, Poles, Austrians, Italians and Germans.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector our troops consolidated their gains on strip of land between Po Di Primaro River and Valli Di Comacchio. They crossed Canal which runs into Lake (area 6060) and pushed on North along two roads which are above flood level.

Our troops reached Canale Valletta which connects Valli Di Comacchio and Adriatic into which canal debouches (area 6166). Here they are meeting much increased opposition and enemy appears to be well dug in to North of Canal.

Farther inland enemy patrol driven off South of S. Polito 3540. Normal activity SW along Senio. We received some shelling and mortaring North of Route 9. Patrol clashes occurred this area. Farther West in mountains sharp enemy local attacks near Frassinetto 0131 beaten off.

Weather: Mainly fair with local showers in Appenines. Outlook: Fair.

Distribution: Normal.

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CONFIDENTIAL

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
4 Apr 45

EIGHTH ARMY

Following up local operation in Eighth Army coastal sector our troops cleared remainder of ground South of canal which runs into VALLI di COMACCHIO (area 6060) in course of which more PWs taken. Having crossed mouth of PO di PRIMARO river our men turned South along West bank and joined up with our other troops who had crossed river (area 6358). Pushing inland SW they captured several enemy strongpoints and defensive positions and reached vicinity of LA CASCINA 6156.

Those troops who landed near SALARUCCA 6057 captured this strongpoint house and striking South along road encountered heavy opposition round road junction 6157. Simultaneously another party crossed PO di PRIMARO West of road (area 6055) and cleared whole of North bank both sides of road. They encountered mines. Remaining pockets of resistance were cleared by midday 3 April.

To SW two German patrols driven off SW of FUSIGNANO. Our patrols active along SENIO. Farther West in mountains our fighting patrols inflicted casualties on enemy North of M. SPADURO 0226. Patrols clashed NE of S. CLEMENTE.

Weather : partly cloudy. Outlook no change.

FIFTH ARMY

Few patrol contacts made along Fifth Army front 2/3 April. Enemy arty increased slightly in coastal sector.

On right flank and in central sector light arty and mortar fire virtually only activity. Little enemy reaction to our normal patrolling.

On left flank 10-man enemy party engaged by our troops in firefight near CUTIGLIANO and hostile patrol forced to withdraw.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
3 Apr 45

Fifth Army

Patrols operating on Fifth Army front 2 April continued to find enemy defences alert as they encountered S.A., mortar and MG fire in reconnaissance of enemy positions. Several firefights occurred along front.

On right flank only light ground activity reported. One of our patrols clashed with enemy and our arty silenced German MG in another area. Some enemy flares fired in sector night 1/2 April

In central sector enemy patrol approaching our lines detected by flares and fire brought down on hostile force. Our arty active, scoring hits on enemy personnel digging in and also on enemy occupied house.

In coastal sector enemy patrol which approached hill feature North of AZZANO 9899 driven off after short firefight.

Eighth Army

In coastal sector Eighth Army troops carried out a successful local operation at dawn 2 April. Operation comprised thrust up spit of land between Sea and PO DI PRIMARO River while simultaneous landings were made on Eastern shore of VALLI DI COMACCHIO behind German defences. Our troops cleared German defensive positions half way up spit (Area 6358) under considerable shellfire and captured small island in PO DI PRIMARO in this area.

Pushing on we reached tip of spit and from here crossed PO DI PRIMARO at the mouth and landed on West bank. We also crossed river one and a half miles upstream from mouth and pushing inland cleared enemy positions (area 6258). Meanwhile crossing the VALLI DI COMACCHIO our troops made two simultaneous landings on Eastern shore against opposition. First party landed South of canal which runs across strip of land dividing lake from sea (area 6060).

Pushing NE, road bridge over canal at TERRA DI BELLOCCHIO was found to be blown. Advancing East along canal under heavy shellfire we captured next bridge at C.S.A. PATRIGNANI 6160 intact. Area North of canal is flooded.

Second party landed near SALARACCA 6057 and spreading out captured several strongpoint houses, defensive positions and gun positions in all covering area of about four miles square. In this very successful local operation we captured about 200 PWs and one 88 mm gun.

Further inland enemy raiding party attacked one of our positions NE of S. SEVERO 3233 but driven back. To SW we received heavy mortar and arty fire.

Normal patrol activity on remainder of front.

Weather: Fine. Outlook: Fair.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
2 Apr 45.

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Two strong German raiding parties attacked our positions SE of Alfonsine but driven back. Enemy patrol attacked one of our strongpoints South of S. Polito 3540 but forced back.

North of route 9 two German patrols beaten back after fire fights. Enemy patrol occupied house on South side of Senio near Tebano 2325 but driven out by one of our fighting patrols who then occupied house. Normal patrolling farther West in mountains.

Weather: fair. Outlook fair.

Fifth Army

Scattered patrol contacts, some resulting in fire fights, again characterised action on Fifth Army front 1 April. Arty fire continued light and harassing along entire front. Numerous enemy flares were fired particularly on right flank.

In right sector one of our patrols clashed with enemy SW of Monterumici 8328 in firefight which lasted an hour and a half. Another small action occurred in sector where our patrol inflicted estimated ten casualties on Germans occupying building.

Our patrols active in central sector and encountered SA and MG fire as they probed enemy positions. One of our parties ambushed small enemy group killing 2 Germans and taking 2 PWs. Several other brief clashes reported in sector.

On left flank one of our raiding parties attacked enemy dugout near Lama di Sotto 1907 and inflicted casualties on defenders.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
1 Apr 45.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army patrols made few contacts with enemy 30/31 March. Slight harassing arty received on some of our forward positions. Enemy generally unaggressive.

On right flank our patrols carried out normal activities. Some enemy activity observed and our arty scored several hits on hostile positions.

In central sector our troops drove off enemy parties attempting to infiltrate our lines at scattered points. Our patrols drew some enemy SA fire.

In coastal sector usual patrolling continued and some contacts with enemy reported.

Eighth Army

Quiet twenty four hours period on whole Eighth Army front. Our patrols contacted enemy in buildings on South bank of Senio between Alfonsino and Fossignano. Patrols clashed NE of S. Potito and fire fight ensued. One of our patrols contacted enemy near Bagnacavallo - Lugo railway.

North of Route 9 patrol met enemy MG fire. We received some mortar and arty fire South of Route 9. Raiding parties exchanged fire NE of Cunfione and both sides suffered casualties. Farther West patrol clash occurred SE of Fossignano.

Weather: Cloudy with light rain, becoming fair. Outlook: Fair.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
31 Mar 45.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Enemy patrols beaten off East of POSSO VETRO and opposite FUSIGNANO. Our guns shot up enemy movement near BAGNACAVALLO - LUGO railway where it crosses SENIO.

To SW grenade duels occurred along river. Supported by arty one of our fighting patrols attacked German house NE of CUFFIANO and inflicted casualties. Another fighting patrol attacked enemy strongpoint in mountains NW of BORGO TOSSIGNANO 0723 and in hand to hand fighting killed 6 Germans and took one PW. Normal patrol activity farther NW in mountains.

Weather: fair to fine. Outlook visibility moderate becoming poor.

Fifth Army

Action on Fifth Army front 30 March again limited to scattered patrol contacts. Enemy reacted to our reconnaissance activities with SA and mortar fire. Light harassing arty fire fell in forward areas.

In right sector one of our patrols clashed with enemy in fire fire fight NE of MONTERUMICI 8528. Another clash occurred near VADO 8128 where three of enemy patrol believed killed. Our patrol returned without loss.

Several firefights reported in central sector where our patrols found enemy generally alert. Our arty active against enemy installations firing on hostile arty positions, groups of personnel and vehicles.

On left flank small enemy patrol driven off approx 2000 yds West of Mount CORCHIA 0300.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
30 Mar '45.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army patrols encountered little enemy activity along front. Light, harassing arty received at scattered points.

On right flnak twenty man enemy patrol near M.Belmonte taken under our SA fire and enemy party quickly withdrew. Small enemy groups and installations fired on by our arty. Our patrol sreported few contacts with enemy.

In central sector enemy alert to our patrols and some hostile movement observed. Enemy arty extremely light.

On left flank our patrols active and some enemy fire received. Although visibility was poor our tank destroyers took advantage of breaks in weather to knock out several enemy MG's and scored 17 direct hits on hostile dugouts.

Eighth Army

Little activity on Eighth Army front. Normal patrolling South of Valli Di Comacchio. Farther inland strong enemy raiding party driven off South of S. Polito 3540. One of our fighting patrols attacked enemy house on East bank of Senio this area and inflicted casualties.

Supported by mortar and arty fire Germans attacked one of our positions on East river bank immediately South of Cotignola but driven off. South of Route 9 one of our patrols encountered MG fire. Patrol clash occurred SW of Tebano 2324.

Farther West in mountains our arty successfully shot up enemy position NE of S. Clemente.

Weather: Fair periods. Outlook cloudy with fair periods.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
29 Mar 45

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector on spit of land East of Comacchio between Po di Primaro and sea one of our listening posts killed five or six enemy night 27/28 March. Shortly after midday 27th March company of enemy attacked near Cotignola but we put down defensive fire and all was quiet by 1300. North of Route 9 near where Faenza - Bologna railway crosses Senio strong enemy arty, mortar and Nebelwerfer fire especially during early part of night.

Farther West we repulsed two strong enemy raids during night about one mile SE of M. Spaduro 0226. Enemy patrol which used flamethrower when attacking one of our outposts on M. Spaduro driven off. One of our own patrols met and dispersed suspected enemy ambush half a mile North of M. Cerere.

Weather: Fair to cloudy.

Fifth Army

Intermittent rains and restricted visibility continued to limit operations on Fifth Army front 28 March. Our patrols reported some contact with enemy and light, scattered hostile arty fire fell in our forward areas.

On right flank one German was killed and enemy MG captured in patrol clash. Some enemy arty and mortar fire fell but sector generally quiet.

In central sector some digging and movement observed in enemy areas and our arty started fires and caused explosions in shelling targets behind enemy lines.

Hostile patrol driven off in Serchio Valley. On extreme left flank one of our combat patrols encountered heavy defensive fire and was forced to withdraw.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
27 Mar 45

Eighth Army

Little activity in Eighth Army coastal sector but further inland enemy patrols more aggressive than usual during night 25/26 March. On Southern shores of Lake Comacchio in area 5653 we captured three PWs getting out of a boat and N7 of S. Alberto enemy patrol driven off.

On Senio N7 of Bagnacavallo enemy put in raid in two platoon strength which we repulsed, and enemy patrol half a mile further South driven off.

North of Faenza enemy used searchlights when they raided our forward position in area 3030. In this raid enemy lost 14 prisoners 2 killed and 5 wounded from two platoons taking part.

Further S towards route 9 enemy put down considerable arty and mortar fire and was extremely sensitive to any movement on our part. South of route 9 enemy raiding party 20 strong attacked point 92 (area 1522) but dispersed by arty and MG fire. Half a mile farther West we put in small attack on point 106 (area 1742) but met strong opposition and withdrew. Near M. Spaduro 0226 there were several patrol clashes while in vicinity of M. Cerere 0031 enemy raiding party approached our positions and carried out harassing fire programme with SA fire for half an hour and withdrew. Subsequent enemy patrol driven off.

Weather: cloudy with light intermittent rain.

Fifth Army

Activity on Fifth Army front again confined to patrolling with little enemy contact reported. Marked increase in enemy arty in central sector.

On right flank usual enemy movement observed and taken under fire. Targets included MGs, enemy occupied houses, gun battery and vehicles.

In central sector intense arty barrage received during night 25/26 March. In two hour period 735 rounds of arty and 110 rounds of mortar fire fell in area. Elsewhere enemy alert to our patrols and several sharp skirmishes occurred.

On left flank usual enemy groups roamed coastal sector and engaged by our troops and arty.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
26 Mar 45

Fifth Army.

Somewhat increased aggressiveness by German patrols and strong enemy defensive fires encountered by our patrols resulted in several sharp fire fights on Fifth Army front 25 March. Enemy arty fire very slight and mostly of a light caliber.

On right flank one of our patrols clashed with enemy, withdrawing after hurling grenades at hostile group. Our arty in sector engaged tanks, armoured cars and small groups of enemy personnel.

In central sector several enemy patrols repulsed by our troops in short clashes. In one action eleven enemy soldiers killed by one of our patrols, and in another an attempted German ambush of our patrol backfired when our troops discovered ruse and killed three enemy without loss to themselves.

In Serchio Valley our troops drove off enemy patrol which had attempted infiltration of our lines.

Eighth Army

Little activity on whole of Northeastern sector of Eighth Army front. Near Faenza enemy fighting patrol of about 40 attacked our positions late evening 24 Mar but driven off by SA, Mortar and arty fire.

South of Route 9 we attacked enemy occupied house at Tebano 2325 night 24 Mar, demolished house and withdrew. Farther West activity limited to patrolling without contact except in one case where we engaged party of 15 enemy East of M. Spaduro 6226.

Weather: Fair.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
25 Mar '45.

Eighth Army.

Activity in Adriatic sector confined to slight mortaring and arty fire. S/ of Cotignola our tanks shot up enemy occupied houses evening 23 March. Shortly afterwards in same area enemy launched attack in company strength. Fighting continued for two hours before enemy withdrew.

South of Route 9 we improved our positions slightly near Villa Di San Giorgio 2022.

Early morning 24 March enemy attacked our forward positions on M.Battogiolo (area 1020). In repulsing attack we inflicted casualties and took PW's. One of our patrols encountered enemy on spur of M.Cerere 0031 and forced them to withdraw after firefight.

Weather: Fine but fog patches clearing to haze in Po Valley.

Fifth Army.

Action on Fifth Army front 24 March continued to be confined to scattered patrol clashes and sporadic harassing arty fire. Our patrols encountered enemy MG, machine pistol and some mortar fire as they probed German positions.

On right flank German patrols attempting to infiltrate our lines set off some of their own mines and were forced to withdraw. Patrol clash occurred West of Monteramici 8328. Our patrol withdrew without casualties in face of strong enemy fire.

In central sector several sharp firefights reported. Enemy aircraft appeared over sector and some German flare activity observed.

Some 100 rounds of mortar fire fell in Serchio Valley. On extreme left flank our arty engaged small groups of enemy soldiers with good results.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
24 Mar '45.

Fifth Army

Normal scattered patrol contacts made by Fifth Army troops along front. Enemy arty continued light.

On right flank one of our patrols found group of houses near Furcoli (area 8328) fortified and strongly defended. After engaging in short firefight, during which casualties were inflicted on enemy, patrol returned to our lines. Light harassing arty and mortar fire received in forward areas. Enemy-occupied houses, observation post and personnel taken under our arty fire.

In central sector aggressive Fifth Army and hostile patrols active and several firefights resulted. Our recce patrols reported an unusual amount of digging and position preparations opposite their positions.

In coastal sector 20-man raiding party West of Route One repulsed by our arty and mortars. Our patrols received arty and mortar fire at various points.

Eighth Army.

Activity on Eighth Army front again limited to patrolling. West of S.Alberto enemy patrol which attacked early 23 March with grenades and flamethrowers repulsed. Patrol clash which took place in area Tebano 2325 resulted in two enemy killed and two wounded. We suffered no casualties. South of Cuffiano enemy patrol which attempted to attack a house occupied by us intercepted by one of our patrols and dispersed.

In mountains NE of S.Clemente 9928 grenade fights ensued early 23 March. Slight increase in enemy shelling and mortaring during night until first light.

Weather: Fine but hazy.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
23 Mar 45.

Eighth Army

No activity in coastal sector. On 21 March one of our patrols NW of Cotignola inflicted casualties on enemy working party digging on reverse side of Eastern flood bank. Farther South enemy patrols which crossed Senio North of Faenza were driven off.

South of Route 9 several enemy patrols this side of Senio were driven off during night 21/22 Mar while in more mountainous central sector large enemy patrol which attacked our forward positions early on 22 Mar withdrew after fire fight.

Weather: Mainly fair but hazy.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army patrols probing German positions 22 March met strong enemy reaction in form of MG, machine pistol and rifle grenade fire. Enemy's patrols also active with several firefights occurring along front. Our arty engaged small groups of enemy soldiers and scattered movement behind German lines. Some hostile arty fire fell in our forward areas with one concentration reported in coastal sector.

On right flank one of our patrols suffered light casualties in fire fight near S. Ansano 8631 and later a 15 man patrol repulsed in same area. Some harassing MG fire received in forward areas and unidentified aircraft dropped two flares in sector.

In central sector German patrol dispersed by our arty and mortar fire after sharp fire fight. Patrols active in sector and some enemy nebelwerfer and rocket fire received.

One of our patrols clashed with German patrol of approx 25 men in fire fight in Serchio Valley, and another enemy group of about 20 driven off in coastal sector. Enemy arty concentration of about 170 rounds fell along Route 1.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
22 Mar 45.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army patrols made scattered contacts with enemy along front and several firefights occurred. Enemy arty very light.

On right flank combat and recce patrols active. Enemy raiding parties attempted to infiltrate through our positions at several points but repulsed. Numerous enemy targets taken under our arty fire with good effect.

In central sector approx 25 enemy, supported by MGs attempted to assault one of our outposts from two directions. After short firefight they were repulsed with casualties. One of our patrols engaged in grenade fight with hostile party and captured several PWs. Another of our patrols supported by arty and mortars had firefight with enemy patrol that lasted nearly an hour.

Eighth Army

On Eighth Army front enemy raided one of our strongpoints SE of Alfonsine but forced back. German raiding parties also attacked our positions near S. Polito 3540 but driven back by SA and mortar fire. German fighting patrol beaten off SW of S. Severo 3033.

Normal patrol activity along Senio both sides of Route 9. Patrols clashed SW of Molo dei Bagni and German patrol shot up by our mortars. Further West in mountains one of our patrols engaged enemy party with grenades and SA fire North of Tossignano 0823.

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CONFIDENTIAL

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
22 Mar 45.

Eighth Army

On Eighth Army front our troops made local advances to improve their positions in sector NW of Lozzano 4747. We took some PW. No E. enemy patrol beaten off near S. Polito 3540. Strong German fighting patrol attacked one of our strongpoints South of Pelisio 3051 but driven back. Immediately North of Route 9 another enemy patrol forced back after fire fight.

Night 19/20 March German raiding party crossed river NE of Cotignano and attacked strongpoint forcing us to withdraw. Later our arty bombarded strongpoint. Several German patrols repulsed SW of Rio le dei Negni. One of our fighting patrols clashed with enemy party East of S. Clemente 9928. Germans suffered 5 killed and 7 wounded. Later our patrol drove off another enemy patrol.

Weather: Fine. Outlook fine but hazy.

Fifth Army

Activity on Fifth Army front 20 March continued light as our patrols reported scattered contact against enemy. Sporadic harassing arty and mortar fire fell in forward areas. Several small groups of enemy soldiers, as well as gun positions and motor transport, taken under fire by our arty.

On right flank one of our patrols which penetrated into vicinity of Monterumici 8328 encountered mortar and rifle grenade fire and withdrew under cover of smoke screen.

In central sector patrol killed 8 enemy in firefight, while another group captured PWs in raid. Our troops suffered no casualties in this raid.

Further West patrol captured enemy MG and ammunition in raid. In coastal sector our patrols received light harassing MG and mortar fire.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP.
20 Mar '45.

FIFTH ARMY

Continued patrolling characterized activity on Fifth Army front with enemy reacting vigorously to our aggressive thrusts.

On right flank one of our patrols raided La Torre (area 8329) and engaged in fire fight before returning to our lines. Another patrol to a hamlet (area 8128) encountered enemy fire. Several other sharp skirmishes were reported in this sector.

In central sector small group of enemy raided outposts which troops held after short fire fight. Two enemy killed and several casualties inflicted.

In left sector enemy patrol repulsed with SA and grenade fire SE of Molazzana 1304. Our arty continued its effective pounding of German positions, personnel and vehicles.

EIGHTH ARMY

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Strong enemy raid on one of our strongpoints NE of Fusignano driven off. To SW another German raiding party beaten back near S. Polito 3540. Our patrols active to South.

Afternoon 18 March preceded by mortar, arty and tank fire on enemy dykebank positions both sides of Senio SW of Cotignola our infantry attacked towards East dyke-bank. We gained Eastern slope and hurled grenades across dyke onto enemy dugout positions on Western slope. Grenade duel lasted an hour before Germans evacuated position. We then dug in and established position on Eastern slope. In evening our local commander went to top of bank and saw two Germans on reconnaissance approach from across river. He shot one and took other P/W.

At midnight 18/19 March enemy party recrossed Senio and occupied their original position on West slope. Further grenade duels ensued. Normal patrol activity both sides of Route 9. German patrol driven off North of S. Clemente 9928 in mountains farther West.

Weather : mainly fair. Outlook no change.

DISTRIBUTION: Standard.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
19 Mar '45.

Eighth Army.

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. We received heavy shelling NE of Pusignano evening 17 March. Our patrols active in Senio bend NW of Bagnacavallo. Our arty harassed enemy working parties on West river bank this area. One of our fighting patrols met enemy MG fire South of Russi-Lugo Railway and forced to withdraw. German patrol attacked our positions South of Cotignola but broken up by our arty. South of Route 9 patrols clashed SW of Cuffiano. Enemy continued to bombard strongpoint house between Cuffiano and Riolo Dei Bagni which Italians captured 16 March. Farther West in mountains patrols of both sides active.

Weather: Occasional early rain over Appenines otherwise fine. Outlook fine.

Fifth Army.

Patrols operating on Fifth Army front 18 March encountered enemy SA, mortar and MG fire as they reconnoitered German positions. Two concentrations of enemy arty fire received, one in central sector and one on left flank.

On right flank enemy patrol repulsed NW of M.Belmonte 9932. One of our patrols encountered trip flares and minefields and suffered some casualties.

In central sector ten man enemy patrol driven off and some 200 rounds of enemy arty fell. Our patrol operating near Poggiolino (area 4818) met German sniper fire.

In coastal sector our troops drove off enemy party West of Trassilico 1201. Our mortars and arty engaged enemy targets with good results and scored ten direct hits on enemy occupied house East of Strettoia 9496.

Distribution: Normal.

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Intelligence Section
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CONFIDENTIAL
18 March 1945.

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP.

FIFTH ARMY

Drizzling rain and overcast skies restricted activity on Fifth Army front. Firefights developed at scattered points as a result of patrol contacts. Enemy arty was slight.

On right flank one of our combat patrols encountered heavy defensive fire about two miles North of Monzuno 8224. The Germans fired a mortar barrage estimated at 250 rounds as well as MG, grenade and SA fire. Small enemy party attempted to penetrate our lines near M. Belmonte, but withdrew rapidly after brief firefight.

In central sector our patrols reported that several localities which were the scenes of many sharp encounters during recent weeks, are now clear of enemy. One of our patrols in this sector ambushed a 30 man German patrol killing three and wounding five.

On left flank six man patrol captured 12 enemy about mile West of Calomini 1202 and another of our patrols captured several enemy North of Barga.

EIGHTH ARMY

Twenty-four hour period 26/27 March was generally quiet on whole Eighth Army front. In sector North of Route 9 activity confined to slight enemy harassing fire and two or three enemy patrols all of which driven off. South of Route 9 firefight occurred near Tobano between enemy patrol and one of our outposts which resulted in withdrawal of enemy.

Farther West we engaged small enemy parties near Villa di San Giorgio 2022 with mortar fire. Enemy arty mortar and Nebelwerfer fire also active in this area.

NW of M. Spaduro one of our patrols engaged by two enemy sections. Fight ensued and enemy forced to withdraw after suffering 10 casualties in killed and wounded. Own casualties light.

Weather : cloudy with occasional rain.

DISTRIBUTION: Standard.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
18 Mar 45.

FIFTH ARMY

Scattered patrol skirmishes characterized activity on Fifth Army front. Some increase in enemy ground activity.

On right flank our patrols made few enemy contacts. Local firefight occurred near San Ansano 8631. Our arty engaged enemy personnel and positions and suspected enemy OP.

Strong enemy party attempted to retake small village in central sector but thrown back by our troops after twenty minute fight. They approached hamlet from two directions and fired rifle grenades and mortars before assaulting position. Several of the Germans spoke good English and called out "Give up or we will kill you all !" Two Americans who were captured in fight escaped during confusion while enemy withdrew.

Another enemy party of approx 25 men attacked one of our outposts and was repulsed. Enemy patrol attempting to infiltrate through our lines dispersed by hand grenades.

EIGHTH ARMY

Our patrols active in Eighth Army Adriatic sector. Enemy patrols driven back East of Fosso Vetro and to SW along Senio. Enemy fighting patrol attacked strongpoint with bazookas on South river bank near S. Severo 3233 but broken up by our arty. Normal activity both sides of Route 9.

At 0530 hrs 16 March supported by arty two Italian raiding parties of Friuli Group attacked enemy strongpoint house (taken by enemy night 13/14 March) surrounded by outbuildings short way South of Senio between Cuffiano 2023 and Riolo dei Bagni 1823. They approached house across open country from East and SE and reached objective one hour later. Enemy reacted strongly with MG fire from South bank and mortar fire from North side of river. In ensuing fight outside house we captured 5 parachutists before being forced to withdraw.

Later in day an Italian volunteer party comprising one officer and 18 men attacked same house from South. They crept towards house along wadi under continuous enemy fire and 8 men were wounded en route. On nearing house remainder divided into two parties. Under heavy MG fire from house and river bank one party led by officer opened up with Bren gun from about 150 yds East of house. Parachutists retaliated from strongpoint and our other party opened fire with MGs from West side of house. Engaged from both sides strongpoint defenders did not notice Italian officer slip round to front and jump into house throwing grenades. Six parachutists defending house panicked and ran out with their hands up. Our men then closed in and took house.

In day's action German parachutists lost 10 PWs, 15 wounded and 20 killed. For remainder of day enemy continued to engage position with arty and mortars from across river. Our troops were supported by Desert Air Force who shot up enemy gun positions on North bank.

Farther West in mountains patrols of both sides active.

Weather: fog patches on coast.

DISTRIBUTION: Standard.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

17 Mar 45.

EIGHTH ARMY

On Eighth Army Adriatic coast enemy patrol driven back. Our arty broke up German patrols East of Fosso Vetro. One of our patrols clashed with enemy South of Alfonsine. Normal patrolling along Senio to S/.

Enemy raiding party attacked strongpoint on Senio East bank at S. Polito 3540 but beaten off with casualties. Our arty shot up enemy transport west of S. Severo 3233. We received considerable mortar fire North of Route 9. South of Route 9 our patrols maintained contact and our mortars harassed enemy movement. Strong German patrol crossed Senio S/ of Riolo Dei Bagni but beaten back. Farther West in mountains patrols of both sides active.

FIFTH ARMY

Fifth Army patrols and raiding parties continued to probe enemy defenses 16 Mar and enemy patrols were also active, resulting in several sharp clashes along front. Our recce parties encountered SA, MG, bazooka and mortar fire in their operations.

In right sector elements of our troops continued to occupy positions won night of 14/15 Mar in raid on hill 367 (area 8732). Our forces are dug in near crest of peak, in some places only 60 yds from enemy.

In Salvaro 7327 First Armoured Division troops engaged in sharp fire fight with enemy smartly before dawn 16 Mar. At one time during fight they controlled several buildings in town, including portion of heavily defended church. Germans laid down heavy SA, mortar and MG fire on our troops from areas adjacent to town and from town itself. Enemy fired several flares over area. After suffering some casualties we withdrew.

Small enemy patrol repulsed by MG and mortar fire South of Africa (area 6825) and casualties inflicted on enemy group ambushed by our troops North of here.

Another small German patrol driven off vicinity Rocca Corneta 4916.

On left flank our MGs and mortars engaged enemy mortars with good results. Two of enemy weapons silenced.

Weather : some haze, clearing by afternoon, no precipitation.

DISTRIBUTION: Standard.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
16 Mar '45.

Eighth Army

On Eighth Army front one of our patrols pushed on up Spit between Adriatic and Po Di Primaro River. Our patrols active farther inland. Enemy patrol driven off near Rossetta A245. Another German patrol broken up by our fire East of Senio on Bagnacavallo-Lugo road. We received phosphorous bombs and grenades NE of Cottignola.

Our patrols active North of Route 9. Increased enemy mortar fire this sector. Night 14/15 March our mortars harassed enemy working party near Biancanigo 2326. Our arty shot up enemy vehicles on road NE of Cuffiano. German patrol infiltrated into our positions SE of Tossignano but beaten back. Our patrols active in mountains NW of Tossignano.

Weather: Hazy inland: Early fog patches dispersing later. Outlook Fair.

Fifth Army

Patrols and raiding parties engaged in several minor clashes with enemy along front.

On right flank light arty and mortar fire received. Scattered ground activity observed during day of 14 March in enemy's rear areas. Our arty engaged several active enemy S.P. Guns and other targets. Dusk to dawn patrols reported few enemy contacts.

East of Reno River our troops occupied Serra (area 7327) night of 14 March and continued to push westward toward Salvara 7327 where they met strong resistance from enemy SA and MG's. Germans also aggressive during night. Strong force attacked our positions in vicinity of San Martino 7628 but repulsed after short fire fight.

West of Reno River one of our raiding parties penetrated deep into enemy territory North of M.Belvedere 5217 and destroyed quantity of equipment and ammunition. Enemy raids repulsed South of Africa (area 6825) and at several other scattered points in that area.

Little activity in coastal sector.

Distribution: Normal.

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HQ 15 Army Group
15 Mar 45.

Fifth Army

Operations on Fifth Army front confined to scattered patrol clashes and sporadic enemy arty and mortar fire. Our patrols reported only light contact with enemy forces.

In right sector 87 round concentration of enemy mortar fire fell in one area in 45 minute period, while our arty engaged targets of opportunity with good results.

Farther West fire from our mortars silenced enemy MGs firing from VERGATO 6925 and patrol clash occurred West of CASTEL D'ALANO 6025. Other fire fights took place NW of M. GIOVO 2611 where three out of enemy party of 10 men are believed to have been killed, and in SERCHIO Valley NW of CASTELNUOVO 1308.

In coastal sector our arty fire dispersed several groups of enemy.

Weather: good visibility, no precipitation.

Eighth Army

Our patrols active in Eighth Army coastal sector. Enemy patrols beaten back East of FO 80 VECCHIO. To SW German fighting patrol supported by flame thrower attacked one of our strongpoints North of COTIGNOLA but driven off. Enemy patrol also broken up while trying to cross SENIO at S. SILVERO 3233. Our patrols active both sides of route 9.

Our arty harassed German working party NE of CUFFIANO 2023. Enemy machine gunners active this area. Night 13/14 March German raiding party crossed river and attacked one of our positions SE of RIOLO DEI BAGNI 1823 forcing us to withdraw. Further West in mountains patrols of both sides active.

Weather: Fog patches dispersing gradually during morning. Outlook no change.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
14 Mar 45.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army troops encountered increasing enemy aggressiveness near VERGATO. Two enemy raids and two patrol clashes reported. Our patrols and arty continued to harass enemy in other sectors of front.

On right flank arty bombarded enemy positions and scored direct hits over wide area. After our shells closed enemy dugout in vicinity of BURIANO 9934 Germans seen digging in debris and evacuating wounded under protection of Red Cross flag. Direct hit on enemy-occupied building caused two explosions and set fire to building. Our combat and recce patrols made few contacts with enemy.

East of Reno River enemy party estimated at about 14 men attacked one of our outposts South of San Martino 7628 and fire fight developed. SA and arty defensive fire drove off attackers. Our troops took several PWs. Further group of 10 enemy raided another outpost NW of M. TERMINE 7526 but attack dispersed by mortars and MGs.

At bend of Reno River North of VERGATO 6925 one of our patrols engaged 25 man German patrol. During fire fight our troops received heavy mortar fire. Enemy counterattack on M. SPIGOLINO 4309 repulsed.

On left flank our troops encountered minefields while improving their positions in BERCHIO Valley. Our patrols received hostile MG fire near route one South of STRETTOLA 9496.

Eighth Army

On Eighth Army front one of our patrols pushed up spit of land between ADRIATIC and PO DI PRIMARO River. Our patrols also active East of FOSSO VETRO. Enemy patrols broken up by SA. Germans evacuated house 500 yards East of SENIO on BAGNACAVALLO - LUGO road which we then occupied as outpost position.

Evening 12 March preceded by arty duel we attacked enemy dugout positions in East dyke bank from area this house. Enemy attacked simultaneously from river and fierce close-quarter fight ensued lasting three quarters of an hour between house and dyke bank. Our men were supported by flame thrower. Later enemy returned to attack but broken up by our own guns and arty. Twenty seven Germans killed in whole action. We suffered one dead and some wounded. To SW grenade duels occurred along SENIO. Normal patrol activity both sides of route 9. Patrols clashed opposite RICLO DEI BAGNI 1823 and firefight ensued. Our patrols active in mountains further West.

Weather: Fair but hazy after morning fog.

Distribution; Normal.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
13 Mar 45

EIGHTH ARMY

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Two German patrols broken up West of S. Alberto 5352. One of our patrols contacted enemy in house SE of Alfonsine. We received heavy shelling to SW. Enemy patrols to Senio East bank near Russi - Lugo railway driven off.

Immediately South of Cotignola our positions in east dyke bank engaged by bazooka from across river. Our arty retaliated and shelled enemy positions on West bank. Our men also shot up enemy strongpoint house on West bank with Piat. House collapsed. Grenade duels occurred SW of Cotignola.

Normal patrol activity both sides of Route 9. Farther West in mountains one of our patrols contacted enemy East of S. Clemente 9928.

Weather: fog clearing towards mid-day Outlook fine.

FIFTH ARMY

Patrols continued active on Fifth Army front 12 March and our troops engaged in several firefights with enemy. Our forces made slight improvement of their front-line positions in two areas, and occupied mountain peak in central sector. Enemy arty fire was generally light along front.

In right sector approx 1000 yds SW of Monterumici 8328 our troops improved their positions by about 300 yds and occupied several houses. Our outposts also advanced slightly South of Salvaro 7327. No enemy opposition in either area.

North of M. Belvedere 5217 one of our patrols received long range enemy MG and SA fire. NW of Belvedere fire from Brazilian troops killed three Germans out of group of nineteen and forced surrender of remaining sixteen.

M. Spigolino 4309, 5900 foot peak North of Route 66, captured 11 March. Killing of seven Germans and capture of four in firefight for peak was reported. Enemy attempt to recapture height repulsed morning of 12 March.

In coastal sector light enemy arty fire fell on our forward positions and patrols reported some contact with enemy.

Weather: good visibility, no precipitation.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
12 Mar '45.

Fifth Army

Vigorous Fifth Army patrols continued aggressive probing along front with enemy activity confined principally to reaction to our patrol thrusts. Slight increase in enemy arty, especially near M. Grande D'Aiano (area 5826).

On right flank one of our patrols attempting to infiltrate into German positions halted by harassing mortar and MG fire raking route of approach. In stiff firefight another patrol near San Ansano 8631 clashed with hostile party night of 10/11 March. Three Germans killed and a fourth believed killed. Enemy aircraft dropped several bombs on our forward positions just East of Route 65.

With bazookas, rifle grenades and SA unknown number of enemy attacked one of our outposts near Salvaro 7327 night 10/11 March. They hit building occupied by our troops but thrown back with casualties. Our troops along Reno River South of Vergato received mortar and MG fire from town during hours before dawn 11 March.

In document recently captured on Fifth Army front Field Marshal Kesselring urged war-weary German infantrymen to continue fanatical resistance in Italy. Kesselring message was quoted in order issued by Freyherr Von Gablenz, Commander of 232 Infantry Division: "We do not defend Italy in these battles, but Germany itself. Not one inch of ground must be surrendered to our enemies without a battle. Officers and men alike must be permeated with this thought. I know that the troops, particularly the Commanders, are convinced of the necessity of this campaign."

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector one of our patrols again pushed up spit of land between Adriatic and Po Di Primaro River and took eleven PW's. Patrol clash occurred East of Fosso Vetro. Normal patrol activity along Senio River both sides of Route 9. One of our patrols to River opposite Riolo Dei Bagni found strongpoint house unoccupied. Farther West in mountains several patrol clashes occurred.

Weather: Fine to fair. Outlook little change.

Distribution: Normal.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
11 Mar 45.

EIGHTH ARMY

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Our patrols active East of Fosso Vetro. Our arty broke up enemy patrol NE of Fusignano.

Night 9/10 March one of our patrols comprising two NCO's and eight other ranks successfully knocked out enemy strongpoint house in front of Senio East dyke bank NE of Fusignano. They were supported by our arty which shelled houses on both sides of objective. At 2030 hrs patrol started to crawl towards strongpoint 1000 yds distant. By 2300 hrs they were within 200 yds of house when enemy opened up very heavy nebelwerfer barrage on our position this area.

Taking advantage of surrounding noise our men made a dash towards house and set up Piat gun 40 yds from objective. Enemy were taken by surprise and Piat scored direct hit on house. Our patrol also opened up with MG and grenades. Enemy retaliated from house and also from their dugout position in East slope of dyke bank but house became untenable and Germans defending it forced to withdraw.

Firefight occurred SW of Fusignano. Normal patrol activity along Senio both sides of Route 9. Patrols clashed in mountains SE of Tossignano. We received heavy mortar fire area Borgo Tossignano 0723. East of S. Clemente 9928 one of our patrols was attacked by enemy party and forced to withdraw.

Weather: fair. Outlook no change.

FIFTH ARMY

Renewed enemy aggressiveness was encountered by Fifth Army troops in Reno valley NE of Vergato. Our patrols made few contacts in other sectors of the front.

On right flank scattered enemy movements and flare activity were observed. Our arty and mortars continued to pound enemy positions and enemy troops were dispersed with casualties near Il Poggio 0033 and Casignola (area 9933). Mine-clearing patrols suffered some casualties from sugar-mines, schu mines and stake mines.

Ten man enemy patrol, supported by 150-round mortar concentration, repulsed by our troops SE of M. Belmonte 9032. During another patrol in this area several of our troops became isolated on top of a ridge during heavy fighting on 9 March. German efforts to dislodge them were unsuccessful and the soldiers succeeded in breaking out and reaching our lines during night.

Strong enemy SA and MG fire prevented our patrols from entering Fornaci (area 7227). Near village an undetermined number of enemy attacked hill but driven off by our arty. Aggressive enemy infantry action brought with it an increase in arty fire.

Troops of 10 Mountain Division added another M. Belvedere (area 6524) to their list of captured peaks. This mountain and M. Valbura (area 6424), both about one and one half miles NW of Castelnuovo 6622, were occupied without opposition.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
10 Mar '45.

Fifth Army

Limited gains made by Fifth Army troops in vicinity of Vergato 6925 night 8/9 March. Our patrols had several clashes with enemy parties along front and enemy arty scattered and sporadic.

On right flank one of our patrols captured some German paratroopers on Hill 425 (area 9732). Another of our patrols in this vicinity engaged in brief firefight with casualties to both sides.

Our troops in central sector moved up to Sabbioni 7226 and other points on Carviano Ridge about a mile East of Vergato. This gives our forces control of all high ground commanding East bank of Reno River to about a mile North of Vergato. West of river we occupied high ground overlooking Africa (area 6825) and have patrolled to town itself. Twenty man German raiding party attacked platoon outpost in sector morning of 9 March, killing one man and wounding several. Our infantrymen reacted quickly with SA, MG's and grenades and called for defensive arty fire. Ten of enemy killed within few yards of our positions while the rest withdrew.

Our patrols North of M.Della Torracoia made little contact with enemy but two of these parties discovered caches of enemy ammunition and guns. The patrols destroyed considerable quantities of enemy arty, mortar and SA ammunition as well as two 88 mm Guns and one 37 mm Gun.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector one of our patrols probed up spit of land between Adriatic and Po Di Primaro River toward German strongpoint house on East River bank (area 6358). They found house strongly defended and protected by dug-in positions and minefield across spit. We took some PW's. Our patrols active East of Fosso Vetro.

To SW we shot up enemy working party NE of Fusignano. Enemy shelling intensified West of Bagnacavallo. Enemy attacked one of our strongpoints opposite Cotignola but driven back. Our arty shot up enemy movement NE of S. Severo.

Patrols clashed North of Faenza-Bologna Railway. In mountains South of Route 9 one of our patrols encountered strong German patrol South of Tossignano. One of our patrols contacted enemy SE of S. Clemente.

Weather: Hazy becoming fine. Outlook fine.

Distribution: Standard.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
9 Mar 45

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Enemy patrol beaten back East of Fosso Vetro. One of our patrols to Senio NE of Fusignano contacted enemy. We received heavy Nebelwerfer fire near Bagnacavallo.

Another grenade duel occurred over Senio East dyke bank. Dyke has steep banks and flat top approx 10 yards wide. Our men are dug in on East slope while Germans are similarly positioned on West slope of same bank. This action is typical of many which have taken place along Senio North of Route 9.

North of Cotignola our troops observed enemy dugout position on Eastern slope of East dyke bank which Germans occupied at night and vacated during day. In their absence we concealed powerful explosive charge in dugout connected to our position by a wire. German party occupying positions night 7/8 March were blown up and buried under debris. Following morning one of buried enemy party was observed being dragged to safety with a rope tied round his waist.

South of Route 9 our patrols to river drew fire. Enemy raiding party crossed Senio SW of Riolo dei Bagni night 7/8 March but driven back after fire fight. Later enemy party again crossed but with same results. In mountains West of Tossignano patrols of both sides active.

Weather: Fair to cloudy with occasional light showers. Outlook mainly fair.

Fifth Army

Increased enemy sensitivity to our patrols on right flank and intense arty in sector West of Route 64 characterised activity on Fifth Army front.

On right flank patrols drew immediate reaction from enemy with arty and mortar fire. One of our raiding parties reached its objective NE of M. Belmonte where heavy enemy shelling was received. Troops of a mortar platoon captured enemy patrol that had infiltrated through our lines. Our arty continued its effective engagement of enemy targets over wide area, attacking troop concentrations, convoys and emplacements.

East of Reno river our troops occupied Carviano 7126, about a mile East of Vergato. Four close-in patrol clashes occurred in vicinity of M. Serlese (area 7427) with casualties to enemy.

Germans continued to shell roads leading South and SW from Castel D'Aiano 6025 and in vicinity of M. della Spe (area 6126). Heavy concentrations of enemy arty and mortar fire received in these areas throughout night of 7/8 March.

Some enemy arty also received in Gerchio Valley where one of our patrols captured a three man enemy patrol.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
8 Mar '45.

Fifth Army

Many skirmishes accompanied vigorous mopping up operations in 10 Mountain Div sector. Elsewhere on Fifth Army front our patrols continued active.

On right flank enemy arty and mortar fire light and scattered with enemy concentrating mortar fire in area of M.BELMONTE 9032. Enemy raiding party of estimated company strength, supported by arty, mortars, SP guns and automatic weapons, driven off after heavy firefight about a mile East of CASTELLA 7020 with casualties to both sides. Our troops occupied positions at POGGIACI area 7227, CASTELVECCHIO 7327 and SERRO (same area) night of 6 March against light resistance.

Intermittent heavy arty and mortar fire fell on our newly-won positions in vicinity of CASTEL D'ALANO 6025. Additional PW's taken in mopping up operations in PIANICOLA 6126 and on South slopes of M.BELLA CASTELLINA (area 6224).

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector one of our patrols probing up spit of land between Adriatic and RO DI PRIOLO River met defensive fire. Our patrols active East of PO330 VECHIO and NE of FUSIGNANO. To S/ normal patrol activity and grenade throwing along SENIO. We received some nebelwerfer fire night 6/7 March.

Enemy patrol crossed river East of FELISIO 3031 but broken up by our mortars before reaching objective. Another German patrol crossed SENIO North of Route 9 but repulsed. We received increased enemy mortar and arty fire this area.

Farther West in mountains patrols of both sides active. Sporadic enemy shelling.

Weather: Mainly fair. Outlook no change.

Distribution: Normal

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP.
7 Mar 45

EIGHTH ARMY

In Eighth Army coastal sector our patrols active. We received some shelling on Terra di Primaro 6356. Our patrols SW of FUSIGNANO encountered wire and mines. Night 5/6 March enemy fighting patrol attacked one of our positions on Senio east dyke bank South of RUSSI - LUGO railway but driven back. Grenade fights occurred this area. We received shelling SE of S. Severo.

In mountains south of Route 9 one of our patrols encountered fire NW of TOSSIGNANO. Enemy raiding party attacked strongpoint house east of S. Clemente 9928 but beaten back. Our patrols active this area. Clash occurred NE of S. Clemente in which enemy suffered casualties.

Weather : fair.

FIFTH ARMY

In series of successful limited objective attacks Fifth Army's 10 Mountain Division supported by Brazilian troops have cleared enemy from dominating heights in front of our lines NE of M. della Torraccia. Original attack launched morning 3 March and by afternoon of 6 March gains up to five miles made through rugged mountain terrain against enemy arty, mortar and AW fire.

More than 1200 PWs taken since beginning of operation, and enemy losses high. German battalion commander and his staff among PWs and practically all one German company captured. Many PWs had come into lines opposite our forces only 12 to 24 hrs before attack, which apparently achieved large degree of surprise.

Our troops encountered some enemy minefields in their advance as they moved forward against entrenched German forces. Fighters and fighter bombers supported attacks and utilized good flying weather to strike at enemy gun positions, troops concentrations and transport. Our tanks and tank destroyers also supported operations.

In addition to aim of taking limited objectives of key terrain features to improve positions local attacks served as test and battle indoctrination course for new and untried 10 Mountain Division. Division accomplished its missions with relatively few casualties and in a manner to indicate that standard of training was of highest caliber. It proved itself a battle-wise division and able to take its place among the best. The division jumped off at 0700 hrs on 3 March from M. della Torraccia and M. Castello after 20 minute arty preparation supported by aircraft, tanks and tank destroyers. In first few hours of attack American troops captured M. Terminale (area 5621), hill 953 (same area) and hill 1011 (area 5521), both more than 3000 feet high. They also captured IOLA 5621 where tanks and tank destroyers mopped up pockets of enemy resistance after infantry had bypassed village. To East Brazilian troops assisted attack by capturing ROCCA PATIGLIANA 6120 and SAN MARIA VILLIANA 6121.

Captured in subsequent fighting were M. Acidola 5923, BADRA (same area) , CAMPO del SOLE (area 5723), SASSOMOLARE 5824, PRADA (area 6022), M. della Croce (area 6122), BACUCCO (area 6123) and numerous other heights and small localities.

In action of 5/6 March 10 Mountain Division troops secured M. Grande d'Aiano (area 5826), M. della Castellana (area 6224), M. Spicchione (area 6325), M. della Spe (area 6126) and mountain town of CASTEL D'AIANO 6025. Brazilian troops captured CASTELNUOVO 6622 and several other nearby localities.

Elsewhere on Fifth Army front our arty and patrols continued to harass enemy.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
6 Mar 45.

FIFTH ARMY

Fifth Army troops continue to improve and consolidate their positions in area NE of M. Belvedere. Elsewhere normal patrols made little contact.

In right sector our troops advanced from 400 to 600 yds night of 4 March to occupy territory previously controlled by our fire and patrols. Hill 375 (area 7828), hill 476 (area 7927) and hamlet of Di Sopra (area 7726) occupied. Heavy minefields and booby traps encountered on hill 481 (area 7828) and our troops withdrew to foot of hill after suffering several mine casualties.

Enemy mortar fire near M. Belvedere increased but enemy arty continued light and harassing. Considerable movement observed in enemy's rear areas. Both troops and vehicles were seen moving in both directions along Route 9.

NE of M. Belvedere American and Brazilian troops of Fifth Army made further progress improving their forward positions through the rugged terrain.

Enemy raiding party of about 40 men near ROCCA CORNETA repulsed by defensive fire from our arty and armor.

EIGHTH ARMY

In Eighth Army coastal sector one of our patrols probed up spit of land between Adriatic and Po di Primaro river and encountered enemy fire from opposite river bank.

German patrol beaten off SE of FUSIGNANO. Enemy raided our positions on Senio East bank North of COTIGNOLA but forced back. German patrol repulsed North of Route 9. We received mortar and arty fire South of Route 9. German patrol crossed river SE of BLANCANICO 2328 but dispersed by our fire. Several enemy patrols broken up by our fire South of CUFFLANO.

Farther West in mountains enemy patrols driven back NW of TOSSIGNANO.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
5 Mar 45

EIGHTH ARMY

Further details of Italian attack in Eighth Army coastal sector : having cleared coastal woods and captured several German strongpoints our troops continued attack afternoon 3 March. With strong arty and Desert Air Force support British tanks and Italian infantry made frontal attack against enemy strongpoint house at TERRA DI PRIMARO 6356 and surrounding dug-in pillboxes which formed definite defensive line across spit of land between Adriatic and Po di Primaro.

Our tank guns knocked out Terra di Primaro house and shot up pillboxes driving enemy out into the open. Infantry battle ensued and by end of afternoon enemy resistance collapsed and we had taken nearly 200 PWs. As reported yesterday outstanding feature of this successful action was close cooperation between British arty and Italian infantry.

Farther West during Italian attack on enemy strongpoints on North bank of Po di Primaro river at bend (area 5855) on 3 March an Italian officer crossed Po di Primaro alone in a boat armed only with two grenades. He picked his way through minefield on North dyke bank and approached German strongpoint house which was still under fire from our arty. German defenders had taken cover and did not see Italian officer approach. He opened front door and shouted loudly whereupon entire enemy party of 18 defending house emerged and gave themselves up. Italian officer escorted them back to river and shouted across for more boats and transported his PWs to South bank. This gallant exploit enabled our men then to cross over and occupy the house. Same officer later rescued Italian soldier who lay wounded in minefield.

To SW our patrols active along Senio river. German patrol driven off SE of FUSIGNANO. Preceded by heavy arty and mortar barrage Germans attacked our strongpoints on East bank of river South of RUSSI - LUGO railway, but driven back. We attacked enemy pocket on Senio East bank NE of S. SEVERO 3233 and forced them to withdraw.

South of Route 9 enemy raiding party crossed Senio and attacked one of our strong-points but forced back after hand-to-hand fight. Half an hour later another enemy party attacked same position but broken up by our fire. Enemy also raided one of our houses from rear on East river bank NE of CUFFIANO. We counter-attacked, killed five Germans and took four PWs. Farther West normal patrol activity.

Weather : Mainly fair but local showers over sea. Outlook mainly fair.

FIFTH ARMY

Fifth Army troops continued to probe enemy positions 4 March and engaged in several fire fights as they met strong defensive fire. Harassing arty fire fell in our forward area, while our arty engaged hostile targets with good results.

One of our raiding parties operating East of M. BELMONTE 9032 killed nine Germans and captured three in a stiff fire fight. South of CASAGLIA 7828 our forces again advanced their front line positions against no opposition.

Farther West one of our combat patrols captured 16 PWs in RANOCCHI (area 5420) and another 18 in CASELINA (area 5320), both West of M. Della Torraccia. A recce patrol killed one German and captured another in a clash on Hill 953 5218 and another of our raiding parties engaged enemy near Hill 906 (area 5219).

North of M. della Torraccia and M. Castello our troops continued to improve their front line positions, occupying several villages and strategic heights.

Patrol clashes also occurred in vicinity M. Spigolino 4309 and in Serchio valley.

Weather : Good visibility, no precipitation.

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4 Mar 45.

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

Fifth Army

Patrols active on Fifth Army front 3 Mar. Our troops clashed with enemy at several points. Sporadic harassing arty and mortar fire fell in forward areas and our arty engaged enemy gun positions, troop concentrations and transport with good results.

Action took a more aggressive tone North of M. della Torraccia and M. Castello where Fifth Army troops made good initial gains to improve positions by seizing additional valuable terrain features.

Patrol clashes occurred near San Ansano 8631 and South of Casaglia 7828, where our troops drove off a party of enemy attempting to infiltrate our lines. After infiltration party had been repulsed our forces moved forward several hundred yards against no opposition.

In coastal sector fire fight reported vicinity Vergemoli 1002.

Weather: Good visibility, no precipitation.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector Italian troops and partisan forces launched attack afternoon 2 Mar to clear enemy from his positions in coastal woods North of Casal Borsetti 6352. Preceded by arty barrage supported by tanks and with strong Desert Air Force support, our troops achieved initial surprise. We overran enemy OPs and captured German maps. Despite strong enemy opposition and many mines we pushed on and by night 2/3 Mar reached base of spit of land between Adriatic and Po di Primaro river (area 6356).

Enemy counter attacks night 2/3 Mar beaten off. We took PWs. Italians also attacked Eastward along North bank of Po di Primaro at bend (area 5855) and captured enemy strongpoint house. We took about 25 PWs. Enemy patrol probed our positions East of Fosso Vetro but broken up by our arty. Our patrols active along Senio NE of Fusignano.

To SW preceded by arty and mortar fire German raiding party attacked one of our strongpoint houses on Senio East bank North of Cotignola, but driven off. We received MG and mortar fire North of Route 9. Farther West in mountains NW of Tossignano patrols of both sides active.

Weather: Cloudy. Outlook, fine.

Further news of Italian attack as follows: On 3 Mar Italian troops of the Cremona Group advanced further up spit of land between the Po di Primaro and the sea and cleared several strongpoints which, as a result of their action on 2 Mar, had been reinforced during the night. They inflicted severe casualties and captured nearly 200 PWs including several officers. By this action the Italians have cleared up the entire coastal area South of the Po di Primaro.

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3 Mar 45.

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. German party entered house on East bank of FOSSO VECCHIO and were shot up by our arty.

To SW we attacked enemy strongpoint on SENIO dykebank. In fierce fighting both sides suffered casualties. Immediately South of Route 9 German patrol crossed SENIO but beaten back by our fire. Night 1/2 March two enemy patrols driven back by our MG fire this area.

In patrol clash South of RIOLO DEI BAGNI both sides suffered casualties. Enemy patrol approached our positions NW of BORGO TOSSIGNANO 0723 but driven off after fire fight.

Fifth Army

Increased enemy arty fire in all sectors featured action on Fifth Army front 2 March. Normal patrolling carried out with little contact with enemy, while our arty and mortars continue to engage German troops, installations and transport.

In right sector enemy positions, SP guns, mortars and vehicles taken under fire by our batteries, with a direct hit reported on enemy dugout near M. CASTELLARO (area 9833).

Farther West some enemy flare activity was observed and German SA and grenade fire from West of MONTERUMICI 8328 fell on our forward positions. Patrol clash occurred approx 1000 yards SW of M. SOLE 7829.

More than 500 rounds of arty and mortar fire fell vicinity M. BELVEDERE night 1/2 March and morning of 2 March. Enemy patrol driven off near GALLICANO 1403 and our four point two inch Chemical Mortars engaged German activity and personnel North and West of GALLICANO with good results.

Weather: scattered clouds, reduced visibility in some areas.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
2 March 45.

FIFTH ARMY

Action on Fifth Army front 1 March was largely concentrated in right sector where our troops successfully raided German positions and engaged in several sharp firefights. Hostile arty fire increased in sector and single German aircraft dropped bombs and strafed in rear of our lines.

Large scale raid on German positons few hundred yards SW of Monterumici 0340 silenced several MG's after two hour firefight. NE of Monterumici three of our patrols clashed with enemy in short engagement.

Single enemy aircraft, believed to be a J.U. 88, dropped bombs and strafed along Route 65 South of Monghidoro 8618. No damage or casualties reported.

Enemy patrol of 20/30 men driven off about 1,000 yards SE of Casaglia 7018 and another hostile group repulsed East of M.Della Croce (area 6122). The Belvedere - Torraccia - Castello area quiet with scattered enemy arty and mortar fire falling on our forward positions. In Serchio valley our fire knocked out enemy observation post.

Weather: Scattered clouds, restricted visibility.

EIGHTH ARMY

In Eighth Army coastal sector our arty harassed enemy activity on North bank of Fo Di Primaro River between sea and Valli Di Comacchio. Our fighting patrols East of Fosso Vetro encountered enemy fire.

German patrols probing our positions NE of Fusignano beaten back. Clashes occurred on Senio East bank SW of Cotignola. We took some PW's. At dawn 1 March enemy raiding party crossed river SE of Biancanigo 2326 and attacked one of our strong-points but dispersed by our arty.

Farther West patrols clashed South of Tossignano and after firefight enemy forced to retire. In same area one of our patrols killed two Germans and took P's. Normal patolling in mountains NW of Tossignano.

Weather: Fair after fog. Outlook no change.

Distribution: Standard.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
1 Mar 45.

EIGHTH ARMY

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Enemy tried to occupy buildings on shore of Valli di Comacchio NW of S. ALBERTO but driven off. To SW we received heavy mortar fire night 27/28 Feb.

Midday 27th Feb Germans again attacked our positions on Senio East bank South of RUSSI - LUGO railway and forced us to withdraw. Our counterattack generally successful and we took PWs. Several Germans still remain on East flood bank. North of Route 9 one of our propaganda broadcasts caused temporary cessation of German MG fire while enemy listened. Heated discussion among Germans subsequently heard.

Night 27/28 Feb two strong enemy fighting patrols crossed Senio immediately South of Route 9 and attacked our strongpoint houses but beaten back. Increased enemy shelling this area. To SW our mortars harassed enemy movement. Supported by mortars and arty German night patrols tried to penetrate our positions South of RIOLO DEI BAGNI 1823 but driven back. Farther NW in mountains patrols clashed South of TOSSIGNANO 0823 and enemy forced to withdraw after firefight.

Weather : Fine. Early morning fog clearing towards midday. Outlook little change.

FIFTH ARMY

Scattered patrol clashes and some enemy arty and mortar fire characterized action on Fifth Army front 28 Feb.

On right flank enemy arty fire increased slightly. One of our raiding parties operating SE of CASAGLIA 7828 encountered enemy minefields and booby traps and suffered light casualties. A firefight occurred several hundred yards East of CARVIANO 7126.

In central sector strong enemy patrol repulsed near M. della Torraccia and Germans continued to mortar the Torraccia and Belvedere features. Our patrols operating in this sector received some hostile MG and rifle grenade fire.

Coastal sector remained quiet with light arty and mortar fire and some sniper fire.

Weather : Good visibility, no precipitation.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
28 Feb 45

Fifth Army

Activity on Fifth Army front 27 Feb largely confined to patrolling with little contact. Enemy arty and mortar fire generally light with small concentrations reported in central and coastal sectors.

Enemy patrol repulsed SW of Casaglia 7828 and one of our patrols operating near Vergato 6925 met heavy German defensive fire and forced to withdraw. Near M. Castello (area 5719) our forces improved positions slightly and occupied hamlet of Seneveglio (area 5820) against no opposition. 97 rounds of hostile arty fire fell on our M. Castello positions.

Farther West area of M. Della Torraccia 5520 extremely quiet following failure of attempted strong German counterattack night 25/26 Feb. NW our arty engaged enemy transport, gun emplacements and tanks with good results, knocking out two Mark Four tanks.

In sector between Serchio Valley and West coast patrols encountered long range MG and mortar fire.

Weather: Good visibility, no precipitation.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Italian party raided enemy strongpoint on North bank of Po di Primaro River NW of S. Alberto inflicting casualties on enemy and withdrew to South bank.

German patrol infiltrated into our positions NE of Fusignano but repulsed. To SW our arty shot up enemy positions along Senio South of Russi - Lugo railway. Preceded by heavy Nebelwerfer and arty barrage some area strong enemy raiding party crossed river night 26/27 Feb. They captured one of our strongpoints on East bank and pushed on South behind dyke bank. Our troops counterattacked and drove Germans back to West bank. Both sides suffered casualties.

Normal activity North of Route 9. Supported by MGs enemy fighting patrol attacked one of our defended houses South of Riolo dei Bagni 1823 but driven off by our arty and SA fire. Enemy suffered some casualties. Patrols of both sides active farther West. Enemy used Smoke NE S. Clemente to cover evacuation of casualties caused by our arty. We received some Nebelwerfer fire this area.

Weather: Fair and hazy. Outlook: Little change.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
27 Feb '45.

Eighth Army

Our patrols active in Eighth Army coastal sector. Patrol clash occurred East of Fosso Vetro. To SE along Senio our arty harassed enemy working parties. German fighting patrol crossed Senio at S. Severo 3233 but forced back by our fire.

Patrols active South of Route 9. German six man patrol SE of Tossignano 0823 broken up by our arty fire. Another enemy patrol East of S. Clemente driven off by our MG fire.

Weather: fair to cloudy. Outlook little change.

Fifth Army

Several enemy counterattacks in vicinity of M Della Torraccia and successful raid on enemy positions in central sector were highlights of activity on Fifth Army front.

Right flank comparatively quiet. Patrols active and arty engaged enemy personnel and vehicles. Light scattered enemy arty, mortar and MG fire received.

In central sector a raiding party captured ten Germans and cleared out three enemy pillboxes to capture bunker on ridge North of Canovetta 9331 in face of stiff enemy opposition. In attempt to repel raiders Germans unleashed arty, mortars, MGs and hand grenades.

Preceded by intense arty barrage strong enemy counterattack launched against our positions on M Della Torraccia morning 26 Feb. Germans in battalion strength suffered heavy casualties and lost PWs before withdrawing. They continued to throw heavy arty and mortar fire on our positions until dawn. A smaller Nazi assault on the mountain broken up afternoon of 25 Feb with aid of our arty. Heavy arty and mortar fire received on M Castello (area 5719) and small counterattack repulsed near La Serra 5820.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
26 Feb 45.

Fifth Army

While Fifth Army troops organised and consolidated recent gains in mountain ridges W of Route 64 our arty and patrols continued active in other sectors of the front.

On right flank our arty particularly effective in pounding enemy troops, vehicles and installations. Direct hit scored on enemy tank near Settefonti 9737. Enemy casualties also inflicted by our mortars at M. Castellaro Bertochi (area 0033) and M. Cerere spur 0031.

In central sector one of our patrols was attacked frontally and from flank by enemy party. In ensuing firefight two Germans were hit. Enemy patrol withdrew under cover of protecting mortar fire. Strong combat patrol engaged enemy in firefight NE of Castelnuovo 6622, killing six and taking six PW.

In mountains W of Route 64 our troops captured high ground NE, N and NW of M. Della Torraccia 5520. Small enemy resistance pockets mopped up, enemy pillboxes neutralised and PWs taken.

Although there has been comparatively little ground activity in recent months enemy has suffered heavily from arty bombardments, PWs report. One German stated that our arty concentrations were "enough to break anybody's nerve". One enemy unit had casualties of from 40 to 50 percent of its fighting strength since December first.

Eighth Army

Our patrols active in Eighth Army coastal sector. Enemy propaganda by broadcast and pamphlets NE of ALFONSINE.

Preceded by heavy arty barrage on our positions two strong enemy raiding parties crossed SENIO evening 24 Feb with object of capturing our strongpoint positions along river bank SW of FUSIGNANO. Our arty bombarded attackers. German raiding parties about 500 yards apart rushed E dyke bank simultaneously and reached low lying fields beyond where they tried to join forces. After fierce fight lasting about one hour enemy driven off. Germans silhouetted against sky as they retreated over dyke made good targets for our marksmen. As they withdrew one group of Germans entered booby trapped house which blew up. We took some PWs.

Later during night 24/25 Feb another enemy raiding party crossed SENIO S of FUSIGNANO but driven back with casualties. We again took PWs. Enemy party also tried to penetrate our positions opposite S POLITO 3540 but repulsed. To S we made local improvements to our positions along SENIO E bank captured night 23/24 Feb. Enemy still holds isolated positions on E bank area of Wier 3000 yards upstream from COTIGNOLA.

S of Route 9 our arty and mortars harassed enemy movement. Enemy patrol S of RIOLO DEI BAGNI 1823 repulsed. Night 24/25 Feb "F" Recce sent two very successful fighting patrols to church on Eastern end of VENA DEL GESSO escarpment 1121 overlooking SENIO Valley W of RIVOLA 1421. One patrol killed 8 and wounded 10 Germans while other patrol killed 9 and wounded unknown number. "F" Recce is Italian unit formed by Eighth Army from Italian parachutists of FOLGORE DIV over one year ago since when it has fought with Eighth Army all way up ITALY. It is equipped with British equipment.

Weather fine or fair. Outlook little change.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
25 Feb 45

EIGHTH ARMY

On Eighth Army front our mortars engaged enemy working parties West of S. ALBERTO 5352. Our arty dispersed enemy patrol East of Fosso Vetro and further SW demolished enemy building North of S. POLITO 3540.

Night 23/24 Feb our troops made local attack to gain positions on East Senio flood bank and to clear enemy from East side of river SW of BAGNACAVALLO 3838 between RUSSI - LUGO railway and S. SEVERO 3233. Our attack was generally successful and we now have several positions on East flood bank. An isolated enemy position North of COTIGNOLA holding out behind our advance troops was successfully silenced by our tanks morning 24 Feb.

In Senio bend SW of COTIGNOLA German resistance was stiffer. Enemy still hold isolated positions on East bank this area. To North of RUSSI - LUGO railway enemy holds East bank of river.

At dawn German ten man parachutist patrol crossed Senio and approached Polish strongpoint SE of CASTEL BOLOGNESE 2427 from North. They were observed at 100 yards distance from house and immediately engaged by our arty which continued to lay down concentrations behind parachutists thereby cutting off their line of retreat. Simultaneously Poles attacked Germans from house.

Trapped between infantry and arty fire Germans fought desperate hand to hand battle until after half an hour we had killed four parachutists including the CSM patrol commander and taken five PWs. Remaining parachutist escaped. Poles returned to house and watched four dead Germans throughout day to ensure that they were not feigning death with intention of escaping during night.

After sunset our men left house and confirmed four enemy dead. They also captured escaped parachutist who was unable to get further than 100 yds from house owing to continued Polish observation. Thus whole German patrol eliminated.

Farther West normal patrol activity. Our mortars fired German position in hay-stack East of S Clemente.

Weather: generally cloudy. Outlook little change.

FIFTH ARMY

Advancing 24 Feb on East and West slopes of M DELLA TORRACCIA 5520 elements of the 10 Mountain Division supported by aircraft and arty improved their positions on flanks of the peak. Enemy troops attempted infiltration of our lines at some points but driven back with losses and our forces in this area are strengthening and consolidating positions. Fighting was continuing 24 Feb.

To East Brazilian troops continued their supporting attack and moved forward against some resistance to capture hill 739 (area 5819), 2500 feet, and hill 958 (area 5720), 3100 feet. Also occupied villages of BELLAVISTA (area 5720) and LA SERRA 5820.

In efforts to counter our gains enemy launched three counter attacks near LA SERRA, employing [illegible] tactics in the second and attempting infiltration and using hand grenades in the third. First two attacks repulsed. Some enemy troops who succeeded in penetrating our lines in third, driven back. Hand to hand fighting reported in this area.

Enemy continued to harass our troops in attack areas with arty and mortar fire, employing heavy arty concentration of 270 rounds to East of M DELLA TORRACCIA.

Elsewhere on front our patrols continued recce and raiding activities with several fire fights reported. Enemy patrol of about 25 men repulsed approx 1000 yards South of CASAGLIA 7828.

Weather: Fair to good visibility, no precipitation.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP.
24 Feb 45.

Fifth Army

After overcoming stiff opposition FIFTH Army troops secured further commanding terrain in their local attack in the BELVEDERE area. Good observation along front enabled our arty and air support to continue hammering of enemy positions.

On right flank our arty scored a direct hit on enemy dugout and when enemy personnel exposed themselves, they were effectively engaged by air-bursting arty shells. Germans then raised Red Cross Flag to evacuate their wounded.

In central sector several raids on enemy fortified positions were made by American troops. One of these patrols went through wire and minefields to attack series of fortified houses. Despite heavy fire from enemy mortars, machine guns, bazookas, small arms and grenades patrol continued forward to unload all its ammunition into windows and cellars of buildings. When our troops withdrew enemy did not pursue them. Another patrol, after making several attempts to storm small group of houses, pulled back and directed arty fire on buildings, demolishing several of them and inflicting heavy casualties on enemy.

In the BELVEDERE area American troops captured 3500 foot M. DELLA TORRACCIA 5520 after bitter fighting. They mopped up pockets of resistance on peak and repelled several counterattacks launched by enemy on position. A party of Italian partisans operating under control of American unit seized ROCCA CORNETA 4916 night of 22 February. Strong enemy counterattack supported by arty and mortar fire repulsed by our troops near C.MILANO (area 4817).

It is now known that one unit of Germans who had been marching for six days were loaded into trucks and rushed to BELVEDERE front recently where they were immediately thrown into action in attempt to help stop American advances.

Brazilian troops supporting BELVEDERE operation organised positions on M. CASTELLO (area 5719) and cleaned up several German pockets of resistance.

Eighth Army

No activity in EIGHTH Army coastal sector. small scale enemy patrolling along FOSSO VETRO. Our arty harassed enemy positions near COTIGNOLA.

German patrol crossed river S of FELISIO 3031 but beaten back by our arty and small arms fire and suffered casualties. German three man patrol comprising one officer one NCO and one Italian penetrated deeply into our positions SE of CUFFIANO but were all captured. To W normal patrol activity in mountains.

In patrol clash S of TOSSIGNANO our arty dispersed German patrol. We raided enemy strongpoint N of S. CLEMENTE and took 2 PWs. Strong enemy party then approached and engaged our raiding party. In ensuing fierce fire fight enemy suffered some casualties.

Weather fair to cloudy. Outlook no change.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
23 Feb '45.

In Eighth Army coastal sector enemy attacked one of our outpost houses between Fo Di Primero River and sea about two miles North of Casal Borsetti 6352 and forced us to withdraw slightly to another position. Further enemy attack on this position driven off. German patrol to our outpost on North bank of Fo Di Primero NW of Mandriole 5852 beaten back. Enemy suffered some casualties. One of our patrols contacted enemy on West bank of Fosso Vetro SE of Alfonsine. To S normal patrolling along Senio. One of our patrols to River North of Cotignola met MG fire. Our mortars and arty shot up enemy movement along Senio.

South of Route 9 German patrols again crossed River and attacked our strong-points but driven back with casualties. Further West patrols of both sides active. Our mortars engaged German house NE of M Spaduro 0226. 6 man patrol NE of S Clemente 9928 attacked party of six Germans in slit trenches. We killed four Germans and took two PW's. As party were returning to our own positions cries of PW attracted attention of another enemy party who came to their rescue. In ensuing fray enemy suffered some casualties.

Weather: fine to fair. Outlook fair.

Fifth Army

Advancing 22 Feb in local attack launched East and West of M Belvedere American troops of Fifth Army reached top of M Della Torraccia 5520, 3500 feet peak NE of M Belvedere. They moved forward against enemy forces defending their positions from elaborate trench system on the height.

Brazilian troops continuing their supporting attack launched morning 21 Feb occupied M Castello (area 5719) and captured village of Abetaia 5718.

Using sixty - eighty men in each attempt enemy continued counter-attacks North of M. Belvedere and to NW along Mancinello - Pizzo Di Campiano ridge. Our troops consolidated newly won positions and repulsed all German attempts to dislodge them.

Hastily brought up German company of approximately eighty men counterattacking 21 Feb North of M. Belvedere practically destroyed by our defensive fire. Twenty-five of attacking force killed and more than thirty PW's captured. Approx eighty Germans forming near Valpiana (area 5118) for another counter-attack dispersed by our arty.

One of our men captured in counter-attack was freed when soldiers from his unit surrounded house where he was held and captured nineteen German PW's. After stiff and prolonged fire-fight in which our troops directed arty and MG fire on enemy. The nineteen prisoners were taken when captured American soldier shouted for attacking force to hold their fire as Germans wanted to surrender.

For probably first time in history of military medicine some of casualties from the attack area are being evacuated from mountain top by means of cable tramway which makes vertical descent of 1350 feet in a complete run of 1800 feet. Cable tramway has cut time required to evacuate a patient from between six and ten hours to four minutes and has freed for other duties three litter crews normally required for each casualty. Tramway car carries medical attendant with patient.

In other sectors of the front patrols were active and numerous contacts were reported. Hostile arty fire showed slight increase on right and left flanks. Our arty and mortars scored hits on German - occupied houses and on enemy transport.

Weather: good visibility, no precipitation.

DISTRIBUTION: Normal.

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Fifth Army

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H. 15 ARMY GROUP
22 Feb '45.

Patrols active in right and central sectors of Fifth Army front with firefights reported at Di Sopra (area 9833) and South of Muzzano (area 8229). In latter action our raiding party probing German defenses met heavy resistance and suffered casualties. Farther West German patrol supported by mortar and arty fire raided hill 505 (area 7827). Enemy withdrew after firefight which lasted three quarters of an hour.

Continuing the local attack launched 19/20 February East and West of M.Belvedere 5217 our troops continued to improve their positions 21 February against stiffening opposition. In conjunction with attack other elements of our forces jumped off morning 21 February East of M.Belvedere and SW of Abetaia 5716 and gained up to 1,000 yards against opposition.

NE of M. Belvedere our troops have taken hill 1079 (area 5520) and have also secured ridge running SW from this hill to M. Belvedere. Mazzancana (area 5518) has been occupied and our forces have also seized hill 1053 (area 5418). NW of M. Belvedere our troops consolidated their positions and repulsed several small enemy counterattacks near Campiano (area 4817) and Serrasiccia (area 4615).

In our attack SW of Abetaia our troops moved forward after heavy arty preparation and are now engaged to E of Mazzancana and S and SW of M. Castello (area 5619). Enemy opposition in both attack areas has consisted largely of small arms, machinegun and mortar fire, with some arty.

Our aircraft continued to support attacks 21 February, striking at enemy arty, transport, and troop concentrations. Many PW's taken.

In "Battle of the Loudspeakers" E of Route 65 enemy responded to one of our propaganda broadcasts with light mortar fire and soon afterwards brought his own loudspeakers "into action" with three German propaganda programs to our troops.

Weather: Good visibility, no precipitation.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Our mortars and arty harassed enemy movement along Senio. Normal patrol activity along river North of Route 9.

S of Route 9 one of our night patrols to Senio NE of Cuffiano 2023 was fired on by enemy patrol from W bank. One hour later at midnight three enemy parties crossed river same area to attack one of our strongpoint houses short way inland. Two parties comprising 15 men each converged on house from N and S while third party remained at short distance W of house to give cover fire. Owing to extreme blackness of night two attacking parties got close to strongpoint before alarm was given by Germans shouting " Hands up " as they rushed house from both sides simultaneously.

Some of our men withdrew from house short way to SE to act as cover party and opened fire on enemy attacking strongpoint leaving six men to defend position. In pitch blackness these six men fought hand to hand battle with 30 Germans for half an hour under hail of fire from our own and enemy firing parties on either side of house. Our men new enemy had had enough when German Commander gave order to retire. Enemy withdrew taking their wounded with them and 2 PW's from our six defenders.

One of our fighting patrols encountered MG fire SE of Tossignano. Sharp patrol clash occurred N of M. Spaduro 0226.

Weather: Fair. Outlook no change.

Distribution: Normal

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
21 Feb 45.

Eighth Army

On Eighth Army front German patrol infiltrated through coastal woods and attacked Italian outpost house North of Casal Borsetti 6352 but driven off after firefight. Enemy then mortared area inland of woods. Our own mortars and arty replied. 135 enemy mortar bombs counted but we suffered only one casualty.

Farther inland our mortars and arty active along Senio. Patrols contacted Germans. South of route 9 strong enemy raiding party supported by arty and MGs crossed river and attacked strong points East of Cuffiano 2023 but driven off by our arty and SA fire. Later one of our patrols followed retreating German party but did not find them. More small enemy attacks repulsed area Cuffiano.

Normal patrol activity farther West in mountains. German patrols attacked one of our positions South of M Spaduro 0226 with grenades but beaten back after firefight.

Weather: fair. Outlook fair. Ground frost.

Fifth Army

In successful surprise action Fifth Army troops launched local attack to improve positions in M. Belvedere sector West of route 64 night 19/20 Feb. Aided by arty preparations and close air support our troops captured M. Belvedere 5217 and other commanding features despite moderately stiff enemy resistance and precipitous terrain. In other sectors of front contact maintained by active patrols.

On right flank our arty and mortars effectively engaged enemy personnel and installations near M Calderaro 9933. For third consecutive day enemy propaganda shells fell in sector.

In central sector considerable enemy movement observed and taken under fire by our arty and mortars. One of our raiding parties received hand grenade fire from enemy in clash at close quarters.

In the local attack west of route 64 NW of Porretta Terme (area 5812) enemy arty strong and concentrated initially, but after daylight Fifth Army counter-battery and aircraft silenced most of enemy guns. Resistance continued with mortar and long range MG fire. Our troops also encountered heavy minefields as they pressed forward to capture mountain villages of Polla 5017 and Valpiana (area 5118), 1139 meter M Belvedere, M Gorgolesco (area 5317) and hill 1088 (area 5318).

Four enemy counterattacks struck at our newly won positions on M Mancinello - Pizzo Di Campiano ridge West of Belvedere mountain mass night 19/20 Feb. All were repulsed. In one counterthrust about 30 enemy came forward with hands raised until within close range, and then dropped to ground and opened fire. Failing to take our troops by surprise they were driven off with heavy casualties. Our own losses were extremely light.

The positions along M Mancibello ridge were taken night 18/19 Feb by unit that scaled an almost sheer rock face, ascending 1500 feet, by means of ropes in some cases.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
20 Feb '45.

Fifth Army

Normal patrols operated along entire Fifth Army front with some improvement in our positions on left flank. Arty fire was slight.

On right flank scattered arty and mortar fire received. One of our patrols encased enemy in fire fight N of M. Grande. Members of another patrol were attacked by strong enemy force W of P. Cerere and encountered enemy machine-gun fire from two directions.

In central sector our outposts were raided by enemy patrols near M. Belvonte and near Pizzano.

Our troops met defensive near M. Cappel Fuso 4716. They overcame mortar, machine-gun and small arms fire to improve positions on the Mancinello - Pizzo Di Campiano Ridge (area 4513 - area 4817) running SE of M. Cappel Fuso.

Eighth Army

Our patrols active in Eighth Army coastal sector. Mortars put abrupt end to German propaganda broadcast.

Preceded by exceptionally heavy mortar and arty bombardment of our positions along Senio enemy raiding party crossed river by night and attacked small group of our strong-point houses on river bank E of Fusignano while houses were still being mortared. German party infiltrated inland from river and splitting into three parties attacked strong-point from rear. Bazooka crew in centre attacked house direct while two MG sections on either side gave covering fire from behind haystacks.

Our men holding buildings were warned of attack by German Commander shouting fire orders. Sharp firefight ensued before enemy driven off. During fray one German ran forward armed with electric torch which he shone in face of one of our Bren gunners to dazzle him. Before gunner could shoot torchbearer slipped behind one of house walls which was hit by bazooka almost immediately and collapsed on top of him. Later our men searched for German under wall but found only German forage cap and blood stained rifle with one of our bullets through the magazine.

To SW patrols of both sides active. Determined enemy attack against one of our outposts opposite Cotignola beaten off. Our mortars harassed German working parties along Senio N of Route 9. Farther W in mountains patrols of both sides active.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
19 Feb '45.

Eighth Army

On Eighth Army front our fire scattered enemy patrol East of Fosso Vetro. We received rockets SE of Alfonsine.

Sporadic mortar and arty exchanges occurred to SW along Senio. In patrol clashes North of Cotignola both sides suffered casualties. German raiding party attacked our outposts opposite Cotignola but driven back by arty, which also shot up enemy house on river near Cotignola and inflicted casualties on Germans.

To SW patrols of both sides active along Senio. Our mortars and SA fire harassed enemy working parties. Farther West we received heavy mortar and MG fire South of Borgo Tossignano 0723. Patrols clashed in hills to NW and enemy suffered casualties.

Weather: Mainly cloudy Outlook little change.

Fifth Army

Patrols moving through fog and mist which severely restricted visibility were active along entire Fifth Army front 18 Feb. Clashes occurred at several points as enemy remained alert and engaged our recce parties with SA, MG and mortar fire. Hostile arty fire again light.

On right flank our forces drove off enemy patrol in area of M. Cerere 0031 while combat patrol operating near M. Grande 0032 met heavy enemy defensive fire.

Farther West our troops repulsed enemy party approx mile and a half SE of Castel-Nuovo 6622. Our Patrols received some long range MG fire from German positions, and enemy personnel in vicinity of Pi-nsinatico 3808 were dispersed by our arty fire.

Weather: Poor visibility, no precipitation.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
18 Feb '45.

Fifth Army

Although the lull in arty fire along Fifth Army front continued there was some increase in mortar and machinegun fire. Patrols active and numerous firefights occurred.

On right flank an enemy patrol repulsed E of M Cerere 0031 by our small arms and machinegun fire. Later one of our patrols investigated the area and found abandoned enemy equipment. A combat patrol N of M Cuccoli 9832 engaged an enemy patrol in firefight with casualties to both sides.

In central sector normal patrols operated. One combat patrol had firefight with a 30 man enemy party N of hill mile W of Pizzano 9432.

On left flank one of our patrols to Abetaia 5718 set off booby trap in a house and suffered several casualties. One of our raiding parties encountered enemy fire near M Spigolino 4309.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. To SW our mortars and arty engaged enemy activity on W bank of Senio bend. Farther SW normal patrolling. Enemy patrol to E bank of Senio SW of Solarolo 2832 repulsed. Our mortars silenced enemy MGs same area.

Still farther W we received heavy shelling and mortaring in mountains SE of S Clemente 9928. Preceded by mortar arty and MG concentrations one of our patrols took enemy position this area. NE of S Clemente one of our patrols shot up German patrol and inflicted casualties.

Weather: fair with extensive mist. Outlook: fair with haze and local fog.

DISTRIBUTION: Normal.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
17 Feb '45.

EIGHTH ARMY

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Our patrols East of Fosso Vetro encountered enemy MG fire. Mortars knocked out enemy MG this area.

Preceded by heavy arty barrage German patrol infiltrated into our positions on East bank of Senio South of FUSIGNANO but driven back by our arty and SA fire. Later one of our patrols found five of German patrol dead on Senio dyke bank. Our Piats and mortars harassed enemy working party North of COTIGNOLA. German patrol attacked one of our outposts opposite COTIGNOLA but driven off after sharp firefight. To SW normal patrol activity. Patrols clashed in mountains SE of TOSSIGNANO 0823. Mortar duels occurred SE of S Clemente 9928.

Weather : Cloudy generally: mist clearing in afternoon. Outlook little change.

FIFTH ARMY

Patrols were active on Fifth Army front 16 Feb, our troops clashing with enemy at several points as they encountered strong defensive fire. Hostile arty fire showed general decrease along front.

On right flank our four point two chemical mortars scored direct hits on enemy tank and also effectively mortared enemy personnel. Our recce patrol in area of FRASSINETO 0131 engaged in firefight with hostile patrol, and clashes also occurred mile and a half East of M. Belmonte 9032 and a half mile NE of MONTERUMICI 8528. In latter engagement our patrol is reported to have killed six enemy and knocked out two MGs with hand grenades.

Our patrol to area of FOGGIOLI 8832 in vicinity of Route 65 met heavy SA and MG fire.

Weather : Broken clouds, fair visibility.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
16 Feb '45.

Fifth Army

Enemy infiltrating parties attempted to penetrate Fifth Army forward positions but were repulsed by our troops in several sectors of the front. Our patrols reported little contact. Enemy targets engaged by our arty with good effect.

On right flank enemy patrol attempted to break through our lines in vicinity of Monteacuto 9933 but driven off by mortar fire. Another enemy group on NW slope of Pressinete Ridge 0431 taken under Machinegun fire and withdrew. One of our patrols directed mortar fire on machinegun emplacement and a direct hit was made causing a number of enemy casualties. Several patrol clashes occurred and one enemy patrol captured near Mt Cerere 0031.

Several enemy installations N of Bologna were engaged by our aircraft and arty. Following bombing and shelling several explosions and considerable smoke observed in target areas.

On left flank enemy arty unusually light. Enemy pressure on Mt Canala 9596 in coastal area caused our troops to withdraw to Southern slopes of this feature. These are positions held prior to the recent attack by our forces in coastal sector. Our troops also engaged several enemy infiltration parties.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Patrol to Serio River SW of Fusignano met no enemy but met with Piat gun. Patrols clashed NW of Ostignola.

To SW our mortars, tank guns and MG's engaged enemy working parties along Serio. German patrol attacked one of our strong point houses on S bank of Serio SW of Rivola 4121 but driven off.

Further NW our arty harassed enemy on lateral road NW of S Clemente 9928. One of our fighting patrols inflicted casualties on German patrol in this area.

Weather: Cloudy to fair. Outlook: Little change.

Distribution: Normal.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
15 Feb '45

Eighth Army

On Eighth Army front enemy patrol attacked an Italian outpost South of Valli di Comacchio but was beaten back. Patrol returned to attack again but kept off by our heavy artly and mortar fire. One of our patrols East of Fosso Vetro encountered enemy MG fire. Our arty engaged German mortars this area and our gunners knocked out enemy SP gun beside a German house NE of Fusignano. House also hit and caught fire.

To SW usual patrol activity along Senio. Our tank guns dispersed German working party SW of Felisio 9041.

South of Route 9 German patrol crossed Senio near Casale 2426 with object of taking PWs. Patrol was from parachute div and comprised two Serjeant Majors and three Lance Corporals, all volunteers for this job. They crossed river at night in assault boat. One of our outposts allowed them to land and proceed toward a strong-point house a short way inland. Outpost then warned our men holding strongpoint of approach of German patrol. As the parachutists neared the house they split up into two parties of three and two men respectively and by-passed house with intention of taking it from the rear. Meanwhile Commander of our strongpoint stationed half his men in house ready to open fire with MGs from upstairs windows while remainder lay in wait for Germans in back yard.

Our Commander himself opened an upstairs back window so that the light would lull enemy into feeling of security. The party of two Germans remained at a distance and the other three approached house from the rear. Our Commander shouted "Hands up" from upstairs window. The three parachutists then opened fire on window and while our MGs replied our men attacked from yard below. In ensuing fray we killed one para-chutist and took two PWs. Remaining two fled.

Further West normal patrol activity.

Weather: Fair to cloudy. Outlook little change.

Fifth Army

Activity on Fifth Army front 14 Feb again concentrated in Coastal sector where enemy continued active against our troops. Both our patrols and those of enemy active, and on right flank and in central sector our arty engaged hostile targets with good results.

In right sector firefights occurred near Il Poggio 0033 and near Pizzano 9432. Our patrols operating in vicinity of M. Belmonte 9032 and along Route 65 (area 8832) encountered heavy enemy fire and suffered some casualties.

Brazilian troops repulsed enemy patrol approx mile and a half NE of Mirrico 6221 and a raiding party operating NE of Gaggio 5516 clashed with hostile patrol.

In Serchio Valley a few hundred yards East of Lama di Sotto 1907 our troops withdrew slightly before enemy raid and then restored their original positions.

On extreme left flank between Strettoia 3596 and Seravezza 9796 our outposts moved back a short distance after enemy forces had infiltrated our lines and also launched a raid about 500 yards East of Strettoia.

Weather: Overcast in some sectors, fair visibility.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
14 Feb 45.

Fifth Army

Day and night patrolling and light exchanges of arty and mortar fire characterized action on Fifth Army front. Several enemy prisoners taken and enemy suffered casualties. Increase in enemy patrolling reported.

In sector South of Bologna enemy patrol driven from Montecalderaro 9933. We captured small patrol near Frassineto 0131. Few patrol contacts made in this area and there was harassing MG, mortar and arty fire.

On left flank patrol of Brazilian troops in platoon strength supported by arty raided hill feature about a mile East of Gaggio 5516 and engaged enemy in firefight. Farther west our troops repulsed 8 man enemy patrol that penetrated our positions.

In coastal sector demonstration by our tanks in vicinity of Gallicano 1403 drew enemy fire. Our patrols clashed with enemy at several points causing some enemy casualties. Considerable enemy arty received on forward positions.

Eighth Army

On Eighth Army front our patrols active South of Valli Di Comacchio. To SW arty more active on both sides. We scored direct hit on vehicle on road along Senio SE of Alfonsine and set it on fire.

Our morturs harassed German working parties along Senio floodbank North of Cotignola. Enemy fighting patrol attacked one of our outposts East of Senio immediately North of Faenza - Bologna railway but was repulsed. We took PWs. One of our patrols probed to river this area and retired after brisk firefight. Enemy patrol South of Cuffiano 2023 dispersed by our fire.

Farther West mortar and MG duels occurred and normal patrol activity.

Weather: extensive mist at dawn cleared by mid morning. Outlook fair.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
13 Feb '45

EIGHTH ARMY

No activity in Eighth Army Coastal sector. One of our patrols East of Fosso Vetro encountered enemy fire. Our arty scored hits on bridge over Senio at Alfonsine.

German working parties East of Fusignano harassed by our arty. Our snipers shot up enemy in one of gaps in Senio East flood bank North of Cotignola. Strong enemy raid on one of our outposts on East bank of Senio immediately North of Faenza - Bologna railway forced us to withdraw. South of Route 9 German arty, mortar and MGs active.

To West normal patrol activity. MG duels occurred SW of Tossignano.

Weather : Cloudy with much fog.

FIFTH ARMY

Aggressive Fifth Army patrols probing positions 12 Feb met strong defensive fires along front as German troops remained sensitive to our recce parties. Counter attacks against our troops in Serchio valley continued. Sporadic harassing arty and mortar fire fell in forward areas.

On right flank one of our patrols operating NW of M. Grande 0032 encountered enemy MG, mortar and arty fire as they approached German outposts. To West of M. Grande, our arty and mortars engaged German dugouts and working parties with good results. South of Bologna the enemy continued his use of smoke, possibly to shield movement, digging parties and laying of mines.

In Serchio Valley our troops repulsed several enemy counter attacks.

In Coastal sector patrols were active with some hostile arty and mortar fire falling on our positions.

Weather: Broken clouds, fair to good visibility.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
12 Feb '45.

Fifth Army

Enemy Aggressiveness continued in Fifth Army coastal sector where repeated counterattacks launched against our positions. Enemy alert to our patrol thrusts along entire front and numerous contacts made.

On right flnak dusk to dawn patrols probed enemy positions. Our arty effectively engaged enemy installations and guns and a mule pack train was taken under fire by our mortars.

In central sector our raiding parties and patrols contacted enemy at scattered points and several firefights ensued. One raiding party penetrated about two miles North of Baccanello 9329 where they encountered minefields and heavy defensive fire from enemy. Intermittent rain turning to snow augmented difficulties of our patrols travelling over almost impassable mountain trails.

Operating deep in enmy territory strong American raiding party made two day patrol to Alpe Tre Potenze 2908. They raided enemy-occupied buildings, destroyed several thousand rounds of small arms ammunition and other supplies and took a number of P/W's.

In Serchio valley enemy is making a determined effort to retain control of the Lama Di Sotto ridge 1908, and principal action E of Serchio has been in this area. Several firefights also developed from patrol encounters W of river.

In coastal area our troops repulsed two counterattacks near M. Cauala (area 9696). E of Route One our troops have consolidated their positions about a kilometer S of Strettoia 9496. After repelling several counterattacks N of Fiume La Foce W of Route One our troops received heavy arty and mortar fire and withdrew to stronger defensive positions S of river.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector German patrol to S bank of Po Di Primaro River near Passo Di Primaro 6155 was repulsed. To W our mortars shot up enemy MP position on N bank of Po Di Primaro at bend (area 5855). We engaged in firefight with enemy patrol on E bank of Canale Naviglio S of Alfonsine.

Enemy blew more gaps in Senio E floodbank N of Cotignola. These gaps are thought to be designed to flood fields on our side of river when it is in flood. Some gaps covered by enemy fire now used by German patrols.

To SW our arty and mortars engaged enemy movement along W river bank.

Patrols on both sides active on remainder of front.

Weather: Cloudy periods of rain or sleet. Outlook: Cloudy with wintry showers.

Distribution: Normal.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
11 Feb 45

EIGHTH ARMY

No change in Eighth Army coastal sector. Our mortars harassed enemy working party East of Alfonsine.

One of our fighting patrols to East bank of Senio river South of Fusignano was engaged by enemy party with hand grenades from their dug-in positions in the dyke bank. Patrol leader opened up on Germans with tommy gun and his men threw grenades forcing enemy to evacuate his position.

Preceded by heavy mortar concentration enemy attacked one of our strongpoints on East bank of Senio, North of S. Polito 3540, but was repulsed. Our mortars silenced enemy fire across river North of Cotignola. Patrols of both sides active along Senio both sides of Route 9. Our mortars and arty engaged enemy working party along river. German patrol crossed river Northwest of Cuffiano 2023 but driven off by our fire. One of our patrols to Senio SE of Riolo dei Bagni 1823 encountered booby-traps.

Farther West our own and enemy patrols active. Arty duel occurred in mountains Southeast of Tossignano 0823.

Weather : Intermittent rain or drizzle.

FIFTH ARMY

Action on Fifth Army front 10 Feb concentrated in coastal sector and in area of Serchio valley, where our troops repulsed several enemy counter attacks. Elsewhere on the front patrols active. Two of our raiding parties penetrated deep into German-held territory.

On right flank one of our patrols captured prisoner in a fire fight mile and a half West of M. Belmonte 9032.

Farther West our raiding parties active. One party operating North of Affrico 6221 knocked out enemy MG, while another party probed deep into enemy territory, two miles Southwest of M. Belvedere 5217, destroyed two MGs and killed six enemy soldiers. Third party captured PWs and inflicted casualties on enemy in a raid on German-held houses mile SW of Alpe Tre Potenze 2908.

East of Serchio river and North of Castelvecchio 1605 our forces broke up three enemy counter attacks, two of which were in estimated-company strength. A fourth counter attacking force, forming to NE of Castelvecchio, dispersed by our arty fire.

In coastal sector our troops repulsed enemy counter attack South of Magro canal (area 9197). Hostile arty fire was heavy more than 800 rounds falling on forward positions.

Weather : Overcast skies : some snow night of 9/10 Feb.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
10 Feb 45.

Fifth Army

Jabbing at enemy in various sectors along entire front Fifth Army troops found Germans alert to our patrols and encountered increased opposition.

Numerous contacts made and several counterattacks repulsed. Increased enemy arty was general.

SE and S of Bologna our arty pounded enemy positions and our troops engaged enemy in mortar duels in vicinity of M. Castellaro (area 9833) and M. Cerere 0031. Air OPs directed fire on number of enemy guns and troop concentrations on 8 Feb. More than 270 rounds of enemy arty fell in forward areas along Route 65 in period ending daylight 9 Feb. Patrolling by both sides continued throughout sector.

Strong enemy pressure encountered in Serchio Valley area where number of counterattacks repulsed by our troops. An attack of Battalion strength was broken up by arty fire in vicinity of Lama 1908.

In coastal area counterattacks were stopped at Strettoia 9496 and North of Fiume La Foce 9095.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Our mortars dispersed enemy working parties on N bank of Reno river NW of S. Alberto 5352. Our patrols active E of Fosso Vetro.

To SW our mortars and arty harassed German working parties E of Alfonsine. In same area a cow entered a booby trapped house which blew up. Germans set off many flares E of Lugo. Patrols of both sides active along Senio. Our positions N of Route 9 received very heavy shelling and mortaring.

S of Route 9 one of our raiding parties took some Pws. Enemy fighting patrols probed our positions E of Rivola 1421 but driven off by our arty fire. In hills NW of Tossignano 0823 enemy raiding party attacked strongpoint house but repulsed after fire fight. Enemy suffered some casualties.

Weather : Fair to cloudy, hazy in battle area. Outlook : Fair.

DISTRIBUTION : Normal.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP.
9 Feb '45.

EIGHTH ARMY

In Eighth Army coastal sector enemy patrols probed our positions on South bank of Po di Primaro river bend (area 6356) and also farther West on North bank of Po di Primaro North of MANDRIOLE 5852. Both patrols repulsed. Our mortars and MGs harassed German working party SE of ALFONSINE.

One of our patrols to Senio river South of FUSIGNANO 3844 took PWs. Our arty engaged enemy movement area COTIGNOLA. One of our patrols to Senio West of S. SEVERO 3233 contacted enemy. Our arty and mortars engaged enemy activity on West bank of river area FELISIO 3031.

Immediately South of Route 9 one of our patrols to Senio took some PWs. Another patrol crossed river South of BIANCANIGO 2326 and clashed with German patrol by light of burning haystacks before withdrawing to East bank. Patrols of both sides active along Senio and in hills farther West. We received mortaring SE of S. CLEMENTE 9928.

Weather : Fair to cloudy. Outlook fair.

FIFTH ARMY

Approx fifteen of enemy party of thirty were killed or wounded by an ambush patrol which surprised enemy group 1000 yds NE of CASTELNUOVO 6622. Our patrol suffered four casualties in this action.

North of GALLICANO in Serchio valley our troops still engaged against enemy counterattacking force of approx one company. Counterattack, launched morning 8 Feb, took place a few hundred yards North of hamlet of BARCA (area 1505).

In coastal sector morning 8 Feb after advancing against light opposition our patrols remained on positions 300 to 2000 yds in advance of our front lines. Our troops were meeting some SA, MG and mortar fire, though hostile arty fire was relatively light.

Weather : Good visibility, higher temperatures, no precipitation.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
8 Feb 45.

Fifth Army.

Stiff enemy opposition encountered by Fifth Army troops SE of BOLOGNA and in SERCHIO valley. Recent gains in these sectors defended and consolidated.

On right flank our patrols continued to feel out enemy positions and our tanks effectively engaged enemy machine-gun emplacements. On afternoon of 6 Feb our troops reached base of CUMULA Ridge (area 9432) where they encountered extensive minefields and were halted by machine-gun and machine pistol fire by enemy entrenched in rocks and caves on steep slopes of ridge.

In central sector there was sporadic enemy shelling of forward areas in vicinity of Route 65 the night of 6/7 Feb. In one of heaviest enemy shellings of recent weeks a total of 1360 rounds of enemy arty fell in this area between afternoon of 5 Feb and early next morning.

In SERCHIO valley our troops took COLLE, small hamlet quarter mile S of TREPIDOLO 1706 against some resistance afternoon of 6 Feb. Counterattck about a mile North of CASTELVECCHIO 1605 resulted in our troops losing some ground which they later regained. Several other enemy attacks were repulsed. Enemy arty and mortar fire fell on forward positions.

Eighth Army.

In Eighth Army coastal sector strong enemy raiding party attacked outpost house half a mile North of CASA BORSETTI 6252 with bazookas and flamethrowers but was driven back. Enemy patrols active East of MOLSO VECCHIO.

Our fighting patrols active on East bank of SERCHIO opposite LUCO 3338. Germans now starting to blow ships in SERCHIO floodbank. Enemy patrols which probed our positions on East bank of SERCHIO in area of CORTINORO driven off. Our mortars dispersed enemy working parties near FALLILIO 3031.

Patrols report SERCHIO River rising as snow thaws. Patrols of both sides active along river. One of our fighting patrols probed enemy positions and encountered mines opposite RIOLO DEI BAGNI 1825.

Further West our patrols active. Arty duels occurred in mountains NW of CASTIGLIONE 0625.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
7 Feb '45

Eighth Army

No change in Eighth Army coastal sector. Enemy patrol broken up on North bank of R Di Primaro river North of Mandriole 5852. Another German patrol probed our positions East of Fosso Vetro but repulsed.

One of our fighting patrols to Senio NE of S. Pelito 3540 encountered heavy MG fire and returned. To SW patrols of both sides active along Senio. Our mortars engaged Germans in boats on the river at Cotignola and also dispersed Germans on river bank one mile SW of here.

Immediately South of reoute 9 one of our patrols drew MG fire. Farther SW mortar and arty duels occurred across Senio. Our patrols active area Cuffiano. Enemy patrols probed our positions along Senio NW of Casola Valsenio 1017 but driven back by our fire. Our mortars dispersed enemy working party on South bank of Santerno river NW of Tossignano 0825. Farther West in hills our patrols active.

Weather: Cloudy with fog. Outlook fair.

Fifth Army

Fighting continued on Fifth Army front 6 Feb as our troops held positions won in early stages of limited objective attack launched on right flank afternoon of 5 Feb.

Jumping off after short arty preparation we met enemy arty, MG and mortar fire as gains were made up to five and six hundred yards against stiff opposition.

Area of Livergnano 8729 and route 65 heavily shelled by enemy, more than 400 rounds of arty and 200 rounds of mortar fire falling in 2 hours and 40 minute period. SE of Castglin 7628 enemy patrol was repulsed. Some rounds of 170 mm fire, first in several weeks, fell near Porretta 5812.

One of our raiding parties attacking a German position on M Spigolino 4309 captured enemy MG and returned to their positions with it.

Our troops continued to make limited advances East of Serchio river moving forward against light opposition. Montebono 2106 and Renaiao 2208 East of Serchio river were occupied. Limited advances also made NE of Castelvecchio 1605.

Elsewhere on front patrols maintained contact against enemy. Slight increases in hostile arty fire noted on extreme right flank and in coastal sector.

Weather: Fair visibility. No precipitation.

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Fifth Army

Mile Fifth Army patrols encountered slightly increased enemy resistance along most sectors of the front. Coordinated advances by our troops on both sides of the Serchio River to improve positions flanking the valley.

In right sector one of our combat patrols penetrated into enemy territory and engaged enemy force. Enemy was repulsed near Frassineto 0131.

In central sector enemy was sensitive to our patrols and there was also some increase in enemy patrolling and arty.

In Serchio Valley East of river our troops occupied Castelvecchio 1505 evening 4 Feb and moved on to take Albiano 1705 against some small arms opposition. Continuing advance morning 5 February our troops recaptured Lund Di Sotto 1906 against some opposition and other elements occupied Hill 916/1807.

East of Serchio River we recaptured Colomini 1202 and town was cleared in early morning 5 Feb. Elements moved forward about a mile North of Sillicano against small arms and machine gun fire.

In coastal sector several patrol firefights occurred near Route One North and Northeast of Querceta 9594.

Eighth Army

No activity in 8 Army coastal sector. Our Arty engaged enemy outposts along Senio River S of Alfonsine. One of our patrols contacted enemy on East bank of river opposite Gotti Nolo 3934.

No S? normal patrol activity along Senio. Patrols of both sides active South of Bizzocanigo 2326. German patrol approached one of our outposts East of Rivola 1421 but driven back by our fire.

Further East in mountains East of S Clemente 9926 one of our fighting patrols encountered strong opposition and found area mined.

Weather: Cloudy with widespread mist and fog. Outlook: No change.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
5 Feb 45

Eighth Army

No change in Eighth Army coastal sector. Our troops attacked a much contested strongpoint house on East Bank of Fosso Vetro. Despite heavy enemy mortar and MG fire we forced an entrance. House was booby trapped and blew up and we subsequently withdrew.

One of our fighting patrols engaged enemy working party West of Conventello 4847 with grenades and Piat. Another fighting patrol to railway crossing over Fosso Vetro two miles S.W of Conventello set fire to enemy strongpoint house and silenced MG post. We took PWs.

Patrols of both sides active along Senio. Immediately North of Route 9 our mortars harassed enemy working parties on river bank. Normal patrol activity South of Route 9. Patrols clashed on South side of Senio opposite Cuffiano and firefight ensued.

Farther West in hills German patrols active and attempted to probe our lines but driven off by S.A and arty fire.

Fifth Army

Strong Fifth Army raiding parties and patrols along the front met considerable enemy resistance. Casualties caused on both sides and several enemy PWs taken.

Numerous patrols active SE and South of Bologna and several firefights occurred in this area. Enemy arty light and scattered.

On left flank our troops occupied Gallicano 1403 in area which enemy captured during counter-attack in the Serchio Valley last December. Other slight advances were made astride the Serchio river.

Weather: Mist intermittently turning to rain made visibility poor but in some sectors snow remains waist deep.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
4 Feb '45

Fifth Army

Numerous patrol contacts, many of which resulted in fire fights, again characterised action on Fifth Army front 3 Feb.

In central and coastal sectors, slight increase in enemy arty fire was noted. Several concentrations of from 25 to 40 rounds fell in forward areas. Fierce defence fire from small arms and mortars was received by our troops operating approximately mile and a half Northeast of Mount Belmonte 9032. Farther West, enemy reacted strongly to one of our raiding parties which approached hill 278 (area 7528).

In area of Mount Palazzo 6321, an enemy patrol was driven off by our troops. German snipers were active near Gallicano 1405. Our arty engaged enemy troop concentrations and gun batteries with good results.

Weather: some rain night of 2/3 Feb, poor visibility.

Eighth Army

No change on Eighth Army coastal sector. Preceded by heavy arty barrage enemy attacked simultaneously several of our outpost houses East of Fosso Vetro. Supported by our arty troops repulsed all attacks except in one case when enemy captured house, subsequently recaptured. Later Germans renewed attacks on same positions but again driven off with casualties.

One of our fighting patrols cut way through fire half mile North of S. Polito 3540, drew German MG fire, and withdrew. To Southwest along Senio our aggressive patrolling provoked considerable enemy arty fire.

Patrols of both sides active South of Route 9. Farther West in hills patrol clashes on lateral road North of Tossignano 0823. We took some PWs and inflicted casualties. Our arty broke up strong German party mile and half East of S. Clemente 9926.

Weather: Cloudy with intermittent light rain or drizzle. Poor visibility expected. Thaw continues.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
2 Feb '45

Fifth Army

Heavy defensive fire from well fortified German positions was encountered by Fifth Army patrols 1 Feb as they tested the strength of enemy installations. Nearly all our patrols drew hostile small arms and mortar fire or engaged enemy in firefights as they approached German dugouts and strongpoints.

German self-propelled arty shelled area of Livergnano 6729 and Route 65 near M Castellazzo (area 8551) one of our patrols killed three Germans and captured prisoner after fierce clash in which hand to hand fighting took place. Two of our men were wounded.

Enemy patrol attacking with grenades was driven off near M Castello (area 5719) and long range German machine gun fire was received by our recce parties operating SW of M Belvedere 5217. Between highway and Reno River (area 6620) enemy arty fire decreased slightly.

In coastal sector one of our patrols crossed the Cinquale Canal and clashed with enemy force approximately two miles North of Forte Dei Marmi 9393.

Weather: Poor visibility, slight precipitation in some sectors.

Eighth Army

No activity in 8 Army coastal sector. Enemy patrol to one of our outposts on North bank of Canale Bonifica two miles SW of S Alberto driven off. Our mortars active and engaged enemy along Fosso Vetro.

Normal patrol activity along Senio. Patrol clash on East bank of river West of Pagnacavallo resulted in fire fight after which Germans withdrew.

To Southwest our troops contacted enemy along East floodbank of Senio. Our mortars harassed enemy working party East of Solarolo 2852. German patrol crossed river this area but driven back.

Aggressive patrolling continues South of Route 9. Our arty very active and scored direct hits on targets. German patrol tried to cross river half a mile Northeast of Rivola 1421 was broken up and withdrew. German patrols probing our positions South of Rivola also repulsed.

Arty and mortar duels occurred SE of Tossignano 0823. German patrol probing towards our positions Pt 307 0822 South of Tossignano driven off. One mile NW of Tossignano patrols clashed and grenade duel occurred. Enemy suffered casualties. Farther NW patrols of both sides active.

Weather: Fair to cloudy, outlook no change.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
1 Feb '45.

Eighth Army

No activity in coastal sector.

We received some mortaring on shore of Valli di Comacchio North of Mandriole 5852. Supported by artillery our infantry and tanks attacked enemy strongpoint house on East bank of Fosso Vetro two miles North of Conventello 4847 but forced to withdraw by very heavy enemy arty concentration.

German fighting patrol which approached house on East bank of Senio one mile NE of Fusignano compelled to withdraw by our fire. Patrols active both sides of Senio. Our arty engaged enemy working parties on West bank SW of Cotignola. One of our patrols found houses demolished on East bank of Senio opposite Felisio 3031 then withdrew in face of heavy MG fire.

South of Route 9 German patrol to East bank of Senio about one mile NE of Cuffiano 2023 broken up by our arty. Sharp patrol clashes occurred South of Isola 1622. Both sides suffered casualties. Further NW patrols of both sides active.

Fifth Army

Patrols probing German defenses 31 Jan received heavy SA, MG and mortar fire as enemy remained alert and reacted strongly against our Recce parties. Numerous firefights reported along entire front. Sporadic harassing enemy arty fire fell in forward areas.

In Right sector one of our raiding parties operating North of Canovetta 9331 met heavy MG and rifle grenade fire which forced them to withdraw after an hour's firefight with enemy. Our arty reported hits on enemy occupied houses and on four gun battery of German arty.

FurtherWest one of our patrols suffered casualties from German "schu" mines as they clashed with enemy force 1000 yds SE of Casaglia 7828.

Large combat patrol penetrated deep into German lines approximately mile and half East of M. Rondinaio 2608, clashed with enemy in fierce five hour firefight, captured six prisoners and inflicted casualties on enemy force. Our patrol returned without loss of a man.

German aircraft dropped bombs in Piandisetta 7522 area. No damage or casualties.

Weather: Scattered clouds, fair visibility, no precipitation.

DISTRIBUTION: Normal.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
31 Jan 45.

Fifth Army

Although patrol contacts were slight along Fifth Army front, arty exchanges increased and enemy aircraft were active.

Nine enemy planes were engaged by our fighters South of BOLOGNA early evening 29 January. One enemy craft destroyed, another probably destroyed and a third was damaged. The German planes broke formation North of our frontlines, enter d Fifth Army area in groups of two and three, dropped bombs and strafed at scattered points. Our antiaircraft guns scored hits on several of the planes and one was probably destroyed. No casualties or damage reported. Flares were released over LUCHON but no hostile action occurred.

On right flank of Fifth Army sector several of our patrols received enemy mortar and machinegun fire but other patrols made no enemy contact.

In central sector there was limited patrolling and enemy maintained unusually heavy curtain of harassing fire including small arms, machineguns and mortars. Perfect visibility enabled our arty to knock out several enemy guns and to engage effectively German fortifications and troop concentrations. A German machinegun nest in house in Mt BELVENTE area destroyed with direct hit by our arty.

Badly wounded South African soldier found by one of our patrols reported he had been abandoned in the snow by German ambush patrol that had captured other members of his small party.

In coastal sector our patrols particularly active and encountered considerable enemy fire.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector.

Enemy fighting patrol again attacked one of our strongpoints on South bank of RENO River 1½ miles Northwest of S. ALBERTO. We were forced to withdraw but later recaptured strongpoint. Patrol clash occurred on North bank of CANALE DI BONIFICA Southwest of S. ALBERTO.

Farther Southwest patrols of both sides active along RENO. Enemy patrol crossed river about one mile North of COTIGNOLA but dispersed by our mortars. Our patrols report BORGO hamlet (area 3654) on East bank of RENO opposite COTIGNOLA demolished. To Southwest again our mortars engaged enemy working parties along West river bank. Our arty engaged enemy vehicles area Route 9 and inflicted casualties. Strong German raid on strongpoint on East bank of RENO one mile Northeast of CUFFIANO 2023 broken up by our arty and small arms fire.

Brisk patrol clashes occurred South of river near RIVOLA 1421. Enemy suffered some casualties. Large explosions heard this area.

Italian patriots shot up German party on West bank of SANTERNO River opposite BORGO TOSSIGNANO 0723. Enemy aircraft dropped bombs on our positions Southwest of here but did no damage.

In mountains to Northwest sharp patrol clash occurred in which enemy suffered casualties.

Weather fair to cloudy; light snow showers on Appenines.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
3C Jan '45.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector. Enemy patrol infiltrated into our positions on South bank Reno River one and half miles West of S Alberto 5352 but driven off.

To SW our patrols probed toward Fosso Vetro drew enemy fire and retired. Patrol to East bank of Senio opposite Fusignano encountered heavy German MG fire and withdrew. Further SW patrols of both sides active along Senio.

Immediately North of Route 9 our mortars engaged enemy vehicles on West bank of river. Our patrols to Route 9 bridge over Senio and South of Route 9 fired on by Germans. Our mortars harassed enemy working parties on West bank.

Further West German patrol tried to cross river without success. Our patrols active in snow-covered mountain sector.

Germans again resorting to both loud speakers and leaflet propaganda in Italian aimed at Italian troops on Eighth Army front in attempt to persuade them to desert. Effect on Italian troops nil.

Weather: Mainly fair. Outlook fair in North some snow showers in South.

Fifth Army

Bright moonlight and crusted snow which made any movement easily seen or heard restricted operations on Fifth Army front 29 Jan. A few German aircraft taking advantage of moonlight dropped bombs at scattered points.

An 18-man enemy raiding party which attempted to infiltrate our lines in right sector was ambushed and believed to have been almost wiped out. The Germans, utilizing route used by one of our patrols which killed and captured a large number of Germans night 27/28 Jan, were allowed to come within few yards of our positions and then were engaged with SA, mortars, MGs and arty.

Enemy fired propaganda leaflets entitled "How to become ill in order to be evacuated" in area of M. Belmonte 9032. Hostile arty fire fell in forward areas near Route 65. Patrol clashes took place in area of M Belvedere 5217, where we captured prisoners, and North of Gallicano 1403.

Enemy aircraft dropped bombs in right sector near Piencaldoli 9417 San Benedetto di Querceto 9021 and Monzuno 8224.

In coastal sector single German plane dropped anti-personnel mines near Pietragunta 9792. No damage or casualties reported.

Weather: Fair visibility, no precipitation.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
29 Jan '45

Fifth Army

Fifth Army patrols contacted enemy at many points along entire front and engaged in several skirmishes with enemy parties. Increased enemy activity noted in some areas.

On right flank patrol contacts were general. One clash occurred on North side of the L Belmonte Ridge 9032. South of Bologna a volunteer combat patrol of 351 Inf Regt raided enemy outpost, killed large number of Germans and took three PWs. With the objective isolated by curtain of arty fire the patrol closed in under a rolling barrage. After rushing the objective, despite deep snow and fire from two MGs covering the approaches, members of the patrol tossed at least thirty hand grenades through doors and windows of a house being used as a strongpoint. One MG was knocked out and crew of the other quickly overpowered and captured. Sn fire continued from bunkers beneath another house. First Lieutenant Ralph Decker of Junction City, Kansas, leader of patrol, placed large demolition charge in the house and few seconds later building blew up, destroying the bunkers and Germans.

On left flank enemy raid repulsed half mile NW of Gaggio Montano 5516. Patrols in Serchio Valley engaged in several firefights. On Route 1 West of Strettoja (area 9596) several patrols encountered fire from enemy machine pistols.

Eighth Army

Positions unchanged in Eighth Army coastal sector. We received some mortar fire. German patrol to South bank of Reno River some two miles West of S Alberto 5352 driven off.

To SW patrol clashes occurred East of Fosso Vetro. Both sides suffered casualties. We received heavy mortaring in this area during night. Enemy patrol probed our positions one and half miles SW of Alfonsine and driven off. Only slight enemy movement reported along Senio farther SW.

German patrol tried to reach one of our strongpoints on East bank Senio opposite Cotignola but driven off by grenades. From here to Route 9 enemy arty more active but patrols made no contact.

Immediately North of Route 9 enemy patrol to East bank of river dispersed by our arty. South of Route 9 our fighting patrols crossed Senio. Still farther SW patrol activity restricted by river flooding.

Weather: Occasional snow turning to rain later; slight improvement expected.

Distribution: Normal.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
28 Jan '45.

Eighth Army

Activity confined to active patrolling on whole Eighth Army front.

German patrols most active East of Fosso Vetro North of Route 16. One of our patrols this area engaged enemy strong point on West bank with piats and withdrew. South of Route 16 patrol dispersed enemy party and inflicted casualties.

One of our fighting patrols to East bank of Senio North of S Polito 3540 forced enemy party to withdraw and inflicted casualties on them. German patrol wearing white camouflage suits attacked one of our outposts on East bank of Senio same area but was repulsed with casualties.

To SW there was increased enemy arty, mortar and MG fire. Patrols of both sides active along Senio. Our mortars harassed large enemy working party behind West river dyke SE [illegible] 2852. Immediately South of Route 9 one of our patrols crossed river contacted enemy and withdrew to East bank. Fires seen in Cuffiano 2023.

Farther west in mountains enemy patrol driven off by our sa fire about two miles SE of Tossignano C823.

Weather: fine to fair. Outlook unsettled.

Fifth Army

Aggressive Fifth Army patrols operating on icy hazardous trails and across swollen mountain streams engaged enemy in several stiff fire fights 27 Jan. Two of our raiding parties met heavy defensive fire as they contacted German positions. Hostile arty and mortar fire continued.

A raider patrol near M Vano (area 9532) met strong opposition and forced to withdraw. Our arty started fires in a German ammunition dump about one mile NW of M Vano while enemy shelled Silverpano 8729 and Route 65.

Patrol clash occurred half mile East of Vergato 6925.

Farther West one of our raider patrols captured prisoners and a MG in fierce fire fight mile and half NW of M Mosca 3004 and enemy party of twenty was engaged two miles West of Frassilico 1201. Clashes also reported 500 yds North of Gallicano 1403, in the coastal sector along Route one South of Montignoso 9399, and just North of Strettoja (area 9596).

Indicative of the fierce local engagements being fought on Fifth Army front is recent action of a 350 Infantry Regiment First Lieutenant who killed four Germans and captured sixteen in breaking up enemy strongpoint retarding his platoon's advance. Hearing German voices from reverse slope of the hill he was on, the lieutenant ran several times to the crest, hurled his grenades into German trenches and then ducked below brow of hill to escape heavy return fire. After he had exhausted his supply of fifteen grenades, sixteen enemy surrendered and four were found dead in their positions.

Weather: rain and snow night of 26/27, low temperatures, fair visibility.

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27 Jan '45.

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Fifth Army

Driving rains swept Fifth Army front 26 Jan and transformed snow into slush. Patrol contacts were light.

Prisoners of War report that Russians are being forced to construct German defense positions in some sectors of Fifth Army front.

On right flank patrols active and contacts with enemy reported. In one skirmish several enemy believed to have been killed.

In central sector American Infantrymen inflicted casualties at a roadblock and knocked out a MG in a clash North of M.FANO (area 9532) afternoon 25 Jan.

A South African patrol to FONDAZZA (area 7425) reported that the town, in heart of No Mans Land between German and Fifth Army lines, is occupied by civilians unperturbed by constant crossfire of arty.

One of our patrols probed deep into enemy territory North of PIANSINATICO 3806 without contact. However on their return trip the patrol received enemy MG fire.

In coastal area our patrols engaged in a series of firefights. Several of the clashes were at close range and hand grenades were exchanged.

Eighth Army

In Eighth Army coastal sector enemy attempt to destroy outpost on East bank of PO DI PRIMARO (see 5954) beaten off. Germans suffered some casualties.

To SW our patrols active and in contact along SENIO. Preceded by heavy arty barrage enemy attacked our outpost positions on Southern outskirts of S.POLITO 3540 but driven off. Several firefights occurred across river South of here. We received some mortar fire.

Some explosions reported area of LUGO 3536. Germans attacked one of our strong-pointsn East bank of SENIO South of COTIGNOLA but driven back to West bank and suffered casualties. Our patrols active along SENIO from here to Route 9.

Enemy working parties engaged by our arty and mortars South of Route 9. Patrols of both sides active.

In mountains farther West our aggressive patrols made no contact.

Weather: Cloudy followed by rain or drizzle; No prospect of immediate change.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
26 Jan '45.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector.

Preceded by arty barrage German party again raided one of our strong point houses East of Fosso Vecchio two miles NE of Alfonsine but was repulsed. Enemy demolished more houses this area. S. Antonio (area 4044) a hamlet on South bank of Senio now clear.

To SW patrols of both sides active along Senio. German fighting patrol attacked one of our outposts on East bank of Senio opposite Cotignola with MGs and bazookas but was driven back to West bank.

Farther SW enemy mortaring and shelling on reduced scale.

North of Route 9 enemy working parties on Senio West bank harassed and dispersed by our mortar fire. Patrols both sides active here.

South of Route 9 enemy very sensitive to our aggressive patrolling.

Weather: snow or sleet turning to rain or light drizzle; no immediate prospect of change.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army patrols testing German defenses 25 Jan engaged in numerous fire fights as the enemy reacted strongly to our probes. Two small enemy raiding parties were beaten off in one area and hostile arty and mortar fire continued.

On right flank patrol fire fights occurred in area of M Belmonte 9032 and German prisoners were captured near San Ansano 8631.

Farther west our patrols received sa and mortar fire as they contacted enemy at many points. Patrol clashes took place at Castelnuovo 6622 M Palazzo (area 6422) and vicinity Villiana 6121. Two enemy raiding parties which raided our lines at Querciola (area 5016) were beaten off with losses to the attackers.

In coastal sector patrolling continued.

Weather: snow and rain night 24/25 Jan, fair visibility.

Distribution: Normal

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
25 Jan '45.

Fifth Army

Activity on Fifth Army front confined to continued patrolling with scattered contacts and firefights with enemy in some sectors.

On right flank one of our raiding parties vicinity M.CERERE 0031 set off a booby trap and encountered enemy MG fire. Enemy patrol near M.CUCCOLI 9032 repulsed.

In central sector our patrols made little contact. Fifth Army arty continued to hammer enemy positions.

On left flank two patrol clashes about a half mile West of SAN MARTINO 7620 resulted in casualties on both sides.

Enemy arty continued moderate to heavy in area of M.BELVEDERE 5217 and the coastal area.

Eighth Army

Positions unchanged in Eighth Army coastal sector.

German night fighting patrol attacked one of our strongpoints about two miles NE of ALFONSINE East of FOSSO VECCHIO but driven off after firefight. Enemy blew up more buildings SW of ALFONSINE. One of our fighting patrols to East bank of SENIO opposite FUSIGNANO captured some PW in face of heavy MG fire. Positions unchanged along SENIO bank.

Our fighting patrols reached bridge over SENIO two miles SW of COTIGNOLA but held up by mines, MG and mortar fire. River bank booby trapped this area. After withdrawing, our patrols heard explosions from direction of river.

To SW our mortars harassed enemy working parties along West Dyke bank.

South of Route 9 enemy rockets fell East of SENIO. One of our patrols crossed river one mile SW of BLANCANIGO 2326 but forced to withdraw to East bank. Still farther West patrol clashes occurred.

Weather: Cloudy with intermittent light sleet or snow.

Distribution: Normal

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
24 Jan '45.

Eighth Army

Positions unchanged in Eighth Army coastal sector.

Our arty scored direct hits on enemy strongpoint houses on South bank of Senio Southwest of ROSSETTA 4245. German patrol attack on one of our outpost houses on South bank of Fosso Vetro 4847 Southeast of ALFONSINE repulsed. Enemy patrol later returned to attack but again driven off by our tanks, arty and mortar fire. Again resorting to his policy of wholesale demolition of houses and property in whole ALFONSINE area, to deny our troops cover in this bitter weather, enemy destroyed several more houses Southwest of town.

Our tank gunfire forced enemy to evacuate stron point houses on West bank of Senio North of S. POLITO 3540. Our patrols found houses on Northern outskirts of S. POLITO booby trapped. When fired on by one of our Piats, houses blew up and caught fire.

Further Southwest frost conditions hampered patrol activity along Senio. Southwest of COVIGNOLA our forward positions received some rifle and grenade fire.

Immediately North of Route 9 SP guns and mortar duels occurred across river. Our patrols crossed river this area contacted enemy then withdrew to East bank. To Southwest after several attempts enemy party supported by heavy Spandau fire crossed river but retired again without aggressive action.

To West in mountains activity hampered by weather conditions.

Weather : Fair or fine turning to cloudy.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army patrols probing German positions 23 January exchanged fire with enemy at several points as they encountered strong defences. Two hostile aircraft flying singly dropped bombs along the front.

Enemy arty fire continued with a 50 round Nebelwerfer concentration reported in right sector. Firefight occurred North of Monte FANO (area 9532) and our patrols to CASA NUOVO (area 8732) and BARCHETTA (area 8832) met heavy enemy fire. An enemy aircraft dropped four bombs in LOLANO area, and another hostile aircraft dropped four bombs near RIOVEGGIO (area 7625). No reports of damage or casualties. Enemy patrol repulsed vicinity of AFFRICO 6221 and our troops involved in short firefights just West and some 2 miles Southwest of Monte Belvedere 5217. Enemy shelled area of GAGGIO MONTANO 5516, and our patrol to Monte Cardosino (area 5509) drew hostile fire.

PIETRASANTA 9792 and FORTE DEI MARMI 9293, in coastal sector, also shelled. Enemy troop concentration in house Southwest of MASSA engaged by our arty. No results observed.

Weather : Slightly overcast and fair visibility.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
23 Jan '45.

Fifth Army

Despite extremely cold weather and continued deep snow Fifth Army patrols maintained normal activity along entire front.

In sector SE and South of Bologna several patrol clashes occurred. Our arty effectively engaged enemy positions and at one point German horse-drawn equipment and vehicles were hit. Observers reported enemy ambulance evacuating wounded. Fifth Army troops also occupied a ridge about a kilometer North of Colle Termine 7526.

On left flank our patrols particularly active and made numerous contacts with enemy. Bombiana 5818 heavily mortared by enemy. Strong enemy raid in Serchio Valley repulsed one kilometer SW of Gallicano 1403.

Enemy aircraft made scattered attack in central sector night 21 Jan. In early evening an enemy aircraft dropped bombs vicinity Castiglione 7209 and caused some casualties. Other attacks occurred near Molinetto 9228, at a point South of Firenzuola 9007 and along Route 65 North of Basso Della Radicosa 8713. No damage or casualties reported. Late evening an enemy aircraft bombed and strafed near Loiano 8624. There were eight attacks in all during the evening, each by a single aircraft. One enemy plane reported probably destroyed.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector.

An enemy aircraft bombed our forward positions East of Alfonsine but caused no casualties or damage.

Our fighting patrols probed to East bank of Senio South of Fusignano, made no contact and found unoccupied German positions.

To SW German Recce patrols probed East of river but driven back after firefight. Night 21/22 Jan enemy MG and SA fire very active area S.Polito 3540.

Farther South our accurate fire dispersed enemy patrol East of Senio. Very slight enemy reaction to our aggressive patrolling along river North of Route 9.

Immediately South of Route 9 our patrols crossed river and found Germans very alert with their positions well covered by MG fire. To SW German patrol crossed river and forced us to withdraw from outpost position. On being engaged by our mortar and arty fire enemy evacuated position.

Farther West patrols both sides active.

Weather: Scattered patches of clouds, prospect fine.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
22 Jan '45.

Eighth Army

Positions unchanged in Eighth Army coastal sector.

Preceded by heavy enemy arty barrage strong German raiding party attacked from Fosso Vetro and penetrated our positions 2½ miles Northeast of Alfonsine afternoon 20 Jan but were forced back to original positions.

To Southwest patrols active both sides along Senio. Our forward positions North of Cotignola received fairly heavy mortar fire night 20/21 Jan. One of our fighting patrols to Senio dyke bank opposite Cotignola engaged in fire fight with enemy across river then withdrew.

Patrols both sides active along Senio North and South of Route 9. Farther west in mountains bad weather conditions continue to hamper operations.

Weather: fine or fair.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army patrols, operating in deep snow, reported only light contact with enemy 21 Jan.

Our arty engaged a column of German motor transport with good results in right sector. Hostile artillery and mortar fire continued, two fairly heavy concentrations being reported.

On right flank enemy patrol activity increased slightly. An arty concentrations of 70 rounds received in one hour vicinity West of Molinetto 9228. An area South of Casaglia 7028 was shelled and mortared by enemy.

In central and coastal sectors some long range machine gun fire was directed against our troops, and patrol clashes were reported a half mile Northwest of Vergenoli 1002, and near Mt Canala 9696.

Weather: good visibility, some snow night of 20/21 Jan.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
21 Jan 45.

FIFTH Army

FIFTH Army raiding parties patrolling along the front encountered only slight enemy activity although fire fights occurred at scattered points. There was a general decrease in enemy arty.

In the M. BELVEDERE sector numerous patrols were active but reported few contacts. One of our reconnaissance patrols received sporadic MG and mortar fire about 800 yds NE of M. FANO (area 9532).

In central sector an enemy patrol which attacked one of our battalion outposts was repulsed. Little enemy arty received in this area.

On left flank one of our patrols engaged enemy in fire fight near PLANSINATICO 3808 and inflicted some casualties. Another FIFTH Army patrol scaled a high ridge West of SPIGOLINO 4309 and made contact with the enemy.

Reports received of small enemy patrols dressed in British winter clothing attempting to pass through our positions. In one case ruse was detected and enemy patrol shot up.

EIGHTH Army

In EIGHTH Army coastal sector our tanks shot up enemy strongpoint house area 5955 on South bank of PO DI PRIOLO, canalised continuation of RENO River. Enemy compelled to withdraw and our troops occupied house.

Further inland patrols both sides active.

Night 19/20 Jan German fighting patrol infiltrated into our positions SE of ALFONSINE but driven back by drum. Our arty harassed German working parties on West bank of FOSSO VETRO this area. Positions substantially unchanged along SENIO bend.

Enemy patrols crossed river SE of COTIGNOLA but forced to withdraw. Further SW our snipers and mortars harassed enemy working parties along SENIO night 19/20 Jan. Sniper dispersed German working party single handed.

In patrol clash immediately South of Route 9 enemy patrol forced to withdraw to West bank of SENIO after sharp fire fight. One of our raiding parties crossed river South of BIANCANICO 2326 and cleared enemy from outpost house. Some patrol found neighbouring house booby trapped.

Strong German fighting patrol crossed SENIO NE of CUFFIANO 2023 and attacked outpost house overlooking river. After sharp hand to hand fighting Germans driven back to West bank. Afternoon 19 Jan our troops captured group of German strongpoint houses on South bank of river one mile SW of CUFFIANO against strong mortar and MG opposition. Our troops were supported by Desert Air Force who scored hits on objective. Enemy attempt to counterattack houses from across river halted and broken up at waters edge by our arty. Germans lost some PW and suffered casualties.

Further West in mountains bad visibility restricted operations.

Weather: Fair periods and outlook mainly fair.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
20 Jan '45.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector.

We attacked enemy strong point houses (area 4951) in angle of Canale Bonifica and Canale Naviglio. Enemy suffered some casualties.

Repeating infiltration tactics enemy penetrated into woods across Senio River 1½ miles Northeast of Fusignano but were cleared up and suffered casualties.

Canadian infantry supported by tanks captured enemy strong point buildings on South bank of Senio opposite Fusignano. Germans then threw grenades into captured positions and forced us to withdraw from forward houses. Later we recaptured all buildings.

To Southwest German patrol crossed river but after fire fight was forced to withdraw. Farther Southwest enemy, taking advantage of mist, intensified digging activity along Senio.

Enemy very sensitive North of Route 9. Patrol to East bank of river drew spandau fire and was heavily mortared. Immediately South of Route 9 we received enemy shelling.

Farther Southwest patrols both sides active along Senio. Our patrols to river in area of Rialo Dei Pagni 1823 engaged enemy on North bank with small arms fire and grenades. Two German patrols infiltrated across Senio Southwest of Rialo Dei Pagni but driven back to North bank after brisk fire fight. We received some Nebelwerfer fire and shelling this area.

Weather: fair.

Fifth Army

Rain and snow, turning into slush, hampered movement on Fifth Army front 19 January as activity dropped to lowest point in several days. Patrols reported little contact with enemy.

Hostile patrol raid vicinity Mt Grande repulsed. Gaggio Montano (5516) area mortared by enemy.

Patrol fire fights occurred approximately one mile West of Mt Belvedere 5217, two to three miles Southeast of Abetone 3311 and just Northeast of Castelvecchio 1605 in Serchio River valley.

In coastal sector harassing artillery fire increased slightly. Enemy forced to abandon position in vicinity of M Cerreta 9698 when engaged by our mortars and machine guns.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
19 Jan '45.

Fifth Army

Fifth Army combat patrols continued their aggressive probing of enemy positions and sparred with enemy parties in scattered engagements along the front. Light defensive arty fire received.

On right flank our patrols particularly active vicinity M.Grande where little enemy contact reported.

In central sector considerable local movement observed behind German lines. Enemy using one-horse sleighs and bobsleds to supply his troops on the snow - covered forward positions.

An American patrol pushed North towards Pergochia Di Vignale 9632 and received heavy fire from a church which enemy using as strongpoint in the village. Our troops returned fire and withdrew after brief skirmish.

On left flank a Fifth Army patrol returning from Prada (area 5116) engaged eight-man patrol in firefight near the town and forced enemy to withdraw.

Good visibility enabled our arty to engage enemy targets effectively.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector.

Strong enemy raiding party forced us to withdraw from outpost position on North bank of Canale Bonifica two miles West of S. Alberto. To SW our patrols cleared Germans trying to infiltrate across Fosso Vetro 4748 North of Conventello. Some PW taken.

In area Fusignano our counterattacks successful against small German Bridgehead across Senio River. Enemy driven back to his original positions.

Enemy attacks against our outposts on East bank of Senio South of Cotignola driven off. Germans suffered heavy casualties. Farther SW our mortars harassed enemy working parties along West bank of Senio.

Patrols both sides active South of Route 9.

Weather: Mainly overcast; prospects cloudy, light rain or drizzle.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
18 Jan 45.

Eighth Army

No activity in Eighth Army coastal sector.

In area Pusignano enemy crossed the Senio in strength of about 100 men and established small bridgehead which is being counter-attacked. We took some PWs and according to their statements inflicted some 20 casualties on one company alone of the attacking force.

North of Cotignola our outposts came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire.

Our patrols are in active South of Route 9 where they captured some enemy small arms from his abandoned outpost positions vicinity Chiarona (area 2626).

Weather: overcast; light drizzle or sleet; icy roads.

Fifth Army

On Fifth Army front 17 January largely confined to patrolling as our forces contacted enemy at scattered points. Hostile arty and mortar fire generally light.

In central sector a newly laid German minefield was located.

On right flank enemy suffered losses in two small and abortive raids North of Mt Sprduro 0327. Hostile patrol driven off near Mt Lenzola (area 0524).

Our patrols, operating deep in enemy territory on rugged 3000 and 4000 foot peaks Northeast of Serchio River, exchanged fire with German patrols a mile or so North of Cutigliano 4006 and some 2 miles Northwest of Mt Mosco 3004. Another clash took place just West of Gaggio 5516.

An enemy patrol moving along Route 1 in coastal sector driven off by our troops in firefight about 4 miles S of Massa 9000.

Weather: slight overcast, fair visibility, no precipitation.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
17 Jan 45.

FIFTH Army

FIFTH Army patrols probing into enemy's forward positions exchanged fire with German forces at several points along the front 16 Jan. One heavy concentration of arty and mortar fire received and a single enemy aircraft, first to appear in many days, dropped bombs in left sector.

On right flank long range MG fire received in area of M. BATTOGLIOLA 1020 and patrol clash took place near M. SPADURO.

In central sector action was brisk near SAN LORENZO 8631 in which vicinity patrols attempting to reach German positions met intense SA fire which forced them to turn back. Other clashes occurred some two miles East of M. GRANDE and at ROCCA PITIGLIANI 6020. More than 200 rounds of arty and mortar fire fell in two and one half hours vicinity BOSCHI 5818.

Bombs dropped by a single enemy aircraft vicinity BAGNI di LUCCA 2797 caused no damage or casualties.

Weather: fair visibility, snow flurries and rain.

EIGHTH Army

No change in EIGHTH Army coastal sector.

Near LEONCINI enemy working parties engaged by our arty towards evening 15 Jan. Enemy very sensitive to movement by our patrols this area.

Fighting along whole of SENIO front continues with local actions each side trying to deny to the other the use of houses near River as observation posts and strong points. Enemy uses bazookas in attempts to demolish houses occupied by our troops.

South of Route 9 deep patrol by Indian troops although ambushed at start succeeded in liquidating enemy outpost, killing 10 and capturing 10.

It can now be revealed that armoured units of the 7th Armoured Bde took part in the sweep made by Major General WHITFIELD's 56th (London) Division to clean enemy from his bridgehead over SENIO South of COTIGNOLA 3 Jan. This Brigade, at present commanded by Brigadier O.L. PRIOR - PALMER, saw distinguished service in the desert with the 7th Armoured Division, the famous "Desert Rats".

Weather: continuing cold, much ground mist, thaw conditions changed to hard frost.

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H.Q. 15 ARMY GROUP
16 Jan '45

EIGHTH ARMY

Coastal sector unchanged.

Enemy raiding party area NE of Alfonsine captured outpost house from our troops but driven off with loss of dead and PWs and house recaptured.

We attacked buildings successfully about two miles NE of Fusignano against heavy opposition. NE of Lugo 3338 we improved our defence positions and patrols forced enemy to withdraw across the river. -

North of Route 9 there was light shelling and mortaring both sides and patrols were engaged by enemy on South bank of river. Enemy activity silenced by heavy mortar fire.

In hills South of Route 9 activity confined to patrolling by our troops.

Weather: Cloudy with rain, sleet or snow.

FIFTH ARMY

Rising temperatures and clearing skies brought some relief to snow-bound Fifth Army troops 15 Jan, although snow lies deep along centre and right sectors as result of the recent storm. During heighth of snow storm more than 12 inches fell in less than 24 hours. Drifts more than 2-feet deep restricted patrolling.

On right flank several patrol clashes occurred causing some enemy casualties. Enemy artillery and mortar fire decreased in the area.

In central sector there was marked increased in enemy artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire.. Enemy patrol activity confined largely to reaction against our patrols. One enemy party crossed Reno river 4 kilometers South of Vergato 7025 but withdrew after exchanging long-range small arms fire with our outposts.

On left flank a number of our patrols were active but little contact reported. Considerable enemy activity observed and there was an increase in enemy artillery fire.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
25 Jan 45.

Fifth Army

Operations on Fifth Army front 14 Jan severely restricted as snow, poor visibility and low temperatures prevented any extensive movement. Our patrols contacted enemy at scattered points and some long range MG fire fell in forward areas. Enemy continued to follow an inconsistent and haphazard pattern in the volume and caliber of his arty fire which was generally light and harassing in nature 14 Jan. No one caliber of shell is heavily predominant in hostile fire although those of 88 mm, 105 mm, 150 mm and 170 mm are most often received. In addition to their own arty, German forces opposing Fifth Army still resorting in a minor degree to use of a variety of foreign arty pieces which include some of Italian, Russian, Czech and French origin.

On right flank S.A. fire repulsed hostile patrols in several areas. Near M Spaduro a German patrol driven off and our arty engaged enemy movement.

In central and left sectors some harassing MG fire received and an enemy patrol of approx 20 men beaten off about two miles West of Barga 1804.

Weather: Snow flurries and light rain, poor visibility.

Eighth Army

Enemy persistence in establishing outposts South of Reno near coast results every day in loss of further PWs. Further enemy raids East of Senio are costing him dear in dead and PWs.

After one such engagement East of Pusignano night 11/12 Jan our outposts found 30 enemy dead next morning.

One enemy party attempting to lay mines East of the Senio near Route 9 driven off by our MG fire and several men captured.

A Polish patrol penetrated 1000 yds beyond Senio to forward slopes of M Chebbio 2024 and returned without casualties after engaging enemy.

Weather: Thaw conditions followed by heavy rains transforming roads into quagmires; fair periods, some rain.

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HQ 15 ARTY GROUP
14 Jan 45.

Eighth Army

Further details of successful Canadian clearing up operation South of the Reno near coast show that enemy company position taken completely by surprise. Troopers of the Governor General's Horseguards assisted by men of local partisan band were able to eliminate whole of company post South of River, troops of which seemed but little trained for active operations after their long spell of coast defence in Norway.

Along whole length of Senio enemy maintains his policy of active defence and has established outposts on East bank in area Fusignano and North of Route 9. Meanwhile his troops are busy elaborating defences in depth. Forced labour of every nationality being used even on Senio frontline works.

Weather: snow conditions followed by rain, and frozen roads.

Fifth Army

With the most severe snowstorm of the winter sweeping high Appenines, activity on Fifth Army front limited generally to security patrolling. The fresh snowfall, totalling from six to eight inches in less than 12 hours, increased depth of snow to average of 12 to 14 inches in most areas. Storm expected to continue for several days. Frontline infantrymen have revetted their foxholes with sandbags and wood to prevent their icy ditches from caving in under pressure of heavy drifts. Wherever possible reserve troops took protection in shell scarred farmhouses defiladed from enemy or huddled in mountain caves.

In right sector one Fifth Army patrol found Furma. (area 1220) clear but received machinegun fire from high ground North of town. A 48 hour patrol probed slopes of Vens Del Gesso 1121 without contacting enemy.

German patrol passed through our outposts one mile North of M Grande night 12 January but enemy withdrew after firefight at close range.

In central sector harassing arty and mortar fire received. Strong enemy combat patrol repulsed with casualties West of Route 65.

On left flank normal enemy arty received and several German patrols repulsed with casualties to enemy.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
13 Jan '45.

Fifth Army.

Aggressive Fifth Army patrols, probing German positions night 11/12 Jan, encountered fierce opposition at two points in central sector and engaged enemy forces in firefights at several other places along the front. Moderately heavy arty and mortar fire fell in our forward areas.

On right flank of Fifth Army front hostile force in La Casetta 0425 reacted strongly to our patrol in that area and laid down heavy fire. Light contact with enemy occurred at several other points in the sector. Fontanelice 0521 shelled by Germans and mortar fire increased in Mt.Grande area.

Combat patrols of our troops attacking Canovetta (area 0732) and San Ansano 8631 met intense rifle, grenade and mortar fire from enemy forces in the two towns. After exchange of fire, patrol attacking Canovetta withdrew under cover of arty barrage. In San Ansano action mortar fire was laid down on our troops when they attempted to cross Savena River and forced them to return to own lines.

Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, for long Commander of German Armies in Italy and rumored to have been ill or wounded, apparently is again in active command of his troops. German order of day for New Year's day, captured on the Italian front, signed by Kesselring, announces "Am leading you in the battle of 1945."

Weather: Overcast skies, fair visibility.

Eighth Army.

After several days of inactivity an engagement in the Comacchio Spit resulted in capture of over 40 PW's. In addition 20 enemy dead were counted. Enemy fighting patrols unusually active night 11/12 Jan in attempts to establish identities of our forward units. One SS raiding party in company strength crossed the Senio near Fusignano. They crossed in three groups, first two of which unsuccessful. Third however blew up some houses before being counterattacked and driven off. Own patrols in this sector also active and positions have been improved.

South of Cotignola our patrols discovered no sign of enemy this side of Senio. Enemy working parties have been active area route 9 and one further patrol driven back.

South of route 9 enemy sent another company raiding party across Senio on night 11/12. This was supported by arty, but made no penetration of our positions and was repulsed. Our own patrols in this sector were active and found enemy in usual positions. We laid two successful ambushes.

Weather: Fair to cloudy; Light snow in places.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
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Eighth Army

Activity in Eighth Army coastal sector limited to light enemy shelling. South of Fusignano 3884 enemy patrol infiltrated into one of our positions but was driven out.

Enemy still maintains small posts in flood bank our side of Senio. He has developed this policy in the valley where abnormal flooding tendency of rivers, each of which has headstream in snow - covered Appenines, necessitates building of artificial flood dash banks sited 50 - 100 yards from and either side of normal river bed. Raised above flat country they are excellent for observation. Inner side of these banks affords excellent cover as they much deeper than outer slope.

At CUTIGNOLA 3654 one of our patrols attempted to get to railway bridge but met extremely heavy opposition and was unable to make headway. Enemy patrols continue active North and South of Route 9. Little activity otherwise.

South of Cuffiano 8023 enemy patrol established itself in buildings our side of Senio and is being dealt with.

Weather: Fair with patches of cloud; hard frost continues.

Fifth Army

Operating deep into enemy territory strong Fifth Army raiding parties were active along entire sector. Although enemy patrolling was lighter several brisk patrol clashes occurred.

On right flank enemy movements engaged by our arty with good effect and normal patrolling general.

In Central sector a patrol engaged in fierce fight. They exchanged hand and rifle grenades as well as bazooka and SA fire and caused number of enemy casualties. Other patrols met concentrated mortar and arty barrages and heavy machine gun fire.

During a patrol to Disotta (area 8329) an American infantry man engaged in hand to hand fight with three Germans when his rifle failed to fire. He knocked out one of enemy by throwing rifle at him and engaged other two with his fists. In ensuing melee one of enemy bit Americans finger to the bone. German mortar fire broke up the Hollywood - style battle and the American patrol forced to withdraw.

Strong patrol to Barchetta (area 8332) found the town unoccupied but received enemy fire from high ground North of town.

On left flank there was increased enemy flare activity.

Along Coast our patrols encountered mines, wire entanglements and machine-gun and mortar fire.

Clear weather enabled Fifth Army arty, working closely with Ground and Air Ops, to blast enemy targets effectively.

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Intelligence Section
Date 13 Jan 45

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
11 Jan '45.

Fifth Army.

Patrols though somewhat restricted by snow and ice were active on Fifth Army front 10 Jan, firefights occurring at several points. Sporadic harassing arty fire and some sniper fire received in forward areas. Our troops again reported enemy groups in white clothing and using skis or snow shoes.

On right flank patrol clashes reported in M.Grande area, in vicinity Rivola and SE of San Clemente 1928. Budrio (area 1121) reported strongly held by enemy. Snipers fired on our positions West of Tossignano.

In central sector our troops repulsed enemy patrol just North of M.Belmonte. Clashes took place also some three miles NE of Bombiana 5818 and same distance SW of Gaggio 5516.

Farther West small enemy raiding party beaten off near Sommocolonia 1906.

Deep drifted snow and icy roads, major obstacles to movement of troops and supplies over road net behind Fifth Army front, are constantly neutralized by highly efficient engineer system of snow and ice removal and road posts. Employing snow plows, bulldozers, scrapers, wreckers and trucks, trained engineer detachments and units maintain twenty four hour vigil on all important supply routes. Road posts set up along principal highways are equipped with snow plows and wreckers to keep roads clear and assist stranded vehicles. These posts, controlled by central engineer office, are alerted if roads become hazardous or vehicles are stalled. Snow is removed almost as it begins to fall and gravel is spread on icy roads and dangerous curves by our troops assisted by Italian labor. These patrol teams cover all roads where drifts likely to hamper traffic. System planned and placed in operation by engineer section of Fifth Army.

Weather: Scattered clouds, fair to good visibility, no rain.

Eighth Army.

In Eighth Army coastal sector another enemy patrol on Southern bank of Reno at 6155 was counterattacked and yielded 10 PW's belonging to 710 Division fresh from coast defence role in Norway. Prisoner said rumour was Hitler had ordered Reno to be held at all costs.

Both sides patrolled aggressively along Senio between routes 16 and 9. One of these patrols from German 278 Division retired on being shot up by us and left some PW's and dead, all discovered to be Italian members of Todt organisation, German Beni Military Labour Corps. PW's claimed they had been driven ahead of patrol as protective screen presumably to draw fire and detonate mines.

In area South of route 9 German SP guns shot up buildings on our side of river. Latter now 5 feet deep and flowing fast.

Germans in more mountainous sector patrolled wearing snow camouflage suits and carrying MG's and bazookas. All these patrols driven off.

Weather: Fair to cloudy; Frost continues.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
16 Jan '45.

Eighth Army

Weather restricted activity on whole Eighth Army front to patrolling.

Enemy patrol 30 strong on Southern bank of Reno at 6155 was driven back by arty fire.

Desert Air Force has carried out successful bombing missions on key road - bridge at Alfonsine with to enemy forces in route 16 sector.

Fifth Army

Clearing skies along Fifth Army front after several days of intermittent snow improved visibility. Bitterly cold temperatures especially during night and deep snow drifts restricted activity to local patrolling and sporadic arty exchanges.

On right flank enemy patrol crossed Senio River East of Riv le 1421 but driven back by our troops. Enemy resisted attempts of our patrols to cross river in the same area. Enemy raid in M Spadura area repulsed with small arty that caused some enemy casualties.

In central sector light arty and mortar fire received. Reconnaissance patrols by enemy and American troops operated South of Bologna.

On left flank strong enemy patrol repulsed North of Volpere (area 6229). Some of our troops patrolling near Calamini 1202 West of Serchio River received bazooka and SP fire from the town. The patrol took cover and directed arty fire on enemy positions.

Weather: fair to cloudy with frost continuing.

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Hq 15 ARMY GROUP

9 Jan '45

FIFTH ARMY

White clad Fifth Army reconnaissance parties and ski patrols made little contact with enemy as deep snows continued to restrict activity all along front. Continued snowfall 8 Jan added several inches to depth of snow now more than twelve inches in some areas.

In right sector there was increase in enemy patrols. All were repulsed. In M Grande area 30-man enemy patrol in white snow suits was driven off.

In central sector virtually no ground activity except limited patrolling. A patrol of 361 Infantry Regt encountered heavy German opposition near enemy held town of Barchetta (area 8632) East of Route 65 on night 7/8 Jan. Enemy highly sensitive to our movements toward village and delivered intense SA and mortar fire.

In coastal sector increase in enemy arty reported. One of our patrols penetrating close to enemy positions received grenade fire.

Under protection of Red Cross flag 7 Jan a four-man litter squad and guide crossing no-mans-land in daylight to pick up wounded American officer were fired on by enemy MG. Guide returned wounded and reported two of litter bearers killed. The other two litter bearers have not returned.

Despite numerous measures taken by Germans to impress their troops with honor and glory of death on battlefield, recent enemy practices on Fifth Army front indicate that enemy still seeking to employ his own "glorious" dead to cause casualties among Allied troops. Boobytrapping bodies of both his own and our battle dead is on the increase. Such devices may consist of grenade concealed in uniform pocket of slain soldier with concealed wire running from grenade's safety pin to a stake under body, or other ingenious applications of same principle.

In addition to grenade type of booby trap enemy has employed teller (or a/tk) mines with igniters so set that any unwary attempt to remove body will detonate mine. S. mines, schu mines and simple explosive charges have been similarly employed and are often concealed near bodies. Such practices have been noted at various stages of Italian campaign but are now being resorted to more frequently.

EIGHTH ARMY

Slight thaw during day but deep snow on whole front still hampering operations.

In coastal sector enemy established patrol on Southern bank of River Reno at 6155 South of narrow spit of land East of Lake Comacchio. We took PW.

Area S Alberto heavily shelled.

Patrols were active down whole of Senio front. Small groups of enemy infantry maintained positions East of River dug deep into reverse slope of bank.

Weather: Fair at first but unsettled and followed by rain and snow.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

8 Jan '45

EIGHTH ARMY

Heavy falls of snow and rain curtailed activity on whole front.

In coastal sector difficulties further added to by mines, demolitions and flooded fields. Despite this British and Canadian troops pushed up coast as far as Casal Borsetti 6352 and farther inland as far as river Reno where it leaves SE corner of Lake Comacchio at 6155.

Elsewhere aggressive patrolling both sides especially in area Fusignano 3844 where enemy raiding party beaten off in early hours of 6 Jan.

In four days Canadian and British troops have cleared 50 square miles between Ravenna and the Valli di Comacchio. Six hundred prisoners were taken and four field guns captured intact. Also captured was a quantity of enemy equipment including mortars and A/tank guns. Eight tanks or SP guns were destroyed.

Weather : cloudy with rain and sleet, and snow on ground.

FIFTH ARMY

Moving with great difficulty over slippery mountain paths and trails and through deep drifted snow Fifth Army patrols maintained contact with enemy 7 Jan. Hostile arty and mortar fire decreased slightly. Patrols operating high in rugged Appennines obliged to move slowly and with great caution. Snow flurries and fog reduced visibility to a few yards in most sectors and mountain streams swollen to abnormal proportions hindered forward movement. In many sectors troops are using snow shoes, skis and white clothing.

Short firefights took place in areas of M Grande and M Belmonte in right sector. Some long range MG fire received in central sector. An estimated 15-man enemy patrol repulsed one and half miles SW M Belvedere 5217 by SA and arty fire. Night 5/6 Jan American infantrymen suspecting a hostile group was in the area, fired three white phosphorus mortar shells in quick succession, the bursts revealing German patrol about one hundred yards away. Enemy patrol withdrew after fire placed on them.

Weather : restricted visibility, snow flurries in mountains.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
7 Jan 45.

Fifth Army

Heavy snows, in some areas a foot deep, and poor visibility restricted operations on Fifth Army front 6 Jan to lowest point in several days. Hostile arty and mortar fire fell all along front. German flare activity general.

In right sector patrols clashed at Casetta 0032 and mile NW of M Della Volpe 1420. Hostile patrols suffered casualties in firefight just South of Tossignano. Rocket projectiles fell in M.Grande area and enemy shelled Casola Valsenio 1017. Also on right flank enemy fired propaganda leaflets into our lines.

In central sector American patrol returning from mission near S Ansano 8631 engaged in a tug of war with Germans over a telephone wire trailing behind Americans. Patrols clashed immediately NE of Monterumici 8328.

Enemy MG just SE of Montecavalloro 6621 silenced by our mortar fire.

Eighth Army

Continuing their pursuit of disorganised German units retreating up spit of land East of Lake Comacchio Canadian tanks and infantry, despite demolitions, mines and floods, have cut line of retreat of about two companies of enemy in marshes South of Mandriole 5858.

Enemy who retreated Westward from S Alberto were met by their own guns coming up to support them. In resulting confusion we captured four field guns and crews.

To South pockets of enemy still hold East bank of Senio and mopping up continues.

Enemy shelling and mortaring has increased considerably on whole front South of Cotignola and in one case enemy patrol used flamethrowers.

Weather: Rain; Some snow in mountains.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
6 Jan 45.

Eighth Army.

Drive over Canale Bonifica surprised Germans defending southern shores of the Valli di Comacchio and forced them to withdraw from S. Alberto area in westerly and easterly directions.

Canadian tanks and infantry followed up and after occupying S. Alberto drove east towards Mandriole 5852 in pursuit of routed enemy.

Desert Air Force strafed retreating Germans and inflicted heavy casualties.

East of Alfonsine complete defeat of yesterday's counter attacks, in which British and Canadian infantry beat off Germans double their own strength, was followed by consolidation of our positions east of the Fosso Vecchio which at this point flows parallel to and 1000 yards east of the Senio.

South of Cotignola 3534 whole of enemy's Senio bridgehead finally swept clear and remaining German pockets which had been isolated by armoured thrusts are being mopped up by supporting infantry. In this operation nearly 300 PW's taken and total on whole front between Faenza and Lake Comacchio over 500.

Further south activity on both sides limited to patrolling.

Fifth Army

With enemy extremely sensitive to probes by Fifth Army combat and reconnaissance parties, extensive patrolling continues all along front. A brilliant moon reflecting on snow blanket that covers front enabled enemy to detect our approaching night patrols and lay down terrific MG and mortar barrages.

Fifth Army right flank relatively quiet with slight shelling and mortaring. A series of patrol contacts reported.

Under cover of long range MG and SA fire a 10 man German patrol in central sector attempted to pierce our lines north of Livergnano night 4 Jan. American infantrymen dispersed patrol which withdrew after returning some fire. Earlier in evening an outpost in same area heard enemy tank moving in darkness and called down an arty concentration. Results of barrage evidenced after firing by appearance of German medics.

Clear visibility in central sector enabled our observation post arty teams to wipe out number of enemy guns and emplacements.

On left flank ferocity of patrol clashes characterised by one Fifth Army patrol that surprised enemy sentry whom they killed with a knife. Later this same patrol, attacked by 6 Germans, killed all enemy party. Some patrols in this sector prowl in enemy territory for as long as 24 hours at a time.

Patrols in coastal sector say enemy continues to booby trap our dead, as well as their own.

Today marks the second anniversary of the organization of the Fifth Army which was activated on 5 Jan 1943 at Oujda North Africa.

Weather : fair to cloudy becoming overcast with intermittent snow.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
5 Jan 45.

Sharp firefights flared up in many sectors of FIFTH Army front as our aggressive patrols sparred with enemy raiding parties on both sides of the lines.

On right flank firefights occurred in vicinity of VIA DEL GESSO 1121, a sheer escarpment extending all along right sector front.

Four hundred yards SE of TOSSIGNANO enemy, using incendiary bullets, set fire to several houses. A British patrol engaged enemy strongpoint North of M. CASTELLO 0031, knocked out MG and inflicted casualties.

Following heavy exchange of arty mortar and SA fire US troops drove off enemy raid about one mile North of LIVERGNANO in an engagement lasting more than an hour. Enemy has been observed expanding his elaborate defences South of BOLOGNA with mines, barbed wire and other defensive works.

Approximately six enemy aircraft flew over central sector evening 3 Jan and dropped bombs and incendiaries about five miles East of LUCIANO 8624. They were engaged by our antiaircraft guns and one JU 87 was hit.

NE of COLLE TIMAINE 7526 an outpost of the South African Division was surrounded by an enemy party but enemy dispersed by our mortar fire. In some area opposing patrols engaged in grenade fight.

Brazilian troops repelled strong enemy combat patrol North of VOLPARA (area 6220) after a firefight.

SANTERNO Valley sector remains quiet with active patrols maintaining contact. Germans effecting unit relief West of M. STELLATO 9496 were brought under surprise fire by our mortars and sustained many casualties.

Eighth Army

On EIGHTH Army front battle becoming more intense South of VALLI DI COMACCHIO. Enemy being forced back from his defensive positions on network of canals West of coastal marshes.

Fighting on along lateral road from CONVENTELLO 4847 Canadian Infantry and tanks reached CASTLE BONIFICA (see 5151) one and a half miles SW of S. ALBERTO 5352. Turning swiftly Eastward along South bank of BONIFICA our troops captured bridge over canal intact SE of S. ALBERTO. They crossed over and pressed on North towards old LAMONE watercourse, now dry.

In fighting South of BONIFICA at least 5 Tigers and 5 German SP guns knocked out.

Enemy counterattacked strongly from SENIO River NE of ALFONSINE against left flank of Canadian advance. They used reserve Recce troops of 8S and 26 Panzer Divs in infantry role. Despite their strength all counterattacks repulsed and over 150 PW taken.

British and Canadian troops mounted surprise attacks and gained further territory against German bridgehead pocket between NAVIGLIO and SENIO Rivers. Canadians established bridgehead one mile wide across NAVIGLIO West of GRANAROLO 3531 against considerable opposition and mines. To SW British tanks supported by infantry of British 56 (London) Division Commanded by Major General J.Y. Whitfield made arm used sweep between NAVIGLIO and SENIO rapidly reducing remaining German bridgehead by over half and causing considerable confusion among surprised Germans. This successful operation was culminating point of previous skillful fighting by the men of 56th Division veterans of Gothic Line battle of GEMMANO which led up to this advance. In British and Canadian operations Germans lost further 100 PW in few hours and 2 SP guns knocked out.

Our patrols active along SENIO both sides of Route 9.

Further ST strong enemy raiding parties supported by arty, Nebelwerfer and mortar fire crossed SENIO but all forced back to North bank.

Weather: becoming cloudy; outlook unsettled.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
4 Jan '45.

Eighth Army.

No change in extreme coastal sector of Eighth Army front.

In area NE of Alfonsine Canadian infantry and armour continued their thrust Northward from Route 16. They inflicted heavy casualties on German Jaeger troops and took a further 100 PW. After capturing Conventello 4847 we advanced along the S. Alberto 5552 road on West side of Fosso Vecchio gaining some 3000 yards against Tiger and Panther tanks brought up by Germans to support their failing infantry. Tank slugging match continues some two miles from S. Alberto.

Reduction of bridgehead West of Senio continues and British troops operating between Faviglio and Senio have gained upwards of 500 yards against stiff opposition.

Activity elsewhere confined to patrolling.

Weather : Fine to fair.

Fifth Army

In Fifth Army's right sector German raids in areas of M Del Verro (area 0425) and Sillaro ridge (area 0826) preceded by rocket (Nebelwerfer) barrage repulsed with losses to attackers. Along Senio river enemy remained extremely sensitive to our thrusts. Hostile forces in hamlet of Paradiso immediately NW of Tossignano 0823 engaged our patrols as they tried to enter village.

Our party in central sector broke up small enemy raid vicinity S. Ansano (area 8631). Fairly heavy hostile arty fell vicinity Liverzano. German attempts to ambush our patrols continued.

South of M. Sole 7629 South African troops clashed with small enemy groups. Tank enemy raids in the Caggio 5516 area repulsed with arty, and hand grenades. Harassing arty and mortar fire in all sectors.

Weather : excellent visibility, no precipitation.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
3 Jan 45

Fifth Army

Fifth Army raiding parties and patrols pushed deeply into enemy positions on various parts of the front. Strong enemy patrols, some with mortar and arty support, also were active.

In right sector of front decrease in enemy arty noted. Extensive patrolling by both sides carried out all along sector.

In central sector large enemy patrol overran one of our outposts North of Liverzano night 1 Jan but position later retaken in counterattack by our troops. Concealed along routes of approach to German positions enemy parties attempted to ambush several of our patrols and sharp fire fights ensued. We captured some prisoners.

On left flank strong enemy combat patrol supported by mortars and arty repulsed near Montecavalloro 6621.

In coastal area our patrols made contact with enemy at several points and encountered number of booby traps along Route One in direction of Massa 9101.

Eighth Army

Positions remained unchanged in Eighth Army coastal sector. In area East of Alfonsine Canadian Infantry and armour continued clearing up strong enemy positions between Lamone and Fosso Vecchio in a Northeasterly thrust. They captured over 70 PW from German Jaeger who stubbornly defended each Casa.

Farther South the pocket East of Senio being slowly cleared but must still be regarded as a substantial enemy bridgehead over river.

Elsewhere activity both sides confined to patrols and light shelling.

In recent fighting tiny farmstead Casa Baldi-Randi was captured. Here Major Fiore, one time land agent to Mussolini, was executed by German SS at request of former master.

Weather: Fair periods with some snow in mountains.

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HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
2 Jan '45.

Eighth Army

Positions unchanged in Eighth Army coastal sector. We received light shelling this area night 31 Dec/1 Jan.

To the SW patrols both sides still active along Senio river bend. SW of FUSIGNANO 3844 German raiding party with mortar support crossed river but forced back to West bank. Enemy suffered casualties and we took some PW. More PW taken when we repulsed small scale enemy attack across Senio North of COTIGNOLA. East of Naviglio enemy counterattacked strongpoint house 1000 yds NE of VILLA GUAGLIA (area 3430) but driven off after sharp engagement. Further gains made between Naviglio and Senio.

British troops occupied Church in S. ANDREA 3329. Our patrols pushed on North of S. ANDREA but forced to withdraw by enemy MG fire. Our patrols probed beyond road previously occupied NE of S. PIETRO in LAGUNA.

Patrols both sides also active along SENIO North of Route 9. Enemy patrols which crossed river at several points forced to retire to West bank. Our arty and mortar fire very active this sector.

Our fighting patrols active also South of Route 9 along SENIO.
Eighth Army arty harassed German transport on CUFFIANO - RIOLO road (2023 - 1823).

Weather: Cloudy with light snowfalls over battle area followed by some fair periods.

Fifth Army

On Fifth Army right sector 1 Jan SAN MARTINO (area 1421) reported clear of enemy. Hostile patrols engaged in vicinity of M. CERERE and M. SPADURO and firefights took place in areas of M. CASTELLARO and M. GRANDE.

Enemy heavily shelled FONTANELICE 0521 and increased mortar and arty fire also received in other areas of this sector.

In central sector enemy turned propaganda loudspeakers on our troops in one area and followed up his "program" with weak patrol activity. A firefight occurred at PARROCCHIA 9632. The M. GRANDE area again heavily shelled by enemy.

In SERCHIO River Valley area, where our patrols tested enemy defences, enemy patrols driven off. Hostile arty fire increased. Area otherwise quiet.

Enemy fired rifle grenades SW of CASTELNUOVO 6622 and a small enemy patrol was repulsed near ROCCA PITIGLIANA 6020.

Farther West and in coastal sector Fifth Army troops improved positions and maintained pressure against enemy.

Weather: Fair to good visibility, slight overcast in some sectors; no rain or snow.

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MMIA	HQ RAC	214 Gp RAF
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3 Jan

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
1 Jan '45

CONFIDENTIAL

Fifth Army

On the Fifth Army right flank enemy particularly sensitive. Our patrols again encountered heavy fire from enemy positions while attempting to cross Senio river near Rivola 1421. Several patrol fire fights occurred also in area South of M. Del Casino 1022.

Increased enemy nebelwerfer fire fell in central sector. Mortar and rifle grenade fire was received SW of Montecavallero 6621.

Against scattered resistance our troops pressed forward in Serchio river area and recaptured all ground taken by enemy East of river in his recent heavy attack. Pushing forward from [illegible] our troops advanced nearly two kilometers across Corsonna stream to occupy hill town of Sommocolonia 1906 one of first places taken by enemy in Serchio Valley attack. Fifth Army troops also made limited advances West of the Serchio where they received enemy fire from Hills overlooking Gallicano.

Coastal sector quiet except for active patrolling. No change in forward positions.

Eighth Army

Our patrols active in Eighth Army coastal sector. Positions unchanged.

To SW patrols both sides active along Senio river bend. Strong Canadian raiding party supported by arty and tanks attacked towards Senio East of Fusignano 3744 and destroyed some enemy MGs on East bank of river. Our arty dispersed German patrol which tried to cross river North of Cotignola 3534. Enemy suffered casualties.

British troops made further gains between Naviglio and Senio North of Faenza. Night 30/31 Dec we forced crossing over Fosso Vecchio canal SW of S Andrea 3329 against strong opposition and occupied buildings beyond canal. Vecchio runs parallel to and one mile West of Naviglio this area.

Further SW our troops pushed on and now control one mile stretch of road NE of S Pietro In Laguna 3028 at right angles to Naviglio. Many mines encountered this area.

Patrols from both sides active along Senio North of Route 9. Enemy working parties on West bank this area heavily engaged by our mortars and MG fire. We received considerable shelling between railway and Route 9.

Our patrols active South of Route 9. Enemy patrol crossed river this area but forced back to West bank.

Still further SW one of our patrols successfully ambushed and attacked enemy patrol. Five of six Germans killed.

Weather: clear and cold.

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SEVENTH ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 10 of 14 JUL 43

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1. OPERATIONS : 10-12 JULY

So far the invasion of SICILY has progressed as well as could possibly have been hoped and far better than could reasonably have been expected. The enemy's position is already extremely difficult, for not only were the German forces badly dispersed at the time of landing, but their Italian comrades, who were better placed to resist it, have shown singularly little ability or even inclination to do so.

Our forces landed on the morning of the 10th and found the beach defences as slight as had been expected. Landings were, in fact, mainly handicapped by the heavy cross swell, which made it difficult to get craft ashore. Enemy opposition was equally slight in most places, and it appears from statements by prisoners that complete surprise was effected. This is confirmed by the fact that almost the only enemy troops encountered during the first day's operations belonged to 206 and 207 Coastal Divisions and 134 Independent Coastal Regt. The enemy was unable to put either his Italian or German Field divisions into action.

On the East coast, the greatest degree of opposition was encountered at the Northern end of the Gulf of NOTO, but by 0930 hrs, satisfactory progress was being made in all sectors. The PACHINO area was cleared and 700 PW taken, AVOLA was occupied and NOTO attacked. By 2100 hrs, SYRACUSE had fallen.

Meanwhile, our forces further South were advancing from PACHINO towards ISPICA. The landings on the SW coast at LICATA and between GELA and PUNTA SECCA were equally successful. LICATA was in our hands by 1155 hrs, and our tanks were pushing Northwards towards CANICATTI. GELA was also captured, and by 1710 hrs a battalion of LIVORNO Division, the only field formation to be encountered during the day, was withdrawing towards BUTERA. To the SE, SCOGLITTI was occupied and our forces pushed on towards VITTORIA.

On 11 July, the enemy had recovered from the shock of our landings, at least sufficiently to put a proportion of his field divisions into action, but there were no signs of coherently planned counter-measures, nor, indeed, have any appeared subsequently. The Italian dispositions revealed few surprises. 54 NAPOLI Division, whose suspected move to the SE from CALTAGIRONE was confirmed, added its rather ineffective support to the resistance North and West of SYRACUSE, and 4 LIVORNO Division made a number of piece-meal counter-attacks on GELA from the West and NW. 103 PIACENZA Division, however, which was thought to be in the CATANIA Plain, took no part in the day's operations, and has, so far, not been identified on the ground. It is pre-eminently the moves of the German forces which, in this campaign even more than in NORTH AFRICA, give the clue to the enemy's appreciation of the situation and his capacity to deal with it. It became clear that he had been caught at a disadvantage, for although during the day he managed to mount a counter-attack against GELA from the direction of BISCARI with 2 HERMANN GOERING Gren Regt and 45 of the Division's tanks, he could do nothing to counter our threat to AUGUSTA and the vital CATANIA Plain, and was busily engaged in moving the bulk of 15 "Panzer" Division across from the Western part of the island. He began by misappreciating the direction of our attack;

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he went on to misappreciate its most important immediate objectives, and he was unable to concentrate a sufficiently strong force to make a decisive counter-attack at the point he selected.

The weight of the attack on GELA was, indeed, considerable, and at one time it reached the outskirts of the town, but it encountered determined defence and was repulsed with the loss of 10 Mk IV tanks. It is noteworthy that 3 P.G.R. of 15 Panzer Division did not take part in the attack, having apparently moved Westwards to join 1 P.G.R. The attempt of LIVORNO to co-operate from the West was no more successful, though elements reached TORRE MANFRIA H.1433. Meanwhile, to the SW our forces were approaching COMISO and on the Eastern flank we had occupied PRIOLO J0540, the high ground West of CASSIBILE J.0620, NOTO and ROSOLINI H8503 and ISPICA. Very little movement was observed on the roads South from the CATANIA Plain, and the expected enemy counter-attack did not materialize. By contrast, heavy movement was seen on the roads running from BOLOGNETTA B5030 as the main body of 15 Panzer Division struggled Eastwards under heavy bombardment from the air. Whether either 26 ASSIETTA or 28 AOSTA Divisions were also concerned in the movement remains to be seen.

On 12 July, nothing further was seen of this movement from West to East, and it must be supposed either that 15 Panzer Division has reached a new concentration area (there are indications that its HQ was in the central area of the island) or has been held up by damage to the roads caused by air bombing attacks. The remaining P.G.R. of the Division, No 2, was identified in the PRIOLO area together with elements of the HERMANN GOERING Division. It appears, therefore, that at least the greater part of the German infantry available in the CATANIA area was committed to stopping the rot South of AUGUSTA. It was not successful, however, for the town was occupied yesterday evening. SOLARINO H.9934 and MELILLI J.0043 were both occupied by our forces, and a further advance made from the latter place towards VILLASMUNDO H.9751. To the SW, the advance was equally rapid. Our armour passed through BUCCHERI H.7637 and pushed to the outskirts of VIZZINI H.7641, while the infantry on their left occupied MODICA and RAGUSA and advanced NNE towards CLIPPATANA H.7028, and further SW captured COMISO airfield. Neither PIACENZA Division nor the tanks of HERMANN GOERING appeared on the ground to contest these advances.

In the GELA area, the Battle Group from the HERMANN GOERING Division was unable to renew its counter-attack, and was attacked in its turn and pushed back to the area just South of NISCEMI. LIVORNO Division was also counter-attacked and driven back with heavy loss, 33 Inf Regt being practically destroyed. Further West, the troops round LICATA extended their bridgehead to CAMPOBELLO G.9251 and NARO G.8155 and were moving in Northwards on CANICATTI and INE on RIESI H.0758.

The total of PW taken so far is in the neighbourhood of 10,000.

Conclusion: The enemy's power to resist and counter-attack our advance depends on the two German divisions in the island. Of these, one has been split and the other, less one regt, has not yet reached the battle area. It is possible that a relatively strong counter-attack force can be assembled from 15 Panzer Division and part, at any rate, of the HERMANN GOERING Division, though it may prove difficult to disengage the latter. But his initial misappreciation and overhasty reaction have allowed us to develop a deep bridgehead and build up a large force, and he will find it difficult now to counter-attack effectively with the forces at present in the island.

/2. Enemy.....

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2. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

The following is a list of Contact Identifications as known 1900 hrs 12 July 43.

On the Italian side, the published Order of Battle has been proved substantially correct, though in some cases the organisation of Coastal Bns in Regts has been at fault. There are in addition some new identifications.

Later information is that Gen. D'HAVET, G.O.C. 206 Coastal Div has been captured and the Division can be assumed to have been all but destroyed.

With regard to the German identifications, our previous knowledge has been substantially confirmed. I/P.G.R. 2 has evidently moved down from the CATANIA area to cover the approaches to AUGUSTA, while the H.G. tanks have gone across to meet the threat from the GELA area.

NATIONALITY	UNIT	PLACE	TIME
1. GERMAN	1 Bn 2 Pz Gren Regt.	PRIOLO	a.m. 12
	an A.Tk Bn	"	a.m. 12
	?? elts H.G. Div	"	p.m. 11
	Tank Unit with Mk IV	East GELA	a.m. 11
	(Identified as Hermann Goering)	" "	a.m. 12
2. ITALIAN	384 Bn 194 Coastal Regt	GELA	
	390 Bn " " ")		
	419 Bn " " ")		
	1 Coy 12 M.G. Bn)	LICATA area	a.m. 10
	711 M.G. Coy)		and 11
	586 Tp 198 Bty 24 Arty Regt)		
	? 159 Bn		a.m. 10
	496 Tp 161 SP Bty 90/53		a.m. 11
	389 (or 289?) Bn 194 Coastal Regt	SCOGLITTI-DIRILLO	a.m. 10
	206 Coastal Div (	ISPICA	a.m. 10
	(	MODICA	a.m. 11
	139 Coastal Regt	LICATA	a.m. 10
	122 Coastal Regt (	ISPICA	a.m. 10
	(	?MODICA?	a.m. 11
	375 Bn 122 Coastal Regt (wiped out?)	6890	a.m. 10
	18 Mob Bty 149/35	PACHINO	p.m. 10
	249 Bn (wiped out?)	PACHINO	a.m. 10
	374 Bn	Between CASSIBILE and SYRACUSE	a.m. 11
	224 Skoda Bty (destroyed)	NOTO	a.m. 10
	146 Coastal Regt (wiped out?)	NOTO	a.m. 10
	420 Bn 146 Coastal Regt	AVOLA	a.m. 10
	104 M.G. Bn	NOTO	a.m. 10
	1 Bn 75 Inf Regt	J. 1029	p.m. 10
	1 Bn)		
	2 Bn) 75 Inf Regt	SOLARINO-FLORIDIA	a.m. 11
	3 Bn)		
	54 Arty Regt (Elements)	MODICA	a.m. 11
	179 CCNN Legion (Elements)	MODICA	day 11
	21 Sapper Coy/11 Assault Eng Bn	Outside SYRACUSE	p.m. 10
	68 Nucleo A/F)		
	69 " ")	LENTINI	a.m. 11
	78 " ")		
	79 " "	SYRACUSE	p.m. 10
	80 " "	SYRACUSE	p.m. 10

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NATIONALITY	UNIT	PLACE	TIME
ITALIAN	84 Nucleo A/P	SYRACUSE	p.m. 10
	85 " "	SYRACUSE	p.m. 10
	453 " "	MARZAMEI	a.m. 11
	372 Coastal Bn	area CARLENTINI	a.m. 11
	456 Coastal Bn (7146 Coastal Regt)	MOTTA	a.m. 12

NOTE: Most of the locations and times are slightly in error. Time does not allow proper classification

3. ENEMY SHIPPING AND SUPPLY

A. Messina Straits Train Ferry

As had been anticipated for some time, one of the 2 train ferries which had been present at TARANTO since May 15, has now returned to the Straits of Messina. She was observed there by PR on the morning of July 11, after reconnaissance on July 8 had revealed her departure from TARANTO. There are now two train ferries active in the Straits. The one recently arrived has a deadweight capacity of 175 tons, while the other has a capacity of 450 tons. Assuming that the new arrival makes the same number of trips per day as her sister ship, it is estimated that her return to service will increase the intake across the straits by some 525 tons daily.

B. Use of Northern Ports and Lighter traffic.

With SYRACUSE and AUGUSTA already in our hands, and the threat to CATANIA such that the enemy may no longer consider it safe to use this port, all Eastern Sicilian harbours have almost certainly been abandoned as ports of intake. The natural corollary is that the enemy will be forced to rely on the Northern ports of MESSINA and PALERMO, and make more use than hitherto of the small harbours of MILAZZO and TERMINI. The difficulty for the enemy lies not in the capacity of the two principal re-mining ports, which is more than ample for maintenance needs, but in port clearance. Already almost all offloading of ships at MESSINA is done by lighter owing to damage to port installations. MESSINA is already somewhat of a bottleneck since all stores despatched by rail can only be routed either South via CATANIA or West via TERMINI (junction of the Northern and East-West line from CATANIA). Owing to the rapid progress along the east coast it seems likely that the Northern route will have to bear the burden of all the traffic destined for forces operating from the centre of the island. From TERMINI onwards there will be the extra congestion caused by movement of supplies landed at PALERMO for similar destinations. Furthermore, the ports of TERMINI and MILAZZO have access only onto the same main line which is likely therefore to be heavily over-loaded.

The use of PALERMO, as well as the Western ports of TRAPANI and MARSALA, has already been largely denied to the enemy for the last three months owing to vulnerability from air attacks and damage done by previous raids. As pointed out, the difficulties of operating the remaining ports are such that there can be little doubt that from now on the enemy will rely even more on lighterage and ferry traffic across the Straits than on shipping to the Northern ports. As stated in para A a second train ferry is now back in service and PR continues to show large numbers of small craft operating in the Straits. Despite the fact that large numbers of craft have to be used to achieve the daily tonnage which could be brought by say even one 1500 - 3000 ton ship, the advantages of small craft are obvious; quick turn round, use of small harbours, and smaller target for air attack. It seems certain therefore that from now on the enemy will expand the already considerable volume of lighter traffic across the Straits and rely mainly on this for supply intake to SICILY.

/C. Enemy shipping.....

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C. Enemy Shipping in the Mediterranean.

Extensive PR of Mediterranean, Adriatic and Aegean harbours has enabled an estimate to be made of the enemy's shipping resources in the Mediterranean. The presence of 1,654,000 g.r.t. of shipping over 250 g.r.t. has been established in these ports. To this should be added an estimated total of 115,000 g.r.t. for shipping at sea or in minor ports not covered, thus giving a grand total of 1,769,000 g.r.t. present in the Mediterranean. Of this same 150,000 g.r.t. is represented by damaged vessels.

The true significance of this mass of figures can only be appreciated if the distribution of the shipping within the Mediterranean is considered. This indicates that the Western Mediterranean has for some time been the most active sector. At the middle of May some 55% of the enemy's total resources were in the West with 45% in the Adriatic and Aegean. The difference is however, greater than a mere estimate of gross tonnage would indicate, for in the Western Mediterranean, a larger proportion of the shipping is serviceable. After making allowances for ships generally unsuitable for military and commercial purposes, it is estimated that 60% of the enemy's serviceable shipping in the Mediterranean remains West of the Sicilian Channel. No considerable West-East movements have recently been observed.

D. Damage to Communications.

As a result of an air attack on the railway system of MESSINA on 12 July the main line to CATANIA and PALERMO was shown by PR to be blocked.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES

(a) Italian

58 LEGNANO Division. There are reports that this division, located in the DRAGUIGNAN - FREJUS area of Southern FRANCE has returned to ITALY. Its destination is unknown.

(b) German

As was anticipated two German Divisions from France are now thought to be in ITALY: namely the 16 Armoured and 29 Motorised Divisions. The location of these divisions is as yet unknown and there is no evidence that either is intended for SICILY. It seems more likely that both are intended for the defence of the Italian mainland. Both these divisions were wiped out at Stalingrad and have since been reformed in France.

It must not be assumed however, that these are the only German divisions likely to arrive in Italy. As was suggested in Summary No. 8 Germany has again formed a reserve of divisions in France (consisting almost entirely of reformed Stalingrad divisions) and it seems probable that these are more likely to be sent to Italy and the Balkans than to Russia. 60 Mot Division (reported by GOEBBELS to be renamed 2 Pz Grenadier Div) was among the divisions believed to have left France for Italy where it was reforming in the NIMES-AVIGNON area. There have as yet been no further reports of the move of this or other divisions to Italy but further formations may be expected.

The migration of German divisions to the Balkans and in particular to S. GREECE continues. 100 Light Division, (another of the Stalingrad Divisions) has been identified in YUGOSLAVIA, probably in the BELGRADE area. 104 (704) Jaeger Division is now thought to be in N. GREECE enroute from YUGOSLAVIA to S. GREECE; and the presence of 1 Armoured Division in GREECE is now definitely accepted.

The four German Garrison Infantry Divisions, 704, 714, 717, and 718 which have been in the Balkans for some eighteen months have now all been upgraded to Jaeger Divisions and renamed 104, 114, 117, and 118.

3. NOTES ON ENEMY FORCES.

(a) Hermann Goering Div Recognition Signs.

The following information has been obtained from PW captured in Tunisia.

(i) Arms of Service.....

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(i) Arms of Service.

The colours of the arms in this Division followed more closely G.A.F. than German Army procedure, e.g.

GREEN - Grenadier and Jaeger Regts.
BROWN - Signals.
RED - Anti Aircraft and Artillery.
YELLOW- Tank, S.P. Artillery and Recce Units.

The pointer on the clockface which is the emblem of the division is coloured according to the arm. Artillery is distinguished from Anti Aircraft by the addition of a red inner circle on the clockface.

(ii) H.Q. and Command Flags.

H.G. Div H.Q. - A square flag divided into three horizontal stripes, coloured black, white and red. The German Air Force Eagle is superimposed.

Div Comd's Flag (on car) - A square flag divided diagonally into red and black triangles and with the German Air Force Eagle superimposed.

Bn H.Q. Flag - In each case a triangular pennant with a horizontal stripe in the colour of the arm.

(b) 132 ARIETE Armoured Division.

A captured document shows that ARIETE Division, destroyed at EL ALAMEIN is being reconstituted with the following main units: MONTEBELLO Lancers, VICTOR EMANUEL II Cavalry, LUCCA Cavalry "in their latest mechanised and motorised form."

COMMENT:

132 ARIETE (or Battering-ram) Division was the first Italian armoured division to be sent to North Africa. It arrived in the Spring of 1941 but the tanks had been sent over ahead, in time to be destroyed by General WAVELL at BEDA FOMM. Thenceforth ARIETE endured all the vicissitudes of the Libyan campaigns; always ill-equipped and almost always under-strength, it was destroyed, revived and reorganised times without number. Italian propaganda was however, industrious in "building up" its reputation and indeed it did on the whole show better form than either of the other two Italian armoured divisions. It is therefore not surprising that the name of ARIETE should be given to the new division which is being collected together after the loss of all Italian armoured divisions in Africa.

The VICTOR EMANUEL II Cavalry Regiment is normally in 2 Cavalry Division at present located in Southern FRANCE. It is known that it had been the Italian intention to convert this division into 134 Armoured Division, which, according to reliable reports, was to be named ERECCIA after one of the Italian divisions which took part in the Spanish Civil War. Recent reports had, however, indicated that the proposed conversion had not progressed beyond the mechanisation of the artillery regiment. It is probable that the revival of ARIETE marks the definite abandonment of the scheme.

MONTEBELLO and LUCCA Cavalry Regiments are of recent creation, though regiments of those names existed during the last war. MONTEBELLO Regiment is numbered 8 and was last identified at PESCARA. The fact that this town is also the depot of 2 Cavalry Division suggests that the new ARIETE Division is an offshoot of 2 Cavalry Division, but it is probable that the latter will

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continue to exist.

Mechanised cavalry regiments are normally equipped with six ton light tanks or armoured cars. The new division is probably designed mainly as a light armoured formation, though it is possible that it will have a battalion of medium tanks attached (now organisation 20 x 13 ton tanks and 24 x 75 mm guns self-propelled on 13 ton tank chassis.

T.S. AIREY
B.G.S.(I)

GSI(a)
14 Jul 43

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 11 of 17 JULY 43.

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1. OPERATIONS : 13 - 15 JULY.

After six days operations the enemy has still been unable to mount a serious counter-attack and it is clear that by the evening of the 14th he had decided that it was impossible to organise one with the forces at his disposal, and had consequently abandoned all hope of holding us South of the CATANIA Plain. The enemy appears from the start to have laid himself open to defeat in detail, and to have failed not only to make any use of the Italian formations from the West but even to concentrate German forces in the East for a full scale counter attack.

HERMANN GOERING Division is split between the East Coast and area NISCEMI - CALTAGIRONE. The coastal battle group of this division is now known, from captured documents, to form the Brigade Schmalz with III Bn H.G. Pzgr Regt (equipped with SP guns) I Bn HG PGR, III Bty HG Arty Regt and 2 PGR (alias PGR HOEHNER, PGR FALKENO) of 15 Panzer Div under command. It was this force which carried out the counter attack on the morning of the 14th towards AUGUSTA and succeeded in breaking into the town and reaching the harbour before finally being driven out again. To the West of this force 54 NAPOLI Division was strung out from RAGUSA to COMISO, with HQ at VITTORIA. 76 Inf Regt was disposed with Bns at RAGUSA, CARLENTINI and SCORDIA. 75 Inf Regt at PALAZZOLO and at CHIARAMONTE and 169 Blackshirt Bn. at COMISO. Other units of the divisions were likewise split. It is not surprising therefore that the division was unable to offer any concerted resistance and was quickly disorganised. On 13 July the GOC and his staff were rounded up at VITTORIA.

In order to fill the gap left by the disorganised and rapidly surrendering NAPOLI Division elements of 3 German Parachute Regiment were dropped in the PALAZZOLO and FRANCOFONTE areas on 12 July having, according to prisoners, arrived from TARASCON (SE FRANCE) via VIENNE and CATANIA. As in Russia in the spring of 1942, at ALAMEIN, and again in TUNISIA parachute formations have been called upon to fill an emergency defence role.

North of GELA the Western Battle Group of HG division, known as Battle Group GOERING, together with 4 LIVORNO and 207 Coastal Division have been pushed gradually North after their unsuccessful counter attacks of the 11th. The GOERING group appears to consist of I and II Bns HG Pzgr Regt, II and III Bns HG P.G.R., part of HG Arty Regt and the divisional Engineer and Recce Bns. The latter has been reporting and reconnoitring our positions along the whole of the southern front. A hitherto unidentified German unit, 923 FORTRESS Bn, and 71 WERFER Regt have also been reported in the area. A captured map showed 4 LIVORNO Division with HQ at CALTAGIRONE, together with two bns of 34 Inf Regt. The division also included two mobile groups each of a tank Coy, SP Coy, Inf Coy, and Arty group at CALTAGIRONE and NISCEMI/BIVIETTO. By 14 July 34 Inf Regt had moved back to the area PIETRAPERZIA - BARRAFRANCA, while part of the division was already back at ENNA. On the morning of 13 July, HQ 207 Coastal Division was at SAN CATALDO but had withdrawn to CALTANISSETTA by the following day. Part of the division was then holding a line AGRIGENTO - RACALMUTO with a mobile group at ALIFANAH. At 1130 hrs. on the 15th the Division was actually ordered to counter attack the Allies in ENNA. On the extreme West of the front 3 PGR of 15 Panzer Division (FULRIEDE) was identified for the first time in this battle in the area CANICATTI on 13 July. So far no identification has been

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nade of 1 PzR and 215 Tank Bn of this Division, though there is an unconfirmed report that the latter was at ENNA on 15 July.

There were signs by the evening of the 13th that the pace of the withdrawal northwards was quickening. During the afternoon heavy movement of MT and guns was observed on the roads MT from CATANIA, north from MADDUSA as well as eastwards on the road PALERMO-SANTA CATERINA. Already by mid-day Sixth Army W/T Station at ENNA had closed down in preparation for a move and a representative of 15 Armd. Div was engaged in reconnoitring a possible new defensive line NW of Pt. 3274.

If a worse and swifter fate is not to befall the Axis forces in SICILY it seems essential that as many German units as possible be disengaged and withdrawn northeast, even if it means abandoning the West of the island. As in the past the Germans may be expected to leave the Italian formations to their fate having previously commandeered their available MT. The fighting to date has been done almost exclusively by German units, while Italian effort in defence of the homeland has scarcely equalled that made in defence of the Empire. It seems not improbable that the final stand in Sicily will be an entirely German affair.

2. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS.

Italian.

Identifications have mainly been confirmatory. 177 Bersaglieri Regt. with 529, 526, and 527 Bns was identified by contact in the AGRIGENTO area. A captured document gives it as part of a counter attack force comprising also a sqdn of 30 PALERMO Cav Regt. 12 Army Gp and 17 Blackshirt Legion. The latter is part of 26 ASSIETTA Div.

H.Q. 131 Tank Regt identified at CALTANISETTA. Mobile Gp "E" was also situated there, containing a coy of FIAT 3000 B Tanks (5 ton tanks mounting a 47/32 gun). These tanks are of last war design and little use.

Mobile Gp "D", containing a coy of 101 Tank Bn and a new identification of 2 coy, 10 Mob MG Bn, is identified at MISTRETTA.

Elements of 104 ISONZO Div have been identified on 7 Army front but there is no information yet to suggest that the Division is there.

There have been no identifications to date of 103 PIACENZA Div.

3. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATION.

(i) Concentrated air attacks upon MESSINA and REGGIO, the two terminals of the Straits train ferry have caused great damage to railway facilities. Cover of MESSINA on 12 July shows that the main line to CATANIA has been blocked by two craters, while damage has been caused to the line from MESSINA to PALERMO. Widespread destruction is also seen in workshops and sidings, where a mangled mass of rolling stock was still burning at the time of the sortie. At REGGIO on 13 July the main line to SAN GIOVANNI was impassable, while extensive damage to sidings had been caused.

Cover of NAPLES on 15 July shows that damage to the marshalling yards is on a very heavy scale. 19 trains are seen to have received direct hits, one has been completely burnt out, and a great number of tracks have been blocked or damaged. Fires are burning in rolling stock.

These reports assume their true significance if taken in conjunction with the possibility mentioned elsewhere of enemy reinforcement of the ETNA line. NAPLES, REGGIO and MESSINA are the only points at which effective interference

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can be caused to its rail route South to Sicily, and as such offer opportunities of doing concentrated damage to supplies and reinforcements. To take NAPLES as an example, the damage to the 19 trains means a slowing down in the flow of supplies and reinforcements along the main coastal route. At MESSINA in addition to the actual damage caused, delays which already exist in the clearance of supplies and reinforcements from the port, will have been further aggravated.

(ii) In the week ending 10 July, it is estimated that 17,050 tons of shipping entered Sicilian ports, in addition to the lighter and train ferry traffic across the Straits. Examination of the distribution of this tonnage among the various ports show clearly which were the harbours most used by the enemy in the period which culminated in the Allied invasion. MESSINA took the lion's share of the intake with 10,750 tons, CATANIA came next with 4,300 tons, while PALERMO and AUGUSTA showed only slight activity. There was no intake to either SYRACUSE or TRAPANI.

Thus despite continued air attacks the enemy is still relying mainly on the port of MESSINA, since to the above figures must be added an estimated 1875 tons a day of supplies carried on the train ferries.

4. DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN FORMATIONS.

FRANCE.

Moves of German divisions from North to South West France have been reported. A CAF Field Division is believed to have arrived in the CARCASSONNE area, and possibly two air Division in the area AVIGNON - NIMES, where numerous gliders and other aircraft have been reported. It is probable that 19 CAF Field Division and 7 Parachute Division are concerned with this move. The presence of parachute formations is confirmed by the capture in Sicily of prisoners of 3 Parachute Regt who stated that they had arrived from CARCASSONNE via NAPLES on 10 July. At the time of writing it is not known to which division this regiment belongs. Whatever the original intention may have been which occasioned the bringing of Parachute formations to SE France it now seems probable that they are to share the fate of the RAMCKE brigade and be relegated to an infantry role.

ITALY.

The German forces in Italy are now believed to have been further strengthened by the arrival of 3 Motorised Division. This is another of the "Stalingrad" Divisions. It is not improbable that a further armoured division, 24 or 26 has also arrived. PW evidence suggests that elements of an armoured division were already arriving in VIENNA on 9 July. This would mean that a total of four German divisions had arrived. 16, 24 or 26 Armoured, 3 and 29 Motorised Divisions.

BALKANS.

The reinforcement of German formations in the Balkans continues. The latest arrival is 297 Infantry Division(yet another re-formed Stalingrad division). The Division's present location is not known, but elements may be in GREECE.

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The present German Garrison of the Balkans is now as follows:

ALBANIA & GREECE

1 Armoured Division
22 Infantry Division
104 Light "
117 " "
189 Reserve "
11 GAF "
21 to 999 Infantry Div.
297 Infantry Div.

YUGOSLAVIA.

SS Prinz Eugen Division
1 Mtn. Division
100 Light "
114 " "
118 " "
186 Reserve "
Brandt SS "
Bosnien SS "

GSI(a)
14 JULY 43.

U.S. ARMY
C.G.S.(G).

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 12 of 21 JUL 43

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1. OPERATIONS 16 - 19 JULY

Our bridgehead has been extended and widened in all directions except one, the vital line covering CATANIA where the HERMANN GOERING division is opposing a bitter resistance. Elsewhere all is in flux. The Italian troops have nowhere opposed any serious resistance, and, like the civilian population, seem rather to welcome our arrival, expressing themselves, when captured, highly gratified at our choice of SICILY as a point of disembarkation. In their disintegration they have involved the other GERMAN division, the reformed 15 Panzer. Caught on its way to the West of the island by the surprise of our landing 3 P.G.R. was in action in the area it had reached, CANICATTI, by 13 July, though it was 16 Jul before elements of the 1 P.G.R. Battle Group, which began to move from SALEMI on the night of 10 Jul, was identified in the ENNA area.

On 19 Jul HERMANN GOERING Division was holding in front of CATANIA with the SCHMALZ Battle Group in the East and CENTURIPE to the West. In the West the line lay back along the DITTAINO and the Eng Bn on the extreme right was worried about the flank of the Division. It had blown the bridge at RADDUSA Station (H.4784) but had been unable, in spite of repeated efforts, to make contact with 15 Pz Div. In between was apparently an unspecified Blackshirt Bn and possibly some fragments of LIVORNO and NAPOLI driven North from RAMACCA. These last have not been recently identified on the ground but should be available in this area. Further West 15 Pz Div is falling back Northwards and North Eastwards, trying to make contact. 1 P.G.R., which had not to date been very heavily engaged was apparently holding firm in the ENNA area where prisoners were taken from both I and II Bns. 2 P.G.R. was contacted from 16 to 19 Jul; a prisoner on 17 Jul said that the regt was directed from CANICATTI to SAN CATALDO and turned North and North East. It may be that FULIRIEDE, who has had much the most fighting so far, was intended to move back through LEONFORTE behind the screen of P.G.R. I, but an identification of his III Bn on 19 Jul in the ENNA area and our rapid advance since on LEONFORTE may indicate that this plan has been at least partially thwarted.

We know at least where 15 Pz Div is going and that gives us a forecast of the shape of things to come in SICILY. As early as 16 July a representative of the division (Lt. Col. GUELL, who appears to be a senior staff officer on Div HQ) was carrying out a recce apparently in the area between the TROINA - CESARO road and the Northern coast road while another officer of the division was also reconnoitring TROINA and CESARO and back as far as BRONTE and RANDAZZO. A provisional site for Div. HQ was selected at MALCMOGLIERA (G.6816). It is clear that 15 Pz Div has been given the task of defending the Northern slopes of ENNA. It is not clear whether the sector is expected to extend to the sea, though GUELL mentions the coast road as a possible L of C.; if it is to get such a long frontage one would expect the division to receive some reinforcements. A noteworthy point is that these defensive positions were proposed "By Corps" and on 12 July occurred a reference to 14 Pz Corps which sent an order to all units of 15 Pz Div. 14 Pz Corps was at STALINGRAD and it is natural to connect it with the four ex-STALINGRAD divisions, 3 and 29 Panzer Grenadier and 16 and 24 (or 26) Panzer Divisions which are known to

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have arrived in ITALY. (According to a captured diary 14 Pz Corps was in South ITALY in Jun). Again, it would be unreasonable and unnecessary to send over merely a Corps HQ to take command of divisions already in the island at such a critical moment so that we must be prepared to see fresh forces following.

Reinforcements have continued to arrive in driblets. Two Fortress Bns numbered 923 and 924 have turned up, one on 7th Army and one on 8th Army front together with a March Bn 69, called KAMPFBATAILLON REGGIO. As in TUNISIA the Germans apparently have a fair store of independent battalions which can be brought in hastily to relieve a dangerous situation. It is not known whether any more parachutists have arrived and at least II Bn of 3 Para Regt on the word of the O.C. appears to have suffered very heavy losses. The main change in the Order of Battle is the elimination of an entire Italian division, 103 PIACENZA, which now appears to be relieving 10 PIAVE Division in the ROME area. This puts the previous candidate for the position of the fifth field division in SICILY, 104 MANTOVA, back in the running again but so far there has been only a tentative and unconfirmed identification of this division. Surely if it were there, especially if it were in the CATANIA area it would have been identified by now. It looks as if the Italians considered four field divsions sufficient for SICILY and that MANTOVA was left in CALABRIA.

We have a little news of 26 ASSIETTA Division which so far has been identified mainly by inference from Tac/R reports of troops withdrawing in front of our advance. It now appears from a prisoner that at least parts of 30 Inf Regt had been directed on PALERMO. There have been frequent air reports of movement towards PALERMO from the centre. Another part of the division may be represented by the report of a column of troops on foot extending from SCIACCA to CASTEL VETRANO at 1100 hrs on 19 Jul. It seems likely that ASSIETTA is withdrawing to the West of the island to put up possibly only a token defence of the capital.

The emphasis throughout is on the Germans and it is clear that the final defence of SICILY in the North Eastern tip will be an all German show. Italian morale is reported on all hands as catastrophic and it is clear that the Germans have ceased to place any confidence in them and make their plans without any reference to them. German morale will probably not be first class; there are many aliens among their number and the extra-ordinary measure of withdrawing all pay-books from 15 Pz Division may be intended to prevent desertions. But the most discouraging factor for the German troops will be the feeling that they have to bear all alone the weight of the defence of a country far from their own among indifferent Allies and an apathetic civil population.

2. <u>ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.</u>

A. PR has revealed a marked increase during the past week in the number of small craft operating in the Straits of Messina. Cover on 18 July showed that there were at least 11 Siebel Ferries, 14 F - boats, and a considerable number of small craft active. This number is well above the average of vessels which have been seen during the past month or six weeks, and must be regarded as a direct consequence of the Allied invasion. In view of this it would not be surprising to see further reinforcements appearing shortly on the island, if indeed they have not already been ferried over.

Whether further craft materialise or not in this area will depend on the progress and duration of the campaign. In any case it would be logical to expect the enemy to maintain a substantial number of vessels there if only as an insurance against a possible hasty evacuation to the mainland.

The two train ferries are still present in the Straits, although they appear to have been less active of late. This may be accounted for by the congestion likely to be reigning at the ferry termini as a result of Allied air raids, details of which were given in our last summary.

B. In the period 11 - 17 July, shipping intake to SICILY other than traffic by small craft across the Straits was on a low scale. A total of 6,500 tons arrived, all of it at PALERMO.

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There was no intake to CATANIA while traffic at MILAZZO and MESSINA consisted only of vessels from other Sicilian ports, and is not therefore classified as intake.

C. As a result of the heavy daylight raid on NAPLES on July 17 further substantial damage has been caused to installations and communications. Preliminary reports show that the marshalling yards are now completely unserviceable owing to numerous craters and derailed trucks, while all the Ry tracks have been severed between the roundhouses and station. The Royal Arsenal which has suffered on many previous occasions, has received additional damage, and numerous fires are seen in oil storage tanks.

3. ENEMY STRENGTHS.

German Divisions.

As was expected there has been a large paper increase in the number of identified divisions. During this year the "paper" total has fluctuated from 310 Divisions in January to 290 Divisions in March and has now risen to a present total of 324 Divisions, the highest ever. This "new high" is accounted for by the fact that it is now known that all the 20 Divisions destroyed at STALINGRAD have been hastily reformed and must once again be included in the total of effective formations. Other formations resurrected include 15 Armoured and Hermann Goering Divisions now identified in SICILY. A few low grade formations have been upgraded while one or two new Divisions have been identified. Numerous and extraordinary expedients have been devised to raise men for the active Divisions. Of the total of 42 training Divisions at least half are also engaged on garrison duties outside the REICH.

This has been done with the deliberate aim of deceiving the GERMANS themselves and creating the illusion that the GERMAN army today is as powerful, if not more powerful, than before. However, there can be no doubt that owing to the known man-power shortage this illusion has been created at the expense of adequate reinforcement for formations which have been engaged on the RUSSIAN front with only brief respites since the summer of 1941. War Establishments of formations are in general lower, the quality of men poorer, their training less thorough; their confidence in themselves and their cause is shaken and even perhaps waning.

4. NOTES ON ENEMY FORCES.

A. German.

3 Gren Regt. 15 Armd Div. Examination of Pa.W. and Paybooks shows that this Regt is made up of 3 March Bns, originally intended for Africa, but now diverted to building up the infantry of the revived 15 Armd Div.

The Pa.Ws show the characteristics which one came to associate with the later arrivals in the African campaign. They are, in large part, either very young or over 30, and included a high proportion of Austrians and Slavs in their ranks. The following are some details regarding the actual Bns of the Regt.

I Bn. Formed from 63 March Bn.

II Bn. On May 20 formed from 65 March Bn. At the beginning of July, this Bn was at CANICATTI. On conversion from 65 March Bn to II/GR3, the Arty personnel were removed to be absorbed into a Div Arty Regt, which has not so far been formed. To make up for the loss of this personnel, a number of Yugoslavs from a special March Bn were incorporated in this Bn. II Bn is of four Coys, each of three Lt. and one Hy. Pls.

III Bn. Formed from 67 March Bn on May 21, 1943. The present organisation of the Bn is of three rifle coys and a Hy coy.

As an indication of the armament of the Bns, the following details are given of the two coys, from which Pa.Ws were taken.

5 Coy. 1 - 3 pls are Lt. pls, each of three secs, each 10 - 12 men and armed /with 2 x MG.....

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with 2 x MG 42's. Each lt pl is further equipped with three rifle grenade discharge cups. 4 pl (Hy) consists of (i) two HMG secs, with each one MG 42 on heavy mounting (ii) 2 x 8 cm mortars (iii) 2 x 5 cm A/Tk guns.

9 Coy. Of four pls. 1 - 3 are lt pls, 4 is hy pl. The number of men and MG's in these pls is uncertain. The hy pl has 2 x HMG 42 and 2 x 8 cm mortars. At Coy HQ is one anti-tank gun of uncertain calibre.

13 (Inf.Gun) Coy. Believed to have 7.5-cm inf guns, of which four were allotted to 2 Bn for a recent exercise.

Strength of Coys: 11 Jul 43 :

5 Coy	-	150	
9 Coy	-	160	(has had heavy casualties since)
10 Coy	-	160	
11 Coy	-	160	
12 Coy	-	120	

On 25 Jun 43, 3 Gren Regt moved to the area TRAPANI - PALERMO, where it stayed five days doing training. PW was told by an officer that the real reason for the move was that the few German troops on the island were being shuffled around so as to give the impression that there were far more German troops on the island than was actually the case.

(COMMENT: This move of 3 Gren Regt to area TRAPANI-PALERMO was probably only temporary)

5 Coy contained about 20 Austrians, 5 Alsatians, 6 Poles and a number of Rhinelanders. None of these had the slightest wish to fight, and their one desire was for the war to end so that they could get home to their families when they had been forced to leave to suffer alone. Morale throughout the Coy was low.

2 Sqn 504 Heavy Tank Bn. A PW captured in SICILY has given the following information:-

2 Sqn had four tps, each equipped with four tanks plus one tank for the O.C. Sqn.

It arrived in SICILY with the new organisation of two Mk III and two Mk VI tanks per Tp, which was considered the best proportion. In PIAZZA ARMERINA its eight Mk III tanks were exchanged for eight Mk VI tanks by the HERMANN GOERING Tank Regt, so that from Jun 43 it reverted to the old system of four Mk VI tanks per Tp.

At Appendix 'A' to this Summary is a brief provisional Order of Battle of German forces in SICILY.

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B. Italian

26 ASSIETTA Div

The following information has been obtained from a PW believed reliable.

General O. of B. agrees with previously published OB. of B., with the exception that the PW was most emphatic that Div was very much under strength and that 29 and 30 Inf Regts had only two Bns each. He gave the Regts as stationed at PANTANNA and near SCIACCA. Div HQ at PANTANNA.

Div M.T. consists of about 50 small trucks.

Bersaglieri

From PW source the following information regarding second line Bersaglieri organisation is of interest.

177 Bersaglieri Regt (525, 526 and 527 Bns) was formed in Feb 43 from the Bersaglieri Regt Depots mainly from 1907 class. It was intended for territorial use only.

Bns had four coys each and HQ platoon. Each coy had 3 platoons; two with 3 LMG and one with 3 M.G.

Normal battalion strength was 600 but 526 Battalion's strength was only 300.

M.T. consisted only of four motor tricycles for battalion.

This Regt has been eliminated in the AGRIGENTO area but other similar formations are likely to be encountered.

616 Auton GaF M.G. Coy

The following information is from a PW of the unit.

Organisation:	HQ Platoon ; three MG platoons ; each platoon three secs.
Armament:	Carbines for all personnel; each sec one M.G
Strength:	W.E. Strength 167 men ; effectives averaging 150.
M.T.	Nil

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B.G.S. (I)

GSI(a)
21 Jul 43

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APPENDIX 'A'
to 15 Army Group INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 12 dated 21 JUL 43

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE - SICILY

14 Armoured Corps - C.O.C. Gen HIBER or HUBE

HERMANN GOERING Armd Div

2 Gren Regt

* I Bn
* II Bn
* III Bn

H.G. Tank Regt

* I Bn
* II Bn
* III Bn
(Marks III and IV)
(8.8cm S.P. guns)

* 504 Heavy Tank Bn

HQ Coy
2 Coy

* H.G. Engr Bn

H.G. Flak Regt (only IV Bty identified)

H.G. Arty Regt

* I Bty
* II Bty
* III Bty
* IV Bty

* H.G. Recce Unit

15 Armd Div (Div SICILY)

1 Gren Regt

I Bn
II Bn
III Bn

* 2 Gren Regt O.C. Col KOERNER

I Bn
II Bn
III Bn

3 Gren Regt
(For details of this regt, see notes on 3 Gren Regt in this Summary)

I Bn
II Bn
III Bn

/71 Heavy Mortar .....

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71 Heavy Mortar Regt (four tps with D-Werfer)

215 Tank Bn

1 Coy)
2 Coy) Mk III and Mk IV specials
3 Coy)

557 Heavy Arty Bty

Eng Bn SICILY

Mob Bn SICILY

Arty Regt SICILY

I Bty) Each two tps of each 4 x 105-mm
II Bty) one tp of each 4 x 150-mm
III Bty) one tp of each 4 x 175-mm
) Each tp in addition has 1 x 37-mm A.Tk gun.

Survey Bty AFRICA

33 Armoured Survey Tp
90 " " "

Non-Divisional Infantry

3 Para Regt (7 Air Div)

I Bn
II Bn
III Bn

1 Parachute Arty Regt (one tp)

x 69 March Bn (Bn REGGIO)

923 Fortress Bn (Three Rifle coys, one Hy Coy)

924 Fortress Bn

Bty equals American Bn

x Part of OEHRING Battle Group.
* Part of SCHMALZ Battle Group.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 13 of 23 JULY 43

(a) Sidelined information will not be reproduced in any intelligence summary of formations under this HQ except by special permission.
(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hours of receipt.

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1. OPERATIONS : 20 - 22 JULY

Hard fighting continues in the area South and South West of CATANIA where we have not been able to make any substantial advance. Prisoners from HERMANN GOERING Division may show no keenness for the fight; it can only be deduced that these prisoners are unrepresentative or only the bad ones surrender since the division as a whole is fighting even better than in TUNISIA. 15 Panzer Division after rather a scrambling rearguard action round LEONFORTE and ASSORO has now arrived on HERMANN GOERING's right flank; some of P.G.R. 3 were caught at LEONFORTE when they put up a very desperate fight but P.G.R. 1, though at the cost of heavy casualties, seems to have reached a position somewhere East of NICOSIA.

The enemy line in the Eastern sector runs from about 5 miles South of CATANIA due West to the DITTAINO and thus along that line to CATENA NUOVA, except for an allied bridgehead at SFERRO. From CATENA NUOVA it strikes North to include REGALBUTO and NICOSIA. SCHMIZ' Battle Group still holds the Eastern end of GOERING's the North Western end of the GOERING front, supported by parachutists and miscellaneous scratch inf bns. 15 Pz Grd Div has probably not yet sorted itself out but may have 1 P.G.R. on its left adjoining GOERING and 3 P.G.R. on the right, still probably a little far forward, while the remainder of 34 Inf Regt, were on 22 Jul moving North up the CESARO - SAN FRATELLO road to find a little peace in this as yet unthreatened sector and eventually, when reformed and stiffened, to prolong the line to the sea.

In the West a two-pronged pincer movement by 7 Army has had some sweeping success. Moving forward with great speed against considerable difficulties including most extensive demolitions of the already meagre and unmetalled communications in this sector the Southern arm of the pincer captured CASTELVETRANO on 21 Jul and the Northern arm entered PALERMO on 22 Jul. In two successive days fell the great military airfield developed so long and lavishly to ensure command of the SICILIAN narrows and the capital of the island itself.

The bag in prisoners in the West is not yet known, nor the exact fate of the divisions there. It seems almost certain that 28 AOSTA Div and the two Coastal divisions, 202 and 206, will shortly cease to exist. 26 ASSIETTA seem to have escaped, at least in part, to fight another day. Part at least of 30 Regt, was directed on PALERMO where it may have shared the fate of the capital but it seems that the majority of the division, accompanied by II Bn 6 Inf Regt of AOSTA, made for the ALIMENA area where prisoners were taken from all the divisional units. It seems reasonable to conclude that the division is trying to make its way into the MESSINA strip by the road running parrellel to the Northern coast road and air reports tend to confirm this. It has had some losses (possibly by desertions mainly, since it does not seem to have been involved in heavy fighting) which are believed to include the whole of its Blackshirt Legion.

The arrival of XIV Corps HQ has been followed as was expected by at least part of another division. I Bn 15 Gren Regt has been identified in the general area of REGALBUTO. This is one of the two regiments in 29 Panzer Grenadier division which has been located for some time in Southern ITALY (the other is 71 Gren Regt). Only the one Bn has so far been identified in action but since a division of this nature would scarcely be split up and used for piecemeal reinforcement one must expect to find the whole regiment and possibly

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seen the whole division arriving in SICILY. When they arrive the enemy will have the equivalent of nearly four German divisions and say half of an Italian division to hold a land front of about 51 miles and a sea front of about a hundred miles. No account is here taken of 213 Coastal Division which if it behaves like the other coastal divisions will need considerable German stiffening and even they will be more of a danger than an assistance. German troops mixed in with Italians run the risk of being encircled by the failure of their allies on the flanks.

2. ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS

Detailed study of damage at ROME following the attacks of Jul 19 shows that the weight of the attack fell on the LITTORIO and LORENZO Marshalling Yards, where heavy damage was caused to rolling stock, trucks, railway installations and industrial plant in the vicinity. At the LORENZO yard, 4 trains have been burnt out, and another 5 are seen to be burning. Very severe damage has also been caused to the freight depot and to a large locomotive shop, while a viaduct at the Western Exit has been holed in two places.

At the LITTORIO yards, at least 50 direct hits were scored on trucks or rolling stock, including one which destroyed the main arteries to the marshalling yards. It is estimated that the yards have been 50% temporarily blocked. The locomotive Depot has also been severely damaged.

No damage has been caused to the Vatican City or to any historic buildings in ROME.

The already overstrained line from NAPLES to REGGIO was further damaged by a raid on the important junction of BATTIPAGLIA on 21 Jul. The line from here to REGGIO was severed, and damage caused to rolling stock. At SALERNO too, the track to BATTIPAGLIA has been destroyed at several points. These raids are likely to have a very useful effect in impeding the flow of traffic to the MESSINA straits. It is considered that they will have caused a considerable dislocation of the programme of reinforcements and supplies to SICILY.

3. DISTRIBUTION OF AXIS FORCES IN EUROPE

At Appx "B" will be found a map showing distribution Axis forces in Europe. German forces are classified as:

(a) Offensive. Includes all armoured, SS, Motorised, Light and Mountain Divs and Field Army Inf Divs in the series 1 - 400.

(b) Defensive. Comprises low category Inf Divs in the 700 series, L of C (SICHERUNG) Divs, Frontier (GRENZWACHT) Divs, training and reserve divs and so-called, Field Training (FELDAUSBILDUNG) Divs.

(c) Adm Divs. All stationed in GERMANY and include ERSATZ Divs and 24 Adm Divs z.b.v.

Italian forces are graded:

(a) Field Divs. Include the solitary armoured, a few Mot and all the mobile Inf Divs.

(b) Coastal Divs. Low grade territorial divs with primary role of Coast and Beach Defence.

The lay-out of Axis divisions in Europe at the present time reflects the essentially defensive nature of the enemy strategy. For the first time he is confronted with a situation where his dispositions are governed not by his own offensive plans, but by the threats and potential threats of the Allies. This involves on the part of the High Command a careful allocation of troops in such a way that these threats, if they develop can everywhere be met with enough forces to

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ensure a reasonable chance of defeating them.

In RUSSIA it would seem that this has meant finally moving on to the defensive. Despite an increase since the Spring in the number of Divs on the Eastern front there has not been an increase in the striking power of the Army, since most, if not all, the divisions there are below establishment. The enemy probably hopes to maintain sufficient forces to defend his present line of hedgehog positions along the front against any RUSSIAN attacks without himself embarking on any offensive on the scale of the past two summers.

Certainly forces which would normally by now have been sent to RUSSIA have not gone there. They have instead been sent either to the BALKANS or ITALY, or have remained in the West to guard against any attempt there. The reinforcement of the BALKANS has been in progress since the early Spring, and the move of divisions into Southern GREECE continues. The recent campaign against the partisans has clearly been conducted with a view to releasing forces for the more threatened areas of the South. How far the Axis has succeeded in eliminating the partisans remains to be seen, but that there is still an apprehension of the threat to the Mediterranean areas other than SICILY is clear from the words of SERTORIUS on Jul 13. "The 10 divs which the enemy is estimated to have landed in SICILY is not half the total of the forces which he has been concentrating in the Near East and North Africa. Hence he is in a position either to throw everything he has into SICILY or to attack another part of the European Southern front with troops as strong, or perhaps stronger, than those already employed in SICILY".

To meet these threats, troops have already been withdrawn from the West. For the first time the Garrison in FRANCE and the Low Countries has dropped in the middle of the summer "invasion period". This is a result of the despatch of an armoured division to the BALKANS and of the reinforcement of ITALY and SICILY, where there are now 6 German divisions and 16 Italian divisions. There is also believed to be a German division in SARDINIA as well as 3 Italian In face of the growing threat to ITALY this may not represent the full total of divisions which will find their way South.

Meanwhile, it is unlikely that the Garrison of the West will fall much below the present total of 34 divisions for some time to come. Not unless, and until, Allied moves show clearly that there is no threat to NORWAY will the garrison there (now at the high level of 11 divisions) show any appreciable reduction.

Thus the Axis forces today are delicately balanced to meet all threats. The real danger lies in the possibility of the balance being upset by an attack either in the East or the West greater than the enemy has appreciated. Then, in an effort to stabilise the position, the Axis may find the effects of the losses of two years fighting in the East decisive.

At Appx "A" is a Location List of identified German Divisions.

4. ENEMY ORGANISATION

(a) ITALIAN

(i) 207 Coastal Div

Brig Gen August LAURUSCHK, Commanding General 207 Coastal Division stated that his division consisted of two regiments of three battalions each, 10 Bersaglieri Regt (see note below) 12 x 8.4 7[illegible] 12 100-mm and 12 149-mm guns.

(ii) 10 Bersaglieri Regt (Col STOLET)

10 Bersaglieri Regt has been reported by ToW as destroyed in the AGRIGENTO area. It consisted of 35, 73 and 74 Bns formed from Depot troops. Composition of Bn was 3 companies and HQ platoon. Armament of companies:

One platoon with 6 L.M.Gs
" " " 3 Mod. 37
" " " 3 Breda 20-mm
" " " 3 47/32 A.Tk guns

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[illegible] is the Old North Africa 1942 organisation, and the regiment may have been destined for that theatre.

(iii) 18 Complement Bn ASSIETTA Div

This unit which was captured at S. SPINA on Jul 16 is a new identification. The Bn has a low scale of Inf armament.

One P.W. a 1st Lieut, was recalled to service in May 43 and had not yet been issued with all his uniform and was still partly dressed in civilian clothes. He could not obtain issue of a revolver, and was given a rifle deficient of magazine. Spares for M.G. could not be obtained over the last eight months.

(iv) 131 Tank Regt (Col [illegible])

Regiment consisted of 101 and 102 Battalions. 101 Bn had its companies detached as autonomous units. It had HQ company with 3 or 4 R.35 tanks and 2 L6 tanks acting as radio stations.

1, 2 and 3 companies each divided into 3 platoons with 5 tanks each, and HQ platoon with one tank for the O.C. Total number of tanks per company was 16 (R.35), and Bn total is 54.

DETAILS OF R.35

Armament: R.35 is armed with co-ax 37-mm gun and 7.5-mm M.G.

Radius of action: On roads 80/90-km.
Cross-country 50/60-km

Speed: 22-km.p.h.

Ammunition carried: 72 A.P. rds; 30 rds HE, for M.G., 2400 rds in magazines of 150.

Spares: Spares could not be obtained, with the result that broken-down tanks only were used to supply the required parts. This cannibalisation process gradually reduced the number of these tanks available. The rubber on the bogey wheels was so worn out that the track was practically on metal.

Engine: Subject to overheating. Tank had to be stopped quite frequently in order to cool the engine.

Radio: Platoon and company commanders' tanks only were provided with an RF 2 set. Battalion HQ had two L6 tanks acting as radio centres.

Crew: One driver and one gunner.

Part of 101 Battalion has been destroyed.

(v) 1 Autonomous Mortar Bn (Maj MESSINA)

Battalion consisted of 101, 102 and 103 companies.

Organisation: Three Companies in Battalion of 960 men.
Four Platoons in Company of 320 men
Three sections, each one mortar in Platoon of 80 men

It is to be noted that 4 Platoon of each company is the HQ Platoon and is without automatic weapons. There is one 81-mm Mortar per section making a total of 27 Mortars per Bn. Mortars were usually carried by the troops

/themselves .....

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themselves, but for long distances they had a cart for each platoon. Each munition bearer, 15 in all, carried six rds.

(b) GERMAN

The following information has been obtained from PsW and captured documents.

(i) 15 Armd Div

(a) 1 P.G.R.

1 Bn, Arrived in SICILY as 1/P.G.R. NAPLES.

PsW from II Bn give the composition as three companies instead of four; each company has 18 L.M.Gs, 2 H.M.Gs, 2 x 8,1-cm Mortars and one A.Tk rifle 41. II Bn has suffered 40% casualties up to 10 Jul.

Organisation I Bn as for II Bn. 13 Company had 6 x 7.5 cm A.Tk. guns (two in support II Bn); 14 Company had 12 7.5-cm A.Tk guns.

(b) 2 P.G.R.

PW states I Coy had 3 x 7.5-cm guns.

(30 Corps I.S. 569)

(c) 215 Tank Bn

From mid-Jun, 2 Coy 504 Tank Bn was attached to 215 Tk Bn, but was detached early in Jul, and attached to 90 Lehr Regt.

215 Tk Bn consisted of HQ Company, four tank companies, a Workshop company and a R.O.F. Section. According to a more recent PW, 215 Tk Bn now consists of three companies of approximately 22 tanks each. All Mk IIIs and Mk IVs.

The tanks of 13 Bn, including the Tigers of 504 Bn when incorporated in 215 - bore a white star with a black "C" superimposed ("C" being the initial of the Bn commander).

(ii) HERMANN GOERING

Armd Div

(a) 1 P.G.R.

PW from 1 Company states I Bn was cut to pieces in area GELA 10/11 Jul, and had 50/70 men 17 Jul; he states II Bn was encircled at CAL 'GIRONI 14 Jul and had heavy casualties.

(b) 2 P.G.R.

The regt consists of HQ company and three battalions, with similar organisation. Each bn is of four coys (three rifle and one heavy). In I Bn, 4 coy is stated by PW to have three platoons.

I (Inf gun) Platoon with 4 x 7.5-cm Inf guns (all knocked out).
II (Eng) Platoon. 24 men in three sqds (each one L.M.G.) used as assault engineers (NOT PIONEERS) as bridging equipment was left in ITALY.
III (Super Heavy Mortar) Platoon with 4 x 15-cm NEBELWERFER Mortars (no amn)

II Bn has 5, 6 and 7 (Rifle) Companies and 8 (Heavy) company. Each Rifle Company consists of three light platoons and one heavy platoon. Each Light platoon consists of three sections, with each two L.M.Gs, 42 and Platoon HQ (W/T operator and two runners). Each Heavy Platoon consists of a light inf gun section, with two 7.5 Inf Guns and Heavy Machine Gun section, with four H.M.Gs. With

/Two inf gun.....

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the Inf gun section there is an O.P. and the necessary telephone operators. 8 Coy was the heavy coy and was organised into an A.Tk platoon, a heavy mortar platoon and an engineering platoon. The A. Tk platoon had, when in NAPLES, four 5-cm A.Tk guns. At NAPLES these were replaced by A.Tk guns of a larger calibre. PW is not sure whether they were 7.5-cm or 8.8-cm. The heavy mortar platoon was equipped with six RUSSIAN 12-cm mortars, carried on small STEYR lorries. The engineering platoon is believed only to have been used for bridge-building and sapper activities. 5 company strength 13 Jul 43 ; 120 - 130 all ranks. It had heavy casualties on this date. All unit vehicles bore the HG Div emblem: a clockface with a green pointer, the pointer painted green to indicate the Inf arm.

(c) H.G. Tank Regt

III (Assault Gun) Battalion was V/Arty Regt HG until the end of Jun.

504 Tank Bn

This bn originally consisted of HQ Company and two heavy tank coys. 1 Coy went to AFRICA with its TIGER tanks and was lost. 2 Coy moved to SICILY in Apr 43 with its TIGER tanks and early in Jun moved from TRAPANI area to SALEMI and here it temporarily became part of 215 Tank Bn, providing a heavy platoon of TIGER tanks in 3 and 4 coys of 215 Tank Bn. Early in Jul it was set up again as an independent company, regaining its TIGER tanks. On 13 Jul 43, when its 3 Platoon went into action, it was still an independent Coy although it was said to be attached to HG Tank Regiment.

According to PW, 2 Coy, 504 Tank Bn consisted of HQ and four platoons. Each platoon had four Mk VI Tiger tanks. With Coy HQ, there was a MK VI Tiger Tank in which the Coy commander rode. There was also a repair section ('I' Trupp) in the company, which was equipped with a crane truck ("wrecker") and a workshop truck. According to a PW, 2 Coy had a strength of 150 all ranks. Each tank had a crew of five. As far as PW knew there were no spare crews. In the action on 13 Jul 43 four Tiger tanks of 2 Coy were definitely damaged, and possibly a fifth. This left 2 Coy with a total of 12/13 tanks.

(d) H.G. Arty Regt

A PW gives the organisation of this regt as:-

I Bn	(US Bn)	- three troops (US Bty)	of 4 x 105-mm guns/hows LFH18)
II "	"	" " "	of 4 x 150-mm hows (SFH18)
III "	"	" " "	of 4 x 105-mm guns (LFK18)
IV "	"	" " "	of 4 x 105-mm guns/hows (LFH18)

(e) H.G. Recce Unit

PW states that 6 Coy is A.Tk coy with 8 x 7.5-cm S.P. A.Tk guns on Mk II tank chassis.

(COMMENT: It is possible that PW means the Czech T38 chassis. This equipment was not in North Africa)

Original strength: 210/220; has suffered heavy casualties and lost two guns (these may possibly be the 12 TDs claimed by our forward troops on 15 Jul at H 6552).

(f) H.G. Eng Bn

This Bn moved to SICILY at the end of Jun. 2 Coy arrived a few days later (2 Jul) and was on its way to join the Bn at PALERMO when the whole unit was ordered to move to CATANIA. From CATANIA the bn moved to

/CAJATGIRONE.....

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CALTAGIRONE and then moved to GELA area when the Allied landing was made. Here it was used chiefly in an inf role, though some mines were laid by it.

Its organisation is as follows:

Battalion consists of HQ Coy and four coys.

1, 2 and 3 coys were inf companies with three light and one heavy platoons. The light platoon consisted of three sections, with one N.C.O. and ten men, equipped with 2 machine Guns 42. The heavy platoon had one heavy mortar section with 2 x 8-cm Mortars and three heavy M.G. sections with each one H.M.G. (MG 34 and MG 42). 4 Coy was known as an Assault Coy (STURMKOMPANIE). It consists of two platoons, one with the heavy projector and the other with Flame Throwers. 1 Platoon had three M.T.Ws each with six heavy projectors built in at the sides. 2 Platoon had two M.T.Ws each with one, or possibly two, heavy Flame Throwers.

According to PW 4 Coy did NOT exist in the old HG Eng Bn. He had never heard of 5 Coy or 6 Coy. During the engagement at GELA 3 Coy had NO 8-cm Mortars as it had had to give them up to an Inf unit.

2 Coy strength - 180
4 Coy strength - 60/70

There were only three men instead of six, on the H.M.Gs in 2 Coy. At GELA fugitive Italian soldiers were impressed as Nos 4 - 6 (for carrying amn). They fled. Personnel of the Bn were, according to PW, everything else but the volunteers they are alleged to be. They were men drafted from all branches of the services; from Air Force ground personnel from construction bns, Signals, A/Tk etc. There was a fair proportion of ex-RUSSIA personnel. Few of them were the do-or-die type and even fewer intended to die for the Leader and Fatherland. Few of the personnel of 2 Coy had been trained in Engineer duties.

The tactical sign on Bn vehicles was a white clock face with a black pointer indicating the number of the coy.

(iii) Paratps

(a) 3 Parachute Rifle Regiment

PsW from 2 Bn give the following organisation - four coys (5 - 8), each six L.M.Gs, 2 light Mortars and 2 A.Tk rifles, 41. Was allotted 3 x 5-cm A.Tk guns (no amn abandoned FRANCOFONTE) and some Assault Arty by HG Div.

(b) 1 Para Arty Regt

PsW from 1 Troop give the organisation of 1 Bty as 4 x 10.5-cm LG 2 (each with a crew of four men) and Inf section (Staffel) of 32 men with 6 L.M.Gs and a signals section. Original strength 120 men (of whom 30 were left behind in FRANCE). 1 Troop left AVIGNON in 13 Gliders. Several Gliders crashed or were shot down en route and two guns were lost. PW states that I Bty is the only one in existence. II Bty was lost in AFRICA and never replaced.

(iv) Independent Units

(a) 923 Fortress Bn

This is the former 125 z.b.v. March Bn which was renamed about 21 Jun 43. Up to this date it had been equipped for RUSSIA and was standing by to leave. Quite suddenly the RUSSIAN kit was withdrawn, personnel were issued with tropical kit and the new name, 923 Fortress Bn became official.

/On 28 Jun.....

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On 28 Jun 43, 923 Fortress Bn moved to SICILY It arrived on 5 - 6 Jul 43 and was stationed successively at MESSINA, SANTA TERESA and CALTAGIRONE. About 12 Jul 43 2 and 4 Coys of the Bn left CALTAGIRONE and went to GELA area where they took up posns. 1 and 3 Coys remained at CALTAGIRONE. The Bn was attached to HG Div for rations.

The Bn is of four similar Coys, numbered 1 - 4. Each coy consisted of three light platoons and one heavy platoon. The light platoon was of three sections of 1 N.C.O. and 10 men with two M.Gs 42. The heavy platoon had one M.G. sec with two H.M.Gs 42 and one heavy Mortar section with two heavy (8-cm) Mortars. There were no A.Tk weapons in the coy but some of the men were A.Tk personnel and had been told that A.Tk weapons were on the way. 4 Coy strength on the 12 Jul was 145 - 150. Of the total Bn personnel, 253 were from LORRAINE.

(b) 69 (REGGIO) March Bn

This Bn was identified with 200 Special Bde (SCHMALZ). PW gives organisation as HQ Coy, three Rifle Coys and a Heavy Coy. The latter has 180 men with 4 H.M.Gs, 2 Heavy Mortars and 3 A.Tk rifles 41.

5. ENEMY EQUIPMENT

PANTHER TANK

A captured Italian document dated 24 May 43, dealing with strengthening of bridges in SICILY gives the accurate data of the PzKw IV and PzKw VI tanks.

The following particulars are also given for the "PANTHER" Tank:

Length	22ft 0½in
Width	10ft 10½in
Height	9ft 8in
Weight in action	43 - 44 tons
Track width	2ft 2in

Track length on ground is given as 12ft 11½in, the same length as that quoted for the PzKw VI Tiger. No details of armour or armament are given.

COMMENT

This tank has not been identified in North Africa, and as far as is known, has not been in action on the RUSSIAN front.

The specifications of the "Panther" tank is not yet clear but it seems probable that it may be armed with a high velocity gun of 7.5-cm calibre, and that its design has been influenced to no small extent by the RUSSIAN T 34 Tank.

The following specifications of the PzKw VI TIGER are given for comparison:

Length	20ft 4in
Length including guns	27ft 0½in
Width (Road track)	10ft 6in
" (Cross country track)	11ft 9in
Height	9ft 5½in
Weight	56-tons.

G.S.I(a)
23 Jul 43.

T.S. AIREY,
B.G.S.(a)

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APPENDIX "A"
to 15 Army Group INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 13 dated 23 Jul 43

LOCATION LIST OF IDENTIFIED GERMAN DIVISIONS (Based on information received up to 22 Jul 43.)

LIST "A"

	Total Divs all types	Armd Divs	SS Divs all types	Mot Divs	Lt Divs	Mtn Divs	Fd Army Inf Divs. 1st Category (1-50)	2nd Category (51-299)	3rd Category (300-400)	Low Category Divs	L of C Divs (Sicherungs)	Frontier Divs (Grenzwacht)	Trg and Res Divs (Reserve)	Fd Trg Divs (Feldausbildung)	Depot Divs (Ersatz)	Adm Divs (zbV)
FINLAND	7		1 (mtn)			3		3								
RUSSIA																
North	43		1 (Inf)	1	3	1	9	20	1		6			1		
Centre	88	8	1 (Cav)	5			6	44	14	1	5			1		
South	57	11	4 (Armd)	1	2	2	7	17	10		3		1	1		
Unlocated	2													2		
	196	19	7	7	5	6	22	84	25	1	14		1	5		
FRANCE	28	2	1 (Armd)	2				2	8	5			8			
BELGIUM	4		1 (Armd)				1			1		1				
HOLLAND	2							1		1						
DENMARK	4							1		1			2			
NORWAY	11	1						8		2						
GERMANY & PROTECTORATE	41					1						4		20	16	
POLAND	13							1					4		8	
BALKANS (YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE, CRETE)	15	1	1 (mtn) 1 (? mtn)	1	5	1			2	1			2			
ITALY & SICILY	6	4		2												
UNLOCATED	4							3	1							
	324	27	11	12	10	8	23	100	36	12	14	5	17	5	20	24

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LIST "B"

ESTIMATED TOTALS AND DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN DIVISIONS
(based on information received up to 22 July 43)

	TOTAL	OFFENSIVE	DEFENSIVE	ADMINISTRATIVE
FINLAND	7	7		
RUSSIA	189	168	21	
FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES	34	18	16	
DENMARK	4	1	3	
NORWAY	11	9	2	
GERMANY, POLAND & PROTECTORATE	54	2	8	44
BALKANS	15	12	3	
ITALY & SICILY	6	6		
UNLOCATED	4	4		
	324	227	53	44


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


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DISTRIBUTION OF AXIS FORCES IN EUROPE

AS AT JULY 22 1943

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AS AT JULY 22 1943

GERMAN FORCES _____ BLACK

ITALIAN FORCES _____ GREEN

TOTAL EASTERN FRONT (INCL. FINLAND) (OFF:175, DEF:21)

DENMARK
TOTAL 4 DIVS.
(OFF: 1. DEF:3.)

LOW COUNTRIES
TOTAL 6 DIVS.
(OFF:3. DEF:3.)

GERMANY, POLAND & PROTECTORATE
TOTAL 54 DIVS.
(OFF:2. DEF:8. ADM:44.)

FRANCE
TOTAL 28 DIVS.
(OFF:15. DEF:13)

TOTAL 7 DIVS
(5 Fd. - 2 Coastal)

TOTAL 3 DIVS.
(2 Fd.- 1 Coastal)

TOTAL 5 DIVS.
(3 Fd. - 2 Coastal)

TOTAL 15 DIVS.
10 Fd.
1 Para.
4 Coastal.

CORSICA
TOTAL 1 DIV
OFF. 1.

SARDINIA
TOTAL 4 DIVS
OFF. 4.

REMNANTS
4 Fd. Divs.
3 Coastal Divs.

TOTAL 2 DIVS.
OFF. 2.

BALKANS and GREECE
TOTAL 15 DIVS.
(OFF:12. DEF:3.)

TOTAL 31 DIVS.
(31 Fd.)

EDINBURGH
DUBLIN
LONDON
PARIS
LUXEMBOURG
BERNE
BERLIN
PRAGUE
WARSAW
KAUNAS
KIEV
VIENNA
BUDAPEST
ODESSA
BELGRADE
BUCHAREST
SOFIA
TIRANA
ROME
MADRID
LISBON
GIBRALTAR
TETUAN
ALGIERS
TUNIS
MALTA
SICILY
ATHENS
CRETE
TRIPOLI
BENGHAZI
ISTANBUL
ANKARA
BATUM
BAKU
CYPRUS
BEIRUT
JERUSALEM
CAIRO
BAGHDAD
TEHRAN

Sea
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Mediterranean Sea
Red Sea
BALEARIC Is.

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
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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 14 of 6 AUG 44.

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1. OPERATIONS 23 JULY - 5 AUG.

The enemy were allowed only a short respite in front of CAMPOLI and none on the Northern Sector. We have maintained constant pressure all along the line combined with a concentrated thrust at the centre which has obliged him to abandon CAMPOLI and exposed him to the danger of a split between the two halves of his line.

When the Germans discovered, apparently to their surprise, that we were temporarily unable to press forward from the ARIELLO Bridge, they organised for defence along the line of the DIVIANO and the TROIGNI river and then from TROIGNI itself North to the sea west of SAN VALENTINO. Already, however, by 27 July, the enemy was looking for a more permanent line. This line, which a captured document of Hermann Goering Div calls the Brückenkopf position, runs from the sea 3 kms North of ACRIELLO due West to include DILUCIVILLE and ADLINO; the further course is uncertain but from enemy behaviour it appears to be extended to include TROIGNI and thence presumably to run North to the Coast as before. Hermann Goering Div had prepared two intermediate lines to be occupied on the way back, one including and one excluding CAMPOLI and both pivoting on the strong hill position of CERVARIETE. This plan for an orderly withdrawal was frustrated by the strength of our attack on CERVARIETE. Though reinforced by 3 Para Regt, probably the best German troops on the island, CERVARIETE was stormed after fierce fighting and ADLINO is now directly threatened. It is reported that the enemy seem to be thinning out the ARIELLO garrison in front of ADLINO, although its loss would interpose the mass of XIII between the two halves of the enemy line. It is early as yet to forecast the fall of ADLINO, but it is clear that the enemy must already be thinning out a withdrawal behind ENNA.

Further North, the enemy continue to defend TROIGNI with great determination. If he is to attempt to hold a line in front of SAN VALENTINO and CHERRO, he must keep us at a safe distance from the road joining the two which is the only possible lateral communication on this part of the front. In the TROIGNI fighting the mainstay of the defence is PGR ENS; this Regt is fighting with very great determination, but is known to have had the most severe losses. HERMANN appears to be in support immediately in rear and his HQ was shown by D/F to be about 5 kms SW of CHERRO; III Bn has been identified about 5 kms North of TROIGNI. In the same area is 15 PGR of 29 Pzgt Div with 71 PGR between it and the coast. One Bn of 15 PGR is South of TROIGNI and 382 PGR is also split with I Bn North and to South of the town.

Other identifications are rather disjointed as might be expected in a withdrawal. HQ 1 Para Div 3 Para Regt on its right and 4 Para Regt on its left; it was intended, circumstances permitting, to put both Regts in a sector of their own on the East Coast but the break through at CATENANUOVA prevented this plan. The REINHARDT who for so long bore the brunt of the battle have been withdrawn to reform on the ADLINO - TROINE road. The fact that the German Tanks have not played a great part in the battle is not surprising in view of the terrain but it is interesting to note that small detachments of them, usually about three in number, have been used well forward as SP Arty to assist the forward infantry. It does not appear that they have had any particular success in this role.

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It appears that a certain thinning out of non-essential elements has taken place. Evidence is slight but on night 2/3 Aug, there was a reference to what may have been rear HQ 6 Army moving back to the Mainland and on 5 Aug, D/F put the mobile HQ of 15 Pz Div in the toe of ITALY. Both these could well be dispensed with; 6 Army HQ is of little use now and the ground is unfavourable for a recce unit. The attempted flight of 500 Recce Unit from Capo ZOPPO suggests a parallel. These moves should not be pressed to suggest that the Germans have already begun to evacuate. They must appreciate that they will be shortly pressed back behind the PO by the splitting of their line at ADRIATIC but everything still suggests that they will continue to put up as tough a delaying action as possible confined by the fact that the further back they go the more their line is shortened.

A postscript should be added on the Italians. Contrary to what was suggested in IS No.15, it appears that parts of 26 ASSIETTA Div succeeded to escape into the Maddalena; at least Div HQ is there with General ROMITO taking further ineffective effort to discover the exact whereabouts of his own troops and his allies. Prisoners have been taken in the ANCONA area from both 5 and 6 Inf Regts. However PWs agree that very large numbers of men have deserted; the high proportion of Sicilians in the formation has facilitated the process and many of ROMITO's troops are probably peacefully tilling their fields at the present. 26 ASSIETTA is also stated by prisoners to have been reduced to about 40% of its original strength and, as in the case of all Italians, recent political events will have reduced its fighting value to a very low level. A recent Italian prisoner made the sardonic unusual statement that the morale of the front line troops was very high; the reason for this, he added, was that all were convinced the war was already lost.

2. POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY.

There are no really reliable reports of conditions in ITALY and it is dangerous to speculate on the present situation in the country. A few broad outlines can be given. When Maresciallo BADOGLIO assumed supreme power, his first acts were directed solely to measures ensuring internal security; lip service was paid to the principle that ITALY would remain faithful to the Alliance and continue the war at GERMANY's side, but it is clear that the main role laid down for the troops in ITALY was not so much defence against external aggression as the preservation of order and public services and the prevention of riotous assembly. (The latter is defined as the gathering together of more than three persons). The Army has other tasks as well; with the abolition of the Fascist State and the dissolution of all Fascist Party organs, a great part of the administration and countryside machine, presumably under direct Army control, will be set to fill the gap. With all these intensely practical and essential tasks on hand, the Italian Army can scarcely be expected to give much attention to a task evidently regarded as inevitably by all Italians, the defence of the home country. It is true that during the lull in front of CATANIA, General AMBROSIO's communiques took on a rather more cheerful tone and the nerveuriel Italian temperament may have allowed itself some fleeting hopes; the reaction is likely to be all the more serious, but it must be allowed that the period of comparative freedom from disaster has given time to the Germans to take necessary military dispositions and to prevent a collapse outbreak of anarchy in ITALY. But no Italian doubts that the sacking of MUSSOLINI's fall is that peace must be made, if possible on honourable terms, if not, on any terms possible.

The Italian Press and Radio is now "under entirely new management" and London and Rome are having some little trouble in thinking up new political system cobbling the best of the "Corporate State" with the old Italian tradition of Liberalism". Most of them find it easier to abuse the Fascist leaders for "hiding themselves out of the mire and for discarding the sacred "Statuto", the Constitution; the latter line rather hits at the King, whose oath is to the constitution.

Apart from.....

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1. OPERATIONS 6 - 12 AUG.

The enemy has continued to withdraw and has not made any attempt to do more than impose delay. It looks as if he no longer intends to hold any definite line in SICILY, like the bridgehead position on ETNA position but intends to carry out one continuous withdrawal movement until he reaches the other side of the Straits. This movement, however, is a very slow one and full use is being made of the difficulties of the ground, assisted by demolitions. We have been able to do little to speed up the enemy's withdrawal or to encircle any of his troops except in the North coast where sea-borne landings have produced a satisfactory number of prisoners and considerable acceleration of the enemy's backward movement.

On 6 Aug TROINA was captured, on 7 Aug ADRANO, and the converging advance on RANDAZZO was well under way. On 8 Aug CESARO and TROINA fell but the great road junction at RANDAZZO was still in enemy hands on the evening of 12 Aug. HERMANN GOERING Div was responsible for the defence of the TROINA road with its one remaining H.C. Grenadier Bn, 3 Para Regt, II Bn 382 PGR, the RANCIO Bn and the invaluable H.C. Eng. Bn; the advance of 7 Army from CESARO was opposed by 15 PG Div with 104 PGR and I Bn 15 PGR in the ETNA Battle Group and to the North of the road FULLRIEDE'S 129 PGR with possibly II Bn 71 PGR under command. This has been the main centre of interest; on the North coast 29 PG Div has been pulling back either to conform with the withdrawal of the centre or as a result of the successful landings at SAN FILARCO D'ALLENZIO on 8 Aug and at BROLO on 11 Aug. 71 PGR remains on the right, apparently with IBn forward and IIIBn well back. II and III Bns 15 PGR have also been identified on the North coast together with 29 Eng Bn. The corridor East of ETNA, where the enemy has been steadily but apparently unhurriedly falling back, is defended by 4 Para Regt and 115 PGR (KOMMER) plus the scratch CAMMIN Bn formed from GAF ground staff. From a captured map it appears that 4 Para and 115 have been retiring by alternate bounds, the stage which has apparently been reached at the moment puts 115 PGR on a line along the general line of the CS Northing from I.CASTIGLIONE (S.9705) to just North of RANCIO with a salient in the middle bulging Southwards for about 2 kms while 4 Para is concentrating in the area C.LAMBUNO SW of MONTE.

The enemy tanks have not been much in evidence which is not surprising in view of the country and they appear to have been split up over the front in support of the infantry in a mobile role. A divisional order of H.C. Div on 1 Aug orders 1 Sqn of H.C. Tank Regt to move to RANCIGLIONE to be at the disposal of General STAHEL who commands the Northern coast defences "in a coastal defence role". It was probably from this Sqn that the tanks were drawn which were encountered by the 7 Army landing near SAN FILARCO D'ALLENZIO. 1 Bn H.C. Tank Regt, less 1 Sqn remains however in divisional reserve behind the right flank of the div.

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There is further evidence on evacuation. It appears that some part at least of 6 Army remained behind when what appears to have been rear army was evacuated as reported in IS No.14 (it is also possible that what moved on 2 Aug was rear LIVORNO Div). On 12 Aug a station was located at PALMI which may be HQ 6 Army. On 11 Aug it is possible that ASSIETTA Div HQ and HQ 29 Inf Regt left for the mainland. As far as the Germans are concerned our evidence so far mainly concerns 15 P.G. Div. On 5 Aug it appears that a recce party was organising a collecting point for the div at SANTA ANNA (D.6471); next day it was clear that some of the Div Signals Bn 999, was then on the mainland but not, apparently, Bn HQ. On 7 Aug D/F showed a unit of 15 PG Div to be on the mainland but it was a unit hitherto unidentified. More interesting are the steps being taken to smooth the way for evacuation on this side of the Straits. On 5 Aug the Engr Bn was investigating the possibility of a "traffic circuit" which was to run from FONDACO at D.253606 along the North coast road to TORRE DI FARO, down the East coast to SANTA AGATA, thence inland via D.657320 to PALIAZZO (D.317585) and so back to FONTANA by the road through GESSO. The report states that concentration areas both sides of TONO (D.3765) are thought favourable and a petrol dump is necessary in the SAN NICOLA area (D.2960). It seems clear that 15 PG Div is going to use FARO as its point of embarkation. This is referred to in another place as "Ferry No.1" which is a suitable number for what must be the most Northerly of the crossings.

We know less about H.G. Div but a captured Div Order dated 2 Aug states that one bn of II Bty and two bns of IV Bty will be detached and evacuated to the mainland with 10 r. ..g. while on 10 Aug a representative of 1 bn of I Bty was already established at PALMI. It is a little strange that so large a part of the artillery should leave so early.

MESSINA STRAITS EVACUATION.

Landing craft which have hitherto been employed in rushing over supplies and reinforcements to SICILY are now engaged in the reverse process. The withdrawal of forces has not begun suddenly. MT since 5 Aug has shown an increasing number of LC arriving at beaches on the East side of the Straits with deck cargo, indicating that a beginning was being made. When selecting evacuation points it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that those points which have proved most suitable for beach to beach operations whilst bringing over reinforcements and supplies will in turn be used for "export". For the last six weeks the main ferrying effort has been concentrated in the area North of MESSINA to TORRE DI FARO. From a purely ferrying point of view this area has several advantages. The Straits are narrowest in this area, beaches are suitable for loading MT direct onto barges and there are numerous small piers. A main road runs the whole length of the coast and there are numerous approaches from the road onto the beaches. From a military point of view this area is furthest from the front, allows a maximum concentration of Flak cover for embarkation, and is comparatively safe at least from Naval interference by day. Points observed to have been in constant use in this area and beaches in their vicinity are TORRE DI FARO, CANZIRRI, SANTA AGATA, PORTICATELLO, PARADISO, PACE and SALVATORE DEI GRECI. Although there has always been a steady lighter traffic from ports South of REGGIO to various ports between MESSINA and RIPOSTO where some 10 LC were seen operating in this area on 11 Aug, it seems unlikely that this route will continue to be operated in view of the increasing nearness of the front and ever increasing danger from naval interference. It is confidently expected that points North of MESSINA to TORRE DI FARO will be those from which the major evacuation effort will be made. Some evacuation may be carried out from the North Coast.

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Despite the fact that there are numerous signs that evacuation has in fact begun, it cannot be said that the tempo of lighter traffic has noticeably increased. The number of craft resent, particularly miscellaneous small craft seen on the beaches, has increased, but the activity of larger craft such as LC and SIEBEL Ferries does not show an appreciable increase.

This might in part be accounted for by the fact that whereas hitherto it is believed that the enemy has done little night ferrying and he may now be attempting more, presumably occasioned by the increased scale of Allied air interference, which has resulted in the sinking of a steadily increasing number of craft, and also by a natural desire to conceal as far as possible the rate and extent of withdrawal. Therefore, it seems likely that some night ferrying is in fact going on. Despite this however it must be remembered for the last 6 - 7 weeks there has been a constant flow of men, equipment and supplies across the Straits and mere reversal of this process would of itself not arouse suspicion if it were not for the fact that LC with deck cargoes are now invariably seen arriving on the Eastern shores of the Straits.

At the present time, it is believed that the enemy has at least some 20 LC and 15 SIEBEL ferries operating in the Straits in addition to numbers of smaller craft. This is by no means the limit of craft which could be called on, as it does not include craft observed operating from NAPLES to harbours on the North Coast of SICILY and the North CALABRIAN coast.

The rate of evacuation, it is believed, will not be limited by the numbers of craft available, but rather by the rate of delivery of men and equipment to the evacuation points and to the extent of the effort made to remove equipment. A captured operation order from H.G. Division throws some light on this problem. This order clearly lays down that each man is to take his own weapons and ammunition and more if he can carry it. No specific orders are given for loading MT and equipment; only details of how best to destroy what cannot be taken across. It is also known that a carefully prepared traffic circuit has been laid down apparently for delivery of troops to beaches in area TORRE DI FARO - C.PIZZIRRI - SANTA AGATA, with a "return" route on to the main North-coast road. It would appear to be generally realised that, whatever the official intentions are, evacuation must finally be limited to men with light weapons.

Assuming that in the main this will be the case and, (taking all likely known "hinderances" into account) it is estimated that a maximum of some 15,000 men can be ferried across daily. Theoretically, this total could be much increased, but to achieve even this figure the enemy will have to accelerate the present rate of daylight activity or operate at night. This figure does not take into account the numbers of men who may be filtered across the Straits in small boats. Local Italian owners of small craft are, however, most unlikely to be willing to run the gauntlet of Allied fighters and bombers. The size and capacity of any armada of small boats will depend on the extent to which the Germans themselves can procure and operate them.

3. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.

A. SICILY.

LC continue to bring cargoes down from NAPLES, but it has been noted that they are tending to put in at ports on the N.CALABRIAN coast in particular VIBO VALENTIA, and few are actually proceeding down as far as MESSINA itself. For the rest, hospital liners have been putting in regularly at MESSINA and are carrying their wounded up to N.ITALIAN ports, particularly LEGHORN.

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B. MAINLAND.

There has been some improvement in the railway situation in S.ITALY, as a result of intensive efforts made to repair air-raid damage. Latest reports show that there are now through lines at most of the important junctions S. of NAPLES. BATTIPAGLIA, FOGGIA and REGGIO are all open, but NAPLES was still blocked on 8 Aug, the last date for which a report is available. Details regarding traffic are scanty but such evidence as there is suggests that it is still on a minor scale.

4. ENEMY ORGANISATION.

MESSINA DEFENCE SYSTEM.

From a captured O of B revised to 31 May, the following points of interest are noted.

The garrison consists of the following main units:-

119 Coastal Regt. (HQ S.FILIPPO INFERIORE).
370 Coastal Bn. (HQ S. MARGHERITA).
371 Coastal Bn. (HQ GAZZINI.).
442 Coastal Bn. (HQ MESSINA.).
503 Coastal Bn. (HQ CASTANEA delle FURIE).
158 How. Bty. (HQ S. MARGHERITA).
(12 Hows.149/19: 4 Hows. 155/14).

6 Hilbert Legion, consisting of 30 Tps with a total of 30 CD guns, 38 AA/CD and 61 AA.

NOTE:- The recently identified 88 mm. Btys are not included in the O of B, so the gun totals will be greater.

5. AXIS FORCES IN MEDITERRANEAN.

(a) GERMAN FORCES IN ITALY.

The following German divisions are known to be in ITALY, 3 Pz Gr. Div, North of ROME, 16 Pz Div, BARI - BRINDISI area, 26 Pz Div SALERNO or CALABRIA and elements of 1 Para Div in the NAPLES area. The following divisions may also be in North ITALY, 24 Pz, 60 Pz Gr and 156 (or 158) Reserve Divisions; the two former having been previously reported as earmarked for ITALY. Further divisions are apparently on the move: 386 Pz Gr and 715 Inf Divs are reported as earmarked for ITALY, while 113, 343 and 76 Inf Divs have left their former locations in FRANCE. It does not necessarily follow that all these Divs are going to ITALY as it is thought that still more German Divisions will be required in the BALKANS in order to take over effective control in the event of an Italian surrender.

The indications are, however, becoming clearer that, whatever decision ITALY makes, GERMANY is preparing to resist any Allied attack on ITALY and is already moving in the necessary forces.

(b) WITHDRAWAL OF ITALIAN FORCES FROM FRANCE.

It is reported that 58 LEGNANO and 40 TORINO Divs have returned to ITALY from S.FRANCE.

(c) SPREAD OF GERMAN CONTINGENTS.....

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(c) SPREAD OF GERMAN COMMITMENTS.

The reports of GERMAN troop movements into ITALY and the withdrawal of ITALIAN troops from FRANCE, have important implications. The GERMAN garrison of FRANCE will presumably either have to be increased or further stretched to cover the areas vacated by the Italians, while the transfer to ITALY of most, if not all, of the GERMAN Divisions mentioned above will use up most of the remaining reserves of GERMAN formations. This reserve was formed by the re-formation in FRANCE of divisions wiped out at STALINGRAD. It has often been stated that, owing to known GERMAN man-power shortage, the re-creation of these divisions had been carried out at the expense of adequate reinforcements for divisions in RUSSIA. This statements is supported by a recent report from the RUSSIAN General Staff that GERMAN Divisions in RUSSIA are on an average approximately 40% under W.E.

6. APPENDICES.

At Appendix "A" is a translation of an Operational Instruction of HERMANN GOERING Div dated 2 Aug 43.

GSI(a)
14 Aug 43.

for T.S. AIREY.
B.G.S.(I).

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APPENDIX "A"
to 15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 15 dated 13 Aug 43

SECRET

Enclosure to Div Order No 31/43 Secret, of 2 Aug 43

DIRECTIVE.

for future Movements and Battle Actions in SICILY.

1. No demolitions and no road blocks are to be manned by Italian personnel. Officers i/c battle groups are responsible for the enforcement of this.

2. Every German soldier who is forced to take to the mainland must be in possession of infantry weapons. Apart from revolver and bayonet he will carry a rifle, machine pistol or LMG, with ammunition. In the case of sections, 1 HMG or mortar. These weapons are tickets for the ferry. Without those mentioned, soldiers will ruthlessly be prevented from crossing.

3. No Italian, whether civilian or soldier, may interfere in any way with the movements of the German armed forces. All Italian motor vehicles and heavy weapons will be removed from the roads ruthlessly. This does not apply to units which, as part of the Division, have proved their worth in battle and carry on in the fight.

4. Isolated remnants of formations, platoons and sections of any description, are to be put under command of local units. They will be made to form part of the current movement. Out-of-date orders are no longer valid.

5. Any MT, weapons or equipment that cannot be transported across are to be completely demolished. Destruction by fire is strictly forbidden, since fires and traces of burning are liable to attract the attention of enemy aircraft, both by day and by night. Blowing-up is the most effective method of destruction, and will be applied to weapons as a matter of principle. MT will be destroyed so as to put them out of action for a long time at least. (They will be blown up, magnetos removed, tyres slashed, the engine smashed, or the whole vehicle run over a cliff).

6. The most rigid discipline is the main condition for the success of all future movements. Anyone not co-operating will be shot. Examples of individuals always work wonders.

7. All Traffic Control organisations come under direct orders of Div HQ. Whoever does not comply with regulations is subject to disciplinary action, vide para 6.

8. Roads which, because of enemy action have been blocked (bomb craters or demolished houses), must be made passable as quickly as possible, or diversions created and flagged by drawing on the civil population and PW.

9. All ranks will carry haversack rations for 24 hours as well as iron rations.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 16 of 19 AUG 43.

(a) Sidelined information will not be re-produced in any Intelligence Summary of formations under this HQ except by special permission.

(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hrs of receipt.

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1. OPERATIONS 13 - 17 AUG.

(a) Operations on land during this period present no features of particular interest. Assisted by the mountainous terrain and the many demolitions the enemy skilfully disengaged and transported a large portion of his remaining troops across the Straits of MESSINA. It appears that his withdrawal was certainly hastened by our pressure and particularly by the amphibious operations carried out on both coasts but in general it can be said that the withdrawal from SICILY was well carried out.

On 13 Aug RANDAZZO fell, and the German forces holding this town withdrew Northwards up the FRANCAVILLA road, apparently reaching the T junction with the North Coast road just before it was cut by 7 Army's rapid advance in this Sector. After this their withdrawal East on this road was very hasty and 7 Army made practically no contact with the enemy up to the end. Opposition to 8 Army's advance as well was restricted to small but determined rearguards covered by demolitions. Shortly before midnight on 16 Aug patrols from 7 Army entered MESSINA and by next day the city was firmly in our hands. According to the German Radio the last German troops left SICILY at 0700 hrs on 17 Aug. The last to leave, they say, was General HUBE who is described as C.O.C. 29 P.G. Div but in fact is believed to be commanding 14 Corps. It is, however, true that 29 P.G. Div has added to its STALINGRAD laurels the honour of forming the rearguard in SICILY.

CALABRIA is now the enemy's front line and it is important to establish what are his new dispositions there. Apart from 14 Corps evacuated from SICILY it is known that 26 Armoured Div is in CALABRIA. On 15 Aug a unit of the Div mentioned MONTAURO (Z 1819) and MONTAURO Station which is on the coast South of STALETTI. On 16 Aug another unit of the Div reported an air raid on SCALEA (T 53). It looks as if the Division was fairly widely spread out. Further North there is 16 Armoured Div somewhere in South ITALY and 3 P.G. Div in North ITALY. 2 Para Div is believed to be in the NAPLES area. The chain of Command is obscure as yet. 14 Corps HQ apparently got away reasonably intact but another Corps HQ has now turned up. An Italian source on 18 Aug refers to a "German 2nd Corps" at SALA CONSILINA (O 3500). It is not known what troops this Corps will have under command or whether it has brought any divisions with it. As for the forces removed from SICILY it is as yet too early to make an estimate but we must expect that a total of up to 50,000 have been evacuated. This is an overall figure, excluding wounded but including Flak and Services and must be treated as an approximation merely.

(b) ITALIAN COASTAL REGTS.

It is interesting to note that 146 Coastal Regt has apparently succeeded in keeping the identity of at least its HQ, having retreated all the way from the South. It appears that the Coastal Formations, where they have been able to escape, are joining in the evacuation as comparatively organised entities, whereas at the beginning of the operation it looked as though they would merely disintegrate. It is probable that 213 Coastal Div HQ is among the fortunate ones.

2. MESSINA STRAITS EVACUATION.....

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2. MESSINA STRAITS EVACUATION.

The evacuation, preliminary stages of which had commenced as early as Aug 1, was completed by the morning of the 17th. A captured document shows the following timetable; starting on 1 Aug Hermann Goering Div, 12 Aug 15 P.G. Div and on 15 Aug 29 Pz.Gr. Div. The build up of LC and Siebels in anticipation of the end had been going on from the last week in July. By 1 Aug approximately, 20 LC and 15 Siebels were operating and there was no subsequent startling changes in the numbers of craft in the Straits area. An increase in the number of very small craft of the fishing smack type did however become apparent about 7 Aug, and as many as 50 of these were present in the Straits during the last days of the evacuation. Whether the appearance of these arose from the spontaneous desire of their Italian owners to assist in a smaller though no less hazardous DUNKIRK, or whether it resulted from the Germans requisitioning all they could lay their hands on and manning them themselves, must be left to the researches of a future GIBBON. In any case, the brunt of the evacuation definitely fell on the LC and Siebels, which as anticipated, operated almost entirely through the beaches between MESSINA and TORRE di FARO. Of the two train ferries, only the smaller one appears to have assisted in the evacuation although both were still present in the Straits on the 15th. The smaller operated from MESSINA harbour itself to SAN GIOVANNI. Cargoes were probably entirely personnel. The withdrawal was begun sufficently early to permit the evacuation of equipment. Tanks and MT were seen loading on to Siebels and F. Boats and it is clear that guns and other pieces of equipment have also been removed. Ferrying was almost certainly carried on by night, and will have been assisted by the brilliant moonlight.

How far the evacuation was completely successful and to what extent Allied air and naval forces were able to impede it, is not yet known. It seems doubtful whether any serious losses will have been incurred in transit. The shortness of the crossing, the difficult nature of the targets involved and the murderous AA barrage across the Straits, said to be the heaviest outside the RUHR VALLEY, have precluded any spectacular results. Moreover, the very nature of the Straits precluded the use of naval forces except by night. It may be however that considerable casualties were inflicted upon the concentration of men and materials on the beaches.

3. ENEMY SUPPLIES & COMMUNICATIONS.

The decline, not to speak of the fall, of the Roman Empire having progressed one stage further, interest now focusses on the mainland. Briefly the position to date here is that very serious dislocation has been caused by our air attacks to the enemy railway system South of NAPLES, particularly in CALABRIA. To overcome this the enemy has fallon back on the use of sea traffic along the West Italian coast to points on the CALABRIAN peninsula. So far as road transport is concerned his capabilities will be governed by his MT position which is thought to be far from satisfactory.

Railways.

Since the last Summary, further reports have indicated heavy damage to the railway at CATANZARO. This is one of the key junctions in CALABRIA, and attacks upon it have certainly contributed to the growing railway constipation here. That all is not well in this area is confirmed by the great congestion observed on 15 Aug, in the 15 mile stretch between MELITO and GALATI in the toe. Here one train was reported every 2 miles by our pilots, and there were probably as many as 300 trucks in the railway yards near MELITO. These trains may well have been present in connection with the evacuation, although the area concerned is some distance South of the main points of disembarkation. However, the fact that there was such a concentration of rolling stock along an area seriously exposed to our air attacks suggests an inability on the part of the enemy to disperse his traffic in this part of the world. This must almost certainly have resulted from the Allied air attacks.

Sea Traffic.....

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Sea Traffic.

With intake to SICILY at a standstill, landing craft and tanker lighter traffic from NAPLES has been directed to ports along the N.CALABRIAN coast. VIBO VALENTIA in particular is known to have been very active. With SICILY in our hands the weight of Allied air and sea attack may soon render this port untenable and, like MILAZZO during the latter stages of the SICILIAN campaign, it may fall into complete disuse. There are, however, alternative harbours along the coast S of NAPLES. PIZZO, a little further North than VIBO, has had a small turnover of small craft for some time and there has lately been evidence that the harbour of SCALEA, approximately half way between NAPLES and REGGIO, is being used by small craft to an appreciable extent. As many as 10 F-lighters and 7 supply barges were seen there on 13 Aug. It may well be that the enemy will consider using this and other small harbours not too near the Sicilian bases for the unloading of goods, thence dispersing them by road.

4. RE-FORMING OF STALINGRAD DIVISIONS.

(a) The extent to which the Germans felt it necessary to re-constitute as rapidly as possible, presumably on account of morale, divisions wiped out at STALINGRAD is shown by the following statement by a PW.

On 1 Mar 43, 372 Inf Div was renamed 29 Mot Div. There was a sorting out of personnel, about one third in PWs Regt being replaced by survivors from the German 29 Mot Div destroyed at STALINGRAD and by leave personnel. 1/48 Inf Regt became 15 Gren Regt.

(b) Balkans.

In spite of rumours which are reported as being current among Italian garrisons in GREECE, there appears to be no prospect of an immediate Italian collapse there, nor of Italians turning on the Germans. On the contrary G.O.C. 11th Army informed all forces under his command on 3 Aug that the Italian High Command was continuing the war side by side with the Germans. The Italians in general appear to be waiting upon events at home and refraining from any action which might compromise them, either now or in the future in the eyes of the Germans or the patriots.

5. GENERAL.

(a) ITALIAN PRESS REACTIONS.

The following extract comes from BUDAPEST Morse News for 10th Aug 43.

The Italian Press does not conceal the gravity of ITALY's present position. The POPOLO DI ROMA openly declares that it would be both stupid and useless to try and conceal that the situation is grave in ITALY. This paper continues; "While it is undeniable that the downfall of Fascism was brought about by developments in the war situation, it is untrue that the downfall of Fascism will involve the ending of the war. The BADOGLIO Government has assured us of the consoling fact that a system based on oppression has come to an end. It has promised to re-establish freedom.

It cannot, however, assure us of the re-conquest of [redacted], LIBYA and the MEDITERRANEAN Islands. The military legacy of Fascism has survived the destruction of the system itself, and this we cannot eliminate so easily as we have the single-party system and the Chamber of Corporations.

The enemy, who has always maintained war against Fascism and not against the Italian people, seems willing to alleviate our position.

Hitler has declared that he thinks it an advantage for his troops to fight several thousands of kilometres away from German frontiers. Fortunately for them, German people can recall this statement without disappointment.

The Italian people.....

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The Italian people, however, in addition to sharing the fate of the German people in enduring bombing raids on the civilian population, is faced with enemy armies on Italian soil.

This is the cause of the extreme gravity of ITALY's position. The Italian Government is confronted with immense responsibilities - that of opposing the most daring military operation that any government has ever had to face.

(b) GERMAN FIGHTER PILOT MORALE.

(a) The following is from a PW. He stated that in the week preceding his capture 19 pilots were lost from his Gruppe, leaving only 18 serviceable aircraft on July 12. Further he stated, that at the beginning of July a special order of the day was issued by Major General GALLAND stating that the following conditions must be fulfilled by all GAF fighter pilots in the MEDITERRANEAN Area.

(i) An enemy must be shot down, or

(ii) Hits must be visible in the A/C to show that the pilot had been engaged in combat, or

(iii) The pilot must be shot down himself.

In future no excuses would be accepted and a pilot who did not fulfil one or more of these conditions would be made the subject of an immediate Court of Enquiry with a Court Martial to follow. It was further expected of each formation of fighters who took off that they would shoot down at least one enemy aircraft.

(b) According to a prisoner, Reichsmarschall GOERING recently issued the following order of the day to the GAF fighter units in the MEDITERRANEAN Area. "Together with the Fighter Pilots in FRANCE, NORWAY and RUSSIA, I can only regard you with contempt. I want an immediate improvement and expect that all pilots will show an improvement in fighting spirit. If this improvement is not forthcoming, flying personnel from the Kommodore downwards must expect to be reduced to the ranks and transferred to the Eastern front to serve on the ground". As a result of these proclamations a strong feeling of defeatism is prevalent amongst fighter units, and many pilots, including Staffel-Kapitans, have been heard to say that it is better to become prisoners than return to base to face a court martial.

NOTE: Whether or not these two orders were in fact issued it is significant that GAF Fighter Pilots believe they were.

6. ENEMY EQUIPMENT - ITALIAN.

PW gives the following information regarding the AUTOBLINDA 40 C. (N.M).

Armament	-	1 x 75 mm. 1 x 20 mm. 1 x 8 mm Breda.
Speed	-	On roads up to 100 km. per hour. Cross country up to 50 km. per hour.
Range	-	Maximum over roads 400 km.

Comment: While the data given seems to be optimistic, PW who was a Lt. in Tank Instruction Centre at VERONA, claims that the figures for speed and range are substantially correct, and this armd car is better than anything produced in either the German or the British Army. The letters N.M. stand for "Nuovo Modello". The armd car is a 4-wheeler only.

7. APPENDIX. - At Appendix "A" is a Note on the new German Tank "PANTHER".

M.S.I(A).
19 Aug 43.

J.T.S. AIREY.
for B.G.S.(I).

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APPENDIX "A" TO 15 ARMY GROUP
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 16 OF
19 AUG 43.

NOTE ON THE NEW GERMAN TANK "PANTHER".

(NOTE:- The following details of the new German tank "Panther" are still somewhat indefinite; but as it is expected in service very shortly, the present indications of its characteristics, although as yet unconfirmed, may be useful).

1. There are indications that German tank production is being concentrated on two types of tank. One of these is the heavy Pz.Kw.VI, of which type "H" has already been in action in North Africa and Russia. The other, which is probably the more important of the two, is a new medium tank known as "Panther" and occasionally referred to as the Pz.Kw.V. The establishment for medium tanksqns equipped with Panther tanks or intended to be so equipped (m.Panz.Kp. "Panther") is known to have been in existence for some months. The tank has not yet, however, been in action in very large numbers, though one report from a good source refers to its successful use in recent fighting on the Russian front. Whether or not the Germans are yet in a position to employ this tank on a really large scale, there is little doubt that they ultimately intend that it should take the place of the Pz.Kw. III & IV.

2. The general design of the Panther tank is believed to be based on that of the Russian T.34. Features common to both tanks are reported to include a low contour, well sloped armour, and a high power/weight ratio. The German tank, however, is understood to have a three-man turret, an engine and transmission of German design, and many differences in mechanical detail.

3. The following general specification of the Panther tank is based on information so far collated, but is still subject to confirmation:-

Weight:	34 to 38 tons.
Crew:	5
Armament:	One high-velocity 7.5 cm. gun and one M.G. co-axially mounted in turret; probably no M.G. in hull.
Armour:	Front 80 - 100 mm. Sides 60 - 80 mm.
Engine:	Believed interchangeable with that on Pz.Kw.VI i.e. an unsupercharged 21 litre Vee 12 petrol engine developing a maximum B.H.P. of 642, though more than one report has mentioned the possibility of a similar engine fitted with an exhaust driven supercharger.
Dimensions:	Uncertain, but see 4 below.
Performance:	Maximum speed 30 - 35 m.p.h. Gradient 38 degrees. Radius of action (roads) 78 miles.
Intercommunication:	External: R.T., W.T., flag, etc. Internal: Intercomm. telephone.

An Italian document.....

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An Italian document concerned with bridge strengthening gives the weight in action as 43 - 44 tons, but this is now believed to include a safety margin.

The duties of the crew are the same as in Pz.Kw.III, IV and VI, namely, comd, gunner, and loader in the turret, and driver and wireless operator in the hull.

There is little doubt that the 7.5 cm. gun has a better performance than the 7.5 cm. Kw.K.40 at present in use in Pz.Kw.III, but it is not yet clear whether it is the tapered bore 75 cm. Kw.K.41 or an improved parallel bore gun. It is of course possible that both types may be used.

It is suggested that the same plate thickness as are already in production and employed in the armour of the Pz.Kw.VI may be used for the Panther as follows:-

Front Armour:	Vertical plates.	102 mm.
	Sloping Plates.	82 mm.
Side Armour.	Vertical Plates.	82 mm.
	Sloping Plates.	62 mm.
Top and Belly Plates.		26 mm.

Owing to the extensive use of sloping plates, the vertical areas on the front requiring 102 mm. armour are likely to be very small.

4. The exact dimensions are not known, but there is little doubt they are within the following limits, and they are probably close to the lower figure in each case.

Length:	19ft. 10 ins	- 22 ft. 5½ ins.
Width:	9 ft. 10 "	- 10 " 10 3/4 ins.
Height:	7 " 10 "	- 9 " 8 ins.
Track Width:	1 " 8½ "	- 2 " 2 "
Length of Track on ground:	12 " 6 "	- 12 " 10½ ins.

The upper figures in each case are taken from the captured Italian document already referred to and are believed to include a safety margin of approximately 10% in most cases. The lower figures correspond with those for the Russian T.34, except in the case of the track width, where the lower figure is about 2 in. less than for the Russian track. The tracks are expected to be interchangeable with the narrower of the two types used on the Pz.Kw.VI, which is approximately 1 ft. 2 ins wide.

5. A P/W who has provided much detailed information on this tank states that its construction does not follow the standard German practice. The hull and front superstructure, according to this P/W, form a single unit in the Panther instead of two separate units bolted together, as in the Pz.Kw.III & IV. This would be a logical development if the front plate of the superstructure is in one piece with the glacis plate, as in the T.34.

The same P/W states that the vision arrangements in the Panther are much better than those in the T.34 and that:-

(a) The turret traversing gear is probably electric, as in the Pz.Kw.IV, though it may possibly be hydraulic, as in the Pz.Kw.VI.

(b) The suspension is slightly different from that on the T.34; P/W is uncertain in what respects, but suggests the use of torsion bar springing and possibly overlapping bogie wheels, as in Pz.Kw.VI.

(c).....

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(c) A multi-plate dry clutch is fitted. P/W also refers, however, to the possible fitting of a Fottinger hydraulic coupling as an alternative.

(d) An eight speed semi or fully automatic gear box will probably be fitted, though the retention of a simple 4-speed gear box as in the T.34 has been considered.

(e) The Panther tank is practically gas-tight, but this merely came about by chance.

In connection with the above statements, it should be borne in mind that this P/W probably had access to the Panther tank only while it was still under development. He had no knowledge of the extent to which the Panther has been prepared for wading, but it is unlikely the Germans will have neglected this in their design.

(The above is an Extract from AFHQ Publication dated 3 Aug 43).

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.17 of 25 AUG 43.

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(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hrs of receipt.

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1. GENERAL.

It is obvious that important German military movements are taking place in ITALY - re-shuffling in the South and reinforcement in the North - but it is not possible yet to draw an exact picture of the results of these movements. We know a little more about dispositions in the South. Both 29 P.G. and GOERING Divs have been moving; the former apparently to the area of the Gulf of GAETA where MTB had a report centre at SESSA (M.9492) on 20 Aug, while GOERING Div Engineers were at LOCRI on 18 Aug and other elements at COSENZA on 19 Aug and SOVERATO on 20 Aug. A petrol dump for the GOERING Div was stated to be at CASTROVILLARI on 20 Aug, so that it appears that the Division is moving North out of CALABRIA. Of the original 14 Corps, therefore, only 1 Para Div and 29 P.G. Div have not been heard of; the former suffered very heavy casualties, the latter nothing like so heavy. Someone must be left to hold the toe, since 26 Pz Div does not seem to have moved down at all, and it looks as if 29 P.G. Div, with or without 1 Para Div, will again have the post of honour as it did in SICILY. From available information on casualties it looks as if the division evacuated about 6,000 men across the Straits and adding in such elements as never went to SICILY (for instance the Tank Bn and Recce Unit) it may have a strength of about 10,000. 1 Para Div can probably not muster more than 3,500 men; unless the enemy appreciates an immediate danger of attack the division is likely to be withdrawn to reform, possibly in the NAPLES area where its sister formation, 2 Para Div is believed to be.

We have then 29 P.G. Div located in the toe with 26 Pz Div to its North. The latter, as stated in our last Summary, has elements as far South as MONTAURO (Z.1819) and as far North as SCALEA (T.53). This is defence in depth with a vengeance and suggests that the Germans envisage the defence of CALABRIA as a slow withdrawal on the lines of the defence of the North Eastern corner of SICILY, with the sea flanks sufficiently covered to nullify the effect of landings similar to those carried out in the later phases of that withdrawal.

Italians have 31 Corps in CALABRIA; 31 Corps with its HQ at CATANZARO. Under command are 104 [illegible] NOVA Div, 211 [illegible] 212 Coastal [illegible] and what remains of the MESSINA Command. It is doubtful if these forces have any military value in the present situation except for the effect they may have on the nerves of their German comrades. The forces from SICILY are apparently being decently wound up and the puppets put back in their boxes. 6 Army HQ has gone off to VERONA to reform alongside ARIETE in that home of lost causes. 16 Corps HQ have left for SPEZIA. Generals GOTTI, SCHREIBER and CHIRIELEISON of 213 Coastal Div, ASSIETTA Div and LIVORNO Div respectively were to report to 31 Corps HQ on 23 Aug, presumably for railway warrants and possibly a change of headgear. They certainly have no troops to command and there is little reason why they should be given any more.

A correction should be made in IS No.16. "the "Second German Corps" then referred to at SALA CONSILINA is almost certainly II FLIEGERKORPS as the Army formations of that number are otherwise engaged.

Organisation - GERMAN.....

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2. Organisation - GERMAN.

A. PARATROOP TROOPS.

The following information is provided by a PW believed reliable.

(i) 7 Air Corps. PW stated that it was misleading to say that 7 Air Corps consisted of two para divs. These were so small and incomplete that he rounded to him more of a joke than anything else.

(ii) 1 Para Div. According to PW the following units are part of 1 Para Div: a Div Sigs Section, a Div Arty Unit and a Div MG Bn, 3 and 4 Para Regts.

(iii) Div Arty Unit. According to PW, the div arty unit (he did NOT call it a Regt) consisted of two batteries, one of which was equipped with 10.5 cm Paratroop Hows (L.G.2) and the other with 7.5 cm Paratroop Hows (L.G.1). He confessed, however, that his knowledge in this respect was hazy. He could give no details of strength, organisation or armament. He knew that part of these units had been in SICILY.

(iv) Div M.G. Bn. PW was positive about this unit. It is an independent unit within the div and consists of three coys armed exclusively with Hy M.Gs. These are either sub-allotted to div units as required or used in force in support of them.

(v) Div Sigs Section (DIVISIONSNACHRICHTENZUG). PW insisted on the title and stated that the Div Sigs Section consisted of two units, each of coy strength. He claimed that the two coys had been used as infantry right from the start and that by 15 July 43 they had been reduced to a total strength of 20 men and one 2/Lt. They were then withdrawn.

(vi) 4 Para Regt. PW stated, that it had had heavy losses in RUSSIA, was below strength and did not contain more than 50% of its original personnel. 4 Para Regt consists of three bns, 13 Coy and 14 Coy.

(vii) 1 Bn. 1 Bn had at the start of operations four coys, of which 1 - 3 were rifle coys and 4 Coy was a Hy coy. The organisation of the rifle coys was three light pls and one heavy pl. Light Pls consisted of three sections with two L.M.Gs. and 12 men. Heavy Pl had one Heavy MG and one Heavy Mortar.

4 Coy had four Heavy MGs and four Heavy Mortars. This was the W.E. In RUSSIA it had had as many as eight MGs. In SICILY, owing to casualties, it was progressively reorganised. On 17 July it had two Heavy M.Gs, two L.M.Gs. and one Heavy Mortar. By 2 Aug all these weapons had been lost.

(viii) 2 Bn. PW stated that 2 Bn was much under strength. It had been a Ski Bn in RUSSIA.

(ix) 13 Coy. 13 Coy, 4 Para Regt, contains four 10.5 cm Super-Hy Mortars.

(x) 14 Coy. 14 Coy is the A.Tk Coy. It contains some 7.5 cm A.Tk guns and some guns of smaller calibre, without muzzle-brakes, but which PW cannot specify more exactly.

PW last had contact with 1 Bn on 4 Aug. He estimated its strength on that date as follows:-

2 Coy.....50 men.
3 Coy.....40 - 50 men.
4 Coy.....30 men, 7 NCOs. and 1 Officer.

PW also spent some time with 9 Coy on 4 Aug, and says it has a strength of about 50 men only. He had NO information about 1 Coy.

In MANCE the emblem of 1 Para Div was a black ring surrounded by a red ring and inside it a black arrow outlined in red pointing obliquely downwards from right to left.

B. HERMAN GOERING .....

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B. HERMANN GOERING Tank Regiment.

A PW from H.Q. Tank Regt provided the following information.

(i) Organisation.

3 Bn H.Q. Tank Regt, consisted of 9, 10 and 11 Tps, each with HQ and three Secs.

(ii) Armament and Strength.

Each Tp had seven 7.5 cm Assault Guns, each with a crew of five men. These were distributed as follows:-

HQ Sec under Tp Comd .....1 Gun.
Three gun secs, each.....2 guns.
There were 9 LMGs to each Tp.
The Total strength of 9 Tp was approximately 100 all ranks.

(iii) Ammunition.

The Tp carried 70 to 80 rounds per gun, normally comprising HE and AP shells in about equal proportions; the proportion of HE to AP would, however, vary slightly, according to the Tps task.

3. MAIN METHODS - ITALIAN.

Staff Work.

The following notes on a slip of paper were found in the waste paper basket of the Mayor of CASTIGLIONE.

(1) Hail to the Star Spangled and Stripe/Hail to the Union Jack.
(2) Welcome to our Garden SICILY.
(3) Welcome to our City CASTIGLIONE.

4. ITALY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.

Reports of the arrival of further German formations in ITALY make it clear that despite the change of shirt GERMANY still feels it in her interest to continue the defence of Italian territory. This support will entail the movement into and within ITALY of further GERMAN formations, and the maintenance of a lengthy L of C. Consequently, Italian communications assume a far greater importance than hitherto. Attention focuses principally on the railways which are now being methodically attacked by the Allied Air Forces.

The ITALIAN rail network is extremely vulnerable since except in the industrial area of the LOMBARDY plain the network is not extensive and is ill equipped with adequate alternative routes along which traffic can be diverted. Hence the blocking of one particular junction has a paralysing effect on railways over a whole section of the country. Furthermore, the alternative routes are in most cases quite incapable of carrying the weight of traffic thrown upon them by the blocking of the main lines.

This state of affairs is best illustrated at BOLOGNA and PISA. Through these two junctions must pass all traffic from Northern to Southern ITALY. If these junctions are blocked there can be no through traffic from the Northern network to Central and Southern ITALY.

The two West Coast main lines PISA - LEGHORN - ROME - NAPLES, and BOLOGNA - FLORENCE - ROME - NAPLES are the two main railway arteries of the country. These lines are also the main routes for traffic to S.E. ITALY as the East Coast line from ANCONA Southwards is only single track.

The blocking.....

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The blocking of the main lines out of ROME forces all traffic to be diverted via a complicated and inadequate single line network further inland, while at NAPLES the blocking of the by-pass junctions not only closes the main line South but also the main East - West line via BENEVENTO and FOGGIA. Successful attacks on BENEVENTO can also close this line. The second main East-West link is through BATTIPAGLIA to TARANTO; this route also provides an alternative route to the toe through SIBARI and CATANZARO. BATTIPAGLIA is of extreme importance, as the closing of this junction paralyses the entire South Western circuit BATTIPAGLIA - METAPONTO - SIBARI - CATANZARO - REGGIO - PAOLA - BATTIPAGLIA.

On the East coast the blocking of FOGGIA paralyses most of the South Eastern network, while complete paralysis would follow if BATTIPAGLIA and the NAPLES by-pass junctions were simultaneously blocked.

Even this brief outline is sufficient to show that by successful attacks on certain junctions it is possible to paralyse the railway system of a whole section of the country.

Attacks on Communications.

Allied air attacks against railway communications in ITALY have been continuing for several months, and already considerable dislocation is known to have been caused.

The most noticeable effect has been produced by attacks on the junctions along the main West Coast lines, which has forced the enemy to increase the use of small craft along the coast South of NAPLES. Recent attacks have again centered mainly on the network around and South of NAPLES. SALERNO, BATTIPAGLIA, VILLA LITERNO, AVERSA, CASERTA, CANCELLO and SAPRI have all been attacked by day or by night in the last week, the first two junctions having received the main weight of the offensive. BENEVENTO and FOGGIA have also been heavily attacked. The enemy's sensitiveness to these attacks is shown by the fact that during the recent attack on FOGGIA enemy fighter reaction was greater than experienced for some time. Upwards of 70 enemy aircraft were encountered.

Intruder and long-range fighter attacks have been continued against trains, stations, etc. These attacks have cumulatively disorganising effect. Engines, wagons and freight are destroyed and Stations shot up. Furthermore, the stagnation caused by the blocking of junctions is likely to provide an increasing number of targets in the form of stationary trains, etc, while the diversion of rail traffic to the roads in Southern ITALY will also provide road targets for long range fighters.

Present state of the Railways as a result of recent attacks.

The bombing of the ROME marshalling yards temporarily closed all lines but the repairs should now have restored the situation. The constant attacks on the NAPLES by-pass junctions keep this important network in a constant state of disorganisation. It is probable, however, that some through working is usually possible, but on a scale insufficient to cope with requirements. Further South the junctions of SALERNO and BATTIPAGLIA appear to be blocked. The present situation at FOGGIA and BENEVENTO is not known. In the Toe, the railway is believed blocked at SAPRI, REGGIO, CATANZARO and SIBARI.

General Effects.

The dislocation caused by Allied bombing attacks on the Italian railway system will throw a heavy strain on the German MT Columns and on Coastal shipping. The disadvantage of being forced to move large quantities of supplies by road are well known; and it will take large fleets of German trucks to move even part of the supplies immobilised owing to railway dislocation. This state of affairs would of itself be bad enough if there were an abundance of MT. On the contrary, however, there is evidence that the Germans are suffering from a general shortage of MT.

The dislocation.....

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The dislocation of the railway system South of NAPLES has already forced the Germans to rely mainly on coastal shipping, (mostly by landing craft) for the movement of supplies to SICILY, which presumably will have to be continued for the supplying of troops in CALABRIA and Southern ITALY generally. The effective bombing of PISA and BOLOGNA might force the enemy also to increase coastal shipping North of NAPLES. West coast harbours and shipping are vulnerable to Allied Air and Naval attacks and the small harbours at VIBO MARINA, GOLFA - TAU[illegible] and SCALEA have already been subjected to heavy Allied air and naval bombardment. Their fate will be shared by other harbours which the enemy is found to be using. The importance which is attached to the use of these harbours is shown by the increased flak protection which has lately been given them. The total of small craft sunk along the West Coast is steadily mounting.

The combined effects of the attacks on railways will be not only to block and disorganise the German L of C but also to impede the mobility of German formations. Formations themselves can move by road but supplies and even much of the heavier equipment would if possible be moved by rail.

Whereas in GERMANY repairs can be quickly effected and necessary improvisations quickly organised, such is not the case in ITALY. It can be fairly assumed that anything which appears to further German interests and increases the likelihood of ITALY becoming a German battleground will be distasteful to the Italian public.

There is ample evidence that repairs are slow and it is certain that it is mostly German initiative which ensures that they are effected. All this entails more and more German control and a consequent worsening of ITALO-GERMAN relations.

NOTE: A map of the Italian railway system South of ROME is being prepared. It is regretted that it is not available for issue with this Summary but will be attached to Summary No 18.

5. MAIN DISPOSITIONS

GERMANY

Spread of German Commitments in the West

It now seems reasonably certain that all Italian Divisions are leaving or are about to leave S.E. FRANCE. To take their place the following German Divisions are reported to have moved into this area - 336 Mot Div, 76 and 715 Inf Divs and 158 Reserve Div. These divisions were previously thought to be en route to ITALY (See Summary No 15) but it now seems more likely that they will remain for the time being in S.E. FRANCE in place of the evacuated Italian Divisions. They include however two offensive divisions which would be readily available for transfer to ITALY if called for. It is now reported that of 113 and 343 Infantry Divisions in FRANCE both previously reported as on the move, the former is destined for RUSSIA, while nothing further is known of the latter. A Division, believed to be SS Div 10, has moved from the North to fill the gap left in S.W. FRANCE by the departure of 386 Mot and 715 Inf Divisions.

Train movements towards S.E. FRANCE during the past few weeks have been sufficient for further divisions to have arrived in this area in addition to those mentioned above, and it must be assumed that some have crossed into ITALY.

The necessity for occupying the area vacated by the Italians will cause a further stretch of German strength in FRANCE and absorption of Reserves.

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Total German Formations in FRANCE and LOW COUNTRIES

Insufficient evidence is as yet available to enable a balance to be struck as to the exact present strength of German Divisions in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES. As was stated in the preceding paragraph these have undoubtedly had to be spread to include hitherto Italian occupied FRANCE; with consequent re-shuffle in other areas. The small reserve of divisions reformed in FRANCE has almost certainly been further drawn on and divisions sent to ITALY while at least two have gone to RUSSIA (113 and 291 Inf Divs).

On the credit side 389 and 94 Inf Divs ex STALINGRAD Divs are now known to have been reforming in the ST. LO and LORIENT areas respectively. 189 Reserve Div is reported to have arrived in FRANCE from the BALKANS. It seems most unlikely that the previously published total of 38 Divisions (incl 16 Defensive) and 4 CAF Field Divisions has increased. The total is now thought to be less and the number of Defensive Formations greater.

STALINGRAD Divisions

With the identification of 94 and 394 Inf Divs reforming in FRANCE all the 20 Divisions reported wiped out at STALINGRAD have been re-identified. The STALINGRAD list was 14, 16, 24 Armoured, 3, 29 and 60 Motorised, 100 Light, 1, 44, 71, 76, 94, 113, 295, 297, 305, 371, 376, 384 and 389 Infantry Divisions.

D. ITALIAN

Italian Divisions

Evidence suggests that the Italians imitating their German masters are reforming the following Divisions out of the remnants of the ten divisions of the 8 Army which were withdrawn from RUSSIA in early 1943. 8 Army HQ itself has been reconstituted at PADUA and 9 PASUBIO Div is reforming in the PARMA area. 52 TORINO Div is undergoing the same process near UDINE and to bring up its strength is cannibalizing units of 159 VENELO Div (GORIZIA). There are also indications that 157 NOVARA Div is being absorbed into a revived 2 SFORZESCA Div. Of the Alpine Divs, it is possible that 2 TRIDENTINA and 3 GIULIA are being reformed at MERANO and UDINE respectively.

There are no reliable indications of moves or impending moves of Divisions from the BALKANS to ITALY, but it seems certain that all Divs from Southern FRANCE are returning. Of these 58 LEGNANO and 48 TARO Divs, which were previously reported to have returned to ITALY (See Summary No 15) are now reported to be in the North.

Italo - German situation in N. ITALY.

The return of divisions from FRANCE to ITALY together with the reformed 8 Army Divisions raises the strength of the Italian Army in Northern ITALY to a possible 12 Divisions, plus an Alpine Group. This comes at a time most opportune for the Italians, and is likely to cause some embarrassment to the Germans. The present political and military situation in Northern ITALY appears extremely complex and delicate. On the one hand there will be the German troops arriving with the express but presumably veiled purpose of occupying as much as possible of Northern and Central ITALY for the purpose of safeguarding the German L of C to the South and of preparing defence positions. On the other hand there will be a hostile, war-weary and demoralised industrial population vainly expecting peace at any moment. On top of this there are some 12 divisions most of whom will consider themselves lucky to have returned safely to ITALY and to be spared the fate of their co-patriots in the BALKANS despised by the Germans and hated by a hostile population. They will doubtless have hoped to find themselves rid of their German masters and are likely to resent anything that savours of German occupation of the North. The presence of these divisions, reinforcing public dislike for the Germans, may make a German attempt at occupation of Northern ITALY extremely difficult without at least a show of force. It is likely to tax German diplomatic, political and

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military ingenuity to the limit.

General

(i) Regarding the reformation of 132 ARIETE Armoured Div, a report of unknown reliability suggests that the Germans have provided the Italians with 100 tanks for a new Armoured Division. This is considered improbable though the Italians may have received some German tanks for training purposes.

(ii) It is reported that 12 SASSARI Div is now in the UDINE (UDINE) area. The four Divisions in the ROME area are thus now possibly disposed as follows:-

21 GRANATIERI di SARDEGNA Division .....ROME
10 PIAVE (Mot) Division .....OLIVANO ROMANO
103 PIACENZA Division .....LITTORIA
12 SASSARI Division .....UDINE

(iii) Coastal Divs

The following identifications have been made :-

203 Division in CAGLIARI area.
209 Division in BARI area.
210 Division in LECCE area.
227 Division in LITTORIA area.

It is possible that there is a further Division in Northern SARDINIA.

5. BALKANS

The defence of the PELOPONNESE appears to have become a German commitment. 65 German Corps has been identified with its HQ at VERIA, while the Italian divisions formerly in this area are moving North. Reinforcements including 1500/2000 German Infantry have been reliably reported moving to the IONIAN islands; there is however no evidence that control of these islands has passed out of Italian hands. Evidence that ITALY is still nominally responsible for command of Axis forces on the mainland West of the PINDUS is found in a recent order from Eleventh Army to 104 JAEGER Division to cancel mass evacuation of 16 villages which the latter had ordered as a reprisal for the capture of nine Germans.

6. RECALL OF ITALIAN WORKERS

According to a reliable report all Italian workers in GERMANY and the Occupied Territories have been ordered to return to ITALY by 31 August. Those working in GERMANY itself, numbering 270,000, are known to have been returning home in groups over the past two months, the departure of large numbers from KIEL, DANZIG, LINZ and VIENNA receiving much publicity in the Press; but this is the first mention of the return of workers from the occupied territories, and it is assumed that the order applies only to those engaged on work contracts and not to those who have been resident in those countries over a period of years.

7. MORALE.

An Italian, who was in the NAPLES area on July 20th, states that the Neapolitans were overjoyed at the news of the bombing of ROME.

8. ENEMY EQUIPMENT

PANTHER TANK

Further to Appendix "A" of Intelligence Summary No 16 dated 19 Aug.

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The following particulars have been received from the SOVIET General Staff on the latest German Tank - the PANTHER.

DIMENSIONS

Overall length (without gun)	-	22 ft 7½ ins
" width	-	11 ft 2½ ins
" height	-	9 ft 6½ ins
Turret Ring	-	5 ft 5 ins
Track width	-	2 ft 2 ins
Track length on ground	-	13 ft 5½ ins
Pitch of track	-	6 ins

ARMOUR

All angles given from vertical

Front Armour

Turret	-	100-mm - Vertical
Upper Front	-	85-mm - at 57°
Lower Front	-	75-mm - at 53°

Side Armour

Turret	-	45-mm - at 25°
Upper Side	-	45-mm - at 42°
Lower Side	-	45-mm - at Vertical
Top and Belly	-	17-mm

ARMAMENT

The armament consists of 1 x 75-mm gun and 1 M.G. coaxially mounted.

AMMUNITION

75 rounds are carried for the gun. (M.G. ammunition not specified).

ENGINE

600 H.P. MAYBACH.

SUSPENSION

Front sprocket, rear idler and eight bogies overlapping (rim to rim), similar to the TIGER.

SPEED

Maximum speed 30 M.P.H.
Average speed 15 M.P.H.

T.S. AIREY,
B.C.S. (I).

GSI(a)
25 Aug 43.

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(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hrs of receipt.

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3 Coy.....40 - 50 men.
4 Coy.....30 men, 7 NCOs. and 1 Officer.

PW also spent some time with 9 Coy on 4 Aug, and says it has a strength of about 50 men only. He had NO information about 1 Coy.

In FRANCE the emblem of 1 Para Div was a black ring surrounded by a red ring and inside it a black arrow outlined in red pointing obliquely downwards from right to left.

B. HERMAN GOERING .....

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B. HERMANN GOERING Tank Regiment.

A PW from H.G. Tank Regt provided the following information.

(i) Organisation.

3 Bn H.Q. Tank Regt, consisted of 9, 10 and 11 Tps, each with HQ and three Secs.

(ii) Armament and Strength.

Each Tp had seven 7.5 cm Assault Guns, each with a crew of five men. These were distributed as follows:-

HQ Sec under Tp Cond .....1 Gun.
Three gun secs, each.....2 guns.
There were 9 PWs to each Tp.
The Total strength of 9 Tp was approximately 100 all ranks.

(iii) Ammunition.

The Tp carried 70 to 80 rounds per gun, normally comprising HE and AP shells in about equal proportions; the proportion of HE to AP would, however, vary slightly, according to the Tps task.

3. ENEMY METHODS - ITALIAN.

Staff Work.

The following notes on a slip of paper were found in the waste paper basket of the Mayor of CASTIGLIONE.

(1) Hail to the Star Spangled and Stripe/Hail to the Union Jack.
(2) Welcome to our Garden SICILY.
(3) Welcome to our City CASTIGLIONE.

4. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.

Reports of the arrival of further German formations in ITALY make it clear that despite the change of shirt GERMANY still feels it in her interest to continue the defence of Italian territory. This support will entail the movement into and within ITALY of further GERMAN formations, and the maintenance of a lengthy L of C. Consequently, Italian communications assume a far greater importance than hitherto. Attention focuses principally on the railways which are now being methodically attacked by the Allied Air Forces.

The ITALIAN rail network is extremely vulnerable since except in the industrial area of the LOMBARDY plain the network is not extensive and is ill equipped with adequate alternative routes along which traffic can be diverted. Hence the blocking of one particular junction has a paralysing effect on railways over a whole section of the country. Furthermore, the alternative routes are in most cases quite incapable of carrying the weight of traffic thrown upon them by the blocking of the main lines.

This state of affairs is best illustrated at BOLOGNA and PISA. Through these two junctions must pass all traffic from Northern to Southern ITALY. If these junctions are blocked there can be no through traffic from the Northern not to Central and Southern ITALY.

The two West Coast main lines PISA - LEGHORN - ROME - NAPLES, and BOLOGNA - FLORENCE - ROME - NAPLES are the two main railway arteries of the country. These lines are also the main routes for traffic to S.E. ITALY as the East Coast line from ANCONA Southwards is only single track.

The blocking.....

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The blocking of the main lines out of ROME forces all traffic to be diverted via a complicated and inadequate single line network further inland, while at NAPLES the blocking of the by-pass junctions not only closes the main line South but also the main East - West line via BENEVENTO and FOGGIA. Successful attacks on BENEVENTO can also close this line. The second main East - West link is through BATTIPAGLIA to TARANTO; this route also provides an alternative route to the toe through SIBARI and CATANZARO. BATTIPAGLIA is of extreme importance, as the closing of this junction paralyses the entire South Western circuit BATTIPAGLIA - METAPONTO - SIBARI - CATANZARO - REGGIO - PAOLA - BATTIPAGLIA.

On the East coast the blocking of FOGGIA paralyses most of the South Eastern network, while complete paralysis would follow if BATTIPAGLIA and the NAPLES by-pass junctions were simultaneously blocked.

Even this brief outline is sufficient to show that by successful attacks on certain junctions it is possible to paralyse the railway system of a whole section of the country.

Attacks on Communications.

Allied air attacks against railway communications in ITALY have been continuing for several months, and already considerable dislocation is known to have been caused.

The most noticeable effect has been produced by attacks on the junctions along the main West Coast lines, which has forced the enemy to increase the use of small craft along the coast South of NAPLES. Recent attacks have again centered mainly on the network around and South of NAPLES. SALERNO, BATTIPAGLIA, VILLA LITERNO, AVERSA, CASERTA, CANCELLO and SAPRI have all been attacked by day or by night in the last week, the first two junctions having received the main weight of the offensive. BENEVENTO and FOGGIA have also been heavily attacked. The enemy's sensitiveness to these attacks is shown by the fact that during the recent attack on FOGGIA enemy fighter reaction was greater than experienced for some time. Upwards of 70 enemy aircraft were encountered.

Intruder and long-range fighter attacks have been continued against trains, stations, etc. These attacks have a cumulatively disorganising effect. Engines, wagons and freight are destroyed and Stations shot up. Furthermore, the stagnation caused by the blocking of junctions is likely to provide an increasing number of targets in the form of stationary trains, etc, while the diversion of rail traffic to the roads in Southern ITALY will also provide road targets for long range fighters.

Present state of the Railways as a result of recent attacks.

The bombing of the ROME marshalling yards temporarily closed all lines but the repairs should now have restored the situation. The constant attacks on the NAPLES by-pass junctions keep this important network in a constant state of disorganisation. It is probable, however, that some through working is usually possible, but on a scale insufficient to cope with requirements. Further South the junctions of SALERNO and BATTIPAGLIA appear to be blocked. The present situation at FOGGIA and BENEVENTO is not known. In the Toe, the railway is believed blocked at SAPRI, REGGIO, CATANZARO and SIBARI.

General Effects.

The dislocation caused by Allied bombing attacks on the Italian railway system will throw a heavy strain on the German MT Columns and on Coastal shipping. The disadvantage of being forced to move large quantities of supplies by road are well known; and it will take large fleets of German trucks to move even part of the supplies immobilised owing to railway dislocation. This state of affairs would of itself be bad enough if there were an abundance of MT. On the contrary, however, there is evidence that the Germans are suffering from a general shortage of MT.

The dislocation.....

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The dislocation of the railway system South of NAPLES has already forced the Germans to rely mainly on coastal shipping, (mostly by landing craft) for the movement of supplies to SICILY, which presumably will have to be continued for the supplying of troops in CALABRIA and Southern ITALY generally. The effective bombing of PISA and BOLOGNA might force the enemy also to increase coastal shipping North of NAPLES. West coast harbours and shipping are vulnerable to Allied Air and Naval attacks and the small harbours at VIBO MARINO - COLIA - TAURO and SCALEA have already been subjected to heavy Allied air and naval bombardment. Their fate will be shared by other harbours which the enemy is found to be using. The importance which is attached to the use of these harbours is shown by the increased flak protection which has lately been given them. The total of small craft sunk along the West Coast is steadily mounting.

The combined effects of the attacks on railways will be not only to block and disorganise the German L of C but also to impede the mobility of German formations. Formations themselves can move by road but supplies and even [illegible]h of the heavier equipment would if possible be moved by rail.

Whereas in GERMANY repairs can be quickly effected and necessary improvisations quickly organised, such is not the case in ITALY. It can be fairly assumed that anything which appears to further German interests and increases the likelihood of ITALY becoming a German battleground will be distasteful to the Italian public.

There is ample evidence that repairs are slow and it is certain that it is mostly German initiative which ensures that they are effected. All this entails more and more German control and a consequent worsening of ITALO-GERMAN relations.

NOTE: A map of the Italian railway system South of ROME is being prepared. It is regretted that it is not available for issue with this Summary but will be attached to Summary No 18.

5. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

A. GERMAN

Spread of German Commitments in the West

It now seems reasonably certain that all Italian Divisions are leaving or are about to leave S.E. FRANCE. To take their place the following German Divisions are reported to have moved into this area - 386 Mot Div, 76 and 715 Inf Divs and 158 Reserve Div. These divisions were previously thought to be en route to ITALY (See Summary No 15) but it now seems more likely that they will remain for the time being in S.E. FRANCE in pl[illegible] of the evacu[illegible] Italian Divisions. They include however two offensive divisions which would be readily available for transfer to ITALY if called for. It is now reported that of 113 and 343 Infantry Divisions in FRANCE both previously reported as on the move, the former is destined for RUSSIA, while nothing further is known of the latter. A Division, believed to be SS Div 10, has moved from the North to fill the gap left in S.W. FRANCE by the departure of 386 Mot and 715 Inf Divisions.

Train movements towards S.E. FRANCE during the past few weeks have been sufficient for further divisions to have arrived in this area in addition to those mentioned above, and it must be assumed that some have crossed into ITALY.

The necessity for occupying the area vacated by the Italians will cause a further stretch of German strength in FRANCE and absorbtion of Reserves.

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Total German Formations in FRANCE and LOW COUNTRIES

Insufficient evidence is as yet available to enable a balance to be struck as to the exact present strength of German Divisions in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES. As was stated in the preceding paragraph these have undoubtedly had to be spread to include hitherto Italian occupied FRANCE; with consequent re-shuffle in other areas. The small reserve of divisions reformed in FRANCE has almost certainly been further drawn on and divisions sent to ITALY while at least two have gone to RUSSIA (113 and 294 Inf Divs).

On the credit side 389 and 94 Inf Divs ex STALINGRAD Divs are now known to have been reforming in the ST. LO and LORIENT areas respectively. 189 Reserve Div is reported to have arrived in FRANCE from the BALKANS. It seems most unlikely that the previously published total of 38 Divisions (incl 16 Defensive) and 4 CAF Field Divisions has increased. The total is now thought to be less and the number of Defensive Formations greater.

STALINGRAD Divisions

With the identification of 94 and 394 Inf Divs reforming in FRANCE all the 20 Divisions reported wiped out at STALINGRAD have been re-identified. The STALINGRAD List was 14, 16, 24 Armoured, 3, 29 and 60 Motorised, 100 Light, 1, 44, 71, 76, 94, 113, 295, 297, 305, 371, 376, 384 and 389 Infantry Divisions.

D. ITALIAN

Italian Divisions

Evidence suggests that the Italians imitating their German masters are reforming the following Divisions out of the remnants of the ten divisions of the 8 Army which were withdrawn from RUSSIA in early 1943. 8 Army HQ itself has been reconstituted at PADUA and 9 PASUBIO Div is reforming in the PARMA area. 52 TORINO Div is undergoing the same process near UDINE and to bring up its strength is cannibalising units of 159 VENETO Div (GORIZIA). There are also indications that 157 NOVARA Div is being absorbed into a revived 2 SFORZESCA Div. Of the Alpine Divs, it is possible that 2 TRIDENTINA and 3 GIULIA are being reformed at MERANO and UDINE respectively.

There are no reliable indications of moves or impending moves of Divisions from the BALKANS to ITALY, but it seems certain that all Divs from Southern FRANCE are returning. Of these 56 LEGNANO and 48 TARO Divs, which were previously reported to have returned to ITALY (See Summary No 15) are now reported to be in the North.

Italo - German situation in N. ITALY.

The return of divisions from FRANCE to ITALY together with the reformed 8 Army Divisions raises the strength of the Italian Army in Northern ITALY to a possible 12 Divisions, plus an Alpine Group. This comes at a time most opportune for the Italians, and is likely to cause some embarrassment to the Germans. The present political and military situation in Northern ITALY appears extremely complex and delicate. On the one hand there will be the German troops arriving with the express but presumably veiled purpose of occupying as much as possible of Northern and Central ITALY for the purpose of safeguarding the German L of C to the South and of preparing defence positions. On the other hand there will be a hostile, war-weary and demoralised industrial population vainly expecting peace at any moment. On top of this there are some 12 divisions most of whom will consider themselves lucky to have returned safely to ITALY and to be spared the fate of their co-patriots in the BALKANS despised by the Germans and hated by a hostile population. They will doubtless have hopes to find themselves rid of their German masters and are likely to resent anything that savours of German occupation of the North. The presence of these divisions, reinforcing public dislike for the Germans, may make a German attempt at occupation of Northern ITALY extremely difficult without at least a show of force. It is likely to tax German diplomatic, political and

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military ingenuity to the limit.

General

(i) Regarding the reformation of 132 ARIETE Armoured Div, a report of unknown reliability suggests that the Germans have provided the Italians with 100 tanks for a new Armoured Division. This is considered improbable though the Italians may have received some German tanks for training purposes.

(ii) It is reported that 12 SASSARI Div is now in the FORMIO (CADEA) area. The four Divisions in the ROME area are thus now possibly disposed as follows:-

21 GRANATIERI di SARDEGNA Division .....ROME
10 PLAVE (Mot) Division .....OLIVANO ROMANO
103 PIACENZA Division .....LITTORIA
12 SASSARI Division .....FORMIO

(iii) Coastal Divs

The following identifications have been made :-

203 Division in CAGLIARI area.
209 Division in BARI area.
210 Division in LECCE area.
227 Division in LITTORIA area.

It is possible that there is a further Division in Northern SARDINIA.

C. BALKANS

The defence of the PELOPONNESE appears to have become a German commitment. 65 German Corps has been identified with its HQ at VITINA, while the Italian divisions formerly in this area are moving North. Reinforcements including 1500/2000 German Infantry have been reliably reported moving to the IONIAN islands; there is however no evidence that control of these islands has passed out of Italian hands. Evidence that ITALY is still nominally responsible for command of Axis forces on the mainland West of the PINDUS is found in a recent order from Eleventh Army to 104 JAEGER Division to cancel mass evacuation of 16 villages which the latter had ordered as a reprisal for the capture of nine Germans.

6. RECALL OF ITALIAN WORKERS

According to a reliable report all Italian workers in GERMANY and the Occupied Territories have been ordered to return to ITALY by 31 August. Those working in GERMANY itself, numbering 270,000, are known to have been returning home in groups over the past two months, the departure of large numbers from KIEL, DANZIG, LINZ and VIENNA receiving much publicity in the Press; this is the first mention of the return of workers from the occupied territories, and it is assumed that the order applies only to those engaged on work contracts and not to those who have been resident in those countries over a period of years.

7. MORALE.

An Italian, who was in the NAPLES area on July 20th, states that the Neapolitans were overjoyed at the news of the bombing of ROME.

8. ENEMY EQUIPMENT

PANTHER TANK

Further to Appendix "A" of Intelligence Summary No 16 dated 19 Aug.

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The following particulars have been received from the SOVIET General Staff on the latest German Tank - the PANTHER.

DIMENSIONS

Overall length (without gun)	-	22 ft 7½ ins
" width	-	11 ft 2½ ins
" height	-	9 ft 6½ ins
Turret Ring	-	5 ft 5 ins
Track width	-	2 ft 2 ins
Track length on ground	-	13 ft 5½ ins
Pitch of track	-	6 ins

ARMOUR

All angles given from vertical

Front Armour

Turret	-	100-mm	- Vertical
Upper Front	-	85-mm	- at 57°
Lower Front	-	75-mm	- at 53°

Side Armour

Turret	-	45-mm	- at 25°
Upper Side	-	45-mm	- at 42°
Lower Side	-	45-mm	- at Vertical
Top and Belly	-	17-mm	

ARMAMENT

The armament consists of 1 x 75-mm gun and 1 M.G. coaxially mounted.

AMMUNITION

75 rounds are carried for the gun. (M.G. ammunition not specified).

ENGINE

600 H.P. MAYBACH.

SUSPENSION

Front sprocket, rear idler and eight bogies overlapping (rim to rim) idler to the REAR.

SPEED

Maximum speed 30 M.P.H.
Average speed 15 M.P.H.

T.S. AIREY,
B.C.S. (I).

GSI(a)
25 Aug 43.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.17 of 25 AUG 43.

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4 Coy.....30 men, 7 NCOs. and 1 Officer.

PW also spent some time with 9 Coy on 4 Aug, and says it has a strength of about 50 men only. He had NO information about 1 Coy.

In FRANCE the emblem of 1 Para Div was a black ring surrounded by a red ring and inside it a black arrow outlined in red pointing obliquely downwards from right to left.

B. HERMAN GOERING .....

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2. HERMANN GOERING Tank Regiment.

A PW from H.Q. Tank Regt provided the following information.

(i) Organisation.

3 Bn H.Q. Tank Regt, consisted of 9, 10 and 11 Tps, each with HQ and three Secs.

(ii) Armament and Strength.

Each Tp had seven 7.5 cm Assault Guns, each with a crew of five men. These were distributed as follows:-

HQ Sec under Tp Comd .....1 Gun.
Three gun secs, each.....3 guns.
There were 9 LVCs to each Tp.
The Total strength of 9 Tp was approximately 100 all ranks.

(iii) Ammunition.

The Tp carried 70 to 80 rounds per gun, normally comprising HE and AP shells in about equal proportions; the proportion of HE to AP would, however, vary slightly, according to the Tps task.

3. ENEMY METHODS - ITALIAN.

Staff Work.

The following notes on a slip of paper were found in the waste paper basket of the Mayor of CASTIGLIONE.

(1) Hail to the Star Spangled and Stripe/Hail to the Union Jack.
(2) Welcome to our Garden SICILY.
(3) Welcome to our City CASTIGLIONE.

4. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.

Reports of the arrival of further German formations in ITALY make it clear that despite the change of shirt GERMANY still feels it in her interest to continue the defence of Italian territory. This support will entail the movement into and within ITALY of further GERMAN formations, and the maintenance of a lengthy L of C. Consequently, Italian communications assume a far greater importance than hitherto. Attention focuses principally on the railways which are now being methodically attacked by the Allied Air Forces.

The ITALIAN rail network is extremely vulnerable since except in the industrial area of the LOMBARDY plain the network is not extensive and is ill equipped with adequate alternative routes along which traffic can be diverted. Hence the blocking of one particular junction has a paralysing effect on railways over a whole section of the country. Furthermore, the alternative routes are in most cases quite incapable of carrying the weight of traffic thrown upon them by the blocking of the main lines.

This state of affairs is best illustrated at BOLOGNA and PISA. Through these two junctions must pass all traffic from Northern to Southern ITALY. If these junctions are blocked there can be no through traffic from the Northern network to Central and Southern ITALY.

The two West Coast main lines PISA - LEGHORN - ROME - NAPLES, and BOLOGNA - FLORENCE - ROME - NAPLES are the two main railway arteries of the country. These lines are also the main routes for traffic to S.E. ITALY as the East Coast line from ANCONA Southwards is only single track.

The blocking.....

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The blocking of the main lines out of ROME forces all traffic to be diverted via a complicated and inadequate single line network further inland, while at NAPLES the blocking of the by-pass junctions not only closes the main line South but also the main East - West line via BENEVENTO and FOGGIA. Successful attacks on BENEVENTO can also close this line. The second main East-West link is through BATTIPAGLIA to TARANTO; this route also provides an alternative route to the toe through SIBARI and CATANZARO. BATTIPAGLIA is of extreme importance, as the closing of this junction paralyses the entire South Western circuit BATTIPAGLIA - METAPONTO - SIBARI - CATANZARO - REGGIO - PAOLA - BATTIPAGLIA.

On the East coast the blocking of FOGGIA paralyses most of the South Eastern network, while complete paralysis would follow if BATTIPAGLIA and the NAPLES by-pass junctions were simultaneously blocked.

Even this brief outline is sufficient to show that by successful attacks on certain junctions it is possible to paralyse the railway system of a whole section of the country.

Attacks on Communications.

Allied air attacks against railway communications in ITALY have been continuing for several months, and already considerable dislocation is known to have been caused.

The most noticeable effect has been produced by attacks on the junctions along the main West Coast lines, which has forced the enemy to increase the use of small craft along the coast South of NAPLES. Recent attacks have again centered mainly on the network around and South of NAPLES. SALERNO, BATTIPAGLIA, VILLA LITERNO, AVERSA, CASERTA, CANCELLO and SAPRI have all been attacked by day or by night in the last week, the first two junctions having received the main weight of the offensive. BENEVENTO and FOGGIA have also been heavily attacked. The enemy's sensitiveness to these attacks is shown by the fact that during the recent attack on FOGGIA enemy fighter reaction was greater than experienced for some time. Upwards of 70 enemy aircraft were encountered.

Intruder and long-range fighter attacks have been continued against trains, stations, etc. These attacks have a cumulatively disorganising effect. Engines, wagons and freight are destroyed and Stations shot up. Furthermore, the stagnation caused by the blocking of junctions is likely to provide an increasing number of targets in the form of stationary trains, etc, while the diversion of rail traffic to the roads in Southern ITALY will also provide road targets for long range fighters.

Present state of the Railways as a result of recent attacks.

The bombing of the ROME marshalling yards temporarily closed all lines but the repairs should now have restored the situation. The constant attacks on the NAPLES by-pass junctions keep this important network in a constant state of disorganisation. It is probable, however, that some through working is usually possible, but on a scale insufficient to cope with requirements. Further South the junctions of SALERNO and BATTIPAGLIA appear to be blocked. The present situation at FOGGIA and BENEVENTO is not known. In the Toe, the railway is believed blocked at SAPRI, REGGIO, CATANZARO and SIBARI.

General Effects.

The dislocation caused by Allied bombing attacks on the Italian railway system will throw a heavy strain on the German MT Columns and on Coastal shipping. The disadvantage of being forced to move large quantities of supplies by road are well known; and it will take large fleets of German trucks to move even part of the supplies immobilised owing to railway dislocation. This state of affairs would of itself be bad enough if there were an abundance of MT. On the contrary, however, there is evidence that the Germans are suffering from a general shortage of MT.

The dislocation.....

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The dislocation of the railway system South of NAPLES has already forced the Germans to rely mainly on coastal shipping, (mostly by landing craft) for the movement of supplies to SICILY, which presumably will have to be continued for the supplying of troops in CALABRIA and Southern ITALY generally. The effective bombing of PISA and LEGHORN might force the enemy also to increase coastal shipping North of NAPLES. West coast harbours and shipping are vulnerable to Allied Air and Naval attacks and the small harbours at VIBO MARINA - GIOIA - TAURO and SCALEA have already been subjected to heavy Allied air and naval bombardment. Their fate will be shared by other harbours which the enemy is found to be using. The importance which is attached to the use of these harbours is shown by the increased flak protection which has lately been given them. The total of small craft sunk along the West Coast is steadily mounting.

The combined effects of the attacks on railways will be not only to block and disorganise the German L of C but also to impede the mobility of German formations. Formations themselves can move by road but supplies and even much of the heavier equipment would if possible be moved by rail.

Whereas in GERMANY repairs can be quickly effected and necessary improvisations quickly organised, such is not the case in ITALY. It can be fairly assumed that anything which appears to further German interests and increases the likelihood of ITALY becoming a German battleground will be distasteful to the Italian public.

There is ample evidence that repairs are slow and it is certain that it is mostly German initiative which ensures that they are effected. All this entails more and more German control and a consequent worsening of ITALO-GERMAN relations.

NOTE: A map of the Italian railway system South of ROME is being prepared. It is regretted that it is not available for issue with this Summary but will be attached to Summary No 18.

5. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

A. GERMANY

Spread of German Commitments in the West

It now seems reasonably certain that all Italian Divisions are leaving or are about to leave S.E. FRANCE. To take their place the following German Divisions are reported to have moved into this area - 386 Mot Div, 76 and 715 Inf Divs and 158 Reserve Div. These divisions were previously thought to be en route to ITALY (See Summary No 15) but it now seems more likely that they will remain for the time being in S.E. FRANCE in place of the evacuated Italian Divisions. They include however two offensive divisions which would be readily available for transfer to ITALY if called for. It is now reported that of 113 and 343 Infantry Divisions in FRANCE both previously reported as on the move, the former is destined for RUSSIA, while nothing further is known of the latter. A Division, believed to be SS Div 10, has moved from the North to fill the gap left in S.W. FRANCE by the departure of 386 Mot and 715 Inf Divisions.

Train movements towards S.E. FRANCE during the past few weeks have been sufficient for further divisions to have arrived in this area in addition to those mentioned above, and it must be assumed that some have crossed into ITALY.

The necessity for occupying the area vacated by the Italians will cause a further stretch of German strength in FRANCE and absorbtion of Reserves.

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Total German Formations in FRANCE and LOW COUNTRIES

Insufficient evidence is as yet available to enable a balance to be struck as to the exact present strength of German Divisions in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES. As was stated in the preceding paragraph these have undoubtedly had to be spread to include hitherto Italian occupied FRANCE; with consequent re-shuffle in other areas. The small reserve of divisions reformed in FRANCE has almost certainly been further drawn on and divisions sent to ITALY while at least two have gone to RUSSIA (113 and 291 Inf Divs).

On the credit side 389 and 94 Inf Divs ex STALINGRAD Divs are now known to have been reforming in the ST. LO and LORIENT areas respectively. 189 Reserve Div is reported to have arrived in FRANCE from the BALKANS. It seems most unlikely that the previously published total of 38 Divisions (incl 16 Defensive) and 4 CAF Field Divisions has increased. The total is now thought to be less and the number of Defensive Formations greater.

STALINGRAD Divisions

With the identification of 94 and 394 Inf Divs reforming in FRANCE all the 20 Divisions reported wiped out at STALINGRAD have been re-identified. The STALINGRAD list was 14, 16, 24 Armoured, 3, 29 and 60 Motorised, 100 Light, 1, 44, 71, 76, 94, 113, 295, 297, 305, 371, 376, 384 and 389 Infantry Divisions.

4. ITALIAN

Italian Divisions

Evidence suggests that the Italians imitating their German masters are reforming the following Divisions out of the remnants of the ten divisions of the 8 Army which were withdrawn from RUSSIA in early 1943. 8 Army HQ itself has been reconstituted at PADUA and 9 PASUBIO Div is reforming in the PARMA area. 52 TORINO Div is undergoing the same process near UDINE and to bring up its strength is cannibalizing units of 159 VENETO Div (GORIZIA). There are also indications that 157 NOVARA Div is being absorbed into a revived 2 SFORZESCA Div. Of the Alpine Divs, it is possible that 2 TRIDENTINA and 3 GIULIA are being reformed at MERANO and UDINE respectively.

There are no reliable indications of moves or impending moves of Divisions from the BALKANS to ITALY, but it seems certain that all Divs from Southern FRANCE are returning. Of these 58 LEGNANO and 48 TARO Divs, which were previously reported to have returned to ITALY (See Summary No 15) are now reported to be in the North.

Italo - German situation in N. ITALY.

The return of divisions from FRANCE to ITALY together with the reformed 8 Army Divisions raises the strength of the Italian Army in Northern ITALY to a possible 12 Divisions, plus an Alpine Group. This comes at a time most opportune for the Italians, and is likely to cause some embarrassment to the Germans. The present political and military situation in Northern ITALY appears extremely complex and delicate. On the one hand there will be the German troops arriving with the express but presumably veiled purpose of occupying as much as possible of Northern and Central ITALY for the purpose of safeguarding the German L of C to the South and of preparing defence positions. On the other hand there will be a hostile, war-weary and demoralised industrial population vainly expecting peace at any moment. On top of this there are some 12 divisions most of whom will consider themselves lucky to have returned safely to ITALY and to be spared the fate of their co-patriots in the BALKANS despised by the Germans and hated by a hostile population. They will doubtless have hoped to find themselves rid of their German masters and are likely to resent anything that savours of German occupation of the North. The presence of these divisions, reinforcing public dislike for the Germans, may make a German attempt at occupation of Northern ITALY extremely difficult without at least a show of force. It is likely to tax German diplomatic, political and

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militia ingenuity to the limit.

General

(i) Regarding the reformation of 132 ARIETE Armoured Div, a report of unknown reliability suggests that the Germans have provided the Italians with 100 tanks for a new Armoured Division. This is considered improbable though the Italians may have received some German tanks for training purposes.

(ii) It is reported that 12 SASSARI Div is now in the FORMIO (GAETA) area. The four Divisions in the ROME area are thus now possibly disposed as follows:-

21 GRANATIERI di SARDEGNA Division	ROME
10 PIAVE (Mot) Division	
103 PIACENZA Division	OLIVANO ROMANO
12 SASSARI Division	LITTORIA
	FORMIO

(iii) Coastal Divs

The following identifications have been made :-

203 Division in CAGLIARI area.
209 Division in BARI area.
210 Division in LECCE area.
227 Division in LITTORIA area.

It is possible that there is a further Division in Northern SARDINIA.

C BALKANS

The defence of the PELOPONNESE appears to have become a German commitment. 65 German Corps has been identified with its HQ at VIENNA, while the Italian divisions formerly in this area are moving North. Reinforcements including 1500/2000 German Infantry have been reliably reported moving to the IONIAN islands; there is however no evidence that control of these islands has passed out of Italian hands. Evidence that ITALY is still nominally responsible for command of Axis forces on the mainland West of the PINDUS is found in a recent order from Eleventh Army to 104 JAEGER Division to cancel mass evacuation of 16 villages which the latter had ordered as a reprisal for the capture of nine Germans.

6. RECALL OF ITALIAN WORKERS

According to a reliable report all Italian workers in GERMANY and the Occupied Territories have been ordered to return to ITALY by 31 August. Those working in GERMANY itself, numbering 270,000, are known to have been returning home in groups over the past two months, the departure of large numbers from KIEL, DANZIG, LINZ and VIENNA receiving much publicity in the Press; but this is the first mention of the return of workers from the occupied territories, and it is assumed that the order applies only to those engaged on work contracts and not to those who have been resident in those countries over a period of years.

7. MORALE.

A civilian, who was in the NAPLES area on July 20th, states that the Neapolitans were overjoyed at the news of the bombing of ROME.

8. EQUIPMENT

PANZER TANK

Further to Appendix "A" of Intelligence Summary No 16 dated 19 Aug.

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The following particulars have been received from the SOVIET General Staff on the latest German Tank - the PANTHER.

DIMENSIONS

Overall length (without gun)	-	22 ft 7½ ins
" width	-	11 ft 2⅝ ins
" height	-	9 ft 6½ ins
Turret Ring	-	5 ft 5 ins
Track width	-	2 ft 2 ins
Track length on ground	-	13 ft 5½ ins
Pitch of track	-	6 ins

ARMOUR

All angles given from vertical

Front Armour

Turret	-	100-mm - Vertical
Upper Front	-	85-mm - at 57°
Lower Front	-	75-mm - at 53°

Side Armour

Turret	-	45-mm - at 25°
Upper Side	-	45-mm - at 42°
Lower Side	-	45-mm - at Vertical
Top and Belly	-	17-mm

ARMAMENT

The armament consists of 1 x 75-mm gun and 1 M.G. coaxially mounted.

AMMUNITION

75 rounds are carried for the gun. (M.G. ammunition not specified).

ENGINE

600 H.P. MAYBACH.

SUSPENSION

Front sprocket, rear idler and eight bogies overlapping (rim to rim). Similar to the TIGER.

SPEED

Maximum speed 30 M.P.H.
Average speed 15 M.P.H.

T.B. Price Lieut Col

for T.S. AIREY,
B.C.S. (I).

GSI(a)
25 Aug 43

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.18 of 5 SEP. 1943.

(a) Sidelined information will not be re-produced in any Intelligence Summary of formations under this HQ except by special permission.

(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hrs of receipt.

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A. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Shipping - General.

The general trend of shipping in Western Italian waters is now Northwards. This is particularly noticeable in respect of LC and tank lighters which are now arriving at LEGHORN from the NAPLES area in large numbers. On the 28 Aug, 46 of these craft were present at LEGHORN. By the 31 Aug the total had risen to 57, and on the 2 Sep no fewer than 66 such craft were present.

Merchant shipping, too, is moving North. This is clearly shown if we compare the present totals of shipping at GENOA and NAPLES with those of 17 July. On the latter date there were 113,400 tons of shipping in the NAPLES area, and 159,200 tons at GENOA. But by Sep 1 the NAPLES area had fallen to 23,100 tons, and GENOA had risen to 246,300 tons. Merchant shipping at LEGHORN has remained at much the same level.

Further North still, main interest centres on MARSEILLES where 50 barges are at present being converted into the tank lighter type which has been so popular with the enemy in recent months. A further 12 are converting at LA CIOTAT, while a small number of Siebel Ferries are assembling at ST. LOUIS DU RHONE. At MARSEILLES, too, submarine pens are being constructed, and work is reported to be pushing ahead quickly. Pending their completion, TOULON appears to be the main submarine nest in this area. Six 500 ton U-Boats were present there on 1 Sep.

Available information on the East coast of ITALY indicates that traffic between VENICE and BARI is on the increase. This is probably in part intended to ease the burden of the railways, and indeed offers better prospects of doing so than did similar attempts on the West coast. In the closed waters of the ADRIATIC merchantmen may find a greater degree of safety than they did on the East Coast.

2. Coastal Shipping.

There have been few developments of major importance. The main point of interest has been a decrease of coastal shipping to the small harbours along the West coast of ITALY. After a period of considerable activity during the latter stages of the Sicilian Campaign and for a brief period afterwards, traffic has dwindled to a very low level. This development is not altogether surprising. The main function of sea transport hitherto has been the relief of the sadly dislocated railway system S. of NAPLES. So long as the supply of SICILY was a matter of major importance it can be argued that the use of LC and other small craft for the transport of men and equipment was a worth-while investment although even this makes a poor substitute for rail traffic. However, the situation has now altered. There is no longer such a vital need to supplement the carrying capacity of the crippled railway system, now that it does not appear to be the enemy's intention to make SOUTHERN ITALY a major battleground. Instead of a flow of men and supplies into and through CALABRIA, the process is now reversed. As indicated in Para 1 the area of

Landing craft.....

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landing craft activity has in fact moved North of NAPLES. The concentration noted at LEGHORN may in part be accounted for by an intention to resume small craft traffic to CORSICA and SARDINIA, which has been almost reduced to a standstill by the withdrawal of craft for the evacuation of troops from SICILY. However, with fighting now taking place on the Italian mainland and the front likely to move Northwards it would seem that the enemy will now be able to rely mainly on M.T. for the supplying of troops in Southern ITALY, despite the drastic state of the railways. The time taken for loading and unloading, the necessity of harbour clearance by MT and the increasing danger of attacks by allied fighters provide further reasonable explanations of the enemy's apparent decision to give up lighter traffic South of NAPLES.

8. Railway Situation.

Air attacks in the past 10 days have covered the entire Italian network from REGGIO in the toe to TRENTO and BOLZANO in the far North. Results have been in the main highly satisfactory, especially in the area S. of NAPLES. Indeed, it may be assumed that the railway situation is now so bad that no reliance can be placed upon it for the speedy supply, or indeed for the supply at all of army forces in the area. N. of NAPLES, the situation though easier, is still very unsatisfactory for the enemy. North of ROME the line is blocked at CIVITAVECCHIA and further North still PISA has been blocked as a result of the heavy raid of 31 Aug. On the BRENNER, the main lines to BOLOGNA and the LOMBARDY Plain are cut at BOLZANO and TRENTO. Details are as follows.

NAPLES Area.

The main line from NAPLES to REGGIO is completely impassable throughout its length, except along the stretch between SALERNO and SAPRI where BATTIPAGLIA is open. In CALABRIA itself there are no through lines anywhere. East of NAPLES the line NAPLES to FOGGIA is completely impassable. Thus the only possible way by which traffic can proceed South is via the very complicated inland network through AVELLINO and POTENZA to METAPONTO. It is considered that this traffic is only on a minor scale.

ROME Area.

The coast line is now blocked at CIVITAVECCHIA, while the line running South from SULMONA to NAPLES has been cut. At TERNI, traffic appears possible on a very restricted scale, while the junction of ORTE is now open.

N. ITALY.

At PISA, all lines to LEGHORN, FLORENCE and SPEZIA have been cut, thereby seriously affecting the Southward move of troops from FRANCE and North Central ITALY. The traffic from AUSTRIA over the BRENNER has been seriously dislocated by the blocking at BOLZANO of the lines to TRENTO, LAIVES and MERANO, and at TRENTO of the main VERONA - BOLZANO railway. Of particular value is a direct hit on the railway bridge over the ISARCO River, splitting the bridge apart.

(Attn Appendix "A" is a map showing the railway system of Southern Italy).

B. MOVE OF GERMAN DIVISIONS.

1. Further to para 5 of Summary No.17, 389 and 44 Inf Divs are reported to have moved to S.E. FRANCE. 386 Mot Div previously reported to be in this area is now thought to be identical with 3 P.G. Div already known to be in ITALY. The Divisions so far reported to have moved to S.E. FRANCE are 44, 76, 389 and 715 Inf Divs and 158 Reserve Div. Whilst the last three would seem suitable as replacements for departed Italian Formations it is suggested that 44 & 76 Inf Divs, two first class divs, have in fact moved into Northern ITALY.

Numerous reports.....

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Numerous reports continue to be received of the movement of German troops in and out of FRANCE. Amongst those reported as moving possibly to N. ITALY are 65, 94 and 305 Infantry Divs. Although definite evidence is still lacking, train movements suggest that 24 Pz Div has left FRANCE for N. ITALY. Other possible identifications in N. ITALY include S.S. Adolf Hitler, S.S. Reich and 71 Inf Div (from DENMARK). The latter was reported moving through KLAGENFURT and may now be in the TRIESTE area.

2. German Garrison of FRANCE.

As shewn in the previous paragraph reports of troop movements in and out of FRANCE have been numerous and it is still difficult to state exactly the extent to which the garrison of FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES has been reduced. However, it is doubtful if the total of divisions now exceeds 28 as against 38 in June. Exchange of divisions with the Russian front continues. 31 Inf Div is reported to have arrived whilst 113 Inf Div has left (See Summary No. 17 para 5).

3. "The Big Stretch".

The move of German divisions from FRANCE to ITALY clearly demonstrates the apprehension with which the Germans view the opening of a front in ITALY, and the extent to which they are being forced to disperse their formations. 28 Divisions in FRANCE, 17 in the BALKANS, 15 - 20 in ITALY, SARDINIA and CORSICA, 11 in NORWAY, 194 in RUSSIA; these facts speak for themselves. Furthermore, the reserve of formations formed in FRANCE would appear to have been used up. The German Army is now strung out through occupied and hostile EUROPE. Even the advantage of interior lines of communication is offset by the necessity of guarding these against hostile populations, patriot and guerilla forces. Nowhere can the enemy concentrate for attack, or call up further reserves for defence without weakening another sector of the vast European front. As yet there is little evidence of the withdrawal of German divisions from the Russian front and in view of the non-stop Russian offensive it would hardly seem a propitious moment for such withdrawal. However, if the reports of the identifications of S.S. Adolf Hitler and S.S. Reich in N. ITALY are correct, at least two divs have been withdrawn from RUSSIA to ITALY. Despite the unfavourable situation RUSSIA would seem to be the sole source of supply if further divs are required for FRANCE, ITALY or the BALKANS.

Although the total of identified German divisions is theoretically as large as ever this state of affairs is in fact entirely false. It has been reported by the Russian G.S. that the average German division in RUSSIA does not exceed some 60% of its official W.E. Furthermore, it is known that the STALINGRAD divs were in part re-formed by the cannibalisation of other divs. The gravity of the German man power shortage already acute before the STALINGRAD and TUNISIAN defeats is clearly reflected in this state of affairs.

4. German Strategy.

There are indications both from the recent fighting in ITALY and in RUSSIA that German strategy is taking a more sober and cautious line. GERMANY can ill afford further Stalin and Tunisian debacles. It may be that sound military direction has gained the ascendancy over blind political intuition. We have already witnessed the disappearance overnight of Fascism in favour of a semi-military government without any immediate collapse of the entire internal political situation of ITALY. Perhaps it is not impossible that Nazism might go the same way and with the same ease.

C. DEFENCES - ITALIAN.

The pillboxes encountered in SICILY were generally of poor quality. They were not reinforced except where it was considered desirable to strengthen the structure e.g. where flooring formed the roof of an underground chamber it was strengthened with quarter inch steel rods but there were no reinforcement walls.

Pillboxes were in.....

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Pillboxes were in three main types.

Type "A".

Circular wall eighteen inches thick, with a roof two feet thick, of squared random rubble, either built on a concrete raft sunk six inches into the ground or with the wall sunk eighteen inches into the ground. Loopholes were twelve inches high, three feet wide in the front and eighteen inches wide in the rear.

Type "B".

Material was similar to the above but wall and roof were five feet thick with the wall sunk between two feet and three feet six inches into the ground. Loopholes were two feet high and six feet wide in the front, stepped back to two feet wide in the rear.

Type "C".

These were the best encountered. Internal diameter was fourteen feet, with a circular wall four feet high surmounted by a domed roof, rising to nine feet six inches high, externally. The wall was five feet thick, with the roof tapering from the same thickness over the wall to three feet six inches in the centre. The concrete was of very coarse aggregate pebbles and unwashed sand, coated with half an inch of very fine concrete made from granite chippings, further topped by ten inches of rough brick masonry. All was camouflaged with shrubs.

In some instances with this type the concrete was sunk twelve feet below ground level and an underground chamber constructed.

(Source:- R.E. Intelligence).

D. APPENDIX.

At Appendix "A" is a map showing the Railway System of Southern ITALY.

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5 Sep 43.

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Apart from these official and semi-official reactions there are various likely stories from neutral press services which deserve recording. One is of riots in the Northern industrial cities, and this has been confirmed by Axis Arabic broadcasts, which explain that there are many Communists in these parts. Interestingly enough, the German Radio has rather tended to spread these stories, perhaps intending to frighten the Italian bourgeoisie with accepting German military occupation as an insurance against Bolshevism. Another story is that the Germans have occupied ISTRIA with the important ports of TRIESTE, POLA and FIUME. This would be a reasonable precautionary measure to guard the flank of the Balkans. In the same area, Slovene unrest and activities by partisan bands are reported.

3. GERMAN MILITARY SITUATION IN ITALY AND THE BALKANS.

ITALY. There have as yet been no reliable reports of the movement of German formations, either in or out of Italy, since the political crisis of 26 July. There are however unconfirmed reports that the Germans have occupied ISTRIA, including the ports of FIUME, TRIESTE and POLA. This is credible, as it seems likely that with the Allies strongly established in SICILY and faced with the possibility of Italian surrender, the Germans will not entertain hopes of holding Southern and central ITALY, but withdraw Northwards. Whatever line the Germans decide to hold in ITALY it is essential that they should also control ISTRIA both to safe-guard their flank, and the L of C from Northern Italy into the Balkans. There are numerous unconfirmed reports of German troops "pouring over the Brenner". These are certainly exaggerated but, if German envisages fighting in Northern Italy, this movement may be connected with the formation of the necessary bases. In view of a possible Italian surrender, the situation regarding the eight Italian Divisions in S.E. France, and the safeguarding of the right flank of a Front in North ITALY may well be causing the Germans some anxiety. The Italians will presumably be anxious for the return of these divisions whose safe conduct might be bargained for against the facilitation of German withdrawal Northwards and the placing of the Italian Fleet outside our grasp. It seems likely in any case that as in ISTRIA Italian control in SE France will be replaced by German. The arrival of further German formations in Italy from France must also be expected.

BALKANS. Despite the presence of some 30 Italian divisions in the Balkans German control has been extended and strengthened in the last six months. The total German strength has increased from a total equivalent of 8 to an equivalent of 19 divisions. There is now virtual German military and political control of CROATIA which was originally organised in June 1941 as an independent kingdom under Italian protection. At least one German division has moved from Yugo-Slavia into Albania, where no German formations had hitherto been identified. Since 1939, Albania has been considered as part of metropolitan Italy and garrisoned solely by Italian troops. Similarly in Western Greece and the Peloponese German and Italian formations have been interspersed. The interspersion in Western and Southern Greece is ostensibly to bolster up Italian formations and strengthen resistance to a possible Allied invasion, which it appears the Axis fears might also take place in these areas. However, in the light of recent political developments in Italy, the purpose of the whole German policy in the Balkans can be seen more clearly. The increase of German control and re-disposition of formations would now seem to be nothing else than part of the German plan to continue to control the Balkans in the event of Italian surrender.

There is every indication that in spite of the strain of increased military and administrative commitments, which would be imposed on the Germans in the event of an Italian collapse, the Germans will attempt strenuously to deny the Allies a further foothold in Europe.

As Italian power in the Balkans fades, another Axis satellite is playing a bigger part in the losing game. The Bulgarian area of occupation in Greece has been extended to include the whole of Macedonia and Thrace, excluding Salonika, while, in Yugo-Slavia it is reported that Bulgarian troops have been in action against MIHAILOVIC in the PRISTINA Area.

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4. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS AND STRENGTHS - SICILY.

(a) German.

It is estimated that there is a nominal total of 30 German infantry battalions (including engineer and recce battalions employed in an infantry role) covering the 60 mile front of the ETNA position. They appear at present disposed between the sectors of this front as follows:-

1. Hermann Goering Sector - ACI CASTELLO to incl ADRANO - 13 Bns.
2. 15 Pz Div Sector: Excl ADRANO to incl. TROINA - 10 Bns.
3. 29 Pz Gren Div Sector: Excl. TROINA - S.AGATA. - 7 Bns.

A number of the units included in the above total of 30 must by this time be battalions in name only. It is known that, of the original 3 Pz Gren Bns of Hermann Goering Div, only one now retains a separate existence, and the three bns of PGR KORNER (115 PGR) may now have been reduced to two, which also include the remnants of 904 Fortress Bn. Although we have no positive evidence of a similar re-organisation in the other two Regts of 15 Pz Div, it is more than possible, in view of their consistently heavy engagement in rearguard actions over the past fortnight, that in their case also two or more battalions have been amalgamated. Both 3 and 4 Para Regts have been involved in extremely fierce fighting. 3 Para Regt still retained its three battalion organisation on 1 Aug, but recent prisoners statements make it improbable that the effective strength of the Regt is more than one up-to-strength battalion. It is therefore considered unlikely that the German infantry strength amounts to more than the equivalent of 25 effective battalions.

German dispositions from NW to SE are believed to be as follows:-

N.Coast - excl TROINA.	29 Mot.Div.Area.	(71 P.G.R. (II & III/15 P.G.R. (1 Bn of FULLRIEDE ex 15 Armd Div. (I/382 P.G.R.
Incl. TROINA - ADRANO.	15 Pz Div Area.	(1 P.G.R. (ENS). (Remainder of FULLRIEDE (behind 1 P.G.R.). (I/15 P.G.R. ex 29 Mot Div. (II/382 P.G.R.
ADRANO - E.Coast.	H.G. Div Area.	(HG Pzr.Bn. (N of ADRANO). (3 Para Regt. (923 Fortress Bn. (CAIA Bn. (104 Reggio Bn. (I/P.G.R. 2 (II/P.G.R. 115 (I/P.G.R. 115. (4 Para Regt.

FIUMEFREDDO - PAULUS Battle Gp. (See Para 6).

(b) Italian.

Army and Corps Troops.

There have been few identifications of Army and Corps Troops. It is possible that a total of about four btys have emerged into the MESSINA triangle.

Divisional Troops.

28 AOSTA and 26 ASSIETTA Divs do not appear to have had specified areas allotted to them yet, but are [illegible] S.FRATELLO - ADRANO; what evidence there is suggests ASSIETTA to the North and AOSTA to the South.

Probable strengths: four weak bns each; three btys each.

NOTE. Constant reports of desertion especially of Sicilians by the wayside may well have reduced these strengths further.

4 LIVORNO Div.....

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4 LIVORNO Div: remnants, barely a bn strong, previously in the REGALBUTO area, now probably destroyed. Div HQ GALA D 0747

Coastal Tps

It is not yet known how much of 213 Coastal Div and the bns in the CATANIA area has been destroyed since the capture of the city, but it is probable that any that have escaped are of negligible fighting value. Disposed along the Eastern and Northern Coasts and MESSINA are some eight bns and perhaps ten btys.

Miscellaneous

Two tactical gps each about 1000 strong, still exist; one at BARCELLONA, the other at LINGUAGLOSSA.

In addition, there may be remnants, Ind. M.G. Coys etc. totalling approximately two bns.

ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

With the virtual blockade of Sicilian harbours still in enemy hands to all but small craft, attempts to disrupt enemy supplies have focussed during the past fortnight upon the railway lines running Southwards to the toe and heel of ITALY. Heavy and repeated attacks have been made on the railway junes of CATANZARO, SALERNO, FOGGIA and BATTIPAGLIA, while the raids on REGGIO and SAN GIOVANNI have virtually brought rail traffic to a standstill at these latter ports. NAPLES has again been severely hit. Further North, the railway junc of BOLOGNA main centre, through which all traffic from the BRENNER has to pass, has sustained major damage in the marshalling yards and sidings.

Amid the mass of reports received of detailed raid damage, it is difficult to assess accurately the strategic effects of these attacks. Nevertheless, it may be said that as a result of the raids made during the past month, the railway lines running South from NAPLES have sustained damage, which has materially effected the movement of supplies to SICILY by these routes. The constant disruption of traffic at SALERNO, BATTIPAGLIA and FOGGIA, has produced bottlenecks which have hindered the onward despatch by rail of supplies reaching NAPLES.

One result of this has been the development of sea traffic by small craft between NAPLES and the Straits. Landing Craft have been observed at various points on and off the West Coast of ITALY and there can be little doubt that by bringing cargoes from NAPLES to the Straits they are being used to relieve some of the strain on the railway line. Nevertheless the cargo carried by an L.C. is at the most 80 tons so that even if 20 L.C. were employed wholly on this task, their total contribution would be only 1600 tons of supplies every 6 days, allowing two days for the trip each way, and two days for loading and unloading. On the other hand one single railway train would carry an average of 500 tons supplies, so that the use of lighters is a very inadequate substitute for an efficiently working railway line.

Meanwhile, in the Straits area, Siebel Ferries and L.C. continue to be active all along the coast between VIBO-VALENTIA and Capo SPARTIVENTO on the mainland, and between TORRE di FARO and RIPOSTO in SICILY. Recent photographic cover shows a higher proportion of dock cargo carried by these vessels, and there are some grounds for believing that shipments to SICILY latterly have consisted of supplies and equipment rather than personnel. The two train ferries are still present in the Straits, but show only spasmodic signs of activity. Indeed, in view of the great destruction at the termini at both sides of the Straits, their raison d'etre has virtually disappeared and in face of the growing threat to MESSINA, they may well be withdrawn from the Straits.

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6. ENEMY ORGANISATION - CONTD.

H.G. Div.

Captured documents show that the previous division of H.G. Div into two battle groups (with the addition of a number of units extraneous to the Div - notably 2 P.G.R. from 15 Arrd Div) under the command of SCHMALZ and OEHRING has now given place to a fresh orientation, given below.

This fresh Division into battle groups exists, in its entirety, only on paper. The course of battle has prevented the setting-up of the battle groups completely on the lines laid down. VON DER HEYDE reported by PWs to have been killed, and his battle group, if it still exists, must be under another name. In the PRUSS Gp, CREL P.G. 3 is with REINHOLZ and not KLUTT. II/302 PGR is in the TROILA sector, well away from SCHMALZ and 90% Fortress Bn has been absorbed by 115 PGR.

Only PAULAS' group, guarding the bridges near FIUMEFREDDO, is probably complete as laid down.

1) Battle Gp. - VON DER HEYDE.

I/3 Para Rifle Regt.
923 Fortress Bn.
IV/Arty Regt HQ.
5 Tp. s.P.V.Flak Bty.

2) Battle Gp. - PRUSS.

HQ & II/HG Tank Regt.
CREL PC I Flak.
Under Command of this Battle Gp are:-

(a) Battle Gp. - KLUGE.
HQ & I/PGR 2.
I/PGR 1 (remnants)
CREL PC Bn.
One Italian Bn.
I/HG Arty Regt.
One Italian Bty.
10 Tp. s.P.V. Flak Bty.

(b) Battle Gp. - REINHOLZ.
HG Recce Unit (Less 1 tp).
II/PGR 2 (remnants).
10% Reggio Bn.
II/HG Arty Regt.
9 Tp. s.P.V.Flak Regt.

3) Battle Gp. - SCHMALZ.

HQ s.b.V Bde.
I/2 PGR.
SCHUTZEN Bn.
4 Para Rifle Regt.
II/302 PGR.
90% Fortress Bn.
One Italian Bn.
III/HG Tank Regt.
III/HG Arty Regt.
II/33 Arty Regt.
One Italian Bty.
CAMPINA Flak.

4) Battle Gp. - PAULAS.

1 Tp HG Recce Unit.
One 1/7 cm Gun Tp. of II/33 Arty Regt.
9 Coy, PGR 3.
Two Sqns. I/HG Tank Regt.
One S.P Gun Flak Tp.

7. Enemy Methods.....

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7. NEW METHODS.

(a) Changes of Title - GERMAN.

Recently captured documents show that the German High Command's policy of reconstituting destroyed units and formations is still being pursued.

Several of the component parts of 15 Armd Div have been given titles reviving memories of the Division's past in AFRICA; the following are the only ones known to date, but others may follow:-

2 P.C.R. (KOMMEN.) is now called 115 P.C.R.
Arty Regt, Sicily is now called 33 Arty Regt.

(b) Camouflage.- German.

The most interesting discovery has been of two sniper suits in disruptive pattern.

The clothing comprises two tunics, one having a helmet cover to match. They are of good cloth printed with disruptive patterning of various colours. The tunic which has the matching helmet cover is made up of a close weave cloth with an elastic inset at the waist. It can be used either the normal way or inside out. The outside pattern has a background of green, the inside of brown. The helmet cover is carefully made, also double-sided, with elastic insets and hiding-hooks. The second tunic is of twill, tailored on the usual lines, and of general green colour disrupted with brown.

Both tunics blend well with the general foliage, but they both have the weakness of still revealing characteristic outlines, as they both fit closely to the body.

ITALIAN.

(a) A special camouflage group, employed solely on camouflage work, has been identified on the strength of 6th Army. It consists of one officer and 8 O.Rs.

Materials provided for the group consisted for the most part of paint and string nets with grass garnishing.

(b) The study of camouflage so far encountered in SICILY confirms the impression that there has been an improvement in enemy methods, no doubt due to German prompting.

Pillboxes.

Care has been taken to blend these into the general ground pattern.

In several cases, in the PACHINO area, pillboxes were covered with complete huts made of straw. One pillbox overlooking a road junction between PACHINO and ROSOLINI was an actual small house, reinforced with concrete and having a weapon slit just above ground level.

Examples seen in the PALAZZOLO area were roofed with straw and sited on slopes in the vicinity of limestone outcrops, which made them difficult to recognise. They had straw "blinds" to cover the weapon slits.

One pillbox noted and photographed near ROSOLINI was sited against a wall, and an attempt had been made with paint to simulate the stone-pattern of the wall.

Many of these pillboxes were given away by the poor siting of their defensive wiring. Instead of being sited to blend with the ground pattern, wire was often haphazardly across fields, thereby giving away, to the air photographer, many otherwise excellent positions.

Gun Positions.....

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Gun Positions.

Of the gun positions studied, half were covered by overhead Italian grass-garnished nets, while the other half had no overhead cover, the guns themselves being covered with brushwood and similar natural furnishings. Generally, gun positions were poor, being given away by tracks, etc., and poor camouflage. Here and there, however, a good site was found. Such a one was a single gun position near MALAZZOLO. Here the pit was dug out of an embankment at the side of the road and had a low overhead cover of Italian grass-garnished nets with the furnishing picked out with boughs etc.

One A.A. gun is worthy of comment. This was sited in a recently cut cornfield below CASTIGLIA, on a forward slope. There were several stacks of straw in the field and a further stack had been constructed around the gunshield. This simple treatment was, from all appearances, successful.

GSI(a).
6 Jun 43.

for A.S. MIRSKY.
D.C.S.(I).

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1. GENERAL

The past week has seen the consolidation after bitter fighting of our bridgehead in the SALERNO GULF and the beginning of the exploitation. The delay imposed upon our advance into ITALY has so far been no more than a temporary one but it has undoubtedly enabled the Germans to prevent our exploiting fully the situation created by the defection of the Italians. The fact that the Germans have been able to carry out against little resistance the disarmament of the Italian forces and to obtain control of nearly all the strategic points in Central and Northern ITALY is due very largely to the promptness and vigour of the resistance made to our landings in the SALERNO area. In this sense the Germans may claim with some justification to have won if not a victory at least an important success over us. The point has not been overlooked by German broadcasters. It is a useful weapon with which to soften the announcement of subsequent withdrawals.

With the rapid advance of the 8th Army and the steady build up of our forces over the beaches the balance of forces has now turned against the enemy and his position in the SALERNO area has become untenable. The withdrawal, which he has now initiated by the readjustment of his Eastern flank and the re-distribution of his forces, must be more than a local one. The eight divisions commanded by KESSELRING are by themselves inadequate to assure the defence of a position astride the peninsula and it is unlikely at

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this stage that the gaps will by filled by bringing down divisions from the North. The possibility of further Allied landings North of our present position which has already deterred the enemy from moving down the whole of 3 and 15 P.G. Divisions to the SALERNO area still applies and must be more than ever present in the enemy's calculations since his evacuation of SARDINIA and CORSICA. Formidable as the total of 20 German divisions in ITALY may appear, they will not be sufficient for the simultaneous tasks of guarding a long and vulnerable coastline and providing a force adequate to hold a line East to West across the waist of ITALY. In addition to the purely military aspect of the situation the Germans are faced with the problem of internal security. The disarmament of the Italian armed forces and the repression of open disturbances among the civilian population have settled only the immediate problem. It is unlikely that the Germans either wish or are in a position to extend these measures to include the complete occupation of Central as well as Northern ITALY. The administrative problems involved would require the employment of additional forces at the very moment when GERMANY's situation on all fronts makes necessary the utmost economy in the use of her manpower.

These considerations suggest strongly that the Germans do not intend to undertake more than delaying actions in Southern and Central ITALY. The evidence so far available is insufficient to show which of the possible defensive lines in the North the enemy will attempt to hold. If however, the present dispositions of his forces may be taken as a guide, it is unlikely to be South of the line RIMINI - LEGHORN.

2. LOCATION OF GERMAN DIVISIONS IN ITALY.

The distribution of German divisions not identified in the present fighting is believed to be as follows:-

(a) Central ITALY

Area North of NAPLES	-	15 P.G. Div
Area ROME - CIVITA VECCHIA	-	2 Para Div & 3 PG Div

(b) Northern ITALY

PIEDMONT	-	343 and 371 Infantry Divisions
LIGURIA and N. TUSCANY	-	76, 94, 305 Infantry Divisions. 24 Panzer Division Elements 90 Panzer Grenadier Division.
LOMBARDY	-	16 and S.S. Adolf Hitler Panzer Div. Unidentified Panzer Grenadier Division. 65 and possibly one other Infantry Divisions. Elements S.S. Division Das Reich.
TRENTINO	-	44 and possibly one other Infantry Divisions.
VENEZIA	-	71 Infantry Division.

/3. ENEMY SUPPLIES .....

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3a. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Supply Routes into ITALY

The most important German supply line is now the railway from AUSTRIA into N ITALY over the Brenner pass. Along this linepasses the bulk of the supplies for the 19 German divisions now in ITALY. There are two other main routes into N ITALY: One from FRANCE the other via YUGO-SLAVIA. The former can hardly be considered an alternative route for supplies from GERMANY to ITALY, as it would necessitate a detour around SWITZERLAND through FRANCE. The N East route provides, however, an alternative link with GERMANY via VIENNA, LUBLJANA, and TRIESTE. During the period 12 July - 19 August 57,000 tons of petrol and crude oil are reported to have reached ITALY by this route. Despite the fact that the Germans must be mainly dependent on the Brenner route the normal capacity of this line is more than adequate to provide sufficient tonnage for daily maintenance for the entire German force and also permit of a reasonable rate of build up of stocks.

The pre-eminent importance of the Brenner route is therefore obvious. It is, however, a vulnerable bottleneck. The first attack on this vital German life line was made on 1 Sep and resulted in serious damage to the railway bridge over the river ISARCO at BOLZANO, which it was estimated reduced the capacity of the Brenner line by 75% for about two weeks. Besides the railways into North ITALY it is possible for GERMANY to stop supplies from the South of FRANCE to N. West Italian ports. It is not thought however, that this will ease the German maintenance problem to any extent, as the depots from which any supplies will be drawn will almost certainly be in Southern GERMANY.

German Action in ITALY to Secure L of C

With the announcement of the Italian surrender to the Allies, the Germans immediately put into operation what was obviously a prearranged plan to seize control of the communications in Northern and Central ITALY. The object of this plan was to secure the L of C of German formations fighting in Southern ITALY, and to ensure the security of the German North Italian base; both vital to the German Army for the future conduct of the war in ITALY. At the same time, and with the same object, the Germans took control of the ports of GENOA, SPEZIA, LEGHORN, CIVITAVECCHIA, VENICE, TRIESTE, POLA and other smaller harbours, and seized the merchant shipping present. The mere occupation of railway stations and dockyards by a few hundred German soldiers and sailors is not however sufficient to ensure their continued working on German behalf.

Road and Railway Transport Problems

The main difficulty confronting the Germans at the present time will be the problem of forcing or persuading the Italians to operate the railways at all. There have been numerous and apparently reliable reports that strikes and go slow tactics have resulted in at least stagnation and in some areas complete stoppage of the Northern Railway System. It is also reported that Italian railway officials have attempted to obstruct by refusing to hand over wagons to German Army. That the Germans appreciate the seriousness of the situation is shown by a report that they have brought their own railway personnel into ITALY to ensure the working of the railways. It must be assumed that to whatever heights Italian obstinacy may rise, the Germans will succeed in operating the railways to an extent sufficient to satisfy their own needs.

The main German base in North Italy is now reported to be at VERONA. This is on the direct route from GERMANY, via the BRENNER, and is also one of the largest rail centres of N. ITALY. Presumably the Germans can operate the railway as far as VERONA with their own personnel and equipment direct from AUSTRIA. The main railway operating problem will be the transfer of trains

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from the Northern network onto the central network South of PISA and BOLOGNA; and further South from ROME to NAPLES.

Owing to the pre-occupation of the Allied airforces with close support with operations in the SALERNO area the much battered Italian railway junctions except in the NAPLES/have had a short breather in which to execute repairs. Hence the present state presents a slightly less sorry picture than in recent weeks. In the North the main line to GERMANY via the BRENNER is now open again.

/areas

At the Southern end of this line the marshalling yards at VERONA have shown considerable activity. On 16 Sep considerable activity was also observed at PADUA which might indicate that the North East route via TRIESTE was operating. It has however, been reported that the Southern line into N. ITALY via TRIESTE has been cut by Italian and Great action between LUBLJANA and TRIESTE.

At PISA and BOLOGNA through lines are working and slight activity has been observed in the marshalling yards. The two main West coast lines PISA - ROME are open as well as the lines BOLOGNA - FLORENCE - ROME. On the latter route the marshalling yards at AREZZO and TERNI showed considerable activity on 16 Sep. The East coast line is blocked at PESCARA as a result of recent heavy attacks. This line has been used increasingly in recent weeks and the blocking of the line will cause serious delays. The ROME yards are all functioning and recent reconnaissances have revealed fair activity. All the junctions in the NAPLES area are in a permanent state of dislocation owing to repeated attacks and it is unlikely that there is more than an improvised skeleton service of trains operating in the whole area. The line to the East via BENEVENTO remains blocked.

Whilst the BRENNER line has shown considerable activity and there appears to be fair activity South of BOLOGNA and PISA the indications are that there is still little movement of trains from Northern to Central ITALY via BOLOGNA and PISA which form the links between the two systems.

The present evidence suggests that the chaotic internal situation in Northern and Central ITALY with sporadic uncontrolled fighting between Germans and Italians throughout the country may make it dangerous and difficult for the Germans to organise either road or rail transport unless vulnerable points are guarded and road convoys escorted; this at least until they get a grip on the situation. Furthermore, the Germans are known to be suffering from a general shortage of M.T. and are unlikely to have large numbers of M.T. Columns available for moving large tonnage of supplies from the North to Central ITALY. There is evidence that the Germans hope to alleviate this position by taking over Italian Army M.T., but in this they are meeting a lot of opposition from Italian troops who are sabotaging the vehicles.

Shipping:

Despite what appears to have been fairly quick action by the Germans the latter did not prevent the bulk of the Italian fleet escaping and the remainder scuttling itself. The Germans succeeded in seizing most of the active merchant shipping in the North Italian Ports and reconnaissance has revealed only a few merchant vessels scuttled; apart from deliberate German blocking of NAPLES by scuttling vessels at the quayside. It is likely, however, that although vessels have not been scuttled many will have been sabotaged or deserted by their crews. Shortage of crews, not ships, is likely to handicap the German use of Italian shipping. Since the start of the present operations little activity has been observed at either GENOA, SPEZIA. At LEGHORN and PIOMBINO there has been considerable activity connected mainly in the evacuation of Germans from SARDINIA and CORSICA. Some of the traffic at LEGHORN, however, has been coastal traffic between GENOA, LEGHORN and CIVITAVECCHIA: and there has been the usual concentration of small craft.

/ NAPLES harbour .....

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A. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Shipping - General.

The general trend of shipping in Western Italian waters is now Northwards. This is particularly noticeable in respect of LC and tank lighters which are now arriving at LEGHORN from the NAPLES area in large numbers. On the 28 Aug, 46 of these craft were present at LEGHORN. By the 31 Aug the total had risen to 57, and on the 2 Sep no fewer than 66 such craft were present.

Merchant shipping, too, is moving North. This is clearly shown if we compare the present totals of shipping at GENOA and NAPLES with those of 17 July. On the latter date there were 113,400 tons of shipping in the NAPLES area, and 159,200 tons at GENOA. But by Sep 1 the NAPLES area had fallen to 23,100 tons, and GENOA had risen to 246,300 tons. Merchant shipping at LEGHORN has remained at much the same level.

Further North still, main interest centres on MARSEILLES where 50 barges are at present being converted into the tank lighter type which has been so popular with the enemy in recent months. A further 12 are converting at LA CIOTAT, while a small number of Siebel Ferries are assembling at ST. LOUIS DU RHONE. At MARSEILLES, too, submarine pens are being constructed, and work is reported to be pushing ahead quickly. Pending their completion, TOULON appears to be the main submarine nest in this area. Six 500 ton U-Boats were present there on 1 Sep.

Available information on the East coast of ITALY indicates that traffic between VENICE and BARI is on the increase. This is probably in part intended to ease the burden of the railways, and indeed offers better prospects of doing so than did similar attempts on the West coast. In the closed waters of the ADRIATIC merchantmen may find a greater degree of safety than they did on the East Coast.

2. Coastal Shipping.

There have been few developments of major importance. The main point of interest has been a decrease of coastal shipping to the small harbours along the West coast of ITALY. After a period of considerable activity during the latter stages of the Sicilian Campaign and for a brief period afterwards, traffic has dwindled to a very low level. This development is not altogether surprising. The main function of sea transport hitherto has been the relief of the sadly dislocated railway system S. of NAPLES. So long as the supply of SICILY was a matter of major importance it can be argued that the use of LC and other small craft for the transport of men and equipment was a worthwhile investment although even this makes a poor substitute for rail traffic. However, the situation has now altered. There is no longer such a vital need to supplement the carrying capacity of the crippled railway system, now that it does not appear to be the enemy's intention to make SOUTHERN ITALY a major battleground. Instead of a flow of men and supplies into and through CALABRIA, the process is now reversed. As indicated in Para 1 the area of

Landing craft.....

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landing craft activity has in fact moved North of NAPLES. The concentration noted at LEGHORN may in part be accounted for by an intention to resume small craft traffic to CORSICA and SARDINIA, which has been almost reduced to a standstill by the withdrawal of craft for the evacuation of troops from SICILY. However, with fighting now taking place on the Italian mainland and the front likely to move Northwards it would seem that the enemy will now be able to rely mainly on M.T. for the supplying of troops in Southern ITALY, despite the drastic state of the railways. The time taken for loading and unloading, the necessity of harbour clearance by MT and the increasing danger of attacks by allied fighters provide further reasonable explanations of the enemy's apparent decision to give up lighter traffic South of NAPLES.

7. Railway Situation.

Air attacks in the past 10 days have covered the entire Italian network from REGGIO in the toe to TRENTO and BOLZANO in the far North. Results have been in the main highly satisfactory, especially in the area S. of NAPLES. Indeed, it may be assumed that the railway situation is now so bad that no reliance can be placed upon it for the speedy supply, or indeed for the supply at all of army forces in the area. N. of NAPLES, the situation though easier, is still very unsatisfactory for the enemy. North of ROME the line is blocked at CIVITAVECCHIA and further North still PISA has been blocked as a result of the heavy raid of 31 Aug. On the BRENNER, the main lines to BOLOGNA and the LOMBARDY Plain are cut at BOLZANO and TRENTO. Details are as follows.

NAPLES Area.

The main line from NAPLES to REGGIO is completely impassable throughout its length, except along the stretch between SALERNO and SAPRI where BATTIPAGLIA is open. In CALABRIA itself there are no through lines anywhere. East of NAPLES the line NAPLES to FOGGIA is completely impassable. Thus the only possible way by which traffic can proceed South is via the very complicated inland network through AVELLINO and POTENZA to METAPONTO. It is considered that this traffic is only on a minor scale.

ROME Area.

The coast line is now blocked at CIVITAVECCHIA, while the line running South from SULMONA to NAPLES has been cut. At TERNI, traffic appears possible on a very restricted scale, while the junction of ORTE is now open.

N. ITALY.

At PISA, all lines to LEGHORN, FLORENCE and SPEZIA have been cut, thereby seriously affecting the Southward move of troops from FRANCE and North Central ITALY. The traffic from AUSTRIA over the BRENNER has been seriously dislocated by the blocking at BOLZANO of the lines to TRENTO, LAIVES and MERANO, and at TRENTO of the main VERONA - BOLZANO railway. Of particular value is a direct hit on the railway bridge over the ISARCO River, splitting the bridge apart.

(See Appendix "A" is a map showing the railway system of Southern Italy).

B. MOVE OF GERMAN DIVISIONS.

1. Further to para 5 of Summary No.17, 389 and 44 Inf Divs are reported to have moved to S.E. FRANCE. 386 Mot Div previously reported to be in this area is now thought to be identical with 3 P.G. Div already known to be in ITALY. The divisions so far reported to have moved to S.E. FRANCE are 44, 76, 389 and 715 Inf Divs and 158 Reserve Div. Whilst the last three would seem suitable as replacements for departed Italian Formations it is suggested that 44 & 76 Inf Divs, two first class divs, have in fact moved into Northern ITALY.

Numerous reports.....

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Numerous reports continue to be received of the movement of German troops in and out of FRANCE. Amongst those reported as moving possibly to N. ITALY are 65, 9[illegible] and 305 Infantry Divs. Although definite evidence is still lacking, train movements suggest that 24 Pz Div has left FRANCE for N. ITALY. Other possible identifications in N. ITALY include S.S. Adolf Hitler, S.S. Reich and 71 Inf Div (from DENMARK). The latter was reported moving through KLAGENFURT and may now be in the TRIESTE area.

2. German Garrison of FRANCE.

As shown in the previous paragraph reports of troop movements in and out of FRANCE have been numerous and it is still difficult to state exactly the extent to which the garrison of FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES has been reduced. However, it is doubtful if the total of divisions now exceeds 28 as against 38 in June. Exchange of divisions with the Russian front continues. 31 Inf Div is reported to have arrived whilst 113 Inf Div has left (See Summary No. 17 para 5).

3. "The Big Stretch".

The move of German divisions from FRANCE to ITALY clearly demonstrates the apprehension with which the Germans view the opening of a front in ITALY, and the extent to which they are being forced to disperse their formations. 28 Divisions in FRANCE, 17 in the BALKANS, 15 - 20 in ITALY, SARDINIA and CORSICA, 11 in NORWAY, 194 in RUSSIA; these facts speak for themselves. Furthermore, the reserve of formations formed in FRANCE would appear to have been used up. The German Army is now strung out through occupied and hostile EUROPE. Even the advantage of interior lines of communication is offset by the necessity of guarding [illegible] against hostile populations, patriot and guerilla forces. Nowhere can the enemy concentrate for attack, or call up further reserves for defence without weakening another sector of the vast European front. As yet there is little evidence of the withdrawal of German divisions from the Russian front and in view of the non-stop Russian offensive it would hardly seem a propitious moment for such withdrawal. However, if the reports of the identifications of S.S. Adolf Hitler and S.S. Reich in N. ITALY are correct, at least two divs have been withdrawn from RUSSIA to ITALY. Despite the unfavourable situation RUSSIA would seem to be the sole source of supply if further divs are required for FRANCE, ITALY or the BALKANS.

Although the total of identified German divisions is theoretically as large as ever this state of affairs is in fact entirely false. It has been reported by the Russian G.S. that the average German division in RUSSIA does not exceed some 60% of its official W.E. Furthermore, it is known that the STALINGRAD divs were in part re-formed by the cannibalisation of other divs. The gravity of the German man power shortage already acute before the STALINGRAD and TUNISIAN defeats is clearly reflected in this state of affairs.

4. German Strategy.

There are indications both from the recent fighting in ITALY and in RUSSIA that German strategy is taking a more sober and cautious line. GERMANY can ill afford further Stalin and Tunisgrad debacles. It may be that sound military direction has gained the ascendancy over blind political intuition. We have already witnessed the disappearance overnight of Fascism in favour of a semi-military government without any immediate collapse of the entire internal political situation of ITALY. Perhaps it is not impossible that Nazism might go the same way and with the same ease.

C. DEFENCES - ITALIAN.

The pillboxes encountered in SICILY were generally poor quality. They were not reinforced except where it was considered desirable to strengthen the structure e.g. where flooring formed the roof of an underground chamber it was strengthened with quarter inch steel rods but there were no reinforcement walls.

Pillboxes were in.....

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Pillboxes were in three main types.

Type "A".

Circular wall eighteen inches thick, with a roof two feet thick, of squared random rubble, either built on a concrete raft sunk six inches into the ground or with the wall sunk eighteen inches into the ground. Loopholes were twelve inches high, three feet wide in the front and eighteen inches wide in the rear.

Type "B".

Material was similar to the above but wall and roof were five feet thick with the wall sunk between two feet and three feet six inches into the ground. Loopholes were two feet high and six feet wide in the front, stepped back to two feet wide in the rear.

Type "C".

These were the best encountered. Internal diameter was fourteen feet, with a circular wall four feet high surmounted by a domed roof, rising to nine feet six inches high, externally. The wall was five feet thick, with the roof tapering from the same thickness over the wall to three feet six inches in the centre. The concrete was of very coarse aggregate pebbles and unwashed sand, coated with half an inch of very fine concrete made from granite chippings, further topped by ten inches of rough brick masonry. All was camouflaged with shrubs.

In some instances with this type the concrete was sunk twelve feet below ground level and an underground chamber constructed.

(Source:- R.E. Intelligence).

D. APPENDIX.

At Appendix "A" is a map showing the Railway System of Southern ITALY.

GSI(a).
5 Sep 43.

T.S. AIREY,
R.G.S. (I).

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SUBJECT:- Lessons from 'HUSKY'

15AG/9004/ G (Air).

30 Aug 43.

TO: G (Trg)
T.A.F.

Ref 15 AG/2001/7/G (Trg) dated 26 Aug 43.

1. The following remarks on Air Support Control during 'HUSKY' are offered in addition to those of EIGHTH ARMY.

2. LOADING OF TENTACLES.

Failure to make adequate shipping bids for tentacles was a reflection on the state of air support training of formations who did not appreciate their function; this particularly applies to those cases where tentacles were shut out and left in N. Africa.

3. CODES & CIPHERS.

The same difficulty of distribution in a modified form was encountered on the Main Air Sp Control Net. The problem would be simplified if a secure code or cipher with a uniform key could be supplied for use on all air sp control nets.

4. BOMBLINE.

(a) The provision by EIGHTH ARMY of a progressive series of forecast bomblines for use on 'D' day if all communications failed proved of value and appears essential in an operation of this nature if direct support is available at an early stage.

(b) EIGHTH ARMY forwarded bomblines throughout the operation which were consistent and appeared to reflect faithfully the movements of forward troops. The definition of the bombline as the predicted line of forward troops for the next two hours is now well understood by both the Army and the Air Forces; it should be adhered to and any temptation to offer 'fancy' bomblines resisted i.e. the forwarding of two 'bomblines' , one an estimate of troops positions and the other a 'safe' line.

5. LANDMARKS & RECOGNITION.

There were few reports of the use of artificial landmarks or the use of smoke for recognition of our troops or indication of targets. Past experience indicates that the display of initiative by ground troops in these matters always has its reward, especially when there is any danger of confusion between our troops and the target.

6. AIR LIAISON OFFICERS.

The provision of A.L.O.s with the P38 groups whilst employed tactically would have assisted considerably and every effort should be made to provide them on similar occasions in the future.

7. AIR RECONNAISSANCE.

The following are points in brief from a report by A.L.O. 40 sqn S.A.A.F.

(a) Tac/R was controlled throughout by EIGHTH ARMY; it was found that this was best achieved by detaching an A.L.O. from the sqn to Main H.Q. EIGHTH ARMY where he was responsible for allotting Tac/R tasks under the direction of G (Ops).

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
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RAILWAY SYSTEM CENTRAL & SOUTHERN ITALY.

Appendix A to G.S.I. 15 ARMY Gp. INT. Summary No. 17 Dated 25 Aug. 43.



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
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RAILWAY SYSTEM CENTRAL & SOUTHERN ITALY.


Appendix A to G.S.I. 15 ARMY Gp. INT. Summary No. 17 Dated 25 Aug. 43.



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(b) Pilots reported that SICILY proved more difficult for reconnaissance than any encountered between ALAMEIN & TUNIS. Arty positions in particular were difficult to pinpoint, the enemy ceasing fire when tac or arty/R aircraft were sighted.

(c) Co-operation was carried out with the Royal Navy and several successful shoots were carried out by a monitor (15" guns) using a modified arty/R procedure.

(d) It was found that the photographic resources of the sqn were NOT sufficient to satisfy both ordinary demands for obliques and MERTON obliques for two Air OP Sqns.

(e) The following figures have been forwarded:-

July 9 - Aug 16

	No of Recces
Tac/R	161
Arty/R	53
Photo R	19
Av. recces per day	6
Max " " "	11

D. Heleden Giddles
Lt. Col.
G (Air).
H.Q., 15 Army Group

FIELD.
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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 20
of 11 Oct 43

(a) Sidelined information will not be re-produced in any Intelligence Summary of formations under this HQ except by special permission.

(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hours of receipt.

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I. ENEMY SITUATION

The enemy line is for the moment stabilized and a continuous front runs right across the peninsula. On the West 14 Pz Corps has under command 15 P.G., Hermann Goering and 3 P.G. Divs in that order inland from the coast, all disposed behind the line of the VOLTURNO. 15 P.G. Div extends about as far inland as GRAZZANISE, H.G. Div to a few miles short of CAIAZZO and 3 P.G. Div's left boundary, which is also the Corps Boundary, runs roughly in the area of ATOROSI. 76 Corps continues the line with 26 Pz, 29 P.G., 1 Para and 16 Pz Divs, again in that order from South to North. Boundaries here are more difficult to ascertain but from PW identifications it seems likely that 26 Pz Div's Northern boundary is the ISERNIA - VINCHIATURA road, 29 P.G. extends to the area of CAMPALESA and the boundary between 1 Para and 16 Pz Divs is the 60 Northing; all the above are approximations.

It will be seen that all the divisions of 10 Army are now in the line except for 2 Para Div which has the responsibility of guarding ROME. This thickening up with two new divisions, 3 and 15, may reflect the weakness of the divisions already engaged and indeed these divs have been continuously engaged for a long time and have been seriously reduced in strength. But taken in conjunction with the violence of the counter-attack by 16 Pz Div at TERMOLI we must consider the possibility that the Germans have decided to put a halt, of what intended duration we cannot say, to their continuous withdrawals. We are approaching the narrowest part of the peninsula and the MINTURNO - VASTO line which the Germans reconnoitred before the Italian Armistice. Some 10 kms behind the present enemy line in the North runs the river TRIGNO, backed by a high ridge of mountains. Italian military authorities describe it as the strongest line in ITALY. From a study of the map the next line back, the line of the river SANGRO, looks even stronger, the mountains are still higher and the gorge more pronounced. It may be indeed that the TRIGNO is rather too near the present front line and it is doubtful whether the Germans have yet been able to start work on the defences which are necessary even with the strongest natural line. On the other hand there are reports of digging, with forced Italian labour, at CASTEL DI SANGRO at the headwaters of the river of the same name, and if that be the final line the TRIGNO may be used only to give time for the digging to be carried further. It is not clear how this line is to be linked with

/the West .....

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the West Coast line based on MINTURNO. The GARIGLIANO gives an obvious sheet anchor for the coastal portion, after that it is a question of blocking at some convenient points the MIGNANO defile and the upper waters of the VOLTURNO; the line in this sector is not so strong as on the enemy's left but it includes plenty of hilly, not to say mountainous, country and can be made to link up well with the SANGRO line. It must be remembered that the troops of 14 Pz Corps who will hold this part of the front include two fresh divs and the Hermann Goering Div which has a good reputation and a heavy scale of armament. Finally, there remain the coastal flanks, both the Adriatic and the Tyrrhonian. As far as we can see at present there are no forces available in 10th Army to guard the coasts, but certainly they must be guarded. If the Germans are to stand in Central ITALY KESSELRING must find some troops, from ROMMEL's Army or elsewhere, to protect himself from a sea-borne landing.

We have sketched out a possible line for the enemy to hold if they have decided to hold a line in Central ITALY; it remains to ask have they so decided ? and if so why ?. To neither question can a definite answer be given. To the former one can reply that there has been in the last few days a definite feeling from forward reports that the enemy's attitude was stiffening and the orders to 16 Pz Div - a tired and depleted div, be it noted which was being withdrawn from the line - to recapture TERMOLI at all costs show that the enemy is beginning to realise he can go too far in his withdrawals. If the decision to stand has been taken, one fact shows definitely that it represents a sudden change of plan; the evacuation of CORSICA. It can scarcely be believed that if the Germans had all along intended to stand in Central ITALY they would of their own free will have surrendered to us an outflanking position so far in their rear. The reasons for this decision are easier to find, though they must be sought more in the realm of politics and psychology than in military science proper. Continuous withdrawals which have now gone on without a break for eleven months from ALAMEIN via TUNIS to NAPLES, are bad for the morale of the troops and the home country and for the prestige of German army. A more serious blow to prestige would be the loss of ROME: the name of ROME still counts for something in the world, apart from its more particular associations for the Catholic world. Moreover if the Germans can continue to control the greater part of ITALY, including the capital, there will be some chance of the "National Fascist Republican Government", at present rather a puny child, gaining some semblance of life and if it did it would take a great deal of the administrative burden off German shoulders. If the Germans retired to North ITALY the revivified Duce would hardly be worth the trouble of taking with them. Finally there are some more purely military reasons why the Germans should stand; first to deny us the use of the ROME area airfields and secondly to give more time to prepare a line in North ITALY. It seems from all accounts that the Germans have had even more trouble than they expected both from the "Communists" of the Northern industrial towns and more particularly from the Slovenes in the North East. They may even have been so impressed by these movements, especially the latter, as to feel some apprehensions for their Northern line; another rising on the scale of the present one at a time when Allied troops were close at hand and available to give more immediate support might be too reminiscent of the Gloucesters at ABOUKIR.

We must wait and see how the battle goes on the lower VOLTURNO and the Adriatic Coast in the next few days. All the evidence we have so far indicates hearty digging by the enemy in rear of his present positions and there is no sign as yet of a continuous prepared line. If the enemy continues to stiffen his resistance and if he brings up fresh troops to guard his sea flanks we shall know that a stand is intended.

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2. ENEMY SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Capacity of Main Routes into ITALY.

Information from official Italian sources shows that prior to the Armistice the Brenner route was operating up to two-thirds of normal peacetime capacity, while the lines from the East and West dropped to a lower scale of activity. This would seem more indicative of the importance of the Brenner route, than of any inability to operate the other lines. As was stated in the previous Summary the Brenner route alone is capable of a daily tonnage more than adequate for the supply and maintenance of the present German forces in Italy. This is in fact an understatement, as even allowing for some non-military traffic and working unimpeded at its pre-Armistice capacity the Brenner line alone could cope with a daily tonnage sufficient to supply and maintain a force at least twice as large as the present German forces in Italy. Furthermore the daily capacity of the Brenner represents about 50% of the total daily intake capacity of the railways leading into Northern Italy. It would appear therefore that the Germans are in fact in a strong position as regards the supply and maintenance of their forces in Italy. Nevertheless as was pointed out in the previous summary, the Brenner route is extremely vulnerable; in the first heavy Allied air attack on BOLZANO the main line railway bridge over the ISARCO River was damaged and it is now known that as a result the line was closed for 40 hours and restricted working was necessary for some 14 days. This bridge was again hit in a raid on 4 October. The Germans must therefore reckon with repeated interruptions on this line due to bombing, despite some protection afforded by the Alpine winter weather. It seems reasonable to assume therefore that the Germans will be forced to rely more than hitherto on the less direct North Eastern route from AUSTRIA for the supply and maintenance of troops in Italy.

Neither this route nor that from France is any more secure. The main line to AUSTRIA through LJUBLJANA and TRIESTE is being constantly interrupted by guerrilla action; while in the west the coastal line is reported to have been blocked by Italian action at FREJUS in S.E. FRANCE. Here one end of a tunnel having been blocked the other end was demolished after a troop train had entered the tunnel. The Mount Cenis route into SWITZERLAND is still reported to be closed as a result of guerrilla action. These instances are symptomatic of the difficulties which the Germans are up against in maintaining their L of C into Italy. The closing of the Swiss routes, while not affecting the flow of military supplies would throw onto the other lines the burden of transporting industrial supplies, such as coal which the Germans will have to continue to supply, even on a reduced scale, and for the transport of which they will, as hitherto, rely on the routes via SWITZERLAND. The general conclusion must be that the total capacity of the routes leading into Italy is such that, despite all the difficulties set out above the Germans should be able to supply and maintain as many or more divisions as can possibly be expected or needed. Sustained attacks on the Brenner however could reduce the daily intake capacity into Italy by as much as 50%. Quite apart from the nuisance and dislocation caused by blocking the main route South from Germany the more threat of such consequences will almost certainly compel the Germans to despatch further forces into N.E. Italy and Slovenia to ensure the security of the North Eastern routes, if they have not already done so. The western route from France would presumably only be used for supply and maintenance in the last resort as it involves a wide detour around SWITZERLAND.

/(b) Present .....

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(b) Present State of Italian Railways and German L of C.

Recent reconnaissance of the principal Northern railway junctions has revealed considerable activity. On 5 October some 70 train lengths were observed in the Milan Marshalling yards; on the other hand the Marshalling yards at PISA and BOLOGNA, the main transfer junctions for the Northern and Central railway systems although not extensively damaged by recent raids still do not reveal great activity. Further South reconnaissance of CIVITAVECCHIA, FLORENCE, ORTE, TERNI and SULMONA has shown a fair state of activity. Activity in the ROME yards has fallen off and the main line South is still probably blocked at FORMIA.

In general it appears that the railways have recovered from the immediate post armistice chaos, aided by Italian indifference, the arrival of German railway operating personnel, and a show of force. Present evidence suggests that the reports of civil resistance to the Germans and of chaotic conditions in the Northern towns were at least highly coloured if not grossly exaggerated. The reports of guerrilla successes against the railways in the North East and Slovenia are doubtless likewise exaggerated but nevertheless the state of affairs here is undoubtedly far more serious, and we may expect the Germans to react sharply to this threat.

Italian official information confirms the view that the main German depots are now all in North Italy; which would account for the limited rail activity from the North to Central and Southern Italy. These lines presumably only have to handle the current supply and maintenance of formations in Central and Southern Italy.

There can be little doubt that the German supply situation has eased considerably. Only limited use has been made as yet of the coastal shipping route from GENOA and LEGHORN to CIVITAVECCHIA; and coastal shipping activity has hitherto provided a reliable indicator to the state of the road and rail L of C. It must be admitted that the Germans through prompt action, and bluff aided by Italian indifference have avoided a crisis which might well have jeopardised their whole position in Italy. Failure to secure the L of C through Central Italy would certainly have hastened a withdrawal Northwards, but whatever the German intentions in this respect may be they should not now be governed by uncertainty as to supply and maintenance.

(c) Shipping

After the frantic M/V and L.C. activity in connection with the evacuation of CORSICA, a lull has now fallen on enemy shipping movements. As reported elsewhere activity along the West coast has been desultory and there is little evidence of any organised supply traffic to or from West Coast ports. Movement in Adriatic waters has been equally slight. It is very likely the Germans are taking advantage of this lull to refit and repair their small craft which must by now be feeling the effects of 4 months almost uninterrupted activity in West Italian coastal waters. In this connection it may be noted that 30 L.C. are at the present time being fitted out at TOULON. Larger shipping is also sheltering in ports well away from the battle areas. GENOA, VENICE and TRIESTE between them contain 80% of the total shipping in Italian waters.

Information regarding the port of NAPLES throws an interesting sidelight on the difficulties involved in the effective destruction of a large port. The pre-Armistice capacity of NAPLES was in the nature of 8,000 tons per day. By Oct 1, when we entered the town, P.R. had revealed that the harbour had been rendered entirely unserviceable owing to quay side demolitions and the scuttling of vessels at their berths. Yet by 12 Oct it is anticipated that the Allies will be able to pass some 3,500 tons per day through the port. This means that despite the worst the Germans could do to the port, it is working again at 48% capacity after only 12 days.

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3. ENEMY EQUIPMENT

(a) German Tk and A/Tk Equipment

Some details of the newest German Tk and A/Tk equipment appear in the notebook of an officer of 64 PGR who attended a course in May this year.

(i) The following new weapons are identified.

7.5 cm Kw.K L. 43 (1s) - firing a 6.8 Kg projectile. M/V 385 (? metres per sec).

8.8 cm Pak 43/41

7.62 cm Pak 43

5 cm Kw.K L. 42 - firing a 2.06 kg projectile. M/V 685 (? metres per sec).

8.8 cm Pak on SP chassis

HORNET

The two latter are forms of SP a/tk guns evidently intended to be put into service alongside the TIGER and PANTHER tks.

(ii) Particulars of other recently identified a/tk weapons are:

7.5 cm Kw.K 42

	100 m	500 m	1000 m
Penetration at normal (type of amn not stated)	150mm	124mm	100mm

7.5 cm Pak 41 is confirmed as a tapered-bore gun, tapering from 7.5cm to 5.5cm, with a M/V of 1260 metres per sec.

(iii) Hollow charge amn is said to have no effect on spaced armour. It is not to be used if AP amn is available, and is only "Ersatzmunition".

(iv) The following quotation confirms that the PANTHER was produced to beat the T.34, from which it is developed. The basic armour appears to be 80 mm.

"The T.34 is superior to the Mk IV owing to the inclination of the armour plates (30° as against the Mk IVs 80°). Our PANTHER with 35° armour inclination and 80 mm armour is superior to the T.34."

(b) Mark IV Tank

Two Mark IV L tanks, captured 10 September, had a thin steel plate skirting of about 5 mm bolted to the sides and covering the top of the tracks. The skirting extended to the base of the turret to allow all round traverse.

/(c) 7.5 cm .....

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(c) 7.5 cm KWK 40 Mounted on a Mark III Chassis

A 7.5cm SP gun has been captured. It consists of a long barrelled 7.5cm gun fitted with a muzzle brake and mounted on a Mark III chassis. The turret is fixed but completely covered in, with about 30 - 40 mm top armour. The gun is set slightly to the left, while an MG 34 is mounted to the right. The turret is low, so that it is possible that the great length of the gun relative to the chassis may cause it to be mistaken for a Mark VI. But the chassis is that of a normal Mark III.

On one 7.5cm SP gun there was attached an armoured skirting, which stretched from the top of the bogies to just below the top of the turret, leaving only the commander's turret visible. The skirting consisted of a number of plates, 3 ft by 4 ft, loosely bolted together by a slot and hook arrangement. The plates had been shot away on the example found, revealing two spare lengths of track, which were being carried on each side against the body of the hull between the bogies and return rollers.

4. APPENDICES

At Appendix "A" is "Economic Effects of the Collapse of Italy".

GSI(a)
11 Oct 43

T.S. AIREY,
B.G.S. (I).

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ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE COLLAPSE OF ITALY

Economically, the break up of the Axis is unlikely to have very serious effects upon Germany. Indeed the Germans may well find that the defection of their ally has appreciably eased their supply and transport difficulties, since Italy, far from being a self supporting partner, represented a continuous drain upon German economic resources. A profit and loss account of the result of the break between Italy and Germany may help in an assessment of the new situation.

A. Savings accruing to Germany as a result of Italy's collapse.

(a) Coal: Up to now Germany has been providing Italy with about 12,000,000 tons of coal annually or 5% of her total coal production. While she cannot entirely stop coal exports to Italy, she will now be able to reduce them drastically, confining supplies to what is necessary for essential military purposes and for the maintenance of any Italian industries of importance. From the transport point of view the gain is considerable. It is estimated that some of the 300 German locomotives and 15,000 trucks which have been employed on coal traffic to Italy will now be released for other purposes.

(b) Oil: 1 - 1½ million tons of oil from ROUMANIA and HUNGARY have been supplied to Italy annually. Here again Germany will effect a substantial gain by a sharp reduction of these supplies.

(c) Industrial Goods: Approximately ½ million tons of iron and steel manufacturing machine tools and machinery have had to be sent to Italy every year.

(d) Copper, Nickel and Tin: Italy was completely dependent on Germany for supplies of these. Although the quantities involved were small — 10 - 15,000 tons of copper, 3 - 4,000 tons of nickel, and between 500 and 1000 tons of tin, Germany could ill afford to spare any of them.

(e) Rubber: Owing to the slow development of the Italian synthetic rubber industry, the Germans have had to provide Italy with about 10,000 tons of Buna and a small quantity of natural rubber per annum. Because of the non-arrival of blockade runners from the Far East, Germany's own rubber position has become latterly very precarious, particularly in view of the recent air raid damage to Buna plants. In view of this the saving of 10,000 tons of rubber per annum must be accounted no small gain.

(f) Wheat: As the Italians have come nowhere near to achieving self sufficiency in foodstuffs, the Germans have had to supply 300 - 350,000 tons of wheat and grain in the past year alone to Italy. We may expect Germany to show very little concern in the future over the feeding of Italians, so that this economy represent a complete gain to the Reich.

(g) To maintain the Italian explosive industry some 10,000 tons of TNT have been despatched to Italy each year from Germany

(h) Finally there is the incalculable gain resulting from the release of transport, labour and fuel hitherto used for transport of these and other less essential materials, such as wood pulp from Scandinavia to Italy. It is estimated that the equivalent of at least 28,000 trains a year have been engaged solely in the supply of goods to Italy. What this means to the over burdened German railway system is difficult to overestimate.

/B. Losses .....

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B. Losses Suffered by Germany as a Result of the Italian Collapse

(a) 250,000 tons of sulphur supplied annually to Italy from Sicilian production. In addition, Italy has provided Germany with about 200,000 tons of Pyrites a year. Together these exports represent about 40% of Germany's total sulphur resources. This loss may affect German rayon and staple fibre production, as the greater part of the sulphur imported is used in these industries.

(b) 1500 tons of Italian silk imported annually. Italy is by far the greatest silk producing country in Europe and Germany took 70% of her annual crop. The loss of this means that German silk imports will be down to ⅓ of what they were prior to the armistice. This must be accounted a serious loss.

(c) 4000 tons of Boracic acid per annum. Italy is the only source of natural boracic acid in Europe, and about 80% of her total produce has been taken by Germany annually. This is used in the manufacture of optical and heat resisting glass.

(d) 1,125 tons of mercury per annum. This represents about 45% of Germany's total mercury imports. The remainder comes from Spain. While Spain can provide all Germany's needs, both German shortage of foreign currency and Allied political pressure on Spain will furnish hindrances to the adequate supply of this product. An uninterrupted supply of mercury is of vital importance to the chemical-electrical industries and thus to the entire German war effort.

(e) Some 40,000 tons of zinc and 10 - 15,000 tons of bauxite per annum. These represent about 7% and 10% of total German supplies respectively appreciable quantities in view of the unsatisfactory position in regard to these minerals.

(f) 500,000 tons of fruit annually. This is hardly an economic loss of importance, although it has been reported that the ensuing reduction in lemonade supplies has greatly increased beer consumption throughout the Reich.

The above represents a purely economic profit and loss assessment. The conclusion which can be drawn is that although Germany has indeed suffered some losses of considerable importance, these are not such as to have an immediate or crippling effect. On the other hand the savings resulting from Italy's collapse are very appreciable, and in German eyes will doubtless outweigh the economic effects of the losses.

From the manpower point of view, it is estimated that prior to the armistice there were about 275,000 Italian workers in Germany of which about 75,000 were agricultural workers, and most of the remainder miners and other skilled workers. Some repatriation was going on prior to the armistice, but the process has now been reversed and a considerable number of the Italian armed forces have been sent to labour in Germany. It seems likely that the number of Italians now working in the Reich will be in excess of 300,000.

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NAPLES harbour has been inactive since 8 Sep and the Germans have now started to block the harbour by sinking vessels in the berths. On 20 Sep one cruiser, two liners, two torpedo boats, two tankers, 18 merchant vessels and several small craft had been scuttled and there appeared to be only eight berths available in the port. Movement of the remaining vessels in NAPLES BAY suggests that it is intended to employ some of these for the obstruction of these berths. Two dry docks have been damaged and the floating dock probably damaged as a result of this work of destruction. Explosions and palls of smoke rising from the city have been reported and there seems little doubt that the Germans are carrying out a scorched earth policy.

L. C., Supply barges and German munition transports, vessels of some 1000 tons and classed as naval vessels, have been engaged in coastal traffic between GENOA - SPEZIA - LEGHORN - CIVITAVECCHIA. It is suggested, therefore, that once again the Germans intend to fall back on coastal shipping to maintain their L of C. Landing craft will creep down the coast to unload at small harbours. Larger vessels will, however, be unable to come further South than CIVITAVECCHIA for want of a port. Once again the delay of double trans-shipment for a short sea carry (LEGHORN-CIVITAVECCHIA 150 Miles) must be accepted in order to maintain a precarious L of C.

Supply Bases and Stocks

The main German supply base in ITALY both for the N. AFRICAN and SICILIAN campaigns was NAPLES. The base for SARDINIA and CORSICA was at LEGHORN while in recent months a North Italian base has been started at VERONA. The extent of German stocks at NAPLES is not known, but once the Germans are forced North of NAPLES it is thought that they will be mainly dependent on supplies direct from N. ITALY. The LEGHORN base has, it is presumed, only been catering for the 1½ divisions in SARDINIA and CORSICA, and is therefore likely to be insufficiently stocked to maintain some 8 divisions, most of which will be engaged in active operations.

The North Italian base was apparently started as soon as the decision was taken to send further formations to ITALY, and in theory it should by now hold adequate stocks to maintain all German forces in ITALY at their present scale of activity. There is however ample evidence that the normal railway working via the BRENNER was by no means maintained during August and there is every reason to suppose the rate of build up may be well behind schedule. Nothing is known as yet as to what stocks the Germans have seized from the Italian Army. Some have certainly been sabotaged by the Italians; for example a large amount of oil was seen covering the harbour at both LEGHORN and NAPLES. Previous to the present destruction at NAPLES by the Germans large dockside fires were observed; suggesting that the harbour oil storage tanks had been fired.

Conclusions

Until the Germans succeed in organising rail, road and coastal traffic from the North on a firm basis the whole German L of C in ITALY will be extremely precarious, but it must be assumed that the Germans will succeed in at least organising a flow of supplies sufficient for the basic needs of German armed forces. Nevertheless the German position in ITALY is not sufficiently strong to permit complete disregard for civil requirements. Like it or not the Germans will find themselves faced with the problem of feeding a starving population. Even while the fighting continues in the present areas current supplies will have to be brought by rail and sea from N. ITALY. In N. AFRICA and SICILY German formations were continually operating on a hand to mouth existence although shortages were not such as to impede front line operations. This situation is almost certain to continue in South and Central ITALY but in view of the transport difficulties and the larger forces to be supplied, the effect on the fighting formations may be more noticeable.

At Appendix "C" is a map of the Railway System in Northern ITALY.

/Situation .....

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4. SITUATION IN TE BALKANS AS A RESULT OF THE ITALIAN SURRENDER.

GREECE & AEGEAN

Events in GREECE since the armistice have shown that German arrangements to cope with the situation by taking over important points and disarming the Italians have on the whole made progress. VECCHIARELLI in ATHENS undoubtedly helped by playing his troops into German hands with a series of orders giving the Germans more and more control; and most Italians on the mainland and nearby islands can now be considered as virtual prisoners. Some of those who have volunteered to fight for the Germans may be allowed to keep their arms to do so; the majority will probably be used as labour gangs where their natural talents will be better employed than as soldiers. It is probable that the Germans will be anxious to reduce the number of such useless mouths at an early date and at least partial evacuation of disarmed Italians from the BALKANS to the North is likely.

In the AEGEAN, CASTELROSSO is in our hands, and we are in touch with the garrisons of COS and LEROS. RHODES, SCARPANTO, CRETE, and a number of lesser islands including KYTHNOS, KEOS, AMORGOS, NAXOS, SERIPHOS, KYTHERA and ANTI KYTHERA have passed into German control; whilst reports from SAMOS suggest that the Italian garrison of 6,000 rejoiced at the armistice, and that the situation there is capable of exploitation. There have been some ridiculous incidents including the presentation of an ultimatum by the senior of the nine German O.Rs on ANTI KYTHERA to the officer commanding its Italian garrison of 100 followed by the latter's immediate surrender.

The German take over in CRETE is reported to have been accomplished without undue trouble. Some of the Italians are believed already to have been evacuated to GREECE and the Italian commander's only object will probably be to get himself out of the island in the opposite direction, namely into British hands. At SCARPANTO also the newly arrived German battalion had no difficulty in asserting itself. In fact the only Italo-German clash in the AEGEAN appears to have been on RHODES.

On morning of 9 September the Germans asked for control of the port of RHODES and were refused it. They agreed to withdraw to the centre of the island but attacked the Italians in the afternoon. The latter, leaving the majority of their scattered defence units in situ, withdrew into a ring some 3 miles from RHODES town. The town was shelled and dive bombed; each hit, according to the Governor and C in C, Admiral CAMPIONI, chipping a piece off his heart. By noon on 11 September he had capitulated.

On paper that part of 50 REGINA Division which constituted the garrison of RHODES was a formidable affair. It was close on 35,000 strong, and, on our latest evidence, had no less than 450 field, anti-tank, coastal and heavy anti-aircraft guns, sited all over the island. Neither in spirit nor in concentrated strength however, did it prove equal to General KLEEMAN's Stuka-division, which is now known to be only 6,000 strong.

The most pressing German needs in the AEGEAN would appear to be reinforcements for RHODES including coastal and anti-aircraft gunners to man the guns left by the Italians; the evacuation of Italians, as soon as shipping permits, from RHODES and other islands likely to be operational. Finally the Germans must find close on a division to garrison those islands such as SYROS, SAMOS and LEROS, not yet accounted for, as the Italians will probably hand them over to the first comers.

ALBANIA and YUGOSLAVIA

The picture is equally confused. Elements of 4 Italian Corps

/ in Northern ....

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in Northern ALBANIA and of 14 Italian Corps in MONTENEGRO had not yet surrendered by 11 and 14 September respectively. But TIRANA had fallen by the 10th and the Germans are reported to have reached the coast at DURAZZO by 11 September.

100 and 118 German Jaeger Divs, which have been held in reserve in Southern YUGOSLAVIA for some weeks, have now been joined by 297 German Division which was identified the area MITRONICA (SERBIA) in early September. Strong elements of 118 are believed to have moved to the MONTENEGRIN - ALBANIAN border and either 100 or 297 is now believed to be in ALBANIA.

Thus confronted by three German Divisions, the Italians' resistance will doubtless be short lived.

Along the coast further North the Germans also have the situation in hand. SS PRINZ EUGEN Division is reported to have occupied the area DUBROVNIK - IMOTSKI. Troops believed to be of 114 Jaeger and 373 Germano-Croat Divisions have occupied SPLIT, SIBENIK, KNIN and ZARA, and there are reports of German SS in GOSPIC and LUBLJANA.

Such Italian and patriot resistance as the Germans have met in their drive coastwards has been uncoordinated. Their first object was doubtless the occupation of ports, airfields and other key points. With this achieved they must now consider the disposal of the Italians. Some may be retained for dilution with the garrison at points of secondary importance in the Partisan area or for use on ancillary duties. The alternative for the Italians would appear to be German prison camps. In neither case is the prospect alluring.

GENERAL

Von WEICHS who was first reported in SE EUROPE in mid August, is now confirmed as German C in C SUEDOST. He has a force including *sixteen German divisions and seven regiments, and for the present he can count on the BULGARIANS and to a lesser extent on some CROATS for local defence. In the last few days he has shown at RHODES that there is no change in Germany's strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean which remains based on the strong "outer ring". His resources though not excessive may be sufficient for his present defensive tasks.

* This total excludes two local SS Divisions which however are not apparently considered as part of the German Army.

(Adapted from M.E. Weekly Review)

5. GERMAN FORCES IN RUSSIA

There have been some changes in German command in RUSSIA, and a new 8th Army has been identified in South RUSSIA.

Following is a list of the German Army Groups, Armies, and Commanders in RUSSIA.

Army Groups

North	Army Group	North	Fieldmarshal	von	KUECHLER
Centre	" "	Centre	"	"	KLUGE
South	" "	A	"	"	KLEIST
	" "	South	"	"	MANNSTEIN

/ARMIES .....

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ARMIES

North	16th Army	Fieldmarshal BUSCH
	18th Army	Col. General LINDEMAN
Centre	2 Pz Army	Col. General MODEL
	3 Pz Army	Col. General REINHARDT
	4th Army	Col. General HEINRICH
	9th Army	Commander not known
South	8th Army	General KEMPF
	1st Pz Army	Col. General von MACKENSEN
	2nd Army	General WEISS
	6th Army	General HOLLIDT
	17th Army	Col. General JAENECKE
	4th Pz Army	Col. General HOTH

At Appendix "D" is a map showing the distribution of German divions in EUROPE.

GENERAL

Arrangements for Troop Movements in FRANCE

An interesting sidelight on the German arrangements for the movement of troops from the West is given in a report from FRANCE that in the West region alone the Germans usually hold 4,000 wagons formed into some 80 trains which stand without engines in readiness of normal troop movements or a military emergency.

Protection for Railway Engines

As a consequence of the sustained RAF attacks on trains in FRANCE and the Low Countries not only do trains have an A.A. Wagon but it is becoming a regular practice to armour the cabs of locomotives. Experiments are being made in the complete covering of engine and tender, but this is considered unpromising owing to the weight; some 4,000 French locomotives are being fitted with cab armour.

Damage at PLOESTI

Reconnaissance photographs of the Roumanian oil refineries show the following results of the attacks on 1 August.

> A refinery with annual capacity of 485,000 tons was so severely damaged that almost complete re-building would be necessary before it could resume operation, while two of the largest refineries was damaged sufficiently to put them out of action for a short period. At least 100,000 tons of oil is estimated to have been lost by destruction of storage tanks. It is also reported that the second largest refinery with an annual capacity of 1,500,000 tons was put completely out of action but so far it has not been possible to obtain photographic cover of this plant. General dislocation and damage to the complicated machinery of the various plants may be worse than is apparent from photographs.

/ ENEMY EQUIPMENT .....

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6. ENEMY EQUIPMENT

7.62 cm F.K. 39 (Field Gun)

Information has been received of a new type of 7.62 cm. gun in use by the Germans. According to reports so far received, the nomenclature of the gun is the 7.62 cm. F.K. 39 (Field Gun).

The gun is fitted with a double baffle muzzle brake similar to that used on the 7.5 cm. Pak 40. The recuperator is fitted above the tube and the buffer below.

The gun is mounted on two pneumatic rubber tyred wheels and is provided with a shield. From photographs examined, it appears that the wheels are removed when in action and the gun rests on two box split trails.

The breech is of the vertical sliding block type.

The following particulars have been received:-

Calibre	7.62 cm.
Rifling	32 Grooves RH
Length of Rifling	215 cm.
Length of Barrel	299 cm.
Length of Barrel including breech ring	320 cm.
Length including muzzle brake	348 cm.

The sight drum is calibrated for the use of A.P. 40 and 39 rot ammunition. Some cartridge cases found near the equipment were stamped 7.5 cm. Pak 40 with 7.62 cm stencilled on the side. It appears therefore that the gun is used as an anti-tank gun rather than a field piece.

Penetration figures for the 8.8 cm A.P. 40 Round

The following penetration figures have been estimated by the ORDNANCE BOARD for the 8.8 cm A.P. 40 round.

Firing against HOMOGENEOUS ARMOUR

RANGE YDS	NORMAL MM	30% MM
Point Blank	210	154
500	182	126
1000	157	103
1500	135	84.8
2000	115	69.7

- - - - - - - - - - - -

Estimated Muzzle Velocity 3000 f/s.

(Source: AFHQ Signal 1114 of 6 Sep)

/MINE DETECTOR .....

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MINE DETECTOR, MODEL TEMPELHOF 41

A document describing a new type of mine detector has been found. So far no specimens have been obtained.

The following is a translation of the description of the mine detector given by the captured document.

Model TEMPELHOF 41

The mine detector is portable and works on H.F. principle.

A. Parts

Spindle shaped transmitter, fixed frequency with corrector for temperature. D.L. 11 Valve and detector with connecting cable ending in a plug with waterproofed lead.

Handle in four jointed sections each 45 cm long. Receiver with 2 D.L. 11 Valves, 1 D.F. 11 valve, fixed frequency, Voltmeter for testing batteries, anode and filament batteries, attachable loudspeaker and connecting cable ending in a joint with a tone control. The whole may be contained in an infantry pack.

B. Instructions for Use

The apparatus is switched on by plugging the cable from the receiver into the detector coil plug. The tone control will be set so that the loudspeaker produces the tone of greatest volume by turning the control to the right. When metal is approached the note will rise in pitch. The effective detector surface is outlined in yellow.

C. Battery Testing

When the apparatus is working, the voltmeter shows the strength of the filament battery. The reading should never be below 1 volt. By pushing a button the meter registers the anode strength. On a 90 volt connecting cable the reading should never be allowed to drop below 70 volts. The normal life of both batteries used intermittently is approximately 100 hours.

D. Valve Changing

The valve in the detector brush can be removed by loosening the upper cover and unscrewing the base-cap. The receiver valves may be removed by opening the cover of the receiving set.

E. Correction of Frequency

The corrector on the detector brush is brought into play when owing to variations of temperature it is impossible to set the loudest tone by means of the tone control. In this case the tone control is set at its mean and the corrector is adjusted by means of special key supplied, until the desired tone is obtained.

F. At Appendix "A" is diagram of the mine detector, Model TEMPELHOF 41.

/10.5 on I.F.H. .....

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10.5 cm l.F.H. 18 Gun-How. on Mark II Chassis (Sd.Kfz. 124)

A specimen of this equipment has been identified at D.275612. An illustration is attached at Appendix "B".

The gun was a normal 10.5 cm. l.F.H. 18 gun-how. with a muzzle brake fitted on by means of a clamp. It fired the following ammunition:-

H.E. F.H. Gr.
H.E. Semi-Stool F.H. Gr. Stg.
Hollow Charge 10 cm. Gr. 39 rot HL.

The armour protecting the gun was 10 mm thickness.

The chassis appeared to be identical with the Mark II, with the exception that there were only three (not four) return rollers.

The height of the equipment was approximately 8 ft. 1 in.

On the left of the gun shield was stencilled ST GEFR ABNDT; the figure 10860 was painted beneath.

On the left side armour were painted the following identifying details:-

Sd Kfz 124 (special Vehicle Type 124).

Gesamtgew 11.5t(Total weight - 11½ tons).

Ve. Kl. Ib. (5th Class - Q Branch).

Comment

This equipment may solve the mystery of the alleged S.P. 88's several times reported on the northern coastal sector but never confirmed.

7. APPENDICES

At Appendix "A" is diagram of the mine detector, Model TEMPELHOF 41.

At Appendix "B" is an illustration of the 10.5 cm l.F.H. 18 Gun-How on Mark II Chassis (Sd Kfz 124).

At Appendix "C" is a map of the Railway System in Northern ITALY.

At Appendix "D" is a map showing the distribution of German divisions in EUROPE.

GSI(a)
25 Sep 43

T.S. AIREY,
B.G.S. (I).


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
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APPENDIX "A"
to 15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 19 dated 25 Sep 43.

DIAGRAM OF THE TEMPELHOF MINE DETECTOR MODEL 41.



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
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10.5 cm. LFH Gun-How.
on Mk. II Chassis.

HEIGHT - 246 cm.
WIDTH - 235 cm.
LENGTH - 450 cm.
CLEARANCE - 25 cm.



10·5 cm I.F.H. Gun-How on Mark II Chassis (Sd. Kfz 124)


Width of track - 30 cm.
Contact length - 250 cm.
Width between tracks - 167 cm.
Diam of Bogies - 54 cm.
Front Sprocket - 70 cm.
Rear Idler - 65 cm.

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
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LEGHORN

AREZZO

SIENNA

PERUGIA

ANCON

TERNI

VITERBO

AQUILA

LEGEND

DOUBLE TRACK, STANDARD GAUGE, STEAM

SINGLE TRACK, STANDARD GAUGE, STEAM

DOUBLE TRACK, STANDARD GAUGE, ELECTRIC

SINGLE TRACK, STANDARD GAUGE, ELECTRIC

SINGLE TRACK, NARROW GAUGE, ELECTRIC

SINGLE TRACK, NARROW GAUGE, STEAM

G.S.I. (TOPO) 15 ARMY GP.


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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 21
of 21 OCT 43

(a) Sidelined information will not be re-produced in any Intelligence Summary of formations under this HQ except by special permission.

(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hours of receipt.

I. ENEMY SITUATION

The forcing of the VOLTURNO line introduced no radical change in the situation on the front. The enemy defended the river line with great vigour but was always careful to withdraw in time any force which seemed in danger of encirclement; thus HERMAN GOERING Division, which had been able to maintain its strong positions opposite CAPUA without great difficulty, fell back finally to conform with 15 and 3 P.G. Divs who had been less successful. As a result the enemy still presents a connected front running in a fairly straight line from sea to sea. In the wild country East of the Appennines the enemy withdrawal has again been slow; 26 Pz Div in particular is fighting stubbornly; it has the most important role at the moment since the vital ISERNIA road junction is in its area. 29 P.G. Div is not being quite so determined; its morale is lowest and it has suffered very heavy casualties.

It is clear that the enemy's attitude is stiffening all along the line and if we can credit an Italian source stated to be very reliable reinforcements are on the way. This source states that after a heated argument between ROMMEL and KESSELRING (whose long and unsuccessful collaboration in AFRICA certainly generated enough heat to last till now) two divisions were released from the North to support 10th Army. This gives 10th Army 9 Divisions in the line and one in reserve (2 Para Div, in the general area of ROME) which is a formidable force considering that the difficult nature of the country will allow of fairly restricted divisional fronts. Certainly the despatch of reinforcements makes it almost certain that a decision to stand South of ROME has been taken though the actual numbers facing us may not rise in proportion since it may be expected that one or other of the present rather battered formations will pass for a time into reserve. From reports of troops arriving in the PESCARA - CHIETI area it appears that one division is intended to strengthen the Adriatic flank; it would be reasonable to allot the other to 14 Corps but there is as yet no news of any reinforcements there.

There is a strong possibility that ROMMEL's two divisions will be shortly replaced. Two divisions, 371 and 60 FELDHERRNHALLE, are reported in the French Riviera in the area between NICE and MODANE and it seems more likely that they are in transit than that they are intended to strengthen the already adequate garrison of the sector. They may well have had to wait for the disrupted communications between FRANCE and ITALY to be repaired. On the other hand a deserter from 21 P.G.R. of 24 Pz Div, stated that his Regt had entrained at FLORENCE about Sep and it was generally believed it was destined for RUSSIA; this is supported by an Italian report of two divisions being sent from North Italy to

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RUSSIA though it is unlikely that more than one division can be spared if a Panzer Division is to go.

II. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Supply Routes

Returning Italian diplomatists have reported that the lines BOLOGNA - FLORENCE, and the line FLORENCE - ROME via AREZZO are entirely given over to German military traffic and operated by German Officials. This line which is the main line through central ITALY to the South is electrified and is therefore presumably the main German route for the supply and maintenance of their troops in the South. Supplies for the West coast will be routed through ROME whilst those for formations in the central sector are presumably routed via TERNI and SULMONA to a railhead probably in the area ISERNIA - VENAFRO. It has also been reliably reported that the East Coastline (at least as far as RIMINI) is also given over to German military traffic and controlled by German Officials. This line provides direct rail communications with troops on the East coast and also an alternative route to the centre via PESCARA and SULMONA. The line from RIMINI to PESCARA is certainly in use for troop trains as during the last week the airforce has daily reported the successful straffing of trains along this line resulting in the usual scenes of panic and chaos. South of PESCARA transport appears to be mostly by MT. The capacity of the lines, at least as far as PESCARA and SULMONA, is more than adequate for the supply and maintenance of formations in the line. South of SULMONA however there is only a single track and the route is extremely tortuous; consequently much of the movement will be by road.

Present state of the Railways.

Reconnaissance of 14th showed that the ISARCO river bridge at BOLZANO had again been repaired and that the line was once more open. In ISTRIA and SLOVENIA the Germans are reported to have reacted strongly to the threat to the Security of the N. Eastern routes into ITALY and to have taken energetic military measures to bring the area under control, nevertheless latest reports indicate that the main line TRIESTE - LUBLANJA is still interrupted.

As a result of extremely bad flying weather reconnaissance of the Northern railway junctions has not been possible on a large scale. However such meagre reports as are available show that the considerable activity reported last week has been maintained. As was stated in the previous paragraph the East Coast route has been very active; and has suffered for it. The most notable increase of activity was observed at ROME on the 14th. The ROME marshalling yards had previously shown only slight activity; but on this date some 65 train lengths were observed, many of which were mixed coaches and goods wagons and were probably troop trains. This view is supported by the fact that this increased activity coincides with reports of arrival of further formations South of ROME.

Shipping

Owing to bad weather little useful reconnaissance has been possible. However on 15th GAETA harbour was seen to have been partly destroyed, and the remainder prepared for demolition. A start has also been made with the blocking of SPEZIA harbour, where two block ships have already been sunk. However low the Germans may rate their chances of holding us in Southern and Central ITALY this seems to be an early admission of ultimate failure.

In the Adriatic .....

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In the Adriatic little activity of interest has been observed in the Italian ports. On the Dalmatian coast however the situation is still far from favourable from the German point of view. German control still does not extend beyond the ports, nor does it extend to the islands along the coast; which are mostly in partisan hands. In the last week one German tanker and one Italian M/V were captured and a third ship sunk by British naval forces in this area while a fourth vessel was sunk by fire of coastal guns from one of the islands. With the control of the main railway through YUGOSLAVIA to the Eastern BALKANS being constantly interrupted due to guerilla activity the German L of C in this theatre is far from secure. The present situation is indeed one of a choice of two evils. If vessels hug the coast and sail under shelter of the islands they are liable to be fired upon; and some ships have already been lost as a result of such action; if they put further out to sea they run the risk of British interference, which has already proved effective. Consequently if the German L of C to GREECE and the AEGEAN is to be secured we may expect action against some of the partisan held islands. Further South the islands of CORFU and CEPHALLONIA have already been secured.

III. ENEMY EQUIPMENT

SELF PROPELLED NEBELWERFER (PANZERWERFER)

A PW from 21 Battery 56 Pz Werfer Regt has disclosed the existence of yet another "Secret Weapon".

It appears to be an S.P. version of the 15-cm Nebelwerfer 41.

Following are particulars given by PW:-

The "Weapon" consists of ten barrels arranged in two sets of five. Calibre 15-cm.

The "vehicle" is a half ton light semi-tracked vehicle, fully armoured. The armour is 5-mm thick and serves to protect the crew from "shrapnel".

The weapon is mounted on a turret having a 360° traverse.

A door is provided in the vehicle through which the weapon is "fed", this door must be closed before firing due to tremendous flash.

One M.G. is mounted on the turret, and a second door provided for the crew.

These guns are guided from an O.P. through an observer and fire control officer.

Ammunition

The following types of ammunition are used:-

(a) Fragmentation type - similar to Artillery shell (HE ?) Range of fragmentation - radius 200 - 300 metres.

(b) Gas shell.

(c) Bacteria shell (PW - not much is known about this).

(d) KAELTEGESCHOSS (Liquid air shell). Supposed to freeze the body for about a minute.

(e) Compressed air shell - PW believes this shell is just a fantasy.

An ammunition lorry carries 40 rounds of ammunition.

This weapon can .....

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This weapon can be used for direct and indirect fire.


Range - direct fire - 50 Metres
Range - indirect fire - 8000 Metres

Rate of fire from a battery of eight PANZERWERFERS is claimed to be 80 rounds in 3 - 4 seconds.

Every precaution is being taken to keep information concerning this weapon from Allied hands.

PW's battery - the only one in Italy was only provided with fragmentation shells (HE).

Design of SP Pz Werfer



LWK (light ½ track)
Speed - 60 km per hour
Max speed - 80 km per hour

Tactical Signs:



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Comment

The equipment might well exist but it is evident that PW is either not familiar with the equipment or has tried to lead the Interrogator "up the garden path". Should the report about the thickness of armour be correct (5-mm) then it would seem that a half-ton vehicle would be gravely overloaded. A 5-ton or 8-ton half-tracked vehicle would seem more probable. The 15-cm Nebelwerfer 41 is 6 not 5 barreled whereas the 21-cm has 5 barrels, but it would be possible to have two sets of 5 barreled 21-cm Nebelwerfer mounted on a 5 or even 8-ton half-tracked vehicle plus an M.G. mounted on top of the superstructure.

HE, Smoke and Gas shells are known to exist for both the 15 and 21-cm Nebelwerfers. Compressed air, Liquid air and Bacteria shells have so far proved a myth.

GSI(a)
21 Oct 43

T.S. AIREY
B.G.S.(I).

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APPENDIX "A"
to 15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 21 dated 21 Oct 43

GERMAN MORALE

Since CSI is largely devoted to taking in other people's washing, we must be particularly chary of sweeping assertions about the German Morale. In this connection there is a tendency to make too much of prisoners' statements. To be a prisoner is not yet to be typical. A man on capture is either angry with himself or with somebody who has blundered or he is despondent. Neither mood gives a fair taste of the morale of the unit he has left.

The German army in ITALY has obviously been told to destroy everything which may be of use to us. The instructions to the Goering Engineers are comprehensive enough: "Destroy: bridges, stations, water, gas and electricity, works, factories, mills. Mine: roads, houses and entrances to villages". Apparently the soldiery goes beyond them to pay off private grudges, to indulge in private loot and, in some instances (horribly well authenticated), in sexual murder. The Command has clearly realised that an army in retreat sets a peculiar problem of morale. The remedy, partial only, is to represent the holding of bounds in that retreat as successes in themselves. A unit is ordered to hold a position until a specified date. It is successful and the soldiers, now knowing no other victory, feels satisfied he has done a good job. If, as was recently asserted, the German soldier in ITALY now 'believes in withdrawal as he once believed in victory', it is because the need for withdrawal and the best way to do it have been explained to him. He does the job properly and the private satisfaction of efficiency is buttressed by the public approval of comprehensive destruction. So long as the German soldier is ordered to avoid heavy engagements and meanwhile to lay waste the land, it may scarcely be expected that his morale will flag. Mercenaries throughout the centuries must have longed for such amiable instructions. Moreover, despite the immense casualties, there are still many German soldiers with five to eight years' service; some even longer. Routine, discipline and a merited tradition of efficiency override personal grievances, lack of air support and distrust of Hitler. Further Nazi doctrine is still artificially inseminated by weekly political instruction. Pep talks may be an annoyance but in default of better information they keep the soldier in line by their sheer monotony.

The German soldier is as sentimentally nostalgic about his wife as he is regularly unfaithful to her. Great trouble was paid always in North Africa to arrange regular leave and to ensure punctual delivery of mail. Stallion leave is apparently still granted from ITALY but letters have been more infrequent, probably due to the damage to homes in Germany and the persistent interruption of the railway services in ITALY which may have caused the mail to be set aside while more important commodities come South. 1 Parachute Division's mail is apparently still in ROME. The close family feeling upset by these interruptions may make a German soldier worried about his relatives, but fear of reprisals on them if he voices defeatist views usually makes him keep the grudge to himself. It may leave him dissatisfied; it has not yet made him inefficient.

Those German soldiers who still believe in victory have two main reasons besides sheer stupidity for their opinion: they have accepted the propaganda about the shortened line - in RUSSIA as in ITALY - and they are still liable to fall for the old "secret weapon" gag. The continued production of excellent weapons and up-to-date equipment gives the German soldier confidence in his arms and adds to the ease with which he may be made to believe in the next secret weapon. These soldiers on the other hand who desert because the game is no longer worth the candle have, in

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recentcases, walked over because their parents or wife and children have been killed and they are no longer interested in defending a Germany which represents to them not a home but a graveyard.

The average soldier, as difficult to find as the average man in peacetime (because he is the same person) probably falls between these two schools. Fear of the consequence of defeat, sheer disciplined routine, a tradition of efficiency and a confidence in his weapons override the worry about his home and the annoyance of being deserted by the Luftwaffe. In ITALY there is a further reason for getting on with the job without belly-aching. Fighting the "plutodemocratic" armies in ITALY and looting the local population as a sideline is better than the alternative. The biggest fear of the German soldier in ITALY is an order to return to RUSSIA. However unpleasant and ubiquitous our aircraft, however worrying the lack of or bad news from home, this is not the Eastern Front.

The German Army was beaten in the last war in the field. That defeat was made easier by the worsened morale due to the bad news from home. This time the news from home will be worse (and here is the chance for propaganda) and it will eventually seep into the German soldier's conditioned psychology. Leave may eventually be too dangerous to grant. The feeling, however, that decisions on national policy are none of his business, the habit of almost instinctive obedience to whatever folly or bestiality is ordered, (a ritual which marks the German as so different from the British soldier) is not yet undermined. The fear of defeat demands its postponement.

(SOURCE: 8th Army Intelligence Summary No 573)

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APPENDIX "B"
to 15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 21 dated 21 Oct 43

Army Order of the Day
10 Army High Command
The Commander in Chief

Army Headquarters, 18 Sept 1943.

Army Order of the Day

The Battle of Salerno has been fought.

The enemy lost: Almost 5,000 prisoners, 165 tanks and armd vehicles, 58 guns, 234 heavy infantry weapons, thousands of light weapons, and army equipment of all types. We must add this his high casualties in blood.

Success to ours !

In its importance it will bear fruit in the further conduct of the war on Italian soil.

My thanks go first of all to our brave soldiers. Once again has German soldiery proven its superiority over the enemy. Leadership and soldiery of our troops again have proven their high standard

The 16th Panzer Division had to face the first onslaught of the enemy. Through its enduring defensive battles, it laid the foundation for the employment of the remaining units of the army.

The commanders and units of the Southern sector, after a splendid evacuation of CALABRIA, were able to reach the battlefield despite the distances and supply difficulties involved. Thanks to their untiring energy and initiative in the ensuing heavy defensive and offensive fighting, they have shown the enemy again what it means to fight German soldiery.

Command and units in the Northern sector, at the risk of weakening their positions along the coast, denied the enemy in hard battle the full use of the Port of SALERNO. Through this, the enemy was deprived of one of his most basic requirements for his operation. Despite difficulties, the Supply services successfully safeguarded and removed all valuable supplies during the withdrawal.

Every one knows that the Luftwaffe has done all within its power to assist the hard-fighting ground troops.

With pride we mourn our dead. Their sacrifice was the source of our victory.

But after battle, a new resolve. Fuehrer and Fatherland remain confident that the 10th Army will fight to the very last and anticipates the opportunity to deal the enemy another blow.

To the Fuehrer Victory - Heil !
Commander in Chief:
(Signed) Von Vietinghoff
Col-General.

(SOURCE: 8th Army Intelligence Summary No 573).

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.22
of 27th Oct 43.

(a) Sidelined information will not be re-produced in any Intelligence Summary of formations under this H.Q. except by special permission.

(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hrs.of receipt.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION.

Captured documents show that on 14 Oct H.G. Division was withdrawing to a position called BARBARA. Prisoners from 76 Corps have also referred to the BARBARA position so it can be taken that this is a line running right across the peninsula. On the 14 Corps front its position is pretty clear; it is the line of hills starting with MONTE MASSICO and running from there via TEANO and VAIRANO, at which latter there appears to be a strong point; from VAIRANO the line is not given but the loss of PRATELLA presumably means that the valley of the upper VOLTURNO will be blocked not further forward than PRESENZANO. After this the great mass of the MATESE mountains interposes between the two Corps. The BARBARA line on the 76 Corps front would most naturally be the line of the TRIGNO which rises just North of the Mountains and flows in a Northerly direction through difficult country. If this is so the BARBARA line is already in danger at several points; 8th Army have crossed the TRIGNO near its mouth and 5th Army's capture of ROCCHETTA and PRATELLA threatens TEANO and the upper VOLTURNO respectively. It is likely therefore in view of the above and in view of the lack of defence works so far visible that BARBARA is not the final line. There is more evidence now accumulating that what one prisoner calls."the winter line" will rest on the SANGRO and the GARIGLIANO.

In the North the question is bound up with reinforcements and reliefs. 65 Infantry Division was reported by the Italians as having come South and we have now identified 145 Infantry Regt of that division in position behind the SANGRO and probably part of the Div Arty Regt. An Italian source reports seeing much horse-drawn arty in the Eastern coastal sector; this would fit 65 Division which is an ordinary infantry division. Also in this area is 1 Para Regt presumably also engaged on the same task of preparing defences. We have had very little contact with 29 P.G. Division for the last three days which may suggest that it is thinning out to the rear positions; certainly it needs a rest badly. The Northernmost defences are already taking shape; Photo/R. of 25 Oct shows a continuous defensive line under construction West of the SANGRO between C.4305 and 3500.

On the West Coast.....

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On the West Coast the other division of the two which came from ROMMEL to MESSERLING is believed to be 305 Infantry Division (APWO WIS 60); this division was previously in LIGURIA which is the most likely area to be drawn on since there are no operations in progress as there are in the North East, and Southern FRANCE can quickly supply replacements. If any further divisions are to come South (and prisoners from 15, H.G., 29 and 16 Divisions all state that they are expecting to be relieved) it is likely that they would be drawn from the same area. As to the position they are to hold there is little more evidence. There are reports of defences being dug at MIGNANO, which blocks the defile on the main road to ROME and an A.Tk ditch between ROCCARAVINDOLA (H.0929) and MONTERODUNI (H.1424) blocking the road to the head waters of the VOLTURNO above VENAFRO; these positions tie in with the GARIGLIANO line on the coast (See I.S. No.20). On 14 Corps sea flank the aid of nature has been enlisted and the dykes have been cut round TERRACINA and on the coast North of MONTE CIRCEO; the bullfrog of the Pontine Marshes can see his most advertised achievement undone to defend his capital.

2 Parachute Division is still in the ROME area and a recent prisoner reports that it has four regiments, 2, 5, 6 and 7. It is said to have suffered casualties both at the hands of the Italians in the taking of ROME and also in the rescue of MUSSOLINI. Italian reports speak of S.S. troops in ROME in some strength; these are unlikely to come from Adolf Hitler Division or from the unidentified S.S. Division in the area of ISTRIA - SLOVENIA so they may have come from the Bde REICHSFUEHRER S.S. which was evacuated from CORSICA. Another evacuated division, 90 P.G., appears to have shifted East to the area of FORLI and TREVISO.

2. ENEMY SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS.

Supply Routes.

An Italian source who left BOLOGNA early this month reports that the Germans were routing trains for the East coast from VERONA (the main N.Italian base) via FERRARA and RIMINI thus by-passing BOLOGNA. This was due not only to the damage caused by air-raids but also because the Germans considered this junction an obvious target and did all they could to by-pass it. This would account for the fact that FR of BOLOGNA has seldom revealed any very high degree of activity.

It has been reported that South of ANCONA the Germans have been making extensive use of the road VISSO - TRIPONZO - TERNI, even prior to the recent blocking of the railway Southwards from ANCONA to PESCARA. The use of this road would seem to suggest that much of the supplies forwarded via the East coast have been transported South from ANCONA by road, and that the railway has only been put to limited use. Road movement from ANCONA to TERNI (and presumably South to SULMONA) would further suggest that the East coast route has also been used for moving not only supplies destined for troops on the coast, but also to relieve the strain on the main central railway and at the same time avoid some of the more obvious target junctions.

State of the Railways.....

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State of the Railways.

Besides the interruptions caused by the bombing of bridges which is dealt with in the succeeding paragraph, other rail targets have been attacked. ANCONA yards were attacked on the 20th and the main line blocked by debris; three days later an ammunition train exploded with exceptional violence as a result of a direct hit. This junction is probably still blocked. Considerable havoc was caused in the TERNI yards on the 19th, but a through line was open a few days later. The marshalling yards at FLORENCE revealed considerable activity on 23rd and were bombed on the 25th; results as yet unknown. The marshalling yards at PISTOIA were bombed on the night of 24/25. The east coast line South of ANCONA has probably come off worst in recent attacks and it is doubtful if it is now used to any great extent. However during the last week all the main lines south of LEGHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA were blocked. Some of the repairs will take more than a few days to execute. It may be fairly said that railways in Central ITALY had a bad week. In the N.East the line TRIESTE - LJUBLJANA is still reported to be cut owing to partisan activity but the line to VIENNA via TARVIS and KLAGENFURT is believed to be functioning normally. Considerable Northward traffic was reported recently through TARVIS.

Attacks on Roads and Bridges.

During the past week our bombing effort has been in part directed to attacking individual communication targets in the form of rail and road bridges, and in one case a viaduct. The difficulties of destroying bridges by air attack are well known, but although only a percentage of attacks carried out were successful, nevertheless the combined effort was extremely satisfactory and resulted in the main lines ROME - LEGHORN, ROME - FLORENCE and ANCONA - PESCARA being effectively blocked, and traffic on the main North South roads in area ORBETELLO thrown into some confusion.

With one exception targets were all located on short sectors of the three main railway lines as follows:-

1. LEGHORN - ROME line between GROSSETO and CIVITAVECCHIA.

Damage in this sector was confined mainly to the ORBETELLO area. A direct hit was scored on the MONTALTO di CASTRO railway bridge halfway between ORBETELLO and CIVITAVECCHIA, and the TALAMONE railway bridge North of ORBETELLO has sustained damage; considerable destruction was done to the track near this bridge. The railway line has also been cut South of ORBETELLO by many direct hits on the track near CAPALBIO and CHIAROME. Damage to the three road bridges in this sector is also reported, although in all cases traffic can either by-pass or still make use of the bridge, considerable confusion and dislocation to road convoys almost certainly ensued.

2. FLORENCE - ROME line between ORVIETO - ORTE.

An attack on the railway bridge 9½ miles SE of ORVIETO resulted in direct hits, rendering the line impassable to traffic. In addition further direct hits have caused a partial collapse of the rail embankment. North West of ORVIETO a railway bridge was demolished.

3. ANCONA - PESCARA line.

A railway bridge North of PEDASO was demolished by direct hits. Further South an attack on a railway bridge near GROTTAMARI probably succeeded in cutting the railway line but no damage was caused to

the bridge.....

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the bridge. A night attack on the road and railway bridges at GIULIANOVA resulted in the destruction of the railway bridge and damage to the road bridge.

A raid on a railway viaduct N. East of TERNI made on 21 Oct proved unsuccessful.

Shipping.

Although coastal traffic has been confined almost entirely to L.C. and supply barges operating between GENOA, LEGHORN, PIOMBINO, SAN STEFANO, CIVITAVECCHIA, NETTUNO and ANZIO, this has been brisk and there are signs that it is increasing. Sustained attacks on the railways will certainly cause a sharp rise in this traffic. Coastal traffic on the East has as yet only been slight due largely no doubt, to a general shortage of small craft in the ADRIATIC. On the West coast M/Vs. continue to arrive at GENOA from Ports further South and the tonnage seen on 20 Oct had reached a total of 266,000 tons. The intention is almost certainly to evacuate as much as possible of this tonnage Westwards to the French ports as the Allies advance Northwards. Much of it may in fact be scuttled, as with an ever decreasing Mediterranean seaboard under Axis control the supply greatly exceeds the demand; furthermore there is reported to be a shortage of crews. Great repair and constructional activity of small craft has been observed at most of the West coast ports.

Port demolitions continue, and were almost complete at GAETA on the 22nd, while preparations for blocking LEGHORN are proceeding. The hull of an obsolete 5000 ton Cruiser and a 3000 ton M/V are being placed alongside the harbour boom ready to be moved into position for sinking. On the East coast demolitions have been carried out at ORTONA the only harbour South of ANCONA on the Axis occupied East coast capable of taking any vessel larger than an L.C. We may however expect to see a development of lighter traffic along the East coast to relieve the railway which has now almost ceased to function. On 21st three barges were seen unloading at SAN BENEDETTO del TRONTO.

General.

There have been numerous reports of Germans in ITALY requisitioning and removing large numbers of horses Northwards. The Germans who still have Infantry Divisions equipped with a large amount of horse transport have undoubtedly suffered large losses in animals in RUSSIA and are probably as much in need of remounts as of tanks and guns.

3. ENEMY PERSONALITIES.

General-major HEIDRICH.

A British officer who was entertained to dinner by General Heidrich shortly after the TERMOLI landing (in which he was taken prisoner) gives this account of the GOC, 1 Parachute Division.

General Heidrich.....

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General Heidrich is about 45 years old. In appearance he startlingly resembles Mr. Churchill, and he said we that other British officers have remarked on this fact; the resemblance is heightened - I did not enquire whether he did it on purpose - by the cigar he is always smoking. His grey unpleasant eyes give an impression of ruthlessness that belies his corpulence. In the morning, in his pyjamas, he is a terrible sight. He spoke no English, and our entire conversation was conducted through an interpreter.

It is difficult to say how far his conversation was meant to draw me out and how far it represented his real views. He did not suggest that Germany would win the war, but seemed to envisage a compromise peace between Germany and Russia, perhaps in the Spring; then, England would hasten to make a compromise also or, after trying to invade in the West and suffering appalling casualties, would recognise that loss of life on such a scale could not be tolerated, and would in turn be forced to compromise. He was very emphatic on the heavy casualties we would suffer in any attempt to open a second front. He also trotted out the Yellow Peril, saying that in twenty or thirty years' time, Europe would be fighting for her life against the hordes of Asia; could not Britain and Germany patch up their differences before it was too late, and set about arming in real earnest for the next war ?.

General Heidrich said that the TERMOLI landing was perfectly timed. Had we landed one night earlier, we should have been unable to inflict any casualties, as there was no one in TERMOLI. A landing a night later would have bumped a very strong position, as reinforcements were already under orders to join the garrison. His own H.Q. had been in TERMOLI, and he apologised for not offering me wine; he had had to abandon his cellar together with much of his kit. The day after the landing, his intercept station had picked up a sitrep from our forward formation, reporting the capture of a German Colonel, who afterwards turned out to be only Major Rau. Heidrich was very merry with this mis-identification, asking me with enormous joviality - "Can't your troops identify a German officer yet ? Fancy making Rau a Colonel ! He's a good major, but no better".

The General expressed great admiration for a captured British pamphlet on discipline, which he had had translated and distributed in his division. I was able to return the compliment by mentioning his own pamphlet on the employment of parachutists which had been translated and distributed to the British Army after we had captured it in CRETE. Heidrich said he particularly admired the British as opponents and said that he made a point of entertaining to dinner all British parachutist officers captured by his division. He seemed to have got it into his head that I came from the Airborne Div, for he asked me whether I knew certain officers from that Division who he had entertained. When I said I could not answer any questions on military topics, he gracefully changed the conversation to subjects of general interest, and apologised for the dinner, saying it was rather a scratch meal but "we live a hand-to-mouth existence these days. There are more important things for transport than food, so we more or less live on the country".

T.S. AIREY,
B.G.S. (I).

G.S.I.(a),
27th October 43.

TSA/JH.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 23
of 4 Nov 43

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The thrust by 5th Army at the junction between 14 and 76 Corps has upset 14 Corps' defensive programme and the BARBARA line has been abandoned. On 1 Nov the enemy had abandoned TEANO and our patrols were thrusting to the summit of MONTE MASSICO; further North our troops are pressing in to the entrance to the MIGNANO defile. It was probably this last threat which decided the enemy to withdraw off the fine defensive position of MONTE MASSICO; since he had already blown the GARIGLIANO bridges behind this position the only route of supply or eventual withdrawal was the lateral road behind the ridge of hills running up towards MIGNANO. For this reason we must expect him to try and hold the roads through ROCCAMONFINA and GALLUCCIO until he has completed thinning out from the Southern end of the line, and after this he will probably abandon the mountain mass of S. CROCE and withdraw his right wing behind the GARIGLIANO.

It is still not certain which is to be the next position for 14 Corps now that BARBARA has gone. Italian reports speak of a winter line from GAETA to CASSINO but surely they are using loose expressions. There seems no good reason why the Germans should allow us into the plain of the SACCO, centering round PONTECORVO, when they can hold us in the MIGNANO defile and from such evidence as we have of enemy defensive preparations it seems that he does in fact intend to deny us access to this plain; we have reports of diggings at CASTELFORTE (G.8500), on the hill in the loop of the river at G.9000 and at MIGNANO. From CASTELFORTE Southwards flooding and demolitions will strengthen the line of the GARIGLIANO.

In the middle of this withdrawal re-grouping is going on in 14 Corps. Prisoners from 3 PG Div stated that on about 27 Oct I Bn 8 PGR and I/29 PGR with some of the divisional artillery were relieved and moved back to the area of CASSINO. They did not know what formation had relieved them, it is obvious however, from the units mentioned that a relief of the entire division is taking place and its sector will have to be taken over by at least an equivalent formation, possibly one of the infantry divisions from the North. There is also clearer evidence that Hermann Goering Div is at last to get the relief it has been promised so long; on 1 Nov

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the Eng Bn were reconnoitring a rest area and billets in the area of SEZZE (G.2222). It is not certain, however, that the enemy strength in the area will be raised by these reliefs; a prisoner from the 305 Inf Div which now appears to be arriving to reinforce 14 Corps (its Recce Unit is already here) speaks slightingly of the combat efficiency of the Div and the low state of training of the new drafts of which it is made up.

On 76 Corps front we have at last a complete picture from photographic reconnaissance of the SANGRO Line (details in para 2). The name is slightly misleading as far as the centre of the line is concerned since here it abandons the river to move back Westwards behind the CASOLI - PRESCOCOSTANZA road, following the abrupt and precipitous slope of the MONTAGNA DELLA MAIELLA. This is a very strong line by nature and the defences, even in their present stage of development, are described as formidable in the Northern sector. Moreover in contrast with 14 Corps front we are not yet anywhere in contact with 76 Corps winter line and are indeed experiencing some difficulty in crossing the TRIGNO.

There is no important change from last week in the enemy dispositions on the front in Eighth Army sector. 129 Recce Unit have moved to the North coast to the area of CASALBORDINO (H.4893) but otherwise very little has been heard of 29 PG Div. The Recce Bn has probably been detached from its Div for coast watching duties.

2. ENEMY DEFENCES ON THE SANGRO LINE

The final stage of the SANGRO line has at last become clear. A series of successful Ph R's, the last flown on 29 October, shows the main line running in a Southwesterly direction from the coast NORTH-EAST of FOSSACESIA (C 3905) to the area NORTH of CASOLI (H 2491), whence it roughly follows the lateral road to CASTEL DI SANGRO (H 0954) and ALFEDENA (H 0348).

At present the line appears to be strongest in the coastal sector. It consists of well dug trenches running SOUTH-WEST from the coast for four miles and lying to the SOUTH of the FOSSACESIA - LANCIANO (H 3702) road almost as far as the 37 Easting grid. In addition a considerable number of weapon pits has been dug and wiring appears to be in progress in the area H 4105. The line in this sector runs close to the top of the ridge giving good observation over the SANGRO plain. It is situated mainly in plantations with a number of houses to the rear which may be used as strongpoints. Although demolition of houses in front of the line has begun no trees or hedges have yet been cleared. As the line of trenches for the most part runs under trees it is not possible to state in every case what may be expected in the way of weapon pits and other fortifications. As the line continues further SOUTH-WEST it becomes more disconnected. In certain areas large organised localities can be clearly distinguished amongst the general patchwork of diggings and weapon pits. SOUTH of the road between SAN MARIA (C 3601) and CASTELFRENTANO (H 2998) there are three strongly defended areas, one with a frontage of some 2,500 yards and the other two approximately 1,000 yards each.

Behind them are patches of diggings in considerable depth, as much as three kilometres in one instance. All are fairly regularly spaced at intervals of approximately one kilometre. If these are

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developed the line is likely to assume formidable proportions in this area. EAST of GUARDIAGRELE (H 1898) are a further two strongpoints consisting of weapon pits and diggings, sited on the slopes to the SOUTH of the secondary road which runs WEST from the main road at H 2698 to GUARDIAGRELE. SOUTH-EAST of this area, almost halfway between CASOLI (H 2390) and GUARDIAGRELE is another area of defences stretching from H 2393 to H 2593. Although this is continuous it has little depth. Between this last defended area and the localities in the vicinity of CASTELFRENTANO there are numerous scattered areas of diggings and weapon pits amongst which no clear-cut pattern can yet be traced. They are mainly sited to the east and west of the road running north from H 3090 to H 2898. Although these do not appear to be strong at present it is probable that they will eventually prove to be a continuation of the series of strongpoints in the CASTELFRENTANO area, since it is obviously essential to guard an area in which lies one of the main approaches to this line and an important river crossing. Little or no activity has been seen to the SOUTH-WEST of the 20 Easting grid until the area NORTH of PESCOCOSTANZO (H 0765) is reached. Along this stretch of some 23 or 24 kilometres the enemy will probably take up positions NORTH of the road, on the SOUTH-EAST slopes of the MAIELLA massif. Such positions as he intends to prepare in this area may very well be left until last since the terrain in itself is so formidable. The mountains rise very abruptly from the valleys and are extremely steep. Their slopes moreover are deeply incised by torrents which flow in very deep ravines with almost vertical sides, certainly impassable to mechanised transport and probably even infantry.

In the area of PESCOCOSTANZO it is clear that the enemy intends to take advantage of this ground which is favourable to him. Defences have so far only been located across the river valleys which are the obvious and easiest lines of advance. At H 0769 two pillboxes and diggings have been located whilst at H 0467 an anti-tank ditch has been scarped out of the hills on either side of the road running into the mountains up the river valley. At the road bottleneck near RIVISONDOLI (H 0462) the low flat ground has been mined whilst defences are positioned on the hillside so as to enfilade North-bound traffic. NORTH of CASTEL DI SANGRO where the road runs into a defile defences have been positioned on a hill near the river crossing at H 0854 whilst near ALFEDENA (H 0348) at the beginning of yet another defile anti-tank ditches and diggings have been located.

Forward of his main position a line of outposts has been constructed. Between the coast and road it runs parallel to the main line, some three kilometres forward of it at the foot of the slope which runs down to the plain near the mouth of the SANGRO. In this area the defences consist chiefly of trenches and weapon pits and at present are not very thick on the ground. SOUTH-WEST from the main road the defences become less definite in character and finally identifiable only as diggings. They are sited very close to the river and follow the branch which runs SOUTH from H 3090. Between the river crossing at H 3090 and H 2886 no activity other than the demolition of bridges on the secondary road

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to the East of the river has been discovered. From the area H 2885 to VILLA SAN MARIA (H 2871) diggings re-appear at very widely spaced intervals, but beyond this point only a few isolated areas have been found, included in which are diggings to the SOUTH-EAST of BORRELLO (H 2568), an anti-tank ditch astride the road at H 2962 and a further area of diggings at H 3262 near the sharp road bend EAST of CASTIGLIONE (H 3762). It is quite evident that the enemy will use his outpost line merely as a delaying position. As soon as we seem likely to force a crossing of the river he will retire to his main defences where he will enjoy the advantages of ground and well constructed positions.

3. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE - NORTH ITALY

The following table gives the present state of the German Order of Battle in ROMMEL's Command. It will be noted that 65 and 305 Inf Divs have been deleted as they are now known to have come South to 76 and 14 Pz Corps respectively. SS Pz Div Adolf Hitler has been identified by its divisional sign in the TRIESTE area; it is likely that the division was merely passing through NE ITALY and may be leaving the country altogether since an Italian source states that two divisions, one of which is 76 Div, are due to leave for RUSSIA. On the other hand the presence of 371 Inf Div in the TRIESTE area, as reported from vehicle signs, appears to mean the arrival of this division in ITALY, by a rather roundabout route from FRANCE. It should be noted that 60 Feldhernhalle Div is still waiting on the French frontier in the MENTON area with SS Panzer Div 10 ("KARL DER GROSSE") further West. Drafts of the latter are believed to have already entered ITALY.

ROMMEL's Command (Army Group B)

Nothing is known of Army and Corps organisation. At the time of the capitulation the Italians stated that LXXXVII Corps was in LIGURIA. It is still believed to be at ACQUI.

HQ Army Group B	Area LAKE GARDA
157 Reserve Division (Mountain)	Possibly BERGAMO
Unidentified Mountain Group	Area BRENNER
76 Infantry Division	Area GENOA) Form presumably
94 Infantry Division	Area SPEZIA) LXXXVII Corps. One of these divisions may be moving southwards.
90 P.G. Division	Area TREVISO
S.S.Brigade Reichsfuhrer	Possibly North of ROME
18 Panzer Division	Possibly SLOVENIA
S.S. Panzer Division A.Hitler	Area TRIESTE
371 Infantry Division	Area TRIESTE, possibly in transit
71 Infantry Division	Area UDINE
44 Infantry Division	Probably area PADUA
162 Infantry Division	SLOVENIA
Unidentified Infantry Division	SLOVENIA
Unidentified S.S.P.G.Division	SLOVENIA
389 Infantry Division	Unplaced, possibly central LOMBARDY.

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In addition to the above, Police and Flak units are almost certainly established in and about the main industrial centres.

4. ENEMY L OF C AND COMMUNICATIONS

There have been several reports that as a result of the cutting of rail communications north of ROME a considerably lengthened road carry has been forced on German M.T. columns. CHIUSI, FICULLE, ORTE and ORVIETO have been mentioned as railway off loading points. Whilst most of the principal supply depots are believed to be North of ROME, it is certain that much of the supplies for the forward depots south of ROME now has to be lifted by road from the places mentioned above. In cannot however as yet be said that rail interruptions have caused any appreciable increase of coastal shipping.

The narrow gauge railway from the East coast line to SULMONA via PALENA is reported to have been in use, at any rate up to about mid October, when there were 2-3 trains nightly to PALENA which was the railhead. Although this line will be affected by the recent blocking of the ANCONA-PESCARA line, since it joins the main line south of PESCARA at ORTONA, it can still be used to transfer inland supplies offloaded from barges and lighters at ORTONA or FRANCAVILLA.

A report from an Italian source states that KESSELRING's Chief Q.M. is a Dr ERNST. ERNST is reported to be an Austrian and a staunch anti-Nazi and is even said to have attempted to cross to the Allies about the time of the armistice and the SALERNO landings. ERNST is further reported to be extremely pessimistic about Germany's chances of success. The report does not state if ERNST was also Q.M. in AFRICA; but even assuming he is not the same Q.M. whose ships unsuccessfully attempted to run the gauntlet of the Allied torpedo bombers, he will have had headaches enough supplying German troops in SICILY and Southern ITALY with a long L of C under constant Allied sea and air attack. It would not be surprising if such a task made ERNST gloomy; being a sufficiently senior officer he may well realise that there is little hope of relief or respite from this state of affairs despite the German grip on N. ITALY. Nevertheless, due no doubt to careful and persistent over-indenting, shortages have been mainly local and have never been such that it can be said that the conduct or course of operations was affected.

Shipping

(a) Italian West Coast

The Northward move of shipping which has been apparent since the fall of SICILY has come to a halt in the past ten days and for the first time there has been a slight decrease in tonnage at the harbours of GENOA and LEGHORN. This is explained by the departure of L.C., Barges and a very small number of M/Vs to ports further South, mainly CIVITAVECCHIA, S. STEFANO and PIOMBINO. The traffic is on a moderate scale, and is probably carrying fuel and ammo to the rear areas of 10 Army. The M/Vs however, are nearly all

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plying between GENOA and PIOMBINO and are probably engaged on the iron ore trade. Some craft may also be used to remove damaged equipment from the 10 Army area. It should be remembered that traffic along this coast can easily be increased at short notice if this is thought necessary. There are at present in Italian West coast ports alone at least 63 L.C. and 81 barges of which only about 20% are being used. In addition 10 more barges have just been completed at MARSEILLES and a further 70 are under construction.

Demolitions at GAETA are now complete and there has been no activity there for over a fortnight. In view of the flooding in the NETTUNO area it is very doubtful whether this harbour too is likely to be of much future value to the enemy. The loss of these harbours and the damage sustained at CIVITAVECCHIA as a result of our air raids may cause the enemy to start developing fresh harbours on the W. coast, and it would not be surprising to find new ports of call being used by the Germans for their supply traffic.

(b) Italian East Coast

There is no sign of any traffic developing from VENICE and TRIESTE down the East coast, although this may not be long in starting. The main East coast harbours have however either been demolished or prepared for demolition. PESCARA has been demolished and preparations have been made for the destruction of ANCONA. While these demolitions do not render the use of harbours impossible, they do however limit their use to A.S.V's and small craft. If, then, the traffic develops it will probably, like that on the West coast, consist mainly of L.C. and A.S.V's with the possibility that ordinary M/Vs may proceed as far as ANCONA there either transferring their cargoes on to M.T. or smaller craft.

State of Railways

The main lines to ROME remain blocked at the points given in our last Summary; railways in general have suffered no subsequent major interruptions.

Adriatic Communications

By taking the islands covering the approaches to SIBENIK the Germans have made a start in the process of securing the islands along the Dalmatian coast so as to safeguard their coastal L of C to the BALKANS. We must expect further action of this kind since reports from YUGOSLAVIA reveal that on 26 Oct the railway system was well nigh completely out of action. The main line from SUSAK to ZAGREB via KARLOVAC is reported to have been thoroughly destroyed; although the Germans are now guarding the sector SUSAK-OGULIN, (the sector threatened by the Partisans) and endeavouring to effect repairs. The line from KARLOVAC North West to LJUBLJANA is also destroyed in many places and out of action. The biggest blow of all from the German point of view must be the interruptions to the main line ZAGREB-BELGRADE between GRADISKA and BROD. It is not surprising that the Germans are reported to be making desperate efforts to effect repairs as quickly as possible. The line is the main German supply link to GREECE and AEGEAN and it is of vital importance. Practically all the internal and lateral lines leading from the main LJUBLJANA-ZAGREB-BELGRADE-NISH line are cut, the sole exception being the line STALAC-KRALJEVO-SARAJEVO to DUBROVNIK. SPLIT is reported cut off from all communications; the

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railway is cut and Partisan guns control the DRVENIK Channel and probably the Southern approaches. Seaplanes, possibly bringing supplies have been shot down in the SPLIT area.

Adriatic Shipping

The lull succeeding the Italian Armistice has to some extent broken and there has been a small traffic from TRIESTE and FIUME down the Dalmatian coast. Unlike the Italian traffic this has consisted entirely of M/Vs most of which have been proceeding to ZARA. A very limited amount of shipping has proceeded to SIBENIK and SPLIT, but since 23 Oct nothing is known to have arrived at the latter port, probably because the Partisan control of the islands adjoining SPLIT is making the use of the port a hazardous proceeding. On the other hand, the garrisons supplies may be running low owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the land L of C. To overcome this dilemma it is possible that the Germans will either attempt to run the gauntlet of the hostile islands and put in at SPLIT, or alternatively put in at the neighbouring port of SIBENIK and try to get supplies through to SPLIT by land.

5. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE

S.S. PRINZ EUGEN DIV

A source, considered reliable, has provided the following information about the above division.

The S.S. Prinz Eugen was formed in SERBIA at the end of 1942 on the basis of a Mountain division. German circles disclosed that it was a new type of division still in the experimental stages, and that its establishment allows it to be used in any theatre of war. The personnel was recruited in SERBIA. There is also a sprinkling of German other ranks in addition to all officers and NCO's who are sworn Nazis. The total strength of the division is said to be 24,000 of two brigades each of four battalions. The strength of a battalion is 1500 all ranks, some infantry are lorry borne. Great attention has been given to the artillery which is pack, horse-drawn and motorised and equipped with the latest guns. The guns are of all calibres including a high proportion of 88 m/m. The division also has a tank battalion equipped with not more than 30 light HOTCHKISS tanks which are in very poor condition. It is not known if these will in the near future be replaced. The transport is very new.

" The G.O.C. is Gen FLESS. He is an Austrian from INNSBRUCK who, in the last war, was a Colonel in the KAISERJAGER Regiment - age 65/70.

T.S. AIREY,
B.G.S. (I).

GSI(a)
4 Nov 43
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OF 10 NOV 43

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1. ITALY SITUATION

We are now in contact with the line on which the enemy intends to stand along almost its whole length. In the north 8th Army has reached the SANGRO along its upper course and it can scarcely be long before we clear out the mountainous area on its upper reaches and appear before CASTEL DI SANGRO and ALFEDENA. On 5th Army front we appear to have actually broken in to at least the forward areas of the winter line to judge by the violence of the enemy counter-attacks.

It now seems likely that the MIGNANO Defile, or rather the hills overlooking it, were intended to form the forward line of the enemy winter positions and the main position lies further back, in the CASSINO area, based perhaps on the line of the FIUME RAPIDO. This is to be deduced from the fact that we met no "battle outposts" or "advanced positions" on our advance to MIGNANO and we have been able to capture both the village of MIGNANO itself and the high ground West and North West of it. It is true that we met with stubborn opposition both here and in the mountains above VENAFRO and the enemy continues to counter-attack with great violence; furthermore as will be seen he has again reinforced his line in the VENAFRO sector. On the other hand a recent prisoner has stated that the present front line is the BERNHARDT position and behind it is another called the VIKTOR line, presumably in the CASSINO area. The probable conclusion is, therefore, that the enemy intended to hold the present line until the line behind was completed, that he was hustled back on to it sooner than he expected and that he is now counter-attacking in order to give time for the completion of the VIKTOR position.

In the meantime the regrouping to which reference was made last week is continuing on both fronts. On 76 Corps front 29 P.G. Div has apparently been at least withdrawn; a prisoner from 71 P.G.R. on 7 Nov confirmed that 15 P.G.R. left some time ago and his own unit was then withdrawing. The Division was to concentrate in reserve somewhere in the rear of the front: the prisoner spoke vaguely of the ROME area. 26 Armd Div has been transferred to 14 Corps front; on 7 Nov

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we had RHQ of 93 Arty Regt moving to CASALATTICO (G.7735) with II Bty at VILLA LATINA (G.8634). On 7 Nov, 9 P.G.R. was identified in the line in the area North of VENAFRO where its 2nd Coy in one attempt to infiltrate lost 56 killed and 21 PWs. The Regt made two further counter-attacks on the morning of 8 Nov and was again thrown back with very heavy losses. In the meantime Div H.Q. had moved to just North of ACQUAFONDATA (G.9627). 76 Div is left therefore with 1 Para and 65 Inf Divs in the SANGRO line and 16 Pz Div, which has just withdrawn through 65 Div. It is possible that 16 Pz Div, for all its need of a refit, may remain in Corps reserve, probably on the Adriatic flank. This is a very weak force with which to hold so long a front, and 65 Div does not appear to be a very powerful formation. Eighth Army's appreciations of its latest adversary is: "Over twelve months preparation has sent this division into battle with equipment pitifully out-moded to-day: its latest machine gun is the 34, its heaviest mortar (at least in 145 Regt) the 5 cm and its anti-tank gun apparently the 3.7 cm, abandoned in AFRICA in October 41. And three deserters in one day is a measure of the small determination behind those arms". It should be added that the division has only two infantry regts and one of these, 145 I.R., appears to be holding a front of about 10 miles.

1 Para Div, seriously under strength as it is, has to hold a front of 25 miles though it must be admitted that a great deal of this consists of precipitous mountain slopes. It is possible that the division may be going to get some assistance, particularly in artillery, of which it must be short, as an escaped Canadian officer recently saw "a considerable number" of pack mountain batteries in the areas of SAN DONATO (G.0545), LA [illegible] (G.9543) and ALVEDENA. Some of these, of course, might belong to 305 Div, the parachutists right hand neighbour. 1 Para has also under command I Bty 93 Arty Regt (possibly only temporarily) and a Recce Bn, possibly 26 Recce Unit.

On 76 Corps front 94 Inf Div has come into the line on the coastal flank. Its arrival was heralded by two deserters who we hope will represent the general morale of the division; they state that there are two regiments in line, 274 on the coast and 276 further North, as far as about G.9014. The division has had a delayed and interrupted journey from the GAETA area, owing to destruction of railways by air attacks. 15 PG Div remains in the line, for all its former hope of relief, as the next division North; its boundary with 3 PG Div, as shown on a captured map, runs from between MICHELE and GALLUCCIO through AQUINO (G.2522). 3 PG Div has been rather unsuccessful of late and PWs speak of low morale in the division; the critical situation has not allowed of its being relieved and it is now holding the exits from the MICHELE defile. H.G. Div does, however, appear to have gone out; we have had no contact with it since reaching the present position and further elements of the division are reported as arriving in the SEZZE area. 26 PZ Div, which has now come into the line North of 3 Div from 76 Corps front has already been dealt with; it was certainly the best division

.....in 76 Corps.....


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


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
APPENDIX D TO G.S.I. 15 ARMY Gp. INT. SUMMARY
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
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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.25

OF 17 NOV 43.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Operations this week have been mainly centred on 14 Corps front and have taken the form of fierce struggles for mountain positions. On the whole the enemy's front still holds, though he has lost many of his forward positions, such as MONTE ROTONDO and the high saddle East of S. PIETRO INFINE and regained others such as MONTE CAMINO. For the moment weather and the necessity for re-grouping imposes a pause.

The enemy thought that when he got back to the winter line he would be able to hold it with reduced forces and re-group his mobile divisions in their shelter to form a reserve striking force. Instead he has been involved in very stiff fighting and has had to throw back into the line formations which he had hoped to refit. Last week on 7 Nov, 26 Armoured division had to be rushed across from 76 Corps front to stem the breach which was developing North and West of VENAFRO; this week the danger point has shifted back to the MIGNANO Defile and the S. PIETRO pass where our capture of the high ground from H.0014 to H.0017 threatened yet another breach in the line. As a result 29 P.G. Div has been brought back and 15 P.G.R. came up from CASSINO on the night of 12 Nov to go into action above SAN PIETRO. These counter-attacks failed and we still hold the high ground. Further South II Bn 104 P.G.R. came up from 15 P.G. Div to stiffen the line facing MONTE ROTONDO and there is now some indication that III Bn of the same Regt may also be operating on 3 P.G. Div front. All this shows that the High Command have no great opinion of 3 P.G. Div which has now had to be bolstered up by two other divisions and a battalion of a third. Nor do we think much of 3 P.G. Division; although it is the freshest of all the motorised divisions, having first come into action on the VOLTURNO, it has so far distinguished itself only by the particularly brutal massacre of civilians at CAIAZZO. And now it looks as though it is to be relieved, though out of its turn, since 103 Recce Unit has a date for the relief - not before the 18th or 19th at the earliest. Presumably the division is to be relieved by 29 P.G. though the latter must have had only a very short time for refit as it only went out of the line on 76 Corps front some time about 7 Nov.

On 76 Corps front things have been much quieter. It looks as though 16 Pz Div is to remain in the line, possibly split up into battle groups to support 65 Inf Div. At any rate 79 P.G.R. is apparently going to remain on the latter's right, being in the CASOLI area where it can also watch the boundary between it and 1 Para Div. The Germans are always sensitive about boundaries, both ours in attack, when they like to make them their objective, and their own in defence, and it may be that the main body of the division will be with 79 P.G.R. There is probably, however, some sort of a battle group, based on 64 P.G.R., to assist on the left flank of 65 Div and to watch

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the coast in its rear.

The position is clearer in the rest of ITALY. It looks as though we are going to have a unified command if we can believe frequent reports from sources described as good by the Italians that KESSELRING has taken over the command of all troops in ITALY. ROMMEL, according to the same report, has been restricted to the BALKANS. In LIGURIA we have again three divisions, 334, 356 and 371, to replace 76, 94 and 305 and presumably they also come under 87 Corps H.Q. 157 Reserve division is still believed to be in the North and 90 P.G. Div in the North East, TREVISO area. There is also one unidentified division recently arrived and the DOEHLA Mountain Brigade, probably still looking after the BRENNER. 44, 71, 88 (still rather doubtful) and 162 Divs are operating in JUGOSLAVIA. The members of the divisions alone tell the story; ITALY is no longer receiving first class infantry divisions, it gets low category divisions which need reforming, for it is doubtful if 334 division, for instance, is yet back to even the moderate form it showed in TUNISIA. North ITALY is in fact replacing FRANCE to some degree as the convalescent depot for shattered formations.

2. ENEMY SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS

Despite the fact that the enemy has obviously suffered serious inconveniences owing to the blocking of the two East coast lines and the two main West coast lines, from LEGHORN and FLORENCE to ROME; it is not considered that this will have reduced the daily tonnage of supplies brought South for the supply and maintenance of 10 Army. The lines still open and the use of coastal traffic which has increased somewhat during the last two weeks are capable of providing a sufficient daily tonnage. Indeed worked to their capacity the railways alone should be sufficient. Nevertheless it seems probable that the enemy has reserved the PERUGIA-TERNI line for supply of formations in the centre and on the left of his line; whilst formations on the West coast and South of ROME were being supplied by coastal traffic from LEGHORN to CIVITAVECCHIA and thence by rail to FROSINONE and AVEZZANO. Recent raids on CIVITAVECCHIA will doubtless have hampered this system. The alternative is to unload lighters further North at PIOMBINO or SAN STEFANO or make use of the AREZZO-TERNI loop line to bring the trains South to ROME. The former will clearly not be very acceptable, as the main West coast line is still blocked South of PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO, consequently supplies will have to be moved South by road, which is clearly uneconomical. Nevertheless some slight increase of lighter traffic to these ports may be expected. The alternative would seem preferable, and, unless there are difficulties unknown to us, there seems no reason why the PERUGIA-TERNI line should not be able to handle sufficient traffic for the whole daily supply and maintenance of 10th Army, helped out if necessary by some M.T. lift; especially since recent operations have undoubtedly reduced daily supply and maintenance to a minimum. Furthermore it is unlikely that air attacks will entirely prevent the enemy using CIVITAVECCHIA for lighter traffic. It is possible however that should the tempo or scope of operations increase considerably over a protracted period the enemy might find himself in some supply difficulties with communications in their present state.

The building up of reserves should not be unduly impeded by the present rail situation, as most of the C in C South depots are North of the present rail interruptions. The railways would have to be effectively blocked further North to achieve this. Judging by our

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experiences in AFRICA where the enemy's supply situation was always from hand to mouth and must have been a perpetual Q.M's nightmare, it would be most dangerous to assume that his withdrawal Northwards will be hastened by supply difficulties.

Railways

General

The three main lines South from BOLOGNA are still cut, although repairs are everywhere now in progress. Traffic is thus necessarily on a restricted scale, and the main activity centres on the by-pass line via PERUGIA and TERNI, through which traffic both from the FLORENCE-ROME and the E.Coast lines is being diverted. In N. ITALY all junctions are believed open and traffic is everywhere brisk. In the areas nearer to the front, recent photographic cover is too scanty to permit of any satisfactory conclusions. The only up to date cover is of AVEZZANO where traffic is on a very reduced scale. However, as pointed out in the last Summary, it is probable that the Germans are in fact using their railways for supply purposes right up to the front.

Details

(a) PISA-ROME LINE

This is still cut at MONTALTO and North of ALBINIA. North of these breaks traffic is on a negligible scale and there is little activity at either PISA or GROSETTO. The damage caused in an earlier attack on GROSETTO has now been repaired and both tracks are probably open. South of the breaks there has been moderate rail traffic between CIVITAVECCHIA and ROME, mainly engaged in the removal of stores from CIVITAVECCHIA harbour.

(b) FLORENCE-ROME LINE

This is still cut North of ORVIETO and CHIUSI. Traffic is however by-passing the break by going down the loop-line through PERUGIA and TERNI, rejoining the main line again at ORTE. All lines are open on the by-pass although traffic does not seem to be very heavy.

(c) E. COAST LINE

This is still blocked at three points South of ANCONA and there is probably only a very restricted local traffic in this region. Traffic coming down from PADUA and BOLOGNA to ANCONA is being diverted from a point just North of ANCONA on to the same loop-line down to TERNI thence South to AQUILA and SULMONA.

(d) NORTHERN JUNCTIONS

Photographic cover of these has been scanty recently but what there is reveals that traffic is on a moderate to heavy scale with marshalling yards fairly heavily laden. Typical loads are:

PADUA	11 Nov	1500 waggons
PIACENZA	10 Nov	520 "
MESTRE	7 Nov	600 "

A recent report on BRENNER traffic states that since the re-opening of BOLZANO on 11 Oct, about 16 trains a day have been running in each direction. The BRENNER working at normal capacity can carry 72 trains each way daily and even before the Italian Armistice was operating 60 trains

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daily in both directions. Even though at the present time it is operating at less than 20% of capacity, this however, when taken in connection with intake by other routes is more than sufficient to meet the present needs of the Germans.

Shipping

Nowhere is there any appreciable change to record. On the West Coast the usual procession of lighters and LC is finding its way to CIVITAVECCHIA, but it is possible that the recent air attacks on the port will make the enemy chary of using it on the heaviest scale of the past few weeks. We may now find shipping putting into other small harbours further up the N coast such as PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO. On the East Italian Coast activity is at a complete standstill and there is no evidence of any arrivals at harbours on this coast. The DALMATIAN coast also shows only restricted activity with a slight turnover at ZARA. There are still no signs of any attempts to run shipping into SPLIT, although as the Germans regain control of the neighbouring islands it is to be expected that shipping activity to the port will once more be resumed.

T.S.AIREY,
B.G.S.(I).

GSI(a)
17 Nov 43
/EGM

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OF 1 DEC, 43.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Until the night of 27 Nov when 8 Army's attack on the Northern flank began, the German winter line has not been seriously threatened in the last fortnight but they have not been able to reap much advantage from this quiet period. Some reliefs have taken place but they have scarcely strengthened the position. First to go was 3 P.G. Div from 14 Corps front, relieved by the half-rested 29 P.G. Div. Next 16 Pz Division was gradually withdrawn from 76 Corps front, a battalion at a time; prisoners from its last remaining units had heard that the division was to leave the country and the spectre of another winter on the Eastern front was having its effect on morale. However 76 Corps could not be left with only 1 Para and 65 Inf Divs and so 26 Pz Div, which had been rushed across to 14 Corps to meet the danger of a break-through at MIGNANO, was sent back again to the Eastern flank to come in between the other two divisions. At least we know that 9 P.G.R. and apparently all the divisional artillery have moved across and Div H.Q. was moving from ATINA on 29 Nov, presumably to take command. Finally, on 28 Nov, we have a prisoner who stated that 44 Inf Div (Hoch und Deutschmeister) has arrived on 14 Corps front and apparently is coming in between 29 P.G. and 305 Inf Divs, where II Bn 131 Inf Regt has already been identified in the area H.0226. This division has up to the present been engaged in operations against the Partisans in SLOVENIA. It has begun its tour of duty in the line by yielding some ground in the area N.W. of VENAFRO, probably however voluntarily as we are now meeting stiffer resistance there.

The result of all these changes is that there is now only one armoured division in the line, 26 Pz, and it is not yet known whether that has brought its tanks with it. The enemy has apparently decided that armoured formations have no role to play here, though we met a few tanks at MOZZAGROGNA - not more than half a dozen as far as is known.

It is too early as yet to assess the course of operations but it appears that on the Adriatic coast we have broken right into the enemy winter line by the capture of MOZZAGROGNA, SANTA MARIA and FOSSACESIA. This was the most developed part of the enemy defences on 76 Corps front and a break-through here would have serious consequences for the defence of the rest of the line. The total strength of divisions in the line has remained the same as the arrival of 44 Div has balanced the withdrawal of 16 Pz but the question of reserves is obviously difficult. The fact that 26 Pz Div has had to shuttle to and fro between the two Corps shows the uneasy situation; 3 P.G. and Hermann Goering Divs are indeed available in a crisis but the former has only just been pulled out after a very unsatisfactory showing and may possibly be needed elsewhere. Hermann Goering remains the last really disposable reserve and so long as the main thrust to ROME remains on the West Coast it is not likely to be moved. Some form of "long-stop" is clearly required on the East Coast and it would be reasonable to expect the enemy to bring down one, or part of one, of the divisions of his fast

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depleting reserve in North ITALY for this purpose. The identification of 361 Inf Regt of 90 P.G. Div in the area North of SANTA MARIA appears to show that North - Eastern ITALY is being drawn on; it remains to be seen whether it will be followed by the rest of the division.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.

ITALY

The weather has fought well and consistently for the enemy; and has considerably softened the blows which we have been able to direct against his communications; the number of attacks which have actually got home being considerably less than those planned and baulked by bad weather. For the same reasons it has been impossible in many cases to obtain information as to the results of attacks carried out. The enemy's supply situation would not appear to have undergone any marked change; and it must be assumed that, aided by the weather, the general state of communications is not worse than it has generally been during recent months.

All the routes into Northern ITALY are reported to be consistently busy. Traffic from the East still appears to be confined mainly to troops; while the BRENNER and LARVIS routes are confined to supplies. Coal traffic appears to have revived as by early November 15 - 16 coal trains a day were reported arriving from GERMANY via SWITZERLAND. This is surprisingly high since it represents a tonnage nearly equal to the daily average pre-war lift. The reason for this is not clear for although there are German military requirements to be met, Italian civilian and industrial requirements will have fallen considerably. GERMANY will not provide coal for Italian homes, but only for essential railway needs and for industries working for German account. However this sudden increase of coal traffic may in part be accounted for by the fact that there had been a long period of almost complete cessation of this traffic to ITALY.

That GERMANY'S present mood is one of ruthless exploitation of her satellites and allies alike cannot be in doubt. Already in Central ITALY the Germans appear to be removing all military and industrial equipment and plant. This process will presumably be extended further Northwards as the battle nears the PO Valley. Removals from Northern ITALY may even now be in process. Reports suggest that in many cases skilled workers accompany the plant they operate. From Central ITALY removals are even reported to include 50 Trolley buses which were supposed to be destined for WARSAW.

Railways.

Recent attacks have again been concentrated on the three main railways into Central ITALY. The line RIMINI - ANCONA was attacked at FANO-SENIGALLIA and FALCONARA. Hits were claimed on the bridges but detailed results are unknown. The marshalling yards at RIMINI were also twice attacked but results are not believed to have been good. On the West the railways bridge over the ORICOME river was twice attacked, also the marshalling yards at GROSSETO, and bridges at ALBINIA. The latter attack is reported to have been very successful. Attacks planned against the FLORENCE - ROME line were baulked by weather. As a result of these attacks the main East-West Coast lines are probably cut but the main central FLORENCE - ROME line still working.

Shipping

CIVITAVECCHIA has been rather severely damaged by air raids. However, this port continues to be used and supplies are undoubtedly being moved South from the main West coast railway line to PISA, which probably

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remains cut North of CIVITAVECCHIA. Apparently no effort has been made to relieve the situation at CIVITAVECCHIA by using the more Southerly harbours of NETTUNO and ANZIO. Shipping continues to move South from GENOA, SPEZIA and LEGHORN via PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO.

On the Italian East coast PR does not indicate any appreciable amount of active shipping at ANCONA and harbours to the South. However, small vessels are probably continuing to put in at these ports.

On the Dalmatian coast bombing attacks were made on SIBENIK on 27 and 28 Nov and on 28 Nov ZARA and DUBROVNIK were hit. These raids have damaged harbour installations. A merchant vessel was probably sunk at SIBENIK and other shipping damaged. Most of the Dalmatian shipping apparently centres around ZARA and SIBENIK and to a lesser degree, SPLIT. South of SPLIT at DUBROVNIK, DURAZZO and VALONA there is little shipping activity.

T.S. AIREY,
Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

GSI(a)
1 Dec 43

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 27

OF 14 DEC, 43

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has been very little change in the enemy's dispositions to meet our attack as it has developed. This is reasonable enough since he was already at full stretch. The rest of 90 P.G Division followed 361 down the East coast to meet 8th Army's attacks and it has shown the stubbornness in defence of its more famous African namesake. On 5th Army's front a battle group of Hermann Goering division has been put into the line in the 15 P.G. sector, but too late to prevent the loss of the dominating feature of MONTE CAMINO. So far only four battalions of 44 Div have been identified in the line, I and II of 131 Regt and II and III of 134 Regt. To judge by the other infantry divisions in 10 Army the division should have either two three-Bn or three two-Bn Regts; prisoners from the other two seem to confirm the presence of 132 Regt but it has not yet been definitely identified and it may never appear. The only other reinforcements which have arrived are two independent mountain battalions which are operating on the Eastern slopes of the MAIELLA range, 3 and 4 Hochgebirgsjaeger Battalions. They appear to have been formed from I Bn 98 Mtn Regt of 1 Mtn Div which was withdrawn from GREECE in October and expanded into two bns in AUSTRIA with the aid of drafts from local depots.

We have therefore in the line at the moment ten divisions and two independent battalions. Of the divisions 65 Inf has had heavy losses, including over one thousand prisoners, and was at one time entirely withdrawn from the line, though when our pressure continued strong it had to be put back in again on the right of 26 Pz Div. 15 P.G. Div has also had serious losses in the fiercely fought engagements which ended in its being driven from MONTE CAMINO back across the GARIGLIANO. In 14 Corps reserve is part of Hermann Goering less a battle group of at least two Inf bns and some artillery which has already been committed; Div H.Q. and the Engr Bn who fought so well in SICILY are still believed to be in the area FONDI - ITRI. In the ROME area is XI Fliegerkorps which has some parachutists and 3 P.G. Div. The latter may possibly be moving to the area North of ROME and may have to do some coast watching though the normal penalty for failure to hold the line in ITALY, so 44 Div were told, is immediate despatch to the Russian front. A horrible threat, they thought this, and most unfair.

Another piece of information on the organisation of command in ITALY has come in from a captured document; 90 P.G. Div, when it was still in North ITALY in the VENICE area, was under command of 14 Army. Presumably this has replaced Rommel's Army Group B (Rommel himself has been reported by the German wireless in DENMARK) and Kesselring, as supreme Wehrmacht Commander in ITALY, has on the Army

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side two Armies, 10 and 14. XI Fliegerkorps may come under him direct or it may be under 10 Army.

14 Army has rather a scratch lot of divisions. (It is rather a scratch formation itself; formed in 1939 on mobilisation, it was disbanded after the Polish campaign and has not been heard of since). Its best formations are, as might be expected, in North Eastern ITALY and ISTRIA where are 71, 162 and possibly 88 Inf Divs. (371 division, which was previously believed to be in that area, is now reported from a reliable source to be operating in CROATIA and taking part in the offensive on BIHAC). 188 Reserve Mtn Div has been reported at BELLUNO (North of TREVISO) but its sister Mountain Reserve Div, 157, is now believed either never to have entered ITALY or to have subsequently left since it is now definitely identified over the French border in the area of ANNECY - AIX LES BAINS. For the rest there are 334 and 356 Divs on the West coast, 22 G.A.F. Div, lately in BELGIUM, now identified in the BRESCIA area, and an unidentified division believed to be forming in the RIMINI area. This makes seven divisions all told and there are also two brigades, DOEHLA on the BRENNER and Reichfuehrer SS if it is under command and if it has not yet expanded to a division. Even these figures may be too high as we are not sure about the boundary in the North between the commands of Kesselring and von Weichs.

If the N.E. divisions are not to be touched, and there is no evidence that the situation in that vital area has appreciably improved, there does not look much chance of 14 Army being able to provide any useful reinforcements for 10 Army. But the latter is fully stretched and weakened by recent losses, and if Kesselring's influence with the Nazi leaders was strong enough to give him victory over Rommel in the competition for the Italian Command, it should be strong enough to bring him some acquisition of strength even in the present difficult state of affairs on the Russian front. It would be reasonable therefore to expect that he should receive some help in the way of reinforcements which would also enable him to withdraw some of his mobile divisions from their present unsuitable employment in the Appenines. It is doubtful if, after his experience with 65 Division, he would be grateful for another new-formed infantry division. When the first Mountain Jaeger troops came in it looked as though 1 Mtn Div, to which they had belonged, was on its way here from JANNINA, but though it has certainly left GREECE it now appears that it merely threw off a detachment for ITALY and all we have so far are two independent bns. There have, however, been frequent reports of mountain troops arriving in ITALY which can probably not be connected with these two bns; for instance a report of the end of November, admittedly an unreliable one in many details, reports the H.Q. of a Mountain Division at PARMA. Whatever the facts about this may be it would be as well to expect some kind of reinforcement for 10 Army if they are to carry out their professed intention of holding South of ROME throughout the winter.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

The past 10 days have been marked by stepped up air raids against enemy ports and at least one highly successful night attack by surface ships on shipping along the Italian East coast.

CIVITAVECCHIA has continued active. In addition to the usual lighter and auxiliary sailing vessel traffic, a munition carrier and a small M/V had arrived by 1 Dec, the first sizeable ships to reach this port since a M/V was sunk there on 13 Nov. On 7 Dec the port was attacked by a large number of medium and fighter bombers

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in several raids. Results of these raids are thought to have been excellent. CIVITAVECCHIA was also bombed successfully though not so heavily, on 8 Dec, night 8/9 Dec and 10 Dec. It has also been subjected to night intruder raids. On 8 Dec SAN STEFANO was heavily attacked by heavy bombers, many hits and explosions being observed.

The enemy's reaction to these raids is not yet known. However, since the West coast railway is cut North of CIVITAVECCHIA, he must continue to move his shipping as far south as CIVITAVECCHIA if he is to make effective use of his sea route to get supplies to 10 Army. Whether or not he is able and willing to keep this route open despite damage to harbour installations and loss of shipping remains to be seen. If he loses CIVITAVECCHIA the enemy will be forced to use PIOMBINO 100 miles to the North or very possibly LEGHORN as unloading ports.

Between ANCONA and ports to the South, shipping is undoubtedly not as active as at CIVITAVECCHIA. However it would appear to be considerably greater than indicated by photographic reconnaissance. On the night of 2/3 Dec destroyers operating between ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO bagged 5 auxiliary sailing vessels; these two ports were also bombarded the same night.

On the Dalmatian coast ZARA and SIBENIK are thought to remain the most active ports. There has also been a considerable increase in the number of small craft in the SPLIT area. Their presence here, however, was probably connected with preparations for an attack on the SPLIT Islands, which the enemy has been expected to launch for some time. SIBENIK was raided on 3 Dec with good results, and a number of small craft has been sunk or damaged in the SPLIT area by air attack. South of SPLIT at DUBROVNIK, KOTOR and DURAZZO there is still very little active shipping.

RAILWAYS

General

Since the last summary bad weather has restricted attacks on railway targets. Raids have however been carried out on all the main lines and several interruptions to traffic have been effected. It has also been possible to make some assessment of earlier attacks on the main supply routes. North of the area PISA-RIMINI all routes are believed to be open, but traffic has not been on a very large scale.

Details

(a) W. Coast Line. This may still be blocked N of CIVITAVECCHIA at ALBINIA where in an attack on the railway bridge on Dec 1 three direct hits were scored. Heavy attacks have also been made on CIVITAVECCHIA and on the CECINA and VADO river bridges South of LEGHORN, but it has not been possible to determine the results. The most active railway station on the line South of LEGHORN appears to be PIOMBINO. A possible explanation of this is that the Germans are loading some small craft at this harbour rather than at LEGHORN prior to sending them down to CIVITAVECCHIA.

(b) FLORENCE-ROME Line. Several attacks have been made on this line, but again weather has precluded satisfactory assessment of results. A heavy attack on AREZZO on 2 Dec is believed to have been very successful and probably interrupted through traffic for some time. ORTE, PONTASSIEVE and the bridge at ORBETELLO have also been raided, but it is probable that the line

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is now once more open throughout.

The by-pass line through PERUGIA and TERNI was attacked at TERNI on 9 Dec. Further raids on TERNI have had to be cancelled owing to the bad weather in this area.

(c) E. Coast Line. All lines were blocked at RIMINI in a highly successful attack on 27 Nov and were still shut on 1 Dec. The East coast line is almost certainly still closed at GIULIANOVA as a result of a very heavy attack by medium bombers on 9 Dec which succeeded in scoring direct hits on the rail and road bridges.

Northern Junctions MILAN alone shows any great activity at the present time. PR of GENOA has revealed only a small turn-over of traffic while at BOLOGNA through working is still restricted by the extensive damage in the station and marshalling yard area..

On the BRENNER route it is reported that traffic continues at a regular rate of some 16-20 trains per day each way. This represents about 25% only of the normal BRENNER peace time working capacity. Nevertheless if even this low rate can be maintained the BRENNER route alone should be adequate to meet the daily requirements of the German forces in ITALY. At the same time coal traffic through SWITZERLAND is being developed. It is reported that the Swiss have now agreed to let 16 coal trains a day pass through from GERMANY to ITALY, and the brisk traffic at MILAN suggests that some traffic is now coming through from CHIASSO. Northbound traffic via CHIASSO is still on a comparatively small scale, and is probably engaged on the removal of captured war material from ITALY.

3. BALKANS

(a) GREECE

During the first days of Dec, German motorised columns from KHARDITSA operating some 30 Kms to the West captured and burned a number of mountain villages. Garrison duties in KHARDITSA have been taken over by troops of Ralli's Quisling government. EDES is reported to be in control of the region JANNINA - METSOVO which was until its departure the responsibility of 1 Mtn Div based on JANNINA. It is not clear from this report if the towns are in EDES hands, but this is unlikely.

(b) YUGOSLAVIA

Partisans under Major Apostolski are reported to be in control between the towns of SKOPLJE, TETOVO, DEBAR and PRILEP. The town of KICEVO was captured by this force on 2 Dec.

The Germans have made determined efforts to secure their line of communications between MONTENEGRO and Southern SERBIA. German forces from SJENICA at the end of November attacked and occupied the town of PRIJEPOLJE and later captured PLJEVLJA. The possession of PLJEVLJA will considerably facilitate movement from NOVI PAZAR - SJENICA to NIKSIC KOTAR and North South movement to and from ALBANIA. At the same time reports of troop movements from MOSTAR to the East have been received. Elements of Prinz Eugen Mtn Div were reported to be concentrating at NEVESINJE 20 Kms to the East of MOSTAR preparatory to a drive on GACKO with the intention of clearing the GACKO - DUBROVNIK road. In fact the Germans are

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driving into Eastern BOSNIA from both East and West.

On 5 Dec the Germans launched an attack from SINJ and IMOTSKI in the direction of LIVNO on the road which runs NE from SPLIT to join the main BANJA-LUKA SARAJEVO road at D. VAKUF. It is not clear which troops are taking part in these operations; the most likely would appear to be elements of 118 Lt.Div with H.Q. in IMOTSKI and 264 Inf Div based on DRNIS with a Regt in SINJ. It is worth recalling that at the end of November a similar operation was undertaken by a Battle Group consisting of 1 Bn 892 P.G. Regt less one coy (264 Inf Div), 11 Coy 741 Inf Regt, 114 Lt Div H.Q. KNIN, 1 Tp Lt. Inf Guns and 6 Tp 264 Arty Regt. The operation was under command 892 P.G. Regt and started from SINJ to which the Germans returned at the conclusion of operations. The present drive seems to be on a larger scale and the Germans have met with some success. LIVNO was captured on 6 Dec and occupied by 1000 men with 10 tanks. On the same day a similar force captured TOMISLAVGRAD. The Partisans were then massing for a counter attack, but further details are lacking.

To the North Partisans captured the town of CAZM. after a fierce battle lasting 36 hours, much booty was taken and heavy casualties inflicted on the mixed German and USTACHI garrison. A three day battle is reported to have taken place between Partisans and elements of the SS Nordland Div between the towns of GLINA and PETRINJA during which the Germans were driven back towards SISAK. A bridge over the river was damaged by the Partisans.

A new German offensive from KARLOVAC and OGULIN in the direction of BIHAC is reported; details are lacking but it can be presumed that troops taking part belong to 901 P.G. Regt, an independent Regt which is reported to have some French tanks.

(c) DALMATIAN ISLANDS

The situation on the Islands has undergone considerable improvement in the last few days. The long awaited attack on BRAC, KORCULA and MLJET has not materialised, presumably because the forces earmarked for these operations, SS Mtn Div Prinz Eugen, 118 Lt Div and 264 Inf Div have had their hands full on the mainland. The Partisans continue to land troops on the coast to test the enemy strength and to harrass the already overworked German garrisons. Landings by Partisans are reported between BIOGRAD and VODICE (North of SIBENIK) and near TROGIR. Other parties landed on the island of ZUT and KORNAT.

KRK and CHERSO are reported to be lightly held by the Germans. Reports of the German evacuation of KRK do not appear to be founded on fact; what may well have happened is that the original assault force has returned to the mainland leaving a garrison force behind. RAB, PAG and the smaller islands of OLIB, SILBA, IST and probably MOLAT are in Partisan hands together with the coastal strip NOVI to the south of GRIKVENICA to inclusive JABLANAC. ULJAN and PASMAN off ZARA are likewise reported to be occupied by the Partisans while an unconfirmed report states that the outer islands of DUGI, RAV. and IZ have been brought under Partisan control. Reports that ZARA has been evacuated by the German garrison can be discounted.

The SIBENIK Group presents a rather more confused picture; it is believed that with the possible exception of ZIRJE they remain in enemy hands. DRVENIK - CIOVO and the smaller islands near SPLIT have been captured by the Germans thus ensuring the sea passage to SPLIT.

.....SOLTA, BRAC,.....

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SOLTA, BRAC, HVAR, KORCULA, VIS and MLJET remain in Partisan hands though the latter two are only lightly held. Partisan H.Q. appreciate that an attack will be launched on BRAC or KORCULA and possibly both in the near future. The respite offered by the German preoccupation elsewhere has been used by the Partisans to put their defences on a sounder footing. The PELJESAC peninsula together with the islands of SIPAN LOKUO and KOLECEP to the North of DUBROVNIK are occupied by German forces.

(d) COMMUNICATIONS

The railway between KNIN and BIHAC has been abandoned by theGermans owing to repeated sabotage by the Partisans. This is a single line railway of slight importance as a good road runs almost parallel to it for the entire length. The line FIUME-KARLOVAC-SISAK has been damaged in a number of places but is still being used by the Germans. Attacks by Partisans on the LJUBLJANA ZAGREB line and in particular at ZIDANI MOST have caused much delay in traffic; details are lacking. Other raids were made on NOVO MESTO and KOCEVJE, now held by the USTACHI.

(e) GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE

V SS CORPS has now been identified with H.Q. at MOSTAR. This Corps presumably controls 181 Inf Div at DUBROVNIK, SS Mtn Prinz Eugen at MOSTAR and 118 Jaeger Div at LIVNO.

XV MTN CORPS

Has moved from BANJA LUKA and was variously reported to be going to SIBENIK and BIHAC. The latter would appear to be more suitable and latest reports point to this being its new H.Q. 371 Inf Div has been identified in operations in CROATIA between KARLOVAC and BIHAC.

A recent arrival is 901 P.G. Regt,believed to be an independent Regt and to have a number of French tanks,based on KARLOVAC.

1 Mtn Div which was based on JANINA has moved out of GREECE, its present location is unknown.

4. APPENDICES

At Appendix 'A' is a translation of captured German documents on the behaviour and treatment of prisoners of war. At Appendix 'B' is a translation of a captured document entitled "Combat Experience with British and American troops".

T.S. AIREY,
Brigadier,
B.G.S. (I).

GSI (a)
H.Q. 15 Army Group,
14 December 43

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APPENDIX "A"
to 15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No. 27 dated 14 Dec 43

BEHAVIOUR OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Two recently captured German documents pay tribute to the reticence of British and American Prisoners of War under interrogation and give proof of the value and effectiveness of thorough and regular instruction in the proper behaviour to be adopted by any soldier in the event of capture.

The second document underlines the value to the interrogator of all documents, including personal papers, and the importance therefore of destroying them at the earliest possible moment.

-o-O-o-

1. Extract from Special Order signed by Major General ZIEHLBERG, G.O.C. 65 Inf Div:-

"I have myself witnessed the interrogation of British soldiers who have received excellent training in security. Although threatened with the death penalty, they gave nothing away under interrogation. To all questions they replied simply, "My orders are to give only my name, rank and number", adding, "A German soldier in my position would not answer these questions either."

Thorough training must be given to our own soldiers in order to ensure the same attitude on their part."

2. 15 Pz Gren Div. Div HQ, 13.11.43

Subject: Handling of Prisoners of War

In the last few days there have been numerous cases of prisoners taken by forward troops being delivered to the PW collecting point minus all documents and personal belongings. According to the statements of the prisoners all these things - including paybooks were taken from them by troops immediately after their capture.

Apart from the fact that plundering of prisoners is unworthy of a German soldier, such conduct increases considerably the difficulties of interrogation and with it the procuring of important data for our own commanders and troops.

In consequence of the great reticence of British and American soldiers in their speech, the articles and papers which the prisoner has upon his person often provide the only opportunity for the interrogator to open up a conversation with the prisoner. Moreover a prisoner, who has had all his belongings taken from him, is as a rule obstinate, annoyed and still less disposed to talk than he would otherwise be. Further, almost all letters and papers provide details about a prisoner's unit, and are during interrogation an effective means of verifying and, where necessary, rectifying a prisoner's statements.

Troops will, therefore, be definitely instructed, that under no circumstances are any articles and especially papers to be removed from prisoners.

It is requested furthermore that before prisoners are transferred to the PW collecting point, they should be given a label on which the place and time of capture are briefly indicated.

For Div. Comd.
Chief of Staff
HECKEL
Col. (General Staff) on
Staff of 15 Pz Gren Div.

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APPENDIX 'B'
to 15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY NO.27 dated 14 Dec 43

COMBAT EXPERIENCE WITH BRITISH AND AMERICAN TROOPS

Generally speaking, the British are superior to us in three respects :

(1) Air superiority

(2) Superiority in material

(3) Superiority in naval units

On the other hand the German soldier feels superior in combat and especially in the quality of his weapons.

PARTLY MOTORISED UNITS

Our opponent makes use of very strong artillery. The English and Americans waste no ammunition, but proceed methodically so that when a target is recognised, it is brought under fire until it is wiped out. They take on one target after another. Therefore: camouflage and yet more camouflage, never let anything give one away; there must be no relaxation of watchfulness by day or by night (relief of sentries to be carried out with care). There must be no movement, even when the positions are not under fire. The enemy works continually with arty spotting aircraft and employs phosphorous and smoke bombs. The former will set fire to surrounding buildings and objects. Therefore prepare and occupy alternative positions. The enemy makes full use of well trained snipers. Arty fire makes a lot of noise, but its effect is not horizontal but in an upward direction (area covered by fragmentation up to 300-m). Our opponent has very careful observers and makes much use of air recce. He makes much use of flare shells, which burst in the air, spread out like a three fingered crown, giving off smoke and fall on the target. Even when there is no firing care must be taken.

Obstacles must be covered by fire by day and night (i.e. minefields, barbed wire etc.,). Put alarm signals into effect, organise units in depth, carry out immediate counter attacks (these are especially effective). The Americans are more nervous and on the alert than the English. Overconfidence and carelessness in our own troops must be discouraged. The enemy uses every available means. He drives his troops to the limit, if in this manner he can save blood and material. Make secure even the most difficult country. Every man must have his weapons to hand. Our opponent even dresses up in civilian clothes and tries to make prisoner. The equipment of his patrols (10-50 men) is very strong and good (rubber soles, a practical uniform with 25 pockets, 2 pistols and a machine pistol, silk maps).

TANKS

Appearance of the Gen Sherman and the Gen Lee. Note: The Sherman has a rounded shape, about equivalent in fighting value to the Mk IV Long, a Rolls Royce engine with a good exhaust and has rubber grips, so that it can overcome steep slopes. The Gen Lee with several turrets is inferior to the Mk IV in combat value. The Tiger and Panther are superior to all American and English tanks.

.....Up till now.....

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Up till now there has been no evidence of a strategical large scale use of tanks. Employment is in groups of 6 - 10. They do not advance alone but generally behind lorried infantry. In combat they do not advance alone, but support the troops as arty.

Use of tanks to obtain a rapid breakthrough or mobile employment have not up to now been observed.

AIR

Employment on a large scale of twin-engined American machines. Attacks in several waves of 20 - 24 machines. Aiming is poor. Troops must be trained to engage aircraft. The English use a machine which is similar to the Fieseler-Storch. Armoured underneath, it does not like the 20 mm AA shell. Deceive the enemy as long as possible as to the main line of resistance, use the heavy weapons only at short range, especially when all weapons can fire (LMG, Mortars etc.,). Do as much damage as possible to Recce troops, so that the enemy loses valuable information and suffers heavy losses. Build shelters for protection against arty for all personnel. Fire comes down mostly on reverse slopes, but sharp declines are not secure as his howitzers can cover a large box area. The American soldier does not know why he is fighting in Europe. For him the chief enemy is JAPAN. He is taken prisoner easily, is very talkative, but absolutely uncommunicative on military matters. German Ps.W. should give only their F.P.Ns. rank and home address. They should throw away their pay-book, defend themselves with "hands and feet, toes and fists". The English broadcast in clear the disclosures of German prisoners over the radio to all units. Culpable capture is a crime and a dishonour and entails a court-martial and the death penalty at the end of the war.

The English wireless set is small, light and easily transportable over long distances. W/T range up to 15 Kms. The German D.Apparatus on the other hand is heavy, its range is only 4 Kms and it can be easily D/F'd. It suffers from disturbances from other transmitters. Remove the transmitter further to the rear and use line from there to the command post. Do not call for arty support for every task (economy of munitions), use the heavier weapons (M.M.Gs. Hy Mortars A/Tk Guns, Inf guns). Bring the A/Tk guns into position at night, fire rapidly and pull out again.

In spite of the enemy's temporary superiority on the sea and in the air, great results can be achieved by brave hearts and clear heads.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.28

OF 30 DEC 43

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

8 Army's advance along the Adriatic coast has continued to meet the most stubborn enemy resistance which reached a peak in the protracted and desperate defence of ORTONA. Reserves and reinforcements have been used unsparingly and often seemingly with recklessness in an attempt to block each successive break in this sector of the winter line. The counter-attacks of 90 P.G. Div have however proved a no less costly policy than the passive defence tactics followed by 65 Div and it in turn has had to withdraw its battered remnants behind a screen provided by 1 Para Div. The extent to which the enemy has been stretched is shown by the identifications of 3 Bn 6 Para Regt and elements of a Para Training Bn, snatched in haste from the ROME area to fill a gap NE of ORSOGNA. Even 65 Div has, pending the arrival of its relief, been called upon to take over a less active part of the line between ORSOGNA and GUARDIAGRELE. The enemy has shown much greater determination in defence in the past week than on any previous line, probably in the hope of wearing down our attack, preventing the conservation of a fresh mobile force capable of exploiting a break-through, and thus turning our attack into an expensive battle of attrition. Such a decision would have been dangerous had it not been backed by the assurance of the arrival of reinforcements. These have now arrived in the shape of 334 Inf Div, the first elements of which have been identified in the ORSOGNA area where according to prisoners they relieved elements of 65 Div about the 22 Dec. 334 has only recently completed its re-formation and we have as yet had no opportunity of testing its fighting efficiency. As an Inf Div however, it is unlikely to have received preferential treatment either in the matter of men or of equipment. According to its first prisoners, the division, apart from Regtl A.Tk Coys and the Recce Unit, is entirely horse-drawn.

After a period of some confusion 76 Corps Order of Battle is again assuming clearer lines. From the coast to approximately CANOSA we now have the bulk of 1 Para Div - only R.H.Q. and 3 Bn 4 Para Regt appear to remain in the ORSOGNA area; South of CANOSA to excl ORSOGNA is 26 Pz Div; South again from ORSOGNA to PENNAPIEDIMONTE is 65 Div, in process of relief by 334 Div, and with

.....3 and 4 Mtn Bns.....

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3 and 4 Mtn Bns covering the right flank down to the MAIELLA Massif. In reserve is 90 P.G. Div apparently engaged at the moment in preparing the enemy's next delaying position behind the FORO. Whether 334 has been surrendered by 14 Army in exchange for 65 Div or whether the latter will also remain as reserve for 76 Corps is not yet clear, but prisoners from 334 say they saw parts of 65 Div going North.

On 14 Corps front, apart from limited withdrawals after heavy fighting from the high ground North of MIGNANO, the enemy has continued to dig his toes in and to develop his defences behind the GARIGLIANO. Behind this stubborn defensive front reliefs have been in progress. Repeated reports of the movement of a mountain formation into Central ITALY have been substantiated by the appearance of 5 Mtn Div. Both of its Inf Regts - 85 and 100.- have now been identified in the line between the 34 and 26 Northings. From these locations it looks as though 5 Mtn is to take over the greater part of 44 Div's sector as well as part of 305's. 305 is thus left free to extend its front Northward to cover the RIVISONDOLI - SULMONA road after the transfer of 1 Para Div to the Adriatic coast, while 44 Div sidesteps South to relieve 29 P.G. Div. The move is a reasonable one, since it gives 5 Mtn Div a sector suitable to its character and makes possible the withdrawal of a further motorised division into mobile reserve. 14 Corps will therefore be left with five divisions and a regt group of Hermann GOERING in the line and one and a half divisions in reserve, unless 29 P.G. Div is to be taken away in exchange for 5 Mtn.

When its reshuffle is complete 10 Army will therefore have a total of eight and a half divisions in the line with two and a half in reserve, i.e. 90 P.G. on 76 Corps front and 29 P.G. plus half Hermann GOERING on 14 Corps front.

In reserve at longer notice is 3 P.G. Div, still in the area of ROME and believed, together with the elements of 2 Para Div which did not accompany the latter to RUSSIA and possibly drafts for the planned new Para Div, to be under command XI Fliegerkorps. There is some evidence that XI Fliegerkorps may also include at least elements of an L of C Division under its command. A recent Italian report mentions the arrival of low category reserve troops in the area CIVITA CASTELLANA and these may be connected with the reported departure of 23 trains of Slovak troops from BREST-LITOVSK with destination ITALY. Neither report however suggests that the new arrivals will be used on more active tasks than guard duties and internal security.

In Northern ITALY, apart from the departure South of 334 Inf Div already mentioned, no changes in the enemy's strength and dispositions have been reported. The diminishing strength of 14 Army thus amounts to six divisions besides the two brigades, DOEHLA and SS REICHFUEHRER, the latter in process of expansion to Divisional stature, and possibly elements of another division in ISTRIA: an equivalent all told of seven and a half divisions. This diminution may be made up if, as seems possible, 65 Inf Div takes the place of 334 Div when its relief is completed.

Dispositions in 14 Army are believed to be as follows:

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LIGURIA Area (87 Corps)	ACQUI
356 Inf Div	SPEZIA-LECHORN
UPPER ITALY	
22 GAF Field Div	BRESCIA
Mountain Brigade DOEHLA	BOLZANO
188 Reserve Mountain Div	BELLUNO
ISTRIA & SLOVENIA	
71 Inf Div	
162 Inf Div	
? elements 88 Inf Div	
RIMINI - PIOMBINO	
SS Bde Reichfuehrer (expanding to Div)	LEGHORN
Unidentified Div forming	RIMINI

It is to be noted that, from captured documents, it appears that 51 Mountain Corps, G.O.C. Gen FEURSTEIN, is commanding in Central ITALY and a General WITTHOEFT is commanding rear area in Upper ITALY; these two commands presumably administer the divisions given above except for the Istrian divisions but it is not entirely clear which divisions are under which command.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

General

The enemy may count himself fortunate that operations on the Italian mainland started in the autumn, since despite ample protection from the winter weather we have been able to inflict serious damage on his rail and sea communications, imposing interruptions and a degree of dislocation which, although as yet insufficiently sustained to cause him vital harm, have undoubtedly brought about a critical situation at times, and have created something of a "hand to mouth" supply situation.

There is much evidence that sabotage both organised and otherwise has lately been on the increase and saboteurs have made most useful attacks on railways and caused delays at times when we have been unable to strike owing to bad weather.

At sea the enemy has continued to rely mainly on small craft moving down the coast, protected by extensive minefields; although in the Adriatic naval forces have had some success against ASVs between ANCONA and BENEDETTO. Air attacks on ports have however succeeded in restricting port operations and reducing port capacities.

In general it may be said that the enemy has been forced to spread his effort. Instead of being able to concentrate solely on the use of one or two railways which would meet his total requirements he has been forced to distribute the work between road, rail and sea; with consequent dispersion of effort and increased use of equipment. Nor is this the sole effect of our efforts. The enemy is known to be short of MT, and the

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constant rail interruptions must keep an amount of much needed MT busy on long distance road lifts. That this is a real handicap to the enemy has been clearly demonstrated by his persistent use of railways wherever possible even right into the forward areas.

RAIL SITUATION

A carefully planned assault on the enemy's entire rail network during the past fortnight has been largely frustrated by weather. The greatest success has been obtained on the frontier areas, and it has been possible to attack all the main lines into ITALY with the exception of the MONT CENIS and the Swiss routes at least once. The BRENNER has been bombed on three separate occasions, twice at INNSBRUCK, twice at BOLZANO and once at AVISIO South of BOLZANO. Results have been very satisfactory on all occasions and photographs show that the greatest dislocation has been caused on the INNSBRUCK-BOLZANO sector. It is thought that these attacks have probably reduced BRENNER traffic even below the small total of 15-20 trains per day reported in Summary No. 27.

On the Franco-Italian coast line, considerable success has been achieved. Here attacks have been directed on to specific targets such as bridges and the ANTHEOR VIADUCT. An attack on the VAR bridge, West of NICE on 18 Dec was in particular very successful and probably caused interference to traffic which may not yet have been fully overcome. The dislocation will have been aggravated by further attacks on IMPERIA on 23 Dec and a successful raid on the RECCO Viaduct near GENOA on 27 Dec. It is likely that there has been very little through traffic between MARSEILLES and GENOA since about 18 Dec. These attacks, however, though useful in impeding local movements of forces between FRANCE and ITALY cannot be accounted of such value as the raids on the BRENNER which is the main supply route from GERMANY.

The TARVISIO line which is the second important supply route into ITALY has also been attacked near the Austro-Italian frontier at the DOGNA Viaduct. It is doubtful however whether this raid effected more than a temporary interruption to traffic.

In the Central Italian area weather has interfered on a serious scale with operations. While attacks on the BOLOGNA-FLORENCE line have been scheduled on seven occasions, it has only been possible to attack on two occasions. The most satisfactory day was Dec 19 when a successful attack was made on the FLORENCE-ROME line at AREZZO and three good raids were carried out on the TERNI by-pass at PERUGIA, FOLIGNO and TERNI. These raids undoubtedly caused serious, if temporary, dislocation on this important supply route and may have had the additional effect of causing part of 334 Division to make the last portion of its journey from the North by road. Since Dec 19 it has been possible to hit the central network on only one occasion, viz Dec 26 when the twin junctions of PISTOIA and PRATO were raided.

Italian sources have indicated that the EMPOLI-SIENA line is being extensively used by the enemy and this was attacked on 27 Dec at POGGIBONSI but results are not thought to be good.

On the West coast line a fairly successful attack was carried out on CECINA, South of PISA on 24 Dec.

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Attacks on the E Coast line have been confined to fighter-bomber attacks on traffic in the area South of ANCONA. Italian sources confirm that the railway bridge over the TORDINO near GIULIANOVA was destroyed on 10 Dec and is now being repaired. As a result SAN BENEDETTO or PORTO D'ASCOLI is now the railhead. All stores, munitions and troops proceed from there by road. Tanks are all unloaded at SAN BENEDETTO.

To sum up, appreciable dislocation has been caused on the BRENNER line on three occasions, but this route is probably open by now. The Franco-Italian coast line, if it is open at all, is working only on a very restricted scale. All other lines are probably open, although satisfactory earlier dislocation was caused to the central network at a period when 334 Div and possibly elements of 5 Mtn Div were moving down to the front.

SHIPPING

General

During the past two weeks there has been no appreciable change in the shipping situation on either the Italian East or West coasts. Along the Dalmatian coast the period has been marked by enemy operations against the islands between SPLIT and DUBROVNIK.

Details

(a) Italian West Coast

CIVITAVECCHIA is still thought to remain the chief unloading point for supplies destined for the German 10th Army. Small ships undoubtedly continue to proceed South to CIVITAVECCHIA from northern ports by way of LEGHORN, PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO. Air attacks on CIVITAVECCHIA have been continued: during the past two weeks at least 6 fighter-bomber raids were made on this port. Apparently our air effort, apart from damage to ships and port facilities, has forced the enemy to disperse his shipping to some extent as a small number of active landing craft have again been observed at NETTUNO and ANZIO south of CIVITAVECCHIA.

(b) Italian East Coast

Not much shipping activity has been observed in the area from ANCONA south. However it is believed that at least some supplies for 10th Army are brought in to ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO, and possibly GIULIANOVA. On 15 Dec a coaster was attacked and probably destroyed by our surface craft between ANCONA and BENEDETTO and occasionally small vessels have been sighted and attacked by our aircraft. According to a civilian report, believed to be reliable, a small number of schooners are active between ANCONA and BENEDETTO; cargoes are stated to be chiefly rations, but ammunition and fuel are probably also carried.

(c) Dalmatian Coast

On 22 Dec the enemy landed on the island of KORCULA from the PELJESAC Peninsula. This attack was resisted by the Partisans but they have been forced to evacuate the island. This is undoubtedly the first step in the enemy's plan to clean up the islands between SPLIT and DUBROVNIK in order to permit the movement of coastal shipping from the Northern Adriatic to

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Southern YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA. If successful, the enemy will thus relieve, at least to some extent, his currently precarious overland L of C situation in the BALKANS.

The cruiser DALMATIA in moving South from the Northern Adriatic, very probably to support the TORCULA attack, was intercepted and attacked by Allied aircraft just south of PASMAN Island on 19 Dec. Near misses were obtained and she evidently immediately returned north, for shortly thereafter she was reported aground between ZARA and POLA off the island of SILBA; on the night of 21/22 Dec she was successfully attacked by our motor torpedo boats and may be presumed a total loss.

In addition to fighter-bomber sweeps along the Dalmatian coast, ZARA, SIBENIK, and SPLIT have been bombed. A heavy raid on ZARA on 16 Dec is believed to have done considerable damage to the port and to have sunk a good size merchant ship. Our aircraft and surface vessels have also damaged and sunk a number of small ships between ZARA and the PELJESAC Peninsula.

ZARA continues to be the most active port South of POLA, and for the most part only a few small coasters appear to be proceeding any further South. South of the PELJESAC Peninsula between DUBROVNIK and VALONA no appreciable activity has been reported. However, there is some indication from Partisan reports of small ships moving Northward to DUBROVNIK, possibly drawn from heretofore inactive shipping, and destined for use in the SPLIT-DUBROVNIK area.

In general the shipping situation along the Dalmatian coast is not satisfactory from the enemy point of view. However, it is believed that an effort will be made to remedy the present situation in view of the importance of this L of C Also indicative of this are the present inland operations and evidence that escort ships and coasters are being fitted out in the TRIESTE area.

3. BALKANS

ALBANIA

Only local actions have been undertaken by the Germans together with the BALLKOMBETAR against the Partisans. POGRADEC near Lake OCHRID was captured by a mixed German BALLKOMBETAR formation during early Dec and the KUKES area in NE ALBANIA is now under German control. To the South of VALONA the Germans are reported to have started a two pronged drive on BRATAJ on 14 Dec, one along the DUKATI valley to TERBACI, the other along the SHUSHICE valley; TERBACI is reported to have fallen to the Germans on Dec 22.

GREECE

The quarrel between ELAS and EDES is still not healed and clashes are reported between them at various places, but the respective leaders show a more tractable frame of mind and feeling is gradually dying down. German propaganda, by setting these two parties at each other's throat, has reaped a good reward and German troops have been involved in only minor clashes and police duties.

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On the night 18/19 Dec Allied light coastal forces met a Siebel ferry escorted by 4 R boats between the Island of BRAC and the mainland near OMIS. The Allied MTB outgunned by the heavily armed ferry broke off the gun duel and swinging around succeeded in placing a torpedo into the ferry. This vessel, laden with petrol and troops burst into flames causing the escorting R boats who had dashed to the assistance to catch fire. Two sank, one made off burning and the fourth was not seen. It is unlikely that many, if any, of the enemy troops survived the fierce fire of the petrol. On the same night in the same locality a 200 ft escort vessel was torpedoed and is presumed to have sunk.

The M/V "JADRO" of SPLIT was captured off HVAR by three Partisan armed fishing boats. The JADRO was manned by Ustachi and armed with four MGs and a 20 mm gun on her stern; she had about 150 tons of food in her holds. On the night 19/20 Dec two small enemy schooners were captured by Allied MTB off SPLIT, twelve German naval personnel were captured.

AIR

Bad weather again interfered with operations and most projected strikes on targets in CROATIA and BOSNIA were cancelled. MOSTAR airfield was attacked and 3 a/c damaged on the ground.

Many successful attacks were made on harbours and shipping, most important being an attack on ZARA on 16 Dec by Mitchells; two ships were hit one exploding and a direct hit was reported on a 460 ft vessel anchored off the peninsula. Fires were started in SIBENIK harbour on the same day and numerous small vessels were attacked along the Dalmatian coast.

T.S. AIREY,
Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

GSI(a)
H.Q. 15 Army Group,
30th December, 1943

APPENDIX 'A' - Order of Battle - JUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA

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In a recent drive in ACHAIA and ARCADIA the Germans rounded up the population at KALAVRYTA and shot 1,470 males over the age of 12 as retaliation for the alleged shooting by ELAS of German P.Ws. Women and children were collected and driven into the school which was then set on fire but they are reported to have escaped by way of the windows. Many villages were burned to the ground including VISKOKA, MEGASPILAION, MAZI and MAZEIKA.

JUGOSLAVIA

The main item of news concerns the German ops against the Dalmatian Islands. The attack on KORCULA commenced during the early morning of 22 Dec with landings at RACISTE and KORCULA town and progressed favourably to the Germans because of weather conditions which prevented the intervention of Allied air support from Italian bases. Operations were brought to an end on 24 Dec by the German occupation of the whole island. It appears that the more seasoned Partisan troops had been evacuated to the mainland and some infiltrated on to PELJESAC before the operation started with the intention of harrassing the German L ofC so that the defence of the island was left to young and less experienced troops.

Elsewhere the situation on the Islands has changed but little. PASMAN is now known to be in enemy hands and lightly garrisoned by a mixed force of Germans and Ustachi. It is not clear which side, if any, is in possession of PAG; reports indicate that a small German garrison is still on the Southern end but it is not known if the Partisans have any troops to the North. DUGI has been occupied by the Partisans but though the enemy has evacuated RAVA no reports of Partisan landings have been received. The Island of IZ is also believed to be a no mans land.

The German offensive in EAST BOSNIA and the SANJAK has petered out. German columns from PLJEVLJA (1 Mtn Div and 2 Brandenburg Regt) moving West together with a push from TUZLA (187 Res Div) to the S.W. and other columns from SARAJEVO (369 Germano-Croat Div), and GACKO (SS Prinz Eugen) moving East were fiercely attacked by Partisans who inflicted serious casualties on the enemy. The Germans succeeded in breaking through, burning villages and looting the countryside in their advance, but if their intention was to bring the Partisans to a pitched battle they failed as partisan activities cropped up in the rear and attacks were made on the enemy columns as soon as they had passed. A striking Partisan success was the capture of BIJELO POLJE, while fighting is reported to be taking place on the outskirts of TUZLA.

In SLAVONIA the Partisans scored important successes. Partisans attacked DJAKOVO on 14 Dec and piercing the defences occupied the railway station where they captured valuable supplies of flour and corn. This town was formerly the H.Q. of 45 Res Gren Regt of 187 Res Div, but since the latter moved south to TUZLA to take part in the East BOSNIA offensive, it is not known whether 45 Res Gren Regt has been replaced by other troops. Political prisoners were liberated and severe casualties inflicted on the enemy before the Partisans were forced to withdraw. The German garrison at VINKOVCI was annihilated and a similar fate befell the garrison at VUCEVCI. The former town is an important junction on the main ZAGREB-BELGRADE railway with connections leading to HUNGARY. No reports have so far been received but it is presumed that the railway was damaged before the withdrawal. GORJANI, a

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fortified village between DJAKOVO and MOJICE, was captured by Partisans on 17 Dec.

The German drive in CROATIA from KARLOVAC to BIHAC seems to have come to an end with the arrival of the German 371 Inf at BIHAC; fighting however has broken out further to the North. Partisans are reported to have attacked GLINA and to have retaken a number of places including VONJIC, VRGIN-MOST and TOPUSKO. Fighting continues to be of a hit and run character with the Partisans giving a good account of themselves.

BANJA LUKA, for long a comparatively quiet town finaly held by the enemy, was brought a little nearer to the war about the middle of Dec when the Partisans captured KOLA some 10 Kms to the S.W. in a surprise attack. About 30 Germans were killed and 62 taken prisoner; much war material fell into Partisan hands.

It is now claimed that when the Partisans entered KOCEVJE, 40 Kms N.E. of FIUME, on 10 Dec they killed more than 100 Germans. Further heavy casualties were inflicted on German reinforcements columns and important textile factories and mining machinery were destroyed before they were forced to evacuate the town in face of strong German reinforcements.

Confused reports continue to arrive about the fighting in the LIVNO area but all reports agree on one point in that the fighting is described as fierce. It seems that the Partisans have frustrated all German attempts to advance to the N.E. A British L.O. reports that the enemy is expected to make another drive to clear the road SPLIT-LIVNO, BANJA LUKA, this time from the latter town with a drive to the S.E. In this connection it is perhaps of interest that another enemy column from TRAVNIK entered the town of JAJCE, not, however, before the provisional Government had been evacuated.

In the welter of other Partisan activities the operation in the PODGORICA and CETINJE area, North of Lake SCUTARI, is perhaps the most important: some 200 Germans and 130 Chetniks were killed and booty taken.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Partisans have continued to harass the German supply routes with considerable success.

Reports from British L.O. states that the Rly between DUGO SELO, near ZAGREB, and POPOVACA on the main ZAGREB-BELGRADE line has been destroyed, the same source reports the line KARLOVAC-ZAGREB to be destroyed in a number of places and is not being used by the enemy. Further attacks were made on the OSIJEK-BELGRADE railway causing some damage and delay and the line BROD-VINKOVCI was cut in 8 places. Partisan H.Q. report that the roads ZVORNIK-TUZLA and ZVORNIC-VLASENICE are under Partisan fire.

NAVAL

The old cruiser DALMATIA, formerly the Austrian NIOBE, has reached the end of a career which started in 1895 off the Island of SILBA where she beached after receiving a near miss from Allied a/c on 19 Dec. On 21 Dec 4 torpedos struck her and she is reported to have broken up. She is now a total loss.

.....On the night.....

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Appendix 'A' to
15 Army Group Intelligence
Summary No.28 dated 30 Dec 43

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN JUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA

The supreme command in the Balkans is exercised by Field Marshall von WEICHS, G.O.C. Army Group 'F'. H.Q. BELGRADE.

JUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA come under command 2 Pz Army. G.O.C. Gen Lothar von RENDULIC. H.Q. BANJA LUKA.

Five Corps H.Qs have been definitely identified :

69 Reserve Corps in SLAVONIA. H.Q. VUKOVAR.
G.O.C. Lt.Gen Erick DENECKE

15 Mountain Corps in CROATIA. H.Q. BIHAC
G.O.C. Gen Rudolf LÜTERS

5 (SS) Mountain Corps in BOSNIA. H.Q. MOSTAR

21 Mountain Corps in ALBANIA. H.Q. TIRANA
G.O.C. Arty Gen BADER

3 SS Pz Corps in North Eastern Croatia and Slavonia.
H.Q. ZAGREB.
G.O.C. Lt Gen Felix STEINER ?

This latter Corps controls the SS P.G. Divs NORDLAND and NEDERLAND and has never been engaged in serious operations, it seems that it came to the area to rest and reform after serious losses in RUSSIA though it has of course performed a most valuable function as a garrison. The fact that two new divisions are reported to have arrived in the ZAGREB area recently from GERMANY suggests that the SS formations may be sufficiently reformed to be relieved. We may therefore probably expect another Corps H.Q. to take over command of this area and the two new divisions. It is not clear whether it will also command 88 and 371 Infantry Divisions; the former is now operating in the 15 Mtn Corps area and the continued presence of 88 Inf Div is now rather uncertain.


The chain of command would appear to be as per attached diagram, locations of H.Qs. must not be taken for granted as a number of their formations are now on the move. 373 Germano-Croat has moved out of BIHAC in a North Easterly direction and has been reported in the area BOS-NOVI. 1 Cossack Division is moving in a westerly direction and the SS Mountain Division Prinz Eugen is reported to be moving East to take control of the area South of SARAJEVO. There are some smaller units such as the 901 P.G. Regt an independent regt believed to have some French tks at KARLOVAC and 14 Police Regt at OGULIN, the latter has not been mentioned for some time and must be regarded as dubious identification. 2 Brandenburg Regt is believed to be working with 1 Mtn Div.

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NOTE:- Allocations of Divisions to Corps is not certain in all cases.

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in 76 Corps after the parachutists, but it has had little success so far in its attempt to stabilize the situation North of VENAFRO. 305 Div, which links up with 76 Corps has done little so far and 577 Inf Regt, the only divisional infantry with which we have had contact, appears to have had little training and to have an undue proportion of younger men. A bayonet charge on 4 Nov broke up a whole Coy, taking over thirty prisoners.

The direct route to ROME is therefore blocked by a force of five divisions holding between them a front of about 35 miles. An average of seven miles is not excessive for a divisional front in mountainous country even if three of the divisions are below strength and two are comparatively untried and less well equipped. In reserve are two further divisions, H.G. and 29 P.G. Divs, both of which have probably been withdrawn to refit but which could be used in emergency. In ROME itself and its neighbourhood and also certainly guarding the coast is 2 Para Div with HIMMLER'S Own Brigade possibly supporting them. Unless the situation becomes desperate or unless all fear of an Allied landing is excluded these forces will probably not be withdrawn from their present stations.

2. ENEMY DEFENCES - DEVELOPMENT OF THE SANGRO LINE

A Ph.R. of 2 Nov has shown a marked increase in the defences constructed on the high ground to the North and South of RIVISONDOLI (H.0563). The chief centre of activity is apparently on the spur to the North of the road junction at H.0561. Considerable fortifications have appeared on both the Eastern and Southern slopes and all overlook the low ground to the South of RIVISONDOLI where the roads run across the low ground or over the foothills before they enter the bottlenecks formed by the mountains.

The defences consist chiefly of trenches and emplacements for A Tk and automatic weapons together with infantry positions. An A Tk ditch has been dug from H.046660 to the foot of a hill at H.045669. Possibly the ultimate intention is to connect this to the existing ditch at H.046668 since infantry positions have already been dug on the hillside along which both A Tk ditches run. Activity has also been observed on the heights West of ROCCARASSO (H.0760) although only diggings have so far been reported. Further South in the area North of CASTEL di SANGRO (H.0953) it is thought that new minefields have been laid astride the road at H.088556, one consisting of seven rows extending Northwest from the road to a stream at the bottom of the valley and another of six rows running Southeast from the road to a hedge which marks the beginning of rough country and high ground.

South of RIONERO (H.1145) a new strongpoint has been constructed astride the road. This is suspected to consist of MG positions and road blocks and it is unlikely that it constitutes part of the main defence line, but rather a rearguard position such as we have encountered along the whole line of our advance.

3. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Shipping

(a) Italian West Coast

There is little significant change in the position. Traffic is still on a moderate scale at PIOMBINO and CIVITAVECCHIA, the rather high turnover of the former port being partly explained by traffic to ELBA, in addition to the normal coastal shipping from

.....,GENOA and LEGHORN.....

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GENOA and LEGHORN. A very small number of L.C. is putting in at S. STEFANO in addition to some E Boats. All the other harbours on the West coast South of LEGHORN are completely inactive. The small port of ANZIO near NETTUNO sustained very heavy damage in a raid on 31 Oct and is likely to be unserviceable for some time to come.

(b) Italian East Coast

Despite the fact that the East Coast Railway line is interrupted at several points South of ANCONA, there is still no sign that the enemy is developing the sea traffic here as a substitute for the land routes. No intake has been seen at East coast harbours in the last week, and it is clear that the enemy feels the dangers of sea traffic are at least as great if not greater than those of the main rail routes.

ANCONA is a good example of the vulnerability of the East coast ports at the present time. This port it will be recalled is the only important undamolished harbour on the East coast South of VENICE. It was the object of a heavy attack on 2 Oct. As a result a Raleolo-class cruiser, one of the latest Italian type, was sunk and extensive damage was caused to quayside installations. This is hardly likely to encourage the Germans to develop shipping traffic in this area. ANCONA is a port of some importance, should it ever be necessary to develop East coast shipping on a large scale, and it is undesirable to allow it to sink into complete stagnation. Despite the absence of confirmatory evidence it is still likely that some traffic will develop at least between VENICE and ANCONA though it may well be on a small scale.

(c) Dalmatian Shipping

There has been very little to report on shipping in this area in the past week. DURAZZO and KOTOR have shown no activity at all, and it is doubtful whether a 3,500 MV reported at SPLIT by the Air Force on 7 Nov was a recent arrival at the port. 2 Siebels are known to have called at DUBROVNIK and these may be proceeding South out of the Adriatic to Aegean waters with a view to mounting an operation against LEROS or other of the Greek islands. At ZARA too there has also been a small turnover of Siebels, some of which have then proceeded South to SIBENIK, thus lending support to the view that their eventual destination will be the Aegean.

Railways

It is reported that the entire Italian railway system is now under German control and is being directed by the Wehrmachtsverkehrsdirektion at BOLOGNA. The lines directly operated by German personnel are stated to include all the main North-South and West-East routes in Northern ITALY. In central ITALY the Germans operate the main line BOLOGNA-FLORENCE-ROME. The BOLOGNA-ANCONA line is stated to be still operated by Italians under German direction. Early in the year, German railwaymen were being trained for service in ITALY, consequently the Germans were probably well prepared for this eventuality; even so the number of men required to staff the German operated lines would be very large and it must be presumed that all the lower grades of employees are still Italian. In RUSSIA the Hauptverkersdirektion DNIEPROPETROVSK employed 5000 Germans and 20,000 Russians: a similar situation presumably prevails in ITALY.

The general state of the railways is unchanged. The traffic over the BRENNER and TREVISO routes into ITALY continues to be heavy; on 13 October a total of 15 trains arrived by the latter route, and this was said to be a typical day's activity. An unconfirmed report states that after six weeks work the MT CENIS tunnel was partially cleared by 20 October and that a single line was operating.

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A concensus of evidence indicates that up to 4 October there had been no general resumption of traffic to ITALY via the Swiss routes, while traffic on the VENTIMIGLIA route is stated to consist mostly of reinforcements. In Northern ITALY rail activity does not appear to be on a great scale. A considerable increase which was reported about early October is now known to have probably been accounted for by collecting empty wagons in northern junctions instead of returning them to GERMANY via SWITZERLAND as is the normal practice. A thousand flats, presumably for the transport of guns, tanks etc, were sent from GERMANY to ITALY via SWITZERLAND in early October. In Central ITALY repair work continues on the bridges destroyed on the LEGHORN-ROME, FLORENCE-ROME lines and has been started on the ANCONA-PESCARA line. Repairs to the West coast line should be nearing completion but elsewhere appear less advanced. Since these three main lines have been cut much traffic is certain to have been diverted to the central line PERUGIA-TERNI and FOLIGNO-TERNI and thence South either to join the main VENTIMIGLIA-ROME line again South of ORTE, or via AQUILA to the railheads at SULMONA and CASTEL di SANGRO. AQUILA and TERNI have both been attacked in the last week.

The extent to which the Germans are endeavouring to economise in the use of MT is shown by the following report that, at any rate up to 25 October, the Germans were running two trains daily from CASTEL di SANGRO as far forward as CAROVILLI.

Despite handicaps and longer MT lift occasioned by the blocking of lines North of ROME and on the East coast, it seems that C in C South has not been forced to resort greatly to coastal shipping. The line interruptions should not seriously impede the build up of stocks in central ITALY while the use of MT columns and the central line through TERNI should be more than adequate for the daily supply and maintenance of the forward troops. In general the railway system both into and within ITALY is operating adequately to meet German requirements.

M.S.AIREY,
A.C.S.(I).

GSI(s)
10 Nov 43

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.29

OF 7 JAN 44

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Operations all along the front have been on only a small scale this week, and the enemy has taken the opportunity to get his troops straightened out into more or less the positions he wants. The two main readjustments referred to last week as in progress have been completed or all but completed; 65 Div has been relieved by 334 Div (146 Regt was the last to go), 90 P.G. has been withdrawn into 76 Corps reserve and on 14 Corps front 44 Div has sidestepped into 29 P.G. Div's sector leaving its own former sector to 5 Mtn Div. The centre of the line is thinly held and it is clear that 305 Div has considerably extended its front: in the North 334's sector only comes down as far as the MAIELLA Massif; in the South we know from a captured order that 100 Mtn Regt's Northern boundary is the 30 Northing and II and III Bns of 85 Mtn Regt have been identified South of the 30 Northing so that 5 Mtn Div's sector can scarcely extend further North than the 40 Northing. From here to the middle of the MAIELLA Massif is 45 kms as the crow flies but a glance at the map shows that the chamois would provide a better measure of the distance. And not only is this terrain most mountainous and desolate but from a strategic point of view it leads nowhere; the only two roads in the sector, starting from ALFEDENA and CASTEL DI SANGRO, lead either to the basin of the FUCINO or the high mountains round the GRAN SASSO and both are eminently defensible.

In the North 76 Corps has at last got a reserve. 90 P.G. has been very severely handled but presumably can soon be made up again. 334 Div is up to strength; it has only six infantry bns indeed but this is now apparently normal, at least in ITALY. Where the new defence line is to be is not yet clear; the main body of 1 Para Div is behind the river ARIELLI at the moment with strong outposts forward. There is some digging activity reported behind the PESCARA but a line there would have the

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disadvantage of being overlooked by the higher ground South of the river and it is possible that a line behind the TAVO (or SALINE) will be chosen which does not have that weakness. The fact is that as long as 76 Corps can block the road to ROME through POPOLI it makes no difference to 14 Corps' position whether 76 stands North or South of PESCARA. The two Corps are now really fighting separate battles divided by the almost impassable mountain country in between defended by 305 division. Given this it would be an advantage for the enemy to start now to dig really formidable defences well in rear of his present position and trust to a stubborn defence of the ARIELLI, the FORO and the PESCARA to delay our approach until they are completed.

On 14 Corps front the development of the CASSINO line continues. From air photographs defences are visible on both sides of CASSINO itself in considerable depth and the line running North and South though the position is now much more clearly defined. The strongly defended part of the line starts West of S. ELIA in the area of L'OLIVELLA (G.8627) and continues down the West bank of the RAPIDO as far as its confluence with the GARIGLIANO and so to the sea. In the Northern sector of this line, along the slopes of Monte CAIRO, the defences are said by prisoners to include a large number of portable steel bunkers installed by the TODT Organisation. At the Southern end of the line 94 Div apparently has two regiments, 274 and 267, mainly engaged on guarding the coast.

It is not known whether 5 Mountain Div was a great success on the North Russian front but so far its performance has not been inspiring. It has not been engaged in any very large-scale operations but it has provided an unusually high number of deserters for a formation so largely German. Perhaps we shall find Austrians as ready to desert as the subject populations in future and even the Bavarian other ranks appear to be moved sometimes to desert from dislike of Prussian officers. It seems likely that many of the men have been storing up their dissatisfaction with the war for a long time, since no one would be so brave as to desert to the Russians, and are taking early opportunities to come over to an enemy who they think will treat them more kindly. Whatever the reason a satisfactory trickle is still coming in and the enemy too appears to be well aware of the tendency; in fact according to a recent prisoner the O.C. of 3 Coy 85 Mtn Regt, on the occasion of this Coy's first action, wound up his usual speech by saying "I know a lot of you would willingly desert. Well, if you are really determined, I can't do much to stop you".

In Northern ITALY there are indications that 14 Army may be receiving reinforcements. Certainly the garrison's in LIGURIA and the plain of LOMBARDY are very slender and the Germans might well consider a certain thickening up necessary. A variety of reports suggests a definite increase of troops, particularly in the BOLOGNA and FLORENCE areas where previously no formation had been definitely located and on the balance of evidence A.F.H.Q. consider that up to two divisions

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may be concerned. It is possible that one of them is an unidentified division which was forming at LIEGE in mid October. This moved to CHEM and is now reported to have left for South Eastern FRANCE or Northern ITALY. Whatever the facts behind those reports it is very probable that the Germans should use the wide plains and good railway communications of Northern ITALY for forming and training new divisions or reforming old ones, whether or not those divisions are intended to fight in ITALY when formed.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

A. SHIPPING

There has been no appreciable change in the shipping situation along the Italian coasts since 29 Dec. Shipping at CIVITAVECCHIA appears to have fallen off a little. Landing craft continue active at ANZIO, undoubtedly to avoid a concentration of shipping at CIVITAVECCHIA, which continues to be subjected to air attack. On the East coast activity is still noted at ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO though on a small scale.

On the Dalmation coast enemy operations against the islands in the DUBROVNIK area continue. On 31 Dec landings were made on KLJEN island, which the enemy quickly overran against very weak Partisan resistance. On 5 Jan the Eastern tip of HVAR island was shelled and small boats were observed standing off the shore. However, no landings were made, presumably because of heavy seas, but a renewed attempt is to be expected and may now be in progress.

Shipping in the SPLIT - DUBROVNIK area continues to increase, undoubtedly as a result of the island operations. Most of the ships are small coastal vessels, though a 5000 ton was reported as far South as the PELJESAC Peninsula. North of SPLIT the situation continues unchanged.

B. RAILWAYS - ITALY

Since the last summary a considerable degree of dislocation has been caused to the rail network of Central ITALY, which is however, beginning to recover by now owing to the respite granted by bad weather. The most successful air attacks of the week have been on RIMINI and against rail targets on the Franco - Italian frontier. RIMINI was attacked on 30 Dec with outstanding results. The marshalling yard has been rendered completely unserviceable for some time to come, and there are still no through lines at this junction, although repairs are in progress. On the frontier very successful attacks were again made on the VAR bridge (nr NICE) and at VENTIMIGLIA on Jan 2. Several direct hits were scored on bridges and there are unlikely to be any through lines for some days again.

On the West coast line, continued fighter - bomber attacks have been made on CIVITAVECCHIA and have succeeded in cutting the main line from CIVITAVECCHIA

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to ROME. The line is still believed to be cut. This interruption is of considerable value in impeding the removal of supplies being unloaded at CIVITAVECCHIA from L.C. Further North on this line, P.R. reveals that the CECINA railway bridge (South of LECHORN) is still unserviceable as a result of the attack on 24 Dec. At PISA there are now through lines North to GENOA, but traffic to FLORENCE is probably still interrupted.

The central network is now open throughout although temporary interruptions have been caused at both PISTOIA and FOLIGNO since the last summary.

The East coast line, in addition to the interruption at RIMINI is still cut at GIULIANOVA where repairs to the railway bridge have not yet been completed.

In addition to the attacks discussed above, raids have also been made on FERRARA, PADUA and TURIN during the past week, all of which have produced temporary interruptions to traffic.

The overall picture presented by the Italian railway system may therefore be summed as follows. The Franco-Italian frontier line is cut for some time to come. All other frontier lines are open and probably working normally by now, and all junctions North of the general area PISA - RIMINI are open. In Central ITALY both the coastal lines are closed and railway bridges are damaged on both. The important inland supply lines from FLORENCE to ROME and the bypass line via PERUGIA and TERNI are however open.

C. RAILWAYS.-YUGOSLAVIA

From a study of the reports from Partisan and S.O.E. sources it has been possible to form a fairly accurate picture of the present situation on the Yugoslav railways. While some of the information below dates from the end of November, it is not thought that there has been any significant change in the position since then.

The main railway line in YUGOSLAVIA is the LJUBLJANA - ZAGREB - BELGRADE line along which the Orient Express used to travel in pre-war days. This is now the principal German supply route down which supplies coming down to LJUBLJANA from VIENNA are despatched. There are no interruptions of a permanent nature on this route but local hold-ups are constantly arising owing to Partisan activities. Thus in the 6 days 18 Dec - 23 Dec the line was cut in two places by mining and the destruction of a bridge near NOVO GRADISC..

From this line four branch lines run Southwards in the sector between ZAGREB and BELGRADE two of which we know to be extensively used by the Germans. The first is the SUNJA - BIHAC line which supplies enemy forces in the BIHAC area. BIHAC itself is thought to be an important railhead.

The other line runs from BROD to SARAJEVO thence down to MOSTAR reaching the Adriatic coast at DUBROVNIK.

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From SARAJEVO there is a connection running East to the BELGRADE - SALONICA line at KRALJEVO. The BROD - DUBROVNIK line though nominally under German control is subject to recurrent interruptions from Partisans particularly in the coastal area between MOSTAR and DUBROVNIK.

The other two branch lines running South from the main LJUBLJANA - BELGRADE railway both go to KARLOVAC, one from a point just East of ZAGREB, the other from SISAK. These are probably not very extensively used. No traffic is able to proceed West from KARLOVAC owing to Partisan control of the railway and very little from KARLOVAC to OGULIN thence to FIUME owing to the local Partisan activity in that area.

The above are the principal railway lines operated by the Germans. The extent to which the Partisans have succeeded in dislocating the railway system of YUGOSLAVIA cannot however be fully appreciated without giving some details of the principal railway lines which are now denied to the Germans thanks to their activities. The most important of these is the KNIN - OGULIN line which runs parallel to the coast between SIBENIK and FIUME. Large stretches of this track have been torn up and it is very improbable that the enemy will ever again be able to use this route. Other lines which are no longer working owing to Partisan control of large sectors of the track are the KARLOVAC - LJUBLJANA, the ZAGREB - KOPRIVNICA, the BANJALUKA - BOSANSKI NOVI, the GACINCI - GSIJUK and the LJUBLJANA - TRIESTE routes. In addition the SISAK - KARLOVAC line if working at all can only be operated with very great difficulty.

On the lines which are operating, railheads have been established at various points, of which BIHAC is the most important. From these points supplies are carried by M.T. to the German forces in outlying districts. These troops located in coastal areas are however supplied by shipping proceeding South down the Dalmatian coast, a large proportion of which puts in at SIBENIK whence a local railway line operates as far inland as KNIN.

3. BALKANS

ALBANIA

There has been little activity of note in ALBANIA. The German drive on BERAT reported in Summary 28 does not appear to have been in any force and has petered out with the German capture of KUC, VUNO and DHERMI during the last days of December. Albanian Partisans clashed with Bulgarian troops and later with mixed German Balkenbetar formations on the S.E PLANINA between the towns of PRIZREN and TETOVO; some casualties were inflicted but reports indicate that fighting was on a minor scale. A split is reported between SKENDER MUCE, BALKAN leader in the DUKATI area about 25 Kms South of VALONA, and the Germans; he is stated to be willing to oppose the Germans and refrain from all aggressive action against the Partisans.

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GREECE

Fighting is reported in the Mt VERIA area where a German force of about 7,000 men with some A.F.Vs attacked ELAS but was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy; about 600 Germans were killed while ELAS lost 35 killed and 48 wounded. Another German column which attempted to reach KORFU from SLATISTA was attacked by ELAS and forced to turn back after 7 hours fighting. A slight improvement is to be noted in the EDES - ELAS quarrel but though they have refrained from attacking each other there is little doubt that relations are still strained.

YUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIAN ISLANDS

Reports indicate that HVAR and BRAC are expected to be attacked in the near future. The enemy has brought artillery across from the mainland to DRVENIK and has shelled the island of SOLTA while SUCURAJ on the eastern tip of HVAR was shelled from the mainland on 4 Jan; this may indicate that the Germans intend to make a simultaneous landing on SOLTA, BRAC and HVAR. PAG has been evacuated by the USTACHI garrison but no Partisan landings have been reported; IZ is now in Partisan hands together with ZUT and other islands in the SREDNJI Channel. The enemy have increased their patrol activity in the SILBANSKI Channel between SILBA and OLIB making the sea route to SENJ more hazardous for the Partisans. A German column which attempted to push down the coast from CRIKVENICA to BRIBER was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Fighting on a reduced scale has taken place in East BOSNIA and the SANJAK; the Germans hold PRIJEPOLJE, PRIBOJ and PLJEVLJA with Partisans in BIJELO - POLJE, KOLASIN, BERANE and MOJKOVAC. A clash took place near PLJEVLJA in which the 3rd Bde of the Garibaldi Div (Italian) under command of a Partisan Corps inflicted heavy casualties on a mixed German and USTACHI force and captured some war material and food supplies. The Germans have been forced to switch forces to secure their L of C in the ZAVIDOVICI - TUZLA - ZVORNIK area on the line BELGRADE - BANJA LUKA and reports indicate that a serious attempt to clean up this area by the enemy will be undertaken.

In SERBIA Partisans attacked and captured a railway station near BITOLJ (MONASTIR) killing the enemy garrison and securing booty.

The most important engagement reported during the past week is the Partisan attack on BANJA LUKA. Not only is the town an important road and rail centre but it is believed to be the Headquarters of Gen RENDULIC's 2 Pz Army. Heavy street fighting was reported in the centre of the town on 2 Jan and on 4 Jan the Partisans were reported to have taken three quarters of the town and to be attacking the TRAPPIST Monastery where H.Q. 2 Pz Army is supposed to be located. Gen RENDULIC and his staff are

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stated to be trapped in the North East of the town. The Partisan success was facilitated by actions further to the North where at BOSANSKA GRADISKA the German garrison consisting of motorised troops was surrounded and held by Partisans on 4 Jan; however, the enemy is reported to have broken out and can be expected to move on B.N.J. LUKA. Heavy German concentrations are reported in PRIJEDOR, BOS NOVI, TRAVNIK and DOBOJ, presumably earmarked for the relief of B.N.J. LUKA, but the Partisans have gone over to the offensive in BOS NOVI and report the ambush and annihilation of a German column near DVOR capturing a great deal of booty. Allied A/C strafed the concentrations at PRIJEDOR.

To the South the fighting in the DINARA Mountains around LIVNO and SUJICA has died down and only sporadic clashes have taken place.

A number of raids were undertaken by the Partisans in the North. VRBOVSKO was captured by Partisans late in December. A sharp engagement took place in the MEDAK area near GOSPIC in mid December when some 150 Germans were killed and the Partisans later claimed that the KORDUN area has been cleared of the enemy.

A German thrust S.W. from NOVOMESTO has been repulsed but fighting is still going on. Partisans captured the small town of FUZINE which is about 15 Kms East of FIUME and repulsed three columns of enemy reinforcements.

ORDER OF BATTLE

A report from Partisan H.Q. states that the SS Divs NORDLAND and NIEDERLAND have left North East CROATIA. No mention is made of III SS Pz Corps H.Q. but it seems likely that the whole Corps has been relieved. 99 Mtn Regt of 1 Mtn Div was reported to be in ZADVIDOVICI near DOBOJ on 20 December but as yet no other indication that 1 Mtn Div is moving North West has been given. 371 Infantry Div, last reported to be in the BIHAC area, entrained in the last days of December at DVOR and SUNJA and is reported to be en route for BELGRADE. This Div is now stated to consist of only 20% Germans (all officers and most NCO's and specialists are German) and 80% Croats who have had 1½ years training in GERMANY. If this report is true, it will be another Croat Legion division in the same series as 369 and 373. An addition to the Order of Battle is 92 Mot Regt reported in SARAJEVO; this appears to be an independent regiment and took part in the SANJAK offensive in December 43. Persistent reports have been received about German reinforcements arriving in the ZAGREB - KARLOVAC area and 367 div has been identified in KARLOVAC. This division is new to the German army list; it will be remembered that the first report of the newly arrived division in the ZAGREB area stated that it had been newly formed in AUSTRIA. Unconfirmed reports place a new div as yet unidentified in the KOCEVJE area and another in the area of NOVOMESTO. These two may be duplications of

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the same division but it would appear that at least two new divs have moved into North East CROATIA in the last month or so to take over the area vacated by the SS formations, one of these being 367 div.

AIR

Bad weather again hampered operations but attacks were made on troop concentrations at PALJEDOR and on 4 December at TRAVNIK and DOBOJ. Results were not observed owing to bad weather. SPLIT, ZARA and the Dalmatian coast were again visited and a 6,000 ton ship was hit and left smoking off the North PELJESAC coast. On 30 December a 500 ft ship in ZARA harbour, which had been damaged in a previous raid, was attacked by JU52s. Near misses were scored and hits made on harbour installations. A direct hit on a seaplane detonated some 100 mines on a nearby quay. Near misses are claimed on a large ship unloading in the PROKLJANSKO Lake near SIBENIK and another large ship was attacked in the ULJAN Channel on 27 December. Near misses are claimed.

The enemy has shown a slight increase in air strength over the Dalmatian coast during the last 10 days. On December 30 the Germans carried out their biggest bombing effort against LUCE which was re-captured by the Partisans recently. 15 HS 126s dropped 39 x 110 Kgs; 3 canisters "butterfly" bombs, and carried out strafing attacks from 100 ft.

4. APPENDICES

At Appendix 'A' is an Analysis of the Move of 5 Mtn Div from RUSSIA to ITALY.

T.S. AIREY,
Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I)

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
G.S.I.
7 January 44

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Appendix 'A' to
15 Army Group Intelligence
Summary No. 29 dated 7 Jan 43.

ANALYSIS OF MOVE OF 5 MOUNTAIN DIV FROM RUSSIAN FRONT TO ITALY.

NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1943.

Elements of this division began moving from Lake LADOGA area between 20 and 25 November. The intention was to move 100 Mountain Rifle Regiment first, then 95 Mountain A.R., then 85 Mountain Rifle Regt, then 95 Eng Bn, and it is probable that this was in fact carried out. 100 Mtn Regt started to leave on 24 November, and the first elements of 85 Mtn Regt were away five days later although the main body did not depart until about 10 December.

The move from Lake LADOGA to the concentration area South of ROME took approximately 18 days for each train involved. The route followed seems to have been the same for all units involved and was as follows. RIGA - GROTTINGEN (on the Lithuanian - Prussian frontier) - POSEN - LEIPZIG - MUNICH - INNSPRUCK - BOLZANO. At BOLZANO most of the division seems to have left the main BRENNER line, probably because of damage to the line (this will certainly apply to elements arriving after 15 December when the AVISIO Viaduct was hit). From BOLZANO the division was routed to PADUA thence to FLORENCE. Some of it then went down the main FLORENCE - ROME line and some along the PERUGIA - TERNI bypass to the ROME area where elements of the div detrained while others went on to PRIVERNO. The whole div had probably arrived by the last week of 1943.

A study of the actual composition of the trains shows that each consisted of between 30 and 40 goods trucks plus one comfortable passenger coach which carried the officers. This is probably the normal size for a goods train in ITALY and taking an average of approx 10 tons as the load of each truck confirms the view that an average supply train carries approx 400 tons. This is rather less than the 500 tons usually taken as a theoretical capacity of supply trains on other European railways. In the case of 5 Mountain Div there were about 25 men to each truck and approx 2 days to a train. The total number of trains involved in the move is not known, but it is estimated that the entire division and equipment took up some 80 - 90 trains.

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H.Q. A.C.M.F. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.30

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The fighting in Central ITALY is dominated by HITLER's Special Order which was read out to all ranks in the Army on 24 Jan. "The Gustav Line" it reads "must be held at all costs for the sake of the political consequences which would follow a completely successful defence. The Fuehrer expects the bitterest struggle for every yard". It is irrelevant to the military appreciation of the situation which particular political results are worth so dangerous a policy - the more dangerous to an army almost every division of which was previously at STALINGRAD - whether the importance of not losing ROME or merely the avoidance of another German withdrawal at a time when the Russians are also forcing them back at one point after another of the Eastern front. The fact remains that Kesselring has taken all the possible and necessary steps to ensure that Hitler's orders are carried out and the issue between us and him is reduced to its simplest terms.

The Fuehrer's order must have been despatched not long after our landing in the ANZIO area. There is hardly a record in previous military history of a landing on so large a scale obtaining such complete surprise. As in the case of almost all successful surprises this was due in part to the fact that the enemy's attentions had been diverted elsewhere; on the morning on which we landed at ANZIO he had just launched his great counter-attack to recover the ground which he had lost on the Southern end of the GUSTAV line. Our original attack here had hit the 94th Infantry division which was spread out rather widely and, thanks again to a fair measure of surprise, we had succeeded in inflicting heavy losses and capturing valuable positions around LITURNO and CASTELFORTE. Kesselring's reaction was to bring down 90 P.G. div from 8 Army front and 29 P.G. div from the ROME area where it had been resting and refitting after a strenuous period in the line. 90 P.G. div was apparently intended to be relieved by 3 P.G. div, which was 29 P.G. div's predecessor in Army reserve; the move was complicated by the fact that one regimental group, 8 G.R. had had to be rushed

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up to assist 5 Mtn div which was being driven back across the mountains by the pressure of the French, losing many prisoners and giving up many deserters. On 22 Jan therefore 14 Corps from the West coast Northwards was held by 94 Inf, 90 P.G., 29 P.G., Hermann Goering Pz (which was also involved in the counter attack), 15 P.G., 71 Inf, 44 Inf and 5 Mtn Div strengthened by 8 G.R. from 3 P.G. Div. In the Central sector as far as Mt. MAINELLA was 305 Inf div. On 76 Corps front were 334 Inf, 26 Pz and 1 Para divs. In transit to 76 Corps front was the remainder of 3 P.G. div. In the ROME area and to North were various parachutist elements to be dealt with in more detail later. In the ANZIO area and for 25 miles each side was II bn 71 G.R. of 29 PG div which had come there the day before for a rest and refit after its strenuous fighting as rearguard for the withdrawal to the GUSTAV line in the CASSINO sector.

The enemy's first reaction was to move back from the GUSTAV line such units as could be spared. Hermann Goering div was an obvious choice as it had been used much in the past for just this job of blocking against sudden dangerous penetrations. 104 G.R. was also sent, as the successful defence of the S. ANGELO sector showed that it could be spared. 29 G.R. from 3 P.G. was diverted to the beachhead on its way across from the East and it is probable that the rest of the division, less 8 G.R. and 103 Recce Unit, are also there. 90 P.G. has apparently sent one bn, II/200, but it has not yet been identified in action. Finally 26 Pz Div was removed from the line and though only I/9 P.G.R. has so far been identified the whole division is available to intervene if necessary. These units appear to be under command of 1 Para Corps which was identified as commanding 29 PG div when the latter was in the ROME area. So far the units mentioned have been from the troops with which we were already engaged but new formations were also rushed up from further afield. It appears that the new Parachute division possibly in Central ITALY has progressed far enough to have at least three Regimental H.Qs: 9 Para Regt has been identified from a captured document, 10 and 11 Para Regts from prisoners, and from another document we know that the Battle Group on the left of our beachhead is apparently commanded by Maj GERING, C.O. 11 Para Regt (he has II/200 G.R. under command). There have been other identifications of parachute units in the area, including a Para M.G. Bn and III Bn 1 Para Regt, and it seems likely that 1 Para Div in 76 Corps has been milked of at least two bns. The next formation to be identified was 65 Inf Div from the GENOA area, by a PW from 145 G.R., followed shortly by a PW from 735 Inf Regt, which is part of 715 Inf Div from the GRASSE area in Southern FRANCE. Finally we have prisoners from Recce Units of two further divisions, 356 Inf and 114 Jaeger; the former is in the SPEZIA area and the latter has been moving North from Central DALMATIA since about 7 Jan fighting its way against strong Partisan opposition. It is too early yet to say whether either of these divisions will follow their Recce Units;

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356 now appears to be the only formation on the West coast between the TIBER and the French frontier and may be tied down by that fact, 114 Jaeger on the other hand was reported by Partisan HQ as being bound for North ITALY. It is quite possible that these Recce Units, or Fusilier bns as they are now called, have simply been brought up as the most readily available reinforcements, being motorised; the original move of 356 Recce Unit certainly has no connection with the danger created by our landing as it began to move from GENOA on 13 Jan. The arrival of 114 Recce Unit may be connected with a report of German troops in Jaeger uniform passing through PADUA on 25 Jan, coming from DALMATIA.

We have therefore opposing our beachhead the bulk of Hermann Goering div, 26 Pz div, 3 PG div less one regt, 65 Inf div (less one regt), 715 Inf and 4 Para divs plus a few miscellaneous bns from 15 PG and 29 PG divs and others. It is possible that not all of 26 Pz and 715 Inf bns have yet arrived but their speedy completion must be expected. Dispositions are probably still fluid and our knowledge is certainly incomplete but it appears that on our left we have from the sea to about the 80 Easting 11 and possibly also 10 Para Regt with II/200 under command and a few small units from 29 PG div. 65 Inf is apparently arriving in this sector. East of this group as far as the general area of CISTERNA is 3 PG sector with 104 GR on its left. 715 Inf div may be moving into this sector. From CISTERNA to the sea again is Hermann Goering div, and apparently the first elements of 26 Pz div.. So far the enemy's attitude has been strictly defensive, in which he has had some success, but it must be expected that with this strength becoming available he will pass to the offensive as soon as he considers himself strong enough.

Since the landing the main interest on 14 Corps front has passed to the CAIRO area where we have broken through the GUSTAV line and gained important heights North of CASSINO. 5 Mtn and 44 Inf divs have had heavy losses here and have had to be reinforced by 191 G.R. from 71 Div. The danger for the enemy lies in the fact that a successful advance here turns not only the GUSTAV line on which the Fuehrer has staked his military reputation but also the Adolf Hitler line behind it which seems from its name even more closely bound up with his personal prestige. This switch line apparently runs from above CASSINO to PIEDIMONTE and thence through AQUINO to PONTECORVO. From here it runs across the mountains to FONDI where its Southern end is covered by the marshes and inundations of the LAGO DI FONDI. This line appears to have been designed to meet the danger of a turning movement against the GUSTAV line from the ANZIO area, just such a turning movement as is now in progress. If this movement progresses, especially in the Monte MAIO area, where we already hold Monte IUGA and Monte PURGATORIO, the German positions behind the GARIGLIANO in the S. ANDREA and S. AMBROSIO area should become vulnerable.

On 8 Army front the enemy has made minor changes to compensate for the troops he has lost to the ANZIO sector. 26 Panzer div has been replaced by 577 and 578 G.R. from 305 div and 146 G.R. which never got relieved when 65 Div left

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for GEMONA now seems permanently tied in its old place. The Central sector is left to only two bns of 576 G.R. with the Recce and Inf bns but the nature of the ground here scarcely demands a larger garrison.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

ITALY

As the Italian campaign develops the enemy's supply and maintenance situation would seem to be slowly deteriorating. True his L of C is now almost completely secure, as regards internal security, but the winter squalls have brought large explosive and well aimed hailstones.

The object of our attacks has been, and remains, to dislocate the vital railways and thus throw the weight of troop movement and the movement of supplies on to the roads. Not that road movement is any easier to attack than rail transport, but the enemy is known to be in straightened circumstances as regards fuel and M.T. Consequently the enemy continues to make every endeavour to use the railways to the fullest extent, even to run supply trains right up to the forward area.

The movement of supplies can be divided into two stages: first the movement from depots in the Reich or N. ITALY to depots in Central ITALY located chiefly in the area between AREZZO and ROME near to the main FLORENCE-ROME railway; secondly the onward forwarding of supplies from Army depots to the forward area. It appears also that this is as far as possible carried out by rail although it is probable that a greater percentage of MT lift is used in the second stage than in the first. Were it possible to enforce the use of MT throughout for a considerable period the situation would be little short of catastrophic for the enemy.

Coastal shipping cannot be as useful to the enemy to-day as formerly. On the West coast the port of CIVITAVECCHIA, with a normal peacetime capacity of 2400 tons, has been so battered by air attacks that the enemy has made little use of it in the last three months and it is doubtful if it has handled more than an average of some 300 tons daily. The ports of PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO are believed to have been scarcely used as ports of intake. On the East coast the small harbours of SAN BENEDETTO GIULIANOVA, and CIVITANOVA have been used probably to their fullest extent while there has been some activity at ANCONA. However the total intake via the East and West coast ports is not estimated to be more than a very small percentage of the total daily tonnage moved by rail. It must be admitted however that the low scale of coastal shipping activity must in part be intentional so long as the enemy can still make do with the rail effort, however difficult the working may be. The situation has, however, now deteriorated further for the enemy; latest information indicates that some demolitions have been carried out at CIVITAVECCHIA, presumably as a result of "panic" about the 22nd of last month when the enemy may have feared that our landing was to be made at CIVITAVECCHIA.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

As far as enemy strengths and dispositions go the week has revealed no significant changes; his intentions are still bound within the frame of the Führer's order to resist to the last. Opposite the ANZIO bridgehead, however, there is now a marked change of attitude and the enemy has definitely gone over to the offensive. With the force hastily drawn from the main 5 Army front he was able during the first week to block our probings outward from the original bridgehead and when we took the offensive on 30 January he already had sufficient strength in hand to prevent any important break-through. From about 4 February on his counter-thrusts at various points became more violent and on 6 February we evacuated the salient forward of CARROCETO. Up to 8 February no large scale attack had yet been made but the enemy can scarcely delay this much longer.

Identifications have helped to fill out the picture given last week though the main outlines remain. On our left we now know that 65 Div has another infantry regt, 147, presumably formed in the GENOA area as it did not fight on 8 Army front in November. 715 Div has provided PW's from both 725 and 735 Inf Regts and also from the Div Eng Bn; prisoners state that the div is now motorised. It is this division which has been attacking West of the GENZANO - ANZIO road. 3 PG Div still only has 29 G.R. of its own infantry but may also have 104 G.R. under command as I and II Bns have been identified in its sector (III Bn is still back in its old sector). East of 3 P.G. sector there are some elements of 71 P.G: 194 G.R. appears to be in the area roughly F9632 and with it is 171 Recce Unit. Next comes 26 Pz div of which we have now identified all the major units though some of its arty is still on 8 Army front. From CISTERNA to the sea is still apparently the sector of Hermann Goering div though that formation has not been quite so prominent

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this week as last. On the extreme left flank, our extreme right, we have the first SS troops which we have met in action since the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler at THERMOPYLAE in the spring of 1941; I and II Bns 35 SS P.G.R., II Bn 36 P.G.R., the Engineer bn and IV Bty of the Arty regt of 16 SS PG div have been identified by prisoners. (The number 16 for the new division Reichsfuehrer SS is derived from a captured document). It looks, therefore, as though we are to get the whole of the division here, both the elements which remained in the LECHORN area and the rest of the div which was forming in SLOVENIA. When complete it should probably include at least a bn of tanks and possibly a regt. A recent identification, still not quite certain, places elements of 721 Jaeger Regt also on our bridgehead front. It seems possible that further units from 114 Jaeger div are now gradually appearing; we have already identified the Recce Unit, the Eng Bn and a company of the A.Tk bn though the latter appear to be nearer the GUSTAV line than the bridgehead.

So far we can identify, or assume from the identification of their parent regiment, about 40 Inf Bns opposite our bridgehead. There are also 6 or 7 Recce Units and 5 Engineer Bns which can all be used as infantry. There is one tank bn in 26 Pz div and two in HG div but the latter are weak and may not exceed 40 tanks for the two together. 16 SS Div's tanks have not yet been identified. There are, however, reports from Italian sources believed reliable of more tanks, including large numbers of heavy tanks, which passed through ROME on 2nd and 3rd February and another source mentioned elements of 13 Pz division. The division itself is on the Russian front and it is unlikely that it can arrive here but the two sets of reports suggest that some armoured reinforcements have been received. It is possible, for instance, that just as 26 Pz and 16 Pz divs only brought one bn of their tank regts to ITALY so 13 Pz in RUSSIA may have taken only one bn with it; the other may then have remained in FRANCE, perhaps re-equipping with heavy tanks, and these may have been rushed down to ITALY. So far this is speculation but we should at least be prepared for the possibility of the appearance of an extra tank bn on our front. There have been other movements also in the area North of ROME; on 5 February the rear elements of 90 P.G. reported that they had been instructed by 14 Army to draw rations in future not from 1 Para Corps but from 362 Div. 90 P.G. itself is fighting in the CASSINO area and though its rear elements are fairly far to the rear and almost certainly North of the immediate area of our bridgehead they cannot be very far North. Clearly 362 Div has left RIMINI and come South; probably it will be responsible for the area North of ROME whose sea coast is otherwise entirely undefended as far as we know. And it also looks very much as though 14 Army has come South; it would be reasonable enough to leave 10 Army to deal solely with the defence of the GUSTAV line while the responsibility for counter-offensive against the bridgehead is taken by 14 Army.

On the GUSTAV line the main interest is still around CASSINO and on the ridge of Monte MAJO. In the CASSINO area it now appears that 90 P.G. Div has taken over; its H.Q. is one km S.E. of ROCCASECCA and it has under command, apart from its own units (but less II/200, opposite the bridgehead) 211

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G.R., 132 G.R., 4 Mtn Bn and one or two bns from 1 Para Div. So far only III Bn 3 Para Regt has been identified here but at least one further parachute bn was moving from 8 Army front on the night 4/5 February. II Bn 134, which has suffered heavy losses, was moved down to 15 P.G's front behind the middle GARIGLIANO. 44 Div as a whole has suffered most severely in the recent fighting and an estimate based on PW reports and making generous allowance for reinforcements with the most unsuitable elements from the divisional rear services gives it a total fighting strength of under 4,500. Further South 15 P.G. apart from the remnants of 134 G.R. has 129 PGR, III/104 and 276 GR under command and its right boundary stretches to include Monte MAJO and Monte ORNITO. 29 P.G. stretches to the LUSENTO river and 94 Div, reduced to a total of four infantry bns and the divisional engineer and recce bns, holds the extreme Southern end of the line.

The issue is clear: if the enemy can eliminate our bridgehead he can reinforce the GUSTAV line with sufficient strength to make it, humanly speaking, entirely secure. If we can break through the GUSTAV line we can eventually join hands with out bridgehead and in the process can probably destroy a large part of 10 Army's weakened divisions. At the moment of writing the thrust West of CASSINO represents the greatest threat to the enemy's daring strategy in Central ITALY.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) SHIPPING

(1) ITALY

CIVITAVECCHIA has now passed completely out of the picture as a supply point for enemy forces and has been replaced by SAN STEFANO. This small port will not easily cope with the tonnage formerly split between CIVITAVECCHIA and ANZIO, but no doubt steps will be taken by the enemy to exploit its capacity to the maximum. It is, however, dangerously exposed to Allied air attack, and there is no convenient alternative harbour.

Traffic to PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO is now restricted to F-boats and supply barges, the 400-ton munition carrier which arrived late January having left early in February. There is considerable activity in both ports, but bad weather, which prevented daily photographic cover, precludes any accurate estimate of the tonnage reaching the enemy forces by this route. In any case it is probably short of 500 tons per day.

On the Italian East coast shipping continues to ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO on the usual small scale. ASV's form the bulk of the traffic but a munition carrier of approximately 1000 tons reached ANCONA at the end of January.

Movement of ships from Ligurian ports to FRANCE continues at the usual leisurely pace.

.....(2) DALMATIAN COAST...

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(2) DALMATIAN COAST

Interest has shifted to the Northern group of islands, where the enemy has made landings on ULJAN, PASMAN and DUGI OTOK, meeting with little Partisan resistance. No doubt he will go on to mop up the other islands of this group; but, as he is unlikely to be able to leave permanent garrisons on more than a few of them and is already reported to have abandoned DUGI OTOK, the potential threat to his coastwise shipping which these islands constitute cannot be said to have been eliminated. More and more he is coming to learn that the attempt to "mop up" Partisans is like trying to pick up a drop of quicksilver with one's fingers.

Shipping activity continues as far South as DUBROVNIK on normal scale, mainly by ASV's and small steamers. Vessels of 1000 tons and above do not venture South of POLA. An important element in this seaborne supply traffic, the traffic in fuel, has been hard hit by the loss during the last fortnight of 3 small tankers, 2 of which were sunk by our air forces and one by light naval forces. The latter have continued to take their toll of medium and small schooners, taking prisoners from the vessels in four cases recently.

(b) RAILWAYS

Since the beginning of the month bad weather has severely restricted air operations over Central ITALY and the enemy has had a chance of at least partially repairing the railway system, all main lines of which were blocked at one or more places on 29 January. However, the bridge at CECINA on the West coast line, which was completely destroyed in December, has not yet been repaired, and the main FLORENCE-ROME line has remained blocked at the bridge North of ORVIETO. Thus the bulk of rail traffic for the ROME area will have been confined to the single track line AREZZO-PERUGIA-TERNI-ORTE, which has a maximum daily peace-time capacity of 24 trains of 250 tons each way as against 72 trains of 500 tons, and 72 trains of 400 tons for the West coast and main FLORENCE-ROME lines respectively. This position will have been aggravated by the cutting of the main lines at TERNI on 5 February. The East coast line was blocked at FANO from 1 to 3 February and it is possible that there was a block at RIMINI as late as 4 February. By 6 February however, the line was definitely open.

Blockage of railways beginning 20 January must have caused the enemy supply situation to deteriorate seriously and forced him to move reinforcements South largely by road. By this time, however, it is estimated that owing to weather restricting our air effort against rail targets he has probably been able to restore his supply position and build up the necessary additional supplies for such offensive action as he may contemplate in the ANZIO area.

3. BALKANS

ALBANIA

Fighting is reported in South ALBANIA, two enemy columns are taking part, one moving South from KELCYRE and the other

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North from the Greek border at DRIMADES. No details are available but it is thought to be on a minor scale.

It is stated that the Bulgarians are forcibly evacuating some 28,000 Albanians from the SKOPLJE area to the Turko-Bulgarian frontier districts.

GREECE

This has been a week of confused reports, little activity apart from punitive excursions by the enemy and some minor clashes between ELAS and EDES.

Col Zervas has accused ELAS of atrocities in the MIROFILLON area SE of JANINA where it is claimed ELAS put to death about 100 people taken from the nearby villages which had favoured EDES; he further requested the formation of a committee to investigate these crimes. A later report dated 1 February states that an agreement has been reached and both parties had agreed to cease fire at midnight 4/5 February to allow further talks to take place. The terms of the agreement are as follows :

1. The official denunciation of the leaders and followers of EDES who have collaborated or are collaborating with the Germans or with RALLIS.

2. Both Zervas and ELAS forces to remain at positions held on day that hostilities cease until unity is accomplished.

3. To start immediate negotiations for the formation of a single ANDARTE army.

The main German activity appears to have been an anti-invasion exercise on a big scale held near PATRAS in the Peloponnese. It is stated that the enemy expect an Allied landing on the PATRAS-AMALIAS coast and are hastily undertaking defence measures.

JUGOSLAVIA

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

In fighting which took place along the railway East of LJUBLJANA on 19 to 22 Jan against a regt of PAVELIC's bodyguard the Partisans inflicted 110 casualties.

Fighting has continued on the GOSPIC-SENJ road but with the capture of PERUSIC on February 1 by a force of USTASHI the whole area flanking this highway must be considered as being under enemy control. Nothing further has been heard of the progress of 392 Germano-Croat Div since one of its columns captured BRINJE on 31 January.

DALMATIA

ZEMUNIK near ZARA is reported to be in Partisan hands but the enemy are shelling it from the direction of ZARA. Partisan sources report heavy troop concentrations around the

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port of TROGIR. Some 200 MT bearing the Rising Sun and Palm Tree of 92 Mot Regt have been seen and the Partisans appreciate that these troops will be used for an attempt to capture the island of VIS in the near future. Reports of troop movements from the South to ZARA continue to arrive but it is not thought that any major elements are involved.

BOSNIA

It is confirmed that JAJCE was still in German hands on 30 January.

The SS Mtn Div Prinz Eugen is fighting on the HERCEGOVINA-MONTENEGRON border and around GACKO; here again details are lacking.

SERBIA

On 28 January a large Bulgarian force including mortar coys and cavalry occupied a line running from LESKOVAC to LEBANE and MEDVEDJA and the villages to the South with the intention, it is believed, of attacking the Partisans in the RADAN Mts and PISTA river area. It is stated that 5 Bulgarian Divs will take part converging from KURSUMLIJA, PROKUPLJE, NISH and LESKOVAC. Serbian Partisans recently ambushed a German force at NOTIA in GREECE near the Jugoslav-Greek frontier killing 100 and wounding 200 Germans besides capturing much war material.

ORDER OF BATTLE

68 Corps has moved from CORINTH to ATHENS and appears to control troops in ATTICA and possibly further West. 117 Div has moved its HQ to CORINTH and seems to be in command of all field forces in the PELOPONNESE. 5 SS Mtn Corps has moved to SARAJEVO since the heavy RAF raid on MOSTAR on 14 January.

1 Mtn Div is confirmed in the KNIN area and may be moving by easy stages North to ZARA. It is reported that 373 Germano-Croat div is to take over the SPLIT-TROGIR-SENJ area; some officers of this Div were recently seen in SPLIT but no other signs of a move have been reported and the div is confirmed to be now in BIHAC.

162 Inf Div is reported to be guarding the LJUBLJANA-TRIESTE railway and to have elements in NOVO MESTO; a number of TURKESTAN deserters have joined the Partisans from this Div and are now formed into a Partisan Bn.

17 Bulgarian Div has definitely been disbanded; this formation previously had commitments in the KAVALLA area.

Brigadier,
B.G.S. (I)

G.S.I.
HQ., ACMF.,
9 Feb 44

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H.Q., A.C.M.F. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.32

OF 16 FEBRUARY 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Since 10 February the enemy in the ANZIO bridgehead has been much less aggressive and the general line there remains unchanged. It has been confirmed by prisoners that operations here are being directed by 14 Army, under the command of Gen MACKENSEN who was last identified commanding First Armoured Army in RUSSIA. H.Q. 1 Para Corps has been located by a captured document at ROCCAFERRATA. Otherwise identifications have been mainly confirmatory; 3 Bn 721 Jaeger Regt is established from prisoners and the only new and surprising identification is 1028 Reinforced Gren Regt which provided two prisoners in the area F 9532, on 13 February.

The enemy's relative quiescence this week in the bridgehead area is due almost certainly to the very heavy losses he suffered during the violent counter-attack of the preceding week. In this 65 and 715 Divs suffered especially, as they bore the brunt of the fighting East of the CARROCETO road and in the immediate area of CARROCETO itself. 3 P.G. Div also had heavy casualties and we know from a captured document that this was accompanied by a serious loss in material. The regimental commander, in fact, states that losses in material are out of all proportion to the casualties in killed, wounded and missing (which he describes as substantial) and that the problem of replacing material is growing more and more difficult, even unsolvable in some cases, which leads to an "insufferable" weakening of combat efficiency. It appears from the document that the regiment is expecting shortly to be withdrawn to a rest area. It seems clear, in fact, that the enemy's first full scale attack on our bridgehead, although it gained some ground, cost him dearly and he is now pausing for regrouping and refitting.

.....On the GUSTAV.....

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On the GUSTAV line the main interest has been the arrival of reinforcements in the CASSINO sector from 8th Army front. These have all so far been parachute bns from 1 Para Div; I/1, III/3 and III/4 Para Regts have been identified from prisoners and it is believed that there are at least two more in this area which probably include III/1 which has returned from the bridgehead. It is clear that the enemy is determined to defend CASSINO to the utmost.

South of the river LIRI I/115 G.R., which appears to be now permanently separated from H.G. Div, has been put in to strengthen the link between the positions round S. ANDREA and those on MONTE MAJO. The enemy have been making repeated attempts to recapture MONTE ORNITO, whose value as an O.P. they now realise more fully after having lost it. The most interesting identification in this area is of II Bn 194 G.R. at G 8500 on 15 February; the prisoner stated his bn had just returned from the ANZIO bridgehead. This may perhaps herald an attempt to regroup 71 Div; it at least brings its scattered regiments into the same Corps after being divided between two armies. It is possible that the special mention given to 211 G.R. in the German communiqué for 15 February may mean that the regiment is about to be withdrawn after the very heavy losses it has suffered. The fact that 194 has turned up in 29 P.G. Div sector may imply the relief of the latter though it remains to be seen whether in that case it would go to the bridgehead or to the CASSINO sector.

On 8 Army front the enemy continues to develop the FORO line using Italian forced labour and apparently Russian labour bns. Photographs of 10 February show that an almost continuous wire obstacle exists forward of the river from MIGLIANICO to VACRI and possibly on to CASALANDITELLA; there is however little in the way of defences behind it. The main line behind the river has also been considerably strengthened. It is now mined most of the way from FRANCAVILLA to the bridge West of MIGLIANICO and fresh diggings have appeared making a continuous line of trenches and weapon pits for 3,000 yards inland from FRANCAVILLA. The main coast road crossing over the FORO is additionally defended by fresh anti-tank positions about 800 yards West of the crossing and others which have appeared in the East bank. There is wire along the sea front at FRANCAVILLA itself. Further North there is practically nothing to report from air photographs though civilians have spoken of defences behind the PESCARA.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) SHIPPING

Absence of photographic cover prevents any estimate of the daily turnover at SAN STEFANO and PIOMBINO during the past week. On 7 February there were 4 F-boats and 5 barges at the former port, and 10 F-boats and 7 barges at the latter. Since then both ports have been repeatedly attacked by Allied aircraft. Apart from the damage caused to port installations, these attacks may stimulate the enemy to seek alternative unloading places in order to avoid concentrating so many craft.

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in these small and vulnerable ports. There is, however, only one point between PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO at which the railway approaches the coast - the very small harbour of FOLLONICA. Hence any alternative supply arrangements in this region are likely to involve a road lift and the attendant duplication of loading and unloading.

On the Italian East coast the usual trickle of supplies reaches SAN BENEDETTO in MSVs.

In DALMATIA the operations against the Northern group of islands off ZARA seem to have petered out with the task half finished. DUGI OTOK was evacuated on 10 February, and only PASMAN and ULJAN remain in German hands. It is likely that a further attempt will be made to clean up these islands, whose potential threat to the enemy's seaborne supply traffic will grow as the Allied armies advance in ITALY.

Shipping activity off the Dalmatian coast continues normally. But Allied aircraft and light naval forces are almost daily sinking one or more of the MSVs or small steamers upon which this traffic mainly depends. In addition a 2,000 ton steamer from POLA was attacked by our air forces near SELIT on 8 February and left ablaze. It is some time since the enemy ventured to send so large a vessel out of relatively safe waters, and his experience will not encourage him to repeat the attempt.

The value of these attacks lies in the fact that they hinder seaborne supply traffic to the coastal garrisons of Southern DALMATIA, whose only other line of communication, the LROD-SARAJEVO-DUBROVNIK railway, is of low capacity and subject to Partisan interruption. With the Allies firmly established in Southern ITALY, the enemy can allow no weakening of this bastion of the European fortress. Therefore he is forced to undertake costly and unprofitable operations in the interior in the attempt to guarantee the security of his landward lines of communication. The effect of such operations is usually short-lived: in the long run it becomes more and more troublesome and difficult for him to maintain the all-important defensive garrisons of the coast.

(b) RAILWAYS

On 7 and 8 February good bombing severely dislocated the Central Italian railway network so that on 9 February all the main approaches to ROME from the North were probably blocked. Since then, however, concentration of air attack elsewhere has given the enemy time to make the necessary repairs, and by 11 February he was probably able to get through all the trains necessary to the maintenance of his forces. As of 15 February only the West coast line can be definitely said to be blocked.

It has been reported that in many places and particularly in the OSTIA and CIVITAVECCHIA areas, the Germans uprooted the electric track rails, despatching the steel to Northern destinations. This report undoubtedly has reference exclusively to the West coast line. It is known that the Germans are, at least to some extent, making use of electric locomotives in ITALY, but presumably traffic on the West coast line is too light to

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warrant maintenance of the necessary electric power facilities.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

An uneasy peace reigns between EDES and ELAS; hostilities ceased on February 4 after ELAS had launched a general attack across the ARAKTHOS river in spite of the arrangement to cease fire on February 3. A German drive is now taking place with the intention of taking EDES in the rear; in this connection Col ZERVAS has asked ELAS for permission to cross the river ARAKTHOS and thus place that obstacle in the path of the better armed Germans. The reaction of ELAS to this request is not known.

JUGOSLAVIA

SLOVENIA AND CROATIA-SLAVONIA

The Partisans have been extremely busy in sabotaging enemy communications and the following successes have been reported during the end of January. A goods train was mined on the line BAKOVA JARUGA-ZAGREB; the engine and three trucks were destroyed causing 30 hours delay to traffic. On the same line near POPOVAC an express train was mined causing the destruction of the engine and two trucks and a delay of 20 hours; the line was cut at BJEVOVAR in many places. A goods train on the main ZAGREB-BELGRADE line was mined near NOVA GRADISKA wrecking the engine and 30 trucks, and in ISTRIA a train was wrecked between TRIESTE and BUJE on February 4th causing the death of some 50 Germans. The Partisans claim that all major industrial installations South of the railway ZAGREB-LJUBLJANA-TRIESTE together with the lines have been destroyed and the railway stations burnt.

Desultory fighting has taken place S.W. of ZAGREB against troops of 1 Cossack Div, and further to the West around NOVO MESTO and KOCEVJE against elements of 162 Turkoman Div where the enemy are making efforts to keep the roads to SUSAK and FIUME open. 392 Germano-Croat Div has reached the area NOVI-SENJ-BRINJE after having had to fight its way down from ZAGREB. Fighting continues in the BRINJE-JESARJE-LEBAR triangle where more than 130 Germans have been killed, and between SENJ and OGULIN. To the North on February 10 the enemy recaptured KOPRIVNICA near the Hungarian frontier. This town was captured together with the railway junction town of VIROVITICA late in November 43, the latter being retaken by the enemy immediately afterwards.

BOSNIA

Partisan forces are again in control of the villages GORNI VAKUF, KUPRES and KONJIC, scene of the recent German offensive, and have retaken VLASENICA to the East from where they are attacking towards SOKOLAC and SARAJEVO. The area between these two zones is strongly held by the enemy to protect the BROD-SARAJEVO railway but Partisan detachments continue their harassing attacks.

.....An enemy column....

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H.Q., A.C.M.F. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 33

OF 23 FEBRUARY 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Ten divisions are now represented opposite our ANZIO bridgehead, and in the last week a most determined effort has been made to eliminate it. This main offensive by 14 Army began on the morning of 16 February with four divisions attacking down the CISTANO - ANZIO road on a front of about five miles. From West to East the units taking part were 65 Div between the 85 and 86 Eastings, 3 P.G. Div with 29 G.R. 309 P.G.R. and 1027 G.R. under command down the main road, 715 Div between the 87 and 89 Eastings and 114 Jaeger Div between the 89 and 92 Eastings. 114 and 715 Divs were rather mixed up in the first attack and the other boundaries are also not entirely clear; 1028 G.R. seems to have been in 114 Div's sector and some elements of 4 Para Div were assisting 65 Div. In general, however, 4 Para and H.G. Divs on the Western and Eastern flanks respectively made only holding attacks. Fighting was very fierce and was assisted by the utmost efforts of the German Air Force. By 18 February the enemy had pressed down this narrow front as far as the 285 Northing and was attacking the "fly-over" bridge at F.862287 but his losses had been very severe. On 19 February the enemy attempted to carry out the second part of his original plan which was to put through two fresh divisions, 26 Pz and 29 P.G. but the breakthrough which would have enabled their mobile divisions to exploit had not been made. Their attack was firmly held and the enemy were forced to give ground. At the same time he tried to widen his salient on the Eastern side by bringing 715 Div round to attack down the railway bed and the POSSO DELLA FICOCCIA towards RADICLIONE (R. 920287). This attack was originally planned for the night of the 18th but the assembly was broken up by our artillery and when it was attempted at first light next morning it met with an Allied attack in force up the road in the opposite direction which took many prisoners. By this time the enemy was in considerable disorder and his forces seriously weakened as is shown by the fact that on 19 February elements of 147, 741, 721 and 725 Regts were all identified between the 90 and 91 Eastings.

By 20 February the enemy's attacks had ceased and the main

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offensive at the bridgehead can be said to have failed. It won ground but has cost him wholly disproportionate casualties. But we cannot expect that he will permanently go over to the defensive for too much depends on the issue. It has already been made a matter of prestige; the defeat of the first Allied landing attempt in 1944 would be a good augury for a year which is bound to see others. From a purely military point of view at ANZIO we are certainly containing ten German divisions with a force about half their number and unless the bridgehead is eliminated we shall continue to contain them for any weakening would at once revive the threat to the rear of 10 Army. We must expect the enemy to resume the offensive again when he has rested and replenished his formations. An indication of his probable intentions is given by the identification of elements of Hermann Goering divisions in the area F.9831 and of 362 Division on the Eastern flank; probably the former will be the spearhead of the new attacks.

There have been one or two new identifications; from the point of view of German manpower 1028 G.R. is an interesting phenomenon. Prisoners state that it is formed of two training bns which were apparently intended for 15 P.G. Div but were sent into action after a very short period of training as an independent formation; they expressed great indignation at being put straight into the line as they had been given to understand that their training had only begun. 1027 G.R. (reinforced) is a more obscure unit and nothing is known yet of its exact composition or nature. 309 P.G.R., I and III bns of which have been identified, is the renamed Infantry Lehr Regt. This is an independent regt normally stationed at the Infantry School at DOEBERITZ where it demonstates tactics and experiments with new weapons. It was hastily removed from DOEBERITZ on 7 February, rushed down to the bridgehead and put straight into action under command of 3 P.G. Div. The regt is said to have 24 Assault Guns attached. The arrival of this formation shows clearly the complete lack of a proper strategic reserve in GERMANY itself. Prisoners from 36 SS P.G.R. made a strange impression; they were all youths of about 17½ years old, of poor physique, low mentality and deficient training. They had not volunteered for the SS (one had violently protested against his enrolment) but had been drafted straight in; they say that the entire class of 1926 from rural districts had suffered the same fate which will certainly account for the phenomenal recent expansion of the SS. Quality, however, seems to have suffered.

On the GUSTAV line CASSINO has still been the main centre of interest and the Germans continue to put up a most bitter and violent resistance in which battalions of 1 Para Div have played a leading part. Further South 29 P.G. Div, which is now identified opposite the bridgehead, has been relieved by the elements of 71 Div which came from there (194 G.R. and the div tps). On 19 February the enemy made a full scale attack to recapture Monte ORNITO, whose importance was referred to last week, employing I and II/194, II and III/129, I/104 and I/115 G.R. The attack was a costly failure and 112 PWs were taken, including three Coy Commanders. It appeared from prisoners taken there that 115 G.R. has returned finally from H.C. Div to its parent formation, 15 P.G. Div, which it has not been with since SICILY and is to be amalgamated with 129 G.R.; the new regt will take the number 115 as being associated with the memories of 15 Pz Div in AFRICA.

.... On Eighth Army....

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On Eighth Army front at the beginning of the week there were in line the first and second bns of both 3 and 4 Para Regts and it appears that these too may be leaving. Between 18 and 20 February II/3 Para was making rather leisurely arrangements to withdraw from the line. On night 20/21 February, according to a PW from II/146 (formerly III/146), his bn was moved up from the ARIELLI area to near TOLLO where it allegedly relieved a unit of 4 Para Regt. It is reasonable to assume that these remaining elements of 1 Para Div will join the rest of the division in the CASSINO area where it will be again concentrated after a month of separation. It is not yet clear what is going to replace them though there are slight indications of the presence of elements of 90 P.G. Div on 8 Army front. In that case the relief might take the form of a direct change-over; 90 P.G. has had a very hard time at CASSINO and its casualties are known to be high, particularly in 200 G.R.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) SHIPPING

On the Italian West coast, SAN STEFANO continues to be the principal port of intake. Photo recce of CIVITAVECCHIA has revealed no sign of activity. There has been insufficient photo cover this week to enable an estimate of intake to be given, but on 20 February there were 4 F-Boats, 4 barges and 2 coasters present at SAN STEFANO; on 19 February PIOMBINO (a staging point on the voyage to SAN STEFANO) had 12 F-boats and 4 barges, and the turnover of F-boats and barges at SPEZIA has been fairly heavy. All this suggests a slight increase in daily intake, which for some weeks has apparently been in the neighbourhood of 200 tons. At the same time, the air attacks carried out against SAN STEFANO by day on 16 February and during night 16/17 February, must have served as a warning to the enemy of what will happen if he continues to put all his eggs in one basket. So it is probable that some attempt will be made to reduce the concentration of shipping in SAN STEFANO by providing an alternative port.

In connection with this coastal traffic, it is interesting to note that ITALY's manganese production, which amounted immediately before the war to 60,000 tons per annum, is mainly concentrated in Southern TUSCANY. Since the recapture of NIKOPOL on the Dnieper River by the Red Army, Italian manganese will play a more important role in GERMANY's steel industry. SAN STEFANO itself is the most likely place for loading ore from the GROSSETO mines, while that from the PISA-LUCCA area will probably be loaded at LEGHORN. A parallel for this is found in DALMATIA, where supply vessels frequently carry bauxite on their return journey.

On the East Italian coast traffic to ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO continues, probably on the usual small scale. Lack of air photo cover precludes any estimate of intake.

In DALMATIA there has been no further activity in the Northern islands. The interest has rather shifted to central DALMATIA, where concentrations of landing craft in SPLIT area suggest that operations are brewing. The obvious objective is VIS, the last remaining Partisan-held island in that area, and a constant threat to the enemy's vital

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L of C. Such an operation, in view of the long stretch of open water to be covered, and the distance from the mainland, would be rather more ambitious than anything the Germans have yet undertaken in this part of the world.

Supply traffic up and down the coast continues normally. There has been no further attempt to sail large MVs South of ZARA since the disastrous expeditions early this month when 3 MVs were destroyed. So a growing strain is being thrown upon the enemy's limited fleet of ASVs and motor coasters. Allied Naval and Air forces continue to add to this strain by attacking such vessels whenever the opportunity presents itself.

(b) RAILWAYS

Since 17 February there has been very little interference with the North and Central Italian railway traffic. The East coast line has been open since 6 February. The main FLORENCE-ROME line was blocked for two days South of ORTE, but the subsidiary ORTE-ROME lines remained open. On the West coast line the bridge at CECINA remains blocked and considerable damage was caused at PIOMBINO on 15 February where the traffic to ROME was probably held up for two days. On 22 February POLIGNO Marshalling Yards and the bridge at MONTALTO di CASTRO are believed to have been blocked.

From air reconnaisance it is apparent that considerable traffic has been reaching ROME, and other sources report that on 9 February 12 trains and on 12 February 20 trains reached the capital from FLORENCE and PISA. On 16 February however, a successful attack was made on ROME marshalling yards and two trains are reported to have been destroyed. Trains have also been observed South of ROME in both the ANZIO and CASSINO areas, evidencing the continuance of the enemy policy of pushing his railheads as far forward as possible. While this rail traffic is not great a few trains slipped through provide a great saving in MT column space and fuel and the enemy is known to be short of both these items

3. BALKANS

GREECE

The negotiations between EDES and ELAS appear to have reached a deadlock after the third meeting between the representatives. Agreement has been reached on all the major issues except the formation of a common Andarte Army and the person of its commander. Col ZERVAS fears the complete subjugation of his force by the numerically superior ELAS formations unless the commander of the proposed joint Army is friendly disposed towards him

ALBANIA

During mid-February Partisans destroyed a small road bridge at PALASSA S.E. of VALONA. This action was swiftly followed by a German drive against the Partisan 5 Bde in the ERATAJ area and against the Partisan 6 Bde in the PERMET (M.61) LUKHERIES Mts. Details are lacking.

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JUGOSLAVIA

SLOVENIA AND CROATIA

Partisan forces are reported to have crossed the river ISONZO between CORIZIA and TOLMINO and to be fighting near the last war battlefield at CAPORETTO.

The German garrisons are still encircled in NOVO MESTO and KOCEVJE and are suffering heavy casualties in their attempts to break out. Between these two towns attacks were made on enemy columns and 16 lorries were destroyed and 73 Germans killed. An armoured train which attempted to interfere from LJUBLJANA was forced to retire after the Partisans had removed some 100 metres of line.

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G.S.I.
HQ., ACMF.
23 Feb 44.

Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

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H.Q., A.C.M.F. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 33

OF 23 FEBRUARY 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Ten divisions are now represented opposite our ANZIO bridgehead, and in the last week a most determined effort has been made to eliminate it. This main offensive by 14 Army began on the morning of 16 February with four divisions attacking down the CISTANO - ANZIO road on a front of about five miles. From West to East the units taking part were 65 Div between the 85 and 86 Eastings, 3 P.C. Div with 29 G.R. 309 P.G.R. and 1027 G.R. under command down the main road, 715 Div between the 87 and 89 Eastings and 114 Jaeger Div between the 89 and 92 Eastings. 114 and 715 Divs were rather mixed up in the first attack and the other boundaries are also not entirely clear; 1028 G.R. seems to have been in 114 Div's sector and some elements of 4 Para Div were assisting 65 Div. In general, however, 4 Para and H.G. Divs on the Western and Eastern flanks respectively made only holding attacks. Fighting was very fierce and was assisted by the utmost efforts of the German Air Force. By 18 February the enemy had pressed down this narrow front as far as the 285 Northing and was attacking the "fly-over" bridge at F.862287 but his losses had been very severe. On 19 February the enemy attempted to carry out the second part of his original plan which was to put through two fresh divisions, 26 Pz and 29 P.G. but the breakthrough which would have enabled their mobile divisions to exploit had not been made. Their attack was firmly held and the enemy were forced to give ground. At the same time he tried to widen his salient on the Eastern side by bringing 715 Div round to attack down the railway bed and the POSSO DELLA FICOCCIA towards PADIGLIONE (R. 920287). This attack was originally planned for the night of the 18th but the assembly was broken up by our artillery and when it was attempted at first light next morning it met with an Allied attack in force up the road in the opposite direction which took many prisoners. By this time the enemy was in considerable disorder and his forces seriously weakened, as is shown by the fact that on 19 February elements of 147, 741, 721 and 725 Regts were all identified between the 90 and 91 Eastings.

By 20 February the enemy's attacks had ceased and the main.

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offensive at the bridgehead can be said to have failed. It won ground but has cost him wholly disproportionate casualties. But we cannot expect that he will permanently go over to the defensive for too much depends on the issue. It has already been made a matter of prestige; the defeat of the first Allied landing attempt in 1944 would be a good augury for a year which is bound to see others. From a purely military point of view at ANZIO we are certainly containing ten German divisions with a force about half their number and unless the bridgehead is eliminated we shall continue to contain them for any weakening would at once revive the threat to the rear of 10 Army. We must expect the enemy to resume the offensive again when he has rested and replenished his formations. An indication of his probable intentions is given by the identification of elements of Hermann Goering divisions in the area F.9831 and of 362 Division on the Eastern flank; probably the former will be the spearhead of the new attacks.

There have been one or two new identifications; from the point of view of German manpower 1028 G.R. is an interesting phenomenon. Prisoners state that it is formed of two training bns which were apparently intended for 15 P.G. Div but were sent into action after a very short period of training as an independent formation; they expressed great indignation at being put straight into the line as they had been given to understand that their training had only begun. 1027 G.R. (reinforced) is a more obscure unit and nothing is known yet of its exact composition or nature. 309 P.G.R., I and III bns of which have been identified, is the renamed Infantry Lehr Regt. This is an independent regt normally stationed at the Infantry School at DOEBERITZ where it demonstates tactics and experiments with new weapons. It was hastily removed from DOEBERITZ on 7 February, rushed down to the bridgehead and put straight into action under command of 3 P.G. Div. The regt is said to have 24 Assault Guns attached. The arrival of this formation shows clearly the complete lack of a proper strategic reserve in GERMANY itself. Prisoners from 36 SS P.G.R. made a strange impression; they were all youths of about 17½ years old, of poor physique, low mentality and deficient training. They had not volunteered for the SS (one had violently protested against his enrolment) but had been drafted straight in; they say that the entire class of 1926 from rural districts had suffered the same fate which will certainly account for the phenomenal recent expension of the SS. Quality, however, seems to have suffered.

On the GUSTAV line CASSINO has still been the main centre of interest and the Germans continue to put up a most bitter and violent resistance in which battalions of 1 Para Div have played a leading part. Further South 29 P.G. Div, which is now identified opposite the bridgehead, has been relieved by the elements of 71 Div which came from there (194 G.R. and the div tps). On 19 February the enemy made a full scale attack to recapture Monte CROCE, whose importance was referred to last week, employing I and II/194, II and III/129, I/104 and I/115 G.R. The attack was a costly failure and 112 PWs were taken, including three Coy Commanders. It appeared from prisoners taken there that 115 G.R. has returned finally from H.G. Div to its parent formation, 15 P.G. Div, which it has not been with since SICILY and is to be amalgamated with 129 G.R.; the new regt will take the number 115 as being associated with the memories of 15 Pz Div in AFRICA.

.... On Eighth Army....

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On Eighth Army front at the beginning of the week there were in line the first and second bns of both 3 and 4 Para Regts and it appears that these too may be leaving. Between 18 and 20 February II/3 Para was making rather leisurely arrangements to withdraw from the line. On night 20/21 February, according to a PW from II/146 (formerly III/146), his bn was moved up from the ARIELLI area to near TOLLO where it allegedly relieved a unit of 4 Para Regt. It is reasonable to assume that these remaining elements of 1 Para Div will join the rest of the division in the CASSINO area where it will be again concentrated after a month of separation. It is not yet clear what is going to replace them though there are slight indications of the presence of elements of 90 P.G. Div on 8 Army front. In that case the relief might take the form of a direct change-over; 90 P.G. has had a very hard time at CASSINO and its casualties are known to be high, particularly in 200 G.R.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) SHIPPING

On the Italian West coast, SAN STEFANO continues to be the principal port of intake. Photo recce of CIVITAVECCHIA has revealed no sign of activity. There has been insufficient photo cover this week to enable an estimate of intake to be given, but on 20 February there were 4 F-Boats, 4 barges and 2 coasters present at SAN STEFANO; on 19 February PIOMBINO (a staging point on the voyage to SAN STEFANO) had 12 F-boats and 4 barges, and the turnover of F-boats and barges at SPEZIA has been fairly heavy. All this suggests a slight increase in daily intake, which for some weeks has apparently been in the neighbourhood of 900 tons. At the same time, the air attacks carried out against SAN STEFANO by day on 16 February and during night 16/17 February, must have served as a warning to the enemy of what will happen if he continues to put all his eggs in one basket. So it is probable that some attempt will be made to reduce the concentration of shipping in SAN STEFANO by providing an alternative port.

In connection with this coastal traffic, it is interesting to note that ITALY's manganese production, which amounted immediately before the war to 60,000 tons per annum, is mainly concentrated in Southern TUSCANY. Since the recapture of NIKOPOL on the Dnieper River by the Red Army, Italian manganese will play a more important role in GERMANY's steel industry. SAN STEFANO itself is the most likely place for loading ore from the GROSSETO mines, while that from the PISA-LUCCA area will probably be loaded at LEGHORN. A parallel for this is found in DALMATIA, where supply vessels frequently carry bauxite on their return journey.

On the East Italian coast traffic to ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO continues, probably on the usual small scale. Lack of air photo cover precludes any estimate of intake.

In DALMATIA there has been no further activity in the Northern islands. The interest has rather shifted to central DALMATIA, where concentrations of landing craft in SPLIT area suggest that operations are brewing. The obvious objective is VIS, the last remaining Partisan-held island in that area, and a constant threat to the enemy's vital

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L of C. Such an operation, in view of the long stretch of open water to be covered, and the distance from the mainland, would be rather more ambitious than anything the Germans have yet undertaken in this part of the world.

Supply traffic up and down the coast continues normally. There has been no further attempt to sail large MVs South of ZARA since the disastrous expeditions early this month when 3 MVs were destroyed. So a growing strain is being thrown upon the enemy's limited fleet of ASVs and motor coasters. Allied Naval and Air forces continue to add to this strain by attacking such vessels whenever the opportunity presents itself.

(b) RAILWAYS

Since 17 February there has been very little interference with the North and Central Italian railway traffic. The East coast line has been open since 6 February. The main FLORENCE-ROME line was blocked for two days South of ORTE, but the subsidiary ORTE-ROME lines remained open. On the West coast line the bridge at CECIN. remains blocked and considerable damage was caused at PIOMBINO on 15 February where the traffic to ROME was probably held up for two days. On 22 February FOLIGNO Marshalling Yards and the bridge at MONTALTO di CASTRO are believed to have been blocked.

From air reconnaisance it is apparent that considerable traffic has been reaching ROME, and other sources report that on 9 February 12 trains and on 12 February 20 trains reached the capital from FLORENCE and PISA. On 16 February however, a successful attack was made on ROME marshalling yards and two trains are reported to have been destroyed. Trains have also been observed South of ROME in both the ANZIO and CASSINO areas, evidencing the continuance of the enemy policy of pushing his railheads as far forward as possible. While this rail traffic is not great a few trains slipped through provide a great saving in MT column space and fuel and the enemy is known to be short of both these items

3. BALKANS

GREECE

The negotiations between EDES and ELAS appear to have reached a deadlock after the third meeting between the representatives. Agreement has been reached on all the major issues except the formation of a common Andarte Army and the person of its commander. Col ZERVAS fears the complete subjugation of his force by the numerically superior ELAS formations unless the commander of the proposed joint Army is friendly disposed towards him

ALBANIA

During mid-February Partisans destroyed a small road bridge at PALASSA S.E. of VALONA. This action was swiftly followed by a German drive against the Partisan 5 Bde in the ERATAJ area and against the Partisan 6 Bde in the PERMET (M.61) LUNGHERIES Mts. Details are lacking.

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HQ., ACMF.
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Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

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H.Q., A.C.M.F. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 34

OF 1 MARCH 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The past week has seen a lull in the beachhead which lasted from the failure of the four day German offensive of 16-19 February until the morning of 29 February when another large-scale attack appears to have begun. It seems that the main enemy schwerpunkt has been shifted East, and the first report of the new offensive speaks of attacks in the area between the 94 and 01 Eastings. This had been suspected from the displacement of enemy artillery towards the East which had been noticed during the week. It is certain that other regrouping has been going on but the evidence is far from complete. 362 Inf Div has been identified between the 94 and 99 Eastings and in the former area of Hermann Goering division, covering CISTERNA, and this makes it probable that the latter (now known as a Parachute Panzer Division) will take part in the new attack. 362 Div itself may also be involved this time, having been inactive during the last attack. What other force will be involved is difficult to say; on grounds of the heavy casualties they suffered in the first attack we can probably rule out 715 and 65 Inf and 3 P.G. Divs while 4 Para is still over in the West. This leaves 114 Jaeger, 29 P.G. and 26 Panzer which may be employed: the first indeed has also suffered very heavy losses and may be restricted to a holding role, but 29 and 26 Pz, which were apparently the two divisions intended as the second wave last time, will probably be well to the fore again. They are, perhaps, the best divisions of which von MACKENSEN disposes, after Hermann Goering div. The attack will probably therefore be made by two infantry and two armoured divisions. The latter are already conspicuous; 90 tanks have been observed on 29 February moving from CISTERNA Southwards towards FEMINA MORTA and it seems as though the offensive this time is beginning with an armoured rather than an infantry attack.

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The enemy intention is probably to drive a wedge into the Eastern part of the bridgehead and thereby cut off our troops holding the line of the MUSSOLINI canal. This does not, on the face of it, look like an all-out attempt to eliminate the bridgehead in one blow but rather the tactics would be to reduce gradually its size, causing us at each stage a serious attrition of force, until it became too small for safety. It seems probable that this new attack is under command of 76 Panzer Corps which appears to be operating under 14 Army; at least it seems clear that this Corps H.Q. is in the bridgehead area. This gives 14 Army two Corps H.Q. which is reasonable in view of its considerable strength in divisions and 1 Para Corps is apparently still commanding the Eastern flank.

Interrogation of prisoners has given interesting information on the 16 February offensive. It is clear that when the attack was launched morale was particularly high; troops had been given a special order from HITLER in which he made it clear that this "abscess" must be eliminated and, even more important for morale, they had been told that they would get massive air support from the Luftwaffe combined with numbers of heavy tanks. Finally at least two regts were told that 14 Army were to have the privilege of operating, for the first time of any German troops, with the "secret weapon". This long-awaited marvel was actually demonstrated to 309 P.G.R. according to one prisoner; the demonstration was a failure and the secret weapon turned out to be the radio-controlled explosive tank which has in fact already been used on the Russian front. None of them was reported in action by our troops but a prisoner reports that 14 of them were exploded prematurely by our artillery. With all this encouragement it is clear that the Germans fought with exceptional fierceness. 735 G.R. of 715 Div was, according to one P.W. reduced by the end of the attack to two assault groups with a total strength of 150 men; this would represent about 95% casualties against establishment strength. The division has apparently, as a result, been withdrawn to a quieter sector of the front or to rest and has not been identified since 20 February. It is clear from PW statements that figures for killed were high and particular damage was done by our artillery fire. 114 Jaeger Div suffered especially from this, for which its previous experience against Partisans in YUGOSLAVIA had not prepared it.

On the main front there has been little change or activity. It is now clear that 1 Para Div has taken over the CASSINO sector from 90 P.G. Div and its H.Q. is at the former's old site near RECCASECCA. Otherwise dispositions are unchanged. A prisoner from 115 Tank Bn who had been posted to 115 G.R. stated that the Bn had handed over its tanks to H.G. Div and the men had been drafted as infantry. On 8 Army front there is also no activity to report; apparently parts of 90 P.G., including elements of 190 Arty Regt and 361 G.R. are somewhere on that front though they have not yet been identified from prisoners. It looks as though a straight change-over with 1 Para Div was intended but final dispositions are not yet clear.

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An Anti-Nazi who travelled all the way from RUSSIA to desert to us in ITALY stated that while in BOLOGNA he met soldiers from the 278 Inf Div which was forming there. As he enquired about it with particular care in order to forge papers representing himself as a member of the division, and since he seems otherwise reliable, this identification should probably be accepted for the hitherto unidentified division known to be forming in the BOLOGNA area.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) SHIPPING

This has been a very poor week for air photography in ITALY, so little can be added to last week's information. No sign of activity has been seen at CIVITAVECCHIA, where port facilities are now known to be almost completely destroyed. Nevertheless, increased activity in F-boats and barges at SPEZIA suggests that seaborne maintenance traffic is being stepped up in Western ITALY. SAN STEFANO continues as the main port of intake on the West coast, but it is not unlikely that arrangements have been made for unloading this increased traffic at other small harbours.

There has been no photography of the Eastern coast of ITALY, but the usual traffic of ASVs is assumed to be reaching ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO.

In DALMATIA, concentrations of landing craft were observed in KORCULA Channel on 25 and 26 February, and the port of KORCULA showed abnormal activity. Two destroyers were sighted near TROGIR on 26 February. There is little doubt that these activities are in preparation for an attack on VIS, which, so long as it remains in Partisan hands, must endanger the vital seaborne supply line upon which the maintenance of the enemy's coastal garrisons depends.

Normal small craft traffic continues up and down the Dalmatian coast. The only large vessel seen, a medium MV at ZATON (near SIBENIK), was attacked by Allied aircraft and received a direct hit. The ports of POLA, FIUME, ZARA and SIBENIK were also attacked.

(b) RAILWAYS

Air attack on 22 February resulted in the cutting of the line near MONTALTO di CASTRO bridge and it is reported that the line is still out. Since this there have been no attacks on the railways in ITALY, and the bridge at CECINA and junction at VITERBO are the only other points where the railway system is now thought to be interrupted.

Owing to the destruction of CECINA bridge on 24 December no through traffic has been possible on the West coast line for over two months. Presumbly the line has been used for nothing more than the small amount of traffic required to move supplies brought in by sea to the small port of SAN STEFANO, and with the line out near MONTALTO di CASTRO through traffic from SAN STEFANO South to the ROME area is no longer possible. Reports

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continue to indicate that the Germans are removing tracks and electric generators from this line for use elsewhere.

The FLORENCE-ORTE-ROME line and the PERUGIA-TERNI-ORTE by-pass still form the main supply channel from the North to the enemy forces on the ANZIO and CASSINO fronts. Since the beginning of February access to ROME by these routes has been possible except on 5, 6 and 7 February when there was a block at TERNI, and on 8 February when ORTE was blocked. It is also believed that traffic was held up at BUCINE viaduct between AREZZO and FLORENCE on 13 February, but this requires confirmation. It is interesting to note that the through lines at VITERBO junction have now been blocked since January and that no repairs seem to have been attempted. The VITERBO-ROME lines (there are two, one electric and the other steam) form a useful loop around ORTE junction on the main FLORENCE-ROME line, but with VITERBO junction blocked no through traffic to ROME is possible over this loop. However, some local traffic from VITERBO to ROME is reported moving over the electric line; there are indications that the steam line has been mined.

The East coast railway line has been open since 3 February.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

The negotiations between the rival Greek parties have continued in a friendlier atmosphere. Eight meetings have taken place between the representatives of ELAS, EDES and EKKA, the latter having proved an effective cushion between the more fiery and involved ELAS and EDES parties. The release of Greek PWs and hostages taken by all parties during the recent struggle has been agreed to.

In the Mt. OLYMPUS area a German troop train was blown upand almost completely destroyed. In the ensuing confusion the Andartes caused great slaughter with hand grenades and LMG fire.

A Bulgarian force which surrounded a Greek band to the South of XANTHE on the river NESTOS suffered heavily in the ensuing action. 200 dead and wounded Bulgars were counted for the loss of 40 Andartes.

ALBANIA

SKENDER MUCO the BALL KOMBETAR chief of the VALONA area and said to be the representative of the Ball Kombetar Committee has stated that this party is willing to serve under orders from CAIRO, but he wished first to have a guarantee of Albanian independence from the Allies and secondly to suppress the Partisan Communistic bands. LIBOHOVE, midway between VALONA and JANINA was captured by the Partisans who took 50 Ball Kombetar PWs.

JUGOSLAVIA

SLOVENIA and CROATIA-SLAVONIA

The mercury mines at IDRIA situated between GORIZIA and

...LJUBLJANA....

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LJUBLJANA have been attacked for the second time by Partisan specialists and are now claimed to be out of action for the duration of the war. Fierce fighting continues in the KOPRIVNICA area where the enemy is striving to open his communications from HUNGARY to ZAGREB and the S.W. A combined force of Germans, Ustashi and Chetniks was repulsed at PETRINJA and an USTASHI force which attempted to interfere from the direction of KARLOVAC was forced to retire. In these operations lasting two days the enemy lost 84 killed, 92 wounded and 10 PWs.

The Partisans claim to have entered but not captured KOCEVJE and have twice destroyed the garrison in VELIKE LASCE to the South of LJUBLJANA. Partisan activity South of FIUME and in the entire area recently taken over by 392 Germano-Croat Div has increased. ZLOBIN was captured on 22 February and the Partisans were then advancing on KRALJEVICA. It appears that Ustashi troops are in possession of OTOCAC, last reported to be held by the Partisans. A report states that a column of 800 Ustashi made a sortie from this town but was forced back after losing 82 killed and wounded.

The recent withdrawal of German Divs from the N.W. has been used by the Partisans to tighten their hold and they claim to be in control of the area exclusive ZAGREB-SISAK-KOSTANJICA-BOS NOVI-BIHAC-KARLOVAC. Lack of heavy weapons and in particular of AT guns has so far prevented them from capturing the towns. CAZIN, 10 miles North of BIHAC, was captured by the Partisans on 21 February. On 15 February a troop train was mined at PERKOVCI on main BELGRADE-ZAGREB line. The engine and 16 trucks were destroyed, 45 Germans were killed and 29 taken prisoner. Some days later a section of the BANJA LUKA-PRIJEDOR line was destroyed and two bridges blown; a train was also derailed at BOS NOVI. On 22 February two trains were derailed on the LJUBLJANA-LITIJA line by Partisan specialists who also damaged the lead mines in the latter town and put out of action the coal mines at RAHJENBERG.

DALMATIA

The Partisans appreciated that the attack on VIS would take place on or about 25 February and claim that the enemy postponed his attempt when the element of surprise was lost. There has been considerable activity on German held KORCULA and the PELJESAC peninsula. An estimate of 3,000 enemy on KORCULA and increased shipping activity in nearby waters points to the conclusion that the attack is imminent. Elsewhere in the Northern islands the enemy have slackened their grip but as yet no partisan gains are reported.

BOSNIA

There has been fighting on a reduced scale near BOS GRAHOVO probably intended as a flank protection for Northbound German convoys on the KNIN-BIHAC road. Fighting at ROGATICA to the East of SARAJEVO continues, but details are lacking. The Partisan forces which invested and captured KALINOVIK are reported to be hard pressed and suffering from lack of ammunition and may eventually have to cede the town to the enemy. Another train has been derailed on the MOSTAR KONJIC line and some 50 Germans killed.

SERBIA

Partisan strength is reported to be increasing but no

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great activity appears to have taken place. An attack by the Partisans on PRIJEPOLJE is announced but no details are given.

ORDER OF BATTLE

162 Inf Div is reported to be in the UDINE GORIZIA area and to have commitments on the Istrian peninsula; it is unlikely that this formation still has duties to perform in the LJUBLJANA-NOVO MESTO area.

SS Mtn Div Prinz Eugen was confirmed in the MOSTAR-NEVESINJE GACKO area but was later rumoured to be moving North.

A delayed report states that LA Police Regt left OGULIN for RUSSIA at the same time as the SS Divs Nordland and Nederland.

It is reported that a regt bearing the number 8 was concerned with operations near KOZANI between BITOLJ and LARISSA. This probably refers to 8 SS Police Regt of the newly formed SS Police Gren Div with H.Q. at LARISSA. SS Police Gren Div has the SS Police regts 5, 7 and 8.

GSI.
HQ. AGIF.
1 Mar 44

Brigadier,
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If so he has finished off the destruction which our bombs had almost completed. Consequently with only the ports of PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO on the West, ANCONA and the little fishing harbours down the coast to PESCHETTO on the East, it is estimated that, in the event of a major rail breakdown in Central ITALY, road transport and the limited coastal shipping could barely cope with the daily army supply and maintenance requirements.

The movement of supplies is not the only form of transport affected. Rail interruptions have imposed considerable delays on the movement of troops. The normal German infantry division is still horse-drawn and is normally moved by rail when making such journeys as from North to South ITALY; indeed it is the German practice (again probably largely due to MT tyre and fuel restrictions) for even the non-tracked elements of armoured and motorised divisions to make such journeys by rail. It is known however that the moves of most of the divisions which have come South in the last few months have been either delayed or the formations forced to detrain as a result of rail interruptions.

Although the rail network in Central ITALY is not extensive, it is too much to hope that even sustained attacks will in fact cause a complete breakdown; nevertheless the mounting chaos and confusion caused by sustained attacks could bring about an intolerable situation for the enemy and one which he could not endure indefinitely. Furthermore, the increased use of MT for the movement of supplies (and consequent increase of fuel consumption) which our recent attacks must be imposing on the enemy, together with the general large scale troop movements necessitated in reaction to our landing, may have far reaching repercussions. Should a serious fuel shortage develop in Central ITALY the enemy's freedom of tactical manoeuvre might well be affected.

Just as important to the enemy as MT and fuel at this time are horses and fodder. It is estimated that the number of horses now being used by 10 Army may well be as high as 35,000, and that these will require at least 400 tons of fodder daily. From what is known of the supply situation in German occupied ITALY there is reason to believe that the enemy may have considerable difficulty in getting the necessary fodder locally as would be his wont. Failing this, supplies would have to come from North ITALY or the Reich imposing yet a further strain on his L of C.

DALMATIA AND CROATIA.

The situation in DALMATIA has also, at least temporarily, deteriorated. In an area where the enemy relies almost entirely on his road and sea communications both have been under constant attack. Nowhere in the area between KARLOVAC-BIHAC-SPLIT and the coast can the enemy be said to be in full control of the main roads, while coastal shipping and ports have been severely handled by the air force. The Germans are still having to fight to keep the main inland roads, SINJ-LIVNO-DONJI and OGROZAC-KNIN-GRACAC. 114 Jäger Div has been fighting its way Northward along the road GOSPIC - OTOCAC - SINJ while 392 Croat Div is apparently fighting its way South down the road from

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KARLOVAC to meet it. Yet another German column is reported to be fighting its way along the SISAK-SENJ road. The Partisans are strongly attacking all troop movements along these roads and there has been fighting on a considerable scale. At the same time German coastal and island shipping has been heavily attacked where the Germans and Partisans continue to perform a kind of "Cox and Box" act on some of the more important of the Dalmatian islands. This state of affairs is only a part of the ceaseless and never wholly successful German struggle for the effective control of communications in YUGOSLAVIA.

RAILWAYS

ITALY

Prior to the ANZIO landings a large scale and co-ordinated air attack was launched against the enemy's rail L of C and is continuing. Helped by good weather the attack proved extremely successful and by the eve of the landings all the main routes of Central ITALY had been cut, while traffic on the subsidiary lines was at best on a very restricted scale. The situation was, in fact, more satisfactory than at any time since the invasion of ITALY. Blocks were caused at all the major rail junctions and in addition successful attacks on the CECINA and MONTALTO di CASTRO bridges had closed the West coast line for an indefinite period.

Thus at the critical period when it was essential for him to have his communications working freely, the enemy was faced with a large scale breakdown of the railways. The seriousness with which he viewed this situation is shown by the rapidity of the repairs effected. 48 hours were normally sufficient to have a junction open again, although the bridges offered a tougher problem, and even now the CECINA and MONTALTO bridges are still closed to traffic. The strain imposed on his repair facilities by the widespread nature of the attacks was of course cumulative, and if it had been possible to maintain them without respite, a very critical situation might have arisen.

Owing to weather conditions, however, attacks were on a reduced scale for a few days after the landing and a degree of recovery was achieved. By 28 Jan the Central route from FLORENCE to ROME was probably open although working on a restricted scale. The West coast line was still shut, and the East coast line probably cut at RIMINI. Attacks were however renewed on 28 and 29 Jan and although full PR is not yet available it seems likely that the Central line is again closed at ORTE and at the North ORVIETO bridge while there is at best only restricted working on the EMPOLI-CHIUSI and the TERNI by-pass routes.

It is as yet impossible to draw any definite conclusions as to the effect this will have on the German supply system. Recent PR and visual reconnaissance of the ROME Marshalling Yard show a considerable amount of rolling stock present suggesting that a degree of congestion has been achieved in this area. At the same time the Marshalling Yard at FLORENCE is only very lightly loaded implying that little traffic is proceeding South down the Central line. Apart from this, little evidence is available but it is certain that the moves of any possible

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reinforcements from the North to the new battle area will have to be carried out at least partially by road at the present time.

In the North, all available information shows that the BRENNER and TARVIS routes are still the main supply arteries for ITALY, though even these are only working on a restricted scale. On the TARVIS route the average daily number of incoming trains in the period 25 Nov - 19 Dec was only 13, and on the BRENNER it was very little more. It is evident that the daily number of trains coming in on any given day rarely exceeds 20 on each of the above routes. This of course is ample for the maintenance of all the German forces in ITALY even if only half of them are carrying supplies.

On the Franco-Italian routes traffic is on a very reduced scale. The coast line is cut at the ROCCO Viaduct near GENOA and may still be interrupted at TAGGIA, while on the MONT CENIS route traffic is only working sporadically. It is clear that apart from troop movements these lines carry little traffic of importance.

YUGOSLAVIA

There is very little fresh to report in the railway situation in the Balkans. Partisan activity continues in the general areas which were outlined in Summary No.29. On the FIUME-OGULIN-KNIN-ZADAR line at least one railway bridge has been destroyed and the track is reported cut at several points.

On the main ZAGREB-BELGRADE railway, interruptions have been on a smaller scale of late except in the BROD area where the track has been cut in at least five places during the past week. Apart from this, the line seems to be working fairly normally. In addition the important narrow gauge line from BROD to DUBROVNIK is now thought to be in use. It seems likely that supplies are being carried down this to DUBROVNIK for shipment to points along the coast.

SHIPPING

ITALY

Up until 22 Jan when we landed on the ANZIO area 10 Army supplies continued to be brought South to CIVITAVECCHIA and ANZIO in the usual P-lighters and supply barges. The only change between the date of our last Summary (7 Jan) and 22 Jan was an increase in lighter traffic to ANZIO. This increase, however, is not thought to indicate an overall stepping up of seaborne tonnage to 10 Army but simply that ANZIO was receiving a considerable portion of the supplies formerly unloaded at CIVITAVECCHIA. As already indicated in our last Summary, this splitting of seaborne supplies to 10 Army between CIVITAVECCHIA and ANZIO was undoubtedly forced upon the enemy as a result of continued air attacks on CIVITAVECCHIA.

With the exception of 1 munitions carrier, supply shipping South of PIOMBINO appears to have been restricted exclusively to small craft, i.e. barges, P-lighters and an occasional ASV.

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Since ANZIO is lost and demolitions have probably been executed at CIVITAVECCHIA, it is thought that SAN STEFANO is likely to become the main port for US Army supplies, probably supplemented at least for the time being, by the continued use of CIVITAVECCHIA on a small scale.

On the Italian East coast we have been successful in sinking a number of ASV's by air and surface attacks and several ports were bombed and bombarded. Otherwise shipping continues to ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO on the usual small scale.

It is interesting to note that the enemy continues to commission new supply shipping. Photo reconnaissance of the shipyard at SESTRI PONENTE (near GENOA) discloses that between 7 Jan and 27 Jan 1 munitions carrier and 2 F-lighters were launched, while on 27 Jan a 480-foot cargo liner, 3 - 45- foot tankers, a munitions carrier, 5 F-lighters and 2 - 120 to 150 foot vessels were observed to be under construction.

From GENOA Westward along the Southern coast of FRANCE the usual supply traffic is evident and the enemy continues his policy, begun with our initial landings in ITALY, of removing ships from Italian waters to French ports. In this area it is interesting to note that it has been reported that crews are being sent by rail from French ports to GENOA to sail ships to French ports. On the arrival of a ship at these ports, the crew is entrained for GENOA again for the same purpose. The Germans have ample shipping at their disposal in the Western Mediterranean Basin, but there is a shortage of crews. The use of crews in this manner would appear to be the most economical way of handling their limited manpower, as the time factor at the moment is not particularly pressing.

DALMATIAN COAST

The islands continue to be the focus of interest along the Dalmatian coast. Since 7 Jan the enemy has captured the islands of SOLTA, BRAC and HVAR with little or no Partisan resistance. LISSOSA has been evacuated by the Partisans and all the other islands between SPLIT and DUBROVNIK are in enemy hands with the exception of VIS. A through coastal route is now open from TRIESTE to the ADRIATIC, though no shipping appears to have moved any further South than KOTOR BAY in Southern YUGOSLAVIA. However, the Partisans have recently countered with attacks on, and at least partial occupation of, the islands of ULJAN and PASMAN between ZARA and SIBENIK. Since Partisan occupation of these two islands would be a serious threat to his vital Dalmatian shipping the enemy reacted quickly and began reoccupation of ULJAN on 31 Jan.

Considerable shipping activity continues from TRIESTE as far South as DUBROVNIK. SPLIT appears to be assuming increased importance though the increase in shipping here may at least in part be attributable to the enemy island operations in that area.

FIUME, POLA, ZARA and MAKOVIC were each subjected to a rather heavy and successful bombing raid. Our air effort against shipping, however, has been notable for the success of our fighters and fighter-bombers, particularly in the area SPLIT-DUBROVNIK. It is estimated that at least 2 fairly large M/V's, a small tanker, an E-boat and some 20 to 25 assorted ASV's schooners and siebel

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ferries have been sunk or damaged.

Our naval units have also been successful in sinking a small tanker and a number of small craft. Several of the ports, including ROVIGNO between POLA and TRIESTE, have been bombarded.

3. BALKANS

ALBANIA

Fighting in the SHUSHNICA Valley has died down but clashes have taken place further to the West around TEPELENE where some 40 Germans were killed. During mid-January the Germans organised mopping up operations in the HERSNIK area (West of KORCA), a number of villages were burnt out and by 20 Jan it was announced that Partisan opposition had been broken and the whole of the area brought under German control.

JUGOSLAVIA

The recent Bosnian offensive appears to have come to an end with the reported arrival on the coast of 1 Mtn Div and the SS Mtn Div Prinz Eugen... Again the enemy failed to encircle the Partisan forces or to bring them to battle and after capturing JAJCE, DUGAJNO, GORNJI VAKUF and most of the towns in this area pushed on to GLAMOC but Partisan activity cropped up in their wake and it is now claimed that most of the towns have been recaptured by TITO's forces. Serious casualties were inflicted on the enemy during these operations but it is to be feared that the Partisans lost much valuable material which had been dumped in this area.

As the centre of gravity of the German operations moved to the West the Partisans in E. BOSNIA again went over to the offensive in the area DONJ, TUZLA and ZVORNIK. Fierce street fighting was reported in TUZLA but the Partisans were forced to withdraw in the face of heavy armoured columns of reinforcements; however a great amount of war material and ammunition is claimed to have been captured by the Partisans who inflicted heavy losses on the mixed German Ustaschi garrison. Further to the South in the FOCA area the Partisans claim to have killed 900 Germans in the recent fighting and the towns of KALINOVIK, FOCA and RUDO were stated to be in Partisan hands. The capture of these towns would seriously impede German communications in the upper DRINA Valley and counter measures will probably be taken by the enemy.

In CROATIA the efforts of the 114 Jaeger Div to reach the area recently vacated by 71 Inf Div have been strenuously opposed by the Partisans but in spite of continuous attacks the German columns reached SENJ on 24 Jan and soon after were reported in NOVI some 10 miles to the North. The rear of the German columns was vigorously attacked on the OTOCAC-GRACAC road and many casualties inflicted on the enemy.

Widespread fighting has taken place to the North between LJUBLJANA and NOVO MESTO, the Partisans claim to have cleared the South bank of the river KRKA between the latter town and KOSTANJEVICA and to have successfully attacked German forces near VELIKA LASCE to the South of LJUBLJANA.

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The German Croat 392 Div which is reported to be moving South in two columns from ZAGREB via KARLOVAC-SLUNJ and KARLOVAC-JOSIPDOL was attacked by the Partisans who claim to have slowed its progress and to have inflicted heavy casualties. The Partisans have captured the villages of GABRIN and POTEC in the PAPUK area killing 352 enemy mostly USTASCHI including the formation C.O. and captured amongst other material 2 x 75mm guns, 30,000 rounds S.A.A., 12 M.Gs and a lorry.

A list of the islands on the E Adriatic coast showing whether held by Partisans or enemy forces is given below. It is emphasised that these islands are usually held by nothing more than look-out posts and with the possible exception of KRK and the larger Dalmatian islands all the islands in enemy hands are garrisoned by less than 200 men each.

KRK	-	Enemy
PRVIC	-	"
CHERSO	-	"
RAB	-	Partisan
UNIE	-	Enemy
LUSSIN	-	"
LUSSIN PICCOLO	-	"
PAG	-	Partisan
PREMUDA	-	"
SILBA	-	"
OLIB	-	"
IST	-	"
MOLAT	-	"
VIR	-	Unoccupied
DUGI	-	Enemy
IZ	-	Partisan
SESTRUNJ	-	"
ULJAN	-	Enemy
PASMAN	-	Enemy (?)
ZUT	-	Partisan
KORNAT	-	"
MURTER	-	Enemy
ZIRJE	-	Unoccupied ?
KAPRIJE	-	?
ZLARIN	-	Enemy
BRVENIK	-	"
SOLTA	-	"
CIOVO	-	"
BRAC	-	"
HVAR	-	"
VIS	-	Partisan
KORCULA	-	Enemy
LAGOSTA	-	"
MELJADA	-	Unoccupied
SV ANDRIJA	-	Partisan
BISEVO	-	"
MLJET	-	Enemy
SIPAN	-	"
LOPUD	-	"

BULGARIA.

A law was passed through the SOBRANJE on 26 Jan creating a new state gendarmerie on the lines of the German SS. Its purpose is to forestall or destroy any mass movements, to prevent

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the formation of subversive groups and to destroy any existing ones. Although the Government is still feeling its way carefully it would seem that it is going to attempt to maintain its alliance with GERMANY by concentrating about itself the reactionary forces in the country.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Main HQ 2 Panzer Army is now reported to be at VRNJACKA BANJA in SERBIA between KRUSEVAC and KRALJEVO. The HQ was in BANJALUKA on 1 Jan.

15 Mtn Corps is reliably reported to be in BANJA LUKA and not as previously stated at BIHAC.

The Partisans claim that the enemy formation surrounded in NOVO MESTO is the 162 TURCOMAN Div; it may well be that elements of this div are in the area but the report should be treated with reserve.

392 Germano-Croat Div is moving down from ZAGREB to the GOSPIC area and may perhaps take up the area recently vacated by 114 Jaeger Div.

1 Mtn Div is reported in the area KNIN and the SS Mtn Div Prinz Eugen at ARZANO South of LIVNO.

The long awaited 13 SS Div BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA has arrived in OSIJEK and is reported to be destined for the coast; it would thus appear that the Northward trend of the coastal Divs was a temporary measure to cover the move of 114 Jaeger Div and no major move has taken place in the area of 264 Inf and 118 Jaeger Divs.

Brigadier,
D.M.S.(I).

G.S.I.
HQ., MCMF.,
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H.Q., A.C.M.F. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
NO. 35 OF 8 MARCH 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The second main enemy attack which began at 0800 hrs. on 29 February had already failed by the afternoon of 1 March. The enemy had not succeeded in gaining any ground at all and the casualties, especially among the inexperienced troops of 362 Div, were heavy. Prisoners amounted to slightly over 500. As stated last week the divisions involved were 362 (all three regts of which have now been identified), 114 Jaeger, Hermann Goering and 26 Panzer on the main front while 715 Div attempted a diversion on our right flank and 4 Para Div on our left. The failure of the offensive was followed by a period of relative calm but strong local attacks, up to battalion strength, covered the enemy's disengagement and fighting patrols have been active to cover what is probably a regrouping. The only evidence so far is reports of heavy MT movement between CORI and CISTERNA both ways on the afternoon of 6 March and morning of 7 March which might indicate the withdrawal of a formation from the line - Herman Goering Div from the locations. 29 PG Div has not been identified in the line since 1 March and may well be in reserve.

There have been several interesting and novel identifications. The most important is 508 Heavy Tank Bn which is stated by a captured diary to be equipped with Tigers and to have arrived from MAILLY LE CAMP in FRANCE on 16 February. 813 Eng Bn, according to a prisoner, operates the remote-controlled explosive tanks referred to last week which are now known to be called GOLIATH. According to the prisoner there is an 811 Eng Coy similarly equipped on the CASSINO front. A prisoner from I Bn 129 was captured at F 9730, having been transferred there from the area of S. ALPOLLINARE on the GARIGLIANO. It is not known whether the rest of this regiment has also transferred; III Bn was still

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in the area on 3 March but II Bn has not been identified for some time. 146 G.R. has rejoined its parent div, 65 Inf, from 8 Army front. 76 Panzer Corps has been definitely identified from a captured order dated 7 February as cooperating with 1 Para Corps under 14 Army; at that date the inter-Corps boundary ran through TORRE DI PADIGLIONE (F 9229) with 1 Para Corps West and 76 Corps East; the boundary is probably about the same at present.

Enemy losses in the beachhead fighting have necessitated many replacements. We have only a very partial knowledge of these but a few instances will show their scale. On 22 February 3 P.G. received a draft of 600 men from March Bn 317 and on 27 February an unspecified March Bn arrived with replacements specially for 29 G.R. 29 PG Div received an unknown number of replacements, probably a March Bn, on 18 February at VELLETRI. 65 Div received 450 replacements on 15 February from March Bn 984 and 26 Pz Div had 1,000 replacements on 24 February divided between its two Grenadier regiments alone. The above figures give us a replacement rate of about 3-5,000 men between 18th and 24th February and it seems that a rate of 5,000 a week for 14 Army alone is not improbable. We have however, possibly over-calculated the enemy's strength in one respect; further examination of the evidence from identifications of 16 SS Div seem to show that only two inf bns can be identified with certainty in the bridgehead area, namely II/35 and II/36; we have besides, from documents, evidence of the presence of IV Bty 16 SS Arty Regt and 16 SS Recce Unit though perhaps only sub-units of these are present. It is, of course, difficult to prove a negative but prisoners' statements make it clear that I and III Bns 36 G.R. remained in LJUBLJANA and we have not firmly identified I and III/35 PGR. Certainly if there had been as many as four infantry bns, as was previously assumed, we might have expected them to take a more active part by now.

There is no important change on the main Fifth Army positions. The enemy continues to develop the switch-line from PIEDIMONTE through AQUINO and PONTECORVO to S. OLIVA. On Eighth Army front the enemy reorganisation has become clearer. 305 Div apparently extends as far as the coast where a PW from I Bn 578 has been captured; apparently this regiment leap-frogged round 577. The boundary with 334 Div appears to run roughly through CRECCHIO and the latter div extends as far as the MAIELLA. 146 G.R. has left this front altogether and gone to the bridgehead. The ALFEDENA-PESCOCOSTANZA sector is still defended by 576 G.R. with at least part of the Div Reconnaissance and Engineer bns under command and possibly 280 March Bn, if it still exists as a separate unit: the whole is known as Battle Group BOIE after the Commander of 576 G.R. The front, therefore, between ALFEDENA and the sea is held by two divisions only, 334 and 305. 90 Lt is apparently not in the line; 361 Regt appears to be in the PESCARA area where it is probably resting after its heavy fighting at CASSINO and watching the coast. We know the enemy is worried about the possibility of landings on the East coast; he has actually erected notices in PESCARA warning troops to have their arms with them at all times in view of the

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imminent danger of landings. The rest of 90 Div has not been located but is probably also resting in some central position.

There is nothing of interest to report from North ITALY, but in FRANCE we have reliable reports of a move South of 9 SS P.C. Division ("HOHENSTAUFEN") from the AMIENS area to South FRANCE. This Division may be intended as a mobile reserve for the French Southern coast but it may also be staging there on its way to ITALY. It seems reasonable to assume that since the enemy has twice failed to demolish our bridgehead with the forces at his disposition at present, and since he must at all costs demolish it or risk his whole defence scheme in ITALY, he is likely to try to bring down some fresh forces. And if possible they should be of better quality than 715 or 362 Divisions.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) RAILWAYS

During the past week weather has again restricted operations against railways. However, successful attacks were made on ROME marshalling yards which the enemy is probably using as railheads. At least one ammunition train is believed to have been hit. It is reported that many trucks in the yards have been destroyed and extensive damage done to the tracks, and that the enemy has been forced to switch much of his rail activity in this area to the LITTORIO marshalling yard on the outskirts of ROME and to SETTE BAGNI about 5 miles further North. The marshalling yards at ORBETELLO, which serve the ports of SAN STEFANO and PORTO ERCOLE, were successfully attacked on night 2/3 March. On 7 March raids were made on the PRATO, PONTASIEVE, CERTALDO and POGGIBONSI yards, but results are not yet definitely known.

Railways in Central ITALY are still blocked at CECINA bridge on the West coast line 20 miles South of LEGHORN and at VITERBO, a junction of several secondary lines some 30 miles North of ROME. However, repairs are going forward on CECINA bridge and according to P.R. on 7 March, 2½ of the total of 3 spans have been repaired.

Considerable coal shipments are apparently still coming into ITALY from GERMANY via SWITZERLAND. It is reported that during December 1943, 184,000 tons of coal were brought in over this route by rail. While this is an appreciable falling off from the figure of 255,500 tons for November, figures for the period 1/20 January are something over 170,000 tons, indicating that January performance will probably have attained the November level.

(b) SHIPPING

During the past week there has been little change in the shipping situation.

On the Italian West coast the usual activity in F-boats and barges continues. SAN STEFANO, the enemy's most Southerly

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port on this coast, has again been attacked and appreciable damage achieved. Appreciable activity nevertheless continues at this port, where five F-boats were observed on 2 March and 4 F-boats and one barge on 6 March. On the East coast, where there appears to be some increase in shipping between ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO, small ships have been successfully attacked at ANCONA, CIVITANOVA and SAN BENEDETTO.

Shipping in the Eastern Adriatic from TRIESTE and FIUME continues active to as far South as DUBROVNIK. These waters remain dangerous for the enemy and ships cannot safely venture South in the face of our continued successful air and surface attacks. On night 29 February our Naval units intercepted a convoy between POLA and ZARA and in the resulting action two enemy merchant vessels were believed to have been sunk. Allied air forces have sunk or damaged a number of small craft, set an M/V afire at SIBENIK, and sunk another M/V at SPLIT.

In order no doubt to replace his losses in small craft, the enemy is building F-boats at Adriatic shipyards. Within the past few days photo reconnaissance discloses that 12 such craft are under construction at MONFALCONE. While these craft are being extensively used on the Italian West coast, they have not heretofore been observed in the Adriatic; with a cargo capacity of about 80 tons, they should form a most useful supplement to the Dalmatian coast small-ship tonnage at present undoubtedly much strained in view of continuous losses.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

More details have arrived about the troop train wreck in the Mt Olympus area. The train was carrying about 1,500 Germans of which, one report states, 900 have been killed or injured. Three coaches with officer dead are still under the waters of the river PINIOS. The Gestapo have sealed off the scene of the wreck but it is known that high ranking German officers have made an inspection of the wreckage. Some idea of the magnitude of the disaster is gleaned by the fact that 350 troops have been working for four days to clear the wreckage.

In the PELOPONNESE the Germans have burned a number of villages South of PATRAS and shot many hostages as a reprisal for the death of two German officers.

To the North, in the JANINA area four German trucks were captured in an ambush on the KALIBAKI GRAVENA road. 8 Germans were killed and 3 Italians made prisoners. The stores, including petrol and tyres were carried off by the Partisans and the trucks burnt.

JUGOSLAVIA

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

A report from SLOVENIA states that the enemy forces

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in this area are purely defensive. The railways MARIBOR-ZIDANI MOST-LJUBLJANA-TRIESTE and VILLACH-KLAGENFURT-DRVOGRAD are strongly garrisoned by Wacht bns and SS Police.

The ZAGREB-VARAZDIN line is not working with consequent congestion on the roads. Partisans are harrying Germans convoys and a number of minor successes are reported.

An armd train was derailed at BOROVNICA on the TRIESTE-LJUBLJANA railway. The engine and six trucks were destroyed and German casualties are believed to be high. A German column was attacked near NOVO MESTO and 176 of the enemy were killed.

392 Germano-Croat is receiving its Balkan baptism on the Croatian coastal strip. Clashes are reported at BRINJE where 25 enemy were killed and at PERUSIC. Repeated attempts by the enemy to break out of OTOCAC in thedirection of PERUSIC were frustrated and the Partisans claim to have killed 60, mostly Ustashi. Perhaps the heaviest fighting has taken place in the area of KOCEVJE. Many enemy sorties were repulsed and heavy losses inflicted on them.

Clashes have taken place in the area GLINA, PETRINJA, KOSTAJNICA between the Partisans and elements of 1 Mtn Div. The enemy used tanks and aircraft in an attempt to enter GLINA but was repulsed by the Partisans.

BOSNIA

KALINOVIK to the South of SARAJEVO is still in Partisan hands in spite of repeated enemy attempts to enter it. It would appear, however, that the enemy have completely surrounded the town, thus preventing the arrival of much needed supplies to the Partisan defenders. A German column was surrounded to the NE of TUZLA and is suffering losses in its attempts to break out. A relief column from CELIC, to the NE, was forced to withdraw after a sharp engagement. Some fighting has taken place near PRIJEDOR and SANSKI MOST; 25 Germans were killed and about 20 wounded. Still another train has been derailed on the SARAJEVO-MOSTAR line and some 100 Germans were killed. Much war material fell into Partisan hands.

DALMATIA

Activity on a reduced scale is reported in the Southern island group. A small scale raid was made on German held HVAR during which six Germans were killed and two wounded. The Northern coastal strip has been the scene of much fighting. JABLANAC and STARIGRAD are now reported to be in German hands thus ensuring their hold of all port facilities along the coast. RAB and PAG are again believed to be held by the enemy.

In Northern waters the Partisans captured two small M/Vs taking a total of 92 PWs. A petrol boat was also captured with a further 8 PWs, and a cargo of 170 tons of flour.

The Partisans carried out an attack on SINJ airfield on the mainland. Buildings were burnt and the landing ground ploughed and mined. 21 Donobran troops were captured and a number killed. An unconfirmed report states that the

....Germans have....

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Germans have demolished and mined harbour installations at SPLIT and KASTEL.

SERBIA

A troop train was blown up near BILJACA, 30 miles to the NE of SKOPLJE and about 20 Germans killed. In the same area a Bulgarian Paymaster, together with his funds fell into Partisan hands. In HERCEGOVINA fierce fighting is taking place between Partisan Odreds and elements of the SS Prinz Eugen Mtn Div and the 118 Jaeger Div. The Partisans claim the capture of VILUSE, VELIMLJE and LASTVA, all in the vicinity of NIKSIC and to control the roads GACKO-BILECA and NEVESINJE-STOLAC-LJUBINJE. Fighting continues near BILECA and PLANA some miles to the North. In these engagements 200 Germans were killed and 400 wounded. Some war material, including 9 MGs, was captured by the Partisans.

ORDER OF BATTLE

An unconfirmed report states that 15 Mtn Corps has moved from BANJA LUKA to ZAGREB.

1 Mtn Div is reported in the SISAK area, elements having taken part in the attacks on GLINA and PETRINJA. Some 3,000 troops of the SS Kroatien Div are reported to have reached BANJA LUKA at the end of February. An officer deserter states that the Div will shortly move into the SISAK area.

2 Partisan Corps operating in HERCEGOVINA now has 4 Divs and a coastal unit under command, an addition of 1 Div and the coastal unit.

ENEMY METHODS

Battle Group formed around elements of Regt BRANDENBURG
28 Nov 43/5 Jan 44

This Battle Group consisted of elements of the Regt BRANDENBURG, 3 Coy 114 Eng Bn and one Tp of Arty from 114 Lt Div. The Battle Group also had with it two 2 cm Vierlinge and six lt tanks (exact calibre unknown).

12 Km from BOSNISCH GRAHOVO, on the way to LIVNO, the Battle Group encountered a superior force of Partisans, who however, had no heavy weapons. Heavy arty fire and the VIERLINGE were directed against them and the Partisans, who could not return the fire, were forced to withdraw. The Battle Group then moved on to LIVNO and took the town without much difficulty. Two days later the 6th and 8th Brigades of Partisans (about 1,000 men) attacked the town and in spite of superior forces and weapons on the part of the Battle Group took possession of it. They were ejected the following day. The Partisans had heavy casualties, but the German losses were slight.

Another task of the Battle Group was to encircle and annihilate the Partisans in the LIVNO area in conjunction with the Prinz Eugen Div, which was to attack them from another direction and chase them into the arms of the Battle Group. An encirclement was completed with the Prinz Eugen Div, but no Partisans were found within the circle.

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EFFORTS TO APPEASE PARTISANS

(a) Treatment of Partisan PWs

Normally the Germans either shoot the Partisan PWs or send them to working PW camps. However, they have frequently issued ultimata to the Partisans to lay down their arms and during the period of these ultimata the treatment of PW is exceptionally good. They are given clothes, food and money and then sent home. They are urged to communicate with their friends and tell them of the good treatment received and suggest that they also lay down their arms.

(b) Use of Leaflets

At various times, leaflets have been dropped by the Germans, one side of the leaflet being a 10 dollar bill, the other side promising safe conduct for the holder and an offer of good treatment. These leaflets are honoured by the Germans but in fact are very rarely used.

(c) Prize on TITO's Head

Notices all over CROATIA offer a prize of 100,000 Marks in gold for anyone who gives information resulting in the capture or death of TITO, with no questions asked.

EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS BETWEEN GERMANS AND PARTISANS

There have been several cases of exchange of PWs. In one instance a Partisan was captured who had come to BOSNISCH GRADISKA disguised as a woman. He was caught, put in jail and accused of being a Partisan leader.

The CO of 114 Engr Bn, who was town major, received a letter within the day from the Partisans, offering to exchange a 2/Lt for the captive who was held "in such and such a house in such and such a room". The Bn CO replied to the writer suggesting that he come to him to negotiate. The reply was that it was just as far from the writer to the major as vice versa.

GSI
HQ, ACIF.
8 Mar 44

Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

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NO. 36 OF 16 MARCH 44

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The enemy has remained strictly on the defensive on all fronts. On the beachhead front the decision had already been taken by 4 March on which date an instruction was issued by 14 Army (reproduced in Appendix 'A') that the line reached should be organised for defence and offensive operations restricted to gaining ground in front of the main defence line to give depth and a better field of fire. The experiences of 16 to 19 February and 29 February to 1 March had shown that the beachhead was firmly established and special orders from HITLER demanding its elimination in three days have had to yield to facts. As part of the change of policy it is now confirmed from prisoners and from a reliable source in ROME that Hermann Goering Div has been withdrawn from the line and despatched elsewhere; prisoners stated it was being sent to FRANCE (its intended destination in January) and whether this is true or not it appears to have moved North from the bridgehead.

An Italian bn of San Marco Marines has been identified in the line from prisoners taken at G 0317. It is called BARBARIGO, presumably after the submarine commanded by EZIO GROSSI, the MUNCHAUSEN of the Italian fleet. This is the first all-Italian unit we have met and according to the prisoners the Germans treat them with some diffidence, putting German troops into their positions at night.

On the Southern front the main change is that 71 Div has apparently sorted itself out and regrouped as a division for the first time since it arrived in ITALY. It appears to have taken over the sector from Monte FAITO to the AUSENTE with 191 G.R. North, 194 G.R. probably still in the CASTELFORTE area and 211 G.R. somewhere between the two. It is not clear what the position is North of 71 Div's sector; we have had no identification of 276 G.R. for a long time and it may also have rejoined its division West of the

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AUSENTE. The dispositions of 15 P.G. div are also obscure; prisoners from 115 Recce Unit say they were relieved by I Bn 104 G.R. on the North bank of the LIRI at G.8615. A detachment of 33 Arty Regt has been reconnoitring positions in the CASSINO area, presumably in support of 1 Para Div which is very short of artillery.

The position in ITALY cannot be regarded as satisfactory for the enemy. He hoped in February to win a resounding victory at ANZIO which would give an immense boost to German morale and depress correspondingly Allied morale at the opening of the year of invasion. The net result of his efforts has been that he finds himself holding no longer a line along the shortest distance between two points across the Italian peninsula but two fronts with a total extent half as long again. The effect of his losses and the needs of the Western front have obliged him to give up his attempts to eliminate the beachhead and go over to the defensive. And however much he may organise the defences round the beachhead it remains a most serious threat to his whole conduct of operations on the GUSTAV line.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

SHIPPING

The enemy shipping situation on the Italian and Dalmatian coasts remains generally unchanged.

On the Italian West coast PR has disclosed the presence of a few F-boats at TALAMONE, a small port just North of SAN STEFANO. Presumably TALAMONE is being used to supplement the supply intake at SAN STEFANO, which continues to receive the attention of our aircraft, having been raided on night 7/8 and on 8, 9 and 13 March. TALAMONE was attacked on the 13th and PIOMBINO the following day. Further demolitions have been observed at CIVITAVECCHIA and it may now be written off as an active port; no supply shipping has been observed there for at least a month.

On the East coast of ITALY shipping is active at ANCONA, though as usual, on a small scale. Craft are largely confined to ASVs, but an occasional MV is also observed. Apparently there is still some shipping proceeding South of ANCONA, presumably to SAN BENEDETTO, a small coaster having been sunk by our destroyer patrol South of ANCONA on night 11/12 March.

Dalmatian coast shipping continues to suffer losses from both air and surface attacks. Losses included a medium M/V near DUBROVNIK hit twice and probably sunk, a Siebel Ferry sunk at OMIS (about 10 miles S.E. of SPLIT), both by air attack, and two small coasters sunk by light naval forces, one in the NERETVA Channel, the other off MURTER Island.

RAILWAYS

In the past week a considerable number of successful attacks have been made on the central Italian railway system. On the West coast line, just as repairs on the bridge at CECINA were nearing completion after eleven weeks, the bridge at MONTALTO di CASTRO was completely destroyed on 9 March, and

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four days later two bridges near SARZANA, S.E. of GENOA were blocked and the line was cut at VIAREGGIO.

On 11 March FLORENCE was bombed for the first time and a block was caused in the N.W. marshalling yard which probably lasted two days. A small bridge just South of ORVIETO station on the FLORENCE-ROME line was destroyed the same day and the line blocked at PONTASSIEVE. A block is believed to have been caused on 13 March at SPOLETO between TERNI and FOLIGNO and on the following day the remaining three lines out of TERNI are also believed to have been cut.

The East coast line has been free of interruption except for a successful attack on a bridge near PESARO, South of SAN BENEDETTO on 11 March.

On the Westerly of the two lines from VITERBO to ROME, the tracks were cut at CAPRANICA junction on 11 March and were not repaired by 13 March. Attacks with apparently good results have also been made on PRATO, POGGIBONSI, FABRIANO, GENOA and PERUGIA, whilst in the North of ITALY, PADUA was bombed, direct hits being scored on a bridge and explosions caused in the marshalling yards.

The dislocation caused by these attacks will definitely have hampered the enemy's rail traffic to ROME, most of which travels on the FLORENCE-ORTE network, and it is possible that on 11 and 13 March traffic was held up altogether.

3. BALKANS

ALBANIA

The Germans have evacuated the civil population from the coastal district between DURAZZO, KAVAJE and SHIJAK. That this part of the coast is causing uneasiness to the enemy is apparent. The civil population of VALONA was sent inland some six weeks ago.

A German column was attacked by L.N.C. near KOLISPOL (opposite CORFU) and suffered a number of casualties. The Partisans destroyed three German trucks before they were forced to withdraw.

GREECE

The 4,700 tons steamship LUXEMBURG suffered serious damage by sabotage whilst undergoing repairs in the dry dock of PIRAEUS. The crankshaft, furnaces and other vital engine parts were wrecked.

A report which throws some light on German manpower difficulties says the Germans have promised that Greek labourers who are willing to go to GERMANY to work will be rewarded by a grant of land and a wife. The report does not state the quality of either.

Some activity has taken place in the North of the PELOPONNESE. Andarte bands are stated to have fallen back

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on KLAVKATA in the face of German columns coming from the direction of PATRAS. No details are available but it is thought to be one of the periodical German drives to clear up the country. Further to the East ELAS claims to have ambushed German troops near KALSANI and to have killed 100 and taken two prisoners of war.

JUGOSLAVIA.

DALMATIA.

It is now confirmed that the enemy hold PAG. The Partisans offered no resistance but faded away to regroup elsewhere. German troop concentrations on KORCULA were successfully shelled by Allied destroyers during the night 9/10 March. A report states that the enemy is destroying installations and mining defiles on the roads MUC, KNIN and MUC DRNIS.

SLOVENIA and CROATIA

Violent fighting is reported in the area of NOVI, SENJ, BRINJE and KRIVIPUT. Details are lacking.

A large German MT column supported by tanks left ZAGREB and is reported to have reached PTUJ (45 miles to the North) without incident. The reason for this move is not apparent unless an offensive is planned against the Partisans in the VARAZDIN KRIZEVCI area.

Two trains have been derailed on the SUSAK SISAK line. In one wreck the Germans lost 80 killed and many wounded, besides a large amount of war material. The power station at VELIKA LASCE about 10 miles South of LJUBLJANA is now known to have been completely destroyed by the Partisans on 24 February. It is not known if this has affected rail traffic between LJUBLJANA and FIUME.

BOSNIA

Units of 373 Germano-Croat Div are pressing on PRIJEDOR 30 miles NW of BANJA LUKA. During the last week the Partisans claim to have inflicted 500 casualties on the enemy. Later reports show that the fighting tends to spread Southwards, clashes having taken place near LJUBIJA and SANSKI MOST. A German attack on the Partisans near LIVNO was repulsed; fighting on a small scale continues. A German sortie from SARAJEVO to reinforce the besiegers of KALINOVIK was forced to retire after losing 40 killed.

SERBIA

Last week fighting took place between Partisans and Bulgarian occupation troops near SKOPLJE. After five days of hard fighting during which the Bulgars are reported to have suffered heavy casualties, the engagement was broken off.

HERCEGOVINA

A mixed German Chetnik column, reported to have been 4,000 strong, which left METKOVIC in an attempt to open up

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communications between GRAHOVO-NIKSIC and TREBINJE was attacked on 4 and 5 March and dispersed by the Partisans. Partisan claims put the enemy casualties at 90 killed, 100 wounded and more than 50 P.Ws. The remainder of the column made off in the direction of NIKSIC. Some days later a mixed USTASHI DOMOBRAN formation was attacked near TREBINJE; 35 were killed and 89 prisoners captured.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Units of the SS Croatia Div are reported to have taken part in the fighting near PRIJEDOR and BOSANSKA GRADISKA. Various reports have been received that 92 Mot Regt has left SPLIT and moved to BIHAC, while there is an unconfirmed report that 1 Mtn Div is moving from the SISAK area to ZAGREB and the North.

4. APPENDICES

At Appendix 'A' is a translation of a captured instruction for the development of defences around the ANZIO bridgehead.

At Appendix 'B' is a paper on the German Military Supply in ITALY.

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GSI.
HQ. AAI.
16 Mar 44

Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

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APPENDIX 'A' TO H.Q., A.A.I.
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.36.
OF 15 MARCH 44

Army Headquarters,
4 March 1944.

Headquarters 14th Army
Headquarters Army Engineers
S-3 Section (Ia)

No.740/44 Confidential

Subject: Construction of Positions

1. The line which has now been reached must be developed defensively forthwith as speedily as possible as the Main Line of Resistance (HKL).

Sufficient depth to form a Main Sector of Resistance (HKF) will be gained by the employment of fighting patrols and general improvement of the line.

Command posts of all kinds (e.g. Bn, Regt, etc.) must be organised for all round defence. The same applies to any positions of troops, machineguns, infantry guns, anti-tank weapons, etc.

Beyond that all bivouac areas of reserve units must be developed into strong points (all round defence).

All these strong points must be arranged according to a uniform plan which should be established by the commander of the sector in question. They should be mutually supporting so that any enemy attack, even a full-scale offensive, will be held up in a mesh of strongpoints.

2. Laying of Mines

In terrain suitable for tanks mine laying should be carried out in conjunction with anti-tank weapons and tank destroyer squads.

In terrain which is not suitable for tanks S-Mines will be laid. It should be noted that numerous marked passages should be left open for fighting patrols or the development of future attacks.

In the matter of laying scattered mines Army Headquarters will decide each case on its merits.

When ground is won forward, any minefields which remain in the rear must be marked according to instructions. Marking posts or the surrounding wire must be placed at least 50 metres (165 feet) from the outer edge of the minefield.

3. Flamethrowers

Flamethrowers for defence (in groups of three) must be arranged in such a manner that they cannot be destroyed by the first few artillery shells falling upon them. (Instructions will be issued).

..... 4. Obstacles.....

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4. Obstacles

Lay only trip wire at first. Economise in your use of wire. Wire fences in rear areas should be torn down and used.

5. Construction of Dugouts

a A limited number of wooden frames are being manufactured. These frames must be used primarily for the construction of dugouts which have to be sited in the direct vicinity of a firing position.

b "Heinrichbogen" (Special type arch), which may have been issued to troops will not be used in the front line.

c Dugouts for more than six men each are prohibited.

6. Trenches should be narrow enough to provide sufficient protection against tanks, and should not be longer than 5 metres (approx 16 ft).

7. Obstacles in rear areas must be examined from time to time. Previously issued orders for the excavation of charge holes will not be carried out for the moment (see Headquarters 14th Army, Headquarters Army Engineers, 537/44 Confidential, 15 Feb 44, to 1st Prcht Corps only).

By command of Signed:

von MACKENSEN

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Colonel

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APPENDIX 'B' TO H.Q., A.A.I.
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 36.
OF 16 MARCH 44

ENEMY MILITARY SUPPLY IN ITALY

I GENERAL

The enemy is estimated to have in Italy about 25 divisions or their equivalent, plus Corps and Army troops, GAF and Navy units. It is not thought that he maintains large reserve stocks in Italy. In fact his total supplies on hand in Italy probably are equivalent to only about 1 month's requirements. This is not to be taken as reflecting any shortage but rather a predetermined policy. Total supply requirements probably amount to some 6,000 to 7,000 tons daily. Since this is a relatively small percentage in German's overall supply needs and since the great majority, if not all, of these supplies must be brought in from sources outside Italy and must then be distributed to consuming units, the enemy supply situation in Italy revolves chiefly around the problem of transportation.

II TRANSPORTATION

a To Italy from Outside sources

It is believed the supplies are moved into Italy almost exclusively by rail. With the exception of oil products brought in from eastern Europe through Ljubljana, the rail arteries for military supplies are the Brenner and Tarvisio lines from Germany*. In as much as 6,000 to 7,000 supply-tons a day represents not more than 20 trains for the entire Italian theatre, the enemy is presented with no real difficulty in moving the necessary tonnage into Italy. There remains, however, the much more complex problem of getting the supplies to the consuming units, i.e. for the most part to points south of Rome.

b Central Italy

South of a general line Pisa-Rimini it is estimated that total daily supply requirements amount to about 4,500 tons. Supplies brought into this area are moved chiefly by rail. Probably about 10% are transported by sea and the amount by long-haul MT is undoubtedly negligible.

It is estimated that the enemy brings in about 500 tons a day by sea, with intake on the west coast at least twice as great as that on the east coast. He might be able to step this performance up to 1,000 tons a day, but this would very likely

.....entail serious losses.....

* Coal, not here included as part of military supply, is brought into Italy from Germany via Switzerland. Coal shipments for November are reported to have been 255,500 tons, falling off to 184,000 tons in December. Figure of 170,000 tons for period 1/20 January indicates January performance will probably have attained the December level.

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entail serious losses from air attack. While a considerable number of ports on both coasts are active the chief ports of intake are San Stefano on the west coast, Ancona and San Benedetto on the east coast, with Genoa, Spezia and Venice as ports of origin. No supply shipping is now apparently moving south of San Stefano or San Benedetto. On the west coast vessels consist chiefly of F-boats (cargo capacity 80 tons) and barges (cargo capacity 100-125 tons) and on the east coast ASVs (cargo capacity 50-150 tons). A few KT ships (cargo capacity 400 tons) and small M/Vs are used, but the latter do not proceed south of Piombino on the west coast and Ancona on the east coast.

As indicated above the railroads handle some 90% of the supplies to Central Italy or about 4,000 tons a day; denied their use it is most doubtful whether the enemy could maintain his forces for any appreciable period of time. However, to move 4,000 tons a day requires only about 12 or 13 trains, which at most represent about 10% of normal rail capacity. It is thus very difficult to affect decisively the enemys supply position by attacks on railways unless all lines are fully blocked and kept blocked for at least 2 weeks. Despite considerable Allied air effort against railways this degree of blockage has so far not been achieved. The most important rail route is the main Florence-Rome line. The east coast line is also considerably active, while the west coast line is at present largely used for moving seaborne supplies from port to southern railheads. Secondary lines are also of importance as they provide alternative routes when points on the main lines are blocked.

It is known that the enemy is short on MT and that he is using a considerable amount of Italian military and civilian vehicles, and probably some of French manufacture. As already stated MT is a negligible factor as far as long supply hauls are concerned. To save on MT the enemy pushes his railheads well forward. The Anzio bridgehead is at least partially supplied from railheads South of Rome and trains are not infrequently reported in the Frosinone, Arce, Sulmona and Pescara areas. The average haul made by Army supply MT to dumps in the battle area probably does not exceed 50 miles.

III DUMPS

In as much as the enemy is not thought to maintain large supply reserves in Italy, it is unlikely that he has many supply dumps in Northern Italy. Such stocks as exist in Northern Italy are probably to be found at or near important rail centres such as Verona, Mantua and Bologna, and at the ports of Genoa, Spezia and Venice. Most of the main rear area dumps (i.e. C in C SW dumps) are believed to be located between Florence and Rome and it is logical to assume that they are largely disposed along the main Florence-Rome railway. The more forward dumps (i.e. Army dumps) are spotted in the general area Rome-Frosinone-Sulmona-Aquila. It is presumed that in general most supplies are consigned from Germany direct to armies, and that only the necessary strategic reserves are maintained in C in C SW dumps. From time to time armies in order to meet temporary shortages of particular items, undoubtedly draw on C in C SW, who in due course replenishes his dumps to cover what he has issued to armies, thereby maintaining a more or less constant strategic reserve level.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has been nothing new to report from the beachhead front this week. The enemy continues to carry out minor regroupings, in one of which 29 G.R. has just relieved elements of 114 Division; the latter has been in the line for some time suffering heavy losses, and deserters have stated that it was due to go back for a rest. 29 P.G. Div appears to be still out of the line and 26 Pz Div has also not been recently identified, so that when the intended regrouping is complete there may be three divisions in 14 Army reserve. Hermann Goering division is almost certainly not to be counted among them; a reliable report states that it has moved to LEGHORN. It is not clear whether the report intends LEGHORN as its final destination - prisoners have said it was again bound for FRANCE, as in January - but possibly it may pause there to rest and refit before proceeding so that during that very necessary period it may be available in an emergency to guard a part of the West coast.

On the main Fifth Army front 1 Parachute division is putting up a most stubborn defence of CASSINO. As far as can be seen at present 3 Para Regt is responsible for the defence of the town and the Monastery hill with the Para M.G. Bn, Para A/Tk Bn, I Bn 1 Para Regt and II Bn 115 G.R. under command. (The last named is the former II Bn 129 G.R. and was brought up from South of the LIRI.) I and II Bns of 1 Para Regt and I and II Bns of 4 Para Regt have also been drawn into the fighting in the town and on the slopes to the West; III Bn 4 Para is said to be on Monastery hill but III Bn 1 was last reported at Div H.Q. ROCCASECCA. The fighting has been extremely fierce and bitter and the enemy has had very heavy casualties and an honourable mention in the German

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communiqué. So far, apart from II Bn 115, there has been no indication of the arrival of any reinforcements; MT movement during the first two days of the attack probably indicated the arrival of a formation from the area of the beachhead in the PONTECORVO area but nothing of it has appeared forward. It looks as if the enemy's intention was to secure the Adolf Hitler Line and to fight a stubborn delaying action in CASSINO before withdrawing to it. It is possible that the measure of success which has so far attended his defence in CASSINO may encourage him to change this plan in favour of a counter-attack to regain the lost ground.

On the rest of the front there is little activity to report. In the extreme North 188 Div is reported to have moved Eastwards from BELLUNO to ISTRIA and SLOVENIA, with its HQ at MARIBOR; at the same time elements of 162 Div are reported to have moved from ISTRIA to the VERONA-PADUA area. With the cutting of the LWOW-ODESSA railway and the Russian advance across the DNIESTER, communications to the Southern part of the Eastern front must again run through HUNGARY and RUMANIA, and the defence of SLOVENIA and its rail communications becomes even more important.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

SHIPPING

It is evident that the enemy is attempting to increase his seaborne supplies to the Armies in the South. On the Italian West coast there has been an increase in activity of F-boats and supply barges, especially at GENOA and SAN STEFANO, whilst two ammunition carriers have left GENOA for the South during the last week, one of which is known to have reached PORTO FERRAIO which is a staging point for SAN STEFANO. One armed coaster was sunk in GENOA harbour during the week; SAN STEFANO was attacked from the air on 19 March and PIOMBINO on 18 March.

Nine supply barges, similar to those used on the West coast, appeared in VENICE last week; this is the first time craft of this type have been seen in any number in the ADRIATIC, and they probably indicate an attempt to step-up supplies to ANCONA. The latter port remains the chief port of intake for the Southern West coast traffic, and the usual turnover of ASVs with an occasional MV was noted during the week.

In the Eastern ADRIATIC shipping has also been on a larger scale this week. Several MVs have been plying between TRIESTE and other Northern ports, whilst there has been an increase in small shipping to the Dalmatian Islands, ASVs, launches and Siebel ferries being the type of craft used. A floating crane had arrived at TIVAT on 18 March. Two Siebel ferries were attacked and set on fire by fighter bombers at HVAR and MARINA on 15 March.

The enemy continues to build small transport craft as fast as he can. 21 F-boats are now under construction at MONFALCONE, and three Siebel ferries at VOLTRI.

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RAILWAYS

The successful bombing of railway targets which commenced on 11 March has been kept up during the last week, and the enemy must have experienced very great difficulty in getting supplies South between 11 and 18 March.

On the West coast the double bridge at SARZANA, on the main line South of SPEZIA, was hit in two places on 13 March and 95 yards have collapsed. CECINA bridge which was finally repaired on 16 March was blocked again on the 18th. The bridge at MONTALTO DI CASTRO is still completely destroyed.

On the central line FLORENCE M/Y which was bombed on 11 March was still blocked on 16 March, and ORVIETO M/Y was blocked from 11/15 March; whilst there were temporary interruptions at ORTE on 16 March and ORVIETO North bridge on the 18th. This line is now believed to be open again.

Fighter bombers have had good results on the lines converging on TERNI in the last few days. All have been cut at one or more places and bridges have been destroyed on the lines to SPOLETO, PERUGIA and AQUILA.

The East coast line has remained open as far as PESARO North of SAN BENEDETTO.

3. BALKANS

ALBANIA

A large force of Ball Kombetar with some German support attacked a Partisan odred at KLIVIC (10 miles N.N.W. KORCA). In the battle which followed, 65 Ball Kombetar were killed and 400 were captured. The German increment is reported to have left the field early without casualties. KONISPOL opposite CORFU is again in German hands. The Partisans stormed and captured this town on 14 March but were forced out after three days by superior German forces.

Martial Law has been proclaimed in VALONA. It is thought that this will not alter conditions in the area, which for a long time has been under a "state of emergency".

GREECE

The peace between the rival Greek parties has shown good results in an increase of activity against the enemy. German propaganda has been busy in the PINDUS area with some results. A statement, coming from German sources, that the Allies and GERMANY will join forces against RUSSIA has been circulated. To lend colour to the statement, leaflets have been dropped asking the local inhabitants to treat kindly any Allied parachutists who may land, adding that they should be handed over to the German authorities at once.

Fighting has been reported in the KARDISTA area. A force of 250 Germans with mortars and arty support were forced to retire after a battle lasting fifteen hours. Casualties appear to have been light on both sides. A mixed German-Albanian band estimated at about 300 clashed with Partisans at VELIOVISTA

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(about 20 miles S.W. of JANJA.). The enemy withdrew after fighting had lasted some twelve hours leaving fifteen dead and wounded behind.

A German post and MT column was attacked on 8 March at FOURAS (25 miles S.S.W. of KARDISTA). Three P.Ws were captured together with much valuable equipment.

JUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

The main news items concern our own naval and air force activities. A Siebel ferry was attacked by Kittyhawks off OMIS. Six hits were scored and the ferry was blown up. A schooner of 150 tons was sunk off MURTER Island. There were no survivors. Coastal forces sank a small schooner in the mouth of the NERETVA river. This craft was carrying 50 leave personnel of which 24 Germans and three Italians were captured. BRNA on KORCULA was shelled by our naval forces on night 11/12 March. Minor clashes have taken place along the coastal strip at SENJ, NOVI and KRIVI PUT. The Partisans are reported to be in possession of OTOCAC and to control the roads for a distance of 5 miles from the town.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

A strong enemy force moved from OSIJEK to VIROVITICA and then turned South. Partisans sallied out of their stronghold on the PAPUK tableland and engaged the enemy South of VIROVITICA. This report, together with the report of enemy troop movements from ZAGREB to the North would point to enemy intentions to clear up the area South of the river DRAVA between VARAZDIN, KOPRIVNICA and VIROVITICA. On the other hand these troop concentrations are admirably placed for eventual use in HUNGARY.

A second enemy offensive is taking place from VUKOVAR (on the river DANUBE South of OSIJEK) in the direction of the BOSUT Woods. Here the Partisans have been forced back to the river SAVA. Fierce fighting is taking place on the North bank of the river. The Partisans have recently been building up considerable forces in this area from where they have frequently raided the BELGRADE-ZAGREB communications.

The encircled enemy garrisons in NOVO MESTO and KOCEVJE have again suffered losses in their attempt to break out. Partisan sources now state that these garrisons belong to the SS Div Reichsfuhrer SS. It will be remembered that the same source claimed that elements of 162 (Turkoman) Div formed the garrisons. The Partisans fought a successful action at LOGATEC (10 miles S.W. of LJUBLJANA.) in which they captured large quantities of equipment and weapons. HORVATI on the ZAGREB-KARLOVAC railway fell to Partisan assault detachments who killed 20 and wounded 40 Germans in the action.

BOSNIA

Fighting in the PRIJEDOR area seems to have abated. A column of enemy reinforcements was forced to retire after losing 80 killed. In the JAJCE area the Partisans fought a twelve

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hour battle with elements of the SS Prinz Eugen Mtn Div and claim to have killed 120. A military train was wrecked on the JAJCE-DONJI VAKUF line and 80 Germans were killed. This is the first indication that this line is in operation again. It was presumed to have been wrecked by the Partisans before they evacuated the area during the last Bosnian offensive.

HERCEGOVINA

The railway NIKSIC-BILECA has been completely destroyed and this area is now reported to be in Partisan hands. The line BILECA-TREBINJE has been frequently cut in the past and is believed to be out of action. The coastal railway from DUBROVNIK to KOTOR is said to be working but the Partisans are threatening to cut it in a number of places.

ORDER OF BATTLE

162 Turkoman Div has been identified in the VERONA-PADUA area. 188 Res Mtn Div has moved in and was last reported to be in the vicinity of MARIBOR near the Hungarian frontier. 13 SS Mtn Div BOSNIA is reported to be taking part in the BOSUT Woods operation and also in the fighting near PRIJEDOR. It may well be that two battle groups have been formed after the manner of the SS Prinz Eugen Mtn Div. This latter formation is known to have one group in HERCEGOVINA and a second in the JAJCE area.

69 Res Corps is reported to have left VUKOVAR for ZAGREB. Confirmation is being sought as there would appear to be no reason for such a move.

G.S.(I)

GSI.
HQ. AAI.,
22 Mar 44

Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

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An enemy column of some 500 Germans and 100 Chetniks was attacked at BOLJANICI near PLEVLJE and casualties inflicted; fighting, in which elements of the Italian Garibaldi Div are taking part alongside the Partisans, continues.

In a recent large scale raid in the HERVENTA area near PROD, the Partisans captured 350 P/s and much war material.

SERBIA

Fighting is general throughout SE SERBIA and it would appear that the Partisan strength has of late increased. Reports continue to arrive about the defection of Bulgarian troops to Partisan bands and though this is probably true in some instances it must not be regarded as general. In the PLEV MARINA district near the Greek frontier a mixed German Chetnik formation was attacked. Twenty Germans and eighty-four Chetniks were killed and sixty-two Chetniks captured, the remainder took to the mountains to effect an escape. Partisan sources estimate that in SERBIA there are 20,000 Ustashi, 110,000 Domobrans and 40,000 Chetniks.

From MONTENEGRO comes a report of a successful ambush by the Partisans on a German column North of DANILOVGRAD. Forty Germans are claimed to have been killed and damage inflicted on M.T.

DALMATIA

DUGI has been very much in the news. Conflicting reports have stated that it was held by a large garrison and then that it was evacuated. It is now believed that the Germans may have finally evacuated the island. ULJAN and PASMAN remain in German hands while LAGOSTA is unoccupied.

ORDER OF BATTLE

392 Germano-Croat Div would appear to be taking over the coastal area South of FIUME and probably as far South as GOSPIC. I Mtn Div has elements in OMROVAC and 92 Mot Regt is in the TROGIR-ROGOZNICA area.

Reports that 13 SS Div BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA is moving to the coastal area lack confirmation but there is a strong probability that this will be its eventual destination.

4. APPENDICES

At Appendix 'A' is a translation of an "Operation Order for the Advance of the HERGER Battle Group (114 Jaeger Div) into the FIUME area".

At Appendix 'B' is "effect on enemy operations at ANZIO of Allied Air attacks on his L. of C."

G.S.I.
HQ., ACMF,
16 Feb 44

Brigadier,
R.G.S.(I).

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Appendix 'A' to H.Q. A.C.M.F.
Intelligence Summary No. 32
dated 16 February 44.

JAEGER MARCH COLUMN

OPERATION ORDER FOR THE ADVANCE INTO
THE FIUME AREA.

1) The enemy is holding the area N of GOSPIC along the route to FIUME with strong forces. Est strength: about 10,000 men.

The area N of the road GRACAC-GOSPIC-KARLOBAG to KORENICA-OTOCAC-SENJ has not been, during the communist rebellion, cleared up by German troops. Guerrilleros are rife. Fertile territory, numerous supply dumps, hospitals, airfields and training establishments are at their disposal. By forced recruiting the Partisan movement constantly receives reinforcements.

Strong attacks by enemy aircraft give reason to believe that the enemy is endeavouring to hinder our advance. Therefore we must reckon with air attacks on troops on the march and in bivouacs.

Those units, which have not received it, may examine the summary of information about the enemy at the office of the regt adjt. Those units, which have received this summary, will impart the information to the coy commanders.

2) TASK

JAEGER March column, consisting of:

H.Q. 721 Jaeger Regt
16 Coy " "
H.Q.Coy " "
Lt Mtn Jaeger column, 721 Jaeger Regt
II Bn " "
III Bn " "
II Bty, 661 Arty Regt
III Bty, " "
114 Recce Bn
114 A/Tk Bn
3 Coy, 114 Eng Bn
661 Fd Replacement Bn

together with Eng Transport echelons has the task:

a) On X day to leave its assembling area and occupy GOSPIC and clear the road GOSPIC-PERUCIC-OTOCAC-SENJ-NOVI-FIUME for the move of the division into the FIUME area.

b) to destroy the guerrillero bands on both sides of the road

c) to keep open this route for the supply traffic of the div by the construction of strong points, not under coy strength.

d) to occupy the Northern Dalmatian ports until relieved by other forces

The following specialist troops will be under command: Survey detachment GOSPIC, one pl 114 Bakery Coy, one pl 114 Mtn Med Coy, one pl 114 MT Coy, one Vet Sec from 2 Coy/114, one Vet Sec from 3 Coy/114, 2 Tp, Transport half squadron, 3 Tp, 114 Mtn Transport coln.

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3) RECONNAISSANCE

II Bn/721 Jaeger Regt will reconnoitre in strength until X day in the area of PERUCIC and will prevent enemy attacks on bridging operations.

114 Recce Bn will send out strong recce forces into the area OSTROVICA/6 Kms ENE of GOSPIC/ and into the area PODOVI-GLUNCUSA and will give the impression of a projected attack on BUNIC-KRALVSKO POLJE.

4) On X day, the BERGER March column will begin the advance

ORDER OF MARCH

Advance Guard

O.C. : Capt MÜLLER, O.C. 114 Recce Bn
Troops u/c: 114 Recce Bn
3 Coy, 114 Eng Bn

H.Q.Staff : 1 pl, 16 Coy, 721 Jaeger Regt
1 pl, 3 AMB Coy, 114 A/Tk Bn mounted on tractors (Raupenschlepper Ost)
Mot echelon of the H.Q. Staff
O.C., II Bty, 661 Arty Regt, (Capt JÄCKEL)
Coy comdr, 1 pl, 114 Mtn Med Coy (Senior Dr v. FORSTER)

Main Body

March sub-coln I

O.C. : Capt KIRCHGEORG (O.C. III Bn., 721 Jaeger Regt)
Troops u/c: III Bn, 721 Jaeger Regt
II Bty, 661 Arty Regt
1 pl, 3 AMG Coy, 114 A/Tk Bn
1 pl, 1 Coy " "

March sub-coln II

O.C. : Capt HRÜGER (O.C. 661 Fd Replacement Bn)
Troops u/c: H.Q. Coy 721 Jaeger Regt
721 Lt Mtn Jaeger Coln
Horsedrawn elts, 1 Pl, 114 Mtn Med Coy
661 Fd Replacement Bn, with Eng Transport echelon
3 Coy, 114 Mtn transport coln
1 pl, 1 Coy, 114 A/Tk Bn
1 AMG pl, 3 Coy " "

March sub-coln III

O.C. : Capt SCRIBA (O.C. 114 A/Tk Bn)
Troops u/c: H.Q. 114 A/Tk Bn
2 Coy " "
Mot Supp coln "
16 Coy, 721 Jaeger Regt, less one pl
Supply coln II, H.Q. 721 Jaeger Regt
One pl, 114 Bakery Coy
Survey detachment GOSPIC
2 Vet sec, 114 Jaeger Regt
3 " "
1 pl, 114 Mtn Med Coy (not sec)
One pl, 114 MT Coy

March sub-coln IV

O.C. : Capt SUCH
Troops u/c: II Bn, 721 Jaeger Regt
III Bty, 661 Arty Regt
One pl, 1 Coy, 114 A/Tk Bn
2 Tp. Transport half-sqn

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March sub-coln comdrs will arrange independently the order of march of their sub-coln.

March sub-coln III must vary its distance from March sub-coln IV in such a manner that the wagons keep up a good pace.

March sub-coln III will therefore share in the MT and tractors. March discipline must be of a high standard. At halts, keep well into the right. Keep proper distances. Overtaking must be possible even on the move. It must always be possible for motorised units to move to the head of the column.

March sub-coln comdrs are responsible for this. They will also arrange an active air protection and are responsible for a constant air attack preparedness.

5) MOVEMENT

The advance Guard will on X day at Y hours leave the area SIROKA KULA-CUKOVAC-LICKI OSIK and reach, as the first day's objective, the area OTOCAC. There they will pass the night. Any enemy is to be driven off by quick and energetic action.

March sub-coln I will leave the area LICKI OSIK (8 Kms NE of GOSPIC on X Day at Y hours + 30 mins and will reach, as first day's objective, the area of OTOCAC. There they will pass the night.

March sub-group II will leave on X day at Y hours the area GOSPIC and will reach, as first day's objective, the area DOLNI PROZOR. They will pass the night there.

March sub-group III will leave the area of MEDAK on X day at Y hours and will reach, as first day's objective, COVICI. There they will pass the night.

March sub-coln IV will leave the area of RENIK on X day at Y hours and will reach, as first day's objective, the area of LESCE. There they will pass the night.

6) THE CROAT USTACHI BN will form strong-points with one coy, at DUDAK Bridge, another at LICKI OSIK and two others at PERUCIC. The Ustachi Bn will remain to guard the route in the places named.

7) ARTILLERY The arty will support the MERGED March coln's advance. O.C. II Bty, 661 Arty Regt will be with the H.Q. Staff.

8) INTER-COMMUNICATION

The regtl signal troop, with the elements of the div sigs bn under command, will establish and maintain from the H.Q. Staff:

a) Wireless comn to the adv guard and to march sub-colns I, II, II and IV.

b) Telephonic comn

It is intended to utilise the permanent telephonic lines existing on the route (only slightly destroyed). Each march sub-coln is to link up through the permanent line at once on halting and on arrival at the day's objective, using its own sig sec for this purpose, and will remain in comn until marching off.

Comn within the march sub-coln is to be arranged by march sub-coln comdrs by wireless or D.R. Projected wireless comns are to be submitted at once to H.Q. Staff. Morning and evening reports to be sent in by march sub-coln comdrs to H.Q. staff at 0500 hrs and 1730 hrs respectively. Interim reports every two hours. Sitreps to be

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sent in in accordance with message regulations. Ammunition reports to be in accordance with Div orders.

Recognition Signals

WHITE: We are here
GREEN: Lay down arty fire
RED : (to be fired in the appropriate direction) ENEMY!

Aircraft recognition signals are to be taken.

9) PRISONERS

Prisoners and deserters are to be taken along with the troops and are to be turned over to Sonderführer HORWIT (H.Q. Staff) when opportunity offers.

Deserters are to be well treated. Remember the order about the granting of special leave for the discovery of important enemy papers and captured dumps. The civil population is to be interrogated.

10) SUPPLY

In accordance with Div instructions. Those units u/c for this march, which do not possess their own supply elements, will be attached for rations and supplies to a supply unit of this March sub-coln, under arrangements to be made by the March sub-coln comdr. Supply arrangements for the motorised H.Q. Staff to be the responsibility of III Bn, 721 Jaeger Regt.

11) I shall be with the motorised H.Q. Staff between the advance guard and the main body.

Signed: BERGER
Col and March Coln Comdr

George
Capt and Acting Adjt.,

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Appendix 'B' to H.Q., A.C.M.F.
Intelligence Summary No. 32
dated 16 February 44.

EFFECT ON ENEMY OPERATIONS AT ANZIO OF ALLIED AIR ATTACKS ON HIS L. OF C.

It is considered that our air attacks against the enemy's railways have played a vital part in supporting the ANZIO landing. Beginning 20 Jan it is estimated that all railway lines were cut along a general line PISA - FLORENCE - RIMINI and that this condition was substantially maintained until about 28 Jan. Since that date weather and other commitments have prevented us from maintaining this condition and with the possible exception of 2 or 3 days the enemy has had at least one line open to the ROME area.

Since the air plan was designed to prevent the enemy from bringing reinforcements from the North, those troops moved to the ANZIO area from 10 and 8 Army fronts are not here considered; exclusive of these, elements of 5 divisions plus 1 independent reinforced regiment were identified on the ANZIO front by 12 Feb. Allowing for elements of these 5 divisions which are known to have been South of ROME prior to ANZIO and for those elements which had probably not yet arrived, it is estimated that by the second week in February the enemy had brought South about 27 reinforced battalions, or the equivalent of 3 three-regiment divisions. It is believed that owing to railway dislocations most of the movement involved in bringing these forces South was by road. Had it been possible to move them by rail it is estimated that they could have been in the line by 29 Jan; while this estimate is believed to be logistically correct, in actuality it tends to be academic in view of the many variables involved. However, with reference to the movement of 65 Div (less one reinforced regiment) from the GENOA area and 715 Div (a two-regiment division) from the MARSEILLES area, the effect of the enemy's inabilty to move them by rail can be assessed with reasonable accuracy. It is almost certain that both 65 and 715 Divs moved by road. Elements of 65 Div were first identified in the line on 27 Jan, of 715 on 30 Jan, and it is likely that these troops were committed just as soon after their arrival as possible. It is believed that 65 Div did not close South of ROME prior to 28 Jan and 715 Div not prior to 1Feb. Had it been possible to move these troops by rail it is estimated that 65 Div could have closed South of ROME by 25 Jan and 715 Div by 26 Jan. Just how much this delay affected operations is difficult to say, but it is believed to be most considerable, and had we not achieved as great a degree of surprise as we did it is not unfair to say it might well have been vital.

Aside from movements of troops there is the question of supply. Since the ANZIO landings enemy strength South of ROME has increased almost one third and supply requirements have increased proportionately. Except for the relatively short lift from railhead to the battle area the enemy moves his supplies almost exclusively by rail. As a result of the blockage of railway lines he is thought to have been forced to draw on reserve supplies which he already had on hand in Central ITALY. This put him in a position where, even after he had managed to get his railways functioning again, he was forced to delay operations until such time as he was able to replenish his reserves and in addition bring in sufficient supplies to support a sustained attack in the ANZIO area. Had he been permitted full use of the railways it is estimated that this could have been accomplished by 1 Feb.

In conclusion it should be noted that in a situation where every consideration dictated that he should launch a strong attack against the ANZIO bridgehead without delay, the enemy did not initiate a serious attempt to eliminate the bridgehead until 16 Feb, 26 days from the day we landed. It is felt that this delay has been in large part the result of our air effort against railways. If we are able to restore this effort to its initial level, it is not unlikely that the enemy would have grave difficulties in maintaining the large number of troops which he now has South of ROME and his freedom of manoeuvre would be very seriously limited.

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

NO. 38 OF 30 MARCH 1944

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(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hours of receipt.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Operations during the past week have again been dominated by the struggle for CASSINO. Bitter fighting has continued in the town itself and for the heights to the North and West, without however any decisive change in the ground situation, and the position appears to be for the moment stabilised with the enemy still in possession of Monastery Hill and strongpoints in the Western portion of the town. Apart from assistance provided locally by two infantry bns and elements of the artillery of 15 P.G. Div, the defence has devolved entirely upon 1 Parachute Div and has been conducted with all the dourness and tenacity we expected from the troops who held us up at ORTONA in December. Identifications during counter-attacks on the 22nd of a Div H.Q. Coy, Regimental Eng Pls and even a GAF Telephone Coy showed clearly that General HEIDRICH was not prepared to yield an inch so long as he could scrape together some force capable of counter-attacking.

Though however the enemy has been able to seal off our penetration without employing his reserves, the losses inflicted on 1 Para Div have been extremely severe and some effort will undoubtedly be made to relieve it now that the battle has died down. Already on the 25th, there was evidence that contact had been made between elements of 104 P.G.R. and the parachutists which may have been the preliminary to handing over. The evidence is still inconclusive and elements of the parachutist div are still in the line, but it would not be unreasonable for 15 P.G. Div, which already had two bns in the parachutists' area to complete its side-step and take over the sector to as far North as CASTELLONE where III Bn 115 P.G.R. has been identified. In this case 90 P.G. Div, hitherto in 10 Army reserve, might be expected to move into the plain North of the LIRI. So far however, though some of 90's

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guns have been identified in action, none of its infantry appears to have moved forward of FROSINONE.

Further evidence of moves on the Southern front is provided by stories from two recent deserters, one from 44 Div, the other from 94 Div. If the former is to be believed the whole of 131 Inf Regt moved South from BELMONTE on the night 19/20 March and took up positions in the FAITO area three days later. 134 Inf Regt was supposed to have come down at the same time. The deserter from 267 Inf Regt of 94 Div claims to have seen 276 Inf Regt some time about the 20th at rest in the FORMIA area. From these two statements it would appear that 94 Div has at last got back its third regiment and is now assembled complete again in the coastal sector, while 276's positions South of the LIRI may have been taken over by part at least of 44 Div.

Elsewhere on the main front there has been little change to note. In the ADRIATIC sector an appearance of livelier movement behind the enemy's lines by day on the 24th is more likely attributable to an improvement in the weather, which is permitting freer movement off the roads, than to any offensive preparations. It is difficult to see where the enemy could find troops for anything more than very local attacks from the two divisions with which he is at present holding from the coast to the MAIELLA.

In the bridgehead the enemy's preoccupation continues to be the development of his offensive positions, and his offensive activity has not gone beyond patrols and small probing attacks in platoon strength. No changes have occurred in his general lay-out and his intentions appear to be to continue to hold the perimeter with his infantry and parachutist troops and to give his mobile divisions the maximum time for resting and refitting. Rumours prevalent among PsW that 4 Para Div is to be withdrawn to complete its training remain unsubstantiated; there is no sign of any fresh formation arriving to take its place and KESSELRING can hardly afford either to thin out 14 Army front any further or to weaken his counter-attack force by committing 26 Pz or 29 P.G. Div to a holding role.

In Northern ITALY there are indications that 162 Div, whose move from ISTRIA was traced in last week's Summary to the area PADUA-VERONA, may now have some elements as far West as the TUSCAN coast. The Germans are spread thinly on the ground along the West coast, and if the Hermann Goering Div now resting and coast-watching in the LEGHORN area is destined eventually for FRANCE, 162 may well be required to fill the gap.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

During the past week dislocation of the Central Italian railway system has been very nearly complete. On the West coast lines the bridges at SARZANA, CECINA and MONTALTO DI CASTRO remain impassable. There was a block at MONTE PESCALI from 20-24 March and GROSSETTO bridge was blocked on 27 March. On the Central line FLORENCE was impassable for three days, the viaduct NW of AREZZO was damged beyond use on 22 March and the bridge NW of ORVIETO on 24 March. On the by-passes POGGIBONSI and CETRALDO bridges were put out of action on 28 March, while

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the lines running out of TERNI in all directions have been kept almost continually cut by fighter bombers. On the East coast line the bridge at PESARO is still useless and the line is believed to have been blocked North of ANCONA for at least two days.

While direct traffic to ROME is now certainly impossible, it is still possible for the enemy to move supplies South largely by rail by ferrying round the breaks with MT and there are indications that he is doing so. He is also apparently using small ships to ferry round the breaks on the East coast, unloading on beaches and carrying the cargoes to the nearest railway by MT. All this, however, can only be done at the cost of considerable time and labour and by further straining his already overworked MT.

SHIPPING

There is very little to report on the Mediterranean. Coastal traffic in F-boats and barges continues at the same rate though at least two MT ships are now in use. SAN STEFANO continues as the main port of intake in the South. The docks at LEGHORN were bombed twice during the past week with good results.

The Italian East coast traffic seems to have increased slightly. Several large coasters have put into ANCONA and at least four tank lighters reached this port during the week. ANCONA remains the chief port of intake on this coast and very little traffic seems to reach SAN BENEDETTO. Three sailing vessels were sunk and quays damaged in an air attack on SENEGALLIA on 24 March.

In the Northern ADRIATIC, TRIESTE is becoming more active, a tanker, two M/Vs and one coaster totalling 15,000 tons having left between 22 and 26 March, and one cargo liner, an M/V and a passenger packet totalling 8,000 tons having arrived in the same period. Also an 11,000 ton tanker, previously laid up, has been moved to an active berth. It is now known that in the night bombing attacks on MONFALCONE on 19/20 March much damage was done to workshops, shipping and shipyard installations including a 480 ft M/V badly damaged and a direct hit on the largest floating dock.

Traffic along the Yugoslav coast has been normal except that eleven assault craft were noted in various ports and ten with an escort vessel off BAKAR inlet on 27 March. 13 vessels, including one siebel ferry and four invasion barges are known to have been sunk in the Eastern ADRIATIC during the past week.

G. S. I.
HQ. AAI.

Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 39

OF 6 APRIL 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The most interesting news of the week is of the move of 114 Jaeger Division, last identified opposite the bridgehead, to the Central sector of 10th Army's front. None of its units has yet appeared in the line but there is sufficient evidence from independent sources to leave no doubt about its presence. Troops wearing the oak-leaf insignia have been seen debussing in the SULMONA area for the past ten days and escaped British P.Ws report that a Div H.Q. has recently arrived and established itself at INTRODACQUA, G 9278. Finally, to clinch the matter, we have two deserters from 576 Inf Regt who claim that advance parties of 114 Div have begun to relieve 576 in the area of ALFEDENA and that 576 is expecting to move shortly to the Adriatic coast. All this fits together to form a clear and reasonable picture. 114 Div will presumably take over the whole of the Central sector from the left boundary of 5 Mtn Div up to PENNAPIEDIMONTE where the responsibilities of 334 Div begin. The resulting increase in strength of four bns is hardly excessive in view of daily improving weather which will soon make roads and tracks through the mountains passable again. On the Adriatic flank the return of 576 Inf Regt and the divisional Recce and Eng Bns to 305 Div may be followed by some readjustment of the boundary between 305 and 334 Divs which will allow each to withdraw at least one battalion into reserve.

Elsewhere on the Southern front the past week has brought few fresh developments. 1 Para Div has not yet been pulled out at CASSINO and whatever rest its troops have been granted has been purely local and cannot have allowed them to do more than to get the dust of CASSINO out of their mouths and absorb rear details before returning to the line. In fact all the reliefs which were undoubtedly in progress a week ago appear now to have been suspended. 90 P.G. Div is certainly not going to be employed on 10th Army front at the moment and elements of

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the division have been reported North of ROME, possibly assisting 103 Recce Unit in rounding up guerillas. Nor is it certain that the whole of 276 Regt has rejoined 94 Division in the FORMIA area. From entries in a diary found on a corpse North of the LIRI it appears that an advance party of the Regiment was sent to the coast on the 20th March but that the move of the remainder of the Regt was overtaken by events at CASSINO. The enemy's order of battle between Monte CAIRO and FAITO therefore still remains a very confused affair, offering few clues apart from showing that no fresh formation is at present being brought in to patch up the GUSTAV Line.

The stubbornness and resiliency of the parachutists have solved KESSELRING's problems temporarily but his reluctance to reinforce from reserves even at the most anxious moments of the CASSINO battle suggests that he is not prepared to stake everything on his present positions. He would no doubt welcome the end of a situation in which he is forced to face us on two fronts, involving as it does the most expensive deployment of his resources and the impossibility of securing adequately his flanks North of ROME. On the other hand it is no less clear that he has been ordered to hold us as far South of ROME as possible and it is unlikely that he will withdraw 10th Army to link up with 14th Army except under the compulsion of such pressure as might threaten the destruction of a great part of his forces.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

During the past week the complete Central Italian railway system has been continually blocked on a general line CECINA-RIMINI, the main blocks being the bridges at CECINA on the West coast, POGGIBONSI, CAMALDO, PONTICINO and INCISA in VALDARNO on the Central network, and FALCONARA on the East coast.

South of this belt the bridges at GROSSETO and MONTALTO di CASTRO on the West coast have not yet been repaired, whilst the PERUGIA viaduct was cut on 28 March and a bridge South of SPOLETO on 2 April, effectively blocking the PERUGIA-TERNI by-pass. On the East coast PESCARA bridge is still down and the bridge at ROSETA DEGLI ABRUZZI has been cut. There is also a bridge blocked at SEGNI on the PISA-FLORENCE line and one TERNI-AQUILA line. There are at present 15 railway bridges completely or partially demobilised between FLORENCE and the Armies in the South.

Whilst the enemy can still run trains between the breaks and ferry freight round by road from one side to the other, this can only be accomplished at the cost of time in loading and unloading, and of further straining his already dangerously stretched MT position.

SHIPPING

In view of the heavy dislocation of the Central Italian railway system, the enemy is likely to attempt to

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step-up the movement of supplies by sea. There is, however, as yet no indication of any definite increase in shipping activity which continues normal.

On the Italian coasts, LEGHORN, PIOMBINO, SAN STEFANO, ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO have all been attacked during the past week, and our aircraft have continued their successes against ships along the Dalmatian coast.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

The sequel to the recent train wreck in the Mt OLYMPUS area has taken the form of vicious reprisals against the local inhabitants by the Germans. Many arrests have been made and 100 persons, mostly young men, have been shot. These repressive measures have had little or no effect on Andarte activities elsewhere in GREECE. A number of incidents are reported which, though minor in themselves, are taking a steady toll of the enemy and increasing his already considerable difficulties.

In what are best described as pick and shovel raids, the villagers in the TRIPOLIS area have systematically destroyed roads so urgently needed by the enemy. Trenches two metres wide and six metres long have been cut into the road surface every two or three kilometres between TRIPOLIS and VITINA.

The railway bridge at ANIRISTA on the TRIPOLIS-ARGOS line has been blown up by ELAS forces. Traffic was for a time stopped completely. Later reports state that the enemy is now manhandling goods from one side of the gap to the other, a process which must still impose considerable delay.

ELAS troops ambushed twelve German lorries at MONODHENDRI near SPARTI. Seventeen Germans were killed and wounded. This attack is probably the reason for the recent severe reprisals and the curfew imposed in Southern PELOPONNESE. Forty women and one hundred men are being held as hostages in TRIPOLIS prison.

A German force estimated at 300 attacked ELAS at MESSINA, 25 miles South of KASTORIA, but were driven off with casualties. A similar force which attempted to enter the village of MESSENIKOLAS 12 miles South of TRIKKALA was even less successful and seventy killed and wounded are reported to have been left behind by the enemy. Two German posts West of LAMIA were successfully raided by Andarte formations.

JUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

On 19 March special service troops carried out a highly successful raid on SOLTA in which the entire enemy garrison of 150 was accounted for. One officer and 97 O.Rs were taken prisoner, all of 2 Coy 892 I.R. Our forces re-embarked with slight casualties. The island is now believed to be again in German hands.

...HVAR was raided....

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HVAR was raided by a mixed Allied and Partisan force on 22 March. 120 Germans and 20 Italians were captured and 30 Germans killed. Fighting is still going on. Fighting is also taking place on KORCULA, LAGOSTA and BRAC in which Allied commandos are taking part. VIS island is reported to be in Partisan hands.

From BRAC comes a report that eighty civilians have been shot by the Germans as a reprisal for the recent Allied raid on the island in which the islanders gave help to the invading forces.

SLOVENIA-CROATIA

Strong elements of 392 Germano-Croat Div thrusting from UGOLIN to KORNICA, PLASKI and SLUNJ were attacked by Partisans and forced back. In the heavy fighting the enemy suffered 250 casualties including a Lieut.Colonel killed, and lost much equipment including several heavy mortars.

German troops moving Northwards have suffered heavy losses in a number of widespread attacks. On 13 March a train carrying German troops and material from BRCKO to PLETERNICA was destroyed at SAPCA. In the engagement which followed 150 Germans, stated to belong to 92 Mot Regt, were killed and much war material fell into Partisan hands. As a reprisal the enemy is reported to have burned the village of SAPCA. Twenty-seven of the inhabitants were hanged and the remainder sent to concentration camps.

An enemy column, stated to consist of 200 troop-carrying lorries and 50 AFVs, was attacked by Partisans near DULAVEK 12 miles South of VIROVITICA. After a furious engagement the Partisans claim to have killed 100 Germans, destroyed 15 vehicles and damaged two tanks. This column is believed by Partisan sources to have been going to HUNGARY.

Another Northbound enemy column was successfully attacked during the night 20/21 March near DAZINOVAC on the branch road leading from BANOVA JARUGA to VIROVITICA. A third column was attacked near DARUVAR. 106 Germans were killed, 50 PWs were taken and five lorries and 28 carts of supplies destroyed.

Railway sabotage has again added to the enemy difficulties. In the PAPUK area a railway bridge was destroyed near IVANICGRAD and two goods trains blown up on the same line. Trains were destroyed at VRBAS, North of NOVI SAD, and S. MITROVICA. The line BANOVA JARUGA - LIPIK has been cut in several places.

BOSNIA

The enemy have made determined attacks against the Partisans in the SREM with the object of keeping communications open with the North. Two enemy columns from BRCKA and SREM RACA converged on KORAJ which they captured only to be thrown out later with heavy casualties. BIJELJINA was recaptured by the enemy on 17 March, since when the fighting in this area appears to have abated. Since 14 March the Partisans claim to have killed 1,200 Germans and 1,000 enemy wounded are known to be in the hospital at BRCKA.

.....Heavy snowfalls.....

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Heavy snowfalls have restricted movement in Eastern BOSNIA. In a clash with NEDIC troops at PRIBOJ the Partisans succeeded in entering the town but were later forced out by German reinforcements. The Partisans also claim to have destroyed an armoured train on the PRIJEDOR-BANJA LUKA line. Two other armoured trains which attempted a rescue were immobilised by cutting the rails at both the front and rear, and were then attacked by the Partisans who inflicted serious casualties on the crews.

ORDER OF BATTLE

The German occupation of HUNGARY has had repercussions on the Balkan Order of Battle. A number of important moves have taken place in the last week and rumour has been rife. 92 Mot Regt was identified by its sign as far North as VIROVITICA and is stated to be on its way to HUNGARY. 1 Mtn Div was also reported to be moving North through VIROVITICA. Partisan sources claim that it is ear-marked for the Eastern front. Elements of 100 Jaeger Div, last identified in the ELBASAN area, have taken part in the fighting in the SKEM. Reports also connect this division with heavy troop movements from BROD to RUMA and thence over the DANUBE to PETROVARADIN. Among the unconfirmed but probable movements is that of 11 GAF Div. This formation, last reported in the ATHENS area is stated to have arrived in CROATIA on its way North. The SS Mtn Div Prinz Eugen is also numbered among rumoured candidates for the Russian front but confirmation is entirely lacking. SS Regts Nordland and Westland have twice been reported in the GORIZIA sector but it is felt that these reports must be treated with reserve until further evidence is forthcoming.

187 Res Div has been upgraded and renamed 42 Jaeger Div and 367 Inf Div is now known as 330 Mtn Div.

BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

GSI(a),
Hq. A.I.
6 Apl 44.

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 40

OF 12 APRIL 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has been less change than was expected on the CASSINO front. 1 Para Div is still holding the town but some elements of 15 P.G. Div are now to its North as well as South; 115 Recce Unit has been identified in the MASS. ALBANETA area and III Bn 115 P.G.R. is in the COLLE SAN ANGELO area. The location of II Bn, which assisted in the defence of CASSINO, is not known. In ROM's old area we have confirmation of the arrival of 114 Jaeger Div, reported last week; prisoners have been taken from I Bn 721 in the area NW of ATINETA and from III Bn of the same regiment NE of PALENA. This rather looks as though 721 Regt is taking over the SULMONA axis and we may find 741 Regt in the ALEDELENA axis.

In the area East of ROME 90 P.G. Div is still in reserve but appears to be more concentrated. At least a bn of 361 G.R. has returned from PESCARA to the ORVINIO area (G 1292) while 200 G.R. appears to be still round ANAGNI (G 3149). There is considerable activity going on in the central sector in rear of the present line and foreign troops have been reputed digging near AVEZZANO. These are probably from the Slovak Technical Brigade which, according to a prisoner, consists of 101 and 102 Regiments, each of three bns; it was previously employed on digging a line near S. OLIVA (G 6912), part of the Adolf Hitler switch position. This new employment may be in connection with the construction of a line to which the enemy could withdraw if his Southern line were breached which would allow the junction of 10 and 14 Armies while still defending South of ROME.

In North ITALY, KESSELRING has apparently lost the bulk of 16 S.S. P.G. Div to HUNGARY and 278 Div has extended its defensive commitments from the RIMINI area into ISTRIA. It is not clear if the whole division has moved but it does at least mean that the East coast is very lightly held. The enemy has never left this stretch of coast so weakly defended before and it would probably be wise to expect some further readjustment of his dispositions possibly, in spite of the difficulties of the situation both in the West and East, the arrival of another low-category division.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

During the past week our air effort against the central Italian railways has continued successfully. However, the enemy has succeeded in effecting a number of repairs. The bridges at MONTALTO

....di CASTRO.....

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di CASTRO and GROSSETTO have been repaired and the West Coast line is now open South of CECINA, where the bridge is still out. The PISA - FLORENCE line is still cut at SIGNA bridge, and PRATO marshalling yard was temporarily blocked on 7 Apr. On the EMPOLI - SIENA line CERTALDO bridge was definitely repaired by 7 Apr and probably earlier and both the bridges at POGGIBONSI were shown to be open by PR on 10 Apr. The tracks, however, were still cut in three places. On the main line South from FLORENCE, the bridge 4 miles West of AREZZO and at INCISA in VAL D'ARNO have both been repaired, and it is probable that the PONTICINO bridge is also passable. The approaches to PONTASSIEVE bridge were cut, however, on 7 Apr, and South of CHIUSI the canal bridge SW of FICULLE has been destroyed and the line blocked at ORVIETO marshalling yard and 4 miles NW of ORTE. The PERUGIA - TERNI by-pass is still blocked at PERUGIA and BASTIA, but the bridge South of SPOLETO has been repaired. On the East coast the bridges at FANO and FALCONARA were repaired by 8 Apr, but the former is believed to have been hit again on the 10th. PESARO bridge is probably open again, while the bridges at CUPRA MARITTIMA and ROSETO DEGLI ABRUZZI are still blocked.

Whilst the situation, from the enemy's point of view has deteriorated on the line South of CHIUSI, it has definitely improved elsewhere, and it is evident from train movements observed that the enemy is using the lines in such a way as to reduce ferrying round breaks by MT to a minimum. There is still, however, at least one break to be negotiated on every line, and the continual fighter-bomber attacks on the lines further South must add considerably to his difficulties.

In the North, TREVISO, FERRARA and MESTRE marshalling yards were all bombed on 6 Apr, heavy damage being caused to tracks, rolling stock and installations, and all traffic being stopped. It has also been reported that an ammunition train was destroyed at MILAN on 28 Mar.

SHIPPING

There is no appreciable change in the enemy supply-shipping situation. SAN STEFANO on the Italian West Coast and ANCONA and RIMINI on the East Coast continue as ports of intake. There is some evidence that the enemy is using small craft to circumvent the breaks in the West Coast railway, notably at CECINA, where the railway bridge is cut.

Air attacks against ports and shipping on the Italian coasts have been light. SAN STEFANO was attacked on the night of 5/6 and 7/8 Apr and a small ship was left sinking South of ANCONA after an attack on 6 Apr.

On the Dalmatian coast, however, the enemy continues to suffer heavy shipping losses. In the past week about 15 vessels are claimed as either sunk or damaged. Traffic along this coast continues to consist of small craft having as far South as DUBROVNIK, with M/V traffic consistently remaining North of ZARA. E-Boats are again apparently operating from KOTOR, three having been observed there on 6 April.

DUMPS

The following were bombed during the past week with generally good results: Stores depot at BUSSI (G 8792); MT depot at G 006553; Supply dumps and MT parks at G 6230 and F 2929; Supply dumps at E 9793; Ammunition dumps at GALLICANO and F 9796; Fuel dumps at G 067303, G 097361 and G 100383.

..... BALKANS.....

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3. BALKANS

GREECE

11 G.F Division which had been reported on the move North towards HUNGARY, has now been definitely identified in ATTICA, its old location, on 30 Mar.

ALBANIA

There has been no sign, as yet, that another formation will move into ALBANIA to take over the ELBASAN area left vacant by the move of 100 Jaeger Div, North towards HUNGARY indeed it is unlikely that the enemy will be able to spare another division, in view of his commitments outside the Balkans. The enemy's intentions for filling the gap left by 100 Jaeger Div seem to be indicated by reports that "Ost" troops have moved in to garrison KORITSA, and by reports that elements of 104 Light division have moved North from JANNINA. 297 Division will presumably detach forces South towards ELBASAN to join up with what troops 104 Light Division can send North, in order to close the gap left by 100 Jaeger's departure.

DALMATIA

By mid March 369 Germano-Croat Division had moved forward towards the coast and set up its HQ in MOSTAR, whilst on 9 Mar, 370 Grenadier Regt of 369 Div was leaving ROGATICA for MOSTAR, and troops of the DEVILS Division were reported, later in the month, in DUBROVNIK. Reports that 7 S.S. Prinz Eugen Division, whose 14 S.S. Regt had garrisoned the TREBINJE area since mid February, was on the move to the North, coincided with the forward movement of 369 Div, which had apparently sent troops forward to DUBROVNIK presumably to relieve 14 S.S. Regt in order to allow it to rejoin 13 S.S. Regt in the TRAVNIK/SARAJEVO area.

The enemy appears to have committed himself to holding on to the SPLIT/DUBROVNIK group of islands, as HVAR was once again in enemy hands by 31 Mar, and on 1 Apr enemy troops had landed on SOLTA.

CROATIA

On 28 Mar RAB was re-occupied by the enemy who landed 700 troops and withdrew leaving 200 behind to garrison the island.

BOSNIA

The Partisan counter-offensive in the SARAJEVO area is going well and the recent arrival of supplies have helped to turn the tide. ZAGONI (X 22) and CELIC (X 29) have been retaken and the Partisans continue to push on.

HUNGARY

1 Mountain Div and 92 Mot Regt have been confirmed in HUNGARY, whilst Partisan sources report that there are approximately three German divisions in the country. Now that the Russian thrust to the North of CERNAUTI has virtually cut the German armies in two, HUNGARY seems cast to play the part of the ISTRIA of the Eastern Front and will presumably serve as an area of strategic reserve for enemy forces opposing the Russian advance.

GSI(a),
HQ, AAI,
12 Apr 44

for BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.41

GF 19 APRIL, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has been very little activity to report this week on any of the fronts. The beachhead has provided one bright exception in the well executed raid on CERRETO ALTO (G 0415) which brought in 61 prisoners from 735 Gren Regt and the Italian BARBARIGO Bn; the latter were apparently dispersed among the former in small packets to give them some battle experience. The Eastern flank of the beachhead has indeed been the most active of late with a fairly steady trickle of prisoners and deserters coming in from 735 G.R. and 7 G.A.F. Bn, the deserters largely from the latter penal unit though 735 has also provided some. The other main feature of the week has been that enemy armour has been making itself rather more obvious; small groups of tanks and SP guns have been firing into our forward positions, particularly on the Western flank though two tanks were also seen on the East. They were quickly taken under fire by our artillery and it is possible that these rather ineffective demonstrations were intended to deceive us into thinking that the enemy still has armour well forward.

On the GUSTAV line we have a little more information on the dispositions of the Southern group of 15 P.G. It appears likely that II Bn 104 G.R. holds the front from Highway 6 to exclusive SAN ANGELO with III Bn on its South and possibly I Bn 276 South of that, on the North bank of the LIRI. In the coastal sector we have, according to a deserter, both I and II Bns 194 G.R. in the CASTELFORTE area with 211 G.R. on their right.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

The last week has seen a race between the German repair gangs and the Allied Air Force which the Allies have managed to win, all through lines South of FLORENCE being still blocked at one or more places.

.....On the West.....

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On the West coast CECINA bridge is still unserviceable and the tracks to the South at Q 184165 were cut on 14 April. MONTALTO DI CASTRO bridge which was repaired on 7 April was destroyed again on the 11th. The bridge at P 748103 on the main line one mile West of SARZANA was open to traffic by 10 April, the bridge 3½ miles N.W. of SARZANA at P 726136 remains cut. Through traffic was stopped and much damage caused at LEGHORN MY on night 14/15 April.

SIGNA bridge on the EMPOLI-FLORENCE line remains cut.

On the EMPOLI-SIENA line the tracks were cut South and 3½ miles North of CERALDO on 15 April but are now probably open again. At POGGIBONSI the bridge at Q 684359 had been repaired by 10 April but the tracks were cut in three places N.W. of the bridge; these, however, were repaired by 14 April. The line to COLLE in VAL D'ELSA remains blocked. The approaches to the bridge South of POGGIBONSI were blocked on 12 April but have now probably been repaired. SIENA MY was blocked on 11 April.

On the main FLORENCE-ROME line the bridge West of PONTASSIEVE was serviceable by 14 April, probably earlier, and the bridge at Q 946566 was open on 14 April. At BUCINE the two central spans of the viaduct at R 076353 were destroyed on 12 April and the track cut North of a tunnel at R 065360 at the same time, whilst on 14 April the line was cut S.W. of the viaduct at R 076353, and N.W. of the viaduct at R 059375. The bridge at PONTICINO is now considered to be open, and the viaduct 7½ miles West of AREZZO at R 168350 was known to be open on 13 April.

Further South on the FLORENCE-ROME line the canal bridge near FICULLE (A 389757) was under repair on 10 April and is now probably serviceable again. ORVIETO station was blocked and the bridge at A 464585 badly damaged on 10 April but both were passable on 13 April. The junction North of ATTIGLIANO (A 586389) was blocked from 12-16 April and the mouth of a small tunnel at A 585407 which was blocked at the same time has not yet been cleared. A bridge at A 618334 4 miles N.W. of ORTE was unserviceable from 10 to 14 April owing to hits on both approaches.

On the PERUGIA-TERNI by-pass, the bridge West of PERUGIA at W 736905 is still unserviceable, but the RASTIA bridge was repaired by 14 April. At MARSCIANO the Northern approach to the bridge at 655800 has been cut in four places since 12 April and the approaches to TODI bridge (685715) were cut on 17 April. Repairs were completed at SPOLETO bridge by 14 April but 100 feet of tracks and embankment were destroyed and the bridge rendered unserviceable again on the 15th. The approaches to a bridge at S 119189, near FABRIANO, were cut on 16 April and have not yet been repaired.

On the East coast line the bridges at FANO, FALCONARA, CUPRA MARITTIMA and ROSETO DEGLI ABRUZZI remain blocked; the bridge at PORTO S. ELPIDIO was blocked on 15 April and tracks cut at PORTO D'ASCOLI and MONTE SILVANO on 16 April.

Fighter bombers have kept up the general dislocation of lines South of ORTE and VITERBO, and on 16 April the MANZIANA viaduct F 460925 was destroyed. The bridge at A 956374 on the TERNI-AQUILA line remains unserviceable.

..... SHIPPING .....

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SHIPPING

This week has been marked by the stepping up of Allied air attacks against enemy ports. On the Italian West coast LEGHORN, PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO were raided on the night of 14/15 April. On the East coast SAN BENEDETTO was raided on the 15th, ANCONA and CIVITANOVA on the night 11/12 and again on the 16th and a direct hit was scored on a 250 foot vessel at ANCONA on the 12th. Along the Dalmatian coast our aircraft continue their successes and some 15 vessels are claimed as either sunk or damaged during the past week. Our naval forces in this area have also had a good week. On night 11/12 April, six small craft were captured and on night 14/15 a tug, a small tanker and a lighter were taken.

There is little change in the overall shipping picture, though there is some indication of increased activity on both Italian coasts. This increase is presumably the result of the present dislocation of the railways.

The building of small craft in the Eastern Adriatic, where the enemy's losses are heavy, continues. On 16 April five Siebel ferries, recently completed at TRIESTE, were observed at FIUME. Also at FIUME on the 16th two additional Siebels were seen in the process of being assembled; this is the first time such activity has been observed at FIUME proper, though engineer landing craft have recently been under construction at KRALJEVICA some 15 miles S.E. of FIUME.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

German troop movements from GREECE to the North have been considerably hampered by railway sabotage. During early April, ELAS detachments blew up two trains between LITOHORON and LEPTOKARIA and another near MESCHAKI. This latter is claimed to have been totally wrecked. A successful train wreck was engineered by another ELAS detachment South of LARISSA. The whole train consisting of 12 coaches, each stated to contain 80 German troops, left the line. 60 Political hostages were shot in LARISSA jail the following day as a reprisal. A troop train of 18 coaches was derailed near VERIA whilst on route for SALONIKA. Casualties reported to date number 100 but it is believed that the total will be much higher.

Andartes ambushed two German lorries near KLISOURA to the South of FLORINA. Some 24 hours later an enemy column of 27 vehicles entered the village and put to death between 400 and 500 inhabitants. The village was completely destroyed by fire.

In the Mt PAJKO area on 7 April ELAS Andartes repulsed a mixed German and Italian force with great success. The enemy force, estimated at about 200 strong, lost 26 killed. Mines were laid on the road FUSTANI, 0.29, NOTIA, 0.39 and destroyed one truckload of troops and damaged two other trucks which were bringing up reinforcements.

In an action between ELAS and RALLIS troops at MARKOPOULON, E.53 on 20 March, 52 RALLIS (Quisling) troops were killed and 42 wounded.

..... ALBANIA .....

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ALBANIA

Minor clashes have taken place between Partisans and mixed German-Armenian troops near KORCE and between LNC and Germans at DELVINE and KONISPOL. A number of reports state that Bulgarian troops are moving West into the KORCE area to take over garrison duties.

JUGOSLAVIA

Islands

The recent occupation of RAB by the enemy was carried out by a special force made up of elements of 824 I.R., 13 SS Mtn Regt and led by officers of 371 Inf Div. It appears that elements of 371 Inf Div which left CROATIA for RUSSIA in Jan 44 have been left behind. A possible explanation would be that the division, known to have 3 Inf Regts when in CROATIA, was reorganised on a 2 Inf Regt basis prior to its departure for the East. This would be in accordance with the enemy's latest trend of cutting down the infantry component in his new divisions. The enemy has reinforced his garrison on MLJET. There are now about 300 Germans on the island. ULJAN is held by a mixed force of 200 Ustashi and Germans and PASMAN by a slightly smaller force. The strength of these garrisons, together with news of defence works on the PELJESAC peninsula point to the enemy's intention to retain his grip on the islands.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

The total railway actions carried out by the Partisans in CROATIA for the period Nov 43 - Mar 44 is as follows:

31	trains derailed
32	locomotives destroyed or damaged
247	railway trucks wrecked
10	bridges destroyed or seriously damaged
2	stations put out of action and a number damaged

392 Legion Div is attempting to clear the KNIN-BIHAC road as a preamble, it is thought, to operations in Central BOSNIA. Fighting, in which 1 Cossack Div is reported to have taken part, has taken place to the South of ZAGREB and in the KOSTAJNICA-PETRINJA area.

PODRAVSKA SLATINA to the South of VIROVITICA is again in enemy hands. The Partisans were forced to withdraw in the face of heavy counter-attacks supported by tanks and aircraft.

BOSNIA

The lull in the enemy offensive from BRCKO, CELIC and BIJELJINA to the S.W. was broken on 12 April. Partisans claim that they are opposed by the entire 13 SS Bosnian Div and that artillery shelling is the heaviest they have yet encountered. By 13 April Tito's forces were forced back into the MAJEVICA highlands from where they are fighting a fierce disengaging action. The Partisans fear an enemy thrust in their rear from the direction of TUZLA, which, if it materialises, would place them in a critical position.

.....Fierce fighting...

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Fierce fighting continues in the FOCA-KALINOVIC sector in which Italian troops of the GARIBALDI division are taking part. An extension of this fighting is reported from GORAZDE in the DRINA valley. It would appear that with the better weather the enemy intends to clear these Partisan strongpoints astride his communications.

Elements of the 7 SS Prinz Eugen Mtn Div suffered a defeat at the hands of the Partisans at MRKONJICGRAD during 7-8 April. Leaving their armour and vehicles in MRKONJICGRAD enemy infantry attempted to reach MLINSTA, L.32, but were cut off and forced to withdraw to JAJCE. In the meantime the Partisans entered MRKONJICGRAD which they still hold in spite of desperate counter-attacks. Casualties in men and vehicles were suffered by the enemy.

In NW BOSNIA the Partisans have captured CAZIN (North of BIHAC) with the exception of a few strongpoints which are still holding out. Further South in the same sector GOLUBIC was captured but lost again to a German counter-attack.

SERBIA

Heavy fighting continues in the USCE-RASKA sector and in the valleys of the IBAR and STUDENICA. The Ivanica district has been the scene of fierce fighting between Bulgarian troops and Partisans, both sides it is stated, are fighting with fanatical courage.

The lead mines at DOBRNVO and KRATOVO were destroyed by the Partisans in an attack during which 60 Germans were killed and 150 Bulgars taken prisoner.

Railway sabotage has shown an increase, a total of five trains having been derailed mostly on the BITOLJ-SKOPLJE line. A total of three locomotives and 104 trucks are claimed to have been destroyed or damaged.

HUNGARY

German troop movements into HUNGARY have met with repeated Partisan attacks in the Jugoslav-Hungarian border districts. A great deal of war material was captured by Partisans in one attack near VIROVITICA, 25 Germans were killed.

A Partisan report states that the Germans are withdrawing from the BACKA leaving the administration in Hungarian hands. A state of intense uneasiness prevails but as yet there have been no incidents between the Hungarians and Germans. It is now confirmed that five Hungarian Divisions are in the LWOW-STAWISLAWOW sector.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Positions in HERCEGOVINA formerly held by the SS Prinz Eugen Division have been taken over by elements of 369 Legion Division and 118 Jaeger Division.

100 Jaeger Division, last reported in the SREM, is now reported to have crossed into HUNGARY.

.....3 Police volunteer....

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3 Police volunteer regt is stated to be in KRALJEVO and it is reported that 4 Police volunteer regt is forming in CROATIA.

GSI(a)
Hq. AAI.
9 Apr 44

Colonel, G.S.C.,
for BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 42
OF 27 APRIL, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has apparently been a slight change of enemy dispositions on the beachhead front. Prisoners from both 8 and 29 PGR have been captured West of CARANO in the area FC030 - 9231 so it is clear that 3 PG Div's boundary has moved East; at the same time we have prisoners from I and II Bns 1028 GR which are believed to be operating under command of 362 Div further East than before between the 03 and 05 Eastings. It is suggested that 362 Div now covers the sector from opposite CISTERNA to about the 96 Easting where we have had a prisoner from 362 Fusilier Bn. 3 PG Div sector extends Westward from there to at least the 89 Easting where we have a corpse identifying II Bn of the Infantry Lehr Regt which is known to be under command. There is one disturbing element in the many identifications from the beachhead which is provided by a prisoner from 1 Coy 9 PGR captured in the area SW of CISTERNA; this is the first identification from 26 Pz Division since early March and it has been assumed to be in reserve though in fairly close support of the beachhead. However this is only one prisoner and it is unlikely that any important elements of the Division have been committed in the line. Possibly our recent aggressiveness up the CISTERNA road caused the enemy to stiffen the front here with a small detachment from the reserve pending the strengthening of this sector by the reorganisation of boundaries already described.

Enemy defences in the beachhead area are beginning to take shape. So far photographic evidence has shown few important defences in the actual line of circumvallation but some minor works are now becoming visible South West of the COLLI LAZIALI on a line F7536 - 7836 - 8238 and South West of VALMONTONE between 8044 - 0650. These are probably intended to be eventually joined up, via the Eastern end of the COLLI LAZIALI, into a line which will cover ROME while allowing 10 and 14 Armies to join force. According to a recent prisoner from 65 Div a switch line("Auffen stellung") is being built behind the Western flank of this assumed line which runs from the area of ARANO to PALOMBARA (FC052); if this were extended to meet the TIBER it would provide a shorter and more easily defensible line.

.....On the main front.....

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On the main front interest centres on 15 PG Div. There is some evidence that the Regimental group of 115 PzR which has been operating to the North of the sector of 1 Para Div and whose HQ was believed to be at VILLA SANTA LUCIA (G 8023) may have been withdrawing from the line on 24 April. On the same day another group in the ITRI area was also on the move and III Bn 104 PzR, the regiment which was operating between Highway 6 and the LIRI, ordered the issue of rations to two of its companies for two days. 115 Tank Bn also seem to be involved: a civilian who reached our lines on 24 April said the tanks which were in S. AMBROGIO (G 8909) had left and the troops stated they were going to the beachhead and on night 21/22 April the tanks in CASSINO were being relieved by assault guns. 115 Recce Unit may also be going to move from its position NW of CASSINO; according to a deserter the O.C. of 2 Sqn, which is on M.SS. ARMIENTA, told the troops they were to be relieved by Alpine troops on 20 April. 1 Sqn, incidentally, is still on the Adriatic coast North of PESCARA. Div HQ, however, apparently remained at S. OLIVA (G 6913) at least up to 24 April. Prima facie the evidence seems to point to the division being removed from the line. If it were, all the mobile divisions in Army Group C would be in reserve, though 15 PG might be used to release one for other duties. If it is withdrawn the LIRI valley will be only weakly held but there is one possible source of relief: the HOHE group has not turned up on the front yet after its relief by 114 Jaeger Div and there is some indication that it has not returned to its division, 305, in the fact that the latter has been reduced to employing unreliable Russians in the front line. This regimental group is, then, possibly to be added to the strength of 14 Corps.

As already stated we have received 17 deserters from a Russian OST battalion, 412, in the ARIENZI area. Having created a good impression by volunteering for patrols, which also had the object of discovering the gaps in the German minefields, two sections of these impressed ex-prisoners waited till their German NCO was asleep and walked across. This is the first time the Germans have put such troops in the line and the experience can scarcely have been encouraging. According to the prisoners there is still 577 OST Bn in the PESCARA area but 555, 556 and 612 Bns which were there have been transferred to the West coast. This may be a suitable opportunity to mention that we have identified a new Italian unit, the 1st Italian SS Bn, in the area SW of CISTERNA.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

This week the weight of our air effort has again been directed against the Central Italian railways, though on several days weather has prevented full-scale operations. At no time during the week has through traffic from the North to a line ROME-PESCARA been possible. However there was one day, and possibly two, when trains may have been able to move from the FLORENCE area as far South as CHIUSI over the main FLORENCE-ROME line or by way of the EMPOLI-SIENA-CHIUSI by-pass line.

As of 25 April the West coast line remained blocked at CECINA and MONTALTO DI CASTRO bridges which have now been out for at least two months.

The line EMPOLI-SIENA was cut at six points, including three

....bridges....

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bridges. This line may have been open on the 20th and possibly on the 19th.

Traffic from FLORENCE South over the Main line was not possible beyond INCISA in VALDARNO (about 25 miles South of FLORENCE) near which two bridges were believed cut on the 24th. This stretch of line was open on 23 April, at which time, however, BUCINE viaduct, a short distance to the South, may have been cut, having been attacked with reportedly good results on the 22nd.

The MIRUGLIA-TERNI and FABRIANO-FOLIGNO-TERNI lines are believed to have remained cut near MACERATA and SPOLETO throughout the week.

On the East coast blocks exist at FALCONARA and at several points South of ANCONA. At FANO bridge a single track appeared to be open on 23 April, but on the night 23/24 April direct hits were scored on the tracks to the N.W.

Despite the severe disruption of the railways activity continues on many of the lines. A number of trains have been observed in motion between breaks and many stationary trucks, in some instances apparently caught between breaks, have also been reported. At least one ammunition train was caught in this way and blown up. The enemy is evidently making every effort to use the railways as much as possible in order to cut down on his MT hauls.

SHIPPING

There is no appreciable change in the shipping picture this week, though there are indications of increased activity along the Italian West coast as would be expected in view of the state of the railways. The usual ports continue active and on the West coast there is evidence of shipping being unloaded at beaches. On 22 April seven barges were seen at the beach near CECINA and six F-boats at the beach near FOLLONICA, a short distance South of PIOMBINO. Slightly further South a considerable number of barges were observed off the mouth of the BRUNA river and a number a short distance up the river. Similar activity has been reported on several occasions and while definite conclusions cannot be drawn, it does suggest the transfer of seaborne supplies from ships to rail or MT.

On the Italian West coast air attacks have been made on GENOA, VIAREGGIO, LEGHORN, PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO and sweeps against shipping along the coast. These attacks have not been heavy and enemy losses have probably not been great. Attacks have also been made on ANCONA, CIVITANOVA and SAN BENEDETTO on the East coast.

On the Dalmatian coast most of the shipping activity was confined to the usual small craft, while larger ships are active from POLA North. In the SPLIT-KOTOR area the enemy continues to lose shipping, though this week his losses have been smaller than heretofore. A raid on MONFALCONE shipyards on 20 April resulted in the sinking of at least two ships though no damage was done to the yard where 24 F-lighters are being built.

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3. BALKANS

GREECE

Civil war has again broken out between ELAS and EDES after a period of uneasy peace. On 14 April an ELAS force of about 1,000 attacked a numerically inferior EDES force of KARPENISI X27. Details are lacking but it is known that on 18 April fighting was still going on. Fighting between ELAS and German forces, the latter supported by some RALLIS troops, has taken place at STRAT. X21. In the same area ELAS engineers derailed a train carrying petrol and military equipment.

It is now claimed that more than 900 Germans lost their lives in the train wreck which took place near LARISSA on 1 April. Another train has been derailed on the line LITOCHORON-LEPTOKARIA where the railway hugs the coast at the foot of Mt. OLYMPUS. The Andartes took up position about 100 yards from the railway at the point selected. When the explosion took place the train was derailed and immediately attacked. The Germans opened fire with Lt and Heavy MGs, mortars and automatics from the train and a general engagement was soon in progress along the line. German guard detachments were attacked at PLATANI, LITOCHORO, ZILIANA, SKALASOTIKA and the PLATOMON tunnel. As a result of these engagements the German detachments were prevented from joining in the main battle. Some minor clashes have taken place in the VERIA area. At PALAITSIA 032, 27 Germans and 11 collaborationists were killed.

The enemy are making determined efforts to smash Partisan resistance in the PELOPONNESE. A three pronged drive from the North converged on KALAVRYTA and from there pushed South in the direction of TRIPOLIS. Other drives are reported from the CORINTH and TRIPOLIS areas. Apart from minor clashes of a delaying nature, the Partisans are offering little resistance. They are, it is stated, dispersing to the mountains to avert casualties.

ALBANIA AND SOUTHERN SERBIA

Some 4,000 mixed German and Albanian troops took part in mopping up operations in the KUC area early this month. It would appear that this drive is not going too well for the enemy as the Partisans are reported to have captured BONGI and CERAVO immediately to the South. Heavy troop movements have been reported on the KORITSA-FLORINA road. 25 German tanks and 100 MT carrying troops are stated to have passed along this road to the West during the night 11/12 April. These forces may well be moving to the SKOPLJE, VELES, BITOLJ area to take over from the Bulgarians. A later report states that Bulgarian units including Arty were moving West along the KUMANOVO-KYUSTENDIL road. The head of this column reached the latter town on 15 April. Bulgarian troop movements are also reported on the SALONIKA-STIP-GOSTIVAR-DEBAR road heading for SOFIA.

JUGOSLAVIA

Islands

MLJET was attacked in considerable strength by the Partisans on the night 20/21 April. By dawn 21 April they had secured a foothold and are reported to have later captured BABINO POLJE and ZARKEZJE. Fighting is still believed to be going on.

.....KORCULA was.....

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KORČULA was attacked by a similar force the following night and latest reports state that BLATO is in Partisan hands.

Enemy preoccupations and fear of Allied landings is illustrated by a report that they are constructing coastal defence works on the Western coast of RAB Island.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

Railway sabotage forms the most important news items. 800 metres of line were wrecked near BENKOVAC on the ZAGREB-SISAK railway on 12 April. The ZAGREB-KARLOVAC line was damaged in two places, the most important being near KRALJEVCI where 1,000 metres are stated to have been destroyed.

A supply train was derailed near MITROVICA on 7 April and a section of the VINKOVCI-BROD line destroyed. Although details of the above operations are lacking it is known that the Partisans usually carry away sections of the rail so that the work of repair is held up by lack of essential parts.

BOSNIA

The Partisans mounted a large scale attack on PRIJEDOR on April 20/21. KOZARAC and OMARSKA were captured by the Partisans on 20 April thus freeing the way from the East to PRIJEDOR. Two German attempts to get reinforcements to the beleaguered town failed. Most of the railway line PRIJEDOR-BANJA LUKA is stated to be in Partisan hands.

A German force estimated at 1,000 with eight tanks moved out of KOTOR L56 in a Westerly direction but was forced to withdraw by the Partisans. A second column on the BANJA LUKA - SIPSKO road was likewise repulsed and suffered casualties. Three supply trains have been blown up on the DOBOJ-PRIJEDOR line.

Fighting in the KOZARA has abated somewhat. An unconfirmed report states that the enemy have withdrawn to the North leaving a garrison at BROD.

Fierce fighting is reported from the SARAJEVO-FOCA, KALINOVIK area. This latter town was taken by the enemy on 14 April.

The Partisans have destroyed a dam near JAJCE thus depriving that town of its power supply.

SERVIA AND MACEDONIA

An attack by the enemy was launched against the Partisan held territory between PODGORICA and BIJELO POLJE on 15 April. Enemy columns from both these towns pushed into the liberated country and met with some initial success. The thrust from BIJELO POLJE was held at MOJKOVAC but the Partisans were forced out of ŠAVNIK. The Southern column was checked some 10 miles North of PODGORICA. Heavy enemy concentrations were reported in SAVNIK, PODGORICA and BIJELO POLJE.

In Eastern SERVIA the Partisans attacked and captured KNIAZ MILAN. The entire Bulgarian garrison of 300 men surrendered with their arms and equipment.

.....ORDER OF BATTLE.....

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ORDER OF BATTLE

A report from Partisan HQ states that the main body of the SS Mtn Div Prinz Eugen is moving to TRAWNIK. A battle group is still fighting in the BOSANSKO area. 350 Mtn Div ex 367 Inf Div is reported to have left the Balkans for RUSSIA. 901 P.G.R. for so long unlocated has turned up in HUNGARY together with one of the Brandenburg Regts. Movements North from the Albanian border may have concerned 297 Inf Div which has been reported in the ZAGREB area. It would appear to be unlikely that the enemy has withdrawn a second division from ALBANIA (100 Jaeger having left the SALONIKA area for RUSSIA) without making some replacement. The rumour that a Brandenburg Div has taken over in the SALONIKA area may mean that 2 Brandenburg Regt has moved South from Central SERBIA to fill this gap. With 1 Brandenburg Regt still in the SIBENIK area it seems probable that the Brandenburg Regt reported in HUNGARY is the 4th. Two new identifications have been made in GREECE. 41 Fortress Div has been identified in the PELOPONESE with H.Q. thought to be at TRIPOLIS. 133 Fortress Div is stated to be in CRETE. Neither identification constitutes an increase in enemy strength as the former has merely taken over the static duties of 117 Jaeger Div and controls 965 Fort Inf Regt while the latter is thought to be the new designation of Fortress Div "Crete".

Brigadier,
D.M.I. (1).

GSI(a)
HQ.AAI.
27 A.F. 44

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.43

OF 4 MAY, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The regrouping in the beachhead area appears to have been completed, as far as the front-line units are concerned, and identifications have confirmed the dispositions outlined last week. The single prisoner from 26 Pz Div has not been followed by any more; it seems likely from what he said, which was not much, that only one Bn of this division was in the line. This is confirmed by another prisoner from Hermann Goering division who had been attached to I Bn 9 PGR for punishment; according to him the Bn had been in position near CISTERNA since the end of March. In both these reports there is no question of anything more than I Bn and it may be that with the recent re-shuffling of sectors this is no longer required in the line. It is all the more likely for 26 Pz Div to concentrate its forces in that the other reserve division which was nearest the beachhead, 90 PG Div, appears to have moved down towards the coast. On 27 April Div H.Q. appears to have moved to the area SW of ROME, South of the TIBER, where it will presumably be responsible for the defence of the coast between the beachhead and the TIBER. The detailed dispositions of its subordinate units are not known though 190 Arty Regt and 190 A.Tk Bn were making a fairly lengthy move on the night 25/26 April; on the other hand 200 PGR was still at PIGLIO on 2 May.

On the Southern front there is some further confirmation of the withdrawal of 15 P.G. Div from the line. Div H.Q. appears to be unchanged at S. OLIVA but 115 PGR appears to be in the ARCE area, 104 PGR just North of ITRI and 115 Recce Unit somewhere North of PICO though it still had an element in the CASSINO area on 25th. We also have a report from a reliable Italian source that an unspecified division is being withdrawn from the CASSINO area to CECCANO, G 4530, for a rest. This is slightly farther West than we have actually located any elements of the division, but the discrepancy is not serious and the report will serve as confirmation. A further confirmation is provided by ground and air reports indicating a relief in the sector between Highway 6 and the LIRI river. In view of the statement last week that the BODE Group might be made available for 14 Corps, it is interesting that a prisoner from 577 GR taken on 2 May said that the 576 GR had not rejoined its division but had been sent "to the CASSINO front".

.....If we take it.....

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If we take it that the withdrawal of 15 PG is confirmed, as seems highly probable on the above evidence, it is all the more strange that there have been definite indications this week that 1 Para Div has also been withdrawn or is in the process of withdrawing. The evidence is not very strong but there was certainly a relief going on in 4 Para Regt on the night 30 April/1 May and the incoming unit was almost certainly not from 1 Para Div; there are some slight indications, which should not be pressed, that Div H.Q. have moved back to the ARPINO area (G 6738) and a prisoner from 85 Mtn Regt said he had heard that 1 Para Div was being relieved in CASSINO.

If these two good divisions are withdrawing from the line it will leave the defences in the area from Monte CASTELLONE to the LIRI very thinly held. There are two Regts available to fill the gap, BODE Group consisting of 576 GR, with possibly 305 Ersatz Bn and elements of the divisional engineer and Recce Bns, and 134 GR of 44 Div which has been in reserve for some time. If we put BODE in South of Highway 6 we have still to find replacements for three bns of parachutists and three bns from 15 P.G. Div; it can be done at a pinch by using the three bns of 134 GR plus 3 independent Mtn Bn (and 5 Mtn Bn if it exists); 4 Bn is believed to be already there. This will just take the place of the front line Bns but leave no immediate reserves in rear. It may be relevant that the O.C. 115 Recce Unit told his men that they were going to be relieved by Mtn troops; on the other hand a recent long-range deserter from AUSTRIA claims to have seen 10 Coy 100 Mtn Regt near PIEDIMONTE. If this is reliable possibly the enemy might bring 100 Mtn Regt down to the CASSINO area, adding perhaps 95 Recce Unit, and put 134 GR in its place though this would complicate the chain of command. All this is conjecture but it does seem that the results of the various moves going on is to leave the GUSTAV line held by a rather thin screen of not the best troops while a strong counter attack force is left behind - but not far behind - to be thrown in to seal off any penetration. From the location of 104 PGR near ITRI it rather looks as if 15 PG Div has at least one eye on the coast; 1 Para Div is more likely to have both eyes on the GUSTAV line and to be used, very much as the CORVIN group of Hermann Goering Div was used during the withdrawal to the GUSTAV line, as a mobile body of first class troops to be thrown in at dangerous points and withdrawn again for employment elsewhere when the danger has been parried. It is to be considered, however, whether the Germans will use these reserves to restore the situation on the GUSTAV line. If too determined a stand is made forward 10 Army may be too weakened to defend effectively the ADOLF HITLER line, the loss of which would be much more serious. It is significant that during the attack on CASSINO in March no reserves were committed and 1 Para Div was left to fight it out alone; in view of the fact that he must expect our next attack to be in greater strength it seems reasonable that he should again pursue the same policy.

On the Adriatic coast Russian deserters have continued to flow in. Documents they brought with them show that they are now called 3 Bn 578 GR, which does not explain why they were placed in 334 Div's sector between the two Bns of 755 GR when their own regiment is on the coast. There have been various reports that divisions in FRANCE have also had OST Bns incorporated to form third Bns for their infantry regts and we may find other cases on the Italian front as well.

..... 2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS...

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

Again this week no through rail traffic has been possible over the Central Italian railway system. Our air effort continues to be directed mainly against bridges though FLORENCE marshalling yards have been attacked and also a number of important rail centres in Northern ITALY. While rail activity has been observed in Central ITALY only two or three appreciable stretches of line have been open and there is evidence to indicate that the enemy is continuing to use these open stretches to distribute supplies to various railheads from which MT can make the necessary haul further Southwards. In view of the state of the railways it must be considered that the majority of supplies are being moved South from a general line PISA-RIMINI by MT. Most of this MT movement is carried out at night.

As of 3 May the state of the railways was as follows. The West coast line was cut at three points between LEGHORN and ROME including CECINA and MONTALTO di CASTRO bridges. The main FLORENCE-ROME line as far South as ORTE was blocked at at least nine points and the line running down from EMPOLI through SIENA to join the FLORENCE-ROME line at CHIUSI was interrupted at six points. The loop lines running from PERUGIA down to TERNI were both cut at two or more places. However, the East coast line was open down as far as CIVITANOVA South of ANCONA and traffic is thus possible over the East coast line and then by way of the FALCONARA-FABRIANO-FOLIGNO line to as far South as SPOLETO where a bridge is down. Between a line CIVITAVECCHIA ORTE and ROME the railways are all out at at least two points.

SHIPPING

Shipping on the Italian West coast continues active though no MT ships, which are the largest supply ships the enemy brings as far South as SAN STEFANO, have been observed at either PIOMBINO or SAN STEFANO since 25 April. The usual barges, small coasters and F-boats are active. At SAN STEFANO, the enemy's most active unloading port for army supplies, 1 MT ship and 8 F-boats were present on 25 April, 4 F-boats and 2 supply barges on the 28th, and 5 F-boats and 1 small coaster on the 29th.

Heavy air attacks on SAN STEFANO and PIOMBINO were made this week, and a number of night raids, with considerable damage resulting to harbour installations and approaches. Harassing attacks have also been made on LEGHORN, SPEZIA and GENOA.

Activity on the East coast continues on a small scale, chiefly at ANCONA. The enemy's most Southerly port on this coast still appears to be SAN BENEDETTO.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

Small scale actions have taken place between ELAS and EDES forces in the ARAKTHOS River area and along the coastal strip to the South of PARGA, R61. The immediate cause of the present deadlock is the disputed sovereignty of the villages KOUKOULI, LOUTSA and TSOUKNIDA, all in square R70. This area, at present held by ELAS

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units, lies astride the EDES line of supplies from ARTA to the North. EL.S has repeatedly refused permission to allow food and stores to pass from ARTA through this territory to ZERV.S. A preliminary meeting has taken place between the leaders of the two bands but EL.S shows no sign of willingness to compromise.

The enemy have launched attacks on EL.S in the Mt VERMION area. Thrusts from nine directions converged on the EL.S positions and after two days fighting, the Andarte opposition collapsed through lack of ammunition. Many Andartes abandoned their arms and fled. It is reported that the Germans have burnt many villages.

Another enemy drive in the FILLATES area near the Southern Albanian border has met with an equal success. EL.S troops are offering little resistance. The Greek population is being slaughtered and the villages of PERIS.S, POLUK and TSUK.NDS have been destroyed. The recent German offensive in the PELOPONNESE has been more thorough than any before. The enemy used mountain paths and picketed heights where Andartes were expected with the result that few escaped the net. The EAM organisation has almost ceased to function in the N.W. and EL.S, its military counterpart, will need at least three weeks before it again constitutes a fighting force.

As a reprisal for the recent train wreck near ST.M. 120 members of EAM have been shot.

ALBANIA

The L.N.C. are stated to be in control of almost the whole of Southern ALBANIA. Some two months ago the Partisan position was described as precarious in the centre and South thus proving the resilience of the Partisan movement.

POGR.DEC near KORCE was captured by the Partisans on 16 April in a well planned attack. Diversionary attacks were made and forces posted to intercept enemy reinforcements before the assault was put in. 40 Germans were killed, 220 Kosovars and 20 Albanian gendarmes were captured together with large stores of food, clothing and arms. POGR.DEC is on the KORCE-ELB.S.N-DURAZZO road, the only East-West route of any importance in the country. Enemy reaction was expected and on 26 April the Germans mounted a heavy counter attack and succeeded in driving the Partisans out of the town.

A German column was attacked on the PODGORIC.-SCUTARI road. The Partisans claim to have destroyed 20 lorries and inflicted some casualties. Spitfires strafed a column of 150 MT moving West from EL.S.N, 17 vehicles were destroyed and a further 24 damaged.

JUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

The results of the raids on ORCULA and MLJET throws light on the scale of the recent fighting. 393 enemy were killed and 505 PW, including 11 officers and 70 NCOs were taken.

.....Booty included....

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Booty included 4 x 7.5 cm Inf Guns, 4 AT Guns, 10 Hy MGs, 26 LMGs, 10 Mortars and 50 tons of ammunition. A number of vehicles including two buses were destroyed before the Partisans re-embarked for their base. On 21 April a small party of Partisans and Allied troops ambushed two German lorries full of troops on BRAC. Both vehicles were destroyed and 30 Germans were killed. Since 19 March when SOLTA was attacked the enemy have lost more than 1,200 troops and much equipment in Island operations thus showing the importance of VIS as a base. The possibility of an enemy attack on this Allied base can not therefore be entirely ruled out, but it is felt that with his commitments elsewhere and his acute shortage of shipping he will be unable to assault and subsequently garrison the Island.

On the mainland the enemy has met difficulties on his lines of communications. On 24 April a column of 1,000 Germans and 1,500 Cetniks was attacked on the KNIN-GOLUBIC-STRMICA road and forced to withdraw. STRMICA was later captured by the Partisans. Further South 3 columns were attacked. 1,500 Germans and some Ustashi from SINJ to HRVACE, 4,000 Germans from SINJ to LIVNO and a similar force at VRLIKA all met fierce resistance and are reported to have returned to their starting points. Although it is felt that these figures are perhaps exaggerated the actions show that even in comparatively well garrisoned areas the enemy can only move his forces with extreme difficulty.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

The recent lull in operations has been used by the Partisans to increase their sabotage of the railway system. The ZAGREB-BELGRADE line was attacked between BROD and NOVSKA and the track torn up in no fewer than 70 places. South of SISAK the line was destroyed and a locomotive and seven waggons wrecked. The line near GLINA was breached and a locomotive and 21 waggons destroyed at POPOVAC F27. The enemy has flooded the BOSUT Woods thus immobilising strong Partisan forces in the area. Simultaneously the enemy launched attacks on the Partisan strongholds in the FRUSKAGORA Mtns with the object of safeguarding the ZAGREB-BELGRADE communications. Enemy reaction may be expected further to the West to protect this increasingly important East-West railway.

It is reported that the enemy garrison in NOVO MESTO is still virtually encircled and suffering losses in its attempts to break the Partisan ring. IVANEC B64, SV IVAN ZELINA and DRAZEVAC to the North of ZAGREB are reported to be in Partisan hands.

BOSNIA

MRKONJICGRAD was recaptured on 23 April by an enemy column operating from JAJCE. Fighting is taking place in the TESLIC M06 and KOTOR VAROS L66 areas and successful enemy attacks are reported in the LIVNO sector. These reports make it clear that the Germans are continuing their policy of harassing attacks, they have failed several times to clean up this area with much stronger forces so can hardly hope for a decisive success now.

The enemy have succeeded in bringing up reinforcements to PRIJEDOR and the Partisans have withdrawn to the outskirts. A later report states that all communications around the town are in Partisan hands and the enemy wounded are being evacuated by air.

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The BANJ. LUKA - PRIJEDOR - BOS NOVI railway is almost completely destroyed, whole sections having been carried off by the Partisans. In a recent action near BIHAC the Partisans killed 26 Germans including a General and 2 officers. No clue to the General's identity has been given.

SERBIA AND HERCEGOVINA

The German offensive in HERCEGOVINA has petered out and the Partisans have gone over to the offensive. In the Eastern sector the Partisans had pushed the enemy back to the road PLEVLJA-SAHOVICI and on 27 April were reported to be fighting in the town of BIJELO POLJE. To the West the Partisans have captured VILUSI and SPUZ and claim to hold all communications between the towns. It is believed that very few German troops have taken part in this venture, the main body of enemy having been made up of Cetniks and Moslem mercenaries.

In Eastern SERBIA the Partisan movement continues to gather strength, 3,000 recruits are stated to have enrolled in the VRANJE area recently. Two trains have been blown up in the last week on the VRANJE-KUMANOVO stretch of the BELGRADE-SALONIKA railway. As the Partisan strength increases, the morale of the Bulgarian occupation troops deteriorates. KRATOVA was attacked by Partisans and after 15 minutes fighting, 172 Bulgarian troops surrendered. An arms magazine fell into Partisan hands. Fighting has taken place near CRNA TRAVA P58 in which the Partisans claim to have routed some 1,000 Bulgarians.

BULGARIA

Partisan activity is growing in BULGARIA. It is stated that 60 Odreds exist, the strongest being in the PLOVDIV area.

The SOFIA-BURGAS express has been attacked and the SOFIA-VARNA express wrecked. Some damage has been done to the SOFIA-PLOVDIV line. There appears to be some uneasiness in both civil and military circles but there is as yet no sign of open revolt. Troop movements are reported in the North towards the DOBRUJA.

HUNGARY

Gen Ferenz SZOMBATHELY, C. of S. of the Hungarian Army has been dismissed and his post filled by Gen WOEHSH, Commander of the 2nd Army Corps.

ORDER OF BATTLE

15 Mtn Corps is now reported to be in KNIN and the HQ of 264 Inf Div has moved from DRNIS to SIBENIK. The Bulgarian column reported moving West along the KUMANOVO-KYUSTENDIL road last week is now known to have gone to THRACE. The Germans are stated to be requisitioning houses in the SKOPLJE area thus giving colour to the reports of the imminent arrival of German forces.

The identification of elements of 297 Division in action in TEPELENA, Southern ALBANIA, in mid-April, seems to disprove previous reports that the formation had left the country It appears rather to have extended its area Southwards, thereby taking part in the regrouping to cover the former area of 100 Jaeger Division.

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4. At Appendix 'A' is an appreciation of the ADOLF HITLER line.

GSI(a)
Hq. AAI.
4 May 44

Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

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APPENDIX "A" TO
A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
NO 43 DATED 4 MAY 44.

THE ADOLF HITLER LINE

During recent weeks the ADOLF HITLER line has shown further developments, and it is now possible to give a fuller picture of the enemy defences in this area.

(a) The "camouflaged structures", which have already been discussed in previous appreciations, clearly form the enemy's main defence. Their number has increased to nearly two hundred. A wide arc of thirty-five structures runs roughly East to West from G 802227 to 773227, covering the approaches to PIEDIMONTE S. GERMANO and apparently intended to prevent any outflanking movement from the LIRI valley up the wide re-entrant commanded by PIEDIMONTE, which is situated on a prominent spur. Eleven structures are staggered in depth behind the forward edge of the line North of Route 6. Between Route 6 and the point where the line crosses the river LIRI South of PONTECORVO, a distance of about 9000 yards (5 miles) there are altogether 114 structures. Finally, West of the LIRI to a point just beyond S. OLIVA there are thirty structures, most of which are in the rolling country Northeast of S. OLIVA and only a few Southwest of Point 101 (702140).

According to the most recent information available no "camouflaged structures" are sited in front of the almost continuous line of wire except for the thirty-five forming the arc South of PIEDIMONTE in which area no wire has so far been detected. The average depth of the line in which these structures occur is about 600 yards, and only five have so far been detected at any appreciable distance West of the lateral road AQUINO - PONTECORVO - S. OLIVA, which runs roughly parallel to the front line of wire.

(b) Of the more minor defences, such as machine-gun positions and anti-tank gun positions as opposed to the "camouflaged structures", approximately seventy have already been discovered. The majority of these are also sited behind the line of wire, except in the PIEDIMONTE area as already noted, but a certain number have been found in front of the wire particularly in the triangle enclosed by the road PONTECORVO - S. OLIVA, the river LIRI, and the RIO FORMA QUESA, and in the neighbourhood of the AQUINO airfield.

The presence of emplacements for anti-tank guns and machine-guns forward of the wire in the triangle mentioned above, together with suspected constructional activity reported in this area, may indicate that the eventual defensive line will incorporate into it this stretch of the LIRI, which is an anti-tank obstacle, from 722154 to its junction with the RIO FORMA QUESA at 726141. If the enemy extended his line South through M.SAN MARIA (7213), M.CAIVO (7212) and M. d'ORO (7310) to ESPERIA he would be able to use his supply route PICO - S. OLIVA more freely and hidden from observation. The track from G 655170 (a point on the road PICO - PONTECORVO) to S. OLIVA has been greatly improved by the enemy and heavy vehicles were reported to be using it on 25 April. Air photos have so far not borne out this suggestion, although military activity has been detected in the area of M. d'ORO. From the topographical point of view, however, such a line has definite advantages, incorporating a line of steep-sided mountains overlooking the LIRI valley.

(c) The wiring, which, with the exception already noted in the

.....PIEDIMONTE area...

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PIEDIMONTE area, forms the front edge of the ADOLF HITLER position, runs in an almost unbroken line from the mountain slopes on the North side of the LIRI valley at 774226 to S. OLIVA on the South side. There is the LIRI valley at 774226 to S. OLIVA on the South side. There is possibly a gap of about 1000 yards from 751199 to 742197, where the enemy's defensive layout crosses LE FORME DI AQUINO, a watercourse with steep banks in this area. This watercourse, which is an anti-tank obstacle or possible obstacle requiring ground reconnaissance, swings Southeast in square 7420, and has not been incorporated into the enemy's defensive layout since the alignment of its course is not suitable for that purpose. The exact position of the wiring is in doubt in one small area Northeast of S. OLIVA. Small gaps for the use of vehicles etc. exist at several points. The type of wiring is uncertain but thought to be "double apron".

(d) The anti-tank ditch system on the ADOLF HITLER line, though showing signs of development, is by no means continuous. In the PIEDIMONTE area a ditch, thought to be still under construction, has been detected between 774224 and 771225. At 774224 this ditch is joined to a watercourse, which is a natural anti-tank obstacle. A Westward arc of anti-tank ditches run from 771225 to 756216 with gaps at route 6 (761223) and at the railway (777224). South of AQUINO an anti-tank ditch crosses LE FORME DI AQUINO between 749199 and 744197, and is still apparently under construction for a considerable part of its length. In the area Southeast of PONTECORVO there is a ditch from 736165 to 733166, where there is a gap of 180 yards, followed by a long stretch of ditch as far as 729158. Three other small trenches exist: 738172 to 738173, 737175 to 737176, and 737178 to 737179.

Possible tank obstacles in the form of drainage ditches are specially noted as follows: on the Eastern perimeter of the AQUINO airfield from 770213 to 772206, with three small gaps in use by vehicles; and in the open country South of the airfield from 769203 to 766196, three gaps also being noted in this obstacle.

(e) Forward and South of the line in the area Southeast of PONTECORVO, particularly in map squares 7215, 7315 and 7316, a considerable number of demolished buildings have been seen. It is believed that these may be used in a defensive role though clearing to make fields of fire may account for demolition in certain instances. This feature, added to the fact that many of the "camouflaged structures" are sited in and/or constructed from demolished buildings, shows clearly to what extent the enemy is improvising his defences from the numerous farmsteads to be found in the LIRI valley.

(f) There is yet no clear indication of the gun lines for the ADOLF HITLER position though several unoccupied sites are known North of Route 6 between the road and CASTROCIELO (7425) in map square 7324, while there are further unoccupied positions near the intersection 7323 and at 702213. Positions under construction are noted at 682212.

(g) The chief outstanding problem of the ADOLF HITLER line is the exact nature and probable armament of the "camouflaged structures".

From information obtained from air photographs and other reliable sources a more exact assessment of the situation may now however be attempted. While air photographs do not show whether these structures should be classified as concrete pillboxes or casemates, it is considered that, despite the considerable variation

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in size of the structures, the majority appear to be large enough to preclude any theory that they may conceal the small mobile pillboxes designed to house two men only, though these mobile pillboxes may be in use at some points.

One characteristic feature which air photos seem to reveal is the very small elevation above ground level of all the suspected structures. It is thought, therefore, that the structures could be classified under one or more of the following headings, as set forth in the margin of the current defence overprints:

(i) Emplacements constructed below ground level, shored with timber (?) and covered with rubble, with embrasures at, or just above, ground level.

(ii) Converted cellars below demolished buildings.

(iii) Shallow emplacements with light camouflage roofing.

(iv) Camouflage-covered concrete pillboxes.

Another notable feature is the absence of communication trenches between the various structures. So far only one stretch of communication trench has been found, namely in the area North of Route 6 in map square 7622 and this links machine-gun and anti-tank gun positions only. There is no direct communication between these forward positions and the "camouflaged structures" sited 600 to 1200 yards in their rear.

This lack of communication trenches and the size and known siting of the structures would seem to indicate that mutually supporting heavy infantry and/or anti-tank weapons will be found to constitute the structures' armament. It will be realised, however, that the exact nature of such armaments cannot be determined from air photographs.

(h) The ADOLF HITLER position across the LIRI valley is as far as can be gauged from air photos a formidable defensive line. Its alignment is well defined and clear-cut. The continuation of the line North and South of the valley, which the enemy must defend in order to avoid any outflanking movements through the mountains, is less obvious.

Presumably the enemy will incorporate M.CAIRO and TERELLE into his defensive layout, and for this there is some evidence from air photos. These show what is suspected to be a line of machine-guns along the Southern spurs of M.CAIRO in the area Northwest of VILLA S. LUCIA (8123), and minor defences continue Northwards forward of PIZZO CORNO (8024), another spur of M.CAIRO. Behind PIZZO CORNO there is an important track junction, where a track linking TERELLE to PIEDIMONTE is joined by another from the rear running along the Southern slopes of M. CAIRO.

Early ground reports of a line Northwards through BELMONTE to ATINA are not borne out by air photos, and such a line would be very unsuitable from the topographical point of view since deprived of the use of the road ATINA-BELMONTE, the enemy would have a long mountain sector to defend without a motorable road leading up to it from the rear.

It is much more likely that the enemy will attempt to continue to hold his present naturally strong positions North of S.ELIA even

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after being driven out of his GUSTAV line which runs from CASSINO Southwards along the RAPIDO. The ADOLF HITLER position in the LIRI valley would then become a switch line pivoting on M. CAIRO.

The present defensive layout Northeast of M.CAIRO is as follows:

TERELLE itself is covered by minor defences including a minefield astride the serpentine road up to TERELLE at 832273. The line continues Northeast from here through Cle ARATE (8328) to the valley in which BELMONTE CASTELLO is situated; the minor defences of this stretch have been interpreted from air photos to consist of weapon pits. On the enemy side of Cle ARATE is an important lateral track from TERELLE to CAPO di CHIL. (8332). The approaches to BELMONTE are covered by minefields astride the road and valley, and by fairly well developed minor defences consisting of anti-tank guns and machine-guns connected by a system of trenches. The line then pivots on M.CASTELLO which drops steeply South and West. Another minefield is laid across the South-North valley in squares 8829 and 8929. From here a line of machine guns and infantry section positions runs Northeast through Cle S.MARTINO (9031), MONTE CANTALA (9232), and MONTE S. CROCE (9433) to the road COLLI (H 0832) - ATINA, where suspected machine-guns, sited astride the road at the pass over the watershed (9434), cover the approach to S. BIAGIO. Further machine-guns have recently appeared on the slopes to the North of the watershed likewise covering the pass.

The Southern extension of the ADOLF HITLER line is far less well defined, and evidence from air photos does not provide any solution. A prisoner captured recently states that defences of a provisional nature were being constructed on the line MONTE FAMERA (7506) - SPICNO (7501) - M.CIVITA (7400) - the massif of SAN ANGELO (6900) - Pte PLANCETA (M 6697) - MONTE MOL. (6696) - the FORMIA area. If ESPERIA (7509), with a good supply road up to it from S. OLIVA, be included as an important pivot of the line, this suggestion is plausible from a topographical point of view, since the line of mountains noted above consist of very steep ranges facing East and South. The possibilities of a defensive line along the LIRI South of PONTECORVO through M. d'ORO to ESPERIA have already been noted above.

Source: Middle East Intelligence Summary No. 711 dated 29 Apr 44.

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.44

OF 11 MAY, 1944.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Enemy dispositions are still apparently far from fixed and there is evidence of still more movement and reshuffling of units. The changes are, however, not so drastic as was suggested last week. It is clear that the movement in 1 Para Div sector implied a local relief only and not that of the division; 4 Para Regt still has two bns forward and Div HQ was reported by a German agent to be at CASTROCIELO (G 737255) on 3 May. The deserter's story of troops of 100 Mtn Regt at PIEDIMONTE is explained by the presence of a mule transport coy of the Regt in that area, apparently under command of the Regimental band-master. 15 PG Div behaved rather strangely as 115 PGR, after having moved back to West of ARCE, moved forward again some time about 4/5 May; there is some evidence that this was due to sudden apprehension of an Allied attack but this seems to have died down again later since Div HQ was moving on the evening of the 8th. All this time two Bns of 104 PGR and possibly a bn of 115 PGR with some of 33 Arty Regt remained in the ITRI area and it is clear that 15 PG Div is directing at least half its attention to the West coast. When we know where Div HQ has moved to we may be able to say whether its whole attention is directed there. In the old sector between route 6 and the LIRI another regiment has turned up which appears to be the long-lost 576 GR. Its HQ was at G 825145 on 5 May and it was under command 15 PG Div. The situation in the LIRI valley is clearly still susceptible of change and we may expect further developments before the Germans are finally satisfied with their dispositions. They are certainly thickening up their artillery; III Bn 190 Arty Regt and a troop of 764 Med Bty have been identified in the general area of CASSINO and CB sources report a thickening up of Medium Artillery in that area with a falling off in the ATINA area.

On the Beachhead conditions have been generally quiet. Two prisoners captured in the area F 8929 identified 508 Heavy Tank Bn which they said was in leaguer at F 8834. This is the first we have heard of this GHQ Mk VI Bn since it was identified by a diary in early March; it is useful as showing that it is still here though its tanks have not been in action for a long time. The prisoner gives its strength as 64 Tigers which is probably a little high. We have further confirmation of the presence of 90 PG in the North West flank

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of the beachhead from a reliable report of a complete Panzer division in the OSTIA area (a natural enough mistake for a Panzer Grenadier division though 190 Pz Bn is in fact equipped with assault guns) and we have some evidence that 200 PGR was co-operating with 4 Para Div on 5 May; the whole regiment, however, was still in the PIGLIO area on 1 May and it still seems to have some elements there. Consistent recent reports of the move of SS troops in MT north from ROME combined with a lack of identifications of SS troops in the beachhead suggest that the small detachment from 16 SS Div has rejoined its division. There has been a fair number of deserters coming in from 14 Army; besides the perennial source of 7 GAF Bn there have been representatives of almost all divisions in the Army in the last week, particularly from 65, 715 and 3 PG Divs though 4 Para Div has also provided two.

In the Central part of the front the enemy has withdrawn from the PALENA area. It is not thought that too much emphasis should be laid on this as this was scarcely vital ground to the enemy, and prisoners had already reported that some such withdrawal was likely when the weather improved. It is interesting to note that 114 Recce Unit never went to the Central sector but apparently went straight from the Beachhead to the Lower GARIGLIANO.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

Throughout the last week once again the enemy has not been able to keep a single through line open South of the PISA-RIMINI area.

On the West coast the bridges at CECINA and MONTALTO DI CASTRO remain out, and a further bridge was down according to PR on the 7 May.

On the Central network all breaks on the FLORENCE-AREZZO line had been repaired by 6 May, but results of attacks against three bridges on this stretch on 9 May appeared good and there are still four bridges down between CHIUSI and ROME on the main line. Both the EMPOLI-SIENA and PERUGIA-TERNI by-passes are effectively blocked by a series of broken bridges.

On the East coast the main line is open to S.BENEDETTO but there are two bridges down between this town and PESCARA.

The network of lines leading into ROME from the VITERBO, ORTE, CIVITAVECCHIA area has been kept continuously cut.

Although it is difficult to obtain any definite evidence it does seem likely that this constant interdiction of his main arteries of communication has had a hampering effect on the enemy's potential freedom of operations. It is thought that he has not been able to build up extensive dumps and that he has, during the last week, only been able to maintain his day to day needs on his present very moderate scale of expenditure. The pinch will come when large scale operations oblige a drastic increase in consumption.

SHIPPING

There were no new developments of importance this week. On the West coast MT ships are again coming into SAN STEFANO, one having been observed there on 5 May along with two supply

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barges and seven F-boats. It is interesting to note that PORTO FERRAIO, the most important port of the Island of ELBA, has of late become increasingly active. On 7 May two escort vessels, one KT ship and seventeen F-boats were observed there and occasionally a small steamship is picked up at this port. It is probable that PORTO FERRAIO, along with PIOMBINO, is being used as a transhipment and staging point for supplies being moved to SAN STEFANO. On the East coast supply traffic appears to have picked up slightly but it is still relatively light being chiefly confined to small coasters. As usual most of the shipping continues to move between VENICE and ANCONA.

While there appears to have been some increase in shipping over the past month it has not been as pronounced as would be expected in view of the continued interruption of the Central Italian rail system. This may possibly be explained by the fact that ports are continually exposed to air attack and while our attacks have not sunk a large number of ships clearance of debris in harbour areas must present difficulties, and if a considerably increased number of ships were used losses might well be heavy. In addition the enemy is reluctant to move shipping to ports well to the South and consequently even after arrival at final port of destination supplies must still be moved a considerable distance before reaching units in the line. Supplies coming in by sea probably do not exceed 15 to 20 per cent of overall requirements. However, while the amount of shipping is not great, it undoubtedly contributes materially to a supply system now denied effective use of the Central Italian railways and perforce largely dependent on MT for the movement of supplies.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

There has been little activity apart from minor clashes and some sabotage of communications. A railway bridge near LAMIA was blown causing the derailment of a train. The locomotive and six coaches were destroyed. Another blown bridge near VILIVINA (NE PELOPONNESE) caused two trains to be derailed but few details have been given. An independent Macedonian Bde controlled by TITO is operating in Lake OCHRID area. On 4 May this brigade attacked the German garrison at PISODHERION M47 thereby provoking the wrath of the local ELAS units who claim to have been negotiating with the garrison to desert with arms and equipment. They further state that the Brigade has no right to operate in GREECE without first seeking permission. A number of ELAS troops are going over to the independent brigade.

Allied special service troops brought off a spectacular coup on the night 26/27 April. Maj-Gen KREIBE, G.O.C. 22 Div CRETE was captured as he was travelling by car on the island.

ALBANIA

There has been heavy troop and MT traffic from SCUTARI

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to PODGORICA and CETINJE. 150 trucks passed along this road on 1 May and a further 240 trucks proceeded North during the night 3/4 May. It is believed that the Germans will use these troops to clean up the area PODGORICA-NIKSIC and the roads leading to DUBROVNIK.

JUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

It appears that only the Eastern end of KORCULA is garrisoned by the enemy. Reports state that they have withdrawn their garrison from VELA LUKA, BLATO and SMOKVICA. BRAC, on the other hand, has been reinforced by a further 400 troops who are reported to have landed at SUMARTIN on the night 29/30 April. Nine enemy schooners landed troops on VRGADA island and later searched KORNAT. The partisans made a surprise raid on TROGIR and claim to have killed 40 Germans. Elements of 264 Inf Div took part in a drive from BENKOVAC to the N and NE. They met stiff partisan resistance and on 27 April were forced back. Some casualties were inflicted but it is apparent that this drive was of a local nature.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

A German offensive is developing in the CORSKI KOTAR. Enemy columns are reported to be moving from OGULIN to DREZNICA, East from SENJ and North from BRINJE. Elements of 392 German-Croat Div and one other Div are said to be involved. A similar operation was undertaken by the enemy between KARLOVAC and LJUBLJANA. Columns of about 3,000 troops pushed from LJUBLJANA to RIBNICA and from KARLOVAC towards METLIKA. A similar force crossed the SAVA at BOSTANJ and moved in the direction of ZUZEMBERK. The partisans claim to have held these enemy columns and to have inflicted heavy casualties. In spite of these preoccupations the Partisans continue to sabotage rail movements. A train was wrecked on the ZIDANI MOST-CELJE line and the line damaged between GORIZIA and PODERDO and TRIESTE-POSTUMIA. Several locos and waggons were destroyed near DRAVOGRAD. To the East a successful wreck was engineered near BATAJNICA Y12, where the death roll is believed to be high.

BOSNIA

Sporadic fighting has taken place on the BIHAC-KNIN road and between CAJCE and JERKOVIGRAD. This latter town now held by some 1,200 enemy troops, has changed hands no fewer than 37 times since the German invasion.

On 26 April a three-pronged drive was made by the enemy on VLASENICA. The Germans are making every effort to clear the Partisans from this area so vital to their supply system. The Southern column estimated at about 2,000 troops was held by the partisans on 30 April while another column from TUZLA was attacked and split up between VLASENICA and KOMMOA B97.

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The enemy columns, stated to be elements of the SS Prinz Eugen and SS BOSNIA divisions were supported by Stukas and Henschels. The partisans claim to have killed 500 Germans in the North of this sector alone while elsewhere heavy casualties are claimed to have been inflicted. KLADANJ was recaptured by the Partisans during the night 3/4 May and an unconfirmed report states that OLOVO and VARES are again in Partisan hands.

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

Fighting in the BIJELO POLJE - PLJEVLJA area continues unabated. On 1 May the partisans captured ANDRIJEVICA and two days later entered BIJELO POLJE. Fierce fighting took place for PLJEVLJA and BRODAREVO and on 7 May the Partisans captured the latter town after inflicting some 400 casualties on the enemy. To the South BERANE was recaptured by Tito's forces. A train wreck causing heavy casualties took place at RISTOVAC near VRANJE.

ORDER OF BATTLE

A new formation, the Albanian SS SKANDERBEG Div is reported to be in the TETOVO-PRIZREN area. The division, said to number about 7,000 men is being formed on the lines of the SS BOSNIA Div with Albanian troops and German officers. It takes its name from SKANDERBEG, a National hero of the 15th century, who fought against the Turks.

The 13 Bulgarian Inf Regt of 7 Inf Div has left the STRUMA-AXIOS area for BOSILGRAD in BULGARIA. A report of another Bulgar Div in the VRANJE-KUMANOVO district is thought to represent regrouping and not a new arrival.

NAVAL

Following details of an enemy patrol vessel captured off OLIB have been received. The vessel is stated to be of 150 tons displacement and to be armed with:

1 Vierling MG 20mm
1 MG 20mm
1 semi-automatic 37mm A.A. gun
4 A.A. "throwers"
1 light mortar
1 heavy mortar
2 automatic rifles

Crew of 22, all Germans, of whom 4 killed and 15 wounded.

From log book captured it appears that this was the vessel responsible for shooting down the Allied fighter over Petreani at the end of April. The aircraft subsequently crashed on Ugljan island.

GSI(a)
HQ.AAI.
11 May 44

Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

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19 MAY 1944 308/5

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 45

OF 17 MAY, 1944.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Enemy reaction to the Allied offensive on the night of 11 May was slow at first, showed increasing signs of anxiety up to about 14 May and is now more controlled though no less harassed. 5 Army's silent attack definitely appears to have scored a considerable degree of tactical surprise, and on 8 Army front, although the initial very heavy counter battery preparations sacrificed immediate surprise, it appears that a relief was being carried out in the CASSINO sector which indicates that no particular anxiety had been felt. The subsequent conduct of the battle has provided no surprises for us: the enemy eventually brought up 90 PG Division, his first reserve for this front, but he has been unable to use it in a divisional counter attack to restore the situation but has had to commit its units piecemeal as they arrived. So far no reinforcements from further afield have been expected. The Germans first announced our offensive as "a holding and diversionary attack" and as late as May 15 they still allowed both the German and Italian wireless to hint that an Allied landing was probable; we know they had disposed their forces up the West coast to guard against such a contingency and if their propaganda staffs are properly in the picture they may still be clinging to their original ideas. It was a characteristic of German Intelligence in AFRICA, as noted by their more acute Italian colleagues, to cling obstinately to preconceived theories and so far at least none of the coastal divisions has been moved with the exception of 90 PG which was holding, with only part of its strength, the least important sector between the bridgehead and the Tiber.

1 Parachute Division has withstood our attack best so far. When it began, I and II/3 Para Regt were NW of Monastery Hill with II/100 Mtn Regt and 4 Alpine Bn adjoining to the North, probably under command, I and II/4 Para Regt and probably I/1 Para Regt were in CASSINO and on Abbey Hill. The Northern assault towards Monte San ANGELO was eventually repulsed after an initial success and the

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division has been able to devote its attention to its right flank where Eighth Army's advance in the LIRI valley threatens to cut its life line along route 6. A first attempt to avoid this danger by withdrawing the Parachute MG Bn from opposite the station and putting it down into the valley as a flank guard resulted in a disaster, and the battalion had two Coys wiped out by tanks but a later attempt to organise the defence of the Northern sector of the valley has been more successful. Lt. Col SCHULZ, Commander of 1 Para Regiment, with III Bn of his Regiment, has taken over command North of the wadi PIOPETTA. His group includes I Bn 115 PGR plus two companies of III Bn, two Coys of II/721 Jaeger Regt and one Coy of II/741 Jaeger Regt (the rest of these bns are probably on the way), the remains of the Para MG Bn, some of the Para Eng Bn, 95 Recce Bn, a troop of 242 Assault gun battery and about a troop of tanks. With this motley force he has been able to hold route 6 open and interpose a steady delaying action to our advance to the Adolf Hitler line.

In the Southern sector of the LIRI valley, South of the PIOPETTA ravine, our attack hit the BODE group as was expected and threw it into considerable confusion. Several companies were overrun and more were sacrificed in the defence of S. ANGELO and PIGNATARO. As with the SCHULZ group reinforcements have been rushed in and the group at present consists of the remains of I and II/576, three Coys of III/115 PGR and some miscellaneous A.Tk and Engineer units from 5 Mtn, 44 Inf and 15 PG Divs.

As has been seen at the moment of attack there was nothing in the LIRI valley sector but the five battalions which had been there all along. When this relatively feeble garrison was hit by two divisions, supported by 700 guns, desperate measures had to be resorted to. A reserve bn of parachutists (III/1) was sent down, the reserve bns of 114 Jg Div (II/721 and II/741) were picked up from the central mountains and hurried down a company at a time, all the reserve units of 5 Mtn Div (the Recce Unit, a Coy of the A.Tk Bn, an Assault Coy and an unspecified Alpine Coy) and any spare units which happened to be in the area were hastily welded into a fighting team which has indeed offered a most stubborn resistance. But it could scarcely be expected that this would be more than a temporary measure and already by the night 12/13th 200 PGR had begun moving forward from PIGLIO. The rest of 90 PG division began to follow on the night of 13 May but by that time a modification had become necessary in what must have been the original plan for 200 PGR had to be put in South of the LIRI to rally the routed remnants of 71 Division and block the approaches to ESPERIA and SANTA OLIVA. The rest of the division came forward at its best pace and by the morning of 15 May 361 PGR was coming into action in the PIGNATARO area. The Tank Bn (SP guns) and the Recce Unit are also in action, the latter presumably providing the armoured cars which have been seen in the LIRI valley. It had been anticipated, on the basis of the enemy's behaviour during the last attack on CASSINO, that any reserves which were brought forward would be employed to man the Adolf Hitler line; the fact that 90 PG has had to be committed forward of that line is a sign not of strength but of weakness and shows that the enemy considered the forces involved in the LIRI valley urgently needed help to avoid being overrun before they could extricate themselves.

South of the LIRI 71 Div, with 131 G.R. and II/115 PGR

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OF 24 MAY, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The beginning of the week saw the right flank of 10 Army, seriously disorganised, being driven rapidly back across the AURUNCI mountains. In the LIRI valley he was withdrawing gradually to the HITLER line, and the first reserves to arrive had already been put in, of necessity South of the LIRI. During the last seven days this tendency has continued; the front has gone back slowly and stubbornly to the HITLER line while South of the LIRI, from PONTECORVO to TERRACINA, his line has been stretched and weakened and has had to be reinforced by three fresh divisions. Even these have had to be put in piecemeal and with the break out from the bridgehead on 23 May a new and even more dangerous situation for the enemy has arisen.

On 8 Army front the Parachutists withdrew from CASSINO on night 17/18. They had left it almost to the last minute and we managed to get about 120 PWs from them, including the O.C. II Bn 4 Para Regt. On the 18th the enemy resistance forward of the HITLER line lessened and on that evening elements of our armour nearly carried some of the strongpoints by a sudden coup in the AQUINO area. Later however resistance stiffened and the enemy settled down to hold the line with great stubborness from PIEDIMONTE to PONTECORVO. 90 P.G., with 361 G.R. and the divisional units, was holding the Southern end of the sector having taken under command various remnants of the miscellaneous units which had been rushed down to the LIRI valley when our attacks started, as well as the remnants of 576 G.R., but having lost 200 P.G.R. which went to restore the situation South of the LIRI. They have also under command 115 Tk Bn which went into action with 26 Mk IVs. In the Northern end of the sector is 1 Para Div also with some miscellaneous (and occasionally unreliable) units under command and its sector stretches as far as the peak of M. CAIRO on whose Southern slopes II/100 Mtn Regt and 4 Alpine division are operating. At the moment of writing it appears that the HITLER line has been breached in the area of PONTECORVO and to North of it and that an enemy withdrawal is taking place there.

.....On 5 Army front.....

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On 5 Army front the enemy line has been swinging Westwards like a rather rickety door on an unstable hinge in the PICO-PONTECORVO area. 71 Div has been entirely destroyed as a fighting formation and none even of its units has been identified, though Colonel NAGEL, O.C. 131 G.R. which was under command, got a mention in the German Communiqué for 21 May. Not only so but 200 P.G.R., which became 71's residuary legatee and took on the defence of the ESPERIA - SANTA OLIVA axis, seems also to have disappeared and it has not joined its division North of the LIRI or at least not in the front line. In their place have come 26 Pz and 305 divisions. The former was put in between the West bank of the LIRI and PICO and the latter, or at least 577 G.R. and II/578, have been counter-attacking West of the PICO - SAN GIOVANNI road where they succeeded on 23 May in recapturing MONTE PALINFERNO but lost the C.O. of II/578 G.R. 305 Division came from the Adriatic flank where it was relieved on night 18/19 May by the first element of 278 Div, hastily summoned from the TRIESTE area. It appears to have 1027 G.R., from the beachhead, under command though prisoners from this have been taken as far West as LENOLA. Some of 334 Div is also probably to join it; we have identified 334 Recce Unit in the PICO area, prisoners taken on the East coast say that 6 Coy 754 at least left for the Southern front on 18 May and at 0130 hours on 23 May a sudden order arrived, according to two prisoners, for the whole division to move South at 0330. Whether it did move is not known since the two informants promptly seized the opportunity to desert. 26 Pz Div, according to an intelligent prisoner, went into action with three squadrons each of 12 Mk IVs and two squadrons each of 12 Panthers; Panthers were reported in the attack against MONTE LEUCIO on 21 May. 9 P.G.R. has been very roughly handled and XIV Corps claim virtually to have destroyed it. Maj RAFFE, the C.O. of II/578 said 26 Pz Div had been ordered to hold "at all costs" in the PICO area to cover the HITLER line positions across the LIRI.

The PICO hinge has held, though with difficulty, but to the West the enemy has been falling back rapidly. A retreat at such a speed, so closely pursued across such trackless country must have caused a considerable degree of disorganisation and we can probably take it that 94 Div, whose losses have been mounting this week, has ceased to exist as an effective formation. 15 P.G. Div was in reserve when the operations started, with only the 104 Regimental group under command; II and III Bns of 104 were put in around FORMIA and I Bn got put in North around S. OLIVA and came later under command of 26 Pz Div. What the division has under command now, or whether it has a sector at all, is obscure but various stray units have turned up from other parts of the front such as 3 Alpine Bn covering VALLECORSA and I/134 in front of PALENA and it may command some of them together with remnants of 94 Div. Its HQ appears to be somewhere back in the FROSINONE area.

It was clear, however, that forces so weakened and disorganised could not hold a line which had lengthened alarmingly and a fresh formation has had to be brought in to prevent our turning the corner at TERRACINA and taking 715 Div in the rear. For this purpose Kesselring has put in his last remaining reserve in South ITALY, 29 P.G. Div from the CIVITAVECCHIA - Lake BRACCIANO area. From a captured order it appears that it was originally intended that this division should have the task not only of holding the advance from the South but also of guarding against a break out from the beachhead, but the rapid advance of II Corps through the mountains and the disintegration of the German forces opposing it

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forced the division to concentrate all its force on the former task. All the Bns of the division but one have been identified between North of TERRACINA and AMASENO and the bulge driven into their centre by the advance to SONNINO and ROCCASECCA DE' VOLSCI means it has already had to stretch its front to a dangerous degree.

On the morning of 23 May VI Corps began an attack to break out of the bridgehead on both sides of CISTERNA in the sector of 362 and 715 divisions. Both German divisions suffered heavily and on the first day, over 600 prisoners were taken. The critical moment of the battle had arrived. 14 Army had already been most dangerously stripped. 26 Pz Div, its immediate reserve, had left a week before, taking with it two squadrons of Panthers from the independent Panther Bn and, if reports are true, some Tigers as well, presumably from 508 Bn. 1027 G.R., from 3 P.G. sector had also been sent to the South. 29 P.G. Div had gone to TERRACINA and had taken with it I/735. The whole of the German army is therefore stretched to the limit and there is only one mobile formation left in ITALY to come to the rescue, the Hermann Goering division in the PISA area. Faced with the destruction of his forces South of ROME it must be assumed that Kesselring, for all his reluctance and in spite of the fact that the division is clearly intended for FRANCE, must employ it to save what he can from the wreck. The decision may well have been taken by the afternoon of 23 May when the full extent of the crisis became obvious and by 0600 hours the advanced elements of the Recce Unit had reached VITERBO. The battle is no longer for ROME or for any ground or position in ITALY but to save the German Armies from destruction.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

During the past week a considerable amount of stationary rolling stock has been observed in the PISTOIA-PRATO-FLORENCE area and along the BOLOGNA-PISTOIA line; it is probable that supplies are unloaded in this area for onward transport by MT. For some time, however, the enemy's main repair activity has been concentrated on the main FLORENCE-ROME line, and with the assistance of the weather, he had by 23 May cleared this line as far South as ATTIGLIANO (just North of ORTE) except for the destroyed bridge NW of ORVIETO. If this state of affairs can be maintained then the pressure on his road transport will be considerably relieved.

The importance attached to the main BOLOGNA-FLORENCE-ROME line is indicated not only by enemy repair activity. Northwest of FLORENCE, at the important junction of PRATO, it is reported that a loop line 3 kilometres long and well camouflaged, has been constructed to provide a by-pass around PRATO connecting the BOLOGNA-PRATO stretch with the PRATO-FLORENCE stretch. South of FLORENCE it is possible that a hitherto unused narrow-gauge line, branching from the main line at the tunnel North of the bridge at G 946566, running along the West bank of the river, through INCISA village and rejoining the main line at INCISA station (Q 945547) has now been brought into use.

Of particular interest this week has been the cutting of railways along a general East-West line SPEZIA-RIMINI. Cuts are thought to have been obtained on all lines connecting the PO valley

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with Central ITALY, namely, GENOA, SPEZIA, PARMA-SPEZIA, BOLOGNA-PISTOIA, BOLOGNA-PRATO, BOLOGNA-RIMINI and FAENZA-BORGO SAN LORENZO (BORGO SAN LORENZO is about 10 miles NNE of FLORENCE). While breaks on all these lines have not existed simultaneously for a protracted period, they are potentially of great value since they directly supplement and appreciably deepen the intensive zone of rail interdiction in Central ITALY and force the enemy to use MT through an area where good roads are relatively few and the going is difficult. It is roughly estimated that the enemy would have to increase his MT performance by about one third, very possibly more, if rail lines through this zone were kept blocked. That the attacks so far have begun to be effective is indicated by reports of heavy MT movement both ways and the existence of dumping areas between FLORENCE and BOLOGNA.

In North ITALY the AVISIO viaduct South of BOLZANO on the BRENNER line has been repaired, but the bridge over the TAGLIAMENTO between UDINE and TREVISO on the main line from AUSTRIA has been successfully attacked and three spans have collapsed. At FIDENZA M/Y which was attacked on 13 May, all through tracks were still cut on the 17th and PARMA and PIACENZA M/Ys which were attacked at the same time were still completely blocked on the 18th. TREVISO M/Y, attacked on 14 May was still blocked on the 18th and all through tracks were cut at FAENZA on 19 May.

SHIPPING

This week has been marked by heavy attacks on ports, particularly PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO on the Italian West coast and PORTO FERRAIO on ELBA. While in relation to the air effort involved only a small number of ships are thought to have been sunk, heavy damage has been done to harbour installations and approach routes. This damage is believed to have achieved the desired result of appreciably cutting down the turn-over of cargoes. In addition, supplies, which the enemy can now ill afford to lose, have been destroyed in harbour areas. What appear to be considerable amounts of fuel have been burnt out at SPEZIA, ANCONA and PORTO MARGHERA (near VENICE).

THE GERMAN LORRY POSITION

The report at Appendix 'A' appeared in a recent Ministry of Economic Warfare Intelligence paper. It is of particular interest at this time in view of the fact that the enemy is now heavily dependent on motor transport for movement of both troops and supplies in Central ITALY. It will be noted that the report makes no mention of the Italian contribution to German MT requirements, and while it undoubtedly has not been great from an overall point of view, it is known that the Germans in ITALY are using a very appreciable amount of captured Italian MT. It has also been reported that MT plants at TURIN are active and trains have been observed carrying MT Southwards from the TURIN area.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

The main items of news during the last week all come from the ATHENS area. ELAS forces attacked a mixed German and Rallis formation at MARCOPOULON, SE of ATHENS and claim to have inflicted 100 casualties on the enemy. A number of sabotage incidents have been reported, the most successful being the destruction of an ammunition train at LEVADHIA D69 and the unconfirmed destruction of

....a petrol train....

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a petrol train. Delayed action charges had been placed in a number of trains at THEBES and further wrecks may be expected. A delayed report from the Mt HELICON area gives details of a clash between a mixed German-Italian-Rallis force and ELAS which took place between 7-11 May. The enemy attacked ELAS who, in a counter-attack inflicted some 250 casualties on the enemy before the engagement was broken off. Activity is again reported from the DRAMA-KAVALLA area. Fighting between ELAS and Bulgarian troops has taken place at PALAEO KAVALLA L37, PANGAEON D86 and SIDEROKASTRON K20. No details have been given but it is thought that these have been patrol clashes only.

ALBANIA

Encouraging reports on the Partisan forces in Southern ALBANIA have been sent by British L.Os. The Partisans are stated to control nearly the whole of the Southern territory and are able to undertake coordinated offensive action against enemy communications. The state of training is uneven but 1, 4 and 5 Bdes have reached a high standard. TEPELENE and PERMET are stated to be in Partisan hands. The capture of the former town situated on the VALONA-JANINA road is a serious threat to German communications and the enemy is expected to react strongly.

A force of 800 Germans and BALLI KOMBETAR launched an attack on the Partisans in the hills between VALONA and BERAT. The Partisans, making excellent use of the terrain, counter-attacked and took 180 PWs. Units of 4 Partisan Bde ambushed a small German convoy at GRABOVICE near PODGRADEC and claim to have inflicted some 25 casualties in killed and wounded on the enemy. There have been some troop movements from JUGOSLAVIA to the KORCE area. No identifications have been made but it is confirmed that at least 100 lorries carrying troops have arrived. A report that the Armenian troops in the KORCE area have been disarmed by the Germans because of mass desertions may mean that the newcomers are meant to garrison this sector. The only troops available from JUGOSLAVIA would appear to be police units but this is as yet unconfirmed.

JUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

The enemy has continued with the work of fortifying RAB. It is known that cement and other building materials had reached the island but no details of the constructions have been received. About 300 enemy troops landed at ZDRELAC on PASMAN and proceeded to make a search of the island. This is thought to be one of the periodical clean-ups and has no particular significance. The final figure for the recent Partisan raid on SOLTA shows that 264 Inf Div has again suffered a heavy blow. 200 killed and 50 PWs, all from 892 I.R. go to swell the casualty list of the "Gch' für Heim" Div. There are indications that 369 Germano-Croat Div is relieving 118 Jg of some of its island commitments. The latter formation would appear to need some rest after the recent rough handling it received on KORCULA and MLJET.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

The short advance made by the enemy last week when they captured KORENICA seems to have been made with considerable speed. It is feared that with the fall of the town a number of Partisan wounded and some war material fell into enemy hands. The enemy now

...control the roads. ..

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controls the roads KORENICA P 37 - UDBINA P 43, LOVINAC P 33 and KORENICA-BUNIC P 26 -PISAC P 35. Fighting is in progress along the roads GRACAC P 42 DRUVNO P 53 - LAPAC P 35 and DRUVNO-UDBINA. The KRBAVSKO POLJE area (NW of UDBINA), where there is a landing ground, is now entirely in enemy hands. The German drive in the PAPUK area has come to an end. The enemy's claim to have liquidated Partisan resistance was disproved when the latter captured ORLJAVAC F 75. Communications have again been the targets for Partisan specialist units. In three attacks in the RUMA area, one bridge and 150 m of railway track were destroyed and 250 telegraph poles were felled.

BOSNIA

Enemy drives of varying strengths but of purely local importance have taken place in Central and N.W. BOSNIA.

An attack, stated to be in some strength, from PALJEDOR down the railway was held at JANSKI MOST and a complimentary drive from DRVAR to the North was repulsed at SITNICA. Other thrusts by the enemy from BIHAC to the South and D. VAKUF to the S.W. were repulsed after fierce fighting.

SERBIA AND HERCEGOVINA

The German troop concentration in the PODGORICA area is stated to have reached a total of 10,000 troops. A minor offensive has been launched by the enemy with the object of clearing the Partisans from essential communications. Columns from CACKO, NEVESINJE, BILECA and STOLAC are driving to the coast in an effort to pin the Partisans down with their backs to the sea and thus destroy them. No details of this fighting are to hand but the Partisans in HERCEGOVINA have eluded much more powerful drives in the past and have no particular reason to fear the outcome of the present operations.

Two German columns were attacked on the road SJENICA-PRIJEPOLJE and casualties inflicted on the enemy. Partisan HQ appreciates that these columns were opening the road for still larger troop movements which may confirm a report that Cetnik forces intended to move from RASKA and PRIBOJ to SJENICA and PRIJEPOLJE respectively.

No further increase in the number of enemy troops in the LESKOVAC area has been reported and it seems certain that the whole of 1 Mtn Div has arrived. Reports all stress the fact that German-Bulgarian relations are very strained and tend to deteriorate. A Bulgarian drive in the JASTREBAC Mtns (West of NIS) has proved even less successful than preceding drives. The Partisans are now stated to be in control of the area bounded by the rivers MORAVA, RASINA and TOPLICA. Two complete companies of Bulgarians, consisting of 225 troops and nine officers deserted with arms and equipment to the Partisans at LESANE P 09, an example which was followed by 70 Cetniks with two officers.

Among a number of sabotage incidents the outstanding is the derailment of a train at KORLAN K 06 on the NIS-KRUSEVAC line. More than 100 German troops lost their lives in this operation.

HUNGARY

Considerable military traffic has been reported moving North from NOVI SAD to SUBOTICA and HUNGARY. The enemy is improving the railway between these two towns and one report states that a further

..... track is being laid.....

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track is being laid. An unconfirmed report states that SERBIA will be taken over by mixed German-Hungarian forces and the Bulgarian troops withdrawn. It is apparent that the German High Command can no longer entirely trust their Bulgarian allies and some other solution for the occupation of SERBIA may have to be sought.

ORDER OF BATTLE

With the arrival of 42 Jaeger Div in the ZAGREB area with H.Q. at SAMOBOR, it appears that 1 Cossack Div has moved East. Reports place it at BROD and POZEGA, the former being the most likely. The role of this division, that of guarding the East-West communications, appears to be the same except that its responsibilities have moved East.

Nothing new has been reported about the Albanian SS Div SKANDERBEG except that the Albanian response to the German request for volunteers has been almost negative.

4. APPENDIX

At Appendix "A" is a report of the German Army position.

D. W. Strathdee
Lt Col

CSI
HQ, A.A.I.
24 May 1944

for Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

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APPENDIX "A" to .Q. A.A.I.
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 45
DATED 24 MAY 1944.

THE GERMAN LORRY POSITION

When the Second Front opens, one of the first acts of the German authorities in Western Europe will be to requisition large numbers of civilian vehicles, at present used for meeting essential civilian needs in FRANCE, HOLLAND and BELGIUM, and to use them to bring divisional MT up to paper strength. This is an indication of the difficult position in which the Germans find themselves as a result of nearly three years of attrition on the Eastern Front. Today it is estimated that she can muster only 440,000 lorries to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces on all fronts.

At the outbreak of war, Germany had 400,000 lorries in civilian use and approximately 200,000 operating with the Army. Losses, however, were insignificant in the first two years of war, and the occupation of Western Europe brought a pool of approximately 750,000 lorries under German control. Of these, 500,000 vehicles were of a type and age that made them useful to the Wehrmacht.

The invasion of Russia brought a sharp change in the situation. Wastage was high, particularly during winter campaigns, and the Germans found that they were unable to make good the losses by new manufacture and at the same time maintain their production of higher priority armaments. They therefore made frequent calls upon the reserve in the occupied countries, with the result that by mid-1943 this pool was almost exhausted.

They were, therefore, compelled last year to give higher priority to the manufacture of lorries and to carry out drastic reorganisation of the industry. It was reported that Opel of Russelsheim was ordered to revert to lorry production and the total manufacturing facilities of German Europe were organised to concentrate upon the production of a few standardised types.

Up to the present, production in Germany has suffered little direct damage from air attack, but administrative and transport difficulties have had their effect on output. Production in FRANCE and BELGIUM, however, has been seriously hampered by air attack.

All current production is devoted to meeting the needs of the Armed Forces and the civilian position in Germany has deteriorated steadily as a result of its semi-starvation. It is estimated that, in March 1944, there were only 310,000 civilian lorries operating in the whole of Germany.

Three important factors have aggravated the position. The first is the greatly increased demand for road transport as a result of the dispersal of factories and for maintaining communications or clearing away debris after air attacks. The second is that the change-over to substitute fuels, quite apart from causing a loss of efficiency, has created a large demand for vehicles for the collection of these fuels. The third is that most of the civilian vehicles are now of a considerable age and are frequently in need of repair. The demand of the Army for spare parts to build up adequate reserves in the West has, however, caused an acute shortage in Germany itself, and it is by no means uncommon for lorries to be off the road for long periods.

.....The net result.....

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The net result of these shortages is that both the German Army and the civilian administration are unable to muster sufficient vehicles to meet all their requirements, and a high rate of loss in battle, plus added strains on the home front, will cause a sharp deterioration in the enemy's MT position.

(Source: MEW Intelligence Weekly Report No 117)

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 47

OF 1 JUNE, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The main centre of interest this week has lain in the former Beachhead. The break out was very successful and carried us up within range of route 6 at VALMONTONE. Our pressure then shifted to a Northwesterly direction; we have forced the enemy back along the whole former left flank of the beachhead to the prepared line in rear which was intended to be the Western end of a line across ITALY covering ROME and finally, on the night 30/31 May, we have broken through this line between VELLETRI and VALMONTONE and gained positions on the heights of the COLLI LAZIALI. In the LIRI and SACCO valleys the enemy, having been driven off the Adolf Hitler line simultaneously with the break out from the bridgehead, is now conducting a stubbornly contested withdrawal which is taking more and more of a Northerly trend. There is evidence of the arrival of further reinforcements from North ITALY and from even further afield.

The break out from the bridgehead met 362 and 715 divisions and inflicted very heavy losses on them. Local surprise was clearly gained and most of the prisoners were taken when the front line positions were overrun. The remnants of 715 Division, after suffering very heavy casualties, seem to have been driven East into the mountains leaving behind so much of its equipment that the division can hardly exist any longer as a fighting formation. 362 Division put up a stiffer fight, 956 Regt offering very stubborn resistance in CISTERNA which ended with the surrender of the Regimental Commander and his Staff and 600 survivors of the regiment. The Regimental Commander of 954 G.R. had also already been captured with his Staff. By the 27th May we had pushed an armoured force up to ARTENA which appears to have got in among some of the enemy's rear elements, for 80 M.T. were shot up by our tanks along the road. This thrust drove a new wedge between 10 and 14 Armies and in order to stop it at all costs Kesselring was obliged to commit the Hermann Goering division which was mentioned last week as being on the way from the North. Once more the enemy have been impelled by the rapid development of events to commit a reserve division piecemeal. We have now had prisoners

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from the Recce Unit, Engineer Bn and both PGRs and the Tank Regt also appears to be in the area. It was also necessary to bring over other reinforcements from 4 Parachute Div and 65 Div, and even from 92 Div from North of ROME, to help plug the gap, but at the time of writing it appears that these have been insufficient and a definite breach has been made in the enemy's defensive line North of VELLETRI extending almost as far as Lake NEMI.

Further East 29 P.G. Division and the remains of 94 Inf Div have been driven gradually North through the trackless LEPINI mountains which have now been almost entirely cleared. On 8 Army's front not much contact has been made with 15 PG or 305 divisions or with the elements of 334 division withdrawn from the Adriatic front and the task of rearguard has been left to 90 PG, 26 Pz and 1 Para Div. The last named put up a particularly strong defence in the ARCE area, with some vicious counter-attacks which slowed up our advance on this important point. A captured map of probably recent date shows the boundary between 90 PG and 26 Pz Divs as from RIPI to TORRICE and between 26 Pz and 305 Div as from POFI to ARNARA which shows the general line up of divisions in this area. 4 Para Regt on 31 May was in the area between Monte S. GIOVANNI (G 5937) and BOVILLE (G 5637) and the rest of the division apparently further back so that it appears that it is intended to withdraw up the ALATRI-SUBLACO road, leaving the SORA-AVEZZANO road to 44 and 5 Mtn divisions. 90 PG, 26 Pz, 305 and 29 PG divisions will presumably withdraw by routes further West and endeavour to come in on the left of Hermann Goering division to form a continuous line from sea to sea. We may expect, however, that some of the troops from this area may be moved more hurriedly past VALMONTONE to reinforce the defence of the COLLI LAZIALI.

Since the Allied attack began on 11 May all the divisions which were then in South ITALY, including the two on the Adriatic coast, have been drawn into the battle South of ROME and West of the Appennines. Of these divisions at least three, 71, 94 and 715, can be said to have ceased to exist as effective formations and the remainder have all been heavily mauled, in particular 15 PG, 90 PG, 1 Para and 362 Divs. As a result the enemy has been obliged to bring down reinforcements from the North: 278 Div from ISTRIA, Hermann Goering Div from the LEGHORN area and a regimental group of 92 Division from the area North of CIVITAVECCHIA. The latter suffered heavy losses from air attacks on its way down and even heavier when it was thrown into the line. Even these reinforcements however, appear to have been insufficient and there is evidence that more troops are being sent from further afield. Three independent reports between 17 and 23 May state that 9 Pz division, which has been in the MONTPELLIER area of South FRANCE, was moving to ITALY. Another report states that 20 GAF division from DENMARK was moving between 24 and 27 May with destination ITALY. Finally there have been reports that 16 SS PG division is moving back from the Balkans to ITALY and its HQ has been several times reported at GORIZIA. This may be connected with another report of troop-train movements from TARVIS and POSTUMIA to BOLOGNA and PARMA. It certainly seems strange that at such a time the enemy should be prepared to denude his garrisons in the West and it is an indication of the seriousness of the enemy situation in ITALY. It is possible that

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not all these reinforcements will be employed in Southern ITALY; if they relieved formations in North ITALY for service in the South they could still be within reach of the Western front if an emergency required their return. There is really, however, only one reasonable formation in the North which they could relieve, 356 Inf Div in the GENOA area. (We have actually had a paybook captured in PALENA from 356 Ersatz Bn but this may not prove anything.) At least it is clear that the enemy still considers that great efforts are necessary to prevent a catastrophe in ITALY.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

From 19 to 25 May the enemy managed, with the assistance of the weather, to keep the main FLORENCE-ROME line as far South as ORTE and the PERUGIA-SPOLETO by-pass tolerably clear, and it is certain that he made full use of this respite to relieve the pressure on his road transport. On 25 May, however, the line was blocked in five places between PONTASSIEVE and AREZZO, and in addition at CORTONA, FICULLE, ORVIETO and at three places between TERONTOLA and PERUGIA. Since this date dislocation has progressed steadily, and whilst the enemy is still making use of every stretch of line he can, the majority of his supplies are once again being carried by MT South of the PISA-RIMINI line. On 31 May all through lines were heavily interdicted and there were no less than 35 cuts on the main BOLOGNA-FLORENCE-ROME line. The only appreciable stretch of line open in Central ITALY runs from a point just West of FALCONARA down through FOLIGNO almost as far as TERNI.

Traffic over the BRENNER, which has returned to normal after the repair of the AVISIO viaduct, had decreased somewhat on 27 May, whilst the gap in the bridge over the TAGLIAMENTO river at CASARSA is still dislocating traffic from the N.E.

SHIPPING

This week our air effort against harbours has been relatively light with only two raids made on Italian West coast ports, namely GENOA and SAN STEFANO. Nevertheless shipping activity on the West coast, at least during the first part of the week, appears to have fallen off somewhat as compared to two weeks ago. PR has been somewhat restricted but presumably the extensive attacks of last week are still being felt. Turnover at GENOA has been low and PORTO FERRAIO appears to have been relatively inactive. At SAN STEFANO six F-boats were observed on the 25th and one MT ship was seen unloading on the 27th. Activity on the East coast appears to have been normal.

The attack on GENOA sank and damaged a number of ships and destroyed harbour installations. Raids on the shipyards at MONTFALCONE and the refining and fuel storage installations at PORTO MARGHERA also achieved good results. At MONTFALCONE there was heavy damage to the yards including the submarine shops, a 590-ft tanker under construction was virtually destroyed, another tanker fitting out damaged and at least four F-boats destroyed or damaged. At PORTO MARGHERA the refinery was heavily hit and several storage tanks were burnt out or otherwise damaged.

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ATTACKS ON MT AND ROADS

This week has seen particularly heavy air attacks against enemy MT and roads. The main routes of withdrawal now open to the enemy are the FROSINONE-SUBIACO-AVEZZANO road and the ARCE-SORA-AVEZZANO road. Highway 6 remains important but becomes increasingly less so with the development of our thrust towards VALMONTONE. These roads have all been heavily attacked and also roads North of ROME, particularly in the VITERBO area. These attacks have cratered the roads, destroyed bridges and created blocks by attacks on towns. In addition, and no less important, our claims against the enemy motor transport for the week 24/30 May total 2104 MT destroyed and 1637 damaged by air attack. This does not include MT destroyed by ground forces, whose most notable success was when tanks caught a column near ARTENA and destroyed 80 vehicles. As a result the enemy is having considerable difficulty in moving supplies and troops in the forward areas, and the strain on his MT must be very heavy, particularly in view of his dependence on MT throughout Central ITALY owing to heavy damage to the Railways. The seriousness of the situation is indicated by the fact that he has moved considerable MT during the hours of daylight in face of our overwhelming air superiority, presumably being forced to do so in order to meet urgent administrative and tactical demands.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

The PELOPONESE has been decreed a zone of operations by the German Military authorities. Civilians are allowed to circulate between 0600 and 1800 hours only, while all postal, telegraphic, road and rail communications have been reserved for purely German use. The growing tension is perhaps best illustrated by a new anti-sabotage measure. All trains will henceforth contain two trucks of Greek hostages, who, if not killed by the act of sabotage, will be held responsible for any loss of German lives.

Zervas reports a clash with German troops in the PREVEZA W 87 area. In two days fighting 24 Germans were killed and 27 wounded. 9 Germans were captured together with 67 mules loaded with ammunition and equipment. Fighting continues with the Germans slowly withdrawing to the North.

ALBANIA

In fighting near the village of KUC M21, 40 Germans were killed. Documents taken from the corpses identify 2 Coy I Bn 524 I.R. of 297 Inf Div and a new identification - 48 R.U. This latter unit left GRAZ and arrived in GREECE during early March and has presumably taken the place of 297 R.U. which was last reported to have moved North to the ZAGREB area. Partisans clashed with Ball Kombetar in the VALONA area at KRESHLAN M16 and CAJRAN M16. The Partisan main force worked to the rear of the Ball Kombetar and killed 11. 100 PWs were captured together with an arty piece, 4 MGs and many rifles.

YUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

Persistent reports that the enemy have evacuated HVAR would

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appear to be exaggerated. What may well have taken place is a further movement East of the Westerly garrisons while a number of troops may have left for the mainland. 600 troops have been withdrawn from BRAC and here again the total evacuation would appear to be contrary to German interests in so much as the sea passage from SPLIT to PLOCA would be seriously jeopardised if Partisan forces were in possession of the islands.

Allied troops made an unopposed landing on MLJET during the night 22/23 May. Our aircraft bombed enemy positions at dawn on the 23rd and by 0900 hours the enemy had been surrounded. No casualty figures have been received but it is estimated that the German garrison was about 300 men.

The mainland has been the scene of small scale but bitter clashes. The entire enemy garrison at BRIBIRSKI MOSTINE U 4583 on the SKRADIN-BENKOVAC road was destroyed by Partisans who later annihilated a column of reinforcements which attempted a relief sortie. 350 Germans were killed in this fighting, 2 tanks and many lorries are claimed to have been destroyed. This action by Tito's forces is all the more praiseworthy as recently the enemy went to considerable trouble to clean up the area. An unconfirmed report states that SEBENIGRAD P12 and NOVI GRAD P11 are again in Partisan hands. 7 small vessels are stated to have been captured in the ports. If this report is true German reactions may be expected as a cardinal point of their strategy is the control of the coastline.

During the first two weeks of May 24 lorries were destroyed and 114 Germans killed by Partisan mines on the road TROGIR-SIBENIK. Maj-Gen LUDECKE, G.O.C. 264 Inf Div, was seriously injured by a mine on the SKRADIN-SIBENIK road.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

Fighting has taken place between LJUBLJANA and NOVO MESTO and the Partisans report the capture of TREBNJE, on the railway connecting these towns. The enemy has recently made strenuous efforts to repair this line, as many as 500 civilians being put to work on it.

A column consisting of 250 lorries, 42 tanks and 20 armoured cars was reported moving from BELGRADE to ZAGREB on the 23 and 24 May. No identifications have been made but it is presumed that this movement is connected with the recent arrival of 42 Jg Div in the ZAGREB area. An unconfirmed report states that this formation is destined for the Italian front.

BOSNIA

At 0430 hours 25 May, 36 JU 52s carrying paratroops estimated at about Bn strength together with a similar force of gliders borne troops attacked Tito's H.Q. at DRVAR P 93. Simultaneous drives by many columns converging on DRVAR have placed the Partisans in an extremely difficult position. Enemy forces from BIHAC, advancing through PETROVAC have linked up with the airborne troops while a second large enemy column has made fast progress from JAJCE towards RIBNIK. The road BIHAC-TRAVNIK is now controlled by the enemy. British LOs confirm that the offensive is on a large scale and appreciate that the German intention is to eliminate Partisan opposition in W. BOSNIA. Tito and most of his staff including British and American LOs are reported to be safe but the situation is still very confused. Unusual enemy activity by recce aircraft had given warning that some

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action was being planned but it is feared that the airborne attack came as a complete surprise. Diversionary attacks were launched by the enemy from the BIHAC-KOSTAJNICA road to the North and NW. Five columns took part in this drive into OROMTLA. Two of these started from BIHAC and are advancing on SLUNJ K21 and TRZAC K40; another is moving from OTOKA P79 towards VRNOGRAC; a fourth from DVOR K81 towards GLINA K64 and a fifth from KOSTAJNICA K92 towards PETRINJA K75. Allied air effort over JUGOSLAVIA was directed mainly against concentrations of enemy aircraft MT and troops in the BIHAC area. Complete assessment of all claims is not yet available but it is apparent that considerable success was achieved.

At Appendix 'A' is Force 266 estimate of enemy dispositions on the Dalmatian islands.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Events in ITALY had given rise to a spate of rumour of Balkan troop movements.

German formations which took part in the occupation of HUNGARY have, owing to the lack of Hungarian resistance, been withdrawn to fill more pressing needs. An unconfirmed report states that the SS Div Reichsfuehrer has arrived in the GORIZIA area while 4 Brandenburg regiment together with 92 Mot Indept Regt are reliably stated to be in BOSNIA. 5 Russian deserters from 1 Mtn Div state that the div is going via SKOPLJE to SALONIKA. On the night 21 May a false air raid alert was sounded in LESKOVAC to cover the departure of the first two trains.

The Hungarian quota on the Russian front again shows an increase. 2, 3, 4, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24 and 25 Lt Divs, 2 Armoured Div, 201 L of C Div and 1 and 2 Mtn Bdes have all been tentatively identified in the area LWOW, STANISLAWOW, KOLOMYJA, KUTY.

A similar increase is reported in the Rumanian forces. II and IV Corps with elements of I and V Corps making a total of 12 Divs are stated to be actively engaged.

Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

GSI(a)
HQ.AAI.
1 June 44

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APPENDIX "A" TO H.Q. A.A.I.
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 47
DATED 1 JUN 44.

ENEMY DISPOSITIONS DALMATIAN ISLANDS

KRK	-	100 Germans late May (temporary German drive on in island and tps there are at present fairly considerable).
LUSSIN	-	600 Germans and Italians.
PAG	-	600 Germans - but may now be evacuating the island.
CHERSO	-	Italian Fascist Guard and some Germans.
RAB	-	600 Germans.
VIR	-	Frequent German patrols.
ULJAN	-	250 Germans area PREKO T 9400.
ASMAN	-	300 Germans area TKON U 1482.
ARGADA	-	50 Germans area U 2075.
LURTER	-	300 Germans area BETINA, TJESNO, LURTER U 3070.
PRVIC LUKA	-	100 Germans area U 4462.
ZLARIN	-	300 Germans area U 4855.
BRAC	-	800/1000 Germans.
HVAR	-	800/1000 Germans.
KORCULA	-	1000/1300 Germans. Recently raided by partisans.
SOLTA	-	300 Germans. Recently raided by partisans.
DRVENIK	-	600
CIOVO	-	800
MLJET	-	300 Germans.

Other islands are in Partisan hands.

In the VIS area islands tps are of 118 German Div - from SOLTA Northwards of 264 Div.

Feeling of population of islands is very strongly pro-British and pro-Partisan. This applies to the whole DALMATIAN area except in following islands.

0 3532	SILBA	Many bombed out refugees from ZARA have found refuge in these areas. They are Italian in origin, untrustworthy and anti-Ally.
0 5027	PREMUDA	
0 5721	SKARDA	
	LUSSIN	Old Italian islands full of mixed Slav/Italian stock; not to be relied upon or trusted.
	CHERSO	
0 4340	ASINELLO	

Partisans are to be found in all islands whether occupied or not by Germans. Safer areas where there are larger Partisan forces and no Germans include - VIS, DUGI (HQ at ZALI, ZELN, BOSAVA T 7206, ZAGLAN T 9085), KORNAT (and naze of islands surrounding), MOLAT (North of DUGI), IZ (between ULJAN and DUGI).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

NO. 48 OF 8 JUNE, 1944.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The fierce fighting in the ALBAN hills, the break through to ROME and the pursuit beyond ROME to CIVITAVECCHIA and TARQUINIA appear to have destroyed and dispersed the greater part of 14 Army. East of ROME the enemy, though also most seriously disorganised, has offered stubborn resistance in the angle between the Tiber and the ANIENE while further East the centre and left flank of 10 Army have fallen back more slowly.

No organised resistance has yet been met between the Tiber and the West coast and four divisions which were withdrawing in this area, 4 Para, 65 Inf, 3 P.G. and 362 Inf, appear to be well out of contact and are probably not in control of the situation. I Bn 11 Para Regt was encountered in the area West of CIVITA CASTELLANA, which may indicate that these better troops had been put in to endeavour to check our advance up the Tiber which is so deeply outflanking 10 Army to the East. In the meantime, however, 20 GAF Division has begun to arrive and prisoners were taken from 39 GAF Jaeger Regt on 8 June at 448917, West of Lake BRACCIANO. They said they had left DENMARK ten days ago. Their mission was supposed to be reconnoitring a line to hold but it looks as though they have got involved in the rout of 14 Army and may get drawn in piecemeal like other German reinforcements in this battle.

East of the Tiber HG Div on the West and 15 P.G. on the East have been offering stout resistance in the area between MONTE ROTONDO and North of TIVOLI but they are now withdrawing North. 1 Para Div was to the East and 90 P.G. div apparently in the ROVIANO area (G 1680). Movements at the time of writing are obscure but it appears that 26 Pz Div is to move to the area of MAGLIANO (A 7418) and take over the task of protecting the right flank of the Army. Some of its elements may be moving to positions further North passing through CALVI (A 8223). H.G. Div, which has shown considerable signs of disintegration, may possibly be intending to withdraw through ROCCA SINIBALDA (B 1028) on the RIETI axis but elements were apparently still engaged immediately East of the Tiber on 7 June. 4 Para Regt on 6 June was to move to TORRICELLA B 0707 where it was to come under command of, apparently, 90 PG Div; this may indicate that 90 PG is also moving North through RIETI to extend the flank guard on the Tiber. If this is so the enemy will have swung his right flank round to face almost due West to meet our

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advance on the other bank of the Tiber. - The location of the remains of 29 PG, 92, 334 and 305 Divs is still obsoure; there is some doubt as to whether they still exist as formations commanding troops and if they do they are probably not commanding their own troops.

Further East the enemy rearguard in the SUBIACO area consisted of 134 GR, 9 PGR and some Flak. The rest of 44 Div continues to withdraw North of BALSORANO, 5 Mtn Div North of PESCASSEROLI and 114 Jaegar Div up the SULMONA road. On the Adriatic flank a deserter from 992 said his battalion was withdrawing on the night of 7/8th June beyond the FORO line. We observed large fires in PESCARA Marshalling yards and heard explosions along the whole front of 278 Div on 8 June.

The twenty German divisions which have fought on the Italian front so far in this battle have now been engaged in four weeks continuous fighting in which they have suffered one defeat after another. None of them, with the unimportant exception of 278 Division, is capable of anything more than a withdrawal and the next line on which we can expect any serious resistance is the PISA-RIMINI position. If the enemy reckons on holding this he can scarcely estimate the value of 10 and 14 Armies as more than eight full strength divisions. To hold the PISA-RIMINI position it is estimated that twelve divisions would not be too many, particularly since recent operations have shown that mountain barriers are not so formidable as had been thought. Besides twelve divisions for the line itself it is calculated that Kesselring must also require further formations to protect his flanks against seaborne landings; he can scarcely reduce the garrison of ISTRIA below two divisions, the Venetian coast will require at least one division and two divisions on the Ligurian coast would probably not be excessive. He may also need two other divisions, which could be of lower category, for internal security in North ITALY. This gives us a possible total of nineteen divisions. He may have by now in North ITALY seven divisions which have not yet been engaged, at least two of which, 162 and 188 Divs, are suitable only for limited operations. We can calculate therefore the total forces at his disposal at about the equivalent of fifteen divisions and not all of these are capable of front line duty. It looks as though the enemy must either renounce the intention of holding the PISA-RIMINI line or expose himself to the danger of a disaster there unless he can provide strong reinforcements of good quality troops. Events in Western and Eastern Europe will decide.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Again this week a very considerable portion of our tactical air effort has been directed against roads and motor transport. Apart from interfering with movement these attacks, coupled with the interruption of railways, have rendered the enemy supply problems extremely difficult. South from a general line SAN STEFANO (E 6330) - ORVIETO (A 4558) - TODI (A 6965) there are very few important roads which have not been either pot-holed, blocked by damage to a town or suffered the loss of one or more bridges. For the seven days 31 May/6 June air attacks are claimed to have accounted for 1884 MT destroyed and 1683 damaged. The week previous 2104 MT were destroyed, 1637 damaged, while incomplete reports for the period 12/23 May total 303 destroyed and 458 damaged. Thus between 12 May and 6 June total MT destroyed is 4090 with damage to 3979, making a daily average loss of 255 and 250 respectively. These figures do not include enemy MT losses resulting from air attacks made during hours of darkness, nor losses inflicted by ground forces. These claims perhaps appear high, but it must be remembered that large numbers of enemy MT have been constantly on the move during the past two weeks. Furthermore they

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tend to be confirmed by actual ground count. For example on the road from FROSINONE (G 4638) to PIGLIO (G 2858), a stretch of about 25 miles, 175 MT were counted, and in the immediate vicinity of SUBIACO (G 2570) 102 MT were strewn along the road over a distance of only one mile.

Added to his transport difficulties the enemy's requirements in ammunition and fuel have risen very sharply since the beginning of our attack on 11 May. While ammunition requirements have probably fallen off recently, consumption of fuel (a critical item) is likely to have increased appreciably. Also, supplies, how much it is as yet impossible to estimate, have been overrun by ground troops and destroyed by air attacks. Prisoners report shortages of ammunition, fuel and even rations. Obviously local shortages of supplies are bound to occur in battle, but on the basis of many reports from various sources it is appreciated that for the past two weeks at least the enemy supply situation has been very tight and has quite probably been an important factor in tactical decisions.

This critical administrative situation could scarcely have arisen had we not begun an all-out air effort against enemy rail communications in Central ITALY at the end of March. Before our attack on 11 May this air programme did not, and could not be expected to, produce immediate decisive results against an enemy who was not being forced to fight and who did therefore not need many supplies and in turn could move such supplies as could not be transported by rail by MT, upon which no major tactical demands were being made. However, when our assault went in, on the one hand supply requirements and tactical needs for MT immediately jumped, while on the other destruction of railways had been such that we were able to devote a large proportion of our air effort to close support of ground troops and attacks on road communications without an appreciable falling off of the degree of rail interdiction.

At this time it is true that the enemy is shortening his L of C which will tend to alleviate his supply problems. However, counterbalancing this advantage are two important factors. In the immediate future we should overrun what have hitherto been the main 10 and 14 Army dumps, most of which are thought to be located South of ORVIETO (A 4558) and from which it is doubtful whether the enemy can evacuate any appreciable amount of supplies owing to shortage of transport facilities. Secondly we will now be able to concentrate greater air effort along a general line GENOA-RIMINI against rail lines crossing the Appennines. As compared to Central ITALY, roads across the Appennines are relatively few and present hard going through country in many places. MT movement tends to be difficult and vulnerable to air and Partisan attacks. In addition there are not many points suitable for transhipment from rail to MT. Thus if the rail lines are interdicted it becomes much more difficult for the enemy to substitute MT than has been the case in Central ITALY.

RAILWAYS

On 30 May a report was received that the line from FALCONARA, on the East coast, to FABRIANO had been opened and was in use; this information was confirmed by a further report on 1 June. Though fighter bomber attacks may have had the line out South of FABRIANO, it is possible that the enemy had an outlet from the East coast line as far South as SPOLETO or TERNI until 3 June, when successful air attacks resulted in at least nine and possibly sixteen cuts between FABRIANO and SPOLETO, and a further eleven East of FABRIANO.

That the enemy still attaches great importance to the main FLORENCE-ORTE line is shown by a report that, whereas on other lines repair gangs consist of Italian labourers directed by Germans, all personnel working on this line are German. Despite this fact, the whole of the Central railway network South of FLORENCE has been consistently cut throughout its length for the past week and there is ample evidence that the enemy is still transferring the bulk of his supplies to MT in the PISA, PISTOIA, PRATO, FLORENCE area. One report states that personnel returning from leave have to wait as long as seven days at FLORENCE for onward

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transport to the South. An ammunition train was blown up at SAN GIOVANNI IN VALDARNO, N.W. of AREZZO, on 1 June and a fuel train set on fire between LUCCA and PISTOIA on the 3rd.

There has been an increase of traffic on the BRENNER-BOLOGNA line since 1 June, and the traffic entering ITALY from the East, after a slight decrease early in the week, is now back to normal. In the N.W. however, there has been a definite decrease in traffic from MODANE through TURIN and ALESSANDRIA to the West coast. Marshalling yards at BOLOGNA, FAENZA, FORLI, CASTEL MAGGIORE, TURIN, GENOA and NOVI LIGURE were effectively bombed during the week.

SHIPPING

This week there are indications that activity on the West coast is again picking up to approach the level of some two weeks ago. On the island of ELBA, PORTO FERRAIO appears to have become less active as a transhipment port for supplies destined for SAN STEFANO, no active shipping being observed there on 31 May. ELBA is still being used, however, four E-boats being observed at PORTO LONGONE on the 31st and one E-boat in a cave across the bay from PORTO FERRAIO. Other ports on ELBA may possibly also be in use. Presumably this development is the result of heavy bombing of PORTO FERRAIO.

Air raids on ports this week have been few. LEGHORN was heavily raided on 7 June and the ports of ANCONA and SAN BENEDETTO on the East coast have also been attacked. However, air attacks against ships at sea off the West coast have been more successful than heretofore. On 2 June a number of barges were damaged and on the following day two convoys were intercepted off LEGHORN with two E-boats, three F-boats, two schooners and two barges claimed as sunk, and another E-boat as severely damaged. If these successes can be continued enemy shipping losses should soon become prohibitive.

PR revealed on 31 May the presence of three F-boats at CIVITAVECCHIA and rail movement between TARQUINIA (5 miles North of CIVITAVECCHIA) and ROME where there had been an increase in rolling stock. CIVITAVECCHIA has not been used for regular supply traffic ever since our landing at ANZIO in January and whether or not the enemy intended to use it again is now academic since the port was captured by us on 7 June. Abandonment of SAN STEFANO is expected in the immediate future, in fact it may already no longer be in use. PIOMBINO, about 50 miles North of SAN STEFANO, then becomes the enemy's most Southerly port. Another 50 miles to the North is LEGHORN, but it is questionable whether the extra handling involved in moving supplies by sea would justify the use of a port as far North as LEGHORN, though the interdiction of land communications may force him to continue to move supplies by sea. The distance from GENOA to LEGHORN is only about 100 miles.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

No large scale operations have been undertaken by the enemy and the only news of any importance concerns acts of sabotage. Two heavy lorries ran on to Andarte mines on the road ELASSON F16 KOZANI N 81 and were blown up causing some casualties among the German crews. Two railway bridges have been destroyed in the PELOPONNESE, one near ALFIOS on the PYRGOS C 52 KYPARISSA C 57 line and another on the coastal railway between KIATON D 55 and VELLO D 55. Trains were attacked at KHILIODOMION D 63, ROUTSI H 98 and MILOI D 40.

ALBANIA

The Governor of KORCA is stated to have deserted to the Partisans'

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together with his force of 50 Gendarmes. 250 political prisoners were liberated and joined the Partisans who now claim to hold the area around the town. The Partisans' hold on the coast between HIMARA and PIGERAS has finally caused reactions in the enemy camp. An enemy attack on the Partisan bridgehead was announced during the first days of June. Enemy columns operating from SARANDE pushed down the KALASES valley where heavy fighting is in progress. Partisan 6 Corps repulsed two enemy attacks in the SHEN VASIL R 38 area but Spitfires on patrol reported no movement in the area on 2 June. The Partisan bridgehead, cutting the SARANDE-VALONA road for some 20 miles, has caused German North-South movement to follow the roundabout route through KORCA and ELBASAN besides allowing sea communications with ITALY.

JUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

The Allied raid on MLJET which took place during 22-23 May has not fulfilled earlier expectations of success. The enemy garrisons retreated to very broken and difficult ground. The locating and subsequent bringing to battle of the main enemy force would have entailed a daylight evacuation of our forces on the morning of the 24th. It was therefore decided to evacuate during the night of 23/24 May. No PWs were taken and casualties are not known.

On 2 June a strong Allied force consisting of 1,000 British, 2,500 Partisans and 100 American troops landed on BRAC. Bitter fighting took place SE of NEMEZISCE and reports state that 500 Germans were surrounded near SUPETAR. The attacking force was forced to withdraw from the latter place owing to German arty fire being brought to bear from the mainland. Partisans with British support advanced from BOL on the South coast towards SUTJURTIN where they hold positions covering the road some 4 miles West of the latter. British elements unsuccessfully attacked hill 778 from MURVICA but during the night 2/3 June further Allied forces including arty were landed in this sector. Steady progress was made against a series of enemy hill top positions surrounded by double bolts of wire and mines and reinforced with concrete. At the Eastern end of the island the Partisans captured SILO Q 3116 together with 100 PW. 130 Germans were killed and much war material including three infantry guns was captured in this engagement. The British contingent started to evacuate the island on 4 June. Partisan intentions were to remain a further 30 hours to mop up and then evacuate. Casualties have been relatively heavy on both sides.

The enemy has shown considerable activity in the Northern group. 2,000 Ustashi were reported to have reinforced PAG where the enemy have installed a number of heavy AA guns. ULJAN and PASMAN were also reinforced and at 0400 hours 31 May enemy forces landed at SALI on DUGI OTOK and on KORNAT. The DUGI force, estimated at about 1,000, is converging from both ends of the island towards the centre while 900 troops are combing KORNAT. Allied aircraft report that many villages are burning on both these islands. An unconfirmed report states that the Partisans have captured ARZANO Q 44 and are advancing on SINJ.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

The enemy drives in the LIKA and KORDUN have slackened and can be regarded as another failure for German arms. UDBINA,

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PLITVICE and most of the KORDUN is again in Partisan hands but the main roads remain under enemy control. Nothing more has been heard of the Northward thrust from the BIHAC-KOSTAJNICA road and it is evident that this was a holding movement to prevent Croatian Partisans infiltrating into BOSNIA where the main German effort has been made.

The coal mine at VELENJE D 95, the source of supply to the power station which in turn supplies the CELJE zinc foundry and other important works, was captured and destroyed by specialists of 14 Partisan Div on 1 May. In the TREBNJE action, reported last week, 100 Germans were killed and many wounded. Several heavy mortars, 15 MGs, 6 Light Mine throwers, 150 rifles, 2 railcars of ammunition and 2 railcars of food fell into Partisan hands. Elements of 13 SS Div BOSNIA are guarding the line of the rivers SPRECA and BOSNA in an attempt to prevent Partisan reinforcements from reaching BOSNIA. At BUSLJA some 10 miles WNW of TUZLA a Partisan div HQ with a hospital was surrounded, but managed to break out to the SW and cross the SPRECA valley. Several PWs were gathered on the way and a herd of cattle which had been commandeered by the enemy was captured.

BOSNIA

The German attempt to capture TITO and destroy Partisan power in BOSNIA continues unabated. The initial wave of paratroops and airborne troops who landed at DVAR suffered heavy casualties and reinforcements were dropped after the town had been dive-bombed. Land forces joined up with the airborne troops but found Partisan GHQ almost deserted. POTOCI L 14 then became the scene of action when it became known that Partisan GHQ was there. Three enemy columns from PREJAKA L 02, VRBLJANI L23 and KLJUC L 25 made rapid progress on the town but a column from BOS GRAHOVO was repulsed. Fierce fighting took place in the area of RIBNIK which fell to a German column of inf and tanks which later pushed on to POTOCI. The situation in this latter area was described as serious and deteriorating fast. TITO together with the entire Allied and Soviet missions broke through the German lines at night and were reported safe in the PREODAC L 01 area. Two columns operating to the South captured the landing ground at GLAMOC. No fewer than 15 attacks from PEULJE L 0207 to TICEVO in the North were repulsed, but the village later fell to powerful columns from GLAMOC and RORE. Enemy intelligence has shown itself remarkably well informed about Partisan movements and reports state that two powerful columns are heading for PREODAC from the East. Partisan 5 Corps which in the meantime had become surrounded in the POTOCI sector managed to break out to the North, and in spite of an ambush managed to cross the PETROVAC-MRKONJICGRAD road intact. As the scene of the fighting moves to the South, Partisan activity is growing in the North. The last report to hand states that RIBNIK has been recaptured by Partisans. The general situation is still regarded as grave though no longer described as desperate. Two facts emerge from these engagements. In no case have the Germans attempted to leave the roads and the destruction of the Partisan bands seems to have taken second place to the intention of capturing TITO and disorganising Partisan GHQ.

Elsewhere in BOSNIA harassing attacks by the Partisans have taken place. Fighting is reported from the SREBANIK M 68, CELIC W 02, BIJELJINA area while further South the Germans were forced to withdraw from VLASENICA to SOKOLAC and ROGATICA. All reports from BOSNIA give high praise to the Allied Air Force who bombed and strafed enemy troop and MT concentrations throughout the area.

SERBIA AND HERCEGOVINA

In fighting which took place near TREBINJE A 56, 30 MGs and other war materials were captured by the Partisans who counted 180 German dead. To the North, further enemy concentrations are reported at RUDNO, SJENICA,

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PRIJEPOLJE and NOVA VAROS which may portend a resumption of activity by the enemy in this area. Sensational reports from SERBIA paint a picture of an impending Bulgarian collapse. Fighting between German and Bulgarian troops is stated to have taken place in NIS where the German forces attempted to disarm the Bulgarians. One Bulgarian Regt is reported to have moved from NIS to JEBANE to avoid a similar fate. All rail and telephonic communications have been stopped at GRDELICA on the frontier. To add further colour to these reports MOSCOW Radio broadcast a report of mutiny by Bulgarian sailors in the Black Sea port of VARNA. It is not thought that these incidents portend a general collapse in the near future, the feeling that each Bulgarian expects his neighbour to do something about the situation but will not start the ball rolling himself is perhaps a truer picture. The situation is however pregnant with possibilities.

HUNGARY

German troops on the Hungarian-Jugoslav border are again reported to have withdrawn. A report states that Hungarian troops have constructed and are manning on the banks of the DRAVA in this area three defence lines.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Two reports place elements of 13 SS Div in MOSTAR but it would appear that the main part of this formation has taken part in the recent Bosnian operations. Other forces identified in this action are a SS Para Bn from KRALJEVO, 4 Brandenburg Regt, one regt of 373 Div 92 Mot Regt, 13 SS Regt of the SS Prinz Eugen Div, 5 Corps troops and elements of 118 Jg Div. The presence of this latter formation makes it apparent that some of its former island commitments have been taken over by 369 Germano-Croat Div. 3, 5. 10 Schutz/Polizei Regts are stated to be in NIS, RASKA and BELGRADE respectively. These formations are reported to be 100% German but equipment and morale is stated to be poor.

I.S. Airey

Brigadier,
B.G.S. (I).

G.S.I.
HQ. AAI.
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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

NO. 49 OF 15 JUNE, 1944.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

As our Northward thrust West of the Tiber developed the enemy reacted by hastily transferring mobile units from East of the river and withdrawing the remaining forces there to conform and by bringing down fresh formations from North ITALY. Two new divisions have now been identified in the Western sector making a total of three which have now been brought down from reserve and committed in this sector. All these divisions have been roughly handled and we have been able to advance to a line running from the sea just South of OMBRONE to North of ORVIETO.

On the West coast the first serious resistance encountered was from 162 Turcoman division, in the form, to begin with, of Cossack Cavalry and Mongol-German cyclists. Both 303 and 314 Regts have since been identified and they have been resisting with rather better spirit than might have been expected. Further inland, roughly in the SCANSANO sector, is 20 GAF division which has already suffered fairly heavy losses. On its left is 90 PG division, all elements of which seem to have been involved; this division was brought across from East of the Tiber through ORVIETO while that lateral was still open. Where the remains of 92 and 65 Divs have gone to is still obscure; some of them may be holding the gap between the left flank of 90 P.G. Div in the SELVENA area (A 0765) and the right flank of 26 Pz Div somewhere in the ACQUAPENDENTE area. Between ACQUAPENDENTE and North of ORVIETO we have 26 Pz, 4 Para and 356 divisions. 356 came down from the GENOA area and was first contacted East of Lake BOLSENA, connected with 4 Para Div which it was relieving. It appears to have been committed, like all the German reserves in this battle, in a piecemeal fashion and suffered considerable losses in a stubborn rearguard action 10 Km North of VITERBO on 10 June. 3 P.G. Division,

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which had been engaged in this sector, appears to have been withdrawn as its HQ on 14 June was at S. QUIRICO (W 0588). 29 P.G. Div moves are more obscure; it was last heard of connected with 26 Pz Div and probably followed it across the Tiber. It has not been identified in contact during the past week and may have moved further West and North.

East of the Tiber Hermann Goering and 15 P.G. Divisions, after offering good resistance in the more difficult country in that area, have been falling back to conform, abandoning NARNI and TERNI. They both seem to be in process of crossing to the West of the river as HQ of HG Div was in the area West of TODI and 15 P.G. Div HQ possibly near MARSCIANO, A 6480, on the night of 14 June. This represents an extensive withdrawal. Further East 44, 5 Mtn and 114 Jaeger Divisions maintain the same relative positions and have been falling back with little contact. On the Adriatic coast the bulk of 278 Division is just behind the VOLMANO with some elements forward of the river on the coast. The Division appears to have under command, or as its right neighbour, the remains of 71 Division organised into one regt numbered 211. The main problem in this sector is the location of 334 Division which was last heard of withdrawing North of RIETI; it will probably have conformed with the movement of HG and 15 P.G. Divisions in their sidestepping movement towards and across the Tiber.

As will be seen the enemy dispositions are obscure and confused, and it must be remembered that all divisions which fought South of ROME are very seriously reduced in strength. We can clear the deck to a certain extent: 94 and 715 Divisions have shown no further signs of life and will have to reform from scratch before they can take the field again. 362 Division, according to a prisoner, has gone to FLORENCE and we know that it is interesting itself in billeting problems in the SCARPERIA area, Q 8894. It may be being used as a headquarters to start allotting divisional sectors on the PISA-RIMINI line. This famous line we now know, from documents captured in Kesselring's H.Q., to be called the GOTENLINIE or Gothic Line (the Germans have shown themselves very conscious of the deeds of their barbarous forebears in ITALY; two of their defence lines in CAMPANIA bore the names of Gothic chiefs). It is to be expected however, that further reinforcements may arrive; there have been persistent reports of an SS division entering ITALY from the North East and several circumstantial reports speak of a Jaeger division, covered with the usual oak-leaves, which came from CROATIA to the ALESSANDRIA area - presumably to relieve 356 Division. The only Jaeger division in CROATIA was 42 Jaeger Division, the former 187 Reserve Division upgraded. Some of its troops were seen in the LUCCA area on 2 June so elements of it may well have come further South. The SS Div may well be our former acquaintance, 16 SS PG Div, as a prisoner from 20 G/F Div had heard that the latter was going to relieve them; it is in any case the only SS division readily available for this theatre. The fact is that Kesselring has to find replacements on the West coast for 356, Hermann Goering and 162 Divisions; his SS and his Jaegers may be considered sufficient but, if the PW's statement is well-founded, even these are being drawn on already, and with his general weakness elsewhere he may still need another division.

.....2 ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS....

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took the brunt of 5 Army's attack. With its centre pierced and both its flanks enveloped it was driven from its positions over its entire front and hurled back to the ESPERIA defile with a loss of about two thousand prisoners and very heavy casualties in killed and wounded. At the moment the division can be said to have ceased to exist as a fighting formation for the imperious Colonel Baron von BEHR, C.O. 200 PGR, has taken over command of the remnants from Div H.Q. and is trying to weld them into a fighting front to cover ESPERIA. Some of 90 PG's artillery has also had to be brought up, reasonably enough since the majority of 71 Div's artillery was caught when the gun area on the Northern slopes of Monte MAJO was by-passed. Apparently the newly arrived artillery has been placed in the DORA line (the new name for the Adolf Hitler line, so as to save the Führer's name from the shame of its fall) and we must be approaching very close to that line since Bohr was complaining that the artillery in question was shelling its own troops. The MONTE D'ORO is probably the link between the plain and the mountain in the Adolf Hitler line.

94 Division, opposing 5 Army's left flank, had slightly better fortune in the early stages of the battle. It suffered heavy casualties from our artillery, however, and was gradually forced out of its positions covering the FORMIA-ESPERIA road in very hard and stubborn fighting. When that road was cut it had to withdraw to conform and is now apparently trying to hold a line somewhere in the FORMIA area. By the morning of 16 May I/274 GR announced it had withdrawn according to plan to the DORA line. The main loss here is of the gun area on M. SCAURI.

How long Kesselring will allow 10 Army to continue to fight without further reinforcement is a problem which must be seriously exercising him at the moment. His resources are limited and he has to husband them if he wishes to be able to hold a line South of ROME. Part of the answer will lie in how long he will still believe in the possibility of a coastal landing. If he thinks that all our resources have been committed on the main front it will be no longer necessary for him to keep a good formation like 29 PG Div on coast-watching duties North of ROME. It is unlikely that he will weaken the forces opposing the beachhead though in view of the present disparity of tank strength between the two fronts (three bns on the bridgehead to one on the LIRI) it would be natural for him to despatch an Armoured battle group of 26 Pz Div to the assistance of 10 Army. There were some indications on 16 May that such a force might be on the way but nothing definite has yet transpired to confirm this. We should see in a day or two whether his losses in front of the Hitler line have been so heavy as not to leave him sufficient to hold that line with safety.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS.

The most important result of our air attacks on the enemy's lines of communication during the last week was the destruction on 13 May of the AVISIO viaduct South of BOLZANO, effectively blocking all railway traffic over the BRENNER Pass.

Whilst all the lines South of FLORENCE have remained blocked throughout the week, attention has been paid to the large junctions further North; the Marshalling Yards at BOLZANO, MESTRE, MILAN, PARMA, PADUA, TREVISO, VICENZA, MODENA, MANTUA, FERRARA and BOLOGNA have all

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been effectively attacked, and tracks, rolling stock and installations destroyed.

The enemy continues to repair railway lines as rapidly as possible, but he is fighting a losing battle and railway activity is steadily decreasing. It is evident that he is having to rely more and more on his hard pressed MT.

SHIPPING

In the Mediterranean, coastal traffic to PORTO FERRAIO and SAN STEFANO has been maintained at its normal level, but there has been a decrease in turnover at PIOMBINO, and it is evident that PORTO FERRAIO is now the more important lying-over port for the SAN STEFANO traffic.

There are now at least two small coasters plying from the Northern ports to PORTO FERRAIO and PIOMBINO where cargoes are probably transhipped to F lighters for onward passage to SAN STEFANO. PIOMBINO, PORTO FERRAIO and SAN STEFANO were bombed during the past week, and at the latter both road and rail exits from the harbour were effectively blocked by the collapse of a bridge over the railway, whilst dock installations and shipping were hit at the other two.

There is little ship building activity on the Mediterranean coast at present; good progress has been made on 3 MT ships at VOLTRI and 2 F lighters have been launched at SESTRI LEVANTE, but work has been abandoned on 6 other F lighters at the latter port and very slow progress is being made on the construction of 6 coasters at PIETRA LIGURE where there have been no launchings since 16 January.

A marked increase of shipping activity has been noted at ANCONA where a 1,000 ton MV and a 500 ton tanker had arrived on 13 May. This is the first time vessels of this size have ventured so far South for some time and it is evident that the strain on the enemy's supply system caused by the dislocation of the railways is causing him to take risks.

ANCONA was effectively bombed on 15 May and hits were claimed on the tanker; it is not yet known whether the M/V was hit as this vessel had disappeared when further reconnaissance was made.

In the Northern Adriatic there has been lively traffic in M/Vs. Eleven 102 feet supply barges are reported to be under construction at VENICE, and two F lighters are being armed there; fifteen of the F lighters under construction at MONFALCONE are also being armed with a gun position near the stern. At TRIESTE three Siebel ferries were fitting out on May 13 and the components of two more had arrived at the docks. There were also two Siebel ferries newly assembled and five fitting out at FIUME on the same date.

A number of 50/60 ft naval launches are being assembled and launched at TRIESTE and at least two of these had already left the port by 13 May, whilst there were two more in the water and five on the quayside. Five similar craft have arrived at FIUME.

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3. BALKANS

GREECE

A report from THESSALY states that Andartes attacked a German unit while the enemy were resting and bathing. It is estimated that 250 Germans were killed. A successful ambush was carried out by Partisans on 5 May in the vicinity of KASTANERI 0 48. A column consisting of 600 troops, 40 trucks and 1 tank was attacked. The tank was damaged by an explosive charge laid in the road and 30 Germans were killed in the ensuing skirmish. Some clashes have taken place in the DRAMA area between Capitanos bands and Bulgarian troops. The Bulgars lost 10 killed and 30 PWs at BOROVO in one of these harassing attacks. More details about the recent train wreck at LAMIA are to hand. Both engines plunged over the embankment and 150 enemy lost their lives. German reactions against the local populace followed and 150 hostages were arrested of which only 18 were detained. The PELOPONESE has been comparatively quiet, the only news of any importance concerns the Security Bns. By order of the supreme command of the Security Bns and Police, 110 Greeks were shot in reprisal for the deaths of two German officers who were killed in ambush.

The independent Macedonian Bde has now left the VITSI area and is reported to have recrossed the frontier.

ALBANIA

Some minor clashes have taken place to the South of VALONA. The Partisans have recaptured BORSH M 20, and claim to hold the coast from inclusive HIMARA to exclusive PIGERAS. Persistent reports of troop movements from GREECE through VALONA, DURAZZO and SCUTARI to the North have continued to arrive. The significance of these moves is not yet clear nor have any units taking part been definitely identified. In the KORITSA area some 300 Armenian troops are reported to have surrendered to the Partisans of 4 Bde.

JUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

There has been some German activity in the Northern islands. On 8 May 500 German troops landed on PAG and a steady stream of reinforcements is stated to be reaching the island. This move by the enemy may portend German intentions to occupy OLIB, SILBA and PREMUDA or to clear up the coastal strip between STARI GRAD and KARLOBAG. A later report states that the enemy is building fortifications on the island. The German garrison on KORCULA is said to consist of 1,000 troops at PUPNAT with a further Bn between ZRNOVO and KORCULA town. During the night 9/10 May a Partisan force made an unopposed landing on SOLTA. No resistance was met until the strong point at GROHOTE was reached, here the enemy put up a strong defence supported by arty from CIOVO. It is thought that some 300 German reinforcements had reached GROHOTE on 9 May. The Partisans later re-embarked without having overcome the enemy garrison.

On the mainland the railway bridge between OPUZEN and METKOVIC was destroyed by Partisans. This stretch of railway, made since the outbreak of war, has been carrying 3 or 4 trains daily.

.....CROATIA AND SLOVENIA.....

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CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

Heavy fighting is reported from the BOSUT forest sector in which elements of 13 SS B.H. Div, Hilfspolizei and Ustachi are taking part. Troop movements from OSIJEK and BROD to the West have taken place. It is presumed that these troops are intended for the DARUVAR area where a German offensive has been reported. Details of this operation are lacking but it is thought that 42 Jg Div is involved. Units of 392 and 393 German-Croat Divs are pushing South from VRHOVINE P 18, PLITVICE P 38 and BIHAC and are stated to have reached KORENICA on the 12th May.

BOSNIA

Confused fighting continues in the area VLASENICA-ZVORNIK. A Partisan report stated that the enemy had withdrawn from VLASENICA to ZVORNIK but a later report on 8 May states that the enemy had recaptured the town and were pushing East towards the river DRINA.

KRESEVO 25 Kms West of SARAJEVO was captured by the Partisans who inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. 94 killed and 54 wounded, all from the 7 SS Prinz Eugen Mtn Div, are claimed by the Partisans. The SARAJEVO-MOSTAR railway was attacked and damaged in a raid which cost the enemy a further 45 killed and 6 PWs. All bridges on this line are stated to have been repaired. In Western BOSNIA the enemy has sent three columns from PRIJEDOR, BOS NOVI and BANJA to the South in an effort to clear the BOS NOVI-PRIJEDOR railway. Strenuous efforts have been made by the enemy to keep this vital line in running order and work of repairs has been carried on with some success. A train was wrecked between BOS NOVI and KOSTAJNICA. 100 enemy were killed and 150 PWs captured.

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

It is stated that when the Allied air forces hit troop concentrations in PODGORICA about a week ago more than 1,000 enemy troops were killed. Considerable damage to military objectives was caused and the report states that the effect on the enemy's morale was enormous. The enemy, however, has continued to reinforce this area with troops drawn from the South. It is apparent that something of greater scope than a local operation is being planned but no indication of its nature has come to light. Reports of troop concentrations in the LESKOVAC, ZITORADA, PROKUPLJE area state that German Jaeger troops with 500 MT have moved into this sector. These concentrations together with Bulgarian concentrations further to the South point to future operations against the Serbian Partisans. On the evidence available it seems that at least part of 1 Mtn div is concerned with HQ at LESKOVAC. The Partisans destroyed a bridge at SUKOVO on the NIS-SOFIA line causing a train to crash into the river. 2 locomotives and many wagons were destroyed.

HUNGARY

In addition to 2, 18 and 21 Hungarian Infantry divisions already accepted in the STANISLAWOW sector of the Russian front, four other divisions and a brigade are now believed to be in the area. These are 16, 24 and another infantry division, an Armoured division and 1 Mountain Brigade. The number of Hungarian formations actually identified on the Russian front is

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thus raised to seven divisions and one brigade. It is thought, however, that the total forces involved is probably nearer the equivalent of nine divisions.

ORDER OF BATTLE

The peaceful nature of the German occupation of HUNGARY has allowed the enemy to recall some of the forces which took part. 42 Jg Div, reported last week to have taken part in fighting in SLOVENIA, is again identified in the DRAVA area. The G.O.C. of the German troop concentrations in the LESKOVAC area is stated to be Maj-Gen v. SEUTTNER who is known to command 1 Mtn Div. This together with other evidence may show that the greater part of the division is in the area.

19 Pol Regt has left the SELJE area for FRANCE, its place has been taken by elements of 25 Pol Regt.

GSI(a)
HQ. AAI.
17 May 44

Brigadier,
D.C.S.(I).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 50

OF 21 JUNE, 1944.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The main weight of the fighting has again been located West of the Tiber. We have advanced in this area an average of rather over twenty miles on the whole front between the sea and Lake TRASIMENE, meeting with stronger resistance than of late and it seems that the enemy is about to try to hold a definite line for a rather longer stand. Yet another reinforcing division has been drawn into the fighting, once more taken from the West.

Enemy dispositions are in general unchanged. From the West coast to the SIENA road we have 162, 3 P.G., 20 GAF, 90 and 29 P.G. divisions. We took prisoners near PAGANICO, G 7784, from the Engineer Bn of 16 SS PG Div which lends some confirmation to the story of the prisoner from 20 GAF Div that they were to be relieved by some of this division. Further back, in an area vaguely described by two Polish deserters as "North of GROSSETO" is 19 GAF division, which, according to the same source, left BELGIUM on 10 June. From the SIENA road to Lake TRASIMENE are 26 Pz, which was reporting our movements in the area A 1485 on 20 June, 4 Para, 356 (which appears to have remains of the Inf Lehr Regt under command), Hermann Goering, 11 Para and 334 Divisions. It will be noticed that 90 PG and 26 Pz have both continued to edge over to their right and it seems likely that both 65 and 92 Divs have been squeezed out and withdrawn for a short rest and refit. East of Lake TRASIMENE the situation is rather more obscure: 15 P.G. is certainly immediately next to the Lake, then apparently 94 division (of which both 267 and 274 G.R. were identified South of PERUGIA on 18 June), then 44 Div which appears to have withdrawn through FOLIGNO and TREVI, then 114 Jaeger, 71 and 278 Divs as before.

Except for the divisions on the East coast all have been fairly heavily engaged this week and must have suffered still more losses; there have been several occasions when the enemy has left his withdrawal too late, as at TODI where 15 PG lost prisoners unnecessarily and had no time to carry out the prepared demolitions.

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15 PG Div was intended on the 14th to be withdrawn from the line, and 115 PGR was apparently to go as far back as BAGNO DI ROMAGNA, R 3673, but it was still in the line on 19 June where it lost prisoners from both regiments and there is no sign yet of its withdrawing. Hermann Goering division was also out of the line for a short time, apperently resting in the area West of PERUGIA, but on the morning of 20 June the division was said to be on the left of 356 Div.

Light is thrown on enemy intentions by a captured order from 334 Div. According to this document, dated 14 June, the division (with 1027 GR under command) was to occupy by the 17th a line from Lake TRASIMENE at W 4092 - 3692 - 3492 where it had a boundary with 1 Para Div. This position was to be held "for a longer time"; it rather looks as though there was some truth in the confidences allegedly made by one of Kesselring's senior staff officers to his Italian doctor, reported by the latter, in which he said that the Germans intended to hold a line from SARTEANO, N.E. of RADICOFANI to CASTIGLIONE on the West shore of the lake and thence from the East shore of the lake to UMBERTIDE. It is not yet clear where the line is meant to reach the West coast, presumably somewhere not far North of GROSSETO though our advance East of route 1 threatens to unhinge it there. It remains to be seen what kind of resistance the enemy will offer on this line; it must be emphasised that up to the present the enemy has been offering steady and stubborn resistance on a variety of lines and appears to have made serious efforts to hold them. It is not a case of an enemy withdrawing with his rear protected by rearguards while the bulk of the forces break contact; with the exception of certain particularly battered formations all the enemy's strength is still in the front line and is fighting hard, withdrawing when absolutely necessary the shortest possible distance. Some divisions have actually been withdrawn from the line but put in again after only one or two days. This is a strange policy for the enemy to adopt. It would be reasonable if it were desired to gain time to allow the Appennine line to be manned by a completely fresh force, which would have to amount to some half dozen divisions, but it is difficult to see where such a force is to come from in this most critical month of the war. As far as can be seen all that is gained is time, and time now at the expense of time later for the steady drain on strength must reduce the hopes of holding the Appennine line for any considerable period. It may be that Hitler still thinks the situation is like that of last Autumn (certainly the weather in the last few days has been giving a fairly good imitation and causing us some delays) and hopes to save prestige by holding us as far South as possible while the Appennine line is made impregnable. The calculation seems to be short-sighted.

General reports indicate that 42 Jaeger division has taken over the responsibilities of 356 Div in the GENOA area. 16 SS and 19 GAF are also available for coastal duties in the former areas of 162 and Hermann Goering divisions, though, as has been seen, at least elements of both of them are in danger of being drawn into the battle. It will be noticed that, in spite of all the German commentators may say, the Germans have been obliged to send into ITALY four new divisions, two from the Balkans and two from the Western front. The total of nominal divisions in ITALY is now twenty-seven but the chances of holding the Appennine line with this force have not been improved by the events of this week.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

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organised and weather has interfered with air attacks against his L of C. With the exception of 14 June, when we claim to have destroyed 126 MT and damaged 75, enemy MT losses have recently been light as compared to the previous three weeks; claims against MT for the six days 14/19 June total 235 destroyed, 129 damaged. Despite effective interdiction of the railways it is thought that the enemy has been able to effect some improvement in his administrative position, though it is still probably not wholly satisfactory. The enemy's L of C still remains vulnerable to air attack and raids by Italian Partisans, who have been particularly active recently. His chief concern now is probably to build up sufficient supplies South of the PO to support his defence of the PISA-RIMINI line.

RAILWAYS

Throughout the past week the Central Italian Railway system has been effectively blocked North of a line from PISA on the West coast, through FLORENCE to FANO on the East coast despite bad flying weather on at least two days. On the West coast there are three bridges at present down between SPEZIA and PISA, and RECCO viaduct between SPEZIA and GENOA is probably out. Between FLORENCE and BOLOGNA one bridge just North of PISTOIA on the single track line to BOLOGNA is cut and two bridges are down and a tunnel blocked on the main BOLOGNA-PRATO line. The East coast line is blocked by two destroyed bridges between RIMINI and FANO. The only other possible route to the South, the single track line from FAENZA, has been interdicted by the destruction of two viaducts just North of BORGO SAN LORENZO. Thus the greater part of the enemy's supplies will have to be transferred to MT in the BOLOGNA area and this MT will have to negotiate the difficult mountainous country between BOLOGNA and FLORENCE. South of the PISA-FLORENCE-FANO line all railway lines are well blocked except the main East coast route, but there is no way of switching inland from the latter and it is most unlikely that it is being used South of RIMINI.

Traffic entering ITALY over the BRENNER has been normal. MESTRE has recovered from the battering it received on 10 June and activity there and at PADOVA and FERRARA indicates that this line is in use again; there has also been a fair amount of traffic coming in from the East via UDINE, VICENZA and VERONA. It has been reported that the latter line is to take precedence over the BRENNER route for supplies entering ITALY but there is as yet no indication of any change in the respective volumes of traffic. Little traffic has been reported entering ITALY from FRANCE of late and activity on the main West-East line via PIACENZA, PARMA, MODENA and BOLOGNA has been negligible.

SHIPPING

As was expected with our further advance Northward in Western ITALY and capture of the island of ELBA, the enemy is abandoning the port of PIOMBINO, where demolitions were indicated by PR on 20 June. Further steps are also being taken to block LEGHORN harbour where a new blockship arrived sometime between 15 and 20 June. However, on 20 June the Southern entrance to the port still remained open and active shipping was present. Some difficulty in obstructing the harbour may arise as a result of our air attacks on block ships at LEGHORN on the 14th. Taking no chances the enemy had also placed an additional blockship in position at SPEZIA by 20 June.

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With the enemy withdrawal in Eastern ITALY a programme of harbour demolitions has also been in progress on the East coast and ANCONA is now believed to be the enemy's most Southerly port. The shipping picture is otherwise normal this week, though increased activity is probable incident to evacuation of ports.

Poor weather this week has hampered our air operations. Ports on ELBA have received most of our attention. PORTO FERRAIO and PORTO LONGONE were attacked on night 16/17 June. Fighter bombers have also operated successfully against shipping in ELBA harbours and nearby waters. A small steamship was either destroyed or heavily damaged at PORTO FERRAIO and a considerable number of small boats destroyed or damaged at sea. Our surface forces have also been active, having probably destroyed a corvette between PIOMBINO and ELBA on night 17/18.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

Many rumours of impending German drives and impending clashes between the guerilla groups have been proved to be without foundation.

An enemy convoy consisting of three Merchant ships escorted by four destroyers, 4 corvettes and 2 E-boats which attempted to supply the garrison on CRETE was successfully attacked. Two of the Merchant ships were sunk at sea or in harbour, the third arrived in CANDIA in a damaged condition and later sank. This was the most formidable enemy convoy encountered in the Aegean for some time.

ALBANIA

The situation of the Partisans in Southern ALBANIA appears to be deteriorating as the German drive gains momentum. The enemy now controls the area NE of the KELCYRE M 52 PERMET M 61 road and is clearing the mountains between PERMET and ARGYROKASTRON. German drives Southwards from PERMET, NW from DRIMADES, R 79 and up the valley of the DHRENO from EPISKOP R 68 are compressing the Partisan bridgehead. Further drives are reported from VALONA to the South and from SARANDE to the North. Enemy sailing vessels have appeared off the coast near HILARE to prevent the Partisans escaping by sea. The enemy lay-out appears to be: elements of 523 Regt (297 Inf Div) to the North, elements of 724 Regt ([illegible] Div) to the South while the centre is reported to be the responsibility of 1 Mtn Div. All Ball Kombetar forces are cooperating with the enemy in these operations. The Partisan bridgehead force was recently reinforced by the newly formed 12 Bde from the HERAT area.

YUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

A Partisan force landed on KORCULA on 17/18 June without meeting any opposition. No reports of subsequent developments have been received. A report from Partisan HQ stated that on 15 June the garrison of SIPAN island (between MLJET and the mainland) was 500 men from 369 Germano-Croat Div. The German sweep in the Northern islands has come to an end and it appears that the enemy have withdrawn to the mainland. The following islands were raided during these operations: OLIB, SILBA, PREMUDA, SKARDA, MOLAT, DUGI and KORNAT. Saboteurs have been busy on the mainland in the PLOCA -METKOVIC area. Six trains and 2 bridges were destroyed on the railway

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connecting these towns and 400 metres of road destroyed between ZAGVOZD Q 54 and KOZICA Q 61.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

Desultory fighting has taken place in the area enclosed by BIHAC-KARLOVAC-FIUME. On 11 June two enemy columns, one of about 1,000 men with 25 tanks on the road HRELJIN to LOKVE and DELNICE, the other of similar strength on the SUSAK-LOKVE road were attacked by Partisans. The enemy columns converged at LOKVE on 13 June. A column of 1,200 men and 30 AFVs which attempted to strike North to BROD J 65 via DELNICE was repulsed, the other column is reported to have moved through DELNICE in the direction of KARLOVAC. Fighting in this area continues. Many attacks on railway communications between LJUBLJANA and TRIESTE have been reported and some delay has been caused to German movement on this important railway.

BOSNIA

The Partisan offensive in the MLJEVICA area (NW of TUZLA) has ended. Enemy casualties so far reported total 1,500. The Partisans claim to have captured large amounts of war material including 100 loaded pack horses on the road CELIC W 92 - LOPARE W 91. It appears that many troops of the 13 SS B.H. Div remained in TUZLA when the Div moved to the MOSTAR area and were reinforced by a regiment from POLAND. Concentrations were reported in TUZLA, BRCKO and BIJELJINA thus constituting a threat to the Partisan rear. The Partisans, fearing no doubt to be hemmed in between the SAVA and DRINA rivers, crossed the SPRECA on the morning of the 12 June and are now moving South. In Central and Western BOSNIA the Partisans have strengthened their positions by occupying POTOCI L 13, BRAVSKO L 15, RIBNIK L 24, LKJUC L 25, GLAMOC Q 29 and PROZOR Q 97. Reports do not make it clear if these towns were captured in the face of German opposition or if the enemy had previously withdrawn. German concentrations are reported in BOS PETROVAC and BIHAC to the North and LIVNO and DUVNO (TOMISLAVGRAD) in the South while elements of 7 SS Prinz Eugen Mtn Div are in the MRKONJICGRAD area.

SERBIA AND HERCEGOVINA

The Bulgarians have started large scale mopping up operations in JABLANICA P 18 area and in the RADAN mountains WJ 80. Details are lacking but two or more divisions are taking part. Fighting is reported to have taken place at [illegible] K16 (NW of NISH) and an unconfirmed report states that Partisans have entered VRNJACKA BANJA (between KRALJEVO and KRUSEVAC). This latter may well be true as it appears that HQ 2 Pz Army left VRNJACKA BANJA and is now stated to be at MLINARSKA CESTA K 5395 near ZAGREB. There has been much activity on the KRUSEVAC J 87 airfield, 200 unassembled gliders are stated to have arrived by truck on 10 June. Enemy concentrations have been reported for some time in the SJENICA - PRIJEPOLJE - PLJEVLJA area. Attempts to drive South into liberated territory have met with limited success. One column moving South from PRIJEPOLJE was broken up by a Partisan attack on 10 June and lost 100 killed, 150 wounded and much war material. A column from PLJEVLJA met with better fortune. After crossing the TARA river, it pushed on to capture ZABLJAK G 94 on 14 June. Elements of 181 Inf Div, 2 Brandenburg Regt and 5 Police Regt were identified in this operation. Fighting is general throughout this area but the enemy does not yet appear to have made his main effort.

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ORDER OF BATTLE

Reports of the move of 2 Pz Army, discussed under "SERBIA" have been sent by many sources and it is certain that an important H.Q. has been set up in the Z.GREB area. The location of 1 Mtn Div in its old area is confirmed. Elements were identified on 3 June in fighting near MOVRICE M 77. Div HQ is situated at KORC. Reports from Partisan sources state that most Balkan Divs are despatching small groups of about Company strength to the Italian front. This may well be true but no confirmation apart from 17 SS Cav Sqn of 8 SS Cav Div has been forthcoming. 17 SS Cav Sqn identified in the SOLNOK area on 11 June was last known to form part of 1 Cav Regt of 8 SS Cav Div in Southern HUNGARY. It is reported that the total Hungarian strength on the Russian front now amounts to 13 Divs. It appears that troops for the Russian front have been found principally from the Central Plain and from the Rumanian and Transylvanian frontiers. The Transylvanian frontier is lightly held by 17 and 26 Divs only, a state of affairs permissible in view of the fact that the Rumanians have withdrawn most of their erstwhile frontier garrisons for service on the Eastern front. The Hungarian depots near the SW frontier have so far not been pruned, owing, no doubt, to nervousness of Tito's activities.

C P R [illegible]

BRIG.D.M.R.
D.M.I.(I)

GSI(a)
HQ, A.A.I.
21 June 44.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Assisted by unprecedented weather for an Italian June the enemy has been fighting most stubbornly to hold his present positions. Penetrations have been made but he has always endeavoured to seal them off by bringing up fresh troops. There have been many reports of new German divisions entering ITALY but there is no evidence as yet that they have received sufficient reinforcements to make the holding of the Appennine line a reasonable proposition, and the object of the delay they are seeking to impose must rather be to perfect the defences there. An appreciation of the present state of the line is attached at Appendix 'A'.

There have been some changes in enemy dispositions to meet our pressure, the two main points where this has been particularly felt being in the coastal sector and West of Lake TRASIMENO. In the former 162 Div has had to be stiffened by 361 PGR of 90 PG Div (200 PGR was still in its old sector on 27 June) and by at least two bns of the exhausted 362 Div and subsequently, on 27 June, 26 Pz Div appeared in the area with 9 PGR holding the line from MONTEMONTANO to CASTELLO which had previously been held by 361. The Division was said to be taking over a new sector in the West at noon on the 27th so that it has presumably relieved 162 Div of its command in this area. CASTELLO is its boundary with 3 P.G. Div. The situation is hardly likely to permit the withdrawal altogether of 162 Div. On the 27th, 26 Pz Div was apparently withdrawing to a line called once more, and surely ominously, the GUSTAV line which, according to a captured map, runs roughly from Q 5406 to 8915. Elements of both 19 G.F and 16 SS divisions have been identified in this area and the former appears to be holding the extreme coastal sector West of 162 Div. It is not certain how much of 16 SS is yet forward: we have identified 35 PGR, the Engineer, Recce and Assault Gun Bns but these may represent only a battle-group of the division detached from coast-watching duties to meet a sudden emergency. However as we advance North and reduce the length of coast which the enemy has to guard we may expect to find more SS men coming into the battle. Both 504 and 508 Hy Tank Bns have been identified in the coastal sector, the former reformed after SICILY, the latter clearly in need of reforming after its handling South of ROME.

West of Lake TRASIMENO our attack on 24 June hit 334 Division pretty hard. 150 prisoners were taken forward of the TRESCIA river and 50 more when

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we had established a bridgehead across it; they all said, moreover, that casualties from our very heavy artillery barrage had been considerable. The enemy's reactions, after withdrawing the minimum distance necessary to straighten his line, was to start bringing 15 PG Div round from the other side of the Lake and on 26 June 104 PGR was already in position West of the railway. This again shows a significant change in enemy intentions; as stated last week he had originally intended to withdraw the division right back to rest and refit. This move of 15 PG has obviously obliged 305 Div to extend its frontage and we had prisoners from I Bn 274 GR on 27 June in the area W 673968 showing that elements of 94 Div are again being brought forward in this sector to help out. Further East 44 Div is now astride the Tiber with some at least of its troops on the East bank. 114 Jaeger had losses on 26 June in the area R 7900. On the East coast the enemy is also resisting; according to a recent prisoner 278 Div has been ordered to hold a line in front of ANCONA until further notice. Apparently a most strenuous defence of the port is intended as he had heard that it was to be evacuated, when the last minute arrived, by sea.

The general picture, therefore, is unchanged from last week and the continued stubbornness of the enemy in holding an unprepared position across the widest part of the Italian peninsula throws a light on their grave doubts about the success of the defence of the Appennine line in its present condition. It may well be that the preparation of the GUSTAV, the HITLER and the CAESAR lines (the latter is the posthumously discovered name for what was called the VALMONTONE line) required too much labour for the GOTHIC line to receive its proper allotment. It is the shortest line now possible in ITALY and naturally strong, but it will still require more troops for its defence than the enemy now disposes of. Of the divisions in North ITALY at the moment 188 Reserve Mountain is probably not of much use, and in any case a division is indispensable in ISTRIA. In fact when we are in contact with the GOTHIC line the danger of a landing in ISTRIA may well cause the enemy to look for still more reinforcements for a tongue of land which so dangerously outflanks his positions both in ITALY and the Balkans. 42 Jaeger div, some elements of which have already been identified in action, but surely only a very small group, has vital duties to perform and is wholly inexperienced in anything but Partisan warfare. It is possible that the enemy can scrape up another division from somewhere; there must be some battered divisions from the Eastern front which could be sent to North ITALY to reform as so many STALINGRAD divisions did. There is also some considerable regrouping going on in JUGOSLAVIA whose intention is very obscure at the moment but which might result in a division being spared from there. But we can scarcely expect many fresh divisions when the German Army is occupied on three separate fronts.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

This week the enemy must be considered to have appreciably improved his administrative position. Owing to poor flying weather the BOLOGNA-PISTOIA-FLORENCE line has been open since 21 June and enemy MT losses have been small. On the basis of improved communications and a more stable front it is probable that the enemy is not suffering any decisive shortage of supply. There is, however, strong evidence that the strictest economy in fuel consumption is being enforced, particularly with respect to petrol. A captured order issued by HQ 44 Inf Div on 13 June states in part: "The fuel situation will continue to remain critical as the available fuel is required primarily for Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions. ..... In place of vehicles with high petrol consumption, vehicles with economical consumption must be used..... All petrol-driven vehicles, with the exception of staff and messenger vehicles, signal vehicles, vehicles drawing heavy guns and ambulances, must be withdrawn immediately, loaded

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ith stores that have to be evacuated, and sent to the rear. Petrol-driven vehicles carrying ammunition, fuel and food supplies must whenever possible be replaced by diesel-driven vehicles..... Twenty percent diesel fuel must be mixed with petrol". This shortage of petrol is not thought to involve merely the Italian theatre, but to neglect the overall effect on German petrol supplies of our current [illegible] air effort against all types of enemy fuel installations, notably the attacks on PLOESTI. It has been estimated that more than sixty percent of all Axis oil production has already been rendered inactive and Germany's fuel position may be considered as approaching a crisis.

RAILWAYS

The main West coast line has been blocked between GENOA and SPEZIA since 20 June, and a series of cuts have been maintained South of SPEZIA as far as CECINA. The line joining SPEZIA to the main PIACENZA-BOLOGNA-RIMINI line at PARMA has also been cut all this week. South of BOLOGNA; the BOLOGNA-PRATO line has remained blocked but the BOLOGNA-PISTOIA line has been open since 21 June allowing movement through FLORENCE as far South as BUCINE (West of AREZZO). The PISA-FLORENCE line and the line South from EMPOLI have both been blocked throughout the past week, but the LUCCA-PISTOIA-PRATO-FLORENCE line has been open. The line South from FAENZA to BORGO SAN LORENZO and PONTASSIEVE and the line inland from RIMINI have both remained blocked, but the main East coast line was open as far as ANCONA on 26 June and possibly earlier as it was heavily loaded on 24 June.

Whilst it has been possible to move traffic South of FLORENCE it is probable that the enemy is unloading the majority of his supply trains in the LUCCA-PISTOIA-PRATO-FLORENCE area. The heavy traffic noted between ANCONA and RIMINI on 24 June probably indicates the evacuation of surplus stores from the ANCONA area and port.

There has been no change in the volume of traffic entering ITALY over the two main routes, the BRENNER in the North and from the East via UDINE, TREVISO, MESTRE and PADOVA. In the West, however, there was an increase in traffic on the TURIN, ALESSANDRIA, GENOA line during the early part of the week and a certain amount of activity was noted at SPEZIA on 21 June. The lateral line from MILAN and TURIN via PIACENZA, PARMA, BOLOGNA and FORLI to RIMINI has again been almost entirely inactive. RAVENNA on the East coast, however, has shown some activity of late. This is the only port of any size between VENICE and ANCONA and is gaining in importance as our advancing troops move nearer to the latter. A further indication of the importance which the enemy now attaches to RAVENNA is seen in the fact that a new by-pass around FERRARA is under construction from a point on the FERRARA-POGGIORUSCO ((R) F 7403) line, two thirds of a mile West of FERRARA main marshalling yards, which is probably intended to link up with the FERRARA-RAVENNA line.

SHIPPING

The only development of note this week is our capture of PIOMBINO. With the loss of this port the enemy has been forced to move his unloading activities at least as far North as LEGHORN. Although active, LEGHORN does not appear to be receiving all Southbound shipping and demobilitions were already in progress here on 21 June. Increased activity at VIAREGGIO suggests possible unloading there. Between LEGHORN and VIAREGGIO another port which might logically be used is MARINA DI PISA (at the mouth of the ARNO) to which there is a railway spur linking this port with the PISA-FLORENCE line. Owing to lack of PR, however, there is no definite information on activity at this port.

On the East coast ANCONA is still being used but we are now only about 25 miles South of the port. PORTO CORSINI, at the mouth of the canal running from the sea to RAVENNA, is evidently acquiring increased importance. On 27 June 2 F-boats, 2 supply barges and

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2 auxiliary sailing vessels were observed in the canal. RAVENNA is well served by three single track railways running generally North, West and South, and it is logical to suppose that it will replace ANCONA as the most active port on the East coast.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

No outstanding operations have taken place during the last week but sabotage and minor clashes have shown an increase. 50 Elas Regt operating in THESSALY, fought a two-day action with a mixed Italo-German force between MELIKI O 43 and NEOKASTRON O 43. Enemy attempts to seize the high ground of VERYINA O 33 were repulsed. Heavy losses in dead and wounded were inflicted on the enemy who later withdrew.

In a clash between Elas troops and a German convoy at DESFINA Y 30 23 lorries are claimed to have been destroyed. No casualty figure was given in the report. Sabotage on the rail systems has been widespread. Two trains were blown up in the LEVADIA Y 70 area causing the destruction of both locomotives and several wagons. 60 German troops are stated to have been killed in one crash. A train carrying petrol and military stores was derailed east of LITOKHORION T 48; details are lacking.

After a period of uneasy calm fighting has again broken out between Elas and Edes. Elas 24 Regt is stated to have attacked an Edes unit near KOUKOULA R 71 on 19 June. Fighting soon became general and spread to PAPDATIS R 91 and GRAMMENO R 84. Reports state that all Elas attacks were repulsed except at GRAMMINO where ZERVAS was counter-attacking. Fighting was reported at ANORRAKHI R 80 on 23 June. This outbreak of hostilities between the two Andarte formations is all the more deplorable at this time when the Germans have to some extent drained the area of troops to take part in the Southern Albanian offensive.

ALBANIA

The German offensive in Southern ALBANIA appears to have come to an end with the dispersal of the Partisans and the clearing of the bridgehead between HIMARE and FIGERAS. The equivalent of two divs took part in these operations and though it is not known how many Partisans managed to evade the Germans it is feared that the Partisan movement in S. ALBANIA has suffered a serious reverse. 100 MT are reported to have left GJINOKASTER M 40 for JANNINA, presumably the elements of 104 Jg Div returning to their normal stations. The bridge at GLOJEK over the LUMI E TIRANES river has been blown up by Partisans. This bridge, one of the largest and most important in ALBANIA, carries all traffic between SCUTARI in the North and TIRANA and DURAZZO to the South.

JUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

The centre of enemy activity has shifted from ALBANIA to DALMATIA. Persistent reports of heavy troop movements from the DRNIS area to the North via KNIN and BIHAC and other columns moving from GOSPIC via OTOCAC, BRINJE to ISTRIA have continued to arrive. Similar movements have taken place from DRNIS to MOSTAR on the road BLATO Q 23 - ZAGVARJE. 264 Inf Div has been mentioned in connection with most of these moves and though regrouping of the coastal forces is undoubtedly taking place no clear picture has as yet emerged. The identification of SS Mtn troops on CIOVO island lends colour to the report that 264 Inf Div is pulling out as the island formed the Southernmost boundary of this formation. A regt of 7 SS Mtn Div Prinz Eugen is reported in the SPLIT area making a total for the area ZARA-SPLIT of the equivalent of two divisions. This is slightly in excess

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of normal garrison requirements and points either to fears of an invasion or the relief of the garrison previously in this area. The Northward movement on the roads KNIN-BIHAC-GOSPIC-BRINJE may be elements of 373 and 392 Legion Divs regrouping after the recent Bosnian offensive. A report states that there is a heavy concentration of troops at SUNJA, believed to be from 373 Legion Div. SUNJA, at the railhead from BIHAC and on the main ZAGREB-BELGRADE line has been a favourite entraining station for formations leaving the Balkans. If the enemy's intention is to take another Div from the Balkans the choice appears to fall between 264 Inf and 373 Legion Divs. Either of these possibilities would give further proof, if such is necessary, of the acute man-power shortage in the German military machine. 264 Inf Div, a static formation made up of extremely young and elderly personnel, has not shown any outstanding offensive qualities in its long sojourn on the Dalmatian coast. The despatch of 373, a Croatian Legion formation, to outside the Balkan theatre would be a reversal of German policy regarding the employment of these formations.

Fighting, in which 250 Germans were killed took place in the BENKOVAC-BIOGRAD sector on 16 June. It is believed that 1 Brandenburg Regt was the formation involved.

The Partisans who landed on KORCULA on 16/17 June ambushed a party of Germans and killed 32 and wounded 10. It is presumed that the Partisan force has since left the island.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

Railway sabotage, mainly on the main East-West lines, has reached a new peak in the last 10 days. The railway bridge at ZALOG P 14 has been blown and the tunnel at the Northern end blocked by demolitions. The railway KRIZ K 97 - IVANICGRAD K 88 is reported to have been cut in 12 places and the CELJE-MARIBOR line to the N.W. has been successfully breached in a number of places. Partisans have seized and are destroying in detail the railway between BJELOVAR A 20 - GARESNICA P 26. Delayed reports from the East tell of terrific damage caused by Partisan saboteurs during the first quarter of June. 50 trucks of cotton were burned at BACKA PALANKA X 67, a troop train was derailed and plunged into the Danube near SREM KARLOVCI and 2 Kms of line, a locomotive and several wagons were destroyed near SREM MITROVICA X 63. Further West a troop train consisting of 12 carriages was destroyed near BANOVCI X 27 and a locomotive and 9 carriages of troops attacked near KUKUJEVCI X 46 causing many casualties.

Enemy troops, reported to be in force, were stated to be on the East bank of the Bosut river near the junction with the Sava. No further news of this concentration has been received nor have any identifications been made. 173 Res Div, last reported in this area with HQ at RUMA has not been mentioned for some considerable time and its continued presence there is queried.

BOSNIA

The German offensive in BOSNIA has proved to be another failure. The recapture by the Partisans of BOS GRAHOVO P 81 during the night 22/23 June has reduced enemy gains to a minimum and the German forces which took part have again suffered in the process of regrouping. A column of 373 Legion Div was attacked on the road from DVAR P 93 - BOS [illegible] and 16 lorries, 2 tanks, 2 guns and 90 men were destroyed or [illegible]. Troop concentrations are again reported, together with a gradual Northward movement, in the BOS [illegible]STROVAC area and are undoubtedly connected with 373 Legion Div.

Two trains were wrecked on the DOBOJ M 28 - TUZLA N 76 line. This line has recently been in use on a reduced scale and is used principally for timber haulage. RIENICA M 54 (not to be confused with RIENIK) was captured by elements of 36 Partisan Div who killed 60 German police in the process.

...To the South...

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To the South the Partisans have gained the initiative and have captured FOCA G 78, USTIKOLINA and GACNICE H 09.

SERBIA AND HERCEGOVINA.

There has been no news of the German drive from the area PLJEVLJA to clear communications to NIKSIC but a concentration of German and Chetnik troops is stated to be in the PODGORICA area. This may portend a double drive into Partisan territory from both North and South. The Bulgarian offensives in the RADAN Mountains J 86 and in the JABLANICA area P 18 have taken on a desultory character. Little headway has been made and only minor clashes reported. Fighting has taken place in the BLACE J 74 area against Bulgars. One enemy relief column was forced back but a second which included some arty succeeded in penetrating into Partisan territory. 2 Bulgarian a/c were shot down in the engagement. An ambush set by MEDIC troops and Cetniks failed at POPSICA K 35 and cost the enemy 120 killed, the greater part being MEDIC troops. Partisans entered LESKOVAC K 20 during the night 16/17 June and burnt 4 small factories, the power station, railway station and petrol stocks. Two locomotives were destroyed together with a quantity of rolling stock, principally tankers. Partisan specialists cut the railway line in 16 places between PROKUPLJE J 93 and KURSUMLIGU J 72 and destroyed two bridges in the vicinity of BRUSNICE J 83.

ORDER OF BATTLE

The manpower shortage in the enemy camp with the subsequent splitting of Divs into battle groups makes a confusing picture when looked at from the point of view of Divisions. Both the SS Mtn Divs have been functioning in two or more battle groups and are now joined by 369 Legion Div. Elements of this formation have been identified on the Dalmatian coast and near ZABLJAK G 94. 13 SS B.H. Div has groups in the TUZLA and SARAJEVO areas while 7 SS Mtn Prinz Eugen appears to be split into 3 groups having been identified in the general areas of TUZLA, MRKAVJICGRAD and SPLIT. 1 Cossack Div is now believed to have moved West into the area recently vacated by 42 JG Div, its duty appears to be the same - that of guarding the ZAGREB-BELGRADE railway at its Western end. 92 Mot Regt has left the SPLIT area and after a short halt in MOSTAR has continued South. It is now believed to be in the GRAHOVO A 95 area. 3,000 German troops are concentrated in the village of VRNJACKA BANJA J 57 which may portend a German drive in this area. No identifications have been made but it is presumed that they are Police troops from 5 Police Regt or 3 Police Volunteer Regt. 1 Jaeger Res Regt last identified fighting with 392 Legion Div is reliably reported as guarding the ZAGREB-KARLOVAC railway. A Turkoman formation has been reported in the SPLIT area.

The Rumanians have again increased their formations on the Russian front by the despatch of the Guards Inf Div and 1 Armoured Div. This brings the total of Rumanian Divs at the front to 16. A further 4 Inf Divs, 2 Cavalry Divs, one Mot div and 2 Independent Bdes remain in the country together with 6 frontier regts and the remnants of seven divs which managed to escape from the CRIMEA.

C C Rawlinson

BRIGADIER,
B.G.S. (I).

G.S.I.
H.Q.A.M.I.
28 June 44.

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THE GOTHIC LINE

GENERAL

The "Goten" Line (the Gothic line, Goth line, or the line of the Goths) is the name given by the Germans to the line which runs from CARRARA (P 8706) on the West coast to PESARO (S. 1280) on the Adriatic, and which has hitherto been loosely referred to as the PISA-RIMINI line. This line, which the Germans must defend if they are to retain the industrial areas of LOMBARDY, was chosen as early as last Autumn as the strongest and shortest natural position in North Central ITALY. Here the Appennines swing in a North-West direction and make a formidable barrier between Northern and Central ITALY, a barrier which can be by-passed only on the East coast. The mountains fall more rapidly to the ARNO than they do to the PO valley, and the enemy has taken advantage of this, siting his defences in the valleys and gorges forward of the mountain passes in the same manner as we have previously encountered at RIVISONDOLI, CIFALCO, SUBLACO and BALSORANO.

TRACE

The direct distance between the coast at the head of Peninsula ITALY is less than 150 miles, but the Gothic line shown on a map found at KESSELRING's Headquarters at MONTE SORATTE A 7605, and as interpreted from air photos, winds across the Appennines for about 190 miles. On the West coast the line starts at MARINA DI CARRARA (P 8202) and from here to CARRARA (P 8706) the defences have been fairly well developed. It then runs across the ALPI APUANE (no definite line can be picked up on air photos) to FESCAGLIA (Q 1292), where many machine gun positions can be seen, and cuts the LUCCA-MODENA road at BORGO A. MOZZANO (Q 2293) which has been developed as a strong point. The forward Southern and South-Eastern slopes of M. BARBONA (Q 2790) have been prepared for defence and the next positions visible on air photos are South of PRUNETTA (Q 4395) - PIASTRE (Q 4695). The line continues Eastwards to astride the main road PISTOIA-BOLOGNA South of the PASSO DI PORRETTA (Q 5497) and isolated defences are visible from here across the mountains South of M. LA CROCE (Q 6097) and M. BUCCIANA (Q 6396) and then NE to the area of VERNIO (Q 7299). KESSELRING's map shows the line to run South of VERNIO, but this is not borne out by air photos.

Eastwards from here the line runs to the most strongly defended position in the mountain sector of the GOTHIC Line covering the approaches to the FUTA PASS. The defences are sited in the area of S. LUCIA (L 8101) astride the main FLORENCE-BOLOGNA road and on the minor by-pass road GAGLIANO (Q 8395)-PANNA (L 8200) - S. LUCIA. The FUTA pass itself is situated at the NE end of the MUGELLO depression, through which the river SIEVE flows, where deployment is possible and is facilitated by a network of minor approach roads. Between FLORENCE and this depression neither air photos nor ground sources, apart from some unconfirmed reports, have produced any evidence of defences and the enemy will probably only attempt a delaying action before falling back on his main line. East of the FUTA pass there is no clear indication as to how the line runs but there are a few machine gun positions South of the IL GIOGO PASS (Q 9098) on the difficult winding road from S. PIERO A SIEVE (Q 8589) to FIRENZUOLA (L 9006) and KESSELRING's map shows the line crossing the FLORENCE-FAENZA road North of the important road junction of BORGO S. LORENZO (Q 9088) approximately at CLA DI CASAGLIA (Q 9897). On the FLORENCE-FORLI road the main defences appear to be at SAMBAVELLO (R 0584) covering the tortuous ascent to the MURAGLIONE PASS (R 1285) while a strong-point has been begun at S. GODENZA (R 0884) to counter any thrust across the mountains from the STIA area (R 1570).

On the next road to the East - from BIBBIENA (R 2458) to CESENA (North-West of RIMINI) - air photos reveal much defensive activity around SERRAVALLE (R 2667) where ground sources also report machine gun positions built in mountainside caves, and on the alternative minor roads to the West. Photo cover shows no defences between SAMBAVELLO and SERRAVALLE, but the line will probably follow the M. FALTERONA ridge. The other road to CESENA

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from the SE. which joins the main BIBBIENA-CESENA road at RASNO DI ROMAGNA (R 3573) was improved on Mussolini's express orders; astride it minor defences have been built between VALSAVIGNONE (R 4062) and the mountain pass VALICO DI MONTE CORNARO (R 4168).

The S. SEPOLCRO (R 5045) - RIMINI road is defended forward of BADIA TEDALDA (R 5459) and East of this village minor defences consisting almost entirely of machine gun positions are continued in a broken and incomplete line along the hills to the North of the road to LUNANO as far as CAVALLICO (R 7163) where defences are sited to block the approaches to PENNABILLI (R 5972) from the SE. The line on KESSELRING's map swings South of these defences, which have been detected on air photos, and certainly great topographical advantage would be gained by defending these roads at DENTA SPIGNA (R 6155) and in SORBETOLO (R 7257). After LUNANO the defences, still only minor ones and with many gaps, swing NE along the North bank of the FOGLIA river through MONTECALVO (R 9070) to MONTECCHIO, where the anti-tank ditch system starts. The line continues along the URBINO PESARO road at an average distance of about 1,000 yards North of the FOGLIA to the town of PESARO itself which is defended but only by machine gun positions.

STATE OF DEVELOPMENT

The Gothic Line is still far from complete, despite the fact that work was started on it nine months ago. The Todt organisation has been responsible for the construction of the defences but other demands have been heavy, so that work has been spasmodic and slow. It is unlikely that any speed-up took place till the VALMONTONE line was suddenly cracked. The defences as they exist to date have been mostly developed on the two coastal sectors, and South of the FUTA pass on the main road from FLORENCE to BOLOGNA. Apart from the double anti-tank obstacles, one about 7 miles behind the other, on the West coast, the line as interpreted from air photos has very little depth and in that respect resembles the Adolf Hitler line in the LIRI valley. On the coastal sectors, besides the normal coast defences there is an anti-tank wall at CARRARA, reported to be of very poor quality cement, two anti-tank ditches in depth on the West coast, and a broken anti-tank ditch system East from MONTECCHIO (S 0075) to the Adriatic. The only other anti-tank ditch is in the FUTA pass defences. According to ground sources it is of concrete and 2 metres deep and 3 metres wide, and this appears to be borne out by air photos. Mines are naturally difficult to pick out in this hilly country but there is a minefield on both sides of the road forward of the FUTA pass anti-tank ditch, and another minefield extends from the town of CARRARA MARITIMA some 2,000 yards to the N.E., to the railway. On the Adriatic minefields have so far only been detected just West of MONTECCHIO (S 0075). For the rest very little wiring has as yet been detected on air photographs and the defences consist of the usual machine gun and anti-tank pillboxes including the mobile two-man steel pillboxes found at CASSINO and on the Adolf Hitler line, and open weapon pits. A few camouflaged structures of the type which were found on the Adolf Hitler line have made their appearance in the FUTA PASS, and tank turrets mounting heavy anti-tank guns, including Panther turrets, with long 75 mm fixed in a concrete emplacement, will undoubtedly have been incorporated into the defences of the coastal plains, and sited to cover the road approaches to the mountain passes. As they stand only two or three feet above ground level they are difficult to pick up on air photos.

As yet the defences of the Gothic Line have only been developed on the coastal sectors and astride the main roads through the mountains to the Plain of LOMBARDY. Much work has still to be done to complete these defences and to make them part of a continuous line, and it is presumably to gain time for feverish last minute preparations that the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies are fighting so stubbornly South of FLORENCE.

(Adapted from Eighth Army)

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31 May 44.

MESSAGE FROM 14 ARMY (Ops)

TO: 1. 1 Para Corps

2. 76 Armd Corps

3. For information, 371 Harko.

1. The orders of the Corps remain unchanged.

In accordance therewith 76 Armd Corps will surrender on the night of 31/5 - 1/6 at 0000 hours 29 P.G. Div inclusive of all units then under its control to 14 Armd Corps. The new dividing line between 76 Armd Corps and 14 Armd Corps will be the same as the present dividing line between the Hermann Goering Para Armd Div and 29 P.G. Div.

2. On the 1/6 the main task besides the defence of the expected strong enemy attacks with the main thrust between the Alban mountains and the coast, is to clean up at the earliest possible moment the existing breakthrough at the Corps junction between 1 Para Corps and 76 Armd Corps.

To this end I order:

(a) Independently of the Corps boundaries everything must be done by both HQs, the last man and the last available weapon must be directed to the mastery of the position here existing. In such a matter, sector boundaries have no meaning.

(b) It is the job therefore of both HQs to attack along the line of the road 75/26, 75/48 and from the Southwest and/or Northeast in order to close the break in the front and to form a front to the Southeast with a firm union and contact on both sides.

(c) The advanced enemy units in the gap presently existing between the Corps are to be blocked by alarm units etc., After the closing of the gap in the front these units are to be hemmed in and destroyed by a concentric advance.

(d) 76 Armd Corps will support its attack from 75/46 to the Southwest with tanks which will be made available, to which are to be allotted infantry in at least Coy strength. 1 Para Corps will assemble all units available for the attack, most possibly one bn of the Assault Regiment in the area 75/39 in order to thrust in the direction of 75/47. The allotment of some assault guns is to be sought. For the security of the area Northwest and West of M. ARTEMISIO, 76 Armd Corps will employ an Armd Recce Company on the road both sides of 75/22 which by constant patrolling will impede a crossing of the ARTEMISIO by further enemy units. Further a thrust forward by way of 75/22 to 75/26 by further Armd Recce troops is to be carried out in order to secure the road 75/13, 75/26. 2nd Bn 1059 Gr Regiment will be placed under command of 76 Armd Corps and will be employed for the cleaning-up of the breakthrough in 1 Para Corps.

3. A report on the measures undertaken on the basis of this order is to reach me at latest at 0700 hours on 1/6.

(sgd) von MACKENSEN

(14 Army (Ops) No. 2338/44).

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APPENDIX 'A' TO HQ AAI INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 52 DATED 6 JULY, 1944.

MESSAGE FROM 14 ARMY (Ops)

TO: 1. 1st Para Corps
2. 76 Armd Corps
3. For information, 371 Harko +

1. It remains the task of the Army to impede the enemy breakthrough to ROME until stronger forces of the 10th Army can come up for the relieving attack. The performance of this task is of decisive importance for the whole conduct of operations. It requires the extracting of the utmost from every man and every weapon, in order that the appointed task may be achieved. I expect and know that my men as previously that have fulfilled all that was required of them, will defend themselves fighting grimly to the last.

2. It is the task of 1 Para Corps to impede an enemy breakthrough on the 3rd June. To this end the Northeastern flank of the Corps is to be drawn back on to the general line 95/33 - 95/41 - East bank 95/48 (to be decided here by the officer in charge of operations) - 75/12 - 75/11 - 36/64. Junction with 76 Armd Corps will be effected at 36/64.

The Tank Company of 29 P.G. Div is to be pulled out on the 2 June at dusk and brought over to 76 Armd Corps at ref point 36/39 where 76 Armd Corps will take over control of the Company.

The Staff of 4 Para Div with 2 bns and as many artillery troops as possible is to be withdrawn from the front line on the 2/3 June and brought up as early as possible on to the general line 36/22 - 36/39 with its centre on the Via Cassilina so that it may bring to a standstill as far as possible to the East any further advance of the enemy. Rapid frictionless performance of the movements is of decisive importance in order to gain as much ground as possible to the East.

3. It is the task of 76 Armd Corps to impede a breakthrough between the general line 36/64 (junction here with 1 Para Corps) and 67/43. Its centre will be along the Via Cassilina.

The following will be sent up to the Corps during the night of 2/3 June and placed under its command:

(a) Tank Coy, 29 P.G. Div from 1 Para Corps (see para 2)

(b) Field Replacement Bn, 29 P.G. Div from Army to ref point 36/39 then to be taken up by 76 Armd Corps.

(c) Field Replacement Bn, 362 Infantry Div from Army likewise to ref point 36/39, there to be taken up by 76 Armd Corps.

(d) Two newly formed companies of 715 Infantry Div by direct agreement with the latter.

(e) The available trucked infantry of 715 Infantry Division which likewise will be brought up to 36/39 and are there to be incorporated into the two Field Replacement Bns of 29 P.G. Div and 362 Infantry Div.

(f) All available units of 334 Infantry Div which arrive.

4. Above all, deep echeloned anti-tank strongpoints are to be formed to counter the enemy tank thrusts. The employment of all available Engineers for the rapid establishment of minefields is more important than their employment in an infantry role. Every man will defend himself where he is placed as long as he has ammunition and is capable of fighting.

(sgd) von MACKENSEN
(14 Army (Ops) No. 2380/44).

Note + 371 Harko is Comd of 14 Army Artillery.

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SHIPPING

With our advance Northward the enemy has been forced to abandon the port of SAN STEFANO and as suggested in last week's Summary PIOMBINO is now probably his most Southerly port on the West coast. It is questionable whether PIOMBINO will remain active very much longer. On the East coast, with the withdrawal of his left flank, it is probable that the enemy will shortly abandon SAN BENEDETTO, if he has not done so already. ANCONA will then be his most Southerly East coast port.

Lately there appears to have been some increase in KT ship activity along the West coast. While not more than 6 or 7 of these ships appear active, they are fast and have a cargo capacity of about 400 tons and are therefore a very useful adjunct to the more common supply barges and F-boats which carry on an average probably not over 125 tons.

Raids this week on shipping have been light. On 8 June an E-boat was damaged North of ELSA and two hits scored on a destroyer at PORTO FERRAIO the following day. One or two barges were also damaged off the West coast. On 13 June ships at LEGHORN intended to be used to block the port were attacked with at least partial success. Fuel installations at PORTO MARGHERA and TRIESTE were successfully bombed and also drydocks and shops at POLA, where enemy submarines are apparently based.

3. BALKANS

GREECE

The enemy has begun mopping up operations in the PREVEZA-ARTA area. Clashes between German troops and ELAS have taken place at LOUROS W89 and PHILIPIAS W99, a German column at MAKRINOROS was forced back on ARTA. A German attack in the Lake INIAS vicinity was repulsed by ELAS who claim to have inflicted 69 casualties on the enemy. 400 ELAS, mostly armed and including the C.O. of ELAS 24 Regt, have deserted to EDES in the ARTA area. For some time small groups of ELAS andartes have been coming over to EDES but this is the first report of an organised mass defection.

ALBANIA

The attack on the Partisan bridgehead between HIMARE and PIGERAS has developed from both North and South. Enemy progress to date has been slow and may be regarded as a recce in force rather than an offensive. German troop concentrations are reported in the villages of KROPISHTI, MAVROVA and DRASHOVICA, all in QM04, and similar concentrations are stated to be based on DELVINE R48 and SARANDE R38 in the South. Two new L.N.C. brigades have recently been formed. The 12th is stated to be operating in the BERAT area but no location has been given for the other, the 15th.

JUGOSLAVIA

DALMATIA

The recent Allied attack on BRAC was made with the intention of drawing off German reserves which may otherwise have been diverted

....to the Bosnian....

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

This week there is no indication suggesting that the enemy has been able to improve his administrative position. Rail interdiction continues effective and disruption of road communications serious. MT movement South from BOLOGNA across the Appennines now appears heavy, and while troop movements will account for some of this, at least part is probably supply traffic. As yet incomplete claims for day air attacks against enemy MT total 948 destroyed and 870 damaged for the week 7/13 June, raising the grand total since 12 May to 5038 destroyed and 4849 damaged. The highways traversed by our advancing armies are littered with burnt out vehicles, silent witnesses of the efficiency of air attacks. Apart from PW reports of MT shortage, the destruction of dumps, and the continued abandonment of supplies and equipment (including a taxi with German Army license plates), the enemy's lack of MT is indicated by two recent reports stating that all civilian MT in the provinces of LOMBARDY and PIEDMONT are being requisitioned. The enemy is also suffering losses in horse-drawn vehicles. On 9 June for example, 44 were claimed destroyed and 11 damaged. There is no definite information this week on the enemy supply position, but it undoubtedly continues very difficult. Shortage of ammunition is indicated by light enemy artillery fire. Presence of abandoned equipment may well indicate a lack of fuel and not only a shortage of MT to tow it. There are several reports that the enemy has been forced to live off the land or eat horse meat since regular rations were not available; this was due more to distributional difficulties than actual shortage.

RAILWAYS

From 7 to 10 June at least one of the lines inland from the East coast was open as far as FOLIGNO and PERUGIA with only one break between PERUGIA and TERONTOLA South of which the main Central line was open as far as ORVIETO. On 10 June, however, the main line running S.E. from BOLOGNA to the East coast was blocked at FAENZA, RIMINI and FANO and since then there have been no indications of activity over this route. On the Central system a line was open from BOLOGNA to PONTASSIEVE on 6 and 7 June since when all lines South of BOLOGNA have been closed.

In the North, heavy attacks on the marshalling yards at TRIESTE and MESTRE on 10 June have curtailed the volume of traffic entering ITALY from the East, whilst in the West, though there has been a certain increase in traffic South from TURIN, there has been no indication of any increase in the volume of traffic from FRANCE. There was a definite drop in activity on the BRENNER-BOLOGNA line early in the week, but traffic was picking up again by 12 June.

Complete photographic reconnaissance has recently been made of an important new railway by-pass on the BRENNER route which enables through traffic to and from GERMANY to avoid BOLZANO thus obviating two crossings over the river Isarco but including a new bridge over the river ESA. Work on this by-pass was first revealed by photographs in August 43. The line should shortly be ready for single track working and some stretches of the by-pass, which is about 2½ miles long, already have double tracks.

.....SHIPPING.....

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to the Bosnian offensive against Tito's GHQ. The action can be considered a success in so much as 2,000 enemy troops landed at SUPETAR during the night 5/6 June. As reported in last week's Summary the Allied force began to evacuate on 4 June and the Partisans some 30 hours later. Known German casualties number 350 but it is thought that the total will be considerably higher. On the night 9/10 June a small Allied force with light guns landed on SOLTA Island. After shelling enemy positions near GROHOTE the force withdrew before first light. The principal object of the raid was to increase the enemy's state of uncertainty in the islands adjacent to VIS. No estimate could be made of enemy casualties but our own force was evacuated intact.

Heavy MT movement from SPLIT to IMOTSKI, MOSTAR and CAPLJINA is reported. Reports indicate that it may be that of 92 Mot Regt, last located in the DVAR area. The KRKA bridge, recently completely destroyed by Spitfires, is being replaced by a pontoon bridge. This bridge carries all traffic between SURADIN and SIBENIK on the main North-South road.

CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

Following Tito's appeal to Jugoslav Partisans to go over to the offensive, the Partisans in the North, already renowned for their railway sabotage, have redoubled their efforts and a veritable spate of train wrecks have been reported. During the night 3/4 June the railway line between KRIZ K 97 and IVANICGRAD was torn up in 95 places and 600 metres of track was removed from the DUGO SELO K89 VRBOVEC E80 line some days earlier. Between 26 May and 1 June 5 locomotives, 46 waggons of war material were destroyed and 150 Germans killed on the ZAGREB-BELGRADE line and extensive demolitions made on the stretch DUGO SELO-NOVSKA F34. So serious had the rail situation become that the enemy were reported to be removing sections of the railway KRIZEVCI E91 - KOPRIVNICA to repair the main East-West lines. The Partisans have captured MIRNA PEC to the NW of NOVO MESTO and in spite of fierce counter attacks have retained their hold on TREBNJE D80 thus denying the railway to the enemy.

BOSNIA

Reports from BOSNIA have shown that the situation is still confused but that the German offensive is slowly petering out. It was reported that the Partisans had recaptured most of the villages in the SRNETICA mountains but a later report states that the enemy is still in possession of RIBNIK L14, BUSIJE L23, POTOCI L03, BRAVSKA L05, and JASENOVAC L05. It appears that the main enemy force is regrouping on BOS PETROVAC leaving a number of small battle groups in the villages whose aim will be to keep the road communications clear for further action. Further to the East and SE German columns are pushing forward to GORNJI VAKUF from BUGOJNO and TRAVNIK from JAJCE and DONJI VAKUF. A column from the SS Prinz Eugen Div is stated to have arrived in TRAVNIK after escaping from a Partisan ambush. The regrouping in the BOS PETROVAC area was considerably hampered by Partisan ambushes. A Mot column was attacked between VRTOCE P76 and BOS PETROVAC on 5 June. 15 MT were burnt by the Partisans who killed some 150 enemy. Next day another column was attacked with equal success at OSTRELJ P94 and another "Prinz Eugen" column which was moving from BRAVSKA to BOS PETROVAC suffered heavy casualties. The SS Prinz Eugen Mtn Div is reported to have suffered about 30% casualties in the last month's fighting. In an effort to relieve the situation in Central and Western BOSNIA the Partisans launched a general offensive to East and NE from the high ground NE of TUZLA. Partisan brigades

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are advancing to the DRINA and SAVA rivers in the face of fierce resistance. LOPARE W91 (NOT on 500,000 map) was captured by the Partisans on 8 June. 350 Germans were killed and considerable booty, said to include 50 half tracked vehicles, 8 guns and 10 ambulances, was captured. Up till 10 June enemy losses in this offensive are reported to be 650 killed and many wounded.

SERBIA

A highly successful attack was carried out by Partisans on the airfield of LESKOVAC during the night 2/3 June. 2 hangers, 4 aircraft, 20 MT, petrol and ammunition dumps were destroyed and casualties inflicted on the German garrison. This action would appear to confirm reports that the enemy garrison in LESKOVAC had been considerably reduced. The railway between KRALJEVO and KRUSEVAC was cut in two places causing considerable delay to enemy traffic.

ORDER OF BATTLE

I Mtn Div appears to be back in its old location near the Albanian-Grecian frontier. Elements are reported in SKOPLJE, BITOLJ and even in KORCA while an unconfirmed report states that the Div HQ has gone to ATHENS and will be followed by the other elements shortly. The most likely area would appear to be somewhere between KORCA and JANINA where the Div could relieve the over-extended 104 Jg Div of part of its commitments.

2 Brandenburg Regt is reported to be in the SJENICA-PLEVLJE area where a number of enemy troops are concentrated. There have been persistent reports of a new arrival in the PALANKA X57 area. A large German force, said to be about divisional strength, arrived at the beginning of June from OSIJEK and set up Hq at GAJDOBRA X58. 4,000 troops with much MT are in NOVA and BACKA PALANKA and state they had come from RUSSIA. An unconfirmed report states that this formation may be the SS Div Gross Deutschland which was last located on the Southern Russian front.

C R Rudloch

BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

GSI(a)
HQ.AAI,
15 June 44.

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.52

OF 6 JULY, 1944.

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(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hours of receipt.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

By the end of last month it was clear that the enemy could not afford to try and hold much longer the unprepared position running East and West through Lake TRASIMENE, which a German reporter referred to as "the new line of defence across ITALY". The speed of the Allied advance along the coast North from GROSSETTO, the heavy casualties suffered West of Lake TRASIMENE and the expensive counter-attacks which the enemy has had to put in in an attempt to seal off penetrations of his positions have further whittled down the already depleted enemy forces. The few days gained by the delaying action have given badly needed time for last minute efforts to improve the defences of the Gothic Line, but it is questionable whether the cost has not been too heavy, for Kesselring is now going to find it more difficult than ever to find sufficient troops to man the line as well as the Gulfs of GENOA and VENICE. Losses have been particularly severe amongst the better divisions which have had to be constantly switched from one threatened sector to another.

On the Western coast where 19 G.A.F. and 162 Turcoman Div had been singularly unsuccessful in trying to stem our advance, 26 Pz Div had taken over from 162 Div by the 27 June and was holding a 20,000 yard front with 1027 G.R. and 314 G.R. under command. On the 29th the Div was back on the R.Cecina and covering the approaches to VOLTERRA with 1027 G.R. between M. RILALDO Q 2624 and PONTE GINORI STA Q 3521, 314 G.R. on its left to just short of SALINE STA Q 4124, 9 P.G.R. stretching from here to Pt 96 Q 4820 and 67 P.G.R. on the extreme East flank holding up to CERBAIOLA Q 5315. In addition 26 Pz was supported by some of the artillery of 162 Div and by 764 Bty, and 26 Recce was in divisional reserve with 2 Mk IVs and 2 Mk VIs under command. An indication of the heavy casualties suffered by this division is that the fighting strength (i.e. excluding all admt personnel) of the Tk Regt was less than 100 all ranks on the 29 June.

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Despite strong resistance Allied troops crossed the river, though on 1 June 26 Pz Div was still trying to restore the situation and regain the original line. A counter-attack made an initial advance of 1,000 yards but was driven back. On the right of 26 Pz Div, 19 G.A.F. Div is now holding a narrow sector with a regimental group of 16 SS Div composed of 35 SS P.G.R. and part of the divisional Engineer and Recce Bns on the coast itself. CECINA was occupied on the morning of 1 July but 35 SS P.G.R. reacted strongly and put in several unsuccessful counter-attacks on the town. At the time of going to press Allied forces have pushed forward some 10-12 Kms beyond the CECINA and VOLTERRA is being outflanked on the West and East. East of 26 Pz Div 3 P.G. and 20 G.A.F. Divs both now very weak, have been steadily giving ground, conforming with the withdrawal of 26 Panzer Div. Further East again to exclusive SIENA the main weight has been taken by 29 P.G. Div while at least a battle group of 90 P.G. Div has probably also been forward though there has been little contact with the Div.

West of Lake TRASIMENE, where the enemy had fought so hard to stabilise on the line South of CASTIGLIONE W 4295, there was a general withdrawal on the night 28/29 June, and next morning the village was occupied. Although prisoners were taken from 115 P.G.R. East of the lake on 2 July, most of 115 P.G.R. had moved round to the West side by the end of last month, and had taken over the responsibility for the main road North to CORTONA and AREZZO. This did not result in the relief of 1 Para Div, badly in need of a rest (III Bn 1 Para was reduced to one weak Coy 30 strong on 29 June) nor of 334 Div which has lost heavily recently (another 90 prisoners were captured on 30 June), but merely caused these divisions to side-step to the West. Consequently both have held sectors of only about 5,000 yards. Hermann Goering Div withdrawing North through SINALUNGA has also been on a comparatively narrow front. 1 Bn 4 Para Regt was involved in fairly heavy fighting on the 30 June, but that evening Hermann Goering, 1 Para and 356 Divs were all making preparations to go back to a line S.W. of CORTONA, which was to join up with the Gustav position where 4 Para Div was covering the approaches to SIENA. That the withdrawal could not have gone entirely to plan is indicated by the fact that on 1 July BRAUER (O.C. 2 Coy 4 Para Regt) was complaining of a 5 Km gap between his Coy and Hermann Goering on the right. However for the past three days the enemy has made no real attempt to stand, pulling back each night, and relying on heavy demolitions to slow up our progress. CORTONA was occupied on the 3rd but contact with 15 P.G. and 305 Inf Div was lost. By the 4th our leading troops were 5 miles S.W. of AREZZO. SIENA was cleared early on the 3rd but progress beyond the town was stiffly opposed by 4 Para Div presumably to cover the withdrawal of those divisions to the East which are moving back along the FLORENCE axis.

East of Lake TRASIMENE where our pressure has not been so strong, 305 Div assisted by a weak regimental battle group from 94 Div, and 44 Div have made a more leisurely withdrawal, only showing signs of anxiety when we captured M. ACUTO R 6210 and M. MURLO R 5708 on the 3rd. Both 2 and 3 Bns 134 Regt, now 150 and 120 strong respectively, were put in to counter attack and succeeded in retaking the summits of both hills. East of the Tiber 114 Jaeger Div has had a relatively quiet time. On the Adriatic 71 and 278 Divisions which had been holding the Chienti river to just South of MACERATA, withdrew on the night of 30 June. A captured map showed the next position - the ELFRIEDE Line - to run behind the POTENZA continuing S.W. to RAMBONA,

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S 4409 and then presumably joining up with the TRASIMENE position. The enemy however made no attempt to hold the line and withdrew North of the river. Contact was made again in the area of LORETO S 6828 and OSIMO S 5833 and the enemy is apparently trying to hold here while the demolitions in ANCONA which started on the 3 July are completed. Another captured map shows a further line running S.W. from the coast at S 6543 to IESI 3937 and then to S 3036, with the divisional boundary between 278 and 71 Divs through MACERATA and CASTEBELLINO S 3034.

It is surprising that the enemy has still not yet made up his mind to go back to the Gothic position. The divisions in the line are so seriously weakened that they have barely any reserves left with which to counter attack. The elements of 19 divisions are forward, but their present fighting strength must be equivalent to less than half that number. Of the remaining 9 in ITALY, 92 may have been disbanded (certainly 1059 G.R. was used to reinforce 19 GAF and 334 Divs, and 1060 G.R. has also been split up), 362 Inf Div which had to commit two bns last week, is probably reforming, 162 Div also appears to have gone back leaving a regiment and divisional troops with 26 Pz Div, while 65 and 715 Divs have been out of the running for some time and are almost certainly being refitted. 16 SS Reichsfuehrer appears to be strung out along the coast from North of LEGHORN to the front line, looking both South and out to sea. Coastwatching in the SPEZIA area, according to a PW, is 135 Fortress Bde controlling 905, 906 and 907 Fortress Bns. Despite the identification of elements of 42 Jaeger Div, probably only getting battle experience, the division is still believed to be in the GENOA area. In view of the extremely heavy traffic reported arriving from TARVISIO and moving through MILAN to the ALESSANDRIA area during the last week of June, it can be safely assumed that another formation has arrived, probably an infantry one. Reports have mentioned that the troops have come from RUSSIA. Together with 188 Reserve Mtn Div in ISTRIA, Kesselring will then hardly have more than the equivalent of some 15 divs to man the Gothic line and to guard his two sea flanks. This allows him to dispose of very few reserves. Kesselring's only source of further reinforcements seems to be the Balkans, where a reshuffle still appears to be going on, which might result in the release of two divisions if their place can be taken by training units or tired formations undergoing a refit. Without some reinforcements he is going to be hard put to it to hold the Northern Appennines.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

On the Italian West coast the main line has remained out at three places between GENOA and SPEZIA during the past week whilst between SPEZIA and PISA the number of cuts rose from four on 28 June to seven on 2 July. West of GENOA the coastal line was also cut near IMPERIA on the 28th and N.E. and North of SAVONA, where there are important oil dumps, on the following day. The line from PARMA to SPEZIA was open on 28 June, but was blocked again on 30th, since when it has not been opened again. The PISA-LUCCA-PISTOIA and the PISA-EMPOLI-FLORENCE lines which surround the enemy's main dumping area have both been cut at several places since 27 June in the case of the former and 29 June in the latter case.

The BOLOGNA-PISTOIA line was open on 28 June, but has been blocked just North of PISTOIA ever since. The BOLOGNA-PRATO main

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line was open on 28 June and again on 1 July since when it has remained open. South of FLORENCE the main line has been open as far as MONTIVARCHI all week. The BOLOGNA-RIMINI line was open on 27 and 28 June but was cut SE of RIMINI on the 29th; on the next day there were four additional cuts between RIMINI and FORLI and the line is now blocked between BOLOGNA and IMOLA, FORLI and RIMINI, RIMINI and FANO and South of FANO. The line from FAENZA to FLORENCE was open from 27 to 29 June, but the branch from BORGO to PONTASSIEVE remained blocked; since 29 June traffic along this line to both PONTASSIEVE and FLORENCE has been stopped by a number of cuts in the area of BORGO S. LORENZO. The line inland from FANO via FERMIGNANO has been cut at one or more places all week.

For at least five days during the last week it will have been possible for the enemy to push trains as far South as MONTEVARCHI, whilst the BOLOGNA-ANCONA line was open for the first three days of the week, and there is no reason to believe that the enemy will not have made good use of these opportunities to follow his usual policy of moving supplies as far forward by rail as possible, even into Divisional areas. At the same time accumulation of dumps in the PISA-LUCCA-PISTOIA-EMPOLI area and the heavy concentration of flak in this area and along the two lines running South from BOLOGNA to the FLORENCE area would seem to indicate that the majority of trains arriving from the North are being unloaded between BOLOGNA and FLORENCE and along the two Central lines between FLORENCE and PISA.

Whilst traffic over the BRENNER has been normal during the past week, there has been a definite decrease in the volume of traffic entering ITALY from the East, especially over the TREVISO-MESTRE-FERRARA-BOLOGNA route. In the West, activity at ALESSANDRIA indicates that supplies are being carried to GENOA, probably for shipment Southwards. There was also a certain amount of activity on the important lateral line PIACENZA-PARMA-BOLOGNA-RIMINI during the early part of the week, and the marshalling yards at RAVENNA, which is now the chief port of intake for enemy supplies on the East coast and has important oil installations, have also been active.

As was to be expected the enemy is demolishing the railway lines as he retires. Thus all bridges have been blown on the main line South of FLORENCE between BUSINI and AREZZO and on the dead-end line running North from AREZZO to PRATOVECHIO, 25 miles due East of FLORENCE.

SHIPPING

While ports on both East and West Italian coasts are active there has been a definite decrease in the volume of shipping in the past two weeks. We are now within about 10 miles of ANCONA and LEGHORN and demolitions at both these ports have presumably been completed by the enemy.

At ANCONA no active shipping was present on 3 July but to the North a few small vessels were at RIMINI (about midway between ANCONA and PORTO CORSINI) from which a coaster departed some time between 30 June and 3 July. While some shipping may still be proceeding to East coast ports South of PORTO CORSINI, port facilities between there and ANCONA are poor and the bulk of supplies coming down the East coast are now probably unloaded in the PORTO CORSINI-RAVENNA canal. Supplies are also evidently moving up the Po river from the sea, F-boats having been observed some time ago up the canal running from the PO to FERRARA where there is a considerable concentration of dumps.

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On the west coast active shipping has been picked up as far South as VIAREGGIO and it is quite probable that at least some moves on down to MARINA DI PISA at the mouth of the Arno. SPEZIA continues the most active port South of GENOA, but how much unloading is done here is problematical; in any event no large build-up of supplies in the SPEZIA area is indicated in view of the fact that it rests almost exactly on the right flank of the Gothic line.

3. BALKANS

ALBANIA

It is now apparent that the greater part of the Partisan forces in the HIMARE-PIGERAS bridgehead managed to escape encirclement during the recent German offensive. Regrouping has taken place and sporadic fighting is reported from the PERMET area. PWs from 523 Gren Regt of 297 Div were taken during the night 29/30 June in the area North of HIMARE. There are indications that elements of 1 Mtn Div are leaving ALBANIA and concentrating in the area of FLORINA.

JUGOSLAVIA

Partisan attacks on the Island of KORCULA and BRAC on 21 June added a further 250 casualties to 118 Jg Div's heavy list. 200 killed are claimed on KORCULA and 20 killed and 17 wounded on BRAC. The enemy is fortifying the coastal strip VODICE U 46 PRIMOSTEN U 54 ROGOZNICA U 53 and bringing up more heavy artillery. No definite change has taken place in the enemy order of battle and the recent heavy movements appear to have been routine reliefs of garrisons.

Fighting has taken place in the SISAK area and it appears that another enemy drive to clear the area SISAK J 33 UGULIN J 93 is under way. Further to the North, in the VIROVITICA D 95 area, Police SS troops have launched attacks against the Partisans, presumably in retaliation for the Partisan sabotage on the CELJE-MARIBOR railway. Strong columns of enemy are reported to be clearing the GROSPULJE-NOVO MESTO railway. Heavy fighting is reported from W. BOSNIA. Some 1,600 troops, including Cetniks and Germans, failed to capture BOS GRAHOVO on 25 June. A number of enemy tanks managed to enter the town but were later repulsed and driven back to the railway KNIN U 79 TISNOVIC P 71.

In MONTENEGRO fighting has centred around the towns of BERANE H 50 and BIJELO POLJE H 42. German intentions appear to be to keep open the area North and East of the line BERANE-PLJEVLJA H 26 by a series of holding attacks.

Nothing new has been received from the JASTREBAC area and this drive by the Bulgarians seems to have petered out in exactly the same way as all previous drives. BRUS J 55 was captured by Partisans on 24 June who secured large quantities of arms and material. The radio station at NIS was destroyed together with the adm store during the night 21/22 June by Partisan specialists.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Persistent reports of troop arrivals in the ZAGREB area

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have been received. 12,000 Mtn troops from the CRIMEA area are stated to be in SAMOBOR (15 m West of ZAGREB); other reports assess this concentration as high as two divs. Elements of 13 SS Div B.H. are stated to have moved N.E. into the SREM (between the SAVE and the DANUBE) from the MAJEVICA area and are now placed along the railway TOVARNIK-RUMA. A new command, Befehlshaber Syrmien (or SREM) has been reported with H.Q. at VUKOVAR X 19 on the DANUBE. It is stated to control 173 Res Div and 606 Sicherungs Regt.

In 18 P.G. or 18 P.G. SS div is stated to have been in the ZAGREB area but to have moved into HUNGARY during the German occupation of that country. This is probably 18 SS Div and is still believed to be in HUNGARY. 1 Brandenburg Regt has moved from SKRADIN, near SIBENIK, and is now located further North West on the coast in the BIOGRAD sector. This move, together with the reported change-over of 892 and 891 Regts of 264 probably gave rise to the recent spate of rumours of formations leaving the Dalmatian coastal strip for ITALY. NEDIC representatives are stated to have arrived in the BACKA (the country NE of BELGRADE annexed by HUNGARY in 1941) and are recruiting the local Serbians. All males between the ages of 18 and 41 are stated to be liable for service. Rumour, which is to some extent verified by the above, states that HUNGARY has returned the BACKA to SERBIA.

4. ENEMY METHODS

Reproduced at Appendix 'A' are two of the last orders issued by von Mackensen, G.O.C. 14 Army, before the fall of ROME. It is interesting that as late as 2 June the German Higher Command had no intention of giving up ROME.

BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

GSI(a)
HQ.A.A.I.
6 July 44.

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APPENDIX 'A' TO HQ AAI INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 52 DATED 6 JULY, 1944.

MESSAGE FROM 14 ARMY (Ops)

TO: 1. 1st Para Corps
2. 76 Armd Corps
3. For information, 371 Harko. +

1. It remains the task of the Army to impede the enemy breakthrough to ROME until stronger forces of the 10th Army can come up for the relieving attack. The performance of this task is of decisive importance for the whole conduct of operations. It requires the extracting of the utmost from every man and every weapon, in order that the appointed task may be achieved. I expect and know that my men as previously that have fulfilled all that was required of them, will defend themselves fighting grimly to the last.

2. It is the task of 1 Para Corps to impede an enemy breakthrough on the 3rd June. To this end the Northeastern flank of the Corps is to be drawn back on to the general line 95/33 - 95/41 - East bank 95/48 (to be decided here by the officer in charge of operations) - 75/12 - 75/11 - 36/64. Junction with 76 Armd Corps will be effected at 36/64.

The Tank Company of 29 P.G. Div is to be pulled out on the 2 June at dusk and brought over to 76 Armd Corps at ref point 36/39 where 76 Armd Corps will take over control of the Company.

The Staff of 4 Para Div with 2 bns and as many artillery troops as possible is to be withdrawn from the front line on the 2/3 June and brought up as early as possible on to the general line 36/22 - 36/39 with its centre on the Via Cassilina so that it may bring to a standstill as far as possible to the East any further advance of the enemy. Rapid frictionless performance of the movements is of decisive importance in order to gain as much ground as possible to the East.

3. It is the task of 76 Armd Corps to impede a breakthrough between the general line 36/64 (junction here with 1 Para Corps) and 67/43. Its centre will be along the Via Cassilina.

The following will be sent up to the Corps during the night of 2/3 June and placed under its command:

(a) Tank Coy, 29 P.G. Div from 1 Para Corps (see para 2)

(b) Field Replacement Bn, 29 P.G. Div from Army to ref point 36/39 then to be taken up by 76 Armd Corps.

(c) Field Replacement Bn, 362 Infantry Div from Army likewise to ref point 36/39, there to be taken up by 76 Armd Corps.

(d) Two newly formed companies of 715 Infantry Div by direct agreement with the latter.

(e) The available tracked infantry of 715 Infantry Division which likewise will be brought up to 36/39 and are there to be incorporated into the two Field Replacement Bns of 29 P.G. Div and 362 Infantry Div.

(f) All available units of 334 Infantry Div which arrive.

4. Above all, deep echeloned anti-tank strongpoints are to be formed to counter the enemy tank thrusts. The employment of all available Engineers for the rapid establishment of minefields is more important than their employment in an infantry role. Every man will defend himself where he is placed as long as he has ammunition and is capable of fighting.

(sgd) von MACKENSEN
(14 Army (Ops) No. 2380/44).

Note + 371 Harko is Cond of 14 Army Artillery.

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31 May 44. TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FROM 14 ARMY (Ops)

TO: 1. 1 Para Corps

2. 76 Armd Corps

3. For information, 371 Harko.

1. The orders of the Corps remain unchanged.

In accordance therewith 76 Armd Corps will surrender on the night of 31/5 - 1/6 at 0000 hours 29 P.G. Div inclusive of all units then under its control to 14 Armd Corps. The new dividing line between 76 Armd Corps and 14 Armd Corps will be the same as the present dividing line between the Hermann Goering Para Armd Div and 29 P.G. Div.

2. On the 1/6 the main task besides the defence of the expected strong enemy attacks with the main thrust between the Alban mountains and the coast, is to clean up at the earliest possible moment the existing breakthrough at the Corps junction between 1 Para Corps and 76 Armd Corps.

To this end I order:

(a) Independently of the Corps boundaries everything must be done by both HQs, the last man and the last available weapon must be directed to the mastery of the position here existing. In such a matter, sector boundaries have no meaning.

(b) It is the job therefore of both HQs to attack along the line of the road 75/26, 75/48 and from the Southwest and/or Northeast in order to close the break in the front and to form a front to the Southeast with a firm union and contact on both sides.

(c) The advanced enemy units in the gap presently existing between the Corps are to be blocked by alarm units etc., After the closing of the gap in the front these units are to be hemmed in and destroyed by a concentric advance.

(d) 76 Armd Corps will support its attack from 75/46 to the Southwest with tanks which will be made available, to which are to be allotted infantry in at least Coy strength. 1 Para Corps will assemble all units available for the attack, most possibly one bn of the Assault Regiment in the area 75/39 in order to thrust in the direction of 75/47. The allotment of some assault guns is to be sought. For the security of the area Northwest and West of M. ARTEMISIO, 76 Armd Corps will employ an Armd Recce Company on the road both sides of 75/22 which by constant patrolling will impede a crossing of the ARTEMISIO by further enemy units. Further a thrust forward by way of 75/22 to 75/26 by further Armd Recce troops is to be carried out in order to secure the road 75/13, 75/26. 2nd Bn 1059 Gr Regiment will be placed under command of 76 Armd Corps and will be employed for the cleaning-up of the breakthrough in 1 Para Corps.

3. A report on the measures undertaken on the basis of this order is to reach me at latest at 0700 hours on 1/6.

(sgd) von MACKENSEN

(14 Army (Ops) No. 2338/44).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 53

OF 12 JULY, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The general withdrawal which began again along the whole front at the end of last month came to a halt about 5 July. At that time enemy resistance stiffened along a general line running from the West coast about 10 Kms N of CECINA, through VOLTERRA to some 4 Kms South of POGGIBONSI, to CIVITELLA R 1528, crossing the CHIANA Valley about 6 Kms S.W. of AREZZO and swinging S.E. along the hills overlooking the valley to M. CASTIGLION MAGGIO R 3221; it then followed a less definite line through the mountains to MONTONE R 6420, GUBBIO R 8419 and reached the Adriatic sector at FILOTTRANO S 4727 and OSIMO S 5833. The enemy has shown every intention of trying to hold along this line and has counter-attacked fiercely every Allied advance. In the West ROSIGNANO Q 1430 was the scene of heavy street fighting for two days until troops of Reichsfuehrer div (16 SS) were finally ejected. VOLTERRA itself was not held, but the enemy was in strength on the commanding hills on either side, and it was only on 9 July that the town was captured. In the face of many counter-attacks by 26 Pz Div Allied forces have now penetrated 9 Kms beyond the town to the West and have reached LAIATICO Q 3537 and are 4 Kms North of CASTELLINA Q 2330. The advance in this sector represents the greatest gain of the past week. Enemy artillery and mortar fire have been heavy in support of counter-attacks, usually put in by about a company of infantry and a few tanks. The fact that hill 380 Q 5831 changed hands four times in one day gives some idea of the stiffness of the fighting, and it was here that as many as 20 tanks were launched in a counter-attack on the evening of 8 July.

Between COLLE d'ELSA Q 6730, scene of more heavy counter-attacks by the enemy, and the Tyrrhenian sea the enemy has made some readjustment of his dispositions. There has been no contact with 19 GAF Div and instead 36 SS P.G.R. and 9 PGR have been identified in the area previously held by the division. It appears therefore that 26 Pz Div has edged West and that the whole of 16 SS Reichsfuehrer is now committed in the line, with both regiments up - earlier reports that there was a third regiment in the division appear to have been correct, but recent prisoners have stated that it has been disbanded to provide reinforcements for 35 and 36 PGRs and in particular to bring the Recce Unit up to strength. The whereabouts of 19 GAF Div are unknown, but it seems very probable that a direct exchange of responsibility with 16 SS Div may have

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been effected, and that it is now combining coastwatching North of LEGHORN with reorganisation after its recent heavy losses. 26 Pz Div, which according to various prisoner statements received about 600 reinforcements (mostly Volksdeutsche) on 24 Jun, is still bearing the brunt of our attack, and elements of 1059 G.R. have made their appearance in its sector, while 2 Bn 1060 G.R. has been identified in 90 P.G. Div's area. (It is now not so certain that these regiments of 92 Div have been broken up as was suggested in last week's summary). East of 26 Pz Div 90 P.G. Div has been involved in the heavy fighting round VOLTERRA, with the remnants of 20 G.F Div (this division has lost heavily), supported by 362 Fusilier Bn on its left. There is no evidence of any other units of 362 Div having been brought down, and the division is still probably reforming in the rear areas. A captured map shows 29 P.G. Div with 1 and 2 Bns 71 P.G.R. in the line West of S. ANDREA Q 6729, with the third bn back covering RACCIANO Q 5934.

East of the POGGIBONSI road to AREZZO the divisions in the line remain the same, reading from West to East, 4 Para Div, said to have been reinforced by 100 Italian Parachutists, 356 Div, apparently on a fairly broad front, Hermann Goering Div, 1 Para, 334 and 15 P.G. Divs. The last four divisions have been very sensitive to any attempt to advance on our part and show no sign of giving up the dominating ground they now hold. On 5 July the parachutists were making preparations to stay for several days and on the 6th showed their intentions were quite clear by asking for more entrenching tools to be sent forward. 1 Bn 4 Para Regt put in a 2 Coy attack on pt 514 R 1125 and succeeded temporarily in retaking the height. 334 Div, which despite recent losses continues to fight well, tried unsuccessfully to recapture TUORI R 1929 on 5 July. The enemy artillery, including 17 cm and Nebelwerfer fire, benefiting from good observation, has been heavier and better coordinated on this front than for some time past. A captured Operation Order of 15 P.G. Div dated 3 July shows the boundary between this Div and 305 Inf Div to run from just West of AREZZO to M. LIGNANO R 2827. In the mountains North of Lake TRASIMENE and West of the Tiber 305 Division, supported by a regimental group of 274 Regt (reduced to two weak Coys according to PW), and 44 Div have been withdrawing without holding any position for long. Prisoners taken on 11 July on M. CIVITELLA R 4325 state that the enemy is withdrawing to route 73. East of the Tiber following the capture of UMBERTIDE we pushed on to reach MONTONE R 6421 on 7 July which was held against several counter-attacks, I Bn 741 G.R. losing the better part of one complete Company in attempts to recapture the village. The enemy reacted strongly to our swift advance to PIETRALUNGA R 7329 and 114 Jaeger Div put in several counter-attacks to retake the village.

On the Adriatic 278 Div has fought hard to retain OSIMO S 5832 and FILOTTRANO S 4727, and only gave up both towns after a bitter struggle. The enemy shows every sign of trying to deny us ANCONA as long as possible and he is still forward of his last remaining line covering the Port, which a captured map shows to run from the sea at S 6543 across to IESI 3937. 278 Div though it has lost heavily (on 5th July 350 PW were claimed and the prisoner total is now not far short of 1,000), has had various additional units under command which accounts for the stiff defence it has put up. 676 Landesschuetzen Bn and 903 Fortress Bn have both been identified by prisoners, and a captured Order shows 924 Fortress Regt to be also under command. Of 71 Div little has been seen, though 211 G.R. lost a prisoner at FILOTTRANO, where the boundary with 278 Div appears to run.

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As long as the enemy considers there is something to be gained by holding South of the Gothic Line he will continue to resist as stubbornly as he is doing at present, in unprepared positions, but on ground of his own choosing. The main factor which must tell in favour of the present policy, however costly, is that it is giving time for the Gothic Line to be developed. Air photographs do not show any very startling progress, though work is going on chiefly in the area North and North East of FLORENCE. How long it will be before the line is ready to be manned is difficult to judge: obviously the officer PW who said that the enemy must hold at all costs South of the line only till 1 July was over-optimistic as to its state of preparedness. Opinions of recent prisoners as to how long the present positions must be held have varied between a week and a fortnight - one week has already elapsed and we have made penetrations at the Western end. The enemy will clearly only go when pushed back and even then will almost certainly try to delay us again before reaching the Gothic Line, probably along the banks of the Arno West of FLORENCE and in the hills N.W. and North of AREZZO.

The other chief factor is reinforcements, for as was pointed out last week the enemy is reduced to the bare minimum. There is a possibility, as yet unconfirmed, that another division in addition to the one reported to have reached Northern ITALY at the end of June, may also be on the way. 103 Recce Unit was apparently unable to find billets just North of BOLOGNA as this area had been reserved by 10 Army for 23 Div. This is the first mention of this div, identified until recently in RUSSIA, and it is possible that there is some confusion with the other unidentified division, which appears to be concentrating just North of GENOA. Reports continue to be received of troops and equipment arriving daily via the BRENNER and TARVISIO but these are probably reinforcements to build up battered formations. Reference has been made to a formation which is being refitted in ROMAGNA, which may well be either 65 or 715 Div, both of which have now been out of the line for some time. In any case these divs as well as 92, 162 and 362 are undoubtedly preparing and reccing positions in the Gothic Line, a task which has presumably also fallen to 3 P.G. Div now that it has been withdrawn. A captured map, undated, shows a concentration area for 29 P.G. Div astride the BOLOGNA-PISTOIA road between VERGATO L 6926 and PORETTA L 5812. Whether this area still holds good remains to be seen, but presumably the enemy formations will take up position in the new line in much the same order from East to West as that in which they withdraw.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

In the past week the most important development has been our success in creating a very pronounced increase in the disruption of the Northern Italian railway system. Blocks have been achieved on the BRENNER route and on at least one of the three lines coming from the North East, and as of 11 July in the general area PISA-GENOA-PIACENZA-VERONA-FERRARA-RIMINI-FLORENCE-PISA there were no less than 60 rail cuts. While this degree of rail interdiction is not to be minimised, it must be remembered that with the rather dense network of lines in Northern ITALY it is extremely difficult to block all lines simultaneously, and without simultaneous and continuous blockage of all lines no immediate effect on the enemy's administrative position can be expected. Thus, while many rail blocks existed on 11 July, there still remained two routes over which the enemy could move through traffic well down towards the FLORENCE area.

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However, what are probably the most vulnerable links in this entire rail system, the Po river bridges, were attacked on 12 July. All rail bridges from PIACENZA, inclusive, East to the Adriatic, with the exception of the one near CREMONA, are thought (PR confirmation is lacking at time of writing) to have been rendered impassable. This, combined with several other cuts in the area MODENA-FIDENZA-PIACENZA-MODENA and between GENOA and SPEZIA, completely isolates, from the point of view of through rail traffic, the forces now falling back on the Gothic line. If we can destroy the CREMONA rail bridge and the road bridges across the Po (some of the road bridges which are part of or very close to the rail bridges have already been destroyed) the consequences may be far-reaching.

Our attacks against enemy fuel supplies, from major installations like PLOESTI to relatively minor dumps in ITALY, continue unabated. While the overall effect of these attacks is difficult to assess, it is apparent that in this theatre, and undoubtedly elsewhere, the immediate effect has been the institution of stringent economy measures which will play a definite part in tactical, and probably strategical, decisions. Our attacks on railway lines further aggravates this situation in compelling the use of M.T.

66 The rail bridge across the PO just South of ADRIA (G 4708) comes to a dead end, a short distance South, at ANANO (M 5397) and is therefore not here included.

RAILWAYS

The main lateral lines of the Northern rail system are the MILAN-VERONA-VENICE line running from East to West and the MILAN-BOLOGNA-RIMINI line running NW-SE. The most important North-South routes are the BRENNER line, which branches off at VERONA with lines running South to BOLOGNA and FLORENCE and Southwest via MANTUA and PARMA to join the West coast railway near SPEZIA, and the lines entering ITALY from the East via TARVISIO, PIEDICOLLE and POSTUMIA, which connect with the MILAN-VENICE lateral line and feed South via FERRARA. In the West the main port, GENOA, is connected by trunk lines with MILAN and the Swiss passes to the North and with TURIN and the Mt CENIS (or MODANE) and RIVIERA lines into FRANCE. These main lines are interconnected with a rather large number of single-track railways. The most vulnerable points in this system are, generally speaking, where they cross the frontier and the Po river.

Air attacks on this system began on 5 July when the bridge over the TAGLIAMENTO at CASARSA, on the main UDINE-TREVISO line was destroyed and the line cut at PORTOGUARO (between POSTUMIA and MESTRE), whilst the MILAN-RIMINI line was blocked S.E. of PIACENZA and at FIDENZA and FORLI; the PARMA-SPEZIA line was blocked at four points. By 10 July the MILAN-RIMINI line was cut in thirteen places, cuts being fairly evenly spaced out throughout the length of the line. The VERONA-BOLOGNA line was blocked North and South of OSTIGLIA (near the Po) and just North of BOLOGNA. The VERONA-PARMA-SPEZIA line was cut South of MANTUA and at eight places between PARMA and SPEZIA. The line connecting BOLOGNA with the N.E. was blocked North of BOLOGNA and both lines from BOLOGNA to FLORENCE via PRATO and PISTOIA were cut. In the N.E. the bridge at CASARSA probably remains cut and in the West the main coastal line is cut at thirteen places between IMPERIA and PISA. Bridges were also demolished North of FIDENZA,

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South of SUZZARA, West of FERRARA and South of RAVENNA, whilst the Mt CENIS line is reported to have been destroyed by guerillas West of TURIN in the VAL DI SUSA. As indicated above the Po river bridges are now also cut.

SHIPPING

Little change is evident in either the East or the West coast shipping picture. Both LEGHORN and ANCONA have now definitely been abandoned. Ships continue to push on as far South as MARINA DI PISA on the West coast; on the East coast most of the shipping appears to be moving no further South than MARINA DI RAVENNA though an occasional move to ports further South is apparent. The West coast ports continue quite active, particularly SPEZIA. Attacks this week have included raids on SESTRI LEVANTE, SPEZIA and MARINA DI PISA on the West coast, while ports attacked on the East coast include MARINA DI RAVENNA, CATTOLICA, PESARO and SENIGALLIA.

3. BALKANS

ALBANIA

Regrouping of Partisan forces continues in the area to the South of VALONA. German troop movements show a steady trend to the North and North East with FLORINA as concentration centre. On 1 July an enemy column made an attempt to reach KORCA N 05 from BERAT M 37 but it was held at DARDHE N 04 where it has since remained. Two German columns were attacked on the TIRANA-ELBASAN-KORCA road and many vehicles were destroyed. It is of interest in connection with this move that the port installations at DURAZZO have been blown up by the Germans who for some time have been saying adieu to the local population. To the South the Germans are stated to have evacuated KONISPOL R 45, DELVINA R 48 and SARANDE R 37 and to be concentrating in DHOLIANA R 87 and DELVINAKION R 78. German troop movements are also reported from LARISSA to SALONIKA. In part these moves may be attributed to normal regrouping after the recent operations but the choice of FLORINA and SALONIKA as concentration centres points to German uneasiness over the Bulgarian situation.

JUGOSLAVIA

Fighting has continued in W. BOSNIA. BOS GRAHOVO P 91 remains firmly in Partisan hands in spite of many counter-attacks by the enemy who employed tanks, arty and mortars. DVAR P 93 has been turned into a German strong point holding some 2,000 troops. Sorties by the enemy from this town in the direction of STRMAJA L 02 were repulsed and heavy losses inflicted. Troop concentrations in the towns and villages on the route South to KNIN U 79 suggests that the enemy is about to make further efforts to re-open the KNIN-GRAHOVO-DVAR - PETROVAC P 95 road. German columns from LJUBIJA L 09 moving South on to SANSKI MOST L 17 suffered heavy casualties on 4 July and were forced to withdraw. Identifications from 373 German Croat Div were obtained in this engagement. In Northern BOSNIA the Partisans captured DERVENTA G 00 (15 Kms S of BROD) but were later forced out by superior German forces from BROD and DOBOJ M 28. The enemy suffered about 500 casualties and lost large quantities of equipment in this engagement. Many important installations were destroyed including the railway station and nine bridges. The town was later bombed by Allied formations with excellent results. In the BIJELOPOLJE H 42 area the Partisans have improved their

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positions and now hold the village of OBROV on the East bank of the river LIM directly opposite BIJELO POLJE. German troop concentrations are reported in PRIJEPOLJE H 46 and GARAZDE B 90 which may portend further enemy thrusts to the South and West.

369 R.U. was in the KALINOVIC R 54 area on 5 July and was pushing East to FOCA with the task, in conjunction with elements of 24 SS Regt, to clear the road to GORAZDE.

In SERBIA a number of minor clashes have taken place. 21 Partisan Div which captured BRUS J 55 last week, has driven the enemy Westwards to a line running roughly North and South about 15 and 33 Kms West of BRUS and KURSUMLIJA J 72 respectively.

A German document giving details of a cover plan has fallen into Allied hands. Formations will be frequently moved, false unit signs and numbers will be displayed and an impression of strength created by deception. The capture of this document throws some light on the spate of confusing reports regarding troop movement which have arrived recently.

Fairly sound sources have reported the setting up of a second MOSLEM SS Div on the lines of 13 SS BH Div at RAJEVO SELO W 94 in the Eastern Sava basin. 13 SS BH Div may well be providing cadres for the formation of the new Div. A Brandenburg Regt is reported to have moved from BOSNIA to the BOS GRADISKA-OKUCANI area on the main ZAGREB-BROD railway. This almost certainly refers to 4 Brandenburg Regt which was previously reported in the vicinity of DRVAR. 55 Cossack Engineer Bn has been identified in SLAVONIA. This probably forms the engineer unit of 1 Cossack Div. It is believed that the main part of 1 Cossack Div is still in the ZAGREB-SISAK area but separate battle groups are operating to the East near OSIJEK. 19 Fort Inf Bn of the 999 series has been identified on MLJET island; two further bns of this series are known to exist. 18 Bn suffered serious casualties in the recent air raids on WIENER NEUSTADT while on route for JUGOSLAVIA while 20 Bn is said to be forming at BAUMHOLDER near FRANKFURT am/m. No further news has been received about the new arrivals in the ZAGREB area but it is evident from reports that a new division is being formed from elements of the cut up CRIMEA Divs.

Coastal Raiding Patrols.

The Coastal Raiding Patrols (Kuestenjagdkommandos) are now known to work in close connection with the enemy intelligence organisation, and in particular 214 Abwehr Tp, HQ SIBENIK, under command of Capt KONRAD. Army units in the area, in this case 264 Div, have to supply men for raiding patrols who act under the guidance and instruction of the Abwehr Sec. Training centres have been set up in each regt sector, namely ZATON for 891 Regt, SIBENIK for 892 and TROGIR for 893. Troops of 369 Div have also been trained. The armament is normal inf with, if necessary, demolition equipment.

The patrols are in the main defensive but in the event of large scale Allied landings Cetniks in Partisan uniform are intended to infiltrate into the beachhead and recce the area for sabotage parties.

GSI(a).
HQ. AAI.
12 July 44.

BRIGADIER, A&Q.
B.G.S.(I).

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OF 19 JULY, 1944.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Three attacks on the left, centre and right of the line which the enemy has been holding so stubbornly have driven him from his delaying positions. APPEZZO was the first bulwark of the line to fall, ANCONA followed and a few hours later American troops entered LEGHORN. The movement of the German reinforcements into ITALY which has so far brought in five fresh divisions since May has been in part reversed and one division is now in process of leaving; but even this minor tribute to the success of the Russian offensive is balanced by the greatly increased arrival of drafts for Kesselring's more battered formations.

On the West coast it is now confirmed that 19 GAF division has been withdrawn and 26 Pz Div has moved West so that its sector is now immediately adjoining that of 16 SS Division. We have not had any contact, either, with 20 GAF Division and in its former sector, East of 90 PG Division, 3 P.G. Division has reappeared in the line after being out for only about a week. It is striking evidence of the fierceness of the fighting in this sector and the extent of German losses that these two divisions, among the most recent arrivals in ITALY, have had to be pulled out; it may well be asked whether the Luftwaffe still disposes of sufficient spare personnel to reform both of them. Apart from these changes the enemy dispositions on the Fifth Army front remain the same and they have been putting up a stiff fight; on the 14th July the French celebrated the fall of the Bastille by capturing the euphonious and strategically important POGGIBONSI, but they were very violently counter-attacked by 4 Para Division and also by 356 Division and the fortunes of the battle appear to have fluctuated sufficiently to cause the Germans to believe, or at least to claim, falsely, that they had recaptured the Southern part of the town. On 18 July a rapid advance was made up to the Arno at PONTEDERA which outflanked LEGHORN. Resistance remained stiff to the West of this salient but the Germans were eventually forced to surrender this vital port.

On 8 Army front enemy dispositions have remained the same with one significant change; Hermann Goering division is leaving or has been withdrawn from the line and replaced by 715 div, prisoners from which were taken on 17 July. There had been plenty of rumours of the relief of Hermann Goering div among prisoners, and MT traffic in the divisional

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rear areas had been heavy but the division was still there, and apparently still fighting on 17 July. The indications are that it is being withdrawn not only from the line but from ITALY and its destination is believed to be the Eastern front. Since the early months of 1943 the Reichsmarshall's own division, then only recently formed, has been engaged in the Mediterranean theatre, in TUNISIA, SICILY and ITALY; with the Russian advance now threatening the very frontiers of the Reich the division is called to a sterner clime; it may yet have the opportunity of defending KARINHALL itself.

The attack on AREZZO on 15 July began with an assault on the two dominating features of M. CAMARCINO and M. LIGNANO; their fall, which was hotly contested, sealed the fate of the town and by the night of 15/16 July, 33 Arty Regt was already moving back up the BIBBIENA axis to the new MLR; that this runs North of the Arno may be judged from the fact that our seizure intact of the bridges at R 221374 by light forces, who overran the German demolitions squad, drew no particular reaction from the enemy. Further to the West 1 Para Div on the night of the 15th was talking of INNSBRUCK and KOHLENKLAU which are probably their names for the IRMGARD and KARIN lines which a captured map from the Goering sector shows as running along roughly the 40 and 45 Northings respectively. The withdrawal apparently came as a surprise to the parachutists at least as on the previous day they had been getting out a "patrolling programme" for the 14th to 22nd July. They have throughout the retreat shown a most aggressive spirit even though Coy strengths have fallen as low as e.g. 62 for 3 Coy 4 Para Regt on 14 July; however if the report of 1,000 parachutists in the FLORENCE area on 12 July is true they may be getting some reinforcements.

East of AREZZO 114 Jaeger Div has extended its front Westward, being relieved by 5 Mtn Div, and now probably has only one bn East of the Tiber. Further East still our attack on ANCONA begun on 17 July made good progress; over 500 prisoners were taken from all units of 278 Div including the C.O. of I Bn 993 and his Bn H.Q. ANCONA fell on 18 July.

There are no new identifications to report from further North; the German division which is said to have arrived in North ITALY still remains anonymous but there are now definite reports of the arrival of the Italian SAN MARCO division, equipped and trained in GERMANY. It is not certain whether the Italians who are reported as collaborating with the Germans in the SAVONA area belong to this division or not. On the East coast there is a report of a German division arriving at PESARO on 13 July; presumably a battered division retiring there to refit. It was reported last week that two divisions were refitting in the ROMAGNA; if one of them, as was then suggested, was 715 Div, it may now have been replaced by another division in need of refitting. A prisoner from I/1059 G.R. shows what is going on in this part of the world; he came from WILDFLECKEN in BAVARIA with a division which was being set up there as a new formation; it was originally intended for the Russian front, or so they judged from the winter equipment with which they were issued, but in the middle of June they were suddenly despatched to the RIMINI-RAVENNA area. Here one regiment was left behind and the other was split into three March Bns and at least the Bn to which he belonged moved South and combined with the remains of I/1059 to bring that unit up to full strength again. The regt which was left behind, and possibly also the other two bns, may well have been used to reinforce 715 Div; deserters from I Bn 735 say that 90% of their bn was composed of men from the WILDFLECKEN division. This supports the idea that the ROMAGNA area is used as a convalescent depot for the resuscitation of battered formations; it has the obvious advantage that divisions reforming there can also be used to protect the Eastern flank of the Gothic Line.

It cannot be long now before we make contact with the Gothic Line, though Kesselring will try to make it as long as possible and will use the line of the Arno to the full as a delaying position. The German withdrawal has been skilfully managed so as to preserve a continuous line and almost all formations are now about equally distant from the sectors they may be expected to occupy in the line. It remains to be seen whether the time gained has resulted in so great an improvement in the defences as to compensate for the losses in men and equipment incurred.

....ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.....

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILWAYS

This week has been notable for the destruction of the PO river bridges by our air attacks which began on 12 July. As of 18 July all of the nine rail bridges from TORREBERETTI (SW of MILAN at J 8122) to the Po delta, with the possible, but doubtful, exception of the OSTIGLIA (F 7512) bridge, were impassable. This degree of destruction built up rather rapidly from apparently only one bridge on the 12th to four on the 13th and by the 16th all but two of the nine mentioned above had been destroyed. As usual our bridge-bombing had been accurate. These bridges are very probably impossible for the enemy to repair owing to their great length of span.

South of the Po no through traffic has been possible across the Appennines throughout the week with the possible exception of one day when the BOLOGNA-PRATO line to FLORENCE may have been open. Exclusive of the destroyed Po bridges there are now, as there were last week, about 60 cuts, many being bridges, in the area FLORENCE-GENOA-PIACENZA-FERRARA-RIMINI-FLORENCE and this condition has remained substantially the same for about the past two weeks. This does not include the line FLORENCE-PISA on which the enemy has executed demolitions. Within this area only between BOLOGNA, OSTIGLIA, FERRARA and RAVENNA will the enemy have been able to use the railways to any appreciable degree and up until recently it is probably in the area encompassed by these towns that he will have had his railheads. His railheads must now be considered as being located North of the Po. However there appears to be some shuttle traffic to the South which the enemy, based on what happened in Central ITALY, is likely to make every effort to continue in order to relieve strain on his MT.

While there are only four rail blocks, all at bridges, North of the Po these have prevented through traffic from MILAN to either the BRENNER or the routes entering ITALY from the North East since 15 July.

SHIPPING

Though ANCONA and LEGHORN had been inactive for at least a week before capture, shipping on the West and East coasts, particularly the former, continues. With GENOA as their port of origin vessels are moving as far South as VIAREGGIO, where three F-boats and two barges were seen on 15 July, but no activity has been noted this week in the Arno estuary, and in view of our advance it is undoubtedly no longer in use. Outside of GENOA, SPEZIA is definitely the most active port; the two KT ships, fourteen F-boats and thirteen supply barges located there on the 17th are typical of the traffic now making use of this port. Some of the small ports between SPEZIA and GENOA are also in use. On the East coast the volume of movement appears quite small and there is essentially no change in the shipping picture here this week.

3. BALKANS

ALBANIA

Following reports of demolitions carried out by the enemy in SARANDE and DURAZZO harbours comes the report that the Southern end of the main jetty at VALONA has been blown up. It is not thought that these demolitions portend an eventual withdrawal by the enemy but may be regarded as a defence measure to prevent port installations falling into the hands of an invading force. Partisan activity has not in any way decreased since the recent German offensive in the South and clashes are reported in the DELVINE R 48 and ARGYROKASTRON M 40 areas. North Eastern ALBANIA, for long a comparatively quiet area, has been the scene of scattered

.....fighting.....

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fighting. Partisan strength has greatly increased by the influx of the brigades which escaped from the South. 1 Partisan Div is stated to have crossed the river Shkumbin and is now operating together with Macedonian Partisans in the area NE of TIRANA.

JUGOSLAVIA

There has been some enemy activity in the Dalmatian islands. 200 enemy troops landed on ULJAN on 9/10 July and are believed to have searched the island for deserters; 400 mixed German and Domobran troops landed on IZ on 10/11 July. Spitfires on patrol attacked this landing and destroyed a siebel ferry and another craft. Allied commandos raided HVAR on the night 11/12 July and withdrew after successfully carrying out their tasks.

On the mainland fighting has centred round GOSPIC P 15 and the Partisan airfield at KRBAVSKO POLJE P 36. The Partisans captured PERUSIC P 16 but were forced to withdraw in the face of powerful enemy reinforcements. The enemy pressed on and later captured the airfield. To the North better success attended the Partisan efforts; DELNICE J 64 RAVNA GORA J 74 and many other villages to the East of FIUME were captured and casualties inflicted on the enemy. LJUBREG A 04 near the Hungarian frontier was entered by Partisans on 6 July but the town was later surrounded by enemy columns from KOPRIVNIKA and the Partisans suffered heavy losses before they were able to break out.

In BOSNIA the Partisans launched a surprise attack on TESLIC M 06 and routed the 6th Domobran Regt. 65 enemy were killed and 350 taken prisoner. Much booty, including two guns and 10 mortars, fell into Partisan hands. The combined German-Bulgarian offensive in the JASTREBAC Mountains appears to have petered out though powerful enemy forces are still concentrated in the area.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Various sources have reported 5 SS Mtn Corps in the OSIJEK area. No report of this HQ leaving the MOSTAR area has been received and the formation in OSIJEK may well be a new Corps HQ designed to control the newly formed Moslem Div and the forces in the SREM. 96 Jaeger Div is reported to be in the ZAGREB area under 69 Corps. It is suggested that this is a mistake for 98 Inf Div which was last identified in the CRIMEA. It is stated that troops of 369 Legion Div wear a badge consisting of three oak leaves on their left sleeves, as well as the red/white chequered Croat shield on the right. If this report is true it may indicate that this formation has been upgraded to Jaeger status. A large German H.Q. has been reported in NAGYATAD in HUNGARY; no clue to its identification has been given. There have been continued reports of troop movements through OSIJEK into HUNGARY but here again no identifications have been made.

BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

GSI(a).
HQ.AAI.
19 July 44.

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO [illegible]

OF 27 JULY, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The impetus of the Polish attack which outflanked ANCONA and threw 278 Division back in considerable confusion carried our Allies well beyond the ESINO river to just South of the MISA. The violence and speed of the attack took the enemy by surprise and reinforcements in the shape of a bn from the Wildflecken Div (the division which supplied a complete regiment around which was rebuilt 715 Div, were hurried in by sea to MARINA S 5149. But even clearer evidence of the enemy's nervousness about this flank was his decision to move part at least of 1 Para Division to the East coast. This division, the most trusted in ITALY, would hardly be switched across unless the enemy appreciated a very real threat in this sector. A deserter from 3 Para Regt who reached our lines on 22 July stated that 1 Para Regt had already left by then, and the regiment has certainly not been identified on its original front since that date. On the 23rd 1 Bn 4 Para Regt instructed one of its companies to send a N.C.O. as guide to the Adriatic. But the move is evidently a slow business because elements of the Regt were still in the line three days later. As yet there is no sign of the third regiment moving. Although the temporary pause in our advance on the Adriatic does not make the transfer of the parachutists a matter of such urgency as at one moment seemed necessary, the relief in the Arno valley in the face of our continuous attacks obviously requires careful tying up and cannot be executed rashly. There is nothing to show that any new troops are taking over, so presumably 334 Division must be side-stepping Westwards into the parachutists' sector as it withdraws up the valley. Though this division is considerably reduced in strength, the enemy presumably appreciates that the formidable hill mass of the PRATO MAGNO which separates 334 Div from 15 P.G. Div withdrawing up the BIBBIENA axis, constitutes a sufficiently strong natural barrier to secure the division's left flank and allow it to take over more ground to the West. Meantime the enemy will probably try to give those units of 1 Para Div which have already been pulled out a much needed rest and hold them back in the PESARO area, only sending them forward if 278 Div shows signs of disintegrating under renewed Allied attacks.

In the mountain sector troops of 5 Mtn Div have been finally driven out of GUBBIO R 8419 and after a stiff fight CITTA DI CASTELLO R 5731 was seized with heavy losses to 114 Jaeger division. From here we have been able to exploit more quickly up the Tiber which broadens out into a plain at this point and are now drawing near SAN SEPOLCRO R 5045

.....from the South.....

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from the South and South West. In the hills North of AREZZO 305 Inf Div has now apparently absorbed into its regiments the oddments of 94 Div which it had under command, and prisoners say that the latter division is now reforming near RAVENNA. In the Arno valley N.W. of AREZZO the enemy has been clinging doggedly to the lines which were named on a captured map IRMGARD and KARIN. On the road to RIBBIENA 15 P.G. division still stands on the former but further West the capture of CASTIGLION R 2140 drove the right flank of the division back to KARIN. The capture of TERRANUOVA R 0543 and S. GIOVANNI R 0044 has likewise pushed 334 and 1 Para Div respectively back to a modified KARIN line, but further West the striding of M.S. MICHELE Q 8943 has punched a hole in this part of the line and the enemy is having to withdraw to the next position called LYDIA, which appears to run West from FIGLINE Q 9650. The attack on M.S. MICHELE apparently struck the divisional boundary between 715 Div and 356 Div. 715 Div which took over from Hermann Goering was thrown into some confusion. It contains only about 10% of the original division and has not made a very good impression on its reappearance.

In the last few days good progress has been made South of FLORENCE and both 356 and 4 Para Divisions have suffered fairly heavy casualties in an attempt to slow up our advance. There was sharp fighting for M. DOMINI Q 8846 and for FABERICA Q 7548, but on the 24th we made deep penetrations into the enemy's delaying positions causing both divisions to fall back during the night. On the 25th opposition was not so severe and our leading troops forced their way to within 10 miles of FLORENCE, destroying three Tiger tanks from 508 Tiger Bn. Tac R at midday saw fires and explosions in the area between FLORENCE and PISTOIA, which suggests that after the heavy fighting of the last few days the enemy may be foreseeing the necessity for a more hasty withdrawal.

On the West coast the enemy has been driven North of the Arno between the mouth of the river and S. MINIATO, Q 4659, and activity is now chiefly confined to patrolling and shelling while both sides regroup for the next stage. The enemy lay-out has altered here for 65 Division has reappeared in the line after an absence of some six weeks. In this time it has been reformed from the OST PREUSSEN Div, apparently another division like Wildflecken which was sent to ITALY late in June to make good some of Kesselring's heavy losses. It is still too early to make any just appreciation of the division's present fighting qualities, but if the recruits are of the same quality as Wildflecken the division stands a good chance of repeating its previous failures and suffering a third disastrous defeat. At the present it is in the line between 16 SS Div, still on the coast, and 26 Pz Div which has shifted East of PONTEDERA. This regrouping has resulted in 90 P.G. Div going into reserve again and it is now located near PRATO Q 6680 where it is available to come to the assistance of 4 Para and 356 Divs if they get into serious trouble.

Of the other divisions drawn out of the line 94 is said to be refitting in the RAVENNA area, and to its South another battered formation (162 and 362 would both qualify) arrived about 13 July to take over from 715 Div. Whichever of these two divisions is not on the East coast is presumably in the central part of the Gothic Line, reforming and assisting in the construction of defences. The two G/F Divs are unlocated, but one at least will be needed for coast watching North of 16 SS Division and the other may be employed in chasing Partisans in the hills behind.

The Fascist radio announced on 25 July that GRAZIANI and MUSSOLINI had recently inspected the Monte Rosa Alpine, the San Marco and the Littorio Divs in Southern GERMANY. Mussolini told the first of these that they would be the first "to see the sky and the sun of the fatherland". The San Marco Div was reported last week as having reached LIGURIA, so that the Monte Rosa Division should also have arrived. If it has been trained, as its name suggests, in mountain warfare it may well move into the Ligurian Alps or the Appennines. There is no news yet of the Littorio Div; but there have been several reports of preparations being made to pass five divisions over the BRENNER and also of Italian troops arriving in the PIACENZA area.

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As there are no signs of any more German formations being sent to Kesselring's assistance all these reports may be connected with the arrival of these Italian formations which have been reformed and trained in GERMANY. To what extent they have been reequipped with modern German weapons, how good their state of training and how reliable their fighting qualities, remains to be seen.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Our air attacks this week have again been directed against the PO River road and rail bridges. One development of importance is the extension of the line of rail interdiction westward to the TURIN area. The two lateral routes connecting MILAN and TURIN with Northeastern ITALY have also been cut.+ These blocks, with others South of the PO, combine to divide Northern ITALY into a number of compartments which, from the point of view of through rail traffic, are inaccessible to each other. It is evident that under these circumstances the enemy is forced to turn to M.T. for the movement of both troops and supplies. However, the PO River presents a barrier to the movement of M.T. as well as trains. All of the PO road bridges (many of which are of pontoon construction and hence easily knocked out) from PIACENZA inclusive to the PO delta are thought to be destroyed. Under these circumstances the enemy must either sail supplies up the river from the sea by boat,ø ferry across the river, repair the old bridges or build new bridges. Information on PO river-shipping is scanty and none is available on ferrying activity; it would appear that no appreciable amount of supplies are being moved by either of these means. On the other hand there has been considerable activity in connection with getting road bridges across the river. (Damage to the rail bridges is, or soon should be, such as to make it impossible to repair them for a matter of months.) Between PIACENZA and the Adriatic activity appears chiefly concentrated from VIADANA (L 2699) Eastward to FICAROLA(L 9998). This is quite logical as it is into this area that the BRENNER railway and the railway lines from the Northeast feed. It is also through this area that supplies from the many dumps in Northeast ITALY (see schematic map of enemy dumps at end of this summary) will move to reach the front. However, with the exception of the OSTIGLIA crossing (F 7411), no bridges appear to have been completed as of 25 July. The situation at OSTIGLIA bridge is rather interesting and appears to be as follows. This is a steel-truss combination road and rail bridge, 1710 feet long with seven spans of 235 feet each (These figures are typical of the main PO bridges and hence their vulnerability; spans of this length over open water require a long time to replace.) The portion of this bridge carrying the road has been destroyed, and while the portion carrying the railway may be passable all rail lines leading to the bridge and its approaches have been blocked. The enemy have therefore converted the rail bridge to a road bridge; on 23 July PR revealed that this improvised road bridge was in use by road traffic.

....The full effect.....

+ That these lateral routes are of importance to the enemy is suggested by the fact on the main MILAN-VERONA line the enemy is attempting to circumvent the broken bridge at DESENZANA (F 2858) by rebuilding a short hitherto-abandoned loop line to the South of DESENZANA.

ø The PO is navigable to 600-ton shallow-draft vessels from the delta to at least as far as its confluence with the MINCIO at F 6314.

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The full effect of this disruption of his L of C is yet to be felt by the enemy. So far there has been no indication that he is running short of supplies, but if he is forced to fight all-out at the front and his dumps South of the PO are subjected to heavy attack a shortage is very likely to develop. Another, and equally important factor, is that when we drive him out of the Gothic line and he is forced to withdraw across the PO it is going to be difficult for him to evacuate any appreciable portion of his heavy materiel across the river.

RAILWAYS

During the past week the air offensive against the North Italian railway system has been successfully maintained. Of the seven bridges over the R. PO between PIACENZA (inclusive) and the ADRIATIC coast, six have been either completely destroyed or continually blocked, and the bridge at OSTIGLIA on the VERONA-BOLOGNA line, which was blocked from 21 to 23 July is now the only one open.

South of the R. PO on the main or PIACENZA-BOLOGNA-RIMINI line four bridges have been destroyed between PIACENZA and PARMA, and one South of FORLI; the line from PARMA to SPEZIA has been cut South of BORGO di TARO and a bridge destroyed at AULLA and both lines South from BOLOGNA, to PRATO and PISTOIA, have remained blocked, the former by a cut North of VADO and the latter by a destroyed viaduct at PITECCIO. A bridge has also been destroyed between CASALMAGGIORE and PARMA, and another at SABBIONETTO on the loop line from REGGIO EMILIA to MODENA, whilst the track was cut at CARPI on the MODENA-MANTOVA line. No through traffic across the Appennines has therefore been possible.

North of the PO bridges have been destroyed at DESENZANO on the main line West from VERONA, just North of MANTOVA blocking the lines to PESCHIERA and VERONA and between MANTOVA and CREMONA. Tracks have been destroyed East of MANTOVA, at ROGARA, LEGNAGO and South of MANTOVA. This damage has blocked all routes of access to the OSTIGLIA bridge and prevented any through East-West traffic.

In the NE the bridge over the R. TAGLIAMENTO at CASARSA destroyed some time ago, probably remains cut. In the North West a bridge over the PO at BOFFALORA has been destroyed blocking the main MILAN-GENOA line, and another at VALENZA on the NOVARA-ALESSANDRIA line. The lines connecting GENOA and TURIN have been blocked by the destruction or blocking of bridges at ASTI, ALBA, OVADA and South of ALESSANDRIA; and a bridge has been blocked at CHIVASSO between TURIN and MILAN. Partisans in NW ITALY have also been active of late against rail communications and have succeeded in closing the MONT CENIS pass for considerable periods.

On the Coastal route into FRANCE a bridge has been destroyed West of ARENZANO, between GENOA and SAVONA, and another at IMPERIA. Further East between GENOA and SPEZIA there were reports that the line was open about 23 July, but this is doubtful. In any event PR of the 25th showed five bridges out on this stretch.

SHIPPING

There is no change in the shipping situation this week.

INSTALLATIONS

At Appendix "A" is a map showing the general lay-out of enemy fuel and ammunition dumps.

Of the fuel dumps, two-fifths are concentrated in the area East of PIACENZA and South of the R. PO where they are dispersed along the roads and railways giving access to the Gothic Line along the general line of the

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
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
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RAILWAYS
NORTH ITALY

II=BLOCKED
I=BELIEVED BLOCKED

SCALE: 1:1,000,000
1 INCH = 15.78 MILES
O.S.I.A(5) A.A.I.

BRA
ACQUI
NOVI LIGURE
ARQUATA SCRIVIA
OVADA
BETTOLA
FOSSANO
CUNEO
GENOA
FORNOVO
BORGO
PONTREMOLI
RECCO
CHIAVARI
SAVONA
SESTRI LEVANTE
SARZANA
SPEZIA
MONTEROSSO
AULLA
MASSA
TENDA
ALBENGA
LOANO
BREIL
VENTIMIGLIA
IMPERIA
TAGGIA
RIVIERA
VIAREGGIO
LUCCA
PISA
LEGHORN
EMPOLI
PONTEDERA
COLLE SALVETTI
VADA
CECINA
VOLTERRA
CERTALDO
POGGIBONSI
SIENA
FLORENCE
PONTASSIEVE
RIGNANO
INCISA
S. GIOVANNI
MONTEVARCHI
BUCINE
INDICATORE
AREZZO
REGGIO EMILIA
SASSUOLO
DECIMA
BOLOGNA
BUDRIO
PORTO MAGGIORE
PORTO GARIBALDI
LAVEZZOLA
LUGO
RAVENNA
PRADURO
VADO
IMOLA
FAENZA
FORLI
VERGATO
GRIZZANA
BRISIGHELLA
PORRETTA
CASTIGLIONE
MARRADI
VERNIO
PITECCIO
VAIANO
BORGO S. LORENZO
PISTOIA
PRATO
S. MARIA
NOVAFELTRIA


8° 30' 9° 30' 10° 30' 11° 30' 12° 30

Appendix "A" to HQ AAI
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PIACENZA-BOLOGNA-RIMINI railway, and at the main ports of intake, SPEZIA on the West coast and RAVENNA on the Adriatic. There are also a certain number of fuel dumps in the vicinity of FERRARA the first junction South of the PO on the main railway line from the NE, and a couple on each of the main roads over the APPENNINES from BOLOGNA to FLORENCE and PISTOIA. Of the remaining three-fifths of the enemy's fuel dumps the majority are situated North of the PO where they are scattered along the roads entering ITALY from the North and NE and the roads giving access to the PO bridges, with a concentration at VENICE from where fuel is carried by sea to RAVENNA. In the West in addition to the dumps supplying traffic on the roads in the MILAN and TURIN area, there is a concentration in the GENOVA, AQUI, ALESSANDRIA area from which fuel is probably shipped to SPEZIA via GENOVA and SAVONA.

Of the ammunition dumps only a quarter are situated South of the PO most of which are concentrated near the railways converging on BOLOGNA, with a group at SPEZIA and one or two near PIACENZA and South of PARMA. The great majority of the ammunition dumps are situated North of the R. PO and East of a line PIACENZA-MILAN and these can be roughly divided into two main groups, one in the NE where the dumps are dispersed along the system of railway lines linking TARVISIO and PIEDICOLLE with VERONA in the centre and BOLOGNA in the South, the other in the North where the dumps are dispersed along the main BRENNER line between BOLZANO and VERONA and the lines giving access to the PO South and West of VERONA. There is also a group of ammunition dumps in the ALESSANDRIA, GENOA, SAVONA area which probably supply troops on the Riviera Coast and a number North of MILAN which probably supply forces in that area.

In conclusion it would appear that the enemy has concentrated his forward dumps to the South of the R. PO. In the case of fuel the policy seems to be to concentrate the main dumps as far forward as possible leaving North of the PO only those necessary for maintenance of L.T. movement in that area. Fuel for the forward dumps is presumably brought direct from the REICH, in bulk; in any event it is apparent that the enemy does not maintain large fuel reserves in ITALY. A large ammunition reserve has, however been built up in the North and NE. In either case the complete dislocation of the PO bridges, both road and rail, as has been achieved of late, will make it extremely difficult for the enemy to replenish his forward dumps especially if these should suffer to any large extent from air attacks, and dislocation of the railways North of the PO would further aggravate the fuel supply situation as this would necessitate the formation of new dumps and breaking of bulk much further North. It is not thought that the enemy could move enough fuel by sea to make any appreciable difference to the situation.

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C.R.M.Wood

G.S.I.(a)
HQ, A.A.I.
27 Jul 44

BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

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OF 2 AUGUST, 1944.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has been little change on either of our coastal flanks this week and the main centre of interest remains in the FLORENCE area. Here the enemy is resisting with great stubbornness and, no doubt appreciating that our assault across the Arno will wait until FLORENCE falls, he has strengthened his forces in this sector at the expense of his lines further West. Whether he will treat FLORENCE as an open city when driven back on to it remains to be seen, though he is apparently treating it as such now, but he is obviously determined to make us pay as heavily as possible now for an eventual unopposed entry. Behind the front there have been no changes of interest but the departure of Hermann Goering Div can scarcely be regarded as adequately compensated by the arrival of a further Italian Division and the "Government troops of the Protectorate of BOHEMIA and MORAVIA".

Along the Arno from the mouth as far as MONTELUPO, Q 6065, there has been no noteworthy activity. An interesting identification in this area was provided by prisoners from II Bn 956 G.R. at Q 466628 which apparently puts their regt under command of 26 Pz Div. It is clear that 362 is not operating as a division. Further East all interest has centred on the defence of FLORENCE. Previously this had been entrusted to 356 and 4 Para Divs but on night 26/27th 29 P.G. Div moved Eastwards to meet our attack on the city from the South West. 71 P.G.R., the regt first engaged, moved its H.Q. to Q 7363, with I Bn at Q 7261 and II Bn at Q 7560. 3 P.G. also shifted its right boundary Eastwards to about the 66 Easting but its left boundary, according to prisoners, still remains on the 47 Easting, well West of EMPOLI. 3 P.G. is therefore well stretched; if danger threatened in this area it might be necessary to re-commit 90 P.G. division whose H.Q. appears to be somewhere in the PRATO area. However, at the expense of the weakening of the front, the defence of FLORENCE has been strengthened and much weight has been taken off 4 Para Div. 12 Para Regt bore the brunt of the defence for the early part of the week but appears to have been relieved on 31 July. Some of 11 Para Regt was back in the line by 30 July and on the same day we had prisoners from 10 Para Regt at Q 782589 who said they had just come back in again. The frontage of the division remains about the same, however, at not much more than a regimental frontage. 356 Div on its left has not had so hard a time.

Further East 1 Para Div has now finally left the line. Presumably,

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as stated by prisoners, it has gone to the Adriatic coast area and there are indications that I Para Regt at least is not far in rear of the present front line there, perhaps already in the Gothic positions. General Heidrich gave a farewell party on 28 July at REGGIO which was [illegible] by Desert Air Force with results as yet unknown.

The arrival of the Italian Monterosa Alpine Division, foreshadowed by Mussolini's recent speech, has been reported from several sources this week. Like the San Marco Division referred to in I.S. No. 55 it appears to be destined for LIGURIA but further East than its sister formation. On 23 July it was reported as moving through BRONI, STRADELLA and VOGHERA (these are all stations South of the Po in the area South of PAVIA and East of ALESSANDRIA) and on 27 July Italian Alpine troops were reported as replacing German units in CARISCO (P 2839) which is just inland from CHIAVARI. The last location we had for San Marco was in the SAVONA area so it looks as though we have San Marco West of GENOA, then 42 Jaeger Div in GENOA itself, Monterosa East of GENOA and 135 Fortress Bde in between German formations in a manner reminiscent of standard German practice in AFRICA, leaving the two most important sectors, the ports of GENOA and SPEZIA, in wholly German hands.

A possibly less reliable addition to the German forces in North ITALY was reported by a recent deserter. According to him the entire Armed Forces of the Protectorate of BOHEMIA and MORAVIA, known as the REGIERUNGSTRUPPEN BOHMEN-MAEHREN, were transferred from the Protectorate during May and are now employed on L of C duties, especially the protection of railway communications. They number some 7,000 men, all Czechs by nationality and race, and are organised in twelve battalions. They wear Czech uniform, have no heavy weapons and are not motorised. For the duties for which they are intended they are probably useful and reliable enough and will release badly needed Germans; in spite of skilfully directed propaganda by perhaps the ablest of the émigré governments the Czechs during the war have in general collaborated with the Germans without giving much trouble.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

That the general dislocation of the North Italian railways and the destruction of both road and rail bridges over the Po is having a definite effect on the enemy supply situation is now evident. Despite every effort at repair, all the railway bridges over the Po except two far to the West, and all the road bridges East of PIACENZA are still impassable, and the enemy is being forced to rely on ferry boats and pont on bridges which are cut in half and hidden along the banks of the river by day. North of the Po the widespread cutting of bridges is causing increased use of MT for ferrying purposes and long detours are often necessary. In one case it has been reported that ammunition going South from MILAN had to be transferred to MT at PAVIA and make a 12½ mile detour to BRONI (K 2819) on the VOGHERA line so as to by-pass the demolished bridge North of BOTTARONE. Another report states that a party of Italian soldiers travelling South from the BRENNER detrained at PESCHIERA, crossed Lake GARDA by ship, entrained again at LONATO and proceeded via BRESCIA, BERGAMO and MILAN to CODOGNO where they detrained, crossed the Po and continued their journey by MT. PW have reported a three day rail hold-up on the BRENNER. South of the Po very little attempt is being made at repairing damaged rail communications and MT now appears to be the main means of transport.

If the present advanced state of dislocation of the railway system North of the Po can be maintained it will cause the enemy to rely more and more on MT and make him use up fuel and tyres he can ill afford to expend, whilst the continued blocking of the Po bridges will make it extremely difficult for him to replenish his forward dumps, especially if these should suffer to any extent from air attack or sabotage. Another probability is that the enemy will attempt to make much more use of the inland waterways, and small cargo carrying craft have already been seen on the river Po as far West as PIACENZA. There are several navigable rivers in North

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and NE ITALY, and it is possible to sail 600 ton vessels up the Po as far as PIACENZA, and up the R. Mincio to MANTUA. The R. Adige will take 300 ton vessels as far as LEGNANO.

RAILWAYS

The air offensive against the Po bridges and other North Italian railway targets has continued successfully throughout the past week. Since 26 July all the railway bridges over the Po East of, and including, the one at TORREBERRETTI (J 7720) have been continually impassable, except for the one South of MANTUA which was not out on 28 and 29 July during which period, however, the track was blocked immediately South of the bridge.

North of the R. Po the line West from VERONA is blocked by demolished bridges at PESCHIERA, MONTEBELLUNA K 6668 (between ROVATO and TREVIGLIO) and at K 5067 (West of TREVIGLIO). Bridges are also down at CREMA on the TREVIGLIO-CREMONA line and at F 2520 on the MANTUA-PIADENA line, and tracks cut North of ROVIGO, at LEGNANO, NOGARA and North of MANTUA.

South of the river the main PIACENZA-BOLOGNA-RIMINI line is blocked by demolished bridges SE of PIACENZA at K 6711, at FIDENZA, West of MODENA at L 4667 and SE of FORLI at M 4715; whilst the track is cut five miles West of PARMA and the bridge at SASSUOLO on the REGGIO EMILIA-MODENA loop-line remains impassable. The line from PARMA to SPEZIA is blocked in several places between FORNOVO and BORGO DI TARO, and the bridges at FORNOVO and AULLA are both impassable. Both lines South from BOLOGNA remain blocked, the one to PISTOIA by two demolished viaducts at PIEVECCIO and the one to PRATO by cut tracks at L 8128. There is also a bridge down at L 8050 on the BOLOGNA-VERONA line, and several blocks between PARMA and CASALMAGGIORE.

West of PIACENZA the bridge at K 5616 remains impassable, bridges are also cut at TORTONA where the line SW from PAVIA branches West for ALESSANDRIA and South for GENOA, at J 9971, on the GENOA-ALESSANDRIA main line, North of OVADA, at ASTI, ALBA and VILLA FRANCA D'ASTI (J 2819), whilst the approaches to the Po bridge at CAVASSO are cut; the track is also cut at BAFFALORE between NOVARA and MILAN and at CEVA on the line running West from SAVONA. On the main Riviera coast line there are four bridges down between GENOA and SPEZIA, one at IMPERIA and one at ONEGLIA.

Partisans too have been active again this week in many parts of North ITALY, and reports have been received of sabotage to a bridge at IVREA (J 2171) and to the SIMPLON, CORTINA-DORBIACO, UDINE-TREVISO and PADUA-VICENZA lines.

SHIPPING

Owing, probably, to the extensive dislocation of the railways, the enemy appears to be trying to step up his coastal shipping. On the West coast SPEZIA continues to be the main port of intake and there is a lively traffic in coastal craft, including KT ships, between this port and GENOA. A number of lighters and landing craft are also being sailed as far South as VIAREGGIO where they are unloaded on to the beaches.

On the East coast VENICE and PORTO MARGHERA are being served by a number of medium M/Vs which make a daily run from TRIESTE, and a 10,000 ton tanker has also recently made this trip. From VENICE and PORTO MARGHERA cargoes are sent South in landing craft and lighters to RAVENNA and CORSINI or other small ports in that area, and up the R. Po to unloading points as far West as PIACENZA.

3. FRANCE

(a) NORMANDY

The American attack launched on the 25 July with strong armoured

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support between PERIERS and ST LO broke through the German positions, and has led to the collapse of the enemy's left flank during the past week. "Deeper penetrations" as the German communiqué puts it, have been effected throughout the week. On the West coast we have now reached the base of the CHERBOURG peninsula with the capture of AVRANCHES and are reported to have crossed the river Selune at DUCEY 6 miles to the S.E. The enemy's lack of adequate armoured forces on the Western flank to meet our attack has cost him dear. The prisoner bag since the start of the attack is now reported to be some 18,000 and mopping up still continues. Very heavy losses in equipment have also been suffered and one road South of COUTANCES is reported to be almost impassable owing to the quantities of destroyed enemy transport littering it. Four divisions - 3 Para, Pz Lehr, 353 Inf and 17 SS P.G. (GÖTZ von BERLICHINGEN) have been virtually destroyed (the latter's iron hand thereby doubtless greatly softened), while 243, 91 and 77 Inf Divs who escaped with remnants from the CHERBOURG peninsula last month, have by now shrunk still smaller. The reference in the German communiqué of 31 July to SS tank units fighting their way out from SOURDEVAL W of PERCY suggests that 2 SS Pz Div, probably the best armoured formation in this sector, has also not escaped unscathed.

While our advance down the West coast has been headlong, resistance has been stiffer further East. To the West of TESSY, 2 Panzer Div and 116 Panzer Div have been identified. The latter comes from the BEAUVAIS area North of the Seine and was identified for the first time on 30 July. Its tardy arrival at the front is hardly likely to retrieve the present situation. NE of TESSY and W of CAUMONT enemy resistance continues to be fierce and 3 Para Div in this sector has been fighting hard.

In the CAUMONT sector, the British attack was initially delayed by extensive minefields but progress has since been very rapid. We have taken Hill 303, 5 miles South of CAUMONT, thereby cutting the CAEN-AVRANCHES road and are firmly established there despite enemy counter-attacks. W of Hill 303 our armour has made considerable progress to the South and is now reported to be 9 miles South of CAUMONT. East of CAUMONT the week has been fairly quiet apart from a few local German counter attacks. 276, 277, 271 Inf Divs and 10 SS Pz Div have all been identified in the area between VILLERS BOCAGE and the river Orne. Up to 31 July there was no sign of any enemy withdrawal in this area.

In the CAEN sector bad weather following the Canadian attack of last week enabled the enemy to do some minor reshuffling and gave him an opportunity of recuperating from his losses in the recent attacks. In the past few days he has been more aggressive and has made several local counter-attacks without regaining any of the ground he has lost. On one occasion elements of both 1 SS and 9 SS Pz Divs took part in a counter-attack without gaining any ground.

Further reinforcements for the battle area may still be on the way. 363 Inf Div, recently arrived in BELGIUM from DENMARK, is now reported moving South into FRANCE, and may be destined for the front. This if it arrives will be the third contribution to the battle made by forces from 15 Army, North of the Seine, during the past fortnight, 326 Inf and 116 Pz having already arrived. It seems likely that the enemy now appreciates the danger of a further Allied landing North of the Seine to have decreased, and in any case, 15 Army is in future likely to have to bear the brunt of the demands for fresh formations for the battle area. 2 Para Div from BRITTANY is another possible arrival, and according to the German radio 5 Para Regt has already distinguished itself in battle. Northward movement from the South of FRANCE may now [illegible] Blaskowitz too has to make further contributions to meet the expenses of the 7th Army.

(b) SOUTH OF FRANCE

Reports of Northward movements from the TOULOUSE-BORDEAUX area may concern either 11 Pz or 9 Pz Divs or both. 11 Pz is reported to have received some heavy tanks and is more likely to be battleworthy than 9 Pz which may

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still be partly occupied with the Maquis in HAUTE SAVOIE. Until further confirmation is received the Divs will still be carried at BORDEAUX and the Rhone estuary areas respectively. The enemy still has 12 Divs South of the line LYONS-BORDEAUX as follows:

Panzer	-	2	(9 Pz RHONE Estuary with possibly elts in HAUTE SAVOIE. 11 Pz East of BORDEAUX)
Infantry	-	12	(242 Inf TOULON 244 Inf MARSEILLES 338 Inf ARLES with elts possibly between LYONS and AVIGNON 198 Inf NARBONNE 716 Inf PERPIGNAN 708 Inf BORDEAUX
Training	-	4	(148 Trg NICE 157 Trg HAUTE SAVOIE 189 Trg Central PYRENEES 159 Trg S of BORDEAUX

(o) GENERAL

The nominal total for enemy divisions in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES is now 65. The Russians report that elements of 19 Pz Div have been identified on the Eastern front but until this is confirmed it will still be carried in HOLLAND. The 65 Divs consist of:

12	Pz or SS Pz
1	SS P.G.
4	Para
41	Inf and GAF
7	Training
65	

H. R. Butler Brad
Lt. Col.
for BRIGADIER,
B.G.S. (I).

GSI(a)
HQ. AAI.
2 Aug 44

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Headquarters,
A.A.I. (Adv).

AAI/1051/6/GSI(a)

3 Aug 44

AMENDMENT TO H.Q. A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 56

DATED 2 AUGUST, 1944.

Page 1 - amend Para 2 line 10 for ~~right~~ boundary read left:
" 11 for left boundary read right.

Page 2 - amend last three lines 2nd para to read:

"East of GENOA and 135 Fortress Bde in the SPEZIA area. Thus Italian divisions are sandwiched between German formations in a manner reminiscent of standard German practice in AFRICA, leaving the two most important sectors, the ports of GENOA and SPEZIA, in Molly German hands".

Page 5 - line 7. Amend total Infantry divisions to read 6.

Page 4 - Line 12. Amend 5 Para to read 5 Para

W. Stanley Tomb
Lt-Col
D.A.&Q.M.G. (I).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 57

OF 16 AUGUST, 1944.

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(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hours of receipt.

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NOTE: NO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY WAS ISSUED ON 9 AUGUST.

1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has been no major change in the enemy lay-out over the past two weeks and fifteen, possibly sixteen, divisions are still disposed in the line. The doubtful runner is 29 P.G. Division which as the enemy withdrew on FLORENCE was gradually squeezed into a narrower and narrower sector. With 4 Para Division sitting behind the Mugnone Canal and watching most of the Northern exits from FLORENCE as far West as the 75 Easting, and 3 P.G. Division stretching as far East as the 71 grid at least, the division's front is reduced to a few thousand yards. No prisoners have been taken from 29 P.G. Division recently, and it is quite possible that 3 P.G. Division is in fact 4 Para Div's right neighbour, and that 29 P.G. Div is resting and refitting behind in the PRATO area. To assist 3 P.G. Div hold a long front, one regiment from 362 Div - 956 G.R. - has been placed under command and it was a bn of this regiment which was driven out of EMPOLI five days ago and forced to withdraw to the North bank of the Arno leaving a few snipers and machine gun nests behind. West of here, despite heavy losses over the past two months, is still 26 Pz Div, and the policy with this division appears to have been to feed it with a constant stream of reinforcements (and it has had more than most divisions) without taking it out of the line. Recently only one of its regts has been forward - 9 P.G.R. - and evidence shows that it was being relieved on night 13/14 by 67 P.G.R. which has presumably been refitting. Under command of 26 Pz Div is the Infantry Lehr Bde or Regt, which fought at ANZIO under the name of 309 Inf Lehr Regt. 16 SS Reichsfuehrer is still on the coast.

The old city of FLORENCE is now clear of parachutists, who have withdrawn behind the Mugnone Canal. From here they make

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occasional raids supported by a couple of tanks to beat up the Partisans who control that part of FLORENCE which lies North of the old city and South of the canal. The burden of feeding the population of the city and the irritation of constant Partisan attacks were presumably the main reasons which made the enemy decide to pull back from the Northern banks of the Arno. He left behind a considerable number of snipers, mostly Fascist, to harrass our troops and to engage the Partisans in internecine strife. But despite an Allied announcement that we have only sent across the Arno sufficient troops to maintain order and supervise the distribution of food, the parachutists are apprehensive, and fire at the slightest movement in the streets approaching the canal. 356 Inf Div on their East flank (a captured map shows the inter-divisional boundary to run through FIESOLE North to FIRENZUOLA) has also withdrawn about one kilometre from the banks of the Arno to the hills beyond, where its anxiety is shown by instructions to forward units to take prisoners for identification.

On the BIBBIENA axis our capture of M. GRILLO R 2346 on 7 Aug provoked violent counter-attacks from 15 P.G. Div which was stiffened by 305 Recce Unit and I/578 G.R. It is not clear whether the appearance of these two units in 15 P.G. Div's sector was necessitated by our threat to the enemy positions, or whether in fact 305 Div was beginning to side-step Westwards. There are slender grounds for supposing the latter might be the case - 114 Recce has been identified West of its divisional sector and two bns of 104 G.R. (15 P.G. Div) were switched West late last month to assist 715 Inf Div. They have not reappeared in 15 P.G. Div's sector nor have they been identified in the PONTASSIEVE area since they were driven off pt 558 Q 8866 on 8 August. Prisoners taken on that occasion had heard the rumour that the division was transferring to the Adriatic. Rumours have often had more than a grain of truth lately (the prisoner from 1 Para Div forecasts his division's move to the Adriatic correctly), and certainly at this point the enemy must try to rest his Panzer Grenadiers and if possible to form a mobile reserve for each Army. The Tac/R report on 15 Aug of 15 M.T. including 4 towing guns, moving North along the new road from STIA R 1570 to S. SOFIA R 3286 (15 P.G. Div's axis) may be a pointer as to the enemy's intentions with regard to this experienced division.

At least one other mobile division (90 P.G.) and possibly a second (29 P.G.) are out of the line. 90 P.G. Div's activities are fogged, perhaps deliberately, by the enemy. Last heard of near PRATO at end of July, by the 27th it was reported resting West of BOLOGNA bound, so it was said, for GERMANY. A deserter from 200 G.R. said that when he left his Regt on the 3rd it was at PRATO under orders to move to REGGIO EMILIA. The following day transport bearing the div sign was reported moving West from PIACENZA towards ALESSANDRIA carrying some 1,500 troops. A further report of doubtful reliability mentions an "armoured division" in the TURIN area moving on the 4 August into FRANCE down the DURANCE Valley leading to the Rhone Valley at AVIGNON. These facts are not necessarily all related and the evidence is inconclusive: what is clear is that the division has been out of the line 3-4 weeks, during which time it must have been at least in part brought up to strength and re-equipped. The new landing in the South of FRANCE may lead the enemy to appreciate that the main schwerpunkt in the Mediterranean has been shifted to the RIVIERA from ITALY, but it is clear that 90 P.G. had not moved at least by 16 Aug.

On the Adriatic, where the enemy had withdrawn some three miles behind the Misa by the 4 August, 278 Div was again bounced back by a Polish attack on the 9th and 10th August and forced to withdraw beyond the Cesena river. In this successful opration prisoners

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were taken from not bns of 278 Div, and also from 914 Assault Gun and 242 Assault Gun Bde. We are now across the river in contact across the road which runs from the coast S 3064 to MONTEPORZIO S 2356.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.

To date there has been no direct information covering the effect of the cutting of the Po river bridges on the enemy supply situation. It is known that at many points along the river the enemy is getting supplies across by night using ferries and pontoon bridges. He has had a rail bridge in operation just North of FERRARA for about the past week. South of the river, while a number of rail cuts exist, there is a considerable amount of open trackage and PR has shown trains to be active in this area; if the events in central ITALY are any criterion we can be certain that this area will be used by the enemy to move supplies well forward by train. No doubt the situation is causing him some anxiety and according to hearsay a German General stated that the question of supply was "serious". However, the probabilities are that current supply requirements South of the river, estimated as not in excess of 2500 tons a day, are being met. When the front becomes more active the picture is likely to be quite different and when the time comes for the enemy to withdraw across the PO he will undoubtedly find himself in an extremely difficult position.

RAILWAYS.

Owing to lack of photo cover it is not possible to give a consecutive picture of the state of the North Italian railway system during the past two weeks. At present however, it is known that all rail bridges over the R. PO East of (and including) the one at TORREBERETTI are still impassable except the one at PONTELAGOSCURO. This bridge, which was blocked on 3 Aug but open by the 8th or shortly before, is most important to the enemy as it is on the direct line from BOLOGNA to PADUA and affords an outlet to the BRENNER via VICENZA and VERONA and to the NE via TREVISO and UDINE. North of the PO the only certain interdiction at present is the destroyed bridge East of MANTUA on the MANTUA-NOGARA line.

South of the river on the PIACENZA-BOLOGNA-RIMINI line a bridge is believed to be impassable at FIDENZA and another between REGGIO EMILIA and MODENA. Tracks have been cut at FAENZA, and the bridge is down at SASSUOLO on the REGGIO EMILIA-MODENA loop-line. The PARMA-SPEZIA and PARMA-GENOA lines are still believed to be impassable. A bridge has been destroyed on the BOLOGNA-PRATO line and another on the line running NE from BOLOGNA to OSTIGLIA. The line from BOLOGNA South to PISTOIA is probably open for most of its length.

West of PIACENZA on the line to ALESSANDRIA and TURIN bridges at K 5616, TORTONA, ASTI and J 2810 are still believed to be impassable. Bridges are probably still impassable at RONCO SCRIVA between GENOA and NOVI, at OVADA NW of GENOA, at ALBA on the line running SW from ALESSANDRIA and at CEVA on the SAVONA-TURIN line. The RIVIERA line is still believed to be blocked by destroyed bridges at ALBENGA, IMPERIA and BORDIGHERA. Owing to lack of PR these blocks are of doubtful certainty.

SHIPPING.

On the West coast traffic continues rather heavy between GENOA and SPEZIA. The amount of supplies being brought South is somewhat problematical in view of a very reliable report of the evacuation of munitions from SPEZIA to GENOA. Since SPEZIA was heretofore a base

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for naval operations and rests on the Western flank of the Gothic line it is quite probable that at least naval supplies have already been moved North. No information is available on what is coming South, but it is not unlikely that an appreciable percentage of cargoes is made up of fortification materials for the Gothic Line.

Along the Adriatic the PORTO CORSINI-RAVENNA canal remains the most active unloading area, though the Po river and inland canals appear to be assuming increasing importance, owing no doubt to the destruction of the Po river bridges. Ground sources report ships moving by canal from GRADO (45577) and VENICE down to CHIOGGIA from which they may continue South by sea or inland waterways. That South-moving shipping originates at VENICE is well known and it is probable that some also comes South from GRADO in view of the dumps in that area. Though PR has picked up barges on the Po as far West as PAVIA it does not appear that any appreciable number from and to the sea move any further Westward than FERRARA. In the FERRARA area PR confirms that barges move up the Po to PONTELAGOSCURO (M 1191) South down the canal to FERRARA and then along the Po di VOLANO running East and West just South of FERRARA. Recent attacks on canal locks should stop or at least restrict this canal traffic.

3. FRANCE

Allied troops began landing operations in the area East of TOULON early on 15 August.

In NORMANDY the main development during the past week has been the capture of LE MANS and the subsequent drive Northwards to ARGENTAN which threatens to encircle the German forces in the great pocket between MORTAIN and ARGENTAN. At the time of writing the gap between the Canadians advancing Southwards on FALAISE and the Americans coming Northward from ARGENTAN is reported to be about 12 miles. The enemy is fighting a fierce delaying action around ARGENTAN to cover the withdrawal of his forces along the secondary roads running through this gap.

The rapid American advance East from NANTES and ANGERS left the German left flank with virtually no troops capable of checking our advance. A hurried reshuffling on the front itself coupled with a substantial reinforcement of the German Seventh Army from other areas of FRANCE resulted. The enemy clearly decided that the NORMANDY front, facing a major and present crisis had to have priority over all other areas where Allied landings might take place in the future. Neglecting the area South of the LOIRE, now almost devoid of troops, he started to reinforce in the LE MANS sector. On the left flank, 9 Pz and 708 Inf Divisions from the South of FRANCE, and 84 Inf Division from the ATHENS area were put in between MAYENNE and LE MANS. In general enemy dispositions here are extremely confused and probably no divisional sectors, as such, exist. North of ARGENTAN we have had IW from 21 Pz, 2 SS Pz, 17 SS P.G. Pz Lehr and 3 Para Divs. Further reinforcement of the German left flank is to be expected and it is reported that 158 and 159 Res Divs (the former now upgraded to 16 Inf Div) are on the way from the Atlantic coast, while captured documents suggest that 6 Para Div may be moving Westwards into the battle. Despite all the reinforcements received, the line from MORTAIN Southeastwards still lacks any sort of cohesion however, and the enemy has been unable to do more than form local strongpoints to check our advance.

While on his left flank the enemy has been putting in divisions piecemeal in the hope of obtaining some sort of stable line, in the centre and on his right flank the situation has been more in hand and

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he has at least been able to prevent any breakthrough. After the failure of the counter-attack at MORTAIN, the enemy began withdrawing under pressure from the MORTAIN-VIRE salient and resistance is reported to be decreasing rapidly E of MORTAIN as the Germans pull out. All along the line from VIRE to the sea, on the Northern side of the pocket, resistance has been fierce with the enemy only giving ground when forced. There has been considerable reinforcement of the area between VIRE and the ORNE. 331 Inf Div from the LILLE-PAS DE CALAIS area has been identified S of VIRE while 9 and 10 SS Pz Divs, 21 Pz Div and elements of 1 SS Pz Div have all shifted West from the CAEN sector. This has left the CAEN area dangerously thin in armour which in part accounts for the initial success of our drive down the CAEN-FALAISE road. A thickening up in infantry, if not in armour, has ensued however and two new infantry divisions from North of the SEINE, 85 and 89 Inf have been identified S.E. of CAEN.

In BRITTANY enemy resistance is confined almost entirely to BREST, LORIENT, ST NAZAIRE and St MALO. At BREST, elements of 2 Para, 343 Inf and 266 Inf Divs are defending the port, while elements of 265 Inf Div are reported in LORIENT and ST NAZAIRE. In ST MALO we have identified all three regiments of 319 Inf Div, the channel islanders, but the bulk of the division is believed to be marooned on the islands.

Since June 6th it is considered that nine divisions, (709 Inf, 243 Inf, 77 Inf, 91 Inf, 353 Inf, 16 GAF, 275 Inf 352 Inf and 5 Para Divs) have been destroyed, while Pz Lehr, 17 SS P.G. and 326 Inf Divs are little more than remnants. The present German forces facing us are the equivalent of approximately 23 divisions. The enemy still has fifteen divisions left North of the SEINE (the departure of 19 Pz Div from HOLLAND for RUSSIA is confirmed) and at the present rate of wastage they are likely to be called upon to make continued contributions to bolster up whatever position the Germans hope to hold in FRANCE.

In the South, our landings on 15 August found the enemy with nine divisions South of the LYONS-BORDEAUX line. 708 Inf and 9 Pz have gone to NORMANDY, and on the Atlantic coast only 159 Res Div was left coast-watching between BORDEAUX and the Spanish frontier. This formation has apparently given up the job as hopeless and is reported to be moving North leaving SW FRANCE devoid of troops. On the Mediterranean side, 11 Pz Div has also left for NORMANDY while part, if not all, of 189 Res Div has moved from the Central Pyrenees to MONTPELLIER. There have been many reports of train movement Northwards towards LYONS but it is not known to which, if any, formation they belong. From the Spanish to the Italian frontier the layout on the coast at D day was 716 Inf Div at PERPIGNAN, 198 Inf at NARBONNE (both recuperating from battles in West or East) 189 Reserve at MONTPELLIER, 338 Inf in the ARLES area, 244 Inf at MARSEILLES, 242 Inf at TOULON and 148 Reserve in the NICE area. Behind them in HAUTE SAVOIE 157 Reserve Division is engaged in the permanent task of mopping up the Partisans.

The total enemy forces in FRANCE are now estimated at 55 Divs viz

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PANZER	11
P.G.	1
Para	3
Inf (incl GAF)	33
Reserve	7
	55

The overall distribution of German divisions in Europe is as follows:-

FINLAND	9
RUSSIA	171
S.E. EUROPE (Incl HUNGARY)	22
ITALY	26
FRANCE & LOW COUNTRIES	55
DENMARK	4
NORWAY	7
GERMANY & Protectorate	10
POLAND and PRUSSIA	6
Unlocated	5
	315

GSI(a)
HQ, AAI.
16 Aug 44

BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 58

OF 23 AUGUST, 1944.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Except on the Adriatic coast, where we have pushed the enemy back to the Metauro, there has been no significant change in enemy dispositions in the line. Behind the line, however, there have been considerable changes. One mobile division has been attracted towards the French frontier by the RIVIERA landings, another has been withdrawn from the line and appears to be passing through MANTUA while the arrival of at least one new German division in Northeastern ITALY has come to light.

The movements of 90 P.G. Div have become clearer this week. Its divisional sign was seen in MILAN on 19 Aug with the significant inscription LEITSTELLE BADE (= Movement Control H.Q., BADE is the Commander) and it seems likely that its movements were dictated by fear of the landing which eventually took place on 15 Aug. A faulty appreciation of 7 Army's intentions sent at least 190 Arty Regt to GENOA, where its guns were in position ready to go into action on 15th but later reports on 19 Aug of a mobile division moving Westwards from TURIN, partly in the direction of the MADDALENA pass on the French frontier, show this mistake was soon corrected. The report quoted last week that the division was bound for the DURANCE Valley may in fact have been based on good evidence though in view of the development of events it is not now likely to attempt to push so far West. There is indeed one very important task for it to do. The Northwards thrust by 7th Army has already cut off 148 Res Div from the West and threatens before long to cut off 157 Res Div in SAVOY and both these will have to form fronts to the West and fight their own way out or base themselves on ITALY. But for the moment at any rate the passes from FRANCE into ITALY are infested with Partisans and it will be vital, if these divisions are to come under Kesselring, at least for supply, to clear a safe L of C for them. If one can judge by the reports quoted above the MADDALENA pass will be one route which 90 P.G. will attempt to clear.

Another P.G. Div has also been moving this week, 3 P.G. On 21st August its Recce Unit was staging in the area of ROVERBELLA (F 4735) and it informed one of its sub-units that the Divisional "LEITSTELLE" was at CERESI (F 4719), just South of MANTUA. This mention of a Leitstelle must imply a fairly long distance move, not a mere withdrawal to refit, and there seems little doubt that the division will not remain in the MANTUA area. Confirmation of the move of the division may be derived from a report dated 19 Aug of a column of assault guns moving North from MODENA to GUASTALLA; these can scarcely belong to 90 P.G. which by this time should have been clear away to the West nor is the direction right. We know

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from 103 Recce that CASTALLA was one of the bridges which the division was to use, though later on 21 Aug it seems to have dropped out, for Northbound traffic, in favour of S. BENEDETTO (F 5010) and S. NICOLO (F 5011). The two bridges for Southbound traffic were CASTIGLIA and FICAROLA L 9790. 3 P.G's place in the line has been taken, apparently, by 362 Div whose H.Q. was located in the area of Q 5377 on 20 Aug. It is indeed, the only formation available and its Commander, Gen GREINER, with his usual macabre humour, has already informed his troops that the division is now strong enough to fill a hole in the line again. 956 G.R., one of its regiments, has been in the line already, for some time, in the REPOLI area.

Two further identifications have been made in North ITALY. The division on the extreme Western sector of the Ligurian coast is now known to be 34 Infantry division, last known on the Russian front. It appears to be under command of Graziani's Italo-German Army, whose H.Q. is reported at NOVI LIGURE, O 80. The other formations in this army are presumably 42 Jg Div and the Italian S. MARCO and MONTE ROSA divisions. A reliable report, based on documentary evidence, gives the strength of the latter as 16,849 all ranks; the same document also mentions the LITTORIO and ITALIA divs as having arrived in the country but in spite of various reports they have not been positively located. The other new German division is 98 Inf Div which has been reforming after its severe losses in the CRIMEA in the ZAGREB area; reports of 27 July and subsequently state that this division moved into ITALY through VENEZIA GIULIA and its movement was followed down as far as BOLOGNA. Pending more exact location it is placed in 10 Army reserve probably with a coast-watching commitment on the Adriatic. Further North it appears possible, from several reports, that 188 Mountain div has moved back into CARINTHIA from ISTRIA; its regts are reported in the area of VOELKERMARKT and KLAGENFURT. If this is confirmed, and it seems strongly supported by several corroborating reports, we can hardly expect the Germans to leave ISTRIA ungarrisoned and must expect some other formation to take 188 Div's place.

On the Adriatic coast of 8 Army 992 G.R. of 278 Div and the attached 242 Ass Gun Bn suffered losses in the Polish attack on 19 Aug and it appears that some of 1 Para Div has had to be moved forward to support it. On 22 Aug at least part of 4 Para Regt was going into position in the front line though they had not yet been heavily engaged. The Panthers of I Bn 4 Pz Regt are also on this flank as appears from documents found in two knocked out tanks.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Enemy movement across the Po river continues to be the focus of interest this week. Unfortunately, from our point of view, the situation is not satisfactory. It is true that all rail bridges, and all but one of the regular road bridges, over the Po are cut as far West as the bridges just South of PAVIA (K 1933), but we have been unable so far to prevent to any appreciable degree the movement which takes place across the river at night by temporary bridges and ferries. The strength of the Po river line of interdiction is that it presents a definite barrier to MT movements as well as rail traffic; its weakness is that the distance from the Po to the Gothic Line averages only about 75 miles and this the enemy should be able to cover without too much difficulty with available MT during the hours of darkness. (As a matter of fact trains are also in movement South of the river). Hence if the enemy is able to get MT across the river the destruction of the Po rail bridges loses much of its significance.

How many bridges and ferries are operating across the Po is difficult to assess but on the night of 21/22 August from 2100 B to 0500 B it is known that four bridges were to be open for traffic, namely at

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S. NICOLO A PO (F 5011) S. BENEDETTO (F 5010), OSTIGLIA (F 7412) and PICARELLA (L 9798), and on the night of 22/23 air reconnaissance showed that the bridge at S. BENEDETTO was in use at 0300 B. It is quite evident that the bridges are being used only at night; during the day they are partially disassembled and dispersed along the river banks near the crossing site. These bridges and others along the river are located at sites where bridges already existed prior to our air attacks. PR and ground reports indicate other crossing points and also barge traffic on the Eastern reaches of the river. It is felt that the only conclusion possible is that the enemy is getting enough supplies across the river to at least meet current requirements.

RAILWAYS

There has been little change in the state of the river Po crossings since last week. East of PAVIA all railway bridges have remained blocked except for the one at PONTELAGOSCURO; PR has been conflicting about the state of this bridge and whilst it is now probably blocked, it has certainly been open to traffic for the better part of two weeks. The importance which the enemy attaches to this bridge, which carries traffic both from the BRENNER and the N.E., is shown by a concentration of 32 heavy AA guns within a radius of four miles and another 34 in the vicinity of FERRARA, the junction just South of it.

North of the Po, bridges probably remain impassable between PIADENA and MANTUA and between MANTUA and NOGARA on the secondary East-West line just North of the Po. On 22 August the tracks were cut in two places between ROVIGO and PONTELAGOSCURO and the bridge North of ADRIA on the single line running South from MESTRE remains blocked. The BRENNER line and the lines running S.W. from TARVISIO and PIEDICOLLE remain open.

South of the river the main PIACENZA - BOLOGNA - RIMINI line was open on 20 August as far as FAENZA and only two blocks have definitely been achieved since then. The PARMA-SPEZIA line is now believed to be passable and in use. The two lines running South from BOLOGNA to PISTOIA and PRATO appear open for most of their length, but whether in use or not is problematical.

In the West, the PIACENZA - VOGHERA line is still blocked. While the bridge over the Po at TORRETTETTI has been repaired the Po river bridge just South of PAVIA at BOTTARONE and approaches to the bridge immediately Southeast of ALESSANDRIA are cut forcing traffic for GENOA to move at least as far West as ASTI (J 4307) where one of the two nearby rail bridges is possibly open. The coastal routes to GENOA from FRANCE and SPEZIA remain blocked at many points and no activity has been noted except immediately West of GENOA.

Activity at marshalling yards and junctions North and South of PONTELAGOSCURO and along the PIACENZA-BOLOGNA line shows that the enemy has been making full use of the opportunities afforded him during the past week, to feed his main forward dumps which now appear to be situated in the IMOLA-FORLI and MODENA-PARMA areas.

SHIPPING

There is no substantial change in the situation. Shipping continues active between GENOA and SPEZIA and between the Northern Adriatic ports and RAVENNA.

The following information on ship-building in the Northern Adriatic is extracted from a photo reconnaissance report covering the past six months. In addition to the North Adriatic it is also known that there are active shipyards in the GENOA area.

"The period has been marked by successful bombing attacks on several shipyards, notably at MONFALCONE, where serious losses were sustained among both naval and merchant vessels. All yards are now concentrating on

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building F-boats and a few coasters, barges and tugs; a handful of naval craft are being completed, but several others have been abandoned, and only small craft such as M.A.S. are still being laid down.

"Outside the yards proper many Siebel Ferries, A.L.C. and I boats (launches) have been assembled at TRIESTE, FIUME and KRALJEVICA. The speed with which these prefabricated craft are put together makes it impossible to give an accurate figure for completions; at TRIESTE alone it seems probable that at least 30 Siebel Ferries have been assembled".

3. FRANCE

In the South of FRANCE, the first week of the invasion has seen very rapid progress by our forces and the total of 17,000 prisoners to date is a measure of our success. The first assault was met by 242 Inf Div, who had elements of one regiment on the islands of LEVANT and PORT CROS, the rest of the division as expected, holding the coast to the East of TOULON. On the following day elements of 148 Res Div were identified in the area West of GRASSE and since then we have identified elements of all the divisions which were located on the French Mediterranean coast with the exception of 716 Inf Div from PERPIGNAN. The enemy has been adopting blocking tactics to oppose our advance to the East and West but has been unable to offer any effective resistance to our rapid Northward drive towards GRENOBLE where we have made contact with the Maquis in the HAUTE SAVOIE region. 148 Div has had the task of holding us to the East while to the West the enemy has been putting in his divisions in piecemeal fashion. 242 Div is North and East of TOULON with elements of 244 Inf Div in the same area. On 242 Div's left are elements of 189, 198 and 338 Inf Divs. Of this latter division there is probably only a regimental group left in the South of FRANCE, most of the division, according to prisoners, having left for Northern FRANCE before the battle started. On the other hand the bulk of 11 Pz Div, elements of which we had identified in the CHARTRES area has remained in the South of FRANCE and has been making its way laboriously from the TOULOUSE gap across the RHONE to the battle. There has so far been no contact with this division but it is now thought to be East of the RHONE, probably somewhere West of AIX en - PROVENCE.

The enemy's main concern must now be to keep the escape route of 19 Army via the Rhone Valley clear, and the advance of Allied recce elements to MONTELIMAR and VALENCE must be causing him considerable anxiety. So far we have not encountered any of 157 Res Div, located in the HAUTE SAVOIE, but it is reasonable to expect that this will have the task of keeping the way open for a general withdrawal of 19 Army which, if it is to take place at all, must take place now. The virtual abandonment by the enemy of S.W. FRANCE where TOULOUSE is now in Free French hands, and the relatively weak opposition so far encountered in the South East, suggests that the enemy is preparing to write off Southern FRANCE, and hopes to establish a single land front in FRANCE somewhere in the North. If this is so, he must start his withdrawal up the RHONE valley immediately, probably leaving behind garrisons to defend MARSEILLES, TOULON and BORDEAUX. He has already left it dangerously late and further delay may mean that 19 Army, like the 7th Army in the North, will be faced with another of the all too frequent "Kessels" in which German Armies have of late found themselves.

Meanwhile in the North events have been moving apace. Having reduced the gap between ARGENTAN and FALAISE to 12 miles, American armoured forces turned Eastwards and in a spectacular drive against light opposition have reached and crossed the Seine near MANTES and are

....outflanking PARIS.....

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outflanking PARIS to the South. At the same time the trap has closed on the ARGENTAN pocket where considerable enemy forces have been cut off and prisoners are now coming in at the rate of about 10,000 a day. Only in the area between ARGENTAN and the sea has the enemy been able to maintain any coherent front. Here he has been withdrawing, at first slowly, and n more rapidly towards the Seine.

In the chaotic state to which 7th Army has been reduced in the past week, enemy dispositions have been confused in the extreme and it is impossible to draw any clear picture. 9 Pz Div is somewhere East o ARGENTAN trying to block the American Northward drive, while a flow of divisions has been arriving piecemeal from North of the Seine to patch up t remnants of 7th Army. 6 Para Div has been identified East of ARGENTAN, while 340 Inf Div, 17 G.A.F. Div and elements of 344 Inf Div all from the area between CALAIS and DIEPPE have been arriving South of the Seine. Elements of 18 G.A.F. Div from DUNKIRK have been identified in the MANTES area and elements of 48 Inf Div from OSTEND in the area East of CHARTRES. This leaves a total of eight uncommitted divisions still North of the Seine including 49 Inf Div from the BOULOGNE sector which is reported to be moving down into the battle.

In BRITTANY, ST MALO has finally surrendered but the enemy is still holding out in BREST, ST. NAZAIRE and LORIENT.

C.K. Monk

BRIGADIER,
D.G.S.(I).

GSI(a)
HQ. AAI.
23 Aug 44

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 59

OF 31 AUGUST, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The main enemy activity of the past week can be briefly summarised as regrouping of his forces forward of the Gothic Line and withdrawal by 10 Army on to the main Gothic positions, a withdrawal which has been more or less voluntary between PONTASSIEVE and URBINO, and which on the Atriatic coast had apparently been planned but not completely put into operation when we attacked on the night 25/26 August.

The regrouping has been primarily occasioned by the collapse of the German Armies in Northern and Southern FRANCE. To N. FRANCE Kesselring has had to send two P.C. divisions - 3 P.G. on 28 August had already reached BRIENCOURT between TROYES and NANCY while 15 P.G. Division was identified by prisoners S.E. of TROYES on 29 August. The retreat of the battered remnants of 19 Army up the Rhone Valley has added a further commitment to Kesselring's Army Group - the blocking of the passes on the Franco-Italian frontier between the Swiss frontier and the sea. True, Kesselring has probably gained two new divisions as the result - but he would hardly regard the acquisition of two reserve divisions, 148 and 157 (both already knocked about and under strength) as fair exchange for two of his best P.G. Divisions. Furthermore, as was pointed out last week, the only other mobile formation available to Kesselring, 90 P.G. Div, has been tied up for the past fortnight in trying to keep the passes over the Alps free of partisans so as to secure an L of C for 148 and 157 Divisions. Whether the enemy considers that 3 divisions are sufficient to hold the Franco-Italian frontier depends on his appreciation as to how serious a threat he considers the Allied Armies will develop against his right flank. At the moment Kesselring appears to be taking the narrow view that the Allied landings in S. FRANCE are principally aimed at outflanking the Gothic Line, and he is consequently taking no risks. Clearly however the employment of 90 P.G. Division in the mountains is uneconomical and the enemy would prefer to have the division in Army Group Reserve. Fear of an Allied landing in the Gulf of GENOA must keep 34 Inf and 42 Jaeger Divisions at any rate for the present in their role of coastwatching and stiffening for the two unreliable Italian divisions. Any substitute for 90 P.G. Division would therefore have to come from elsewhere: the relief by 278 Division of 5 Mtn Division North and N.W.

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of URBINO releases an eminently suitable division - and a relatively strong one - for that type of warfare. It is interesting in this connection that civilians at URBINO were full of rumours that 5 Mtn Division had "gone N.W." - it is not clear how far but it is in the right direction. The only other Mtn Division which might qualify for the task is 188 Res Mtn Division, but recent reports agree that the formation is now in the DRAVE Valley near KLAGENFURT, and that it has been reduced to the status of a draft-finding and training division. Even if 5 Mtn Division has moved to N.W. ITALY there is no evidence as yet that 90 P.G. Division has been relieved of its present commitments.

With 90 P.G. still tied up, the need for some other mobile reserve has become of paramount importance especially in view of strong Allied thrusts up the Adriatic. The three remaining P.G. Divisions- 26 Pz, 29 P.G. and 16 S.S. P.G. (latter of far inferior calibre to other two) have all been holding sectors along the ARNO under 14 Army, and the departure of 15 P.G. Div has left 10 Army with no mobile division. There have been several indications of regrouping in 14 Army. On the 15 August a unit of 12 Para Regt was asking for 1: 25,000 maps as far West as PRATO and on 28th there was a bn commander's conference in the same regt, while an officer of 3 Bn was to be put "further in the picture". All this may indicate that the division is taking over part at least of its right hand neighbour's area - 29 P.G. Division. 4 Para Div has recently been on a very narrow sector immediately North of FLORENCE, and could easily accept wider responsibilities. Further West 362 Inf Div is confirmed as having taken over 3 P.G. Division's old sector. On its right 26 Pz Division has been resting one of its regts - 9 P.G.R. - and evidence suggests that at least part of this Regt is now on the Adriatic, where a unit belonging to it stated at 0655 hours 30 August that enemy infantry and arty were quiet. It looks therefore as if 9 P.G.R. is in process of coming into the line behind the Foglia river. It may possibly be followed by the rest of the division, for 67 P.G.R. is only holding a sector of some 6,000 yards, which could be taken over by 362 Division. This would leave the enemy weaker on the Arno, but it seems very likely that he is in fact already thinning out and that the increase in alertness noted by our troops is designed to give the impression of greater strength than is actually the case. Whether the thinning out will be carried still further to include 29 P.G. Division will depend on events: 71 P.G.R. was still in its original sector on 29 August when it lost PW from II Bn at Q 7069.

Our attack across the river METAURO found 1 Para Division on the coast, having completed its relief of 278 Division which had moved into reserve preparatory to taking over from 5 Mtn Division, and 71 Inf Div further inland. When we crossed the river, the enemy had already withdrawn his main bodies, not apparently because he appreciated a major threat along the coastal plain, but in accordance with familiar tactics on the Adriatic of thinning out in face of any Allied attack. The direction of our attack by-passed most of 1 Para Division to the West, and fell on 71 Division. Air Photos had confirmed statements by a deserter from 3 Para Regt that the Regt had been busy for three weeks constructing a delaying position forward of the river FOGLIA along the ridge running from M. BUSETTO R 9968 - S. ANGELO S. 0371 - CANDELARA 1074. By the 28th we were in contact all along this line and had crossed the ARZILLA stream: FANO was entered unopposed. That night the enemy began withdrawing across the FOGLIA to the main Gothic position and we cleared him from his remaining positions on the ridge South of the river.
Meantime good progress had been made against negligible opposition through

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the hills to URBINO and from there to capture the high ground South of thr river opposite MONTECALVO R 9070. It was in the course of this advance that the first prisoners were taken from 278 Division in its new sector - 994 G.R. losing P.W. at R 9160. On night 29/30 August patrols crossed the FOGLIA and encountered very little enemy reaction. The next day MONTE CROCE R 9168 was captured from 71 Division, and two companies were established in daylight in MONTECCHIO - S 0175 (this village is included in the main defence system).

Several German prisoners have referred to the presence of an Italian division in the Gothic Line, and some of this information has been corroborated by a Partisan Major. Evidence is still conflicting, and it has yet to be established that the Italians belong to a combatant formation, and are not merely miscellaneous Italian Bns which have been assisting in the construction of the Gothic Line.

In the mountains 51 Corps has been voluntarily giving up ground South of the Gothic Line (a recent captured document shows that 76 Pz Corps has been switched to the Adriatic, while 51 Mtn Corps must therefore have moved West to take over ground more suitable to its name). The object of the withdrawal is presumably to secure firmly the positions already prepared. The withdrawal has so far taken place between URBINO and PONTASSIEVE, and prisoners from 715 Division in the SIEVE Valley stated that the Division was to be back on the Gothic Line by 1 September. Such a withdrawal would lay open 356 Division's left flank and would threaten the whole Arno position. It appears therefore that not only is the enemy trying to get Mobile Divisions into reserve but that he is also thinning out his infantry divisions, probably sending units from each back to the main Gothic positions. This may be a precautionary measure to avoid repeating the mistake made at CASSINO, where by reinforcing the Gustav Line and trying to hold it at all costs he so weakened his forces that he was jumped on the Adolf Hitler line. This thinning out will have a second advantage in that if the enemy gets into serious difficulties on the Adriatic he will have bns or even coys out of the line which he can rush across as reinforcements - a policy adopted extensively on the Gustav Line. To add colour to the possibility of a general withdrawal from the Arno a parachutist deserter from 4 Para Division - and a sergeant at that - stated on 29 August that he had deserted because a withdrawal was due to take place on the night 30 or 31st. Furthermore he said that it was announced at an officers conference of III Bn 11 Para Regt that whole front was moving back in the next few days owing to the situation outside Italy.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

PW statements indicate that ammunition stocks were low and a policy of strict economy in force early in August. With the bridge over the river Po open from 6 to 16 August, however, the situation is likely to have improved and it is estimated that there are now two to three weeks supplies of ammunition in dumps South of the river. Since the middle of August all rail bridges over the river Po East of PIACENZA have been impassable, but the enemy continues to bring supplies across at night by ferry and pontoon bridges which are drawn in to the shelter of the banks during the day. South of the Po he is pushing trains well down into the 10 Army dumping area around LODI.

Very heavy loading and activity between BRESCIA and VICENZA

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on the main MILAN-VERONA-UDINE line between 22 and 24 August suggests the possible departure of enemy formations, presumably 3 and 15 P.G. Divs, from ITALY. Any such operation may however, have been seriously interfered with by the blocking of the three main routes into the REICH on 26 and 27 August. The only line out of ITALY now passable is the one into JUGOSLAVIA via PIEDICOLLE.

RAILWAYS

During the past week three of the four main lines from the REICH into ITALY have been blocked. On 26 August the viaduct at VENZONE (C 3450) was destroyed, blocking the TARVISIO line, and on 27th the BRENNER route was blocked by the obstruction of the AVISIO viaduct (A 7632) and the bridge at BOROVNICA on the POSTUMIA line was rendered impassable. The only line now open is the one which crosses the Jugoslav border at PIEDICOLLE.

The main trunk line which runs across ITALY from MILAN via VERONA was open until the 28th of August, and heavy traffic was run between BRESCIA, VERONA and VICENZA between 22 and 25 August. Except for the PADUA-ROVIGO-FERRARA line all the approaches to the Po river are open, but the river itself has been impassable to rail traffic East of PIACENZA all week.

South of the Po breaks have been achieved in the PIACENZA-BOLOGNA-RIMINI line but the PARMA-SPEZIA line and the two lines South from BOLOGNA are still open. The enemy continues to push his trains as far South as the 10 Army dumping area around IMOLA and FORLI.

In the West GENOA has now been cut off from PIACENZA, MILAN and TURIN, and whilst traffic is still possible between GENOA and SAVONA, the coastal route is completely impassable between SAVONA and the French frontier and between GENOA and SPEZIA.

3. FRANCE

The tempo and scale of the enemy withdrawal from Southern FRANCE have increased during the past week. Leaving the bulk of 242 Inf Div in TOULON and elements of 244 Inf Div together with some marine troops in MARSEILLES, 19 Army has been falling back to the East and West. To the East 148 Res Division has been withdrawing under pressure to the VAR river and is presumably to take up positions guarding the frontier. Further North 157 Res Division has also been withdrawing Northeastwards from GRENOBLE, after giving us a thousand prisoners at GAP, and appears to be falling back to the Mt GENEVRE, Mt CENIS and ST BERNARD passes, thus sharing with 148 Res Division responsibility for the defence of the frontier together with such forces from ITALY as Kesselring can spare to prevent any infiltration into his domain. North of GRENOBLE there has been virtually no enemy opposition, and an Allied force, apparently consisting of three press correspondents, is reported to have reached the Swiss frontier.

Meanwhile, to the West, the enemy has been retiring up the Rhone Valley leaving rearguards consisting mainly of 110 P.G.R. of 11 Pz Div plus some infantry elements to cover the withdrawal. In the valley itself, the Allied road block North of MONTELIMAR on the East side of the Rhone has been the scene of fierce fighting. Counter-attacks by elements of 11 Pz, 189, 198 and 244 Inf Divs have been launched in this area. While the Germans have been successful in infiltrating some forces through our block, they have been unable to prevent a bottle neck developing. This has led to considerable congestion on the East side of the valley, of which the air forces have taken full advantage.

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Allied forces from the North and South have now linked up in the MONTELIMAR region and the enemy Northward movement through MONTELIMAR has perforce ceased. The enemy forces still left South of MONTELIMAR are now isolated from the main body of the German forces. North of MONTELIMAR the enemy appears to be taking up a delaying position in the VALENCE area. On the West side of the RHONE valley, a large enemy column has been proceeding Northwards, consisting presumably of 716 Inf Div and the remnants of German military and civil occupational forces from Southwestern FRANCE. This force, which has to run the gauntlet of the Maquis forces operating from the MASSIF CENTRAL area, has suffered heavily in its withdrawal. In the Lower RHONE area, our forces are already reported across the river at AVIGNON and are advancing Southwest. Enemy resistance at TOULON and MARSEILLES has now ceased. Most of the installations at MARSEILLES are reported intact, although blockships have been sunk in the harbour.

There are now virtually no enemy forces left in S.W. FRANCE. The major garrison towns of TOULOUSE, MONTAUBAN, AGEN and CARCASSONE have been abandoned and large dumps of ammunition and POL destroyed by the retreating enemy. Rail movements from BORDEAUX towards POITIERS suggest that the final elements of the enemy forces on the Atlantic coast are departing, leaving possibly a garrison at BORDEAUX to deny us the port.

In Northern FRANCE, any hopes which Army Group 'B' may have entertained of holding the line of the river SEINE have been dispelled by the events of the past week. Northwest of PARIS American forces, having established a bridgehead over the SEINE at MANTES, turned towards the sea on the West bank of the river. The Seventh Army (which had already lost the bulk of ten divisions in the ARGENTAN pocket) was thus faced with the prospect of pulling back across the SEINE the German forces left in a rapidly shrinking quadrilateral of which the sea and the river formed two sides. Although all opposition West of the river has now ceased it is impossible as yet to estimate how far the enemy has succeeded in getting his forces across. Ferries operated day and night at as many as 40 crossing places. As at MESSINA last August, most of the personnel may have got across, but enemy losses in transport and heavy equipment must be serious. The line of the SEINE between PARIS and the sea has been finally broken by the joining up of all the separate Allied bridgeheads over the river and the subsequent capture of BEAUVAIS and GOURNAY. Meanwhile the enemy's left wing is threatened by the Allied advances beyond PARIS. At PARIS, the bridges were found intact and although enemy opposition in the city was initially strong enough to make the use of armoured units necessary the Germans have been able to offer little resistance to our rapid drive Eastwards along the North bank of the MARNE to SOISSONS and on across the AISNE to near LAON. Further to the South only moderate opposition has been encountered in the advance which has led to the capture of REIMS, CHALONS and VITRY. These thrusts threaten the Seventh Army with the now familiar prospect of being outflanked, and there seems no alternative for the enemy but to fall still further back. With our armoured forces already across the AISNE at SOISSONS, the prospects of holding a line based on the SOMME and the AISNE, or the MARNE, are becoming increasingly remote, and it looks as if he must now fall back with his left flank to the Siegfried line while his right wing withdraws as best it can towards the Belgian frontier.

There have been several interesting new identifications this week. Both 3 P.G. and 15 P.G. Divisions from ITALY have arrived in FRANCE and have been identified N.E. and S.E. of TROYES respectively. 47 Inf Division and elements of 49 Inf Division (both from the PAS de CALAIS area) have been identified N.E. of PARIS while elements of three divisions

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from the South of FRANCE - 338, 189 and 244 Inf Divisions - have been identified on the American sector South of the capital. It seems likely that some of the enemy forces operating S.E. of PARIS are now under command of H.Q. 1 Army which was formerly at BORDEAUX.

The destruction of five further divisions - 84, 271, 276, 277 and 363 Inf Divs is now accepted, and they are no longer carried on the enemy order of battle in FRANCE. This brings the total of enemy divisions completely destroyed in FRANCE since June 6 to fourteen. Add to this the 31 German divisions whose destruction on the Eastern front is now accepted, and an appreciable reduction has been achieved this summer in the fighting strength of the German Army.

There are now at least six uncommitted or only recently committed divisions in North FRANCE and the Low Countries, and it is believed that further reinforcements are arriving in the West from GERMANY. The arrival in the PARIS area of a low grade formation was reported about 9 August and it is likely that further such formations are arriving. Arriving simultaneously is Field Marshal MODEL who is reported to have taken command in the West from von KLUGE, the latter's seven weeks in command of the battle having been even more disastrous than RUNDSTEDT's month. MODEL has been in command of Army Groups Centre and North Ukraine, and having succeeded in holding WARSAW in the summer, is now given the task of holding the Western Allies somewhere before the German frontier in the autumn.

GSI(a)
31 Aug 44.

BRIGADIER,
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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 60

OF 6 SEPTEMBER, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There are now elements of seven divisions opposing our attack on the Adriatic sector and although the Gothic Line has been breached for over twenty miles of its length the enemy is still offering stubborn resistance. On the rest of the front he is withdrawing, without offering much resistance to our pursuit, into the Gothic Line; whether he will be able to stay there or will have to continue the withdrawal to beyond the Po to prevent being outflanked from the East will depend on the progress of the next few days.

The rate of build-up on the East coast has been accelerated this week as the strength of our attack slowly dawned on the enemy's mind. By the night 28/29th August 9 P.G.R. had arrived and on 1 September we had prisoners from 67 P.G.R.; the whole of 26 Pz division is now known to have arrived. At about the same time the first elements of 98 Div were identified in the MONDAINO area and at least the infantry of this division now appears to be complete. On 4 September a small battle-group of 162 Div was identified from prisoners and part of I Bn 71 P.G.R., the first to arrive of 29 P.G. Div, was identified in an area unlocated but clearly in an active sector. Div H.Q. of 29 P.G. Div also appears to have arrived on the East coast. Finally a Bn of 5 Mtn Div, II/100 Mtn Regt, were operating on 4 September; the main body of the division is far away in Northwest ITALY, so this must be merely a unit whose relief was delayed for some reason causing it to become engaged in the fighting when the situation began to look nasty.

So far the brunt of the fighting and the heaviest casualties have fallen to the three divisions originally in line, 1 Para, 71 Inf and 278 Inf. 1 Para Regt suffered in the fighting in and S.W. of PESARO, which was captured on 2 Sep, and 4 Para Regt in the fighting for MONTECCHIO. 71 Div had fairly heavy casualties in the MONTECALVO area, where fighting was very fierce. The infantry of 26 Pz Div also had fairly heavy casualties and have not been identified since 3 September. Over 2,000 prisoners in all have been taken since 25 August. The German line now runs roughly North and South and the lay-out appears to be as follows : on the coast is 1 Para Div to as far as CORIANO with under command the battle group of 303 G.R. (162 Div) and possibly I/117 G.R., of 98 Div, from CORIANO to the river Conca possibly 26 Pz Div, unless it has pulled out, then 98 Div as far as about the 77 Northing, then 71 Div on a very narrow front Northwest of TAVOLETO and then 278 Div from about PIAN DI CASTELLO R 8375. If 26 Pz Div is in fact being pulled out, 29 P.G. Div

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will probably go in the CORIANO sector and it may do so in any case as this is the area where our threat is greatest. It seems that part at least of 3 and 4 Para Regts are out of the line together with some of 26 Pz Div's infantry and it is suggested that they may be engaged on preparing the line of defences which is now under construction Southwest from RIMINI. These have been greatly developed since 23 August though they consist of field works only, with no concrete and no wire except in the immediate vicinity of RIMINI itself. This line represents the last ditch which the enemy must hold if he is to prevent us from breaking out into the plain beyond the Appennines.

The rumours reported last week of an Italian Mountain Division being in the line on the Eighth Army front appear to be satisfactorily accounted for by the capture of prisoners from several different bns of the Monte Rosa Alpine division who had been attached to 71 Div in order to gain experience of operations.

On the Arno the enemy began to withdraw on night 30/31 August and was closely followed up. The first bound was to a line running roughly on a level with the mouth of the SERCHIO and based in part on that river and the ROGIO canal South of LUCCA; further East he is established firmly on the line of hills North of FLORENCE including Mt MORELLO, Mt CALVANA and Mt GIOVE. The enemy may withdraw more slowly in the latter sector but on the West coast he has further to go before the Gothic Line is reached, and has apparently already started a further withdrawal. The forces here are now spread rather thin. 334 Div has moved over to relieve 29 P.G. Div and there is no reserve anywhere within reach except for the weak 20 G.A.F. Div which appears to be now coming into the line in the LUCCA area. The whole enemy position in ITALY now depends on holding the Eastern flank of the Appennines. A break through there would directly threaten the communications and essential routes of withdrawal of the forces on the rest of the front and even the threat of a break through must cause the enemy to start a withdrawal from the Gothic Line for such a movement will call for the most skilfull timing and coordination, especially as the movement must be continued across the bridgeless Po.

In Northern ITALY a captured document of the end of August shows that 75 Corps, on the Franco-Italian frontier, has under command 157 Div to the North, 5 Mtn Div in the centre and 148 Div to the South. This confirms the destination of 5 Mtn Div suggested last week but an even more interesting point is that there is no mention of 90 P.G. Div which was definitely in that area. Apart from this, however, there is no indication whatever of that division being relieved though it would be reasonable to expect Kesselring to pull it out as soon as possible for a mobile role. The only sign of change in this area is a rather vague report of the end of August that 42 Jaeger Div was moving but in what direction was not specified. In N.E. ITALY the only change indicated is that elements, probably not more than one or two bns, of 188 Mtn Div have returned from CARINTHIA into ISTRIA. The defence of this area is apparently exercising the Germans; POLA is said to be garrisoned by 6,000 troops and to have been evacuated by civilians and precautions against invasion have been taken.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

There is as yet no recent direct evidence that the enemy is suffering any shortage of supply. While only about one third of the enemy forces on the Gothic Line are now heavily engaged, the present battle will have increased ammunition and fuel requirements somewhat and the past week has seen a very definite intensification of our attacks against the enemy L of C. While no definite statement can be made

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on available evidence, it is clear that the enemy's overall administrative position is deteriorating and may become as precarious as it was during the latter part of May and June.

At many points on the Po crossing activity continues, but the enemy's difficulties along this line of interdiction are undoubtedly increasing as a result of stepped up air attacks. All rail bridges over the Po East of PAVIA are out and supplies continue to move across the river at night by pontoon bridges and ferries. It is now definite that the enemy breaks up his pontoon bridges during the day and then reassembles them under cover of darkness. During this week night Tac/R and PR revealed two pontoon bridges across the river at points where only dispersed bridging sections had been seen during the day.

Rail communications in Northwest ITALY have been heavily disrupted. A pronounced increase in MT movement in this area attests the effectiveness of our rail interdiction here. This hits the enemy at one of his currently most vulnerable points, namely his shortage of MT and fuel. Also, and no less important, this rail interdiction, if maintained, should make the eventual withdrawal of formations from the West both slow and difficult.

Further back along his L of C the enemy is also in difficulties. All lines in the Northeast are cut at one or more points and the BRENNER has been blocked (probably continuously) for at least a week. It is quite evident therefore that if the enemy is getting enough supplies into ITALY to meet current requirements he is only doing so with difficulty, while the POSTUMIA route is blocked just North of GORIZIA.

RAILWAYS

Since 1 September all the rail communications between ITALY and the Reich have been cut at one or more points. On the BRENNER Pass the AVISIO viaduct has been impassable since 27 August and reports have been received of troop trains held up at TRENTO and material being forwarded by road from TRENTO to BRONZOLO 50 Kms further North. In the NE all the railway bridges over the R. Piave are now impassable, cutting the lines to AUSTRIA and JUGOSLAVIA, and the bridges over the R. Tagliamento at CASARSA and VENZONE on the TARVISIO line have also been demolished.

On the R.Po all railway bridges East of PAVIA have remained impassable all week. The main lateral line from MILAN to Northeast ITALY, while probably open for several days, is now blocked West of VERONA; most of the railways running South from this line to the Po remain open.

South of the river the PIACENZA-BOLOGNA and FERRARA-BOLOGNA lines are both out in one or more places, but the line from REVERE, on the South side of the Po, to BOLOGNA and those running South and SE remain passable. The PARMA-SPEZIA line is blocked.

In the Northwest dislocation of the railway system has now reached a high level with at least 20 bridges destroyed West of a line MILAN-GENOA. There is only one very round-about route open to through traffic between MILAN and TURIN, while lines leading into GENOA are all blocked, including the coastal lines running Southwest to FRANCE and Southeast to SPEZIA. The GENOA-SPEZIA line has now been cut at many points for at least a month with no attempt at repair having been made; this route apparently has been abandoned in favour of the PARMA-SPEZIA line which the enemy apparently succeeded in opening after it had been continuously cut for a considerable period. However, as indicated above the PARMA-SPEZIA line has again been blocked.

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3. FRANCE

On 29 August H.Q. 19 Army issued an order stressing the importance of a speedy withdrawal up the RHONE Valley in order to release 11 Pz Div for other tasks. During the past week the remnants of 19 Army have been doing their best to obey the order. Abandoning to their fate the isolated elements of 716 Inf Div left in the RHONE Valley South of MONTELIMAR, the enemy has retired rapidly Northwards through VALENCE and LYONS. The bulk of the enemy forces passed through LYONS on 1 and 2 September with 198 Inf Div and elements of 11 Pz Div forming the rearguard. They left the main road from VALENCE to LYONS cluttered with the wreckage of more than 2,000 destroyed vehicles, 198 Inf Div having suffered particularly heavy losses in material and prisoners amongst whom were the divisional commander, Maj-Gen RICHTER. LYONS is now clear of the enemy who destroyed all but two of the city's bridges. Most of 19 Army is withdrawing rapidly up the LYONS-DIJON road on which our air reconnaissance has observed considerable quantities of horse-drawn transport. Northeast of LYONS the enemy has been attempting a minor delaying action in the BOURG-en-BRESSE region. Our recce elements advancing N.W. from BOURG were counter-attacked by tanks on 4 September and civilians have reported that the enemy has as many as 30 tanks in this region, presumably belonging to 11 Pz Div. This force has, however, been by-passed by Allied troops who have entered LONS LE SAUNIER 35 miles North of BOURG and have reached the Swiss frontier West of GENEVA. Our forward elements are now advancing N.E. to PONTARLIER which is 60 miles S.W. of BELFORT. This drive has so far been meeting little opposition and threatens to beat 19 Army in the race to BELFORT, to which area, according to prisoners, the bulk of 11 Pz Div is withdrawing and where the enemy may hope to make a stand.

The enemy forces North of LYONS amount at the most to the equivalent of two infantry and one weak Panzer divisions (242 and 244 Inf Divs are now considered to have been destroyed and are no longer carried on the enemy order of battle). These represent a sadly reduced force in comparison with the Army Group with which the enemy had doubtless hoped to hold the left flank of a German line across FRANCE. Even if these forces succeed in reaching the BELFORT gap, the developments in Northern FRANCE are such that 19 Army will be fortunate if it ever links up with the rest of MODEL's Armies inside the frontiers of FRANCE.

On the Eastern flank of the Allied Seventh Army the withdrawal to the Franco-Italian frontier continues. 148 and 157 Res Divs which formerly belonged to 19 Army are now believed to be under KESSELRING's command, and enemy dispositions along the frontier are discussed under para 1.

From S.W. FRANCE the evacuation of enemy forces continues. Some 100,000 personnel including miscellaneous civilians and paramilitary groups are withdrawing along the route BOURGES - NEVERS - DIJON. They have probably left behind them a small garrison to defend BORDEAUX. From the Mediterranean coast all enemy forces have been withdrawn and our advance to NARBONNE made no contact.

In Northern FRANCE the enemy forces which had succeeded in escaping across the SEINE last week proved quite incapable of offering any effective opposition to the Allied drive Northwards. The tattered remnants of the German Armies have been withdrawing towards the frontiers of the Reich as rapidly as their inadequate transport will take them. While at a few isolated points, notably COMPIEGNE, BETHUNE and at ABBEVILLE, the enemy has put up local resistance, in the main, the state

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of Army Group 'B' has resembled a rout rather than a retreat. A fortnight ago an orderly withdrawal of the German right wing towards the Belgian frontier seemed a reasonable possibility. To-day the Allied forces are in HOLLAND, and Allied supply difficulties rather than any German ability to hold us must be MODEL's main hope of stemming our advance. The Seventh German Army has disintegrated and its headquarters is no longer thought to be in command of any of the enemy forces in the West. 5 Pz Army is now probably commanding on the German right flank with 1 Army on the left. The forces they command are in an extridably confused state, and it would seem that any German, wearing any kind of uniform is being pressed into their ranks. Even the Navy is not exempted and among the prisoners taken during the past week South of SOISSONS have been the bewildered members of a minesweeping flotilla. Two new formations have been identified this week. 226 Inf Division, a new arrival from GERMANY, was identified East of LE HAVRE, and 245 Inf Division formerly located in the LE HAVRE area provided some P.W. near ABBEVILLE. According to P.W. a third new division - 30 SS Inf Div - also an arrival from GERMANY, is in the DIJON area.

As he goes back the enemy is leaving behind a growing number of prisoners. 9,000 P.W. were taken in the MONS-CHARLEROI area alone. South of the SOMME considerable numbers of unsupported and disorganised infantry elements are being mopped up, while the coastal garrisons North of the SEINE are for the most part being abandoned to their own resources. East of PARIS the situation has been no better. Here 3 and 15 P.G. Divisions have arrived on a scene of rout for which even their experiences in ITALY can hardly have prepared them. They indeed represent the sole stiffening of 1 Army's ill-organised assortment of scratch units, and they have been able to do little to halt the advance which has brought us within striking distance of the borders of the Reich. The general lack of control on the part of the enemy is typified by a recent captured operation order to 3 P.G. Div to hold the MARNE line whereas the division is now back on the Belgian frontier.

The enemy's total strength in the West can now hardly amount to the equivalent of more than 20 divisions. Fresh reinforcements are probably coming up - not from the East certainly, for there there is nothing to spare - but there are reports of more low grade divisions from GERMANY being brought up, while 25 Pz Division is reported to have left DENMARK for the West. Reinforced by these the enemy may hope to make a temporary stand on the line of the MEUSE, but he is woefully short of equipment, tanks and horses, and the MEUSE can at best be only a delaying position before the Siegfried line is reached. Even the Germans are not optimistic and their assurances that Allied troops setting foot on Reich Territory will find every farmhouse and haystack burnt are reminiscent of the Churchillian mood of 1940; but this time there is no English Channel between the Germans and ourselves.

C R Gwatkin

BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

GSI(a)
6 Sep 44

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

A week ago the situation in the Adriatic sector was already fairly stable. By quick reinforcement however the enemy succeeded temporarily at least in stabilising the line. The front West of FLORENCE was milked of two mobile divisions (26 Pz and 29 P.G.), 98 Infantry division moved down from RAVENNA and the second half of 5 Mtn Div was turned back at FORLI while en route to join its division on the Franco-Italian frontier. At one moment it looked as if 162 Turkoman Div would be drawn in as well - a battalion battlegroup appeared in the line, suffered pretty heavy casualties and has now probably gone back to the less strenuous job of coastwatching between RIMINI and CESENATICA. It is not known to what extent this division has been brought up to strength since its first disastrous action on the Tyrrhenian coast, where it lost well over 2,000 prisoners in less than a month, but it is probably low on the priority list for reforming. It is not even certain that it will be made up with Turkomans who must be in limited supply now, and it is possible that low category Germans may be incorporated instead. In any event its most useful role at the moment is probably preparing defences S.W. of RIMINI and watching the coast, available as reserve if the situation demands.

The line to which the enemy is clinging so tenaciously runs still forward of the R. MARANO from the coast to R 8890: this is 1 Para Div's sector and is held by 3 or 4 bns, with most of 3 Para Regt apparently in reserve. Between the 90 Northing and incl CORIANO - scene of fierce fighting in the first week of September - is 29 P.G. Div with both regiments forward though each has a bn in reserve. Further South again is 26 Pz Div along the road to S. SAVINO R 8784 - still held by the enemy up to 12 Sep after heavy fighting - while 98 Div is now concentrated on its right extending as far as the R. CONCA. In 98 Div's sector, after very bitter fighting, S. CROCE was wrested from the enemy and we are now some 500 yards West of the town. South of the river is the battlegroup of 5 Mtn Div (4 bns) which has been pushed out of GEMMANO R 8680, a regimental battlegroup of 71 Div and 278 Div which has eased Northwards a bit and now has two bns in the area NW. of PIAN DI CASTELLO R 8375. In support the enemy has some 30 Panthers, the Mk IV's of 26 Pz Div and 29 P.G. Div (about 70 tanks) and two bns of assault guns. The enemy has managed to sort his forces out into divisional sectors and even though he is holding the line very tightly, each division has some units resting, available as reserve. That the enemy has not escaped lightly in the recent fighting is indicated by the figure of 3,000 P.W. taken since 26 August.

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On the remainder of the front, except in the extreme West where he is still South of VIAREGGIO, the enemy is now back on the Gothic Line. The withdrawal was mainly carried out in easy stages, but on 11 Sep 4 Para Div was bundled back rather more hastily than it expected and the next day was involved in fierce fighting on the outposts of the Gothic Line itself. We penetrated the MLR by capturing M. CALVI, and 5 Bn 12 Para was told to hold all available inf and assault guns ready to assist the critical situation on 2 Bn's front on CALVI. 2 Bn's troubles were not caused by having its B echelon completely destroyed in a bombing attack.

20 G/F Div which had previously been coastwatching behind 16 SS Div North of VIAREGGIO has now reappeared in the line North of LUCCA between 16 SS and 65 Divs. Far more surprising has been the departure of 356 Division, according to some prisoners to the BOLOGNA area and to others to the Adriatic. This move began about 6/7 Sep and the div must by now be out of the line. There has been no question of straightforward relief by another formation, and 715 and 4 Para Divs have had to take over its sector by extending their commitments Westwards and Eastwards respectively. 715 Div has taken over BORGO S. LORENZO - FAENZA road (prisoners from 735 Regt were taken astride this route on 12 Sep) as well as its original commitment DICOMANO -FORLI. 4 Para Div is presumably on the FIORENCE - IMOLA road as well as in the FUTA Pass area. This has left the enemy dangerously thin astride these vital axes.

For the moment the Appennine position, though displaced in the Adriatic sector, is intact. This has only been achieved at the expense of seriously weakening the Western part of the Gothic Line. The withdrawing of 356 Div from the line seriously reduces the enemy's chances of holding the vital passes through the Central Appennines, especially at a time when he might reasonably expect an offensive by Fifth Army. Even allowing for the difficult country and the excellent opportunities the mountain roads offer for heavy demolitions, it is unlikely that the enemy feels so confident of his ability to hold the mountain passes that he can afford to entrust their defence to only two divisions. Unless he has gravely misappreciated Allied strength in the centre, Kesselring must be seriously worried about a pincer movement directed from the FIORENCE area and from the Adriatic against BOLOGNA. The removal of 356 Div can therefore only have two explanations - that he is so worried about his left flank that he considers another division necessary even at the expense of thinning out in the centre, or that he has decided that he must make preparations for an eventual withdrawal from the Gothic Line because he will not be able to hold it in face of renewed Allied attacks. His present dispositions suggest that he has decided he has insufficient forces to hold the line indefinitely and that heeding the warning in good time he has set the stage for the withdrawal. The withdrawal across the Po valley to the river in the face of Allied armour superiority will be a ticklish operation, as will also be the crossing of the river itself with communications and routes dislocated by bombing. The pre-requisite for such an operation is that he should thin out in the West and centre, while holding firm in the East, and that he should create as strong a reserve as possible to prepare delaying positions and assist at threatened sectors.

356 Div by itself will not be sufficient reserve. There have been several reports that the enemy is moving back material from LIGURIA while 42 Jaeger Div is reliably reported to have left the GENOA area to the Italians and gone into reserve. The activities of 90 P.G. Div, last known to be on the Franco-Italian frontier West of CUNEO, are confused. An unconfirmed report claims that elements of the division were moving East from TURIN on 7 Sep, but 200 G.R. lost P.W. at LERCHE N 36 on 12 Sep. One of these divisions and/or a battlegroup of the other, may well be on the way to the BOLOGNA area to help 356 Div. Whether the whole of 90 P.G. Div can be brought into reserve, clearly a more desirable role for a P.G. Div than

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its present one, will probably depend on the activities of the Partisans, 148 and 157 Res Divs, both withdrawing into ITALY, have had fairly heavy casualties and are not particularly reliable divisions, while only half of 5 Mtn Div eventually reached the frontier from the Adriatic sector. The only other division that can assist 90 P.G. is 34 Div, and it may be that the enemy is planning to use these two divisions and 85 Mtn Regt to cover the withdrawal from N.W. ITALY when this is decided upon, while 148 and 157 withdrew ahead of them.

Meantime while preparations are put in hand for an eventual withdrawal and heavy equipment is probably being evacuated across the Po, there is no evidence that the enemy means to steal away yet from the Gothic Line positions. He is standing firm trying to gain time and waiting to see where the next blow will fall. When it does, he will hope to blunt it and so make his own disengagement easier.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

This week little change is seen in the enemy supply picture. With both 5 and 8 Armies launching simultaneous attacks enemy supply requirements will have increased but no serious deterioration in his overall administrative position is looked for until such time as we are able to achieve a more effective interdiction of movement across the Po. river. It is estimated that from PIACENZA Eastward to the sea there may be as many as 14 bridges and an equal number of ferries in operation across the Po at night. This number of crossing points should be more than adequate to meet current supply needs.

Since the BRENNER and one or more of the N.E. frontier rail routes into ITALY have been open for several days, the enemy should by now have been able to get in more than enough supplies to make up for any drop which may have occurred while these routes were blocked. Our difficulty is of course that, as in the past, we have been unable to achieve and maintain the 90 to 100 per cent rail interdiction of these routes which is required if the movement of supplies is to be decisively affected.

RAILWAYS

On the BRENNER route the enemy succeeded in repairing the LAVISIO viaduct by 9 Septembur, and heavy traffic has been reported on this line. In the N.E. all the railway bridges over the R. PIAVE are still impassable, but all cuts East of this river have now been repaired except the bridge over the river TAGLIAMENTO at CASARSA which is now believed to have been by-passed by new trackage laid across the river bed. The three frontier routes are very probably open with the possible exception of the POSTUMIA route which may still be blocked between TRIESTE and LJUBLJANA as a result of Partisan attacks. The importance attached to the TARVISIO route by the enemy is indicated by a report that they have reinforced all bridges in the TARVISIO area by building extra concrete buttresses. While, as above indicated, this route is now probably open, traffic is likely to be on a reduced scale, and at PONTEBBA, 15 miles East of TARVISIO, Partisans are reported to have destroyed the power plant, causing the enemy to revert to steam traction and reducing traffic to a third.

All the railway bridges over the R.PO East of PAVIA remain impassable, but the lines leading to the river from BRESCIA, VERONA, and PADUA and the main East-West line from MILAN to TREVISO are still open. South of the Po tracks have been cut on both lines into BOLOGNA from the North and four bridges have been destroyed on the network of lines which cover the main 10 Army dumping area between FERRARA and RIMINI. The PIACENZA-BOLOGNA-RIMINI line is cut between FIDENZA and PARMA and West of MODENA, where bridges remain impassable, but it is open elsewhere.

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Both lines running South from BOLOGNA are now open, but the PARMA-SPEZIA line which has been open for several weeks is reported to have been blocked by the Partisans.

In the N.W. heavy dislocation continues. All lines are cut between GENOA, TURIN and MILAN, and only MILAN now has direct rail communications with the East. Between GENOA and SAVONA the line is completely unusable and there are two bridges down between SAVONA and IMPERIA.

3. FRANCE

In Southern FRANCE, the past week has been notable for the enemy's attempt to fight a screening action along the DOUBS river to cover the withdrawal of 64 Corps through the gap between the Allied armies in Northern and Southern FRANCE. 11 Pz Div and the remnants of 198 Inf Div have formed the bulk of the screening force, later reinforced by elements of 159 Res and 16 Inf Divs, who apparently formed part of 64 Corps' retreating columns. Enemy resistance remained particularly fierce on the CHAGNONS - MONTBELIARD line until about 9 September when the decision appears to have been taken to disengage and withdraw in a Northeasterly direction towards BELFORT. This decision was almost certainly forced upon the enemy by the speed of our advance along the Swiss frontier which had brought us by that time to within 25 miles of BELFORT itself. Prisoners say that the enemy had intended to hold MONTBELIARD until at least the 15th September, and the abandonment of the DOUBS line so much earlier seems to have caused the utmost confusion amongst the ranks of 64 Corps. These have now split into small and disorganised groups struggling as best they can to find the way back to VESOUL and BELFORT.

11 Pz Div, having abandoned MONTBELIARD, has shifted Eastwards to cover the approaches to BELFORT between VESOUL and the Swiss frontier. Here, enemy opposition is toughest. Elsewhere only sporadic resistance is being met by our troops as 19 Army advances to the BELFORT Gap. Considerable rail movement has been observed from VESOUL Eastwards to BELFORT and the roads East and Northeast of DIJON are filled with troops falling back towards BELFORT as best they can. Somewhere in this area, although not yet identified in action, is 30 SS Division which is reported to be composed of Russian volunteers, one bn of whom deserted en toto to the Maquis recently. Apart from this there are only the disorganised remnants of 64 Corps to stiffen 19 Army's ranks when it finally makes its stand before the BELFORT Gap.

In Northern FRANCE the crossing of the German frontier N.E. of TRIER has been the climax of a week characterised by stubborn enemy delaying actions on the ALBERT Canal and the MEUSE La. On his right flank where 15 Army is now believed to be holding a sector, the enemy withdrew rapidly last week to the line of the ALBERT Canal, leaving to their fate the elements of 15 Divisions cut off in the MONS area. He left behind him garrisons at BOULOGNE, CALAIS and DUNKIRK (consisting of the bulk of 226, 245, 331, 346 and 711 Infantry Divisions) and a number of disorganised troops who failed either to withdraw with the bulk of the enemy forces behind the ALBERT Canal or to get within the protective shelter of the coastal fortresses. Some of these troops have succeeded in escaping across the SCHELDT estuary in rowing boats. Many of them are now in prison cages.

The defence of the ALBERT Canal itself seems to have fallen upon the infantry and parachutist elements of 15 Army reinforced by some hitherto uncommitted formations. 347 Inf Div from DEN HELDER, consisting of many foreigners with little battle experience, has been identified in this sector, as have 712 Inf Div from the ROTTERDAM area and 59 Inf Div a new arrival from GERMANY. The quality of the recently committed divisions in this area is typified by 348 Inf Div which has gone into action with old

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and makeshift equipment including machine guns taken from aircraft. Nevertheless enemy resistance has remained fierce throughout the week on the line of the canal and our bridgeheads have been the scene of sharp enemy counter-attacks. However with Allied patrols now across the Dutch frontier South of EINDHOVEN, it would appear that the ALBERT Canal line has been broken and the enemy is faced with the prospect of swinging back across HOLLAND to the SIEGFRIED Line. The bulk of the enemy's armour in this area has already been disengaged and is reported to be splitting into two main groups, one of which is moving Northwards from the LIEGE area, the other Eastwards possibly for a rapid refit in GERMANY.

The MOSELLE crossings between METZ and NANCY have been the other feature of interest during the week. The enemy has reacted sharply to the American attempts at crossing the river and elements of at least ten enemy divisions have been identified in action in the sector between the two cities. These include seven recently arrived divisions - the ubiquitous 3 and 15 P.G. Divs, 19 Inf, (an upgraded reserve div from DENMARK) and four Divisions from GERMANY - 58, 64, 553 and 559 Inf Divs. The last four are of doubtful quality indeed. 553 Inf Div for instance was hastily formed on 2 August in S.W. GERMANY from men on leave and discharged hospital cases. 559 is probably no better. Moreover the reinforcement of the METZ-NANCY sector has been achieved only at the expense of the area further North between MONTMEDY and GIVET which for a time was virtually drained of troops although resistance is now stiffening with the appearance of 3 Para and Panzer Lehr Divs in this sector. It is in this area that Allied troops have passed into LUXEMBOURG and thence across into the REICH.

Some idea of the state of enemy formations in the West as a result of the recent battles can be gleaned from a captured document of 27 August giving the strength of various formations. 276 Inf Div on that date had 93 men; 363 Infantry Div was a little better off with 150 men. Of the eight divisions whose strength was given, none had more than 1,200 men. It is estimated that on 1 September the enemy's total strength in the West including miscellaneous G.H.Q. troops and infantry replacements did not exceed a maximum of 360,000 men, together with 250 tanks which with replacements might be brought up to 600. Since September 1st, casualties have continued to be heavy and appreciable forces have been locked up in the coastal garrisons. All in all, it is doubtful whether the enemy can muster in the West the equivalent of 15 full strength divisions to man the 400 miles of the SIEGFRIED Line. He may still of course draw reinforcements from elsewhere. GERMANY, whence nine new divisions have appeared in the past three weeks, can doubtless produce some more, although the quality of those already arrived can hardly be encouraging for the enemy. If time permits, SCANDINAVIA and possibly ITALY may also help to swell the total a little. Apart from these the enemy can only draw on the Eastern front where his forces are already stretched to the limit. Moreover time is short and the Allies are in GERMANY, while North of the ALBERT Canal further Allied forces threaten the weakest section of the SIEGFRIED Line - that North of AACHEN. If reinforcements are to be found they must come quickly, for in their present weakened state, prolonged effective resistance by the enemy forces in the West is problematical.

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.62

OF 22 SEPTEMBER, 1944.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The past week has been an unhappy one for Kesselring's army. North of FLORENCE the Gothic Line has been breached by 5 Army who are now pushing over the watershed towards the plain. On the 8th Army front attempts to hold on two successive ridges barring our advance to the Via EMILIA have failed, and today we have reached the banks of the MARECCHIA river, which elements have crossed. Broad and carrying very little water, this river bed is not a very serious obstacle to our advance into the plain itself.

The 8th Army attack on the line the enemy had held so stubbornly from POGLIANO 9192 to CORIANO 8787, South along the ridge through S. SAVINO 8704 and across the CONCA to GEMMANO 8680, started on the night 12/13 Sep and by the following evening the central part of the ridge was in our hands. 98 Div, veteran of the CRIMEA, received the brunt of our attack and lost the better part of one regiment (289 G.R.) in S. SAVINO when our troops worked their way round from the South to cut off its line of withdrawal. Another regiment (117 G.R.) also suffered heavy losses and before long the division was reduced to a single regimental battlegroup. In the course of this fighting a recce unit of 44 Div made its appearance under 98 Div - the first example of piecemeal employment of spare units from relatively quiet sectors of the front. On the following day 114 Fusilier Bn also appeared, only to have its headquarters and C.O. promptly surrounded and put in the bag. No other elts of these divisions have so far been identified on the Adriatic.

On the 14th we launched our attack across the MARANO and by the evening had reached the outskirts of S. LORENZO 8691. This attack struck along the boundary between 29 P.G. Div and 1 Para Div. The latter was only partially engaged in the battle and its left flank did not pull back across the river until the afternoon. In our advance to RIMINI this div has been systematically by-passed to the West all the time and has constantly been forced to conform with the withdrawal of the rest of the front without influencing the battle in any way. Bitter fighting followed in the next two days for the village of S. MARTINO, to the North of S. LORENZO. Here we established a foothold in the Southern part of the village on the evening of the 14th, but a strong counter-attack the following morning by parachutists supported by Tiger tanks (the first identification of Tigers in the Adriatic battle) drove our troops back from the village.

Meantime to the S.W. we had pushed on just North of the CONCA river to capture M. COLOMBO 8382 and it was in this area that contact was made for

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the first time with units of 356 Div. The plight of 98 Div had brought 356 Div down in a hurry from BOLOGNA to be committed to battle before it had had time to rest after the strenuous fighting on the ARNO sector. The bulk of the division took up positions along the MULAZZANO ridge but from the moment of its entry into battle it was on the wrong foot. Its case, after the heavy fighting of the last four days, is almost as serious as that of 98 and 71 Divs. Both bns of 869 Regt are now reduced to a single battlegroup and the two bns of 870 together with II Bn of 871 Regt form another group. The capture of CERASOLA 8280 early on the 18th followed shortly by that of MULAZZANO drove 356 Div back behind the main RIMINI-S. MARINO road. Meantime to the S.W. both 71 and 98 Divs had been withdrawn from the battle and their places taken by 278 Div which in the course of the fighting had gradually shifted further and further North until by the 17th it had a common boundary with 356 Div in the SERRAVALLE area 7888. Under its command is 100 Mtn Regt.

Our advance along the CERASOLA ridge and two successful crossings of the river AUSA in the general area 8090 - 8291 forced the enemy to abandon S. MARTINO on the 19th and pull back to the last remaining ridge barring our entry to the plain. Along this ridge running from the Southern outskirts of RIMINI to FORTUNATO 8394 the enemy had recently made an attempt to build a defensive position, and FORTUNATO itself had been developed as a strongpoint. A captured map shows that this line was intended to continue through M. ARBORETTA 8091 and just West of SERRAVALLE 7787 down to S. MARINO. Our capture of the ARBORETTA feature on the 19th caused the enemy to fall back to an alternative line on the CERIANO ridge some 2,000 yds behind. The weight of our attack on FORTUNATO fell on one of the regiments of 162 Div (314 Regt) which is apparently fighting under command of 29 P.G. Div. Well over 200 prisoners have been taken from this regiment already and the FORTUNATO ridge was finally cleared of the enemy on 20th. As on previous occasions 1 Para Div on the coast had to conform with the enemy withdrawal here and to fall back on the night 20/21 behind the MARECCHIA river leaving rearguards in RIMINI till the next morning.

The battle of CERIANO ridge proved an even tougher proposition than that for FORTUNATO. 20 G.A.F. Div, whose arrival had been heralded as early as the 15th when 29 Div was making contact with its recce unit in the area of S. MARINO, made its appearance in the line in the fighting for the crossings over the river AUSA and has since apparently been under command of 26 Pz Div. Further West much needed reinforcements arrived for 356 Div on the night 19/20 in the shape of a battlegroup from 90 P.G. Div. This battlegroup was largely responsible for the successful defensive fighting which denied us the road running N.E. from CERIANO village to cross roads at R 7993. 26 Pz Div's tanks were in the area of these cross roads all day on 20th holding up our advance. Heavy casualties were suffered by both sides in the fighting for the ridge and by mid-day at least one unit of 90 P.G. Div was considerably reduced in strength. Although there were still elements left on the ridge early on the 21st, by about 1000 hours most of them had withdrawn behind the river MARECCHIA.

On the FLORENCE-BOLOGNA axis bitter fighting has taken place all the week to seize the dominating heights astride route 65 and the road to FIRENZUOLA. The main weight of our attack directed up the latter road fell on 12 Para Regt. The enemy seems to have appreciated too late the strength of our attack and by that time 12 Para Regt had got into serious difficulties as a result of heavy losses, and only a very scanty reinforcement was available. Consequently, companies of the regiment were being taken from one threatened sector to another, often arriving too late to prevent the capture of an important feature. The critical day was the 17th when 3 Bn which had successfully repelled all our attacks on M. ALTUZZO 9198 was to be rushed across to assist the 1st and 2nd Bns in grave trouble at MONTICELLI 8998. 3 Bn's move, which at 1000 hours the regimental commander said was to be made at the double, was delayed by the late arrival of the Infantry Lehr Regiment which was to relieve it, and the enemy was thrown out of MONTICELLI. The Lehr Regt had previously been in the line North of

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PISTOIA and its transfer Eastwards was the first in a series of moves aimed at bunching more tightly on the threatened FIRENZUOLA road. On the 18th our troops stormed and seized M. ALTUZZO and reached the watershed from where they advanced quickly to BARCO 9199 and M. LA CROCE L 9200. 12 Para Regt withdrew in disorder and at 1515 hrs said we had reached RIFREDO L 9100 and complained of lack of contact to the East with the Lehr Regt. On the 19th reinforcements arrived in the shape of 362 Recce unit, and by the next day two other regiments of 362 Div had been identified and it was clear that that div was moving in on the original left wing of 4 Para Div in the area of FIRENZUOLA. Its arrival did not, however, prevent us crossing the river SANTERNO East of the town that same day and reaching the slopes of Colle CAPRILE L 9307. The Lehr Regt seems to have crumbled away and 715 Div which has put up ineffective resistance in the mountains Northeast of BORGO S. LORENZO appears to be too weak and too thin on the ground to be able to hold unaided the mountains between the FIRENZUOLA-IMOLA road and the DICOMANO-FORLI road. On the 21st further reinforcements had arrived in the shape of two bns from 44 Div which lost prisoners East of FIRENZUOLA. The rest of the division may follow to bolster 715 Div. The time has been reached when the enemy must take a risk and the most reasonable place to do so is undoubtedly the sector between the main thrusts of 5 and 8 Army where he has probably appreciated by now that our intentions are not very serious.

362 Div's original sector North of PISTOIA has apparently been taken over by 16 SS Div although the evidence is at present scanty. This has left 42 Jg Div which relieved 20 G.A.F. Div North of LUCCA to hold the sector between the river SERCHIO and the Tyrrhenian sea.

Whatever the enemy's long term policy may be it is clear from the heavy fighting of the past week that he has had every intention of trying to hold the Appennine line. It is difficult to believe that at this stage of the war this decision could have been taken merely for reasons of prestige. In view of the critical situation on the Western front it would have been reasonable to expect that Kesselring would have been ordered to withdraw to a shorter line on the Alps and thus release some divisions for the West. Such has apparently not been the case, and he has been allowed to fight it out on the Appennines. In the course of the Adriatic battle Kesselring has committed ten divisions, and since these have failed to hold 8 Army on a narrow front suited to defence, it is difficult to see how the same force depleted in strength can now hope to stabilise in the plain between the N.E. slopes of the Appennines and the Adriatic. In addition he has now also to face the serious danger of a breakthrough by 5 Army down into the plain behind the bulk of his forces on the Adriatic. To meet this latter threat he has no reserves available unless he thins out still further on the Western part of the Gothic Line. This seems inevitable and we may find the bulk of 14 Army concentrating in the hills immediately South of BOLOGNA leaving only a thin screen to guard the roads into the mountains North of LUCCA and along the West coast.

The Allies having now forced their way past RIMINI, the enemy has little alternative but to try and make an orderly a withdrawal as possible. Although with the weakened force now left the enemy has little chance of stabilising in the plain, the country has many dykes and streams which can be used as delaying positions, and may still enable him to carry out a successful withdrawal. Should it rain the Allied chances of breaking through may be seriously hampered. The problem for Kesselring now is one of careful coordination in the movements of his Armies so that at no time does he gives us the opportunity to break through one Army and outflank the other. It is not an easy task, and its successful solution will largely depend on the whims of the weather and the Allied ability to maintain strong pressure.

.....2 ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS....

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

There is no indication this week of any major developments in the enemy supply situation. While the BRENNER rail route has been cut again it may now again have been repaired and all the frontier routes in the N.E. are apparently open. There should therefore be little difficulty in getting sufficient supplies into ITALY. Within ITALY itself, though considerable dislocation of railways continues in the N.W., through rail traffic to the Po river crossing points from PIACENZA Eastwards appears possible over a number of routes. No rail traffic over the Po is possible, but a considerable number of pontoon road bridges and ferries continue active and rail movements in the area South of the river have been noted. Under these circumstances a decisive shortage of supplies is not to be expected.

With reference to the Po itself, the most interesting developments this week are the discovery by PR of what is very probably an under-water bridge at a point about 15 Kms East of PIACENZA, and the fact that just North West of OSTIGLIA (F 7212) what was previously thought to be a road bridge under construction is now seen to be a rail bridge.

While details of the under-water bridge are not known it is probably suitable for LT. There are also ground reports of similar bridges at three other points, and while they have not as yet been picked up by PR, their existence is not unlikely. Presumably the enemy will still count heavily on the continued existence of such bridges when the time comes to withdraw North of the river; at least to date he must consider that this ruse has been successful.

For some time PR has shown that there was a bridge under construction just Northwest of OSTIGLIA at F 735125. A PR report of 17 Sept on this bridge is as follows: "It is now seen that the bridge is intended primarily for a rail bridge though it is likely that it will also be of sufficient width to carry road traffic. Twenty-eight piers spaced at some 15/20 feet apart, have been built across the river. Narrow planking, suitable for foot traffic only, has been laid apparently at the base of the piers. No decking has yet been laid on top of the piers. Much progress has been made in preparing the track up to either end of the bridge since Sept 12, but this does not yet appear complete, though nearly so."

Otherwise the situation along the Po is relatively unchanged except that a growing number of crossing points, particularly ferries, are becoming apparent. Whether the number has in fact increased of late or whether we are simply discovering more of those that have been in operation for some time, it is difficult to say; it is probably a combination of both. In any event it seems reasonably certain that the enemy will develop a maximum number of crossing points in order to permit a wide dispersion of traffic.

RAILWAYS

On 13 Sept two bridges were demolished between TRENTO and BOLZANO on the main BRENNER line, but these may now have been repaired. By 16 Sept the VERONA-UDINE-TARVISIO line was reopened and still remains passable throughout. The importance which the enemy attaches to this route is shown by the fact that he has started building rail diversions round the bridges. It is also reported that the narrow gauge line from PIEVE DI CADORE, North of BELLUNO, to DOBBIACO is being used for military purposes. DOBBIACO is on a standard gauge line which runs Westwards to FORTEZZA on the BRENNER route and East to SPITTAL and VILLACH; thus, by using this route, it is possible to by-pass a 200 Km stretch of the main BRENNER line, and both the TARVISIO and PIEDICOLLE routes. On the MILAN-VERONA-TREVISO line a bridge was destroyed West of PESCHIERA on 17 Sept, but the three main

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approaches to the Po, namely the PADUA-ROVIGO, VERONA-OSTIGLIA and BRESCIA-CASALMAGGIORE lines are all now open.

On the river Po itself all railway bridges remain impassable East of PAVIA, but the enemy continues to ferry supplies across by all means possible, and as indicated above there is a rail bridge under construction across the Po near OSTIGLIA.

South of the Po the PIACENZA-BOLOGNA-RIMINI line is now interdicted in five places, two of which are South of BOLOGNA, and the RAVENNA-RIMINI line has been abandoned, ten bridges having been blown along a 20 Km stretch on 15 Sep. Though there have, at several times during the past week, been cuts on both the OSTIGLIA-BOLOGNA and FERRARA-BOLOGNA lines, they have always been by-passable and fairly constant traffic has been reaching BOLOGNA from both North and NE, while to the South both the PISTOIA and PRATO lines remain open and there are reliable reports of trains running as far as RIOLA (L 6520), about 20 Km behind the present front line. Owing to lack of photo cover the condition of the PARMA-SPEZIA line, which was reported to have been interdicted by Partisans, is not certain, but it is now believed to be passable.

In the West dislocation continues to be at a high level. It is, however, now possible, by using very roundabout routes, to maintain traffic between TURIN and GENOA and between GENOA and MILAN without having to ferry round breaks. The GENOA-SPEZIA line remains absolutely impassable and is believed to have been abandoned, and to the SW of GENOA two bridges are still impassable between SAVONA and IMPERIA. Partisans have also been active in the West and claim to have cut communications between CUNEO and MONDOVI, FORNOVO DI TARO and FIDENZA, and NOVARA BORGO MANARO (J 6894) and MILAN, but there is, as yet no confirmation of these reports.

3. FRANCE.

The most sensational news in a week already outstanding for the breaching of the SIEGFRIED Defences South of AACHEN has come from a document captured by 7 Army. This is dated September 8 and announces that Field Marshal von RUNDSTEDT reassumed command in the West on 5 September, exactly 3 months after the first breaching of the Atlantic Wall, and 2 months after his replacement by von KLUGE. Thus the High Command in the West changes for the third time in 2 months. After the failure of von KLUGE and MODEL (both reported to be persona grata with Hitler) the enemy has had to fall back on the professional soldier of the old school so ruthlessly removed after the first month of the present battle. Whether the reappearance of RUNDSTEDT marks a general resumption of the war direction by the Army remains to be seen. It does at least suggest that some of the scales have fallen from the Fuehrer's eyes and that he seeks to regain the shattered confidence of the Army before it is too late.

Von RUNDSTEDT returned to a scene incomparably worse than that which he left in early July and his arrival was too late to stop the Allied armies breaching the West Wall as they had broken the Atlantic Wall in June. During the past week there have been important developments in all sectors. On the enemy's right, 15 Army, having abandoned the ALBERT Canal and withdrawn to the ESCAULT Canal, has been forced off this last defensive barrier before the Dutch frontier and Allied forces are now deep inside HOLLAND. The forces defending the ESCAULT Canal were for the most part of doubtful calibre and they had been weakened by the transfer of 3 Para Div to the LUXEMBOURG sector. The departure of this good fighting formation was hardly compensated for by the arrival of two new divisions from the REICH, and with the descent of Allied parachutists behind them, the defenders of the Canal wilted before the Allied frontal assault. The new arrivals were 176 Inf Div and 182 Res Div, both from GERMANY. The commander of 176 Div is now in our hands, and brought the interesting news that

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5 Pz Army is commanded by von ZANGEN, one time commander of a Corps in North ITALY. Prisoners had previously reported that the former Army Commander, SEPP von DIETRICH, had fallen victim to an Allied tank attack on 31 Aug.

On the left flank of 15 Army, in the MAASTRICHT area, resistance has been comparatively light, and MAASTRICHT was taken without great difficulty. Among the defenders of the approaches to the MAASTRICHT gap was 22 GAF Div, a revived edition of the formation believed to have been disbanded early this year, which had fought in RUSSIA and was reported to have been in Northern ITALY for a time in the autumn of 1943.

One of the three coastal garrisons under 15 Army's command, BOULOGNE, fell on 20 Sep after [redacted] fighting. DUNKIRK and CALAIS still hold out, although the defenders of the former have withdrawn to a narrower perimeter this week, while the troops in the CALAIS area have been giving themselves the doubtful pleasure of firing off large quantities of ammunition from the long range coastal guns. 6,000 PW have so far been taken at BOULOGNE. On WALCHEREN Island, there is now a considerable number of troops which, with the arrival of further escapees across the SCHELDT estuary, have been swollen to some 40,000 in number, and are effectively denying us the use of ANTWERP.

Meanwhile on 15 Army's left, it is believed that 7 Army now holds a sector from MAASTRICHT down to the THIONVILLE area. 7 Army was thought to have been relieved by 5 Pz Army after the collapse of the SEINE line, but with the disengagement of the bulk of the German armour to the North of AACHEN and the area behind the MOSELLE, it is likely that 5 Pz Army's turn has now come to lick its wounds while the battered 7 Army reappears to defend the German frontier. In this sector we are now meeting the savagest opposition since the break-out at AVRANCHES last July, but 7th Army has nonetheless been unable to prevent us achieving an important breach of the West wall. Both lines of the SIEGFRIED defences have been penetrated in the area South of AACHEN and the town is reported to be surrounded. Elements of at least five divs are reported in this area, including yet another raw arrival from GERMANY, 526 Gren Div. This formation is well up to the standard of the recent arrivals. It is about 14 days old and composed of training and replacement personnel. It is to be expected that other reinforcements of this, and possibly of better calibre will be brought up to assist 7 Army in the defence of its all-important sector. The Wehrkreise on the German border have been mobilised and 2nd grade reserve personnel (i.e. the physically unfit the untrained and the over 35's) are being brought up to reinforce the defences.

South of THIONVILLE, 1 Army has been fighting hard around the MOSELLE crossings, and the French fortress of METZ has proved a very difficult nut to crack. The infantry elements in this area have been reinforced by the Pz Lehr Division, while 21 Pz Div is reported to be refitting somewhere behind the MOSELLE and may shortly put in an appearance. 1 Army's weakest sector has been its left flank where the contact with 19 Army from the South of FRANCE, if it exists at all, must be tenuous in the extreme. The enemy has been unable to hold NANCY or EPINAL and Allied forces have thrust on to within 50 miles of STRASBOURG. 708 and 716 Inf Divs have appeared in this area but seem to have offered little effective resistance.

In the South it is believed that the remnants of 19 Army have reached the BELFORT area after their disheartened and costly withdrawal, and have probably succeeded in forming a continuous front with 1 Army on their right. On the left flank 11 Pz Div is still fighting hard

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before BELFORT, while the long L of C from the South of FRANCE does little to help the Allied Armies in this area. In front of 19 Army, the junction of the Allied 7th and 3rd Armies has brought about the end of all organised German resistance in the South West. 18,000 P.W. have been taken, comprising three generals, an admiral and miscellaneous naval, military and air personnel.

The scene which confronts the new C in C West is not encouraging. His casualties since D day are thought to be in the neighbourhood of 900,000 comprising 600,000 P.W. and men cut off in isolated garrisons, some 200,000 long term wounded, and 100,000 killed. With recent reinforcements he may now have at his disposal as many as 20 full strength divisions. But he has also to hold a frontier, the defence of which requires some 70 to 80 full strength divisions, and his main fortifications are already breached in one sector. Von RUNDSTEDT may well wonder if it was worth coming back.

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C R Mitch

BRIGADIER,
D.G.S.(I)

GSI(a)
HQ, A.A.I.
22 Sep 44

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TOP SECRET COPY NO 28 OPERATIONAL

[illegible] INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 63

[illegible] 29 SEPTEMBER, 1944

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1. [illegible]

The past week has shown no change in the enemy's tactics in the two areas of our attack. Both on the Adriatic coast and in the mountain sector North of FLORENCE he has continued to give ground only where hard pressed and numerous counter-attacks and strong and at times desperate resistance have further reduced the strength of some of his formations. In spite of his determined defence however he has been forced back in both sectors and on the Adriatic we now stand along the FIUMICINO RIVER, where the enemy has occupied a position which he calls "GERBER" and are attacking SAVIGNANO and the ridge to the S.W. of it, while South of BOLOGNA our advanced troops are on MONTE BIANCHI (I 0617) and we hold a line roughly from C.[illegible] (I 0117) on the PORRETTANA-BOL. road to S.[illegible] DI SAMBUCO (I 9115).

Between the Adriatic and the centre and between the centre and the West coast the enemy has thinned out to a very considerable degree to provide the necessary support for his two threatened fronts. The Adriatic sector has been reinforced by 11th Div whose place has apparently been taken by 356 Div - prisoners were taken from I Bn 870 G.R. area R 0102 on 27 Sep. The whole of 4th Div has moved across on to the PIANCASTELLI-DOZZA axis and 305 Div has moved Westwards to take on the DIOCLIZIO-BOZZI road and has at least one bn as far North as the [illegible]-DOZZA road. The gap left by these two latter divisions may have been filled by 90 Division. Both 90 and 356 Divisions have been very severely handled and their strength whittled away. If the exigencies of the moment do not permit of their being given a complete rest the mountain sector between the advances of 5 and 8 Armies, where our own pressure has never been heavy, is the most fitting place to put them.

Most of 90 P.G. Division, lately on the Franco-Italian frontier, has meanwhile been identified in the line and appears to be controlling some of 356 Divisional Artillery. This is the most formidable reinforcement that the enemy in the Adriatic has received and it has permitted him to keep some control over the pace of his withdrawal.

South of BOLOGNA 4 Para Div and the Lehr Brigade have had very heavy casualties. 12 Para Regt of the former has been reduced to a battle-group whose strength can hardly exceed one bn although the other two regts are less severely affected, while I Bn of the Brigade had about 80 men on 27 Sep and II Bn was reported by prisoners to have formed a battle-group out of 5 of its own.

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Apart from the arrival of 44 Div the lay-out of divisions in this area remains unchanged with 305 Div covering the FOGLI road, 715 Div that to [illegible], 44 Div that to D'OLI while 362 and 4 Para Divs point road by the Edar Brigade hold the sector from the D'OLI road to westward the SO Bisting. Further to the West there has been considerable evidence of a move on the part of 65 Div. Actual destination however not yet apparent and though No 6 HQ LAG G.H. was at L 5524 on 27 Sep, rearguards of all three no to were still in the original area S.W. of PISTOIA on 27 Sep. In this sector prisoners have talked of long withdrawals by 42 and 16 SS Divs as imminent and air recce and ground patrols show that the prepared "GOTHIC LINE" positions between the 30 and 75 Bisting are no longer occupied.

It may well be therefore that here at any rate the enemy has decided that he must begin to face the situation, by extricating those troops whose present positions are not vital and who would be left in disagreeable isolation by an Allied break-through to BOLOGNA. On the East coast, despite our advance from the S.W. to within 20 kms of D'OLI, the enemy shows no signs as yet of making a hasty withdrawal, and for the past two days has bitterly contested the ground S.W. of SAVIGNANO. On several occasions in the past the enemy has delayed his withdrawal dangerously late and despite his apparent confidence it is possible that he may repeat the mistake he made at C.M.ERO where a tardy decision to withdraw cost the parachutists many unnecessary casualties.

2. [illegible] AND COMMUNICATIONS

The [illegible] railway is now known to have been open since 16 Sep and traffic on it is reported to be heavy. Work is still in progress on the by-pass round the [illegible] viaduct, which is probably the most vulnerable part of this line. The by-pass was begun in August and is now in an advanced state of construction. The enemy has also been constructing new roads in the [illegible] area to by-pass the existing roads and by-pass vulnerable points.

In the NE all the bridges over the river [illegible] are now impassable cutting all routes to [illegible] and the Austrian border, and heavy AD movement has been reported in this area. Rail traffic has been reported between DOMEGLIO and [illegible]. This line can be reached from [illegible] via the narrow gauge line from PIEVE DI CADORE to DOMEGLIO, thus by-passing both the main [illegible] and [illegible] routes. The PIEVE DI CADORE-DOMEGLIO line, which has been reported to be in use last week, has a capacity of 400 tons of freight or 4,500 men per day.

The approaches to the R. [illegible] over the [illegible]-[illegible]-[illegible]-PADUA line remain open and continual traffic over the river is reported both by ferry and pontoon bridges. Traffic appears to be especially heavy in the [illegible] and CUTIGLIANO areas. At CUTIGLIANO the new railway bridge was brought into use some time between the 22nd and 25th September, thus making direct rail traffic possible between the [illegible] and BOLOGNA. This bridge was, however, attacked and two central spans destroyed on 26 Sep.

South of the Po traffic continues all along the [illegible]-BOLOGNA-FORLI line, as far South as PARMA, and the enemy is still pushing traffic North from BOLOGNA; fifty trucks were seen at VADO on 22 Sep.

In the NW the situation has somewhat deteriorated from our point of view, and direct traffic is now possible between TURIN, MILAN and GENOA, and between GENOA and the French border; there are also reports of a new road bridge to be built at [illegible] and of repair works in progress on the PIACENZA-GENOA road.

No reports have now been received of industrial plants being dismantled at TURIN; whilst we have no confirmation of this report, it is quite possible

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that the enemy is evacuating machinery to GERMANY, and this would appear to fit in with reports received lately of heavy rail traffic into the RUHR.

J. WESTERN FRONT

"GERMANY has lost a battle but not the war", commented Dr WAGNER of the German Press and Ministry on 25 Sep. Events in the West during the past week have shown clearly that von RUNDSTEDT and the forces under him subscribe in full to HAMLET'S sentiments. The enemy resistance has on all sectors been tenacious, and Allied progress has been slower than at any time since the break-out from AVRANCHES in July. The British corridor from EINDHOVEN to ARNHEM has been the main centre of interest. Some II SS Pz Corps has directed its activities to the elimination of the Allied airborne force West of ARNHEM, and to attacking both flanks of our salient North of EINDHOVEN. An SS battlegroup FRUNDSBERG (the title of 10 SS Pz Div) composed of elements of both 9 and 10 SS Pz Divs has caused the greatest trouble. It is has been exerting heavy pressure against our main supply axis and on 25 Sep did in fact succeed in effecting a temporary cut of the EINDHOVEN-ARNHEM road, which was cleared by a successful counter-attack later in the day. In this area elements of Hermann Goering Pz Regt (presumably from its depot at UTRECHT) and 107 Pz Bde have been identified. The latter is reported to have some 40 Panthers. On the East side of the Allied salient enemy resistance has not been so stiff and we have made good progress East of HELMOND where the German frontier has been crossed, and S.E. of EINDHOVEN where the MAAS has been reached. Two new divisions have been identified in this sector - the 3 Pz Gren, an infantry division (last located on the Eastern front in April of this year), and an upgraded Admin div from GERMANY.

Between ARNHEM and TRIER the week has been relatively quiet, and the enemy has been able to prevent any important exploitation of our penetration of the second siegfried defence line, South of ARNHEM. This sector has been reinforced by a Panzer Division, together with an infantry division newly arrived following a refit in GERMANY after its battering in the East earlier this year. In the TRIER area yet another new infantry division from GERMANY has been identified.

In the ARMY sector enemy resistance remains strong, but further South we have now reached LUNEVILLE and CHATEAU SALINS. A concentration of enemy armour in the sector North and South of LUNEVILLE is becoming apparent, and the enemy is now showing some aggressiveness here. There are at least four Pz or P.G. divs and a Pz Bde in the vicinity, and there is a considerable number of tanks in the FORET DE PARROY (East of LUNEVILLE). Some of these have been dug in owing to lack of petrol. This armour may well form part of the missing 5 Pz Army which is thought to have been refitting after its heavy losses in the August battles. Its reappearance in the line would relieve Army Gp of some of the responsibility for a very long and critical sector of the front.

From LUNEVILLE down to the Swiss frontier there has been little to report. EPINAL has been taken after heavy fighting, but elsewhere resistance has been fierce and the enemy has launched frequent counter-attacks. 11 Pz Div has been showing some aggressiveness in front of BELFORT.

With the capitulation of BREST, the destruction of three further enemy divisions is accounted. In addition 30 SS Div has finally disintegrated following the desertion of the majority of its personnel, and is not carried on the Order of Battle. The nominal total of enemy divisions in the West is now put at 57 divisions. The equivalent strength of these forces, estimated on the basis of personnel available, but ignoring the widespread shortages of equipment, is put at 27 full strength divisions. Now that 1 and 19

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Armies have linked up in Central FRANCE it is probable that Army Group 'G' will again resume control of 1 Army. (Both Armies were under Army Group 'G' in the pre-invasion days but on the evacuation of S.W. FRANCE 1 Army passed to Army Group 'B'.) In addition, if 5 Pz Army is now coming into the line between 1 and 19 Armies in the MONTVILLE area, it is likely that this too will come under Army Group 'G'. This leaves Army Group 'B' with 15 and 7 Armies, and there is now more evidence for supposing that 1 Para Army also holds a sector elsewhere on the German right. It is reliably reported that the Army Commander, General STUDENT, has established his H.Q. at TILBURG. There has been conflicting information regarding the identity of Army Group 'B's Commander following ROMMEL's recent injury, but it would not be surprising to find MODEL in command. Prior to RUNDSTEDT's reappearance he was thought to combine the duties of C in C West and Army Group 'B' Commander. As the Commander of two Army Groups in the East this year, and a reported personal favourite of HITLER, he seems well qualified to take over the somewhat faded glory of the departed desert fox.

Army Group B's sector probably extends from the North sea to the ARDENNES and includes what is at present the most vital part of the front, the sector from the North sea to ANTWERP. The enemy's fluxed reactions in this sector in the past week have shown clearly that he appreciates the critical nature of the battle here. Defeat here would mean at least the outflanking of the Siegfried Line, and an Allied advance Southwards through the flat country North of ANTWERP might even mean that the line of the RHINE, on which a final stand will be made, would be outflanked. On the other hand if the enemy can hold the Allies South of the Lower RHINE, he will gain time to produce new divisions, the fruits of the present total mobilisation, and possibly a new increase in his Air Force. Wishful and short term hopes they may be, but GERMANY can now only work on a short term policy. The front of the British Army Group is likely therefore to have first priority for reinforcements at this present time, and we must expect fresh divisions from the RUHR and possibly some from other sectors of the front to make an early appearance there.

GSI(.)
.....I.
29.Sep.44.

DEPUTY DIR,
M.I.5.(I).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 64

OF 12 OCT, 44

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NOTE: No Intelligence Summary was issued on 6 October, 44.

1. ENEMY SITUATION

Whatever the enemy's intentions may have been at the critical stage of the battle in the middle of last month - and certain precautions against a possible withdrawal over the Po were undoubtedly taken - there can be little doubt that KESSELRING is now determined to hold the Appennines and fight in the RIMINI Plain as long as he can. On the 6th an order signed by HITLER that the Appennine position must be held at all costs was passed to all troops. The rumour that a withdrawal across the Po was inevitable had been going the rounds and HITLER's order will have helped to dispel this feeling of uncertainty and as a morale booster will have been welcomed by KESSELRING who appears to have been fairly confident of his ability to halt the Allied offensive. In the stubborn battle of attrition he has fought he has clearly been playing for time, hoping to wear down the attacks of 5 and 8 Armies till the weather broke and came to his assistance. In part it must be confessed that KESSELRING has succeeded in his object, for though the Gothic Line has now been shattered except at its Western extremity, where in any case our attempts have not been serious, he has been able to slow down our advance and on the Eastern coast to bring it to a halt in the Plain itself. For this he is much indebted to the weather which in the past ten days has reduced the RIMINI Plain to a morass and has greatly hampered operations in the mountains. A gambler's luck and an apparently shrewd appreciation of Allied strength and resources enabled him to hold out, albeit at cost of heavy casualties, till the weather broke and reduced the power of Allied air and armoured superiority.

Since 1 Oct progress on the Adriatic has been limited to the mountains South of SAVIGNANO where 278 Div, 114 Div and 356 Div were unable to prevent our crossing of the FIUMICINO RUBICONE. Our advance had no immediate reactions further North where 90 P.G. Div, now complete on Route 9, 26 Pz Div with elements of 20 GAF Div under command, 29 P.G. Div and 1 Para Div, in that order from South to North, retained their hold on the Western bank of the stream. By the 10th however, the right wing of 76 Corps had been swung back to a line running approximately from LONGIANO - M. FARUTO - MONTE CODRUZZO and 90 P.G. and 26 Pz Divs' positions opposite SAVIGNANO began to be threatened from the flank. Already on the 9th two bns of 90 P.G. were on the move and by the 11th our patrols were able to cross the FIUMICINO against negligible opposition and advance 2,000 yards up Route 9. There are many waterways and canals nearly all equally suitable for delaying positions and probably the enemy will choose to hinge his line near CASETTOLA N 6604 from where the line could follow either the SCOLO RIGOSA or SCOLO RICONCELLO and join up with the canal which runs along 095 Northing, where air observation has shown certain defensive preparations in progress. Alternatively he may decide to go right back to the line of the R. Savio. Meantime the enemy had taken certain precautions to meet our thrust through the mountains. Four of the best divisions in ITALY

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were sitting in the plain watching our progress in the mountains and unable to prevent it. 29 P.G. Div was therefore taken out of the line, its sector being presumably taken over by 1 Para stretching Southwards and 26 Pz Div Northwards, for no new formation has arrived, and placed initially in reserve. On the night 9/10 Oct III Bn 71 G.R. was moved in transport to MONTE CODRUZZO and sent straight into the line, and since then deserters from I Bn have also reached us. On the 10th the other regt - 15 G.R. - had its H.Q. in the SAVIO Valley South of CESENA and it was clear that the whole division was being drawn in on this flank. The most likely role for 29 P.G. Div is on the right of 114 Div, still a strong division, between it and 356 Division which despite the arrival of a March Bn in Oct is still in a very poor state. 356 Div will therefore probably be pushed away to the West behind the SAVIO River.

South of BOLOGNA despite bitter resistance and continuous reinforcing the enemy has been gradually forced further and further back. Desperate attempts to regain M. BATTAGLIA M 0617 caused about 4 Oct, when the enemy was forced to switch his effort Westwards where 4 Para Div was in difficulties on Route 65. The enemy had apparently expected our main thrust to develop up the road to IMOLA and it was here that he brought in 334 Div (relieved on Route 64 by 16 SS Div) to take over part of the heavy responsibility shouldered by 44 Div. The latter at one time stretched from M. BATTAGLIA across to about the 95 Easting, but latterly it seems to have vanished from the line altogether, leaving the Eastern part of its sector to 334 Div and the Western part to 98 Div. The latter, replenished from a regt of the SILESIA Reinforcement Div, has now all regts in the line again: it has already had casualties since its return, losing 150 PW on one day.

It is on the main FLORENCE-BOLOGNA road that the enemy has had most cause to worry. Astride this road were two very battered divisions 362 Div and 4 Para Div: the latter took the brunt of our attack on the Gothic Line, and the former has been driven back through the mountains East of the road with heavy casualties. The identification of 147 G.R. (65 Div), brought in in an unsuccessful attempt to hold M. BIBELE L 9123, was the first evidence of a move across by 65 Div, though there had been indications for some time that moves were in progress in 65 Div sector North of PISTOIA. It is now known that 94 Div, which was very badly cut up in May and June and retired to N.E. ITALY to reform, has come back into the line and taken over 65 Div's sector. The latter has therefore been released for a more active role and is now astride Route 65 engaged in desperate fighting round LIVERGNANO 8729; and 4 Para Div which has suffered heavy casualties, including 1,400 prisoners alone since 10 Sep, is now reduced to a narrow sector between 65 Div and 16 SS Div. There are signs in fact that 16 SS Div is encroaching into 4 Para Div's area - 35 prisoners were taken between the 81 and 82 Eastings - and though prisoners' stories that they are about to be relieved may be no more than wishful rumours, a short rest and refit for those parachutists who have been in continuous action since ANZIO is very likely.

KESSELRING now has some twenty-eight divisions under his command, of which eighteen are committed in the front line and two (44 and 362 Divs) are in immediate reserve reforming with odd bns probably still forward or returning to the line after a short period of rest; five are in N.W. ITALY - 148 and 157 Res Mtn Divs, 34 Inf Div, 5 Mtn Div (less one regt involved in the Adriatic fighting and since identified on one day N.W. of BATTAGLIA) and an unidentified division reported North of GENOA; and in ISTRIA and N.E. ITALY are 188 Res Mtn Div, 237 Div and 71 Div which is reliably reported to have reached the UDINE area where presumably it will combine garrison duties with reorganisation in the same way as its predecessor - 94 Div. With this force - equivalent to some fifteen full strength divisions - and GRAZIANI's Republican Forces which now number some seven trained divisions, of doubtful fighting quality but useful for occupational duties, the Italian front is now by comparison more strongly held than any other German front. It is therefore surprising that KESSELRING has not been called upon to give up any divisions for the Western front, especially in as much as all the divisions which have been involved in the fighting in ITALY are trained and seasoned troops while many of the divisions recently committed in the West are composed of totally inexperienced fortress bns, GAF Signals units, Home Service battalions and new recruits from industry all hastily collected and rushed to the front line with little training and few weapons, relying mainly on desperate patriotism to see them through. How much longer Kesselring will

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continue to be so fortunate it is impossible to tell, but for the moment his aim will clearly be to keep as far South in ITALY as possible, holding whatever line he can and trying to seal off threats of a break-through by makeshift reinforcement from quiet sectors of the front. Though ITALY will continue to be a running sore for GERMANY, the High Command must appreciate that it is likewise a drain on Allied resources and probably hopes that by keeping us fully occupied in trying to force our way through to the Po, there is less danger of a landing on the Dalmatian coast behind his forces in the Balkans. The time may be very near when the Russian advance will compel the enemy to withdraw his S.E. Army from SERBIA and YUGOSLAVIA into CROATIA and ISTRIA, and he may then consider that Kesselring's task is completed. By this time fogs and bad weather will make his evacuation across the Po less precarious and, once back on the ADIGE line where work on defences is being carried on at high pressure, divisions could be spared for other theatres. So far however there is no firm evidence that the withdrawal has started and stubborn resistance will remain the order of the day.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

On the BRENNER railway line the AVISIO viaduct which had been impassable since 30 Sep, was working again for single line traffic by 4 Oct, and PR of the same date shows that the loop-line by-passing this viaduct, which has been under construction for some time, is now rapidly nearing completion. A ground source report of 27 Sep stated that another by-pass on the BRENNER is under construction between S. MICHELE (A. 7937) and ORA (A. 9254), and on 4 Oct PR reported work in progress on a new line running South from the ORA marshalling yards. North of BRUNZOLO the tracks were cut on 4 Oct but have now probably been repaired. PR shows only light activity at TRENTO and BOLZANO since the end of Sep, but ground sources state that movement over the BRENNER route now takes places mainly at night and it is probable that trains go straight through as far as the VERONA area.

To the NE all the railway bridges over the R. PIAVE were still impassable on the 4 Oct, thus no direct traffic has been possible from MESTRE, TREVISO or VICENZA to the CARVISIO and PIEDICOLLE passes. Turnover at CARVISIO, TREVISO and MESTRE has been very light since 26 Sep, and whilst this is, no doubt, partly due to the destruction of the Piave bridges, here again appearances may be misleading as the tendency would be to do as little marshalling as possible between PADUA and the frontier. The most natural marshalling area for railway traffic both to and from the North and NE frontiers is in the yards along the VERONA-PADUA trunk line which has been heavily loaded and very active of late.

All railway bridges over the Po East of PIACENZA remain impassable, but most of the approaches to the river both North and South are open. The most important of these is the VERONA-BOLOGNA line which, except for the bridge over the Po at OSTIGLIA, is open throughout; the PADUA-BOLOGNA line too is blocked at only one place South of the river and open North of it. Rail activity at BOLOGNA continues to be lively and 330 wagons were waiting on the main line North of the town on 1 Oct. Both ground sources and photo recce show that the PIACENZA-BOLOGNA line was active up to the end of Sep, but little activity has been noted since. Repairs are now stated to be in progress on the SPEZIA-PARMA line which for some time past has been subject to Partisan attacks.

In the N.W. on the main line from MILAN to GENOA three bridges are impassable between PAVIA and TORTONA, but traffic is possible between GENOA and MILAN via ALESSANDRIA, NOVARA and BUSTO ARSIZIO. The main line from GENOA to TURIN is passable throughout and through traffic is possible by a roundabout route between TURIN and MILAN. On the coast the line is now open from GENOA to VENTIMIGLIA. The marshalling yards at TURIN were heavily loaded on 30 Sep and 3 Oct and there has been a great deal of activity on the line between MILAN and BRESCIA; ALESSANDRIA yards have also been active.

The roads in NW ITALY have been very active in the last fortnight; ground sources reported constant traffic in the ALESSANDRIA area, on the MILAN-TURIN autostrada and between SPEZIA and PARMA during the last days of Sep, and since 1 Oct bomber pilots have twice reported rather heavy traffic moving generally N/S on roads West of the line MILAN-GENOA.

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A SS order of 21 Sep stated that all fuel dumps on the Lombardy plain were to be evacuated [illegible] to the area West of VERONA. Earlier in the month it was reported that supplies were being evacuated from GENOA and that fuel from installations at MILAN, LODI, PIACENZA, REGGIO EMELIA and CASTALLA was to be moved to TRENTO area, whilst on 29 Sep the German High Command was stated to have ordered the moving of all fuel and ammunition dumps South of the Po to areas North of the river.

On 3 Oct PR reported that a dump in the MANTUA area had probably been moved and that the sites of fuel and ammunition dumps round IMOLA are now deserted. Whilst the reports from ground sources are probably exaggerated and it is not yet thought that any large scale evacuation of supplies is taking place, rail and road movement appears to indicate a general thinning out, especially in the N.W.

3. WESTERN FRONT

Although there has been no spectacular change in the front line since the last Summary, the period has not been unsatisfactory for the Allies. In the South, 19 Army has been forced to give ground every day. In the NANCY area, all enemy counter-attacks have come to nothing, while North of AACHEN and on both flanks of our salient in HOLLAND, small but useful advances have been made. In the rear of the present front line, the fortress of CALAIS has been taken, and the CAP GRIS NEZ guns have fired their last rounds on to English soil.

At the end of September, 19 Army was weakened by the transfer of 11 Pz Div from the BELFORT area to the NANCY sector where 5 Pz Army was making strenuous efforts. Even with its departure the depleted forces of 19 Army have continued to offer vigorous resistance, but have been unable to prevent the Allies from making steady gains, particularly on 19 Army's right flank where RAHERVILLERS has been taken by American forces. To the North of 19 Army in the LUNEVILLE-NANCY-METZ sector, 5 Pz Army, reinforced by 11 Pz Division and a Panzer Brigade, has been utilising its armour with vigour. It was in this sector that an armoured concentration was reported at the end of September. Since then, the enemy has employed as many as 200 tanks in action here in a series of violent counter-attacks. The object of these attacks has probably been to blunt the nose of our advance across the MOSELLE in the direction of the VOSGES. In this area it is clear that the enemy prefers to make full use of the natural advantages for defence of the terrain rather than fall back to the Siegfried Line in a sector where it suffers the double disadvantage of the kink at STRASBOURG, and of being on the RHINE itself South of KARLSRUHE. Having temporarily halted our advance in this area, it looks as if the enemy is abandoning his offensive activity and a Southward shift of his armour from the NANCY area to reinforce 19 Army's right wing is becoming apparent. Both 11 Pz and 21 Pz Divs have shifted South and it is probable that 15 P.G. Div has followed suit.

Between METZ and AACHEN the German Seventh Army's front has been quiet. There has been a considerable thinning out of enemy armour in the ARDENNES recently, leaving this the most weakly held sector of the whole front, particularly in front of LUXEMBOURG where Fortress troops are now believed to be in position on the West Wall. The well tried 2 SS Pz Div is still in the line, but four of the armoured divs formerly in this area have been withdrawn. The disappearance of these forces is reminiscent of the departure of 5 Pz Army at the beginning of last month, and like 5 Pz Army, they may reappear, after a refit, in a new sector. One at least has already made its appearance S.E. of ARNHEM.

The AACHEN area has been lively in the past week, although here too the bulk of the enemy armour has been withdrawn from the line. The only new identification since the last Summary has been in this sector - 246 Gren Division, a rehashed version of the infantry Div which was destroyed in the East in June. The enemy has been counter-attacking with vigour but with little success South of AACHEN, while North of the town our attack has encountered desperate enemy resistance from pillboxes, artillery and mortars around GELLENKIRCHEN.

The withdrawal of 9 and 116 Pz Divs and 105 Pz Brigade from the

.....AACHEN area.....

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ARNHEM area suggested that the enemy was preparing a mobile force for use in another sector - probably in the British salient in HOLLAND. It was not surprising therefore to find all three formations together with 1 SS Pz Div reappearing on the East of the salient. The enemy has now the elements of five armoured divisions in this area. The new arrivals provided timely reinforcement for the weak and poor quality infantry divisions of 1 Para Army and their appearance in this sector has enabled the enemy to launch a series of vigorous, though up to now unsuccessful, counter-attacks against the right flank of the salient. These attacks have been launched from the REICHSWALD, S.E. of NIJMEGEN, and from the area N.E. of NIJMEGEN, suggesting that the enemy's intention is to eliminate our bridgehead over the WAAL. So far, however, the enemy attacks have not been in very great strength, partly because of the hammering his armour has received from our artillery and air force, partly because of his supply difficulties over the waterways. On the West of the salient, 15 Army with its forces fully committed has been fighting hard, but has been unable to prevent us advancing North and South of the WAAL, nor from progressing into HOLLAND North of the TURNHOUT-ANTWERP Canal. Some Eastward movement has been observed North of ARNHEM but this does not as yet seem to be on a scale to suggest that a major withdrawal of 15 Army is in progress. The enemy has probably over 100,000 men to the West of our salient including the large number who escaped to WALCHEREN island last month and it is to be expected that superfluous bodies are now being removed before Allied pressure compels the withdrawal of the entire 15 Army.

Although only one new division has appeared in the West during the past week, there seems no reason to believe that we have seen the end of that has been called the Götterdämmerung wave of new divisions. Despite reinforcements, the enemy's forces in the West are still inadequate to hold the present line against a large scale Allied attack. Nowhere has he anything to spare, and the reinforcement of one threatened area is only achieved at the expense of another. The arrival of further reinforcements for the West is therefore to be expected. All Goebel's words about the total mobilisation with which he has been entrusted may not be empty boasts, and we shall undoubtedly see more Grenadier divisions putting in their appearance. On the other hand the Panzer Brigade of which at least seven have been in action in the West, do not seem to have been very successful and it is doubtful whether any more will be formed. They had been formed for the most part from battered Pz Divs, and although of good fighting morale, were too small to recuperate after heavy losses. The first priority for reinforcements, particularly in infantry, must still be in HOLLAND where the enemy may yet hope to get through to MINNOVEN from the East in conjunction with 15 Army in the West. Taking only second place to this, the enemy strategy must call for the destruction of our foothold across the Siegfried Line in the AACHEN sector. Here the line has already been pierced and the threat of an Allied breakthrough must be ever present. The reappearance in that sector of some of the armour now refitting seems very probable. For the rest, the West must take its chance for reinforcements in competition with the ragging front in the East where the threat to Germany's frontiers is now developing from yet another direction.

C E Kitchen

BRIGADIER,
D.D.S.I. (I).

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...AAI.
12 Oct 44.

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H.Q. ... A. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 65

OF 19 OCT. 44.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

HITLER's orders are being obeyed and Army Group 'C' remains committed to a desperate defensive. This week KESSELRING has clearly recognised that the most dangerous part of his line lies astride route 65; he has thrown in there again elements of an exhausted division which was due for a rest (44 Inf), a battle group of another division whose main body is further West (94 Inf), a mobile div from the 8 Army sector (29 P.G.) and parts of another (90 P.G.) and by bringing into the line for the first time a newly-formed division previously in N.W. ITALY (232 Inf) he has enabled 94 and 16 SS Divs to extend to the East and thicken up their sectors. This has meant a certain weakening on the East coast, and ground has been abandoned there. And it has not prevented Fifth Army from advancing to within 10 miles of BOLOGNA.

On the Adriatic the enemy at the beginning of the week was defending the SCOLO RIGOSSA ditch, the position known as CHRISTA TWO, though 1 Para Div was still forward of this. On 15 Oct we crossed this obstacle astride route 9 without much opposition and by next day the enemy in the plain was definitely withdrawing to the PISCIATELLO, known as HEDWIG ONE. On 17 Oct we had obtained a small bridgehead at 634065. There is still one more delaying position laid down, HEDWIG TWO, which runs just in front of CESENA, before the river SAVIO, the enemy's main defence line on his present scheme, is reached. It seems that the enemy does not intend any serious stand on the lines forward of the SAVIO which he has laid down but rather that they are regarded as phase lines in what looks almost like a timed programme of withdrawal. A minor, controlled withdrawal on the extreme left was probably forced on him by the necessity to detach troops for the vital central sector; moreover, if the danger of a breakthrough in the centre is as great as these measures seem to indicate it will be safer for him to have his left back on the SAVIO rather than on the RUBICON.

In the mountain sector of 8 Army's front the enemy made no attempt to hold the upper SAVIO and by 14 Oct 879 GR was back behind the BORELLO. The regt does not, however, appear to have intended seriously to hold the line as we were able on 17 Oct to push patrols as far as R 5299. The fact is that 356 Div has much too long a front for its present strength; its sector extends from the 10 to the 50 Eastings and covers the whole of the great bulge running South down to the 90 Northing while a return on 17 Oct for I Bn 870 showing a fighting strength of 155 all ranks is believed to be fairly representative of other units of the division. Here again the enemy has weakened his positions and accepted the necessity of withdrawal by removing troops from the central sector: 29 P.G. Div which was to the East of 356 has moved hastily to 5 Army front and has been inadequately replaced by 993 G.R. of 278 Div.

In the centre the most important fighting has been due South of BOLOGNA, on and in the neighbourhood of route 65. At the beginning of this

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from left to right. Elements of 44 Div were being put in on 13 Oct and parts of all three regts have now been identified between the 93 and 97 Eastings. A further stiffening was seen on 14 Oct when prisoners were taken from both bns of 267 G.R. on the 901 Easting; they seem, however, to be separate from the rest of 94 Div which is still apparently between VERGATO and PORRETTA TERME. On 14 Oct also a prisoner was taken from III Bn 71 P.G.R. in the area L 869307; since then all three bns of the regt have been identified in this sector and Div H.Q. has left the 8th Army front. 15 P.G.R. appears also to be on the way though II bn was still at MONTERDALE on 17 Oct. 29 P.G. Div will probably take over the sector East of route 65. Finally on 18 Oct prisoners were taken at L 9830 from III Bn 361 of 90 P.G. Div; II Bn is also in the neighbourhood though I Bn is still back on the Adriatic and lost PW, also on 18 Oct, at M 630062. 200 G.R. also appears to be there but Div HQ was moving the same day and it is possible that more elements may yet be sent across. In the meantime 65 Div, which has had very heavy losses, has been restricted to a very narrow sector actually astride route 65. On its right 4 Para Div is also on a very narrow sector since PW have been taken from 36 SS on the 83 Easting. 16 SS Div sector appears to stretch as far as the 73 Easting, where PW have been taken from 274 G.R., and 94 Div, in turn to have a boundary with the newly arrived (and newly formed) 232 Div somewhere in the area of the 58 Easting. The result has been a pronounced thickening up in the area immediately South of BOLOGNA. In spite of this we have succeeded in advancing some two miles beyond LIVERGNATO (L 8729) which was captured on 15 Oct and in fierce fighting have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy.

There has been no evidence of any important change in the enemy's rear areas but the arrival in the line of 232 Inf Div, which is believed to be the division previously carried unidentified in the area North of GENOA, must imply some reshuffling in N.W. ITALY. In fact KESSELRING must realise that, especially with winter coming on, he has not much to fear from the Allied formations West of the Alps and that he can if he wishes detach forces from 75 Corps to strengthen his position on the Ligurian coast. 232 Div's replacement round GENOA will almost certainly have come from there and there have in fact been reports of movement into the area from the West. In any case if the Appennine position is pierced both 75 Corps and Graziani's Army of LIGURIA will have to carry out a fairly rapid withdrawal to the East to avoid being trapped between the advancing Allies and the Swiss frontier. There is some evidence already that the Germans are stripping the area South of the Po of everything useful which can be removed; large herds of livestock are reported going North, for instance, and it is believed that useful industrial installations are also being dismantled. In view of the probable difficulties of the food situation in the REICH this winter one of the reasons for KESSELRING's stubborn defence of the Appennines may be to enable the harvests of EMILIA and PIEDMONT to be gathered and sent back across the Alps. At any rate he is clearly taking some preparations against the time when it may no longer be possible to obey HITLER's orders.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Lack of PR makes assessment of the enemy rail situation this week difficult but owing to poor weather our air effort against the enemy L of C has been curtailed and it is presumed that the railways are functioning more easily. Up until the 15th through rail traffic to VERONA was possible from most points of the compass with the exception that all rail bridges over the PIAVE remained out and, of course, most, if not all, of those over the Po. On the 15th the weather improved and we were able to block the BRENNER at a point about 20 miles North of VERONA, establish three cuts on the main VERONA-MILAN line, and knock out the bridge over the Po about half-way between PIACENZA and TURIN near TORRE BERETTI. While by this time repairs have probably reopened the BRENNER route and made through traffic possible from VERONA to MILAN, it is noteworthy that the destruction of the TORRE BERETTI bridge effected the complete isolation, for purposes of through rail traffic, of the entire area South of the Po; the only possible route open is the single track line crossing the Po about 50 kilometres East of TURIN at

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C.BAILE where the bridge was down on 3 Oct but may have since been repaired. This complete, or near complete, blockage of all rail lines into the area South of the Po assumes increased importance in the light of the fact that PR of the 12th showed that a considerable number of the Po ferry points had been destroyed as a result of the recent rise in the river. While too much must not be read into this state of the enemy L of C in as much as despite the rise of the Po many ferries and the pontoon bridge sites were apparently not affected, it is quite possible that owing to the loss of some of the Po ferries and difficult footing at others, a temporary shortage of supplies existed South of the river early in October.

There appears to have been no unusual movement of either MT or rail traffic this week with the exception of rather heavy MT movement in the area TURIN-ALESS.-MESS.-ALESSANDRIA on 15 Oct. This MT movement has been noted before and may be nothing more than the use of MT to negotiate breaks in the railways but may indicate a reshuffle of troops.

Marshalling yards along the BRENNER have shown considerable activity and many train lengths have been seen on the through lines; piles of stores at PERI station just South of the block 20 miles North of VERONA suggests transhipment activity. The enemy continues to work on the BRENNER rail diversions and ground sources report that new dumps are being established in the BOLZANO area. Despite the blocks on the PIAVE river VERONA continues to be fed from the N.E. as well as from the BRENNER. On the basis of car loadings and rail cuts traffic from the PIAVE evidently moves to VERONA via the route TREVISO-MESTRE-PADUA-VICENZA. Owing to lack of PR activity between VERONA and the West cannot be assessed.

VERONA marshalling yards have shown considerable activity and sufficient rail lines South to the PO to meet current enemy requirements appear to be open. Notable in this connection is the OSTIGLIA-BOLOGNA line which is open throughout with the exception of the bridge over the PO at OSTIGLIA; on the 12th train lengths were seen at most stations between VERONA and OSTIGLIA and on the following day activity was evident at BOLOGNA and 8 trn in lengths were present on the line North to OSTIGLIA. Further evidence of the importance of BOLOGNA itself is indicated by PR of the 16th which showed what appeared to be an important railhead just North of BOLOGNA at L 909522. Some thinning out of administrative installations in the BOLOGNA area may, however, have occurred as a result of a heavy air attack on the area on the 12th.

Along the PO itself there are several developments of interest in addition to the washing away of ferries mentioned above. There are apparently at least two rail ferry sites on the PO, namely near PONTELAGOSCURO (M 1292) and PIACENZA. At both points tracks have been laid or the road bed prepared from the regular railway to the river edge. Whether or not the rail wagons themselves are ferried across the river is not known, though a ground source reports that such is the practice at PIACENZA. PR of 15 Oct showed that construction at the PONTELAGOSCURO site is probably complete and that the site is active is indicated by the presence of landing stages on both banks and of at least 6 wagons on rail sidings which have been laid in a wood on the North bank of the river in the immediate vicinity of the North landing stage.

Another development is the apparently increased importance of the pontoon bridge site on the PO just North of S. BENEDETTO at F 5814. On 14 Oct PR showed that there were 75 double-pontoon sections present, enough for 2 bridges, and recently the flak protection in the immediate area has increased from 20 heavy and 12 light guns to 32 and 20 respectively.

Shipping on both East and West coasts remains relatively inactive. Between 3 and 11 Oct turnover between GENOA and SPEZIA consisted of three MT ships, one landing craft, two schooners, one coaster and a small MV. Since the 11th there has been little, if any, activity at SPEZIA. West of GENOA there has been some movement at IMPERIA and SAVONA but all other ports appear inactive and according to a ground report of 12 Oct harbour installations have been demolished at SAVONA and block ships sunk. As for GENOA itself our coastal patrols which closed very near to the port on the night of 15 Oct report explosions, presumably demolitions. On the East coast some shipping still appears to be reaching RAVENNA but the turnover is not thought to be large.

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All of the above present nothing particularly out of the ordinary. Reports persist of the evacuation of industrial installations and materials from ITALY and the establishment of new military installations in the North. While preliminary steps to eventual withdrawal North of the Po are undoubtedly now in progress there is little evidence from a logistical point of view to suggest that a withdrawal is contemplated in the immediate future.

3. WESTERN FRONT

Although with the exception of the AACHEN area and the SCHELDT estuary the front has been comparatively quiet during the past week, there has been considerable activity behind the enemy lines. In the South, the reinforcement of 19 Army's right wing last week by a Southward shift of 11 Pz Div proved inadequate to effect complete stabilisation of the front. Slow though our advance in the VOSGES has been, every day has forced 19 Army to give more useful ground. Conscious of this, and of the general weakness of 19 Army, the enemy has given a little more support to his Southern flank by the transfer of a Pz Bde from the METZ sector to the Southern VOSGES. However so far this added reinforcement has failed to produce the desired effect and the slow withdrawal of 19 Army has continued.

Further North in the METZ-NANCY area the armoured concentration which had proved so troublesome in the latter half of September has now finally dispersed with the departure of 106 Pz Bde to 19 Army and of 3 P.G. Div which has been sent North to stiffen up the AACHEN sector. 17 SS P.G. Div still remains and there is a fair amount of infantry in the METZ-NANCY sector but the enemy's offensive plans seem finally to have been abandoned and the PARROY Forest which at one time held a considerable concentration of enemy armour is almost entirely in our hands.

Armour both from this sector and from the British Army Group sector has been transferred with some haste to the AACHEN area where the American attack has caused the enemy to abandon all offensive plans elsewhere in order to reinforce the newly threatened area with all the armour available. There are now four armoured divs, one P.G. Div, a Panzer Brigade, and a Heavy Tank Bn as well as considerable infantry forces at AACHEN. The town itself has been completely cut off with the link-up of Allied forces at WURSELEN three miles to the N.E. but constant enemy counter-attacks continue, and our progress is of necessity slow. The interesting thing about the German reinforcement of the AACHEN area is that it has for the most part been secured at the cost of his offensive intentions at NIJMEGEN. A fortnight ago he had five Pz divisions East of NIJMEGEN and from their dispositions it was very clear that he hoped to launch a counter-attack which would eliminate our bridgehead over the WAAL and regain him NIJMEGEN. Today there remain, it is true, elements of 9 and 10 SS Pz Divs in the area NE of NIJMEGEN, but 9 Pz, 116 Pz and 1 SS Pz Divs and 501 Heavy Tank Bn have all been shifted back to AACHEN. The counter-offensive at ARNHEM has been thrown to the winds, and the enemy's prospects of holding a firm line on the Eastern flank of the salient in face of Allied air and artillery superiority have appreciably diminished. South of NIJMEGEN the enemy has in fact had to give ground, albeit slowly and stubbornly, in the OVERLOON area, while his bridgeheads over the lower RHINE West of ARNHEM have been withdrawn.

There has been little to report on the West of the salient where activity on both sides has been confined to patrols. In the area of the SCHELDT estuary however there has been fierce fighting. 6 Para Regt and 70 Inf Div have been battling hard to keep open the causeway to ZUID BEVELAND and WALCHEREN. Control of the road and railway has passed from one side to another several times, but throughout the week we have at all times been able to keep the road under observation and small arms fire. On WALCHEREN itself flooding has made a large portion of the island uninhabitable. On the South bank of the SCHELDT estuary contact has been established between the Canadian bridgehead over the SAVOJARDS PLAAT and that over the LEOPOLD Canal.

The events of the past week have given striking illustration of the assertion made in last week's Summary that the enemy is able to reinforce one threatened area only at the expense of another. In particular his shortage of armoured reserves has become all too apparent. Twice in the past six weeks

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the enemy has attempted to effect a concentration of armour with the object of launching counter-attacks at some crucial sector. On both occasions, at LAMEVILLE and at HILDESHEIM, he has had to abandon the attempt because his armour at the last minute was called away to meet a new threat developing elsewhere. This is a bankrupt situation which must spell disaster for him when eventually an improved supply position enables the Allies to launch the offensive on the grand scale again. In preparation for that day it is to be expected that he will try to build up an adequate armoured reserve possibly by the formation of new armoured divs, more probably by setting up and refitting existing formations. In the meantime he has a round total of about 60 divisions in the West equivalent to roughly half that number of full strength divisions. So long as the threat develops only in one sector at a time these are adequate to meet the situation. The test will come when he has to meet a crisis at several points simultaneously.

for BRIGADIER,
D.G.S.(I).

G.S.I.
A.A.I.
19 Oct 44

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 66

OF 26 OCT, 44

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

(a) General

Since the battle for the Appennines started Kesselring has managed by a skilful policy of robbing Peter to pay Paul to avoid losing control of the situation. Whenever it looked as if he might break through as for instance on the PORTICATO ridge S.W. of RIMINI and at LIVERGNANO on Route 65, he has always been able to produce reinforcements from another part of the front just in time to seal off the break-in and bring the Allied attack to a halt. In the first place 14 Army was drawn upon to provide one division after another for the Adriatic. Then when Fifth Army attack got under way 14 Army had to thin out on the Western part of the Gothic Line to produce troops for the Centre; and latterly it has been the turn of the Adriatic front which has had to honour the loan it made in Late August and early September. The arrival of 29 P.G. Div just East of Route 65 and 90 P.G. Div North and N.E. of M. GRANDE I. 9952, has enabled the enemy temporarily at least to slow down our advance on BOLOGNA. This policy of switching divisions from one threatened sector to another is one that has been forced on Kesselring by lack of a central reserve and by the certainty that he will receive no fresh formations and probably only a proportion of the replacements he needs. It is a makeshift method which in face of heavy casualties cannot be continued indefinitely, but one which Kesselring had hoped would enable him to wear down the Allied attacks and finally halt them. It is in fact a question of physical and mental endurance. Up to about a week ago Kesselring seems to have remained quite confident that it was only a question of time before the Allies would give up the struggle which was gaining them ground but slowly and at considerable cost. Despite the ever-growing threat which had brought Fifth Army to within 10 miles of BOLOGNA, he showed no sign of anxiety about his forces on the Adriatic. Now, however, with the Allies still making progress from M. GRANDE towards Route 9, despite the arrival in that sector of 90 P.G. Division, and with his forces on the left wing of 10 Army considerably weakened, there are signs that even if he is not yet losing his nerve he is at any rate beginning to pull back voluntarily in the plain in order to straighten his line and avoid any unnecessary risk of an Allied breakthrough.

(b) Eighth Army

On the Eighth Army front by the 18th we had advanced to within 1,000 yards of CESENA on the South, and the enemy was back on Hedrig Two, the perimeter defence of the town continued N.E. along the road to CESENATICO and the line of the VESOLA del MONTALETTO ditch. South of the town however, we had already reached the banks of the SAVIO just East of BORELLO and it was apparent that the enemy had no intention of staying long on HEDVIG TWO. The parachutists were moving back on the 19th and on the same day CESENA was cleared except for a few snipers. That night a bridgehead was seized across the river in the area of Route 9. Although this bridgehead came in for heavy shelling the enemy made no concerted effort to counter-attack it, 114 Div being content to carry out several sharp raids. Meantime the enemy was carrying out a relief; the departure of 90 P.G. Div left the Emilian Highway in the care of 114 Jaeger Div, and feeling that this task should be extended to a more dependable division the enemy decided to switch 1 Para Division, by now returned, from the relatively

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quiet sector on the road to RAVENNA to take over from 114 Div and come in on the right of 26 Pz Div. By the 23rd most of the division had taken up its new positions and 114 Div H.Q. had appeared in the area M 5432 suggesting that the two divisions had effected a direct exchange of sectors. Once this change was completed the enemy started to pull back from the SAVIO, which a captured map shows to be called FRENA, but not before we had forced another bridgehead at PIEVE SESTINA M 5911 on 26 Pz Div front. Two Panthers were knocked out and one captured intact, and the latter came in useful in beating off an armoured counter-attack on the 23rd; fighting in this area cost the enemy 150 PW, mostly from 9 P.C.R. That night the parachutists were pulling back to the next delaying position on the BEVANO river (called FRANCISKA) and events of the following day showed that 26 Pz Div, 278 Div and 356 Div had made withdrawals to conform. FRANCISKA also appears to be nothing more than a delaying position for on the 24th 26 Pz Div was preparing to move back to CUDRIA - the line of the river RONCO - and the parachutists had already sent 4 Para Regt on ahead to FORLI.

These withdrawals must cause 356 Div, holding S of FORLI, and 305 Div on its Western flank to pull back. On the boundary of these two Divs we captured GAIATA 3291 from II Bn 756 G.R. on the 20th Oct, and occupied M.GROSSO R 3495 against very bitter opposition. Enemy resistance then stiffened still further and though we have crossed the River RABBI stiff fighting has been going on for two days round M. dell MARINA R 2996. On the rest of 305 Div front and to the N.W. the enemy started pulling back on the 23rd and we made local advances through the hills. M. SPADURO M 0426 which we captured on the night 19/20 Oct (only to be driven off again the next day in a violent counter-attack by 334 Div assisted by I Bn 956 G.R.) was also found abandoned on the 23rd.

(c) Fifth Army.

In the Centre most of the fighting has been in the area of M. GRANDE L 9932 and M. CERERE M 0021 which were captured on the 20th. Only half of 90 P.G. Div had arrived when we seized these heights, and though II and III Bns 361 G.R. tried to counter-attack our positions on the 20th they were pinned down by heavy fire and suffered considerable casualties; only one weak counter-attack eventually developed. Our positions have been steadily improved in this area and despite the arrival of the remainder of the Div we are now some thousand yards beyond M. GRANDE, held MASSERETTO M 0131 and have beaten off strong counter-attacks on M. CASTELLARO L 9855. On the 24th our swift advance to VEDRIANO M 0234 surprised the enemy and put us within four miles of Route 9.

West of 90 P.G. Div the line is held by a jumble of units - the remnants of 362 Div, formed into small battlegroups and supported by the arrival in the Lohr Brigade sector of a Bn of 25 Jaeger Regt (42 Div) with odd units of 44 Div and 98 Div interspersed. 29 P.G. Div holds from exclusive Route 65 East to about the 95 grid; on the 24th a strong counter-attack by 71 G.R. on BELMONTE E 9032 temporarily regained the hill but by nightfall we were again in possession. 16 SS Div's left boundary now extends to approximately the 84 Easting, so that 4 Para and 65 Divs are reduced to a front of only some 3,000 yards between them. Both have suffered heavy casualties and the parachutists in particular have long been without a rest; the chances are that they later may have been withdrawn into reserve. Similar fortune may have come the way of 44 Div with whom there has been very little contact, and 98 Div, which has lost a further 700 prisoners since it was reformed last month, will soon be qualifying for a further refit.

On the Western part of the Gothic Line 232 Div has now settled into the sector North of PISTOIA and its arrival has allowed 94 Div to follow the normal practice in this area of gradually side-stepping Eastwards. In the fighting which led to the capture of pt 826 L 7326 prisoners were taken from 276 G.R. and the boundary of 94 Div with 16 SS Div appears to be just East of here. First impressions of the new 94 Div are that it has been reformed mainly with veterans wounded on other fronts and young recruits: their fighting morale appears to be high. 42 Jaeger Div, less the Reece Unit and one Bn both committed in the Central sector, still holds the coast and may have to extend its responsibilities to SPEZIA where, according to prisoners taken South of BOLOGNA from three different Fortress Bns, 135 Fortress Brigade was disbanded on the 17th Oct and is now being used to provide reinforcements for divisions on the main front.

... .(d) Western ITALY.....

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(a) Western Italy

In Western ITALY the departure of 232 Div has left the GENOA area bare of a German formation. Reports have been received however of the move of a German division Eastwards along the coast from the MARITIME Alps. The enemy has probably therefore denuded the frontier of a division, either 34 or 148 Division since 5 Mtn Div was still reported S.W. of TURIN on 19 Oct. 148 Div seems the most likely choice as a move to the GENOA area will give this division a chance to reform in a quiet area after its losses in S. FRANCE. 157 Div - North East of TURIN - has already been reformed according to a prisoner who states that on the 1st Oct it was upgraded to a Mtn Jaeger Division. Reinforcements to the extent of one Regt arrived for it from 188 Reserve Mountain Division.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) General

There were no developments this week to indicate any radical change in the enemy's overall administrative position. Weather has again hampered our air effort against the enemy's L of C. As a result he has managed to repair the rail bridge over the PO at CASALE about 50 miles East of TURIN. In view of the repair of this bridge and the fact that at least one of the lines over the TICINO River West of MILAN is now likely to be open, it is probable that through, if roundabout, rail traffic is now possible between MILAN, TURIN and GENOA. In NE ITALY the enemy has at long last been able to open up a line across the PIAVE River, and thus for the first time in a rather extended period the enemy may now move by rail from GERMANY through NE ITALY to the VERONA area and other points in North-Central ITALY without the necessity of having to tranship across the PIAVE. While the enemy has thus appreciably improved his rail communications in NE and NW ITALY, he must be concerned over the fact that the BRENNER railway has been blocked for most, if not all, of the past 10 days at a point about 20 miles North of VERONA. This, among other things, has resulted in the further building up of supply dumps near VERONA, an area already congested with many administrative installations and dumps. A block on the BRENNER at this time must be particularly undesirable in view of a ground report that two Italian Republican divisions were to begin moving from GERMANY to PIEDMONT by way of the BRENNER - VERONA - MILAN on 20 Oct. The accuracy of this report is as yet not known, but from PR it has become clear in the last few days that there is a large amount of rail activity between VERONA and MILAN despite several cuts in the line, and it is also evident that at least some troops are being moved through this area. However, owing to poor weather, information is as yet insufficiently complete to determine exactly how many troops are involved and in what direction they are moving. Typical of recent activity on this route was an almost continual line of trains, apparently facing West, with locomotives in steam, reported by visual recce on 24 Oct as standing on the tracks from a broken bridge over the CHIESE River at F 1960 Westward through BRESCIA to ROVATO, a distance of about 20 miles.

It was reported on 3 Oct that the enemy is using the Lake GARDA shipping to supplement the railways; ports stated to be in use are DESENZANO (F 2959), SALO (F 290745), PESCHIERA, GARDA (F 433703) and RIVA (A 5504).

Reports are still being received of the transfer of machinery and other industrial material from MILAN and TURIN to GERMANY, part of which is reported to be going via SWITZERLAND.

(b) Enemy installations - VERONA

The area VERONA-S. AMBROGGIO (F 5364) - PESCHIERA (F 4355) now contains by far the largest concentration of dumps and installations in ITALY. Confirmed installations in this area at present include 2 ammunition factories, 10 ammunition dumps, 1 fuel dump, 3 MT and spare part depots and 15 general stores dumps. A further 4 ammunition dumps, a fuel dump, an ordnance workshop and 2 general stores dumps have been reported by two or more ground sources but not yet confirmed by PR; in the case of the ordnance workshops the buildings have been confirmed and activity noted, but their exact use cannot be ascertained.

....Other reports,.....

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other reports, considered less reliable, include five ammunition and 3 fuel dumps.

Dumps vary in size from a number of stacks in an open field to large installations with 20 or more buildings or large dumping areas in which it is not possible to distinguish each separate dump. There is one such area at S.AMBROGGIO where the yards of nearly every building within ½ mile of the station contain stores of one sort or another.

This large concentration of installations can be accounted for by the fact that VERONA lies at the juncture of the BRENNER line and the main lateral line from MILAN to PADUA and also has good communications with BOLOGNA via OSTIGLIA or MANTUA and MODENA and with PIACENZA via MANTUA and CREMONA.

The very small proportion of fuel dumps would seem to indicate that fuel, owing to severe shortage, is delivered where possible direct to forward dumps, while such reserves as are maintained further back are dispersed as widely as possible.

3. WESTERN FRONT

The lull on the Western front has been broken during the past week by renewed British pressure on the West bank of the salient in HOLLAND and on the Southern bank of the SCHELDT estuary. Apart from this, now that AACHEN has fallen, the front seems to have entered a static period of which the enemy is taking advantage to give some of his divisions a badly needed refit. Down in the South the reshuffling on 19 Army's front during the past two or three weeks has if anything stiffened enemy resistance, and the stubborn withdrawal has been characterised by enemy counter-attacks and attempts at infiltration. To the North 5 Pz Army, its armour heavily drawn upon to meet the needs of the AACHEN area, has had a quiet week, and in the ARDENNES too the calm of the past month has been uninterrupted. At AACHEN, the garrison commander finally surrendered on Oct 21st after the troops under his command had given proof of their loyalty to the Fuehrer by sending (via the radio) 10,000 Marks for the Winterhilf. The enemy attitude here has been less aggressive than might have been expected in view of the concentration of armour in the area. Resistance has of course been fierce in the extreme but there has as yet been no sign of any major counter-attack developing.

North of AACHEN there has been no important change in the front line. Elements of 5 Para Div, which together with 3 and 6 Para Divs had been missing from the line, have been identified near VENLO. How much of the division is actually there is problematical. Allied pressure in this area has not been such as to warrant fresh reinforcement, especially as the enemy is probably trying to form a reserve of refitted parachute formations out of the remnants of the three parachute divisions which have escaped destruction in the West.

In the AACHEN area the general thinning out of enemy armour continues and the elements of 9 SS Pz Div which were there last week have now been withdrawn. There has been an appreciable reduction too in the artillery in the NIJMEGEN - ARNHEM sector - the number of guns having dropped in the course of a fortnight from 200 to 130. An undated captured map has given some fuller details of the line which the enemy has been constructing North of ARNHEM and which appears to be a Northwards extension of the Siegfried Line. This defensive position runs from DELFZYL to ZWOLLE thence along the IJSSEL and then down the Dutch-German frontier as far as VENLO. It appears from the map that this line is to be held by some seven divisions. Another line is reported forward of this, running from the ZUIDER ZEE South Eastwards to the RHINE West of ARNHEM.

However, despite these preparations for an eventual withdrawal from Western HOLLAND, there is no evidence yet to show that the enemy is trying to withdraw his forces from the large pocket on the West of the SCHELDT. He still has a nominal twelve divisions here estimated at some 100,000 strong and they have been offering very determined resistance to all our efforts at expanding the salient to the West. On the face of it prudence would dictate the abandonment of all HOLLAND, except for the WALCHEREN and BEVELAND fortresses, especially as the enemy has evidently abandoned all his offensive plans East of NIJMEGEN. But prudence has not always been a characteristic of the German High Command and stronger evidence will be needed before a withdrawal from HOLLAND can be described as imminent or even probable.

For the time being the enemy must be mainly concerned with building up some reserves both of infantry and of armour to bolster up his inadequate resources.

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He certainly has need of them. The withdrawal of three parachute formations from the line has been referred to above. Two Panzer Divisions are also missing and presumably refitting. This leaves the enemy, according to SHAEF's calculations, with some 300,000 personnel actually in the line. Even taking into account the troops now out of the line and those tied up in the coastal fortresses, it is doubtful on this calculation whether his strength in the West exceeds an equivalent thirty divs plus about five divs in the form of Fortress Bns. Moreover casualties even in static periods are not light. Figures now available for the NANCY-VENLO sector in the period 10 Sep - 9 Oct are of particular interest in this respect. With the exception of the area immediately round AACHEN, this was the quietest sector of the front in that period, but the enemy nevertheless lost on an average a steady 1,300 PW every day. If other sectors in a quiet period lose proportionately, the resultant enemy casualties are likely to be in the neighbourhood of 4,000 a day or some two to three divisions per week. All in all the effort of building up a substantial reserve to meet the next Allied offensive is likely to be a difficult one for RUNDSTEDT, all the more so in view of the worsening situation in the East which is likely to call for many of the reinforcements intended for the Western front.

C. S. I.
A. A. I.
26 Oct 44

BRIGADIER,
D. G. S. (I).

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The following is a translation from the Croatian of a German document captured by the Partisans, place and date of capture unstated.

2nd Panzer Army,
Section Ia/Id No.4173 Sect. SECRET

HQ, 30th June 1944.

SUBJECT: Experience derived from recent defensive fighting in ITALY
(situation on 17th May 1944)

1. Cooperation between the different arms achieved by the enemy forces has proved to be our greatest threat, particularly with the armoured forces, where over 400 tanks have sometimes been employed.

2. The French have renounced their former methodic manner of waging war and their example has been followed by the British and the Americans. Recently our enemies, particularly with their armoured forces, have attempted to exploit immediately any local breakthroughs or wedges, and convert them into a strategic breakthrough. Following the Russian example, they now hold occupied territory with such strong forces that counter-attacks by local reserves are unable to regain lost ground. Consequently it is necessary for the counter-attack to follow immediately after the breakthrough, as any delay threatens the success of the counter-attack.

3. Cooperation between arms. If the enemy tanks fail to breakthrough, they generally withdraw about 300 metres and signal by rockets. This is the signal for the artillery to open fire.

Measures should be taken to ensure cover. Where ground offers no possibility units should be thinned out. Defensive measures against enemy tanks should be continued from defended positions.

4. Sighting points for enemy artillery. The enemy makes use of prominent ground objectives (church towers etc.) behind our lines as sighting points for his artillery. These objectives should be removed after consultation with the local authorities, and upon orders issued by the commanding officer. The local authorities should be informed beforehand in order that their objections may be taken into consideration.

5. Shrapnel fire. High casualties have been caused by low bursting shells. Niches should be built in trenches to protect personnel.

6. Panzerfaust. The range of this weapon is known to the enemy and his tanks do not approach our infantry nearer than 40-50 metres.

Attack should be made from a well masked position and not before the enemy has reached the favourable range. Attacks against enemy tanks outside this range are useless.

7. It should be borne in mind that French Moroccan troops are capable of passing anywhere where mules can pass and there is always a possibility of deep outflanking moves by them over terrain normally regarded as impassable.

8. The enemy, by making use of his amphibious vehicles, has rapidly crossed streams and water obstacles. There have been as yet unconfirmed reports of amphibious tanks. Therefore all water obstacles should be at any rate observed, if they cannot be properly occupied by troops. In this connection it is useful to mine marshes along their edges which are nearest to our positions.

9. The enemy is making ever more use of his Air Force on a scale as yet unprecedented. This is one of the general problems which we have to face.

After a successful breakthrough on the main front, the enemy takes every opportunity, by day and by night, to ensure that his fighter aircraft make it impossible for us to bring up reinforcements and supplies to our troops. Attacks

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are directed against individual vehicles and mainly take place against those sections of the road from which dispersal is impossible (bridges, dams, etc.).

There has been a case where 100 attacks against one important bridge have been made in less than 24 hours. These attacks are apt to cause a delay of from 2 to 3 days in the movement of reserves and regrouping. The enemy has such superiority in the air that it is difficult for our command to calculate time with any reasonable accuracy. The following counter-measures are recommended :-

a) The employment of adequate "Provost" forces by officers in charge of road traffic;

b) A definite allocation as to which roads are to be used by which type of transport.

c) Labour to be held in readiness at vital points in order that repairs may be put in hand forthwith.

d) A sufficiency of light mobile Flak Units.

e) Engagement of low flying planes by all from every possible point. (See this Army Group Order Ia/Id No. 1685/44 Secr. of 9/6/44).

(sgd). Frh. Von Varnbueler, Colonel,
for Chief of General Staff.

118th Jaeger Division, 19/7/44
Section Ia A. & W.
No. 4657/44 Secr.

SUBJECT: Experience derived from recent defensive fighting in ITALY.

NOTE FOR DIVISION: These recent experiences are particularly valuable. C.Os are responsible that all concerned are acquainted as soon as possible with such parts as refer to their particular activities.

(sgd) Goitner, Lt.Col.,
GSO (1).

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AVAILABILITY OF OFFICERS IN THE GERMAN ARMY

Two documents have been received which throw considerable light on the German problem of finding suitable officers to command units and formations in the field. The first of these is in the form of notes made by Dr. FREYTAG, IIa of LXXX Corps, at a conference held in PARIS on 4 and 5 February 44 for Adjutant-Generals, which give a comprehensive picture of losses of officers and anticipated requirements.

a) Officer casualties up to 20 January 44

Killed	23,776
Wounded	67,400
Missing	16,805
(Exclusive of	5,000 officers lost at STALINGRAD)

b) Losses by ranks up to 1 January 44

	Generals	Cols	Lt-Cols	Majs	Capts	1st Lts	2nd Lts
Killed	33	104	135	576	2000	6563	17346
Wounded	39	200	201	1084	4752	15561	44326
Missing	25	76	110	257	960	2868	4194

c) Relative Losses by arm of Service

The highest losses of officers were among Panzer Grenadier units, followed by Panzer, Infantry, Engineers, Artillery, Signal and Supply troops in that order.

d) Future Requirements

18,000 were needed for new formations.

e) General Staff Officers

The 1,900 General Staff appointments were filled by 964 General Staff officers, 233 officers assigned to the General Staff, 90 former General Staff officers and 500 reserve officers.

f) Divisional Commanders

Command of a division can only be gained by front-line service. Regimental commanders not fit to command a division to be promoted only in the normal way. Command of a training division to be given only to former commanders of active divisions who have been wounded or fallen sick.

g) Regimental Commanders

Were urgently needed. 240 Regimental commanders were casualties in 1943.

h) Intelligence Officers (Ic)

Intelligence officers to be given accelerated promotion only if they have held an active command previously. The N.S.F.O. is not subordinate to the Ic.

The second document contains the conclusions of a conference for Adjutant-Generals held by the O.K.H. on 16 and 17 June 44 and forwarded by the Adjutant-General of Hirst Army to the Adjutant-Generals at Corps with the express proviso that it was not to be transmitted in writing below Corps. The following are the main points of interest:

a) Difficulties have arisen in the general personnel situation, mainly in the filling of positions of company commanders and higher ranks, especially regimental commanders.

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b) Young officers may not be immediately employed under trying battle conditions. They must at first be carefully directed, even if the posts of company commanders must be filled by NCOs.

A better training of young officers beyond the present standard is not possible. Quality of officers depends upon the demand. If the demand is small, a greater chance for selection exists.

c) All staffs must again be examined with a view to determining whether the Führer's order that no officer of the age group of 1914 and younger can hold staff positions has been carried out. Report to Army headquarters by 15 July 44.

d) Average age of regimental commanders at the present time is 30 years. Efforts will be made to raise the age to 32 years. Seven Lt. Colonels below 29 years of age are at present regimental commanders.

It is an imperative necessity to promote all officers suited for higher appointments so as to insure in the fifth year of the war a more normal filling of officers' appointments.

e) Graduates of colleges (Abiturienten) must be considered for officers' careers. A decree is in preparation which will exclude from admission to the universities all those graduates who failed to become officers.

f) There is an urgent need for Army commanders. The Führer has requested the names of ten generals who are fit for the command of an Army to be submitted to him. Age 45.

g) Medical officers who have not been properly employed as well as finance officers who have not yet been employed at all will be reported to Gen. Major MICHELMANN to be sent to the front.

h) Colonels who have been in charge of divisions at the battle front as acting commanders may be promoted to the rank of General within two months.

i) Employment of Staff Officers at the Front.

Troops over and over again request that older Staff Officers be offered an opportunity of commanding troops. All officers before being posted to Staff appointments should have commanded a company for 6 months at the front, before promotion to Lt. Col a battalion for 3 to 6 months and before promotion to Gen. Major a regiment, and before promotion to Gen Lt. a division.

j) No exchange between the Eastern and Western fronts will take place in the future.

k) The number of officers at present is 240,000 (1,200 general officers).

l) Particular concern is at present felt over cases of corruption on the largest scale, extending into the highest ranks. Such cases are apt to influence attitude and morale of the people and may have decisive consequences for the outcome of the war.

According to a decision of Fieldmarshal KEITEL all cases of corruption will be brought before the Central Court in BERLIN even for members of the forces in the field.

Cases of corruption should not be covered up or presented in a less damaging light. Caution when pleading for officers charged with corruption.

m) The Chief of the Army Personnel Office urgently requests that all officers down to the lowest rank become familiar with the order concerning Seydlitz.

n) Extremely strained conditions in the replacement of officers requires a constant examination of all officers, regimental, battalion and company commanders, who are qualified to be promoted to the next higher rank. They must be transferred.

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o) Immediate report to the Personnel Office in the event of a son of a General being killed in action.

p) NSFO (National Socialist Political Commissar)

Of 740 existing positions only 450 have been filled.

q) Youngest Officers in the Various Ranks:

1st Lt	20	years of age
Captain	21	" "
Major	24	" "
Lt Colonel	25	" "
Colonel	32	" "
Gen.Major	38	" "
Gen.Lt	42	" "
General	47	" "
Col.General	48	" "

(SOURCE: AFHQ WIS No.28 of 30 Sep 44)

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 67

OF 1 NOV, 1944

(a) This Summary will NOT be distributed below HQs of Army Corps. Sidelined information will not be reproduced in any Intelligence Summary of formations under this H.Q. without special permission.

(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hours of receipt.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The weather has played the principal role in operations this week and torrential rain with winds of gale force prevented any major change in the situation. The enemy in the meantime has been carrying out reliefs and readjusting his forces; he has brought over still another division from the Adriatic flank to the sector South of BOLOGNA and on his Tyrrhenian flank he has started to bring in an Italian division and a German regimental group.

On 8 Army front we have advanced to the line of the river RONCO from a point North of MELDOLA (M 4405) to as near to its lower reaches as is practicable or desirable by reason of the marshy nature of the ground. On the Northern flank we have been in contact with 721 Jg Regt across the BEVANO on route 16. 26 Recce Unit continued to patrol East of the RONCO in the area S. PIETRO IN VINCOLI, M 521253 up till 29 Oct but has now probably been pushed back across the RONCO. Astride Route 9 we seized two small bridgeheads across the river on 25 Oct, but heavy rain and a rise in the water level meant that they could not be reinforced and 278 Div, supported by Mk VI tanks, was able to eliminate them next day. Further South we were able to establish a bridgehead South of MELDOLA and are advancing Northwards. MELDOLA itself is clear and we are up to the 10 Northing as far East as the 44 Easting. Further South we have captured CAMINATE (M 4005) and are as far North on the West bank of the river RABBI.

76 Corps has been reduced as far as can be considered safe to reinforce the schwerpunkt South of BOLOGNA. In the last two weeks its best three divisions, probably the best three still remaining to the Germans in ITALY, have been removed one by one and hastily recommitted on the Central front where they have succeeded in stabilising the position; an excellent example of the advantages Kesselring derives from his good internal lines. The last to go was 1 Parachute Division which began to move off on 26 Oct. It had just completed taking over the sector astride route 9 from 114 Jg Division. The latter went to the coast where it now stretches as far South as the 27 Northing. It is not certain whether 162 Div still has a sector on its left, though it may still be at least entrusted with the coastwatching in this area. If a report is true that it has recently surrendered 1,500 German O.Rs to 114 Jg Div - and the PW who gave the information had certainly himself been transferred - its fighting value must be lower than ever and it could scarcely be expected to take a serious part in operations. On the right of 114 Jg is 26 Pz Div whose sector extends to within two miles of route 9. Astride the road is 278 Div with all three regts now up. From North of MELDOLA to CAMINATE and on the West bank of the RABBI is 356 Div which has been falling back fairly steadily under pressure throughout the week. 305 and 715 Divs adjoin to the West in the mountainous salient which still protudes to some thirteen miles South of FAENZA. It is not likely that the enemy intends to stand on his present positions indefinitely. The RONCO line has already been turned by our crossin at MELDOLA and we know he has already reconnoitred another line in rear. This appears to be in the nature of a switch line to swing back his Southern flank while still covering RAVENNA with his left; the line will presumably run along the FIUMI UNITI and then up the RONCO as far as M 4924 where it runs down a curving ditch to join the MONTONE at FORLI. The central portion of this line was called GERHILD on a captured map. There is no sign as yet that the enemy is going back to it,

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and while the RONCO continues to present such an obstacle there is no pressing need, but preparations have already been made in the shape of destroying all the small bridges and culverts between this river and FORLI. Furthermore prisoners from 869 G.R. had heard that it was intended to withdraw behind FORLI and believed that the withdrawal had only been delayed owing to the weather.

On the Central front we have been mainly onegaged in consolidating the positions won in the area of MONTE GRANDE though we were able to improve them in the direction of MEZZANO, L 9934. 1 Para Div has now come into the line between 90 P.G. and 98 Divs, having relieved 117 G.R. of the latter which was previously isolated from the rest of the div. The current lay-out of this division is difficult to see but II Bn 1 Para Regt on night 30 Oct was attacking towards VEZZOLO, M 000334. This represents a move Westwards since 26 Oct as on that date the Bn H.Q. was in M 0535 and one of its Coys was making contact with I Bn 200 G.R. in the area M 011332. Probably 200 G.R. has moved West, giving 90 P.G. Div a more restricted sector. An element of 4 Para Regt was also in the line on 26 Oct and a Coy was in the action on 30 Oct but the Regt has not been definitely located.

On the West coast the enemy appears to be at last bringing up some Italian troops into the fighting. Deserters who arrived in our lines on 27 Oct report the presence in the area L 1507 of the whole of 2 Alpine Regt of the MONTEROSA Alpine Division. This division has been in LIGURIA for some time now, mainly in the area East of GENOA, and it is said to have suffered heavily from desertions. The deserters stated that the whole division was coming into the line and this may be confirmed by a report from another source that it was being relieved in its previous sector by the newly arrived LITTORIA Division. Prisoners were also taken from II Bn 6 San Marco Regt of the SAN MARCO Div in the area L 139055. They say their bn is attached to 2 Alpine Regt and possibly this is merely a detached bn sent down to gain battle experience. Apart from this the Germans have also been reinforced by 281 G.R. of 148 Division (previously numbered 8 Res.Gren Regt), prisoners from which were taken on 29 Oct in the area U 9496. It seems possible that when MONTEROSA Division arrives it may take over the whole coastal sector with the help of the stiffening provided by the regt of 148 Div and thus release 42 Jg Div for employment elsewhere. This sector is perhaps the least important on the front and the most mountainous, and may be regarded as appropriate for Italians, especially a Mountain Division.

In Northern ITALY it seems certain that 148 Div, as suggested last week, moved East from the French frontier to take up the previous position of 232 Div; 281 Regt at least came from the area of CAIRO, North of SAVONA. This division has now apparently been upgraded from a Reserve division and its Regts have been renumbered. Further East LITTORIA Division, which apparently entered ITALY this month together with ITALIA Division, is said to be taking over positions near GENOA from MONTEROSA Division. ITALIA has not yet been located though its arrival in ITALY is accepted. In the North East 71 Div has now apparently been joined by 44 Div. This is reported by a prisoner from the divisional Alarm Coy, captured on the Central front. He states that the division had left for the TRIESTE area and the majority had already crossed the Po when the serious situation South of BOLOGNA made reinforcements urgently necessary and the Alarm Coy, formed mainly from the three 13 Coys of the three infantry regiments, was rushed back into the line. 44 Div, though it has had fairly heavy losses, is nothing like so battered as 71 Div; possibly the enemy was anxious not to let it sink too low in strength for the sake of its reputation and to avoid creating a bad impression in AUSTRIA, the country of origin of most of the troops. Northeastern ITALY is now apparently the standard area for divisions to refit, though there have never been as many as two there at one time before. Possibly OKW may think that, when reformed, these divisions would be well placed there should it be necessary to switch them to meet an increased Russian threat to the Eastern frontiers of AUSTRIA.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) General

Again this week the weather has seriously restricted our attacks

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against the enemy L of C. There has been very little PR but it must be assumed that the enemy has by this time repaired a sufficient number of rail breaks to permit through rail traffic in most areas; in fact limited PR on 31 Oct showed that at three points repairs had been made. Most, if not all, of the Po rail bridges undoubtedly remain out; the only known exception is the bridge at CASALE MONFERRATO (J 5432) which has been passable for some time. North of CASALE MONFERRATO at least one, perhaps two, of the bridges over the TICINO River on the rail lines between TURIN and MILAN are probably passable. Recent PR of rail movements in this area are not available but a ground report of 25 Oct states that rail traffic to the North West from MODENA is heavy with trains moving both by day and night. The route reportedly followed is North West to PIACENZA, VOGHERA, TORTONA, then South to ARQUATA SCRIVIA (undoubtedly in order to by-pass the broken rail bridge just West of TORTONA) and then again North West to ALESSANDRIA. With, as noted above, the CASALE MONFERRATO bridge repaired, the enemy is now quite probably taking advantage of bad flying weather to evacuate as much loot as possible from areas South of the Po. The advantage in using the above rail route is of course that it avoids the necessity of having to tranship across the Po, and in fact once having got across the river, trains can now probably move all the way out of ITALY without having to tranship. Once having crossed the Po in North West ITALY these trains can leave the country either by the BRENNER or by the North East ITALY routes; but it is also quite possible, as rather persistently reported by ground sources, that they may leave ITALY by way of SWITZERLAND.

In N.E. ITALY the enemy last week finally opened up a line across the PIAVE River by repairing the bridge at NERVESA. This bridge was attacked on 30 Oct and PR of the 31st showed that it was impassable though not seriously damaged. However, one or more of the other bridges over the PIAVE may be open; but no PR being available since 20 Oct when they were seen as still down, no definite statement of their condition can be made. In any event there appears to be considerable rail activity in the N.E. At TREVISO on 31 Oct 330 units of rolling stock were seen in the marshalling yard as compared to only 80 on the 20th, and the turnover of rolling stock had been complete; at the station 70 mixed units were seen, most of which were loaded flats. This activity may well be connected with the reported, but as yet unconfirmed, move of 44 Inf Div to the TRIESTE area.

(b) Enemy Installations - PIACENZA

The area PIACENZA-CREMONA contains the largest concentration of enemy installations South of the River Po. Confirmed dumps include four fuel dumps, at least three of which are large permanent installations, a methane fuel gas plant, an ammunition filling plant and five ammunition depots, a repair shop, central spare parts depot and two general stores dumps. A further three fuel dumps, a tank depot and general stores dump have been reported by reliable sources but not yet confirmed by photo recce, whilst less reliable reports include one fuel and three ammunition dumps.

Nearly half these installations are concentrated round PIACENZA itself in an area approximately 4 kilometres square; the remainder are spread out over the area CREMONA-CORTEMAGGIORE (K 7709) - BUSSETO (K 8806). The fuel dumps tend to hug the river and at least two are believed to be supplied by river craft.

The reason for this large concentration of dumps is undoubtedly due to the position of PIACENZA in regard to the North Italian communication system, both road and rail. Standing almost in the centre of the Lombardian plain at the North West end of the Via EMILIA (highway 9) and the main trunk railway line which runs South East through PARMA, MODENA and BOLOGNA, it also has excellent road and rail communications with GENOA, TURIN, MILAN and VERONA and is thus an ideal point from which to supply the forces in LIGURIA and Southern PIEDMONT as well as those in the Western Appennines. Its location on the banks of the Po would also enable supplies ferried across the river to be carried direct to dumps by MT without the necessity of reloading on trains.

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3. WESTERN FRONT

Once again the Southern half of the front has shown few major changes. The reinforcement of the German 19 Army has continued with the arrival of an Infantry division from NORWAY in the area North of BELFORT, and the Southward shift of an Infantry division from METZ to the area West of SARREBOURG. It is in this area - on 19 Army's right wing - that the enemy has had to give most ground in the past week, and he has been showing considerable concern at his apparent inability to halt our progress. With the additional reinforcements, 19 Army's resistance has been noticeably stiffer in the past few days, and such progress as we have made has been immediately challenged by enemy counter attacks.

From SARREBOURG to AACHEN the front has been very quiet with only sporadic local actions to break the lull. AACHEN itself now has its first non-Nazi Mayor for a decade. It is reported that the few civilians remaining feel considerable bitterness towards the German Army and SS Units who indulged in wide-spread looting before their departure.

On the British Army sector in HOLLAND there has been lively activity on both sides of the salient. The enemy seems at last to have decided on withdrawal from Western HOLLAND, and to facilitate the extrication of his forces has been lanching sharp counter attacks against the Eastern flank of the salient in the VENLO area. 9 Pz and 15 P.G. Divs have been the cause of the trouble. 9 Pz Div was already in the area, but 15 P.G. had been missing from 19 Army's front for nearly a fortnight. Between them the two formations succeeded initially in driving us back about three miles on an eight mile front. However, having done that, their attacks seem to have petered out and some of the lost ground has been regained. It is, of course, possible that the attacks may yet be resumed in order to draw off Allied forces from the West of the salient. 116 Pz Div is out of the line and may put in an appearance. It is more likely, however, that this formation has gone off to join the three other Panzer divs which are believed to be resting and refitting somewhere in GERMANY. If it has in fact done this, the enemy has the beginnings of a strong armoured reserve which should be of considerable value to him when large scale battles are resumed.

On the West of the salient 15 Army had been for some time showing signs of distress, but fought hard to keep open the BEVELAND isthmus. When this was lost and the enemy's hopes of reestablishing land contact with the forces in ZUID BEVELAND had failed, he seems to have realised that there was little to be gained by holding an uneconomic and potentially dangerous front. The withdrawal of the depleted and exhausted divisions of 15 Army has on the whole been orderly and it is unlikely that we shall succeed in cutting off any large number of the enemy. His withdrawal in ZUID BEVELAND has been less stubborn and the region has been cleared of the enemy in a surprisingly short space of time. Extensive minefields rather than enemy resistance have been the main worry. Some 2,500 PW have been taken on BEVELAND to date but a large number of Germans is reported to have crossed the causeway into WALCHEREN.

There remains WALCHEREN. When this half submerged island is clear of the enemy ANTWERP can be put into use by the Allies and the long enemy resistance in Southern HOLLAND will be over. The Germans may yet stand on the WAAL or the MAAS, but with ANTWERP ours they will doubtless appreciate that the Allies are now in a much stronger position to resume the offensive. In anticipation of this the enemy must find more fighting troops to hold his front, and any shortening of the line which will release even a small number of divisions for a quick rest and refit will be very acceptable. At the moment withdrawal to the ZUIDER ZEE - WAAL line (reported in Summary No 66) looks RUNDSTEDT'S best course of action.

4. EASTERN FRONT

The Red Army has continued to make good progress in NORWAY where the enemy has so far put up comparatively little opposition. NEIDEN, 17 miles West of KIRKENES, is now in the hands of the Russians who are trying to get control of VARANGER Fjord. There is as yet no indication of the line on which the Germans propose to stand. It is hardly likely that they would voluntarily give up the iron ore deposits at NARVIK, and a stand somwhere to the East of that town is to be expected.

....From the Baltic.....

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From the Baltic to the Czechoslovak frontier the front has been fairly quiet in the past week. In LATVIA the Germans have spoken of Russian attacks from AUCE against the bridgehead they still hold in the Western end of LATVIA. There has been no confirmation of this from the Russians. Fighting in East PRUSSIA though sharp has been only local in character, but further South the Germans have been forced to give ground N.W. of PRIGA where the Red Army has extended its hold on the Eastern bank of the VISTULA.

In the Southern sector, the Germans have now withdrawn completely from the Transylvanian salient. Their fierce resistance at DEBRECEN a fortnight ago won for them time to extricate intact most of the 8 Army forces in the salient while after the loss of DEBRECEN the Russian drive from the South of the salient was frustrated by a counter-attack which regained for the enemy temporary possession of NYIREGYHAZA. In the Hungarian plain, however, the Russians have made considerable progress. KECSEMET, 45 miles South East of BUDAPEST has been reached, and the Russian forces hold a twenty mile stretch of the DANUBE North of BAIA, at which point they are within 160 miles of VIENNA.

In YUGOSLAVIA the Red Army now has a firm grip on the DANUBE from NOVI SAD to BELGRADE. The enemy is still falling back in this area and is reported to be constructing defences between the DANUBE at VUKOVAR and SID, thence Southwards to the junction of the SAVA and DRINA rivers. 118 Jg Div (from the Dalmatian coast) and the unreliable 13 SS Division, are reported to be preparing this defence line and they will no doubt eventually be joined by the tattered remnants of 1 Mountain, 7 SS, and 117 Jaeger Divs, now falling back from BELGRADE.

Further South, the Russian advance now directly threatens the enemy's withdrawal route via SKOPLJE - KRALJEVO - SARAJEVO. This is one of the two all-weather highways for German forces withdrawing from GREECE. In anticipation of the loss of this road, the enemy is taking steps to open up two alternative escape roads in YUGOSLAVIA. Elements of 297 Div are now clearing the subsidiary fair-weather road from NOVI PAZAR to VISEGRAD, where it joins the main KRALJEVO - SARAJEVO road. Other forces from GREECE including elements of 104 Jaeger and 21 SS Skanderbeg divisions are reported to be concentrating at PRIZREN and MITROVICA in order to keep open the approaches to the all-weather highway running parallel to the coast from PODGORICA to MOSTAR. The Partisans are challenging the enemy's hold on this road and hold TREBINJE, a key point on it.

Meanwhile in GREECE final demolitions were reported to have been carried out at SALONIKA harbour on 30 Oct and the town is now believed to be clear of the enemy. Enemy rearguards have been contacted at ARNISSA, 60 miles West of SALONIKA and 10 miles from the YUGOSLAV frontier, and it is probable that apart from isolated small bodies cut off by guerillas, the last German soldier will have left GREECE in the course of this present week.

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ENEMY DEFENCES ON THE RIVER RENO

Air photos taken on 20 and 24 October show the beginnings of minor defences along the River RENO from ARGENTA (M 2960) to CENTO (L 8574). A delaying position along the RENO in this area has some topographical advantages. First, the River RENO is a ready-made anti-tank obstacle, the difficulty of which will increase if rainy weather continues in the Appennines. Secondly, there are two large areas South of the RENO, one between ARGENTA and MOLINELLA (M 1561) and the other South of MALALBERGO (M 0472), which consist of water-meadows, ricefields and wet ground liable to become waterlogged after appreciable rain. Thirdly, by bringing his line on the impassable VALLI di COMACCHIO, which is no doubt his intention, the enemy shortens his front, the distance from CENTO to the VALLI di COMACCHIO being about 35 miles. Northeast of CENTO, however, the RENO turns Southwest, and this western end of the line is uncertain, loose and vulnerable, and can be outflanked. For any protracted stand the army would have to lengthen and continue his defences westwards, but of this there is as yet no indication, nor is there any outstanding natural feature like the RENO of which he can make use. The RENO line thus appears rather as a holding line on the enemy's Eastern flank, an intermediate position while the remainder of the forces in the Northwest are extricated.

The RENO line so far consists of minor defences only, chiefly machine-gun positions, and by no means continuous. There is no comparison with the fairly well-developed VENETIAN line. ARGENTA on Route 16 (RIMINI - RAVENNA - FERRARA) will probably be a keypoint in the defensive organisation. Northwest of the town there is an intricate system of defences under construction covering the map square M 2663 (near BOCCALEONE M 2563), with extensions to M 2764. In the area East of BOCCALEONE there are some machine-gun positions North of the RENO. Southeast of MALALBERGO there are twelve machine-gun positions in the area M 1160. MALALBERGO itself on Route 64 (BOLOGNA - FERRARA) will probably be another keypoint in the line. There are minor defences at L 9478 and L 9070. In the area of CENTO minor defences have appeared both West and East of the river. In all, these defences do not add up to much, but they are the first signs of a line as usually found. Ground sources have so far provided only very little information on this new line of defences. According to one source, whose report goes back to the summer, there are minefields along the RENO between ARGENTA and CENTO and also Southwards to LAVEZZOLO (M 3155), Southeast of ARGENTA. The same source states that the bridges along the RENO are mined and that there are anti-tank bunkers on the North bank of bridgeheads.

(Source: 8 Army Isum No.853
29 Oct 44)

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H.Q. A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 68

OF 9 NOV 44

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The improvement in the weather in the last few days has enabled operations to be resumed on the Adriatic sector. Developing the bridgehead established over the RONCO at MELDOLA at the end of the last month we had by the 3rd Nov reached GRISIGNANO M 4211 and had also crossed the river just South of Route 9 where we seized positions both sides of the airfield. This did not however appear to worry the enemy further to the North where he remained in possession of RONCO village, and continued to hold his positions along the West bank of the RONCO with outposts across it at BORGO SISA 4822. On the night of 7 Nov we attacked South of FORLI and by the morning had cleared all the buildings on the Northern perimeter of the airfield and were driving towards S. MARTINO in STRADA 4213 which was captured in the evening. Heavy fighting continued all day and cost 278 Div and 356 Div some 200 prisoners. Earlier evidence had indicated that the enemy did not intend to hold for long forward of FORLI - prisoners in fact stated that the withdrawal behind the MONTONE had only been postponed owing to the deterioration of the weather at the end of last month - and by night 8/9 Nov the enemy had had enough and decided to pull back to GERDA TWO, the code-name given on a captured map to the FORLI-CASTROCARO M 3510 road running just West of the R. MONTONE. By 0100 hrs 992 G.R. (278 Div) was reporting itself in its new positions and later in the morning of 9 Nov our patrols entered FORLI and to the South crossed the RABBI unopposed. North of Route 9 a deserter from 67 P.G.R. stated that on the 6th a runner arrived with orders for his unit to pack up and move off; BORGO SISA was clear by 9 Nov and it is probable that the enemy has pulled back to the RAVALDINO CANAL, which runs Northeast from FORLI to COCCIOLA M 4924. The latter village was still strongly defended today and it is likely that the new enemy delaying position will run as indicated along the R. MONTONE and the RAVALDINO CANAL and hinge at COCCIOLA on to the line he has been holding South of RAVENNA through GAMBELLARA 5128 and along the FOSSO GHIAIA.

On the Polcorps front 305 Div and the right wing of 356 Div have been driven further North. On the 6th M. CASALUDA was captured and held against repeated counter-attacks by II Bn 871 G.R. that night and the following day. Further West I Bn 576 G.R. was forced to give up DOVADOLA M 3005 on the night of 7 Nov and took up a position 1,500 yards to the North in the area of PLANDERA M 3005. The following day M. LECHIA M 2606 was captured but it was not till the morning of the 9th that M. BORA M 2906 was finally secured. In the fighting between these two hills an OST Coy of 578 G.R. suffered heavy losses and by the evening of the 8th was reduced to 13 men. On the right wing of 305 Div a slight withdrawal took place on the 7th and the enemy is now back on M. POMPEGNO M 2006.

From the Central and Western parts of the line there is little to relate. Following their unsuccessful attempt to capture VEZZOLO M 0033 on 31st Oct the parachutists have been quiet, and II Bn 1 Para Regt on 4th was withdrawn from the line to a rest area at VARIGNANO M 0138. The capture of PALAZZO L 6322 provoked severe counter-attacks by 94 Div, but all were repulsed, and similar raids in the SERCHIO Valley by Italians and Germans met with no more success. On the coastal plain we have improved our positions and

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There can be little doubt that the enemy is taking advantage of the present lull South of BOLOGNA and the comparative inactivity on the Western part of the line to carry out some regrouping. Both Regts of the MONTE ROSA Alpine Division have now been identified and this Italian division appears to have taken over a sector between the SERCHIO Valley and the sea, though the coastal plain itself is held by a Regt (281 G.R.) of 148 Inf Div. In addition several companies of the SAN MARCO Div have lost prisoners in the MONTE ROSA sector; these companies are presumably attached to gain battle experience since the div is still placed coastwatching West of GENOA. The Italians return to the line, despite the bouquet handed out by the German communique of 1 Nov, has hardly been a propitious one. The daily rate of desertion has been high, not surprising since most of the personnel of the division were recruited from internment camps in South GERMANY. Two independent reports of the arrival of about a Regt of Germans in the SERCHIO Valley about 4/5 Nov are therefore probably true, and it is likely that the Germans will institute a more vigorous control of the Italians and that they will have to resort to the familiar practice of sandwiching Italian units between German ones. The identity of these German arrivals is unknown. 42 Jg Division used to hold this Western sector, but since it has already been relieved of most of its commitments by 281 G.R. and MONTE ROSA it is probably required for some other task and is unlikely therefore to return. A more probable candidate is another Regt of 148 Div. This would involve a further thinning out of the Ligurian coast which would suggest that the enemy is no longer seriously worried about a possible Allied landing in the Gulf of GENOA. Northwest ITALY has until recently been liberally garrisoned, considering that the only hostile activity has been by Partisans, and the heavy casualties he has suffered on the main front make it inevitable that this luxury be cut down. A report from a ground source dated 6 Nov even suggests that 5 Mtn Div might be preparing to leave SALUZZO, the H.Q. of the Div, was said to be packed on that day with soldiers preparing to move, so it was rumoured, to the Appennine front. This is completely unconfirmed, but not by any means improbable, especially if its place were to be taken by a battle-weary division from the main front.

Meantime the two new Republican Divisions trained in GERMANY have arrived as reinforcements for GRAZIANI's Army of LIGURIA. ITALIA is still unplaced, but several reports which there is no reason to discredit, refer to the relief of MONTE ROSA by LITTORIO and on the 6th the latter's H.Q. was said to be at BONASCO K 3518 near PIACENZA, where some troops of MONTE ROSA were previously engaged on anti-Partisan hunts.

South of BOLOGNA the enemy is clearly resting some of his divisions. Parachutists of 4 Para Div have been reported back in the BOLOGNA area though this does not necessarily discount the possibility that they are still holding a narrow sector. 362 Div is probably in an even more sorry state, and its relief by a new division, rumoured amongst prisoners in the first days of November, may by now have been effected. Certainly it has produced no very recent identifications. It is difficult to see what division is available to relieve it, unless it be 42 Jg Div which has had its Recce Unit and III Bn 25 Regt committed in this sector for some time and has also handed over its commitments on the West coast. Of the other divisions South of BOLOGNA 16 SS, 65 Inf, 29 P.G., 1 Para Div, 98 Inf, 334 Inf and 715 Inf Divs have all been identified recently. 90 P.G. Div however has been particularly quiet and there has been no contact with it since parachutist prisoners said they believed that 1 Para Division had relieved it. 90 P.G. Div may therefore also be in reserve.

Whereas there is no evidence to suggest any large scale withdrawal, the enemy on the Adriatic has not shown any inclination to hold ground since he pulled back from the SAVIO River. It is quite likely therefore that 76 Corps is conducting a limited fighting withdrawal, the speed of which will depend on the weather and Allied pressure, to a shorter line joining up with the present positions South of BOLOGNA and resting its Eastern flank on the VALLI DI COMACCHIO. Such a line would enable Kesselring to economise on his divisions and draw others out to refit. If this policy of a limited withdrawal is in fact in progress, it is very probable that 76 Corps has been instructed to carry it out with the divisions at present at its disposal, exchanging a tired division with a more healthy one within the Corps if the occasion demands. This would avoid having to commit one of the divisions resting in the BOLOGNA area before it had had time to refit and give these divisions a badly needed respite for reorganisation.

....2 ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS..

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

A few days of good weather in the past week have permitted our air forces to achieve a degree of interdiction of North Italian railways heretofore unequalled. While there is no direct evidence that the enemy's supply position has been seriously affected, it seems fair to assume that at least some shortages already exist and in the event that we can continue to maintain the present degree of rail interdiction his position is likely to become precarious. Already the enemy is undoubtedly using a relatively large amount of vital fuel to get supplies past breaks in the rail sys by MT; in view of Germany's overall fuel shortage the enemy is thus hit at what from the logistical point of view is his most vulnerable point.

Since 5 Nov all rail routes leading into ITALY, with the exception of those through SWITZERLAND, have been blocked. On the BRENNER route from VERONA to a point about 15 kilometers North of TRENTO, a stretch of about 100 kilometers, the railway has been blocked at numerous points. While it is true that the cuts achieved consist mostly of craters on the open track, there are at least two points blocked which in the past the enemy has been slow to repair. Weather permitting, this may well be the beginning of a long period of 100 percent interdiction of through rail traffic on the BRENNER. Attacks have also been made on railway electric-power facilities on the BRENNER; if these attacks are carried further the enemy may be forced to substitute steam for the present electric traction along certain stretches, in which event there may well be an appreciable drop in efficiency with the consequent decrease of through train capacity. One weakness in the present interdiction of the BRENNER is the fact that all the blocks but one are South of TRENTO from which an alternative loop line branches off and runs South East to the important rail centre of CASTELFRANCO (G 3976) in North East ITALY on the through line between VICENZA and UDINE; from CASTELFRANCO there are excellent rail routes to all points of the compass. However, there are now three cuts on this alternative route including a destroyed bridge. Furthermore, and this has been another important development this week, most of the possible routes through the area between PADUA and UDINE are blocked at two or more points, including all the rail bridges over the PIAVE river. Thus enemy held territory South of a line MILAN-VERONA-VENICE is, with the exception of the Swiss routes, completely isolated for purposes of through rail traffic.

The MT lift to negotiate the BRENNER railway breaks is appreciable - about 100 kilometers as noted above. In the North East however, the problem of negotiating the breaks in the railway is not quite so satisfactory from our point of view. With a single transhipment across the PIAVE by MT supplies can be moved further by rail to PADUA and then Westwards by way of VICENZA, possibly as far as the important supply base at VERONA. Alternatively they can be carried South West to as far as the LEGNAGO (F 8927) area where the rail bridge over the ADIGE is destroyed. That the enemy is in fact moving supplies in from the North East is indicated by much rail activity at VICENZA between 4 and 6 November and a complete turnover of rolling stock here between the 6th and 8th. At PADUA there is also considerable activity, turnover of rolling stock being complete between the 4th and 7th. However, rail activity has been slight for the past several days at VERONA itself, so it may well be that the approaches to the bridge about half-way between VICENZA and VERONA, observed as cut on the 4th, have not as yet been repaired. Assuming the line is still cut between VICENZA and VERONA and since there is a bridge out on the main line running South from PADUA, supplies must be off-loaded in either the PADUA or VICENZA areas, though some may be moved directly South by through train to LEGNAGO.

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West of VERONA on the line to MILAN by way of BERGAMO considerable activity continues. On 8 Nov a rail bridge West of BRESCIA near CALCINATO (F 1958) was seen to be destroyed and while no movement was then observed in this area, a concentration of about 800 wagons including 300 loaded flats, were located between BRESCIA and CALCINATO, a distance of approximately 20 kilometers. The few engines observed appeared to be facing East and, while the loads on the flats cannot be definitely identified, it may well be that a movement of troops to the East from North West ITALY is involved; the single report that 5 Mtn Div is moving might possibly be relevant. West of BRESCIA, also on 8 Nov, considerable rail activity was noted at ROVATO (K 8872) and BERGAMO.

While VERONA is isolated from the North, East and West, the line South to OSTIGLIA (F 7513) on the PO appears to be open, but this is the only line over which through rail traffic can get as far South as the PO from VERONA, all other routes being blocked at one or more points. Over the PO itself the enemy is now apparently making a determined effort to improve the rail crossings. Of particular significance is the fact that he has repaired the permanent rail bridge over the PO at CASALMAGGIORE (F 1306) which "appeared" to be passable according to PR of 8 Nov. In addition he has begun to reactivate the temporary rail bridge just West of OSTIGLIA, completed but promptly knocked out some time ago, where repairs were 50 percent complete on the 8th. Considerable activity has also been noted recently at the rail ferry just East of PONTELAGOSCURO (M 1292) where the rail wagons themselves are believed to be ferried across the river; there has been no recent information on what appears to be a similar rail ferry at PIACENZA. Other ferries and pontoon bridges over the PO of course continue active, notably near CAMATTA at F 587140 and near FICAROLO at L 983967 where recent night PR shows that pontoon bridges continue to be used. Thus, while the enemy may have been experiencing some trouble in getting across the PO around the first of the month owing to heavy rains, at this time no particular difficulty in getting supplies across the river is probable. The current weak point in the enemy's L of C is rather to be looked for in the railways further to the North.

In view of the state of the railways a step-up in shipping activity might be expected, but so far no pronounced change is evident. In the Ligurian sea traffic between GENOA and SPEZIA continues, and there has been some increase in MT ship activity, but F boat activity is very slight and barge activity appears to have stopped altogether. Traffic from GENOA Westward to SAVONA continues on a small scale, mainly F boats with an occasional coaster and schooner. Other ports appear mainly inactive.

In the Adriatic RAVENNA now appears to be inactive and the quays have been demolished. F boats were still arriving in the RAVENNA-CORSINI canal on a very small scale up to 31 Oct but the only active shipping present on 5 Nov were two F boats in the canal which had not moved since 31 Oct. Turnover at VENICE and TRIESTE has been very light for the past fortnight, though traffic in M/Vs continues between these ports and PORTO MARGHERA, just South West of VENICE. Traffic has also been noted between TRIESTE, POLA and FIUME.

Of late there has been a noticeable decrease in the number of reports of the evacuation of Italian industries to GERMANY, and the general Northward movement of administrative installations. Possibly the preliminary steps to a withdrawal North of the PO have been completed though continual rather heavy rail movement on the MILAN-VERONA line suggests that some evacuation continues. In this connection in any event it is interesting to note what appears to be a reliable ground report to the effect that as of mid-October factories at TURIN were continuing to manufacture spare parts for motor vehicles. Another very recent report states that while FIAT has a capacity of producing 1200 trucks per month it is in fact producing only 150 and that the Germans have threatened serious measures unless production be increased to 400 or 500 within the next two months. In view of the enemy's known shortage of motor transport and spare parts it is logical to suppose that he will continue their production in ITALY as long as possible. Furthermore, while it is probably true that the enemy recently stepped-up his looting of Italian industry, the evacuation of Italian industrial facilities to GERMANY has been a long-standing practice, and it is likely that at the moment the Germans are continuing to devote considerable attention to keeping essential Italian war industries as productive as possible.

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3. WESTERN FRONT

In the Southern sector of the front Allied pressure in the BACCARAT area during the past week has caused the enemy some concern, and a thickening up of 19 Army's forces in this area has taken place. A Panzer Brigade has been transferred Northwards from the BELFORT sector, a Volksgrenadier Division has come down from the North and there have been several local moves on 19 Army's front all tending to reinforce the Northern part of the Army front at the expense of the BELFORT area which is now relatively thinly held.

From BACCARAT to HOLLAND the past week was quiet until Nov 8 apart from sharp fighting around the small German village of SCHMIDT. A new division, 18 Volksgrenadier, has been identified South of METZ in which area on 8 Nov the lull was broken by what the enemy has described as a large scale Allied offensive between PONT A MOUSSON and CHATEAU SALINS. This attack has been launched in what was formerly the sector of 5 Pz Army, which now seems to have gone out of the line altogether. There is as yet no evidence as to how the enemy intends to employ 5 Pz Army. Such armour as the Germans still have in the line is all in the Northern half of the front and it is possible that 5 Pz Army is destined for employment further North, reinforced perhaps with some of the armour now out of the line refitting. Most of this armour however is likely to be incorporated in a new formation now setting up in WESTPHALIA, 6 Pz Army. According to a recent deserter this formation is to include 2, 10, and 12 SS Pz Divs and the Pz Lehr Division. It may be joined by 21 Pz Division which prisoners expect to be taken out for a refit in the course of the present month.

In HOLLAND there has been no resumption of the counter-attacks West of VENLO by 9 Pz and 15 P. . Divs and all the ground we lost in the previous week has been regained after stiff fighting. On the West of the salient, 15 Army, fighting a fierce rearguard action has now withdrawn to the North bank of the MAAS. Elements of 10 SS Pz Division were brought down to the HERTOGENBOSCH area from ARNHEM at the start of the week in an attempt to stem the Allied advance, and the enemy has succeeded in getting most of his forces back across the MAAS, at the same time abandoning all the islands South of the HOLLANDSCH DIEP except WALCHEREN where a small pocket still holds out on the North coast. South of the SCHELDT estuary, 64 Inf Div has ceased all resistance and its commander is in our hands.

Now that the battle for Southern HOLLAND is at an end, it appears that the enemy is engaged in a reorganisation of his chain of command in the West in time to meet the coming battles for the REICH. An accumulation of evidence suggests that a new Army Group - Army Group North - is being formed to take over 15 and 1 Para Armies and charged with the defence of HOLLAND and North West GERMANY. This will leave Army Group B, presumably renamed MITTE, free to concentrate on the RUHR front, with 7 Army and perhaps 5 and 6 Pz Armies under command, while Army Group G, which might logically be called Army Group Süd, holds the front from the VOSGES down to the Swiss frontier. It is not quite clear who will have command of the new Army Group. General BALCK, a cavalryman in the early fifties is now believed to be commanding Army Group G in succession to BLASKOWITZ. However the German radio recently referred to a conference between MODEL, BALCK and BLASKOWITZ which suggests that BLASKOWITZ still held a command of some sort. We might therefore see him take over the new Army Group in the North. RUNDSTEDT remains the supreme commander in the West.

4. EASTERN FRONT

Interest this week has centred almost entirely on the Southern sector of the front. Apart from German counter-attacks in EAST PRUSSIA which the Germans claim regained for them GOLDAP, there has been little change in the Northern and Central sectors.

In HUNGARY, the Russian armour has penetrated into the outskirts of BUDAPEST, where the offensive has come to a temporary halt due in part to bad weather. East of BUDAPEST however, Soviet forces have established a substantial bridgehead over a 35 mile stretch of the TISZA river between KISKORE and POLGAR. South of the Hungarian capital they have extended their hold on the East bank of the DANUBE North of BAJA, and the Germans say that the Russians have effected a crossing of the DANUBE at APATIN.

.....In YUGOSLAVIA.....

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In YUGOSLAVIA, the enemy's concern is now to gain time, firstly to prepare his defence line West of BELGRADE between the DANUBE and the DRINA, and secondly to keep open escape roads while his forces withdraw from North ALBANIA and Southern YUGOSLAVIA. West of BELGRADE 1½ SS Division is hard at work preparing defences while further East 117 Jg, 1 Mtn and elements of 110 Jg and 264 Inf Divisions are staving off the Russians whose pressure in this area has temporarily abated. Further South, the Russians have been able to capture VALJEVO thereby denying the Northward road from KRALJEVO to BROD to the Germans and forcing them to use the KRALJEVO-SARAJEVO road. Even this route stands now in grave danger for 7 SS Prinz Eugen Mtn Division has been unable to stop the Russians reaching PRIJEDLJINA from which town the Soviet artillery should be able to shell the KRALJEVO-SARAJEVO road.

Meanwhile South of KRALJEVO the weary procession of forces from GREECE and ALBANIA fights its way Northward through the difficult mountain roads of Southern YUGOSLAVIA. A thin screen of German divisions, including probably 11 C.A.C. and 22 A.G. is now protecting these routes against the pressure of combined Russo-Bulgar forces. Elements of at least three divisions (297 Infantry, 104 Jg, 41 Fortress) together with some independent Fortress units are in the area of Southern YUGOSLAVIA and Northern ALBANIA proceeding Northwards along several subsidiary routes. The most important of these appears to be that from NOVI PAZAR to VISEGRAD. The withdrawal of these forces is being constantly harassed by Partisans particularly in the PRIJEPOLJE - PRIBOJ area and around VISEGRAD where guerrillas claim to have destroyed the bridge over the DRINA river. It is not clear whether the enemy is using the all-weather highway along the coast from PODGORICA via MOSTAR - SARAJEVO for his withdrawal. This is probably the best of the roads remaining to him, but with the Partisans in possession of the coast line from SIBENIK to North of KOTOR it is likely that forces withdrawing along this road would have an even rougher passage than those now following the mountain roads inland.

Under circumstances in which the Germans may propose but the Red Army dispose, it is not as yet clear what will be the enemy's eventual intentions in South East EUROPE. The general shaping of the vast battlefield suggests that the enemy's present hope is a stand on the line BUDAPEST-DANUBE-across SLOVENIA - and along the DRINA river while three German-Croat divisions protect his right flank in the Dalmatian hinterland. Once safely behind that line Army Group F might hope to reorganise and prepare a delaying zone on the Italian model which would permit a phased withdrawal North-eastwards. The enemy's ability to hold such a line for any length of time will be largely governed by his success in stemming the Russian drive through South East EUROPE towards VIENNA.

5. STANDARD OF EQUIPMENT OF RECENTLY COMMITTED GERMAN FORMATIONS

Prisoners taken in the fighting around EINDHOVEN towards the end of last month have made illuminating statements on the equipment of some of the enemy's recently committed Panzer Brigades. Lorried infantry from one of these formations went into action with armoured TCV's and dual-purpose weapons of inferior design which had arrived less than a week before the formation moved up to the front. The armoured TCV's although brand-new from BERLIN arrived poorly fitted with axles out of alignment and necessitated the crews working in 24-hour shifts to get them ready to move. The dual-purpose DRILLING anti-aircraft guns (calibre believed 1.5 cm), in which the men had no training prior to using them operationally, had frequent stoppages involving the use of a hammer and lasting up to fifteen minutes.

Sabotage in the case of the vehicles and faulty ammunition in the case of the weapons were the causes to which prisoners ascribed these difficulties. This may in part be true, and the employment in large numbers by the Germans of foreign workers upon whom the present course of the war must be having its effect would tend to lend credence to it as an explanation. But the significant fact which emerges is that the enemy is being forced by the demands for equipment on all fronts to abandon his normal method of carrying out tests and adjustments over a period of seven weeks before AFV's, etc., are despatched for operational use. This is one more piece of evidence of the short "pipe" between German factory and fighting line, a situation which will undoubtedly be aggravated by any increase in operational activity and by the

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continuance of Allied air attacks on Ordnance depots and AFV and MT assembly plants.

(Source: SHEF W.I.S. No.31 of 22 Oct 44)

GSI(a)
HQ, AAI
9 Nov 44

BRIGADIER,
D.M.I.(I).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 69

OF 16 NOV, 1944.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The enemy has been steadily pushed back all last week on the Adriatic, and his main line now runs along the FIUMI UNITI just South of RAVENNA, up the MONTONE to within 2,000 yards of Route 9 where it follows the COSINA Canal into the hills to the S.W., joining up with positions given on a captured map from 354178 to M. FORTINO M 3214. MODIGLIANA M 2309 was reported clear yesterday and 305 Div appears to have taken up a line running from CASTELLACCIO M 2912 to M. PRUNETTA M 2212, though rearguards are still forward and the report from civilians that M. del TESORO 1808 is clear is not yet confirmed. The enemy resisted our attack N.W. from FORLI up the corridor between the MONTONE river and the RAVALDINO Canal stubbornly in the first place, and 278 Div lost a good many prisoners, but by the 12th we had advanced to SAN THOME M 4221 and the enemy was pulling back to the MONTONE.

Our attack caught the enemy in process of carrying out a relief, the intention of which was to move 356 Div North of Route 9 into the comparatively quiet sector between 114 and 278 Divs and to replace it South of the main highway by 26 Pz Div and 20 GAF Div. It was, in fact, a direct exchange of sectors, and was clearly designed to bring the better division into the line opposite the main weight of 8 Army attack. 26 Pz Div has had a comparatively easy time recently and although it has not been possible to take it out for a rest and refit, it has absorbed a fair number of reinforcements while still in the line. The units of 20 GAF Div on the other hand are all pretty weak by now - I Bn 40 GAF Regt has only two companies - and they are still under command of 26 Pz Div. Since 20 GAF Div has not controlled its own units in battle for the past two months, it looks as if it may eventually be completely absorbed into 26 Pz Div and cease to function as a separate formation. The interchange of sectors which started on the 9th is by now finished, and 67 P.G.R. yesterday had one Bn acting as rearguard on Route 9, while 9 P.G.R. is on the division's right flank, and two days ago had its regimental H.Q. at M 3218. G.A.F. units are sandwiched in between the Panzer Grenadiers, and are normally placed in the front line while the Panzer Grenadiers are used for counter-attacking. 871 G.R., the last regiment of 356 Div to be relieved, appears to have come in either to reinforce or replace the left wing of 278 Div. The latter div has taken the brunt of our attack and has had fairly heavy casualties.

In the RAVENNA sector another relief has been carried out, 162 Div, having according to prisoners, moved out of the line and disappeared North to some unknown destination. In view of the unreliability of the Turcomen and the fact that the div recently surrendered a fair proportion of its German personnel to 114 Div as replacements, this is hardly surprising. 114 Jaeger Div now extends from the coast inland for about 20,000 - 25,000 yards.

In the Central and Western parts of the Appennine front activity continues to be limited to patrolling and a plentiful flow of desertions from the MONTE ROSA Div. Prisoners from 4 Para Div show that 12 Para Regt has returned to the line, with companies in II Bn averaging 100 men each. This Regt was the hardest hit of the three in the division and fairly substantial parachutist replacements must have arrived. (Prisoners say that 1,000 arrived last month in the BOLOGNA area). Internal reliefs have also taken place in

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division. There continues to be no contact with either 362 Inf or 90 P.G. Divs and both are definitely considered to be out of the line, presumably refitting in the BOLOGNA area.

So far 76 Pz Corps has conducted the battle on the Adriatic without reinforcements - in fact the departure of 162 Division represents the loss of about a regimental group - and there is no sign at the moment of any formation coming up to help. If it is the enemy's intention to try and stand on one of the river lines, either the present one of the MONTONE or else on the LAMONE, he will probably need reinforcements and in that case 362 Inf and 90 P. Divs would be available. On the other hand evidence at present suggests that the MONTONE is certainly a temporary line - it is apparently called GARHILD ONE which presupposes further delaying positions - and 356 A.A. on the 15th had already selected gun sites S.W. of BAGNA CAVALLO 3938 clearly intended for the next delaying position, apparently to be called HEIDEMARIE. It is reasonable to suppose then that the enemy is pulling back to a shorter line, and that the speed of his withdrawal will be governed as suggested last week by the weather and Allied pressure. In this case the forces at present at his disposal should be sufficient to carry out the withdrawal to a general line from M. GRANDE to VALLI di COMACCHIO, and the enemy will obviously try to avoid committing reserve formations in order to give 90 P.G. Div and 362 Div ample time to rest and refit.

Meantime reports from ground sources suggest that the transfer of part at least of 5 Mtn Div from Western ITALY to the Appennine front is in process. Alpine troops with the divisional sign on their vehicles were observed on the 7th moving East from TURIN towards ASTI, and reports of the same date that large numbers of troops were expected shortly in the PIACENZA area were s[illegible] followed up by a flash that 500 Alpine troops en route for BOLOGNA spent the night of 9/10 Nov in the public gardens of PIACENZA while at the same time large bodies of troops had reached the FIDENZA area (between PIACENZA and PARMA). The transfer of 5 Mtn Div to the main battle front though requiring further confirmation seems a reasonable step. It remains to be seen how long the move will take, for interdictions of railway lines are numerous and frequent transhipments will be necessary, and whether its place on the Franco-Italian frontier will be taken by another formation.

The arrival of the two Italian Republican divisions has been interfered with by the successful dislocation of the BRENNER line and ground sources have reported that many of the troops had to march from BOLZANO to VERONA, while PR has picked up heavy vehicle movement South from the BRENNER. By now the bulk of LITTORIO is believed to have arrived and to have taken over MONTE ROSA's old sector between GENOA and SPEZIA with commitments against Partisans S.W. of PIACENZA. The troops are said to be in good heart at being back in their own country but to have little intention of actually fighting. The ITALIA Div is now believed to be on the way South and some BERSAGLIERI troops of the division were reported across the BRENNER on the 6 Nov. Its ultimate destination is unknown but as it will almost certainly come under GRAZIANI's command it will presumably move into Western ITALY and may even relieve 5 Mtn Div.

From N.E. ITALY there is little news. 71 Inf Division has been reported in the Plain South of UDINE, in the sector originally held by 94 Div. 237 Div is still in ISTRIA and elements of 188 Res Mtn Div are reported at various places with some 4 battalions apparently guarding the TRIESTE-FIUME railway. North of UDINE in the TOLMEZZO area Cossack troops provide the garrison and are engaged with the Partisans: as many as 20,000 of these Cossacks have been reported in this area and also in the Plain itself, and it seems that they are in strength of at least a division. Conspicuous by its absence in all these reports is 44 Inf Division, and its location remains uncertain.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

By 12 Nov all the railway bridges over the rivers TAGLIAMENTO, PIAVE and BRENTA were impassable making three complete blocks to be negotiated over a distance of 70 miles on all lines entering ITALY from the N.E. Despite this fact however, activity at TREVISO, PADUA and VICENZA indicates that the railways in this area are still in use. Despite considerable enemy repair activity the BRENNER line remains blocked at several points and there was still no sign of rail movement between TRENTO and VERONA on 12 Nov. That the

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complete blocking of the BRENNER railway has forced the enemy on to the roads is shown by the observation on 12 Nov of considerable MT movement in a Southerly direction North of VERONA, and near S. AMBROGGIO, whilst on night 10/11 Nov 100 lights were seen moving S.W. along the N.W. side of Lake GARDA.

With the BRENNER blocked and cuts on the line between BRESCIA and VERONA there has been complete congestion of the VERONA-BERGAMO line with rolling stock. On 8 Nov approximately 800 wagons, including 300 loaded flats, were seen on the tracks from CALCINATO to BRESCIA, by 11 Nov there was a heavy concentration of loaded flats along the whole line from VERONA to BERGAMO. It was originally thought that the loaded flats might have some connection with the reported move of 5 Mountain Division Eastward from N.W. ITALY. However, in view of the fact that PR shows that no effort was apparently being made to unload it now seems more probable that these flats and other rolling stock are carrying machinery and other loot being evacuated from Northwest ITALY. That such is the case is further indicated by ground reports this week which state (i) that 5 Mtn Division if in fact on the move, is coming Eastward from TURIN via ASTI - ALESSANDRIA - PIACENZA, and (ii) that heavy rail traffic carrying loot has been moving from TURIN and GENOA North across the PO rail bridge near CASALE MONFERRATO (J 6432). South of VERONA the direct line to BOLOGNA has been blocked South of the PO by the destruction of bridges at CAMPOSANTO and S. GIACOMO whilst two impassable bridges at MANTUA deny access to the only alternative route.

South of the river PO although the main line is cut at several places, it is possible by using the network of lines to the North of it to get from BOLOGNA to within a few miles of PIACENZA without the necessity of negotiating blocks, and activity at FIDENZA, CASTELGUELFO, PARMA and COLORNO indicates that this route is in use.

Since the destruction of the PO bridges there have been several reports from ground sources of fuel being carried across the river by pipe line. Two such pipe lines have now been confirmed by photo recce S.E. of OSTIGLIA at F 752108 and MONTELLGOSCURO (M 137920). Both these lines are served by rail spurs at either end and appear active. Ground sources report that the fuel dump at REVERE (just across the river from OSTIGLIA), which was believed to have been destroyed in July, is still operating and this appears to be correct. Photo recce on 6 Nov showed that three underground tanks are still serviceable and the fuelling point appears active.

Since the beginning of Nov there has been a slight increase in shipping activity between GENOA and SPEZIA. Photo Recce shows that 4 KT ships, at least 12 F-boats, a few barges, two or three coasters and sailing vessels are plying between these two ports. On 10 Nov ground sources reported that cargoes from GENOA to SPEZIA consist mainly of fuel, ammunition and rations for the forward troops whilst return cargoes consist of miscellaneous material including radios, sewing-machines and electric utensils looted from SPEZIA. It is thought that more tonnage is being evacuated than is coming South.

3. WESTERN FRONT

This week has seen the final clearing of the enemy positions commanding the entrance to the SCHELDT and the launching of two offensives, by 21 and 12 Army Groups. The former is against the enemy bridgehead West of the MAAS river in Eastern HOLLAND; the latter is developing as a pincer movement encircling the great fortress city of METZ from North and South. In the VOSGES we have been exploiting the salient caused by our surprise capture of BACCARAT in the direction of ST. DIE and have reached the outskirts of the latter town.

The attack in LORRAINE began on 9 Nov with two thrusts North East and South East of METZ. The former early succeeded in establishing a bridgehead over the MOSELLE at KONIGSMACHER and advanced to within two miles of the 1939 German border. Violent German counter-attacks were encountered and progress subsequently was slow but we were able to capture the important town of THIONVILLE (DIEDENHOFEN) where all resistance was reported to have ceased on 14 Nov. South East of METZ DELME fell on the first day of the offensive and

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CHATEAU SALINS on 10 Nov. The attack then took a more North Easterly direction, aiming at the railway from SAARBRÜCKEN to METZ and this has now been cut in three places. The important junction of BENESTROFF is closely threatened and a bridgehead has been secured over the river NIED, between there and METZ, which has been subsequently widened and extended. We now hold five of the ring of forts which have been so stoutly defended for so long and it begins to appear as though the enemy were restricting his defences in this area to the immediate vicinity of the city itself. There is no sign of any intentions to evacuate but neither is there any sign of reinforcements for this sector and it is presumed that the enemy is prepared, while resisting as long as possible, to risk losing METZ rather than weaken a more vital sector of the front to reinforce it.

In HOLLAND resistance ceased on WALCHEREN on 9 Nov, and the whole Southern bank of the MAAS and the HOLLANDSCH DIEP is now clear. On 14 Nov an offensive was started in the 21 Army Group sector in the direction of VENLO. Good progress was made on the first day and the village of MEIJEL captured; enemy opposition is reported to be moderate but the going is very bad. At latest reports our advanced troops are about five kilometers from VENLO.

On the enemy side reorganisation continues. A new division, 272 Inf Div, has been identified in the area South of TRIER. This appears to be the harbinger of a new series of low-grade infantry divisions. It is clear that the enemy, reckoning on a development and intensification of the Allied offensive, will very shortly bring up all his available reserves in a determined attempt to defeat that offensive and effect a stabilisation which will last out the winter. It is believed that four reformed Parachute divisions are by now ready for 1 Parachute Army and there are five reformed Panzer Divisions in SEPP DIETRICH's 6 Panzer Army which must be primarily intended for the DUSSELDORF-COLOGNE sector. It scarcely lies in the capabilities of these forces to mount a counter-offensive, especially in view of the enemy oil situation; it is much more likely that 6 Pz Army will be held as a mobile reserve to counter-attack Allied thrusts towards the RUHR and these counter-attacks are likely to be fierce and determined. The Parachute Divisions, which lack mobility, are likely to be sent into the line straight away and should prove a great source of strength to the defensive; it is believed that some are already in line in 1 Parachute Army's sector. The newly-arriving infantry which lacks battle experience is likely to be used for preference in quieter areas, relieving better divisions for use in more critical sectors. As always hitherto the relief of threatened portions of the front will have to be effected by accepting weakness elsewhere; it is the same flexible strategy as has been practised with such skill on the Russian front and for the same reason, lack of reserves.

4. BALKANS

The German withdrawal from MACEDONIA and ALBANIA, although harried by the Bulgars and Partisans, appears to be rapid but orderly. The fall of KUMANOVO C 95, captured by Bulgarian forces on 10 Nov, was followed by the capture of SKOPLJE, key communications centre in the VARDAR Valley. It is thought that Army Group 'E' was able to extricate the main body of its forces before the loss of SKOPLJE. 41 Fortress Div, acting as rearguard, suffered losses and its tired remnants are now screening the tail of Army Group 'E' as it withdraws North on to PRISTINA O 57. A new and perhaps more serious threat to this withdrawal, the capture by Russo-Bulgarian forces of PODUJEVA, J 60, was stemmed by elements of 104 Jg Div who are guarding the left flank between MITROVICA O 39 and PRISTINA. The main withdrawal route, MITROVICA - NOVI PAZAR - SJENICA - VISEGRAD is firmly in enemy hands though the DRIN bridge at VISEGRAD is destroyed. An alternative route, SJENICA - PRIJEPOLJE - PLJEVLJA and thence North West to GORAZDE B 90 may be attempted. To the South West the Albanian Partisans now hold ELBASAN G 52 and are fighting in the capital TIRANA. Streams of enemy traffic were reported moving West from ELBASAN to PEQIN G 21 on 12 Nov and it appears that 21 Mtn Corps is using the roads DURAZZO - ALESSIO - SCUTARI to extricate its forces from ALBANIA. PODGORICA N 06 seems to be the forming-up place for these forces and reports on 15 Nov state that heavy traffic including infantry

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and artillery was moving North via DANILOV GRAD M 87. The Western route from PODGORICA, via CETINJE - KOTAR - RISAN was cleared by the enemy early this week but the Partisans claim to have recaptured CETINJE on the 14th.

Some progress, was made by the Russians against bitter opposition in the battle for BUDAPEST. The enemy has moved considerable Panzer and Infantry forces to the South and South East of the city where fierce battles are taking place. The Russians claim however to be fighting in the suburbs, with their armour making thrusts into the city proper. Gains were made throughout the week to the East of BUDAPEST where the Russians now hold MONOR H 80, TAPIOSAP H 81, KOKA H 91, JASZ-BEREWY J 11 and along the river TARNA to near KAL J 44. MEZO KOVESD J 74 was captured early in the week. The Russian claims to have forced the DANUBE at DUNAFOLDVAR N 34 and APATIN S 22 are as yet unconfirmed but almost the whole territory East of the DANUBE South of BUDAPEST has been cleared of enemy.

H.Q. Army Group 'F' is now at ZAGREB and H.Q. 2 Pz Army is stated to be at NOVA GRADISKA F 63. It appears that Army Group 'E' is responsible for the area through which runs the withdrawal route and probably Northwards as far as the SAVA and BROD. Assault Div RHODES, not heard of since it left the AEGEAN, is reported to have suffered casualties South East of BUDAPEST. 750 Jg Regt of 118 Div has been reported in the VUKOVAR area, its sister Regt 738 has probably been left behind to reinforce 369 Croatian Div in the MOSTAR sector. Other units in the VUKOVAR area are reported to include 2 Brandenburg Regt, elements of 13 SS Div and some Police and Sicherungs Bns.

C. P. Wood

G.S.I.
HQ AAI.
16 Nov 44.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has been but little change in enemy forward dispositions this week and that all at the extreme Eastern end of his line. He is still determined to hold his positions in this sector until they are seriously endangered and to make us mount a large-scale offensive for each river obstacle; but he is fully prepared to withdraw at least back to a position covering BOLOGNA on the right and resting the left on the VALLI DI COMACCHIO. In the meantime there is evidence, though of uncertain value, of important moves in his rear areas.

At the beginning of the week 76 Corps was back on its MONTONE line except in the coastal sector where we have pushed forward gradually in no great strength against equally weak German outposts to the river RONCO and the FIUMI UNITI. 721 Jaeger Regt and 114 Recce Unit are holding this flank among the marshes. 992 A.R. pulled back in the area of the railway and resisted strongly and successfully our attempts to secure a bridgehead in this area on the morning of 21 Nov. 67 P.G.R., now responsible for the axis of Route 9, also defended its sector with great stubbornness and prevented any progress across the canalised river BOLZANINO. Further South, however, in the sector of 9 P.G.R. and 39 G.A.F. we were able to make better progress in an area where the enemy has not the same advantage of water obstacles, capturing CASTIGLIONE, M 3416, and the stubbornly defended Monte FORTINO, M 3214, and advancing some two kilometres further North at both points. It seems likely that in this area the enemy will next try to hold a line shown on a captured map (called GERHILD, probably a switch-line from the original GERHILD) which follows the upper reaches of the river COSINA to MONTE RICCI M 3218, and then presumably bases itself on the river MARZENO. Monte RICCI is particularly important as it affords dominating observation over the low ground below the present enemy line and over FAENZA and any further advance in this sector must make the MONTONE line, at least in the neighbourhood of route 9, untenable for the enemy.

On the whole of the rest of the front there have been only minor operations. Prisoners from 98 Division confirm that 42 Jaeger Div has relieved 362 Div and that is borne out by PW from III Bn 40 Jaeger Regt, captured at L 9632. In general in the Central part of the front most divisions have a regiment out and resting; 4 Para Div may have two of its three regts out of the line and a report from a usually reliable source states that 2,500 troops from the division are training at AVESA, F 6457, just North of VERONA. These men are presumably replacements and we know that both the Parachute divisions in ITALY have always insisted on a long and thorough period of training for their recruits even at the risk of allowing strengths of units in action to fall very low. The fact that fairly copious replacements have been made available is shown by the increased strength in which 12 Para Regt returned to the line, and we must expect 1 Para Div also to have been made up on much the same scale.

There has been considerably more daylight movement seen by the air in rear of the Eastern part of the front than has been usual for some time. Part of this may be explained by the move away of 162 Div, but not the movement reported between 18 and 22 Nov in the area BOLOGNA - MEDICINA - LUGO - FAENZA, which has been so frequent as to suggest the arrival of new troops in

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this area. It may possibly be connected with a report from Partisan sources that new troops have arrived along the river SENIO in the area of LUGO and ALFONSINE where they are erecting defences on the river bank. These troops are reported to bear a sign which might be that of Mountain troops. There has been no further news since that reported last week of the move of 5 Mtn Div or any confirmation that such a move is taking place and it is too early to say what credence is to be given to the Partisan report. However the hypothesis that 5 Mtn Div may be coming to reinforce 76 Corps is to be borne in mind. If there is no further news of departures from N.W. ITALY there are reports of arrivals. Between 13 and 16 November troop trains were seen moving South through TURIN carrying troops of the LITTORIO Division. They were said to be bound for the CUNEO area though this information is naturally less reliable. It may be, therefore, that LITTORIO is destined for the Franco-Italian frontier, to relieve 5 Mtn Div, rather than for the GENOA area. In the meantime a report, confused and unconfirmed, from N.E. ITALY may throw some light on the move of 44 Division. It has been noteworthy that, although all other formations known to be in N.E. ITALY are frequently reported on, there has been no hint of the whereabouts of 44 Div since a prisoner on 29 Oct said it had left for TRIESTE. The latest report, the date of which is not known, does not specifically mention 44 Div but says that "a VIENNA division which fought at STALINGRAD" was moving through N.E. ITALY to AUSTRIA and HUNGARY. This description will fit 44 Div, and no other in ITALY, and it has always been considered likely that the time would come when reinforcements from ITALY would be required for the South-Eastern front. This may be the first contribution, and it is unlikely to be the last.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

The BRENNER railway was initially blocked on 5 Nov and while the degree of interdiction has varied, PR shows that the line remained out until at least the 18th. A generally similar situation has obtained on all routes leading into N.E. ITALY. While there are rail routes into ITALY through SWITZERLAND these are not believed to be used for military supplies. Thus for a period of two weeks enemy-occupied ITALY was completely isolated for purposes of getting supplies into the country by rail without trans-loading. Resupply could only be effected by a combination of railway and road movement. However, the MT lift to achieve this will have been considerable, at times as high as 100 kilometres and very probably averaging not less than 50 kilometres. The difficulties inherent in such a situation must have been further accentuated by the fact that as of 5 Nov (as indicated above the date of the initial blocking of the BRENNER railway) an Italian division was passing over the BRENNER on its way from GERMANY to ITALY. As to how successfully the enemy has been able to meet the situation we have as yet no direct evidence. It is clear, however, that he has been hit at what from the logistical point of view, and potentially from the tactical point of view, are his two weakest points, namely shortage of fuel and motor transport. Under the circumstances it is most probable that stocks in ITALY have dropped and there is at least indirect evidence that enemy stocks of fuel, and possibly of artillery ammunition, have been seriously depleted.

SUPPLY

It has long been evident that here in ITALY the enemy's supply position varies more or less directly with the degree of interdiction of the railways. In order appreciably to affect the enemy's supply position rail interdiction must be maintained at close to 100 percent since the enemy's daily requirements in terms of number of trains is very small in relation to the potential rail capacity available. (An average of about 10 trains a day is probably now sufficient to maintain enemy forces in ITALY). Also the zone of interdiction must have depth in order to force a long MT lift. Up to 18 Nov these conditions, i.e. nearly 100 percent interdiction through a deep zone, have been substantially met as the result of air bombing.

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notwithstanding great difficulties on his L of C the enemy's consumption rate must at the same time be forced up by heavy fighting or other means. Fortunately for the enemy such heavy fighting as has recently occurred has been confined to a relatively small portion of the front and at no one time has a major portion of his formations been heavily engaged. While this has to some extent been compensated for by recent successful attacks on dumps, it does not appear that the enemy's supply position as of 18 Nov was so precarious as to impose upon him an immediate change of strategic policy. Tactical decisions may, of course, have been affected.

RAILWAYS

Since 18 Nov unfortunately it appears likely that the enemy has to some extent been able to open up his L of C. A high degree of rail interdiction has been maintained in the N.E. but repair activity on the BRENNER has been intense, and since the 18th the line probably has been open for about 48 hours to through traffic. Even before the 18th traffic may have been possible as far South as a point about 15 miles North of VERONA. In addition, both to the South and West the enemy has succeeded in improving rail communications. Three rail bridges over the PO namely those at CASALE MONFERRATO, and TORRE BERRETTI in the ALESSANDRIA area, and at PONTELAGOSCURO just North of FERRARA are now passable. In addition several of the bridges across the TICINO river on lines between TURIN and MILAN are open.

A considerable amount of rail activity has been evident during the past week. On the BRENNER between 12 and 16 Nov, while through traffic was not possible, repairs had evidently progressed far enough to permit a considerable turnover at various points between VIPITENO (North of BOLZANO) and SAN AMBROGIO (just North of VERONA) and a general clearance of previously congested lines had taken place. Between 16 and 18 Nov turnover on the BRENNER had fallen off, but trains were seen headed South at several points as far South as PERI about 15 miles North of VERONA. The presence of a large number of empty flats at TRENTO and ORA has been a further indication of troops passing along the BRENNER; whether these flats had just arrived or were being cleared from other points along the line where they had been previously trapped as a result of cuts in the railway is not known, though the latter seems more probable. On 18 Nov a rather large concentration of rolling stock was seen near SAN AMBROGIO undoubtedly held up by the then existing cut but by this time probably cleared as repairs were then noticed to be in progress at this point; this cut may however have been at least temporarily reestablished by fighter bomber attack.

There has been comparatively little photo cover of the complicated network of lines leading up to the N.E. frontier but activity at UDINE, MONSELICE, TREVISO, MESTRE, PADUA and VICENZA, where change of yard contents and train arrivals and departures have been noted during the past week, indicate that these lines are active. Activity in this area is further indicated by the repair of the bridge over the PIAVE at NERVESSA and also the bridge immediately North of PADUA. However, the PADUA North bridge having again been destroyed, NERVESSA bridge is the only bridge open of all those between UDINE and PADUA across the BRENTA, PIAVE, LIVENZA and TAGLIAMENTO rivers.

West of VERONA the line to MILAN by way of BERGAMO was still heavily congested this week. Immediately West of VERONA there has been some turnover which suggests movement from VERONA as far as PESCHIERA and then South. West of PESCHIERA there has been a considerable turnover at BRESCIA, but with a bridge impassable between BRESCIA and PESCHIERA and apparently no turnover on the track East of BRESCIA, where there has been heavy congestion for some time, it seems improbable that the turnover at BRESCIA reflects a move Eastward. It is more probable that the Italian division which crossed the BRENNER recently is entraining again somewhere in this area and being moved through MILAN (where there has been considerable activity in the yards recently) to the TURIN area; this is further borne out by military-train activity at CHIVASSO where it appears that troops are

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detraining to get around the broken bridge immediately West of the town and by ground reports stating that Italian troops are moving through TURIN to the CUNEO area.

South of VERONA, activity on the direct line through OSTIGLIA (where the bridge over the Po is still down) to BOLOGNA seems to have been somewhat below normal this week. This is probably the result of the repair of the bridge over the PO at PONTELLAGOSCURO between the 11th and 16th; with this bridge repaired traffic Southwards from the VERONA area is undoubtedly moving via LEGNAGO, ROVIGO, and POLESELLA directly across the PO into the FERRARA area. While the line running N.W. from BOLOGNA to PIACENZA has been blocked at several points, alternative routes are available by way of secondary lines between the main railway and the PO. Considerable activity has been noted in this area including a number of possible troop-trains. West of PIACENZA, on the line running to TURIN via ALESSANDRIA, movement of troops appears to be in progress but from PR the direction remains uncertain. It may possibly involve Italian troops moving Westwards from the PIACENZA area to the TURIN area or perhaps 5 Mtn Division moving Eastwards to the Appennine front. Both movements may be in progress.

On the PO river there appeared to be no major developments this week other than the repair of the rail bridge at PONTELLAGOSCURO noted above. One point of interest however is that PR has confirmed that there are now at least four fuel pipe-lines across the river. These are located at PONTELLAGOSCURO, OSTIGLIA, BORGOFORTE and PIACENZA. At these points spur railway lines have been built and it appears that fuel is piped directly from rail tanker cars on the North bank to cars on the South bank.

SHIPPING

Shipping between GENOA and SPEZIA is continuing, and possibly there is some increase this week, presumably in an effort to step-up the evacuation of various industrial materials from SPEZIA. That at least some supplies are coming South by sea is most probable as indicated by the fact that a ship in a Southbound convoy between GENOA and SPEZIA blew up when attacked by Allied Naval Forces on the night of the 18th. Traffic in schooners and other small coastal craft continues from GENOA Westwards to SAVONA.

In the Adriatic between 16 and 19 November demolitions were in progress at PORTO CORSINI and it is probable that by now port facilities here and in the canal running to RAVENNA have been abandoned. Two small vessels were seen at PORTO CORSINI on 19 November but these are likely to have been for purposes of final evacuation or to assist in demolitions and mining. A fairly lively traffic in M/Vs, and occasional KT ship and a host of smaller craft continues between all the Northern ports from PORTO MARGHERA and VENICE to TRIESTE and POLA.

3. WESTERN FRONT

All along the front from VENLO to the Swiss frontier the enemy has been forced back during the past week. In the Southern sector of the front striking progress made been made by French and American forces. In the Centre METZ has been freed, and the MOSELLE crossed in strength, while at AACHEN and to the North British and American forces have made slow but steady progress over terrain vital to the enemy against stubborn German resistance.

In the South 19 Army, with a collection of formations presenting an array more formidable on paper than on the ground, was unable to resist for long before the BELFORT Gap and by 19 November its left wing had completely collapsed enabling French forces by a double thrust to occupy BELFORT and push along the Swiss frontier to the RHINE on a ten mile stretch North of BASLE. The enemy is now trying to prevent fresh exploitation down the RHINE Valley towards STRASBOURG and appears to be making a stand on the RHONE-RHINE Canal in the Southern outskirts of MULHOUSE. However, a threat to STRASBOURG is also developing further North where 19 Army, after conducting a long and stubborn withdrawal along the LUNEVILLE - SARREBOURG railway suddenly broke under the pressure of American armour and fell back 15 miles in one day to behind SARREBOURG.

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Reports so far to hand speak of considerable enemy disorganisation in this area and American forces are now within 20 miles of STRASBOURG.

While Army Group G's Southern flank has had a disastrous week, the German withdrawal further North has been more orderly. Reinforced by 25 P.G. Div, a new arrival, and 21 Pz Div from the BACCARAT sector, the enemy forces in the METZ area were able to offer stubborn resistance before the fortress eventually fell and even now isolated forts are still holding out on the perimeter of the city. With the loss of the fortress German resistance has been less fierce and Allied forces have pushed across the German frontier North East of METZ.

From TRIER up to the AACHEN sector the front has been fairly quiet and main interest has centred on the arrival of a number of newly formed infantry divisions. Three Volksgrenadier divisions have put in their appearance, one South and two North of TRIER. It is clear, as suggested in last week's Summary, that the enemy is following a policy of putting in his new untried formations in quiet sectors while battle experienced formations are released for employment in other sectors. It is of particular interest that 212 Volksgrenadier Division which has been identified just North of TRIER was set up in POLAND some six weeks ago and has only just arrived in FRANCE. PW from this formation say that they were accompanied to the West by yet another Volksgrenadier division, this time from CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The fact that the enemy considers it necessary to bring formations all across EUROPE from the East at the present time is a clear indication of the priority which the Western front enjoys in his eyes.

In the AACHEN sector the fiercest fighting of the week has taken place. In the face of savage enemy resistance and across very extensive minefields, our advance has been slow. This is the vital sector of the front for the enemy and he must cling to every yard of German soil in order to keep the Allies from the RHINE. Nevertheless progress has been made in the past week. We are only six miles from DÜREN, ESCHWEILER has been entered, and GEILENKIRCHEN is entirely in our hands. An assortment of infantry divisions backed up by armour in the form of 9 and 116 Pz and 3 and 15 P.G. Divisions form the enemy's force in this sector. There have been indications however that some of the five missing Panzer divisions setting up under 6 Pz Army are getting ready to participate in the battle. Prisoners have reported the presence of four of them in the area immediately East and S.E. of AACHEN, and although none has been committed yet, it looks as though RUNDSTEDT is now ready to commit them as soon as he feels that his present forces at AACHEN can no longer take the strain.

In HOLLAND the British advance on the MAAS has made good headway against moderate to stiff opposition. The enemy seems to be reconciled to abandoning the West bank of the river and no new formations have been identified. The whole of 7 Parachute Division appears to be West of VENLO but that is all the Parachute representation in the area. 3, 5 and 6 Para Divs are still out of the line.

The winter offensive is now in full swing and the enemy is faced with a situation in which he is most vulnerable - a simultaneous attack on several widely separated sectors of the front. Already events in the South have shown that he is unable to meet his commitments in one sector without having to give ground elsewhere. Nevertheless RUNDSTEDT's is an old and cool hand, and has so far played with the measured caution of a chess player rather than the abandoned recklessness of a gambler. He may have been taken by surprise by the French thrust in the South, but his eyes are still firmly fixed on the AACHEN area where he knows full well what is at stake. The temptation to transfer his armoured reserve to the less crucial sectors further South has been resisted. The armour is still in the North and when it is committed, will probably be committed as a whole. NORMANDY taught a bitter lesson about piecemeal commitment of armour. The COLOGNE plain may show that it has been learnt.

Some points from a SHAEF Intelligence Summary on shortages in

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equipment of German formations in the West are of interest. In spite of the continued evidence of the acute shortage of fuel for vehicles of the armed forces, and, in spite of repeated accounts of immobilised vehicles and low unit motor transport strengths as a result of this shortage, the greater part of information received in recent weeks points in another direction, namely to a shortage of equipment, especially small arms, automatic weapons and motor transport.

Information from a senior officer prisoner of war to the effect that the usual tank strength for Panzer divisions is now between 20 and 50 tanks is a fair indication of the production problems encountered by the Germans under the strain of strategic bombing and heavy operational loss. That this applies to other production as well, is shown by the report of one unfortunate from a Landesschutzen battalion who stated that there were 3 Czech MGs in the whole unit. Other reports indicate that stores of arms confiscated at the time of occupation of CZECHOSLOVAKIA are now being issued to infantry units in default of German models. This practice particularly applies to non-German troops who receive outmoded weapons of Czech, French and Russian origin. Of course it may be that, as one prisoner of war glibly states, care had to be taken NOT to produce up-to-date German equipment, otherwise the Bulgarians would have promptly asked for it. The capture of a secret enemy manual mentions the first use in ground fighting by units of armoured Panzer Grenadier battalions of a heavy machine gun (Drilling MG 151/15 and 151/20) formerly used only as aircraft armament.

Most revealing is one prisoner of war report which gives in detail the composition of an infantry division supply column. In a total of 15 lorries, two thirds of which were confiscated from civilian sources, 5 different manufacturers were represented. Moreover the 15 lorries were of 5 classes ranging from 1½ tons to a lone Renault 3½ ton vehicle. The maintenance problem for this motley caravan is revealed by information obtained from an NCO formerly employed in the motor transport repair depot at LEIGNITZ, SILESIA. He stated that of 6 truck and tractor types commonly used by the Wehrmacht, spare parts for two are virtually unobtainable, parts for two others very scarce, and only for the remaining two is a fairly adequate supply available. These shortages he attributed directly to the bombing of industry and stated further that all German divisions have now but an average of one-third of their authorised motor transport strength. Using as an example the 3-ton Bergward truck, prisoner of war remarked that since the bombing of the HANSA-LLOYD plant in BREMEN there have been almost no replacement parts for this model and that when the gears are damaged, the vehicle has to be abandoned.

4. BALKAN FRONT

Russian progress during the past week has been confined to the sector N.E. of BUDAPEST where Army Group South Ukraine supported by Hungarian forces has been pushed back to the general line of the BUDAPEST-MISKOLCZ railway. The Russians have cut this railway at several points between BUDAPEST and HATVAN, and control it completely from exclusive HATVAN to exclusive MISKOLCZ. Both the latter towns are now closely threatened by Soviet forces.

South of BUDAPEST the front line has shown little change. Russian troops still hold their bridgehead at APATIN but are not across the river in sufficient strength to constitute a serious penetration of the DANUBE line. There is certainly no sign of any early German retirement to a defensive line further West; indeed, until Army Group E's withdrawal from Southern YUGOSLAVIA is considerably more advanced than at present, the enemy has every reason to hold on to his DANUBE positions.

In Northern YUGOSLAVIA some reorganisation of the chain of command seems to be in progress. 2 Pz Army still controls the formations fighting the Russians probably as far South as KRALJEVO. Under its command is thought to be a Corps KUEBLER identified in the VINKOVCI-BRCKO area and also 68 Corps from GREECE, most of whose former formations are now in the area West of BELGRADE. The allocation of divisions to these formations is not known. 118, 1 Mtn, elements of 117 Jg and possibly of 264 Inf divisions are all in the area.

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Elements of 13 SS Handschar division may still be about but a weight of evidence indicates that part of this formation has been dismissed as untrustworthy while the remainder has moved to the ZAGREB area. Somewhere West of BELGRADE also are the remains of 92 Mot Bde which, after being almost completely wiped out in the BELGRADE battle, is reported to be awaiting reinforcements in the VUKOVAR area. How much of 264 Inf Division is involved in the SLOVENJ area is not quite clear. Reports have indicated that the elements which left the Dalmatian coast were bound for BELGRADE but the Div H.Q. and at least a regimental group are still believed to be on the coastal sector, and it is unlikely that more than one regiment of the division is in SLOVENIA.

In Southern YUGOSLAVIA, the German withdrawal is meeting with varying success. From MACEDONIA Army Group E is succeeding in withdrawing its forces relatively rapidly. PRISTINA, 50 miles N.W. of SKOPLJE, is clear and enemy rearguards are falling back to the road junction of MITROVICA. The main, and indeed the only escape, route at present being used by these forces is that via NOVI PAZAR - VISEGRAD. 91 Corps at NOVI PAZAR probably controlling 22 P.G., 41 Fortress and elements of 133 Fortress Divs is retiring along this road leaving 22 Mtn Corps to conduct the rearguard, with probably 104 Jg and miscellaneous elements of other divisions including 11 G.A.F. under command. A bridging column has arrived at VISEGRAD to repair the bridge destroyed by Partisans earlier this month, and all the evidence suggests that the enemy intends at present to use the NOVI PAZAR - VISEGRAD road in preference to the alternative route via ANDRIJEVICA - ROGATICA. It is significant that no attempt has so far been made to clear the Partisans from the road centre of PLJEVLJA on the latter route.

In MONTENEGRO the enemy withdrawal as might have been expected is proving a much more hazardous affair. Here 21 Mtn Corps with 181 Inf Div and the bulk of 297 Inf Div under command has been attempting to open up the route from PODGORICA to NIKSIC where it would have the choice of taking either the NIKSIC - VISEGRAD, or the NIKSIC - MOSTAR road. Considerable troop concentrations have been reported at PODGORICA, and the enemy has succeeded in advancing as far as DANILOVGRAD. Here he has stuck. Partisans reinforced with Allied units have offered stubborn opposition to all attempts at pushing through to NIKSIC and 21 Corps' position is becoming serious. The only alternative route it can use is the ANDRIJEVICA - PLEVLJA road which is also blocked by Partisans. A determined attempt to open up the NIKSIC road is therefore to be expected when the withdrawal from ALBANIA is more advanced. Demolitions between TIRANA and SCUTARI are at present holding up this withdrawal.

On the Dalmatian coast the town of RISAN on KOTOR Bay has been taken by the Partisans who are also operating on the TIVAT peninsula The enemy situation in the KOTOR area is becoming difficult in the extreme and the Partisans speak of a general German withdrawal. In ALBANIA the German forces despite road demolitions have now reached ALESSIO, and the whole of ALBANIA should be clear of the enemy very shortly. The Germans will then have the task of getting Army Group E out of the long salient in YUGOSLAVIA back in a staged withdrawal to the defensive positions now being built in N.W. YUGOSLAVIA.

I E R Mayhew

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 71

OF 28 NOV, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

On 22 Nov we attacked again on the axis of Route 9 and succeeded in getting over the river COSINA to the South of the road. Very heavy fighting ensued with 26 Pz division but by the afternoon of 23 Nov the enemy had had enough. The German communique for 24 Nov described the action as follows : "The Eighth Army, with the concentrated mass of its forces and with the strongest employment of material threw itself against one single German division. In exemplary steadfastness the 26th Pz Division, under command Colonel CRASEMANN defended the cohesion of the front". (Incidentally, Colonel CRASEMANN commanded 8 Tank Regt in Nov 41, during Eighth Army's first offensive). In fact the evening before this announcement the division, which had lost 400 prisoners, made a rapid withdrawal across the LAMONE, leaving no rearguards behind apart from a few men in the houses of BORGO DURBECCO. The situation was in fact regarded as sufficiently serious to call for the employment of 577 G.R. which has been out of contact in reserve for some two months; it came in to the South of Route 9, on the left flank of its parent division and had some casualties apparently due to lack of contact with 26 Pz div to its North. 278 Div also withdrew to conform. 992 G.R. has suffered fairly heavily and on 23 Nov I Bn could only muster 102 all ranks including its medical personnel and Italian cart drivers. However, the divisions' left hand regiment, 993 G.R., still stayed forward between the rivers and a prisoner from I Bn taken in the area M 392265 on 27 Nov stated his orders were to withdraw only if pressed. Similarly, 871 G.R., the next adjoining regiment, stubbornly defended ALBERETO, M 3927, and a general line along 28 Northing and prisoners on 27 Nov said they had no orders about a withdrawal. 114 Jg Div also appears to be still in its old positions behind the FIUMI UNITI although the Partisans in this area have consistently reported a thinning out here and say the main body of the division is back behind the LAMONE. It certainly appears, that although the enemy line has now been extended by the withdrawal to FAENZA he is not yet prepared to give up any ground to the North. Such a withdrawal would involve abandoning RAVENNA and PORTO CORSINI and although the enemy has probably already carried out all the demolitions he wants, he still will not give them up without some sort of a struggle. South of FAENZA, on the other hand, he has withdrawn wholly behind the LAMONE though there may be still some enemy forward of the river in the mountainous Southern sector of 305 Div.

On the remainder of the front there have been minor changes in enemy dispositions only. A second regiment of 148 Div, 286 G.R., has turned up and is apparently in the SERCHIO Valley. 4 Alpine Bn, which has not been encountered for many months, announced its arrival by a deserter and its H.Q., from a civilian report, is at ABETONE, L 3311. It is possible, though a little difficult, to suppose that this Bn is alone responsible for the many reports of the arrival of Mountain troops in this sector, which have run to as high as six battalions, but they would be well within the normal Italian range of exaggeration if we could assume that 3 Alpine Bn had also arrived, possibly in a different sector. The supposition would not be unreasonable, as the two Bns have previously normally operated together.

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There has been a steady flow of deserters on this front, reaching the record figure of 108 on 24 Nov, and a few statistics may be of interest. The figures available cover the period 8 - 22 Nov, and show that on 8 Army front there were 851 prisoners taken of whom 80 deserted and on 5 Army front 455 of whom 409 deserted. The difference is striking - 10% deserters in one case and 90% in the other - and requires a little explanation. The figures for 5 Army are heavily weighted by 136 Russians and 153 Italians, all deserters, who make up about two-thirds of the whole; however, of a total of 83 Germans, 46 or 56% and of 22 Austrians 17 or 77% were deserters. The main explanation must lie in the difference between a static and an active front. On 8 Army front opportunities for actually crossing the lines were much fewer than on the more thinly held and mountainous Western sector of 5 Army front; on the other hand on an active front with the Allies advancing many a would-be deserter can take the easier option of remaining behind when his comrades withdraw. In the latter case he is usually classed as an ordinary prisoner and not a deserter, an additional advantage for him but confusing for our statistics. It is dangerous therefore to build theories on enemy morale on these figures but the high proportion of pure German deserters on 5 Army front is certainly encouraging.

We have further news this week of changes in Northern ITALY. 162 division, whose withdrawal from the line in the RAVENNA sector was reported on 15 Nov, has been definitely identified at PIACENZA. It is apparently to take part in an anti-partisan drive in the mountains to the S.W. which is about all it is fit for. It was originally employed on this task in N.E. ITALY before the June crisis made it necessary to put it into the line, an experiment which has not been successful. In N.W. ITALY a usually reliable source states that 157 Mtn Division is being withdrawn from the Alps and the troops say they are going to the BOLOGNA front. Their destination may not necessarily be correct - it would be a natural assumption for the average man to make - but the move of the division seems to be confirmed. It makes much more unlikely the move away of 5 Mtn Div as this would leave the defence of the Franco-Italian frontier to only 34 Div and LITTORIO; in any case units apparently of 5 Mtn Div were reported moving up towards the frontier on 15 Nov in the VAL DI SUSA. It seems more likely that 5 Mtn and LITTORIO together will take over the Central and Northern part of the frontier, probably intermingled so as to avoid entrusting one large sector to LITTORIO. The various past reports which have suggested a move of 5 Mtn Div may have been based on a mistaken identity of 157 Mtn Div or of 3 and 4 Alpine Bns. In North-Eastern ITALY two further reports from good sources mention the departure of 44 Div, one by its number and the other by the name of the Divisional Commander, Gen von ROST. In both cases its destination is given as HUNGARY.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Lack of photo recce this week makes an accurate assessment of the state of the railways difficult. However, air attacks against railways have been severely limited owing to poor flying weather and it must be presumed that a number of repairs have been effected. Under these circumstances it seems probable that the enemy's supply position, which was believed rather critical up to the end of last week, has been improved. On the other hand ground reports do indicate that the all-import BRENNER railway had not been opened up to through traffic as late as 25 Nov. In fact one report states that the enemy has abandoned repair of the bridge at ORA (over 100 kilometres North of VERONA) in favour of concentrating on the by-pass between ORA and S. MICHELE 20 kilometres to the South, which has been under construction for some time. Ground sources also report that owing to our air attacks on the BRENNER railway electric power facilities, only steam locomotives now operate between TRENTO and VERONA, and further that at the moment there is a shortage of steam locomotives. In view of these reports it seems that the BRENNER railway, if now open to through traffic, was not put in working order as quickly as was anticipated on the basis of photo recce alone. Hence, since it is definitely known that all through lines in N.E. ITALY were blocked up to at least 22 Nov, it may well be that the enemy is still suffering some shortages, particularly of fuel.

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South and West of VERONA the state of the railways is probably reasonably satisfactory. As of 22 Nov there were two cuts in the line between VERONA and MILAN, one a bridge at which repairs were then in progress, and the other a large crater resulting from the probable explosion of an ammunition train. It is most likely that by now through rail traffic is possible from VERONA to within about 20 miles of TURIN. In fact while CHIVASSO bridge (about 15 miles North East of TURIN on the main MILAN-TURIN line) probably remains blocked, the VILLAFRANCA D'ASTI bridge (about 20 miles due East of TURIN) was under repair on 22 Nov; if the VILLAFRANCA D'ASTI bridge is now open, which seems probable, then TURIN can be reached from MILAN by proceeding South across the PO by the CASALE MONFERRATO or TORREBERRETTI rail bridges to ALESSANDRIA and then Westward to TURIN. The opening of this rail route is not of great significance from the point of view of military supply as demands in N.W. ITALY are not great, but it is of considerable interest in view of the troop movements now believed to be in progress and incidentally it eases the problems of evacuating Italian industrial facilities and production to GERMANY.

South of VERONA all PO bridges are thought to remain cut with the possible exception of the one just North of FERRARA at PONTELAGOSCURO which was open on the 22nd but attacked the same day with good results claimed. If PONTELAGOSCURO is open, it is not unlikely that through rail traffic is possible from VERONA South across the PO to the BOLOGNA area.

Owing to lack of photo recce no statement on rail activity is possible.

3. WESTERN FRONT

The rapid drive of French forces on to the RHINE North of BASLE last week did not go unchallenged. Although MULHOUSE and BELFORT soon fell to the French, 19 Army rallied sufficiently to launch a limited counter-attack with the object of cutting through to the Swiss frontier South of BELFORT. The spirit was there but the flesh was weak and the armour non-existent. Doubtless Gen WIESE of 19 Army had hoped to do at BELFORT what ROMMEL failed to do at AVRANCHES, but all he achieved was a certain limited infiltration into our positions which has now been mopped up. Nevertheless the tactics were sound, for 19 Army's situation in the VOSGES is serious and would be desperate if the Allies succeeded in driving Northwards towards COLMAR combined with a Southward push from STRASBOURG. Thus enemy resistance to our drive on the RHINE has been stiff all along the high ground of the VOSGES North of BELFORT. Nevertheless despite difficult terrain we have made advances of 10-15 miles all along this front throughout the past week.

At the Northern end of the great German bridgehead over the RHINE, General LECLERC's division ended another phase of its long trek from CHAD by the capture of STRASBOURG. Here the French have now completed mopping up. The situation with regard to the RHINE bridges is not altogether clear. Early reports suggested that the French had found one of the RHINE bridges intact and succeeded in passing armour across to KEHL on the German side of the RHINE, where some civilian sniping was encountered. South of the city, between STRASBOURG and BASLE, the enemy had at least seven pontoon bridges ready for installation on 19 November and may by now have more ready to deal with a possible hurried withdrawal of 19 Army across the RHINE.

N.W. of STRASBOURG 1 Army has been giving ground fairly rapidly before SAARBRÜCKEN. An interesting identification in this sector has been the Pz Lehr Division of 6 Pz Army. So far there has been only one identification of this formation, but its appearance away from the bulk of 6 Pz Army is less surprising than would have been that of one of 6 Pz Army's other four armoured divisions. Whereas prisoners had reported the presence of the four other formations of 6 Pz Army in the AACHEN sector, there had been no mention of Pz Lehr division, which was obviously making its way down to 1 Army's sector. Between STRASBOURG and SIERCK the enemy has what appears to be on paper a fairly strong armoured force. In addition to the Pz Lehr division, 11 Pz, 21 Pz, 17 S.S. P.G. and 25 P.G. Divisions are all represented. What they amount to on the ground is a

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different matter. Their inability to stop the Allies crossing the German frontier on a 20 mile front West of SAARBRUCKEN can hardly be encouraging to the enemy. Nevertheless their presence in this sector is an indication that it enjoys a priority second only to that of the AACHEN area.

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C E R Hurst

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South and West of VERONA the state of the railways is probably reasonably satisfactory. As of 22 Nov there were two cuts in the line between VERONA and MILAN, one a bridge at which repairs were then in progress, and the other a large crater resulting from the probable explosion of an ammunition train. It is most likely that by now through rail traffic is possible from VERONA to within about 20 miles of TURIN. In fact while CHIVASSO bridge (about 15 miles North East of TURIN on the main MILAN-TURIN line) probably remains blocked, the VILLAFRANCA D'ASTI bridge (about 20 miles due East of TURIN) was under repair on 22 Nov; if the VILLAFRANCA D'ASTI bridge is now open, which seems probable, then TURIN can be reached from MILAN by proceeding South across the PO by the CASALE MONFERRATO or TORREBERRETTI rail bridges to ALESSANDRIA and then Westward to TURIN. The opening of this rail route is not of great significance from the point of view of military supply as demands in N.W. ITALY are not great, but it is of considerable interest in view of the troop movements now believed to be in progress and incidentally it eases the problems of evacuating Italian industrial facilities and production to GERMANY.

South of VERONA all PO bridges are thought to remain cut with the possible exception of the one just North of FERRARA at PONTELAGOSCURO which was open on the 22nd but attacked the same day with good results claimed. If PONTELAGOSCURO is open, it is not unlikely that through rail traffic is possible from VERONA South across the PO to the BOLOGNA area.

Owing to lack of photo recce no statement on rail activity is possible.

3. WESTERN FRONT

The rapid drive of French forces on to the RHINE North of BASLE last week did not go unchallenged. Although MULHOUSE and BELFORT soon fell to the French, 19 Army rallied sufficiently to launch a limited counter-attack with the object of cutting through to the Swiss frontier South of BELFORT. The spirit was there but the flesh was weak and the armour non-existent. Doubtless Gen WIESE of 19 Army had hoped to do at BELFORT what ROMMEL failed to do at AVRANCHES, but all he achieved was a certain limited infiltration into our positions which has now been mopped up. Nevertheless the tactics were sound, for 19 Army's situation in the VOSGES is serious and would be desperate if the Allies succeeded in driving Northwards towards COLMAR combined with a Southward push from STRASBOURG. Thus enemy resistance to our drive on the RHINE has been stiff all along the high ground of the VOSGES North of BELFORT. Nevertheless despite difficult terrain we have made advances of 10-15 miles all along this front throughout the past week.

At the Northern end of the great German bridgehead over the RHINE, General LECLERC's division ended another phase of its long trek from CHAD by the capture of STRASBOURG. Here the French have now completed mopping up. The situation with regard to the RHINE bridges is not altogether clear. Early reports suggested that the French had found one of the RHINE bridges intact and succeeded in passing armour across to KEHL on the German side of the RHINE, where some civilian sniping was encountered. South of the city, between STRASBOURG and BALE, the enemy had at least seven pontoon bridges ready for installation on 19 November and may by now have more ready to deal with a possible hurried withdrawal of 19 Army across the RHINE.

N.W. of STRASBOURG 1 Army has been giving ground fairly rapidly before SAARBRÜCKEN. An interesting identification in this sector has been the Pz Lehr Division of 6 Pz Army. So far there has been only one identification of this formation, but its appearance away from the bulk of 6 Pz Army is less surprising than would have been that of one of 6 Pz Army's other four armoured divisions. Whereas prisoners had reported the presence of the four other formations of 6 Pz Army in the AACHEN sector, there had been no mention of Pz Lehr division, which was obviously making its way down to 1 Army's sector. Between STRASBOURG and SIERCK the enemy has what appears to be on paper a fairly strong armoured force. In addition to the Pz Lehr division, 11 Pz, 21 Pz, 17 S.S. P.G. and 25 P.G. Divisions are all represented. What they amount to on the ground is a

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 71

OF 28 NOV, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

On 22 Nov we attacked again on the axis of Route 9 and succeeded in getting over the river COSINA to the South of the road. Very heavy fighting ensued with 26 Pz division but by the afternoon of 23 Nov the enemy had had enough. The German communique for 24 Nov described the action as follows : "The Eighth Army, with the concentrated mass of its forces and with the strongest employment of material threw itself against one single German division. In exemplary steadfastness the 26th Pz Division, under command Colonel CRASEMANN defended the cohesion of the front". (Incidentally, Colonel CRASEMANN commanded 8 Tank Regt in Nov 41, during Eighth Army's first offensive). In fact the evening before this announcement the division, which had lost 400 prisoners, made a rapid withdrawal across the LAMONE, leaving no rearguards behind apart from a few men in the houses of BORGO DURBECCO. The situation was in fact regarded as sufficiently serious to call for the employment of 577 G.R. which has been out of contact in reserve for some two months; it came in to the South of Route 9, on the left flank of its parent division and had some casualties apparently due to lack of contact with 26 Pz div to its North. 278 Div also withdrew to conform. 992 G.R. has suffered fairly heavily and on 23 Nov I Bn could only muster 102 all ranks including its medical personnel and Italian cart drivers. However, the divisions' left hand regiment, 993 G.R., still stayed forward between the rivers and a prisoner from I Bn taken in the area M 392265 on 27 Nov stated his orders were to withdraw only if pressed. Similarly, 871 G.R., the next adjoining regiment, stubbornly defended ALBERETO, M 3927, and a general line along 28 Northing and prisoners on 27 Nov said they had no orders about a withdrawal. 114 Jg Div also appears to be still in its old positions behind the FIUMI UNITI although the Partisans in this area have consistently reported a thinning out here and say the main body of the division is back behind the LAMONE. It certainly appears, that although the enemy line has now been extended by the withdrawal to FAENZA he is not yet prepared to give up any ground to the North. Such a withdrawal would involve abandoning RAVENNA and PORTO CORSINI and although the enemy has probably already carried out all the demolitions he wants, he still will not give them up without some sort of a struggle. South of FAENZA, on the other hand, he has withdrawn wholly behind the LAMONE though there may be still some enemy forward of the river in the mountainous Southern sector of 305 Div.

On the remainder of the front there have been minor changes in enemy dispositions only. A second regiment of 148 Div, 286 G.R., has turned up and is apparently in the SERCHIO Valley. 4 Alpine Bn, which has not been encountered for many months, announced its arrival by a deserter and its H.Q., from a civilian report, is at ABETONE, L 3311. It is possible, though a little difficult, to suppose that this Bn is alone responsible for the many reports of the arrival of Mountain troops in this sector, which have run to as high as six battalions, but they would be well within the normal Italian range of exaggeration if we could assume that 3 Alpine Bn had also arrived, possibly in a different sector. The supposition would not be unreasonable, as the two Bns have previously normally operated together.

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There has been a steady flow of deserters on this front, reaching the record figure of 108 on 24 Nov, and a few statistics may be of interest. The figures available cover the period 8 - 22 Nov, and show that on 8 Army front there were 851 prisoners taken of whom 80 deserted and on 5 Army front 455 of whom 409 deserted. The difference is striking - 10% deserters in one case and 90% in the other - and requires a little explanation. The figures for 5 Army are heavily weighted by 136 Russians and 153 Italians, all deserters, who make up about two-thirds of the whole; however, of a total of 83 Germans, 46 or 56% and of 22 Austrians 17 or 77% were deserters. The main explanation must lie in the difference between a static and an active front. On 8 Army front opportunities for actually crossing the lines were much fewer than on the more thinly held and mountainous Western sector of 5 Army front; on the other hand on an active front with the Allies advancing many a would-be deserter can take the easier option of remaining behind when his comrades withdraw. In the latter case he is usually classed as an ordinary prisoner and not a deserter, an additional advantage for him but confusing for our statistics. It is dangerous therefore to build theories on enemy morale on these figures but the high proportion of pure German deserters on 5 Army front is certainly encouraging.

We have further news this week of changes in Northern ITALY. 162 division, whose withdrawal from the line in the RAVENNA sector was reported on 15 Nov, has been definitely identified at PIACENZA. It is apparently to take part in an Anti-Partisan drive in the mountains to the S.W. which is about all it is fit for. It was originally employed on this task in N.E. ITALY before the June crisis made it necessary to put it into the line, an experiment which has not been successful. In N.W. ITALY a usually reliable source states that 157 Mtn Division is being withdrawn from the Alps and the troops say they are going to the BOLOGNA front. Their destination may not necessarily be correct - it would be a natural assumption for the average man to make - but the move of the division seems to be confirmed. It makes much more unlikely the move away of 5 Mtn Div as this would leave the defence of the Franco-Italian frontier to only 34 Div and LITTORIO; in any case units apparently of 5 Mtn Div were reported moving up towards the frontier on 15 Nov in the VAL DI SUSA. It seems more likely that 5 Mtn and LITTORIO together will take over the Central and Northern part of the frontier, probably intermingled so as to avoid entrusting one large sector to LITTORIO. The various past reports which have suggested a move of 5 Mtn Div may have been based on a mistaken identity of 157 Mtn Div or of 3 and 4 Alpine Bns. In North-E stern ITALY two further reports from good sources mention the departure of 44 Div, one by its number and the other by the name of the Divisional Commander, Gen von ROST. In both cases its destination is given as HUNGARY.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Lack of photo recce this week makes an accurate assessment of the state of the railways difficult. However, air attacks against railways have been severely limited owing to poor flying weather and it must be presumed that a number of repairs have been effected. Under these circumstances it seems probable that the enemy's supply position, which was believed rather critical up to the end of last week, has been improved. On the other hand ground reports do indicate that the all-import BRENNER railway had not been opened up to through traffic as late as 25 Nov. In fact one report states that the enemy has abandoned repair of the bridge at ORA (over 100 kilometres North of VERONA) in favour of concentrating on the by-pass between ORA and S. MICHELE 20 kilometres to the South, which has been under construction for some time. Ground sources also report that owing to our air attacks on the BRENNER railway electric power facilities, only steam locomotives now operate between TRENTO and VERONA, and further that at the moment there is a shortage of steam locomotives. In view of these reports it seems that the BRENNER railway, if now open to through traffic, was not put in working order as quickly as was anticipated on the basis of photo recce alone. Hence, since it is definitely known that all through lines in N.E. ITALY were blocked up to at least 22 Nov, it may well be that the enemy is still suffering some shortages, particularly of fuel.

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 72

OF 5 DEC, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

On the Adriatic sector the week has seen a steady but stubbornly opposed advance Northwards between the MONTONE and LAMONE rivers which ended on 4 Dec when the enemy evacuated RAVENNA just in time to avoid being cut off there. For the early part of the week we were opposed by 356 Div which had all its three regiments strung out between the rivers on a front running East and West. On the night 2/3 Dec however, 356 Div pulled back behind the LAMONE, the HEIDEMARIE line as it appears to be named, leaving 741 Regt of 114 Jaeger Div, together with the Div Recce Bn, to oppose our Northward advance. They fought stubbornly for RUSSI and S. PANCRAZIO (M 4631) but by the night of 2 Dec they were back on the canal LA CANALA. At this point it became too dangerous to hold RAVENNA and 721 Jaeger Regt pulled out, leaving the city clear by morning of 4 Dec. Where 721 Regt has gone to is not exactly known but 741 Regt, according to a captured map, should be back behind the LAMONE by now, between route 16 and the railway, and presumably 721 Regt will also have swung into position, prolonging 76 Corps flank to the VALLI DI COMACCHIO.

In the meantime an Allied bridgehead has been formed across the LAMONE South of FAENZA in 305 Div's area. The West bank of the LAMONE is now clear as far North as the 21 Northing, though the country is difficult and our advance West is being strongly opposed. This advance does much to nullify the effect of the other main enemy modification of the front, a withdrawal of 715 Div and the right flank of 305 Div to the VENA DEL GESSO, a steep escarpment facing South which runs in a continuous line from TOSSIGNANO, M 0823, to join the high ground above BRISIGHELLA, M 2117. This enemy withdrawal was voluntary, contrary to his usual custom, and was accompanied by thorough demolition of roads South of the escarpment. The shortening of the line thus achieved has enabled the enemy to carry out some readjustments. 305 Div has shifted its weight slightly North, to just South of FAENZA, enabling 26 Pz Div, which is still possibly suffering from its defeat on the GERHILD line, to concentrate on route 9. 715 Div has extended its front as shown by the identification of II Bn 1028 G.R. on Monte RINALDO, M 4020. An interesting point is that, according to an intelligent prisoner from 305 Div, 577 G.R. has again been withdrawn into Corps reserve, which seems to point to a decision not to reinforce 76 Corps at present but leave it to manage as best it can with its present resources.

On the rest of the front the enemy showed some aggressiveness at the beginning of the week and by strong attacks succeeded in recapturing CASTELLARO, M 9933 and Monte BELVEDERE. After this spurt of energy he has remained quiet and contented himself with what look like routine reliefs in 42 Jaeger, 29 P.G. and 1 Para Divs. The last named now has all three regiments represented in the line. 29 P.G. Div, according to a deserter, is expecting to be relieved between 4 and 10 Dec and, after a three weeks rest in the CENTO area (L 8574), to move to 76 Corps to relieve 26 Pz Div. More interesting are the first signs of life in 90 P.G. Div. On 4 Dec one of the

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Infantry Regts, probably 361 G.R., was moving and was setting up a Message Centre at CASTEL MAGGIORE, 8 Kms North of BOLOGNA. This can scarcely have been a very long move, for the regiment was already somewhere N.E. of BOLOGNA, but it may be significant. On the other hand various indications on 5 Dec seemed to place the other elements of the division rather nearer 76 Corps' front. The division is therefore apparently divided over a fairly wide area and it is not possible to deduce where it will be employed; at least we can say that it is apparently ready for action. The location of CASTEL MAGGIORE however does perhaps invite us to look North as well as South - it is on the main route North from BOLOGNA by the PONTELAGOSCURO bridge - and it is not impossible that a regimental move in EMILIA may be a reflection of the situation South of Lake BALATON.

From Northern ITALY there is little to report though 162 Div's drive against the Partisans has started. On the French frontier the VARESE Bn of LITTORIO has relieved troops of 157 Div in the VAL D'AOSTA and 100 Mtn Regt has taken over the MONT CENIS pass. The destination of 157 Mtn Div is still unknown but it is more likely now that it will be Northeastern ITALY. The additional reason is provided by the departure of 71 Div. The reports of the latter's movements have not all agreed as to destination but most of them point to the Northeast. 44 Div has already been thrown into the battle against TOLBUKHIN's forces advancing from the historic battlefield of MOHACS and it is highly likely that 71 Div has also been drawn in to the same scene of continuing disaster.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

This week weather and other commitments restricted our air effort against enemy communications. It is true that many bridges remain cut and no direct access by rail to the area East of PIACENZA and South of the PO is likely to exist, but elsewhere in North ITALY it is probable that all points can be reached by through, if roundabout, rail routes, with the exception that there is a North-South line of interdiction running generally through a point about 25 miles due West of VERONA to MANTUA. This line divides the area North of the PO roughly into two equal parts of which the one to the East is by far the most important since it includes the BRENNER and N.E. routes into ITALY from GERMANY. Through rail traffic is now almost certainly possible over two of the Northeastern routes, and very probably over the BRENNER to possibly as far South as the PO. Under these circumstances and in view of the fact that the enemy's current supply requirements are now rather low any acute shortages which may exist are unlikely to be due to transportation difficulties.

The BRENNER railway, initially blocked on 5 Nov, was very probably open by 28 Nov at which time PR showed it passable to single line traffic almost as far as ORA, about 75 miles North of VERONA, where the bridge might possibly still have been cut at that time. Between 28 Nov and 1 Dec further attacks may have again briefly blocked the line not far North of VERONA, but on 1 Dec PR showed that it was open throughout. On 2 Dec weather finally permitted both medium and fighter bomber attacks and while PR of the same day confirmed that four cuts were achieved, no bridges had been hit and it is probable that the line was again open by the following day and certainly not later than the 4th. As already reported by ground sources, PR now confirms that steam traction is in use on the BRENNER at least as far North as TRENTO. From VERONA, exclusive, to just beyond BOLZANO, rolling stock during the past week has averaged between 2,000 and 2,500 items. While this must be considered a rather heavy concentration of rolling stock in as much as for military purposes the BRENNER is essentially a through route only, and while there has been movement at practically all points on this stretch, turnover is not thought to have been large owing to frequent interruption of the line, reduced potential capacity owing to the necessity for use of steam traction, the availability of only one of the two tracks at a number of points, and the not unlikely report that there is a shortage of steam locomotives. In any event it would appear that the enemy is still not getting enough through the BRENNER by rail alone in as much as on three consecutive nights between 1 and 3 Dec rather heavy MT movement was observed moving both North and South generally between VERONA and TRENTO.

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In the Northeast, the situation from the viewpoint of the enemy is considerably more favourable than on the BRENNER. Of the three rail routes generally between UDINE and PADUA the most Southerly has now been impassable at several points for a considerable period and the enemy appears to be making no serious effort to get it open. However, repairs on the most Northerly line have been rather rapid and it has probably been open for about the past ten days; in any event PR of 2 December showed it was passable throughout. Through traffic was then, and still is, possible from GERMANY at least to PADUA and also probably to VERONA. The Central of the three Northeastern routes was also shown by PR to be open by 5 December. As would be expected in view of interruptions to the BRENNER, traffic through Northeast ITALY is indicated to have been heavy by both PR and ground sources.

In Western ITALY this week repairs to two bridges just East of TURIN (which had been out for a considerable period) open this important industrial centre to through traffic. Trains can now move direct from TURIN to either MILAN or GENOA. A direct line is now also probably open between GENOA and MILAN via ALESSANDRIA since on 28 November the only block on this route was on the approach to the PO river bridge near TORREBERRETTI just North of ALESSANDRIA, and by this time repairs must be presumed to have been effected at this point.

With the exception of TORREBERRETTI bridge and a bridge immediately East of TURIN all rail bridges over the PO have been impassable this week. The area South of the PO and East of PIACENZA thus remains isolated by virtue of a block just West of PIACENZA and the long-standing damage to the GENOA-SPEZIA line. There appears to be little other change along the PO, but worthy of note is a statement by a PW that crossings in the area immediately East of FERRARA are reserved for the exclusive use of 26 Panzer Div. Whether there are similar divisional "sectors" elsewhere along the river is not known but it is not unlikely. It does suggest that at least armoured and motorised formations are drawing supplies direct from points North of the river; however, it seems logical to suppose that there are a number of Army dumps South of the river and in fact recent PW reports so indicate.

To the South of the PO, BOLOGNA now appears to have lost much, if not all, of its importance as a rail centre. On 4 and 5 December all stations, yards and sidings were unserviceable and virtually empty of active rolling stock. Also the main line running Northwest from BOLOGNA to PIACENZA seems to have been appreciably less active this week than heretofore though lack of PR makes a definite statement impossible.

With the development of our air attacks against the BRENNER and Northeastern railways traffic between GERMANY and ITALY through SWITZERLAND assumes increased potential importance. This traffic was at one time appreciable, particularly the movement of coal from GERMANY to ITALY. Despite the continued receipt of occasional ground reports (the most recent being that gun barrels were being shipped from ITALY to GERMANY in sealed cars purportedly carrying wheat) it seems likely that the volume of traffic of all kinds is now much reduced. In this connection the following report from LONDON is in point: "The cutting of the STRASBOURG-MULHOUSE-BASLE main line by the French and the bringing of the KARLSRUHE-FREIBURG-BASLE main line within artillery range, means that traffic between GERMANY and BASLE is completely at a standstill. Although it should be possible for the Swiss, if they so desire, to work the limited amount of German-Italian traffic which has passed in recent months, via SCHAFFHAUSEN and the other frontier stations in North East SWITZERLAND, it is doubtful if the Germans could cope with this traffic in view of the heavy military traffic and railway working difficulties reported in BADEN and WURTTEMBURG. Even though a limited amount of transit traffic may continue through SWITZERLAND for some time, there is now no likelihood of any large-scale resumption of this traffic".

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3. WESTERN FRONT

As the threat to the REICH increases on every sector of the front, so does enemy resistance stiffen. This week in the South and in the Centre RUNDSTEDT's armies have been giving ground much more reluctantly and fighting much more fiercely than in the first fortnight of the present offensive, while in the AACHEN sector, the enemy is resisting as stubbornly as ever. In the South 19 Army has been gradually contracting its RHINE bridgehead South of STRASBOURG. Offering stubborn resistance, particularly around SELESTAT, it has so far made no attempt to escape to the safety of the East bank of the RHINE. Indeed according to one report, the Germans consider 19 Army to be "expendable". Its casualties in prisoners alone have been proportionately higher than on any other part of the front, and a continuance of the present policy may see 19 Army written off altogether as an organised fighting formation.

North of STRASBOURG the approaches to the SAAR have been the scene of satisfactory Allied progress against tenacious enemy resistance. The enemy has appreciated that the advance represents a threat potentially as serious as that in the AACHEN area, and has reinforced the sector with two infantry divisions in the past week. These have been taken from General STUDENT's Army Group in HOLLAND which is being steadily denuded to meet the more urgent needs of the other sectors. In addition the Pz Lehr division of 6 Pz Army has now been fully committed, so fully indeed that prisoners are already talking of an early relief for further recuperation. This division prior to its commitment had had a longer period of rest and refit than any other Panzer division in the West, and even so there is ample evidence that it suffers from inadequate training and equipment trouble. Despite its reinforcements the German First Army in this area has been pressed back all along its front. Perhaps the most important event of the week in this sector has been the capture intact of a bridge over the SAAR South of SAARLAUTERN, which has enabled us to establish a firm bridgehead on the East bank of the river. The Siegfried line has yet to be breached in this sector, where, as at AACHEN, there are two lines of defences, and even a third line may exist behind NEUNKIRCHEN.

The EIFEL front has remained quiet all the week, but at AACHEN the intensity of the fighting has shown no diminution. STUDENT has been called upon to provide another infantry division for this sector, while out of RUNDSTEDT's reserve has come 3 Parachute Division into the area NE of AACHEN. The Recce Unit of 12 SS Pz Division (one of the four in 6 Pz Army has also appeared, but apart from this there have been no fresh identifications of 6 Pz Army. If, as seemed probable, RUNDSTEDT last week felt that the time had come to commit his armoured reserve, this week he seems to have stayed his hand. Although elements may have been committed, the bulk of 6 Pz Army still sits intact West of the RHINE, waiting either to join in the defensive battle, or, if the enemy gauges that we are becoming exhausted, to counter-attack and regain lost ground. Meanwhile the gigantic battle continues and every day a mile or two of German soil is lost to the Germans.

North of AACHEN, appalling weather and floods have given the fighting an amphibious character. There have been two important developments. The last German bridgehead on the West bank of the MAAS has been eliminated by the British attack on VENLO, while at ARNHEM the Germans have added to the floods by blowing the dykes. The enemy claims that this action has already caused a local Allied withdrawal.

Reviewing the present situation, RUNDSTEDT has three major considerations to bear in mind. The first is the enormous German casualty rate. In the first fortnight of this offensive, it is estimated that RUNDSTEDT lost 100,000 men in total casualties, of which figure prisoners represented over 60,000. Since then he has been losing along the whole front something in the nature of 9,000 men per day. Against this, RUNDSTEDT has to weigh the availability of his reserves and reinforcements, actual and potential. Sixth Panzer Army is still largely intact. Three Parachute divisions are still available (2 Para Div, destroyed at BREST, is now reported reforming in HOLLAND), and STUDENT may be able to give up still more

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infantry divisions from his Army Group. Thus there is not yet a shortage of immediate reserves. Moreover, with the beginning of a new month, a fresh wave of Volksgrenadier divisions should soon become available. Finally, the enemy has to consider the state of weariness and casualties among its opponents. His assessment of the former is unknown, but even in its public announcements OKW is surprisingly conservative in its estimates of the latter. For the whole of November the official German communiqué claimed only 5,200 Allied prisoners, an extraordinarily low figure in comparison with the enemy's own losses in prisoners in the same period.

RUNDSTEDT's situation is thus serious, but in no sense catastrophic. So far he has staved off an Allied breakthrough into any vital area of GERMANY, and while he still has reserves left he may yet hope to stem the Allied assault before irreparable damage is done. Stem it he must, for defeat on the West bank of the RHINE might be final.

4. BALKAN FRONT

The German situtiom in S.E. EUROPE has deteriorated still further in this past week. Along the whole front from the Czechoslovak border to Northern ALBANIA the official communiqués have had one setback after another to record. N.E. of BUDAPEST the slow enemy withdrawal has continued. MISKOLCZ and EGER have both been lost, and the railway from HATVAN to MISKOLCZ is now entirely in Soviet hands. The German line in CZECHOSLOVAKIA has been falling back in conformity, and there can be little doubt that a withdrawal at least as far as the HIGH TATRAS is envisaged.

However, the Soviet gains in North East HUNGARY have been overshadowed by the spectacular events in Southern HUNGARY. Attacking from their bridgeheads over the DANUBE at APATIN and BATINA, Soviet forces have achieved an important breakthrough into S.W. HUNGARY which has to date brought them within nine miles of Lake BALATON. PECS fell on 30 Nov; KAPOSVAR, 30 miles beyond, two days later and the Russian bridgehead is now 60 miles deep and 75 miles wide. Thus the whole German position in S.E. EUROPE has been changed in the course of a few days, and unless the momentum of the Russian drive is halted, and halted soon, the position of Army Groups F and E in the Balkans will become grave in the extreme. The German 68 Corps took the brunt of the Soviet attack. (Its Commander, General FELMY, must be looking back with nostalgic regret to the days, not long distant, when he led the life of an epicure, in the comparative quiet of ATHENS organising ineffective sabotage). The Corps' resources proved quite incapable of coping with the Russian pressure. 44 Inf Div, brought over hastily from the UDINE area where it was recuperating from its Italian battles, was identified earlier in the week in the MOHACS sector, and there is further evidence that the enemy is now making hasty and belated efforts to stem the Russian flood. 71 Inf Div from the Italian theatre is reported by more than one source to be on its way to HUNGARY, presumably to help 68 Corps, while 1 Mtn Div has left the BRCKO-ZVORNIK sector for OSIJEK and may also be destined to join 68 Corps.

A new division, 31 S.S., has also been identified in the past week in North YUGOSLAVIA and it too may be drawn into the KAPOSVAR battle if it is not already there. Little is known of this formation which is believed to be a 3 regt LE Div of six bns but it presumably contains a large percentage of Volksdeutsche. Yet another possible arrival is a new Hungarian "HUNYADY S.S. Div", volunteers for which were called for by BUDAPEST radio last week, although this formation, for what it is worth, is more likely to be employed defending BUDAPEST which is now threatened from the South by the Russian attack.

The move of 1 Mtn Div has shown clearly the inadequacy of German resources on the Balkan front; a combined Russo-Partisan force has wasted no time in advancing S.W. of NOVI SAD (X 87) to seize the town of SREMSKO MITROVICA (X 64) on the North bank of the SAVA, in the sector which 1 Mtn Div formerly held.

Under the influence of events further North, Army Group E's withdrawal from YUGOSLAVIA has been accelerated in the past week and about half of the Army Group is now back in the SARAJEVO area. KRALJEVO (J 31) has been

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evacuated and there are unconfirmed reports that CACAK (D 01) is in Bulgarian hands. NOVI PAZAR (J 13) on the Army Group's main escape road was abandoned last week and only rearguards are in contact at SJENICA (H 75), 30 miles N.W. of NOVI PAZAR. This force is unlikely to linger long at SARAJEVO, and we should soon expect to see it continuing its advance along the roads running Northward from the SARAJEVO - CACAK lateral.

Meanwhile, down in MONTENEGRO, 21 Mtn Corps has been able to do little to improve its position. The drive on NIKSIC (G 70) has now been finally abandoned and the enemy has been withdrawing stores and grain back to PODGORICA (N 01). 21 Corps paid heavily in the attempt to break out to the North. It is estimated that casualties in the period 13 to 25 Nov amounted to 680 killed and 1,300 wounded, the bulk of which came from 181 Inf Div, which bore the brunt of the fighting. Moreover, 21 Mtn Corps has enjoyed little more success in its attempt to drive Eastwards from PODGORICA (N 06). BIOCE (N 07) has been captured but there has been heavy fighting to the N.E. and advanced elements of 21 Mtn Corps seem to be no further forward than VILAC (N 07) 12 miles N.E. of PODGORICA. H.Q. Army Group E, despairing of ever seeing 21 Mtn Corps get back under its own steam has apparently decided to send it some much-needed help, and in the course of the past week a column of all arms has been making its way down the PLEVLJA (H 16) - HERCEG (H 50) road obviously with the intention of making contact with 21 Mtn Corps. Until it reached BIJELO POLJE (H 42) this column's progress was relatively smooth but South of BIJELO POLJE it has run into Partisan country and has been halted at least temporarily.

Elsewhere it has been a fairly quiet week in the Balkans except for the KNIN sector where after fierce fighting the Partisans have once more recaptured this important town. From SLOVENIA has come an interesting report regarding the setting up of a Cossack Cavalry Corps. According to Partisan sources a 2 Cossack Div will be formed - presumably in N.E. ITALY and SLOVENIA, where an increase in the number of Cossacks has been reported. This, together with the existing 1 Cossack Div, will form the Corps. Lt.Gen HELMUTH v. PANNWITZ, the present commander of 1 Cossack Div, will command the Corps while Col BOSSE, a regimental commander, will be promoted to a divisional command.

G.S.I.
H.Q.A.A.I.
5 Dec 44.

BRIGADIER,
A.G.S.(I).

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H.Q., A.A.I. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.73

OF 12 DEC, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

On the 8 Army front the enemy is at the moment in process of being thrown back off yet another river line. After an unsuccessful attempt to establish a bridgehead across the LAMONE on the 5th in the area N.W. of RUSSI (the enemy counter-attacked strongly with S.P. guns and drove us back East of the river) two attacks were launched on the night 10/11 Dec and by the following morning we were firm on the West bank of the LAMONE. One of these attacks went in N.W. of RUSSI where the previous attempt had failed and by first light had pushed 114 Recce Unit back behind the FOSSO VECCHIO, a canal some 2,000 yards East of BAGNACAVALLO. The other bridgehead was made about 5,000 yards to the North and quickly captured VILLANOVA M 4541 from 741 Jaeger Regt and seized the bridge at 426398 intact. Counter-attacks later in the day by 190 Recce Unit, assisted by some 5-6 Tigers, against the right wing of this bridgehead in the area M 4542 were repulsed and by nightfall the enemy was West of the FOSSO VECCHIO between the 37 and 42 Northings. The day's fighting brought us in some 300 prisoners from 114 and 356 Divs.

Whereas the enemy appeared to be expecting the first attack over the LAMONE on 5 Dec, the crossing on the night of the 10th seems to have taken him unawares as is evidenced by the large number of prisoners and the capture intact of the bridge. The only reserves the enemy apparently had in this area, apart from internal battalion ones, were 190 Recce Unit and some Tigers. On the other hand, between the 8 - 10 Dec 90 P.G. Div (less its Recce Unit) moved from general reserve North and East of BOLOGNA into the line S.W. of FAENZA, thus indicating that the enemy was expecting a renewal of attacks in this area where the whole of the West bank of the LAMONE was already in Allied hands.

90 P.G. Div started getting ready to intervene on the 5th, by which date it had a battlegroup in the MEDICINA area and another one North of BOLOGNA. For the next few days it was content to play a watching role, during which time 305 Div was engaged in fairly heavy fighting S.W. of FAENZA. The enemy evidently decided that 305 Div was getting worn down in a battle of attrition and with 26 Pz Div on Route 9 still weak after its defeat on the GERHILD Line, he brought 90 P.G. Div down hurriedly and committed it between the two tired divisions. 90 P.G. Div's entry into the battle was as dramatic as on the two previous occasions on which it has been rushed into the line - on the CERIANO ridge S.W. of RIMINI and at M. GRANDE. Using about four battalions supported by tanks and S.P. guns, 90 P.G. launched a series of violent counter-attacks on the 9th, designed probably to knock the Allies off their balance just as they were building up for a renewal of the offensive and if possible hoping to gain a spectacular victory by throwing them back across the LAMONE. The attack progressed some 400 yards South of CELLE 2724 but elsewhere failed to gain any important ground. These spoiling attacks lasted only one day and cost 90 P.G. Div heavy casualties. Since then the Div has been unobtrusively settling down in its new sector, which now extends from approx the 29 to the 24 Easting.

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90 P.G. Div has therefore taken over most of 305 Div's front, and the latter has 577 G.R. and probably 576 G.R. as well in reserve. At the same time 715 Div, now back on the GESSO ridge, has shifted part of its weight further East and II Bn 725 G.R. is now on M. INCISA M 1718 with both bns of 1028 G.R. on its left stretching at least as far as the 21 Easting. It is too early to say whether the intention is to take 305 Div out of the line completely, but the fact that it was mentioned in the German Communiqué of the 8th Dec suggests, if previous experience is any pointer, that it has had fairly heavy casualties and may be earmarked for a rest. At the moment, however, such units as it has out of the line are the only immediate reserves available to be switched North to the BAGNACAVALLO area, should 114 and 356 Divs find themselves in trouble.

On the rest of the front apart from active patrolling, in which 1 Para Div was to the fore, and the usual flow of Italian deserters which reached a peak with 91 in the 24 hours ending 1500 hours 8 Dec, there was little ground activity of note. The relief of 29 P.G. Div, forecast for the first week of December by an intelligent prisoner captured late in November, has however been effected. On the 6th a prisoner was taken from 1059 G.R. who said that the rest of 362 Div had moved into the area South of BOLOGNA preparatory to taking over a sector in the line. Since then 1060 G.R. has been identified well inside 29 P.G. Div sector on the 92 Easting. There has been no contact at all with 29 P.G. since the 6th and it can be assumed that it is resting North of BOLOGNA. A prisoner statement that the third regt of 362 Div - 956 G.R. - had come in to the West of 1059 G.R. is interesting, and taken in conjunction with the finding of two bodies from 362 Fusilier Bn as far West as L 8632 would imply that some units of 362 Div have also moved into 65 Div sector. It would be surprising if the enemy were to take 65 Div as well as 29 P.G. out of the line and hand over the vital Route 65 sector to a single Div - and a division which though recently reformed has not a very high fighting reputation - but such a possibility cannot be altogether ignored: III Bn 4 Para Regt lost prisoners at L 9732, which is further West than we have previously had parachutists, and as a result 42 Jaeger Div may also have sidestepped slightly West into the old 29 P.G. Div sector, reducing the area to be taken over by 362 Div. In addition 4 Para Div with only one regt in the line has for long been on a narrow front, but now both 11 and 12 Para Regts are forward it may have extended slightly Eastwards into 65 Div sector. This reshuffle, if it has in fact taken place, might enable both 29 and 65 Divs to go out of the line and at the same time leave 362 Div with a sector of reasonable width. Even then the withdrawal of two divisions from the line South of BOLOGNA would imply that the enemy regarded an attack by 5 Army as unlikely for the moment: there is no evidence that such is his appreciation and pending further information it is wiser to carry 65 Div still in the line though on a narrow front with probably only one regiment forward.

In North West ITALY most of 157 Mtn Div is now believed to have left, and its place along the frontier has been taken by LITTORIO and 5 Mtn, with an Alpine Regt of the former in the AOSTA Valley and 100 Mtn Regt in the area of Mt CENIS pass. In the old 5 Mtn Div sector 85 Mtn Regt is in the M. S. GENEVRE area South to the PELLICE River while the rest of LITTORIO appears to have moved into the CUNEO area with responsibilities on the Col de la MADDELENA. 34 Div remains unchanged in the Southern part of the Alps. In N.E. ITALY Mountain troops have been reported arriving - on 24 Nov a detachment had reached the area South of UDINE from PIEDMONT and more troops were reported arriving in the UDINE area early in December. This must be 157 Mtn Div, and from these reports it appears to be taking over the sector vacated by 71 Div bounded roughly by UDINE - GORIZIA-exclusive TRIESTE - MONFALCONE - LATISANA. 71 Div has now been identified by the Russians near Lake BALATON and is struck off the strength of Army Group C. This reduces the strength of Kesselring's command to 26 German divisions plus Cossacks in N.E. ITALY in strength of about a division. There have been several persistent reports, however, of a new division in N.E. ITALY (it is referred to as "159 Division", which is clearly a corruption since that div is engaged on the Western Front). The

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possibility therefore that an embryo division, or a low quality one, may have been given to Kesselring as recompense for the sacrifice of two divisions cannot be ignored. However surprising it may seem that the enemy should even consider sending reinforcements to ITALY when the calls of the Western and Balkan fronts seem so much more pressing, the fact cannot be overlooked that in the past three months he has been able to maintain a steady flow of replacements for the formations in ITALY. In any case it is unlikely that the departure of two divisions will affect the strategy of the Italian battle front. The enemy has clearly decided to hold on to the PO Valley as long as possible, for its economic importance which has greatly increased following the loss of large agricultural areas in the Balkans and the bombing of industrial plants in the REICH, as much as for the military advantages of fighting the Allied Armies on foreign soil. Several prisoners have referred recently to the winter line which is to be held in the Appennines South of BOLOGNA, and growth of defences round the city itself shows that the enemy has every intention of fighting a major battle to defend it. In the Adriatic the enemy continues his stubborn defence of river and canal lines, in pursuance of his policy of trying to wear down the Allied power of offensive, and only gives ground when forced to do so. The real stand for the Winter Line however has still to come, presumably when he has been pushed back to the shortest line between his present position South of BOLOGNA and the Valli di COMACCHIO. Even were Kesselring called upon to give up a further two divisions, it is doubtful whether it would change his determination to fight it out South of the PO.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

There may have been one or two days this week during which no through trains could operate between ITALY and GERMANY except by way of SWITZERLAND. At the moment, however, it is possible for trains to move from GERMANY through North East ITALY without transloading, and the BRENNER also is probably open. The PO bridges remain out as far West as PAVIA but throughout the week trains could probably get through to transhipment points on the North side of the river from the VERONA and PADUA areas.

The area North of the PO is still divided in two by a line of rail interdiction running generally North and South from MANTUA. South of the river there appears to be less rail activity than heretofore. The state of the railways in Western ITALY appears to remain relatively unchanged and through traffic is still possible between MILAN, TURIN and GENOA.

There is no appreciable change in the enemy shipping picture.

Although the state of the enemy's L of C is somewhat precarious there is nothing this week to indicate that the enemy is not getting sufficient supplies into ITALY to meet current military requirements.

RAILWAYS

(a) The Brenner Railway

Between 5 and 11 December there was only one day on which weather permitted a strong air effort against enemy railways. This was on the 10th when we succeeded in cratering the track on the BRENNER route at 6, or possibly 8, points between VERONA and a point about 100 rail-kilometres to the North. These cuts unfortunately all appear to have been craters in the track only and the line should have been open again by the 11th, or 12th, though the cratering of a fill a short distance North of VERONA might block traffic for a longer period. Between 5 and 10 December the BRENNER may have been interrupted for brief periods as a result of fighter-bomber attacks on several days but PR confirmation is not available. PR does show that the line was open on the 6th.

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Just how much turnover there is on the BRENNER line is difficult to say. The line from VERONA, exclusive, to BOLZANO, inclusive, a distance of about 150 rail kilometres, was this week still rather heavily loaded with rolling stock; on 6 December about 2,000 items were present and on the 10th 2,500, which as an average is about the same as last week. PR shows that there has been definite movement on the line, but it is still believed that the large amount of rolling stock present represents not so much heavy traffic as it does an inability to clear the line of wagons which from time to time have been trapped between breaks in the railway. It seems probable that when Southbound loaded trains are held up they are unloaded and supplies are dropped off at temporary dumps near the railway or almost immediately carried South by MT. Over the past month a number of dumps have been established near the railway. In addition MT has been not infrequently observed of late along various roads from VERONA Northwards and PR of 10 December showed a considerable amount of MT activity along the road paralleling the railway all the way from BOLZANO South to VERONA though this last might reflect the reported arrival of an Italian division from GERMANY as opposed to supply traffic. Since the enemy is not thought to hold large supply reserves in ITALY he must maintain a more or less constant flow of traffic into the country, and thus, as soon as the railway is opened up it may well be that new supply trains are run through and empty rolling stock subsequently cleared as circumstances permit. In addition, a considerable amount of Northbound traffic is required to move foodstuffs and industrial materials from ITALY to GERMANY. For these reasons the fact that large numbers of wagons are now consistently seen on the BRENNER is not thought necessarily to reflect a large turnover, and it is probable that the line continues to work on a scale appreciably below its normal capacity.

(b) North East ITALY

Though through traffic through North East ITALY may have been impossible for one or two days this week, ground sources continue to report considerable rail traffic coming into ITALY through this area which PR tends to confirm. PR of 10 December shows that the rail diversion at CASARSA bridge C 150084, on the main line 25 kilometres West of UDINE, had been washed out some time between the 5th and 10th. This wash-out, coupled with the BRENNER cuts on the 10th would have made through rail traffic from GERMANY into ITALY (with the exception of the Swiss routes) impossible on the 10th had not the bridge at LATISANA (H 220075) on the most Southerly of the North East railroads, been repaired sometime between the 3rd and 10th. With the LATISANA bridge repaired a roundabout route through North East ITALY was open on the 10th. However, between the 5th and 10th there may have been one or more days during which both the LATISANA bridge and the CASARSA diversion were impassable, in which event no through traffic in North East ITALY would have been possible, since the loop-line which by-passes UDINE to the North West continued blocked as it has been for some time.

(c) North of the PO

In the general area VERONA - CREMONA - ROVIGO - VENICE lack of PR makes any assessment of the state of the railways and rail activity difficult. VERONA, VICENZA and PADUA all continue as active rail centres. The PO bridges remain out but throughout the week trains could probably get through to transhipment points on the North side of the river. Since the two bridges at MANTUA and the bridge at CALCINATO, about 40 kilometres due West of VERONA on the MILAN - VERONA line, continued blocked throughout the week through traffic is still impossible between the Eastern and Western sections of North ITALY.

(d) South of the PO

BOLOGNA, as at the end of last week, shows no sign of rail activity. In fact on the basis of such PR as is available railways in the entire area South of the PO and East of PIACENZA seem to be appreciably less active than heretofore; if such is in fact the case it is likely to be only a temporary condition in as much as the enemy fuel situation demands a maximum use of railway transport, but it may well be that for the time being at least the enemy has been forced to devote most of his repair

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efforts to keeping traffic moving over the BRENNER and North Eastern routes.

(c) North West ITALY

In the West the state of the railways appears to remain relatively unchanged. Four of the five rail bridges over the TICINO river between TURIN and MILAN remain out and as indicated above the MILAN-VARONA route is still blocked. However, direct routes continue open between MILAN, TURIN and GENOA. One development of interest is that, with the repair by 10 December of a bridge just West of PIACENZA, the PIACENZA - BOLOGNA line was opened up to through rail traffic from the West for the first time since early November. This is not considered of appreciable significance from the point of view of military supply since as already pointed out there is still a line of rail interdiction running North and South from MANTUA; in any event with all rail bridges out over the PO as far West as PAVIA, inclusive, if trains coming in over the BRENNER and North East rail routes were to reach the BOLOGNA area by way of PIACENZA, they would have to move all the way West to MILAN, Southwest across the PO to ALESSANDRIA and then Eastwards to PIACENZA towards BOLOGNA, a distance of some 500 kilometres, and it is obviously easier therefore to move military supplies across the more Easterly point of the PO even though transloading from train to MT is necessary. On the other hand repair of this bridge does open up a route by which rolling stock can be cleared from the area South of the PO and in fact recent PR shows a very appreciable decrease along the railway South East of PIACENZA. In addition it should greatly facilitate evacuation of various industrial and other materials.

SHIPPING

Over the past month there has been little change in the enemy shipping picture, except for the loss of the RAVENNA - PORTO CORSINI Canal which was quite active up to shortly before our advance into that area. What port, if any, is to replace the canal is not yet apparent, though CHIOGGIA (G 6523) is becoming increasingly active with barge traffic. Thirty barges were seen here on 10 December. These barges are thought to come South by way of the Canal which closely parallels the Northern Adriatic coast and, upon arrival at CHIOGGIA, to proceed inland by various canals to the PO and ADIGE rivers. CAVARZERE (G 4929), on the ADIGE about 20 kilometres S.W. of CHIOGGIA, is one of the most active inland points. An interesting ground report received this week states that on both 23 and 24 November three railway tank cars arrived at TRIESTE from where they were transported to the "Venetian coast". This report is not unlikely particularly in view of the fact that at the time in question all rail routes through the area stretching from PADUA to UDINE were blocked. In the Northern Adriatic proper shipping continues active between VENICE and TRIESTE but turnover is not thought to be large.

In the Ligurian sea activity continues on about the same scale. GENOA naturally remains the most active port and most of the active shipping (MT ships, F-boats, supply barges and coasters) here plies South to SPEZIA and back, with some activity at the intermediate port of SESTRI LEVANTE. West of GENOA a small amount of shipping continues to move to both SAVONA and IMPERIA, chiefly F-boats and small coasters, MT ships being confined to the GENOA-SPEZIA run.

3. WESTERN FRONT

The pattern of the fighting has not changed materially since last week and resistance continues stubborn in the critical sectors of AACHEN, the SAAR Valley and the KARLSRUHE gap. In the South 19 Army has been further compressed on COLMAR in spite of spirited opposition and frequent counter-attacks especially in the MULHOUSE and THANN areas. The loss of SELESTAT, however, threatens to release the Northern jaw of the trap and endanger the Army's whole position West of the RHINE. It is not surprising therefore that, in spite of an order by HITLER demanding valour rather than discretion, there are already many indications pointing to a general withdrawal to the safer side of the river. If this can be accomplished with a fair measure of success,

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the enemy will no doubt feel able to release seasoned field troops for the more dangerous areas further North while holding the Upper RHINE with static troops of lower category. Meanwhile we may expect to see the retreat marked by the skilful obstinacy characteristic of the Germans in such situations, with every Allied advance within the pocket stiffly contested and every threat to the COLMAR-BREISACH escape route fiercely counter-attacked.

North of STRASBOURG, in the HAGENAU area, the enemy has shown considerable sensitivity in face of our advance which holds the double threat of turning his whole position in the SAAR Valley and of forcing the KARLSRUHE gap. But, though sensitive, he has not proved strong enough to halt us. BISCHWILLER, NIEDERBRONN and REICHSOVEN have fallen and finally, after a week's hard fighting, the capture of HAGENAU has opened the last approaches to the Siegfried Line in this area. In the SAARBRÜCKEN sector the loss of SAARUNION led to a substantial advance which has brought us to a line from ROHRBACH to SARGEMÜND. Here, as at SARRALBURG and DILLINGEN, the enemy has made repeated attempts to drive us from our bridgeheads East of the SAAR river, but has nothing to show for his pains. Throughout the SAAR sector his casualties have continued high - so high, it appears, in the Panzer Lehr Division that it has been compelled to retire from the line to pull itself together after little more than one week's fighting. The need for reinforcements is, therefore, as pressing as ever. A temporary stopping has been provided by the arrival in the DILLINGEN area of 719 Inf Div last reported as moving from HOLLAND to GERMANY; and there are indications, still unconfirmed, that 212 Volksgrenadier Div is moving to the SAAR sector from TRIER. But unless these new-comers have more effect on the battle than would appear likely, further and even more difficult shuffling will be necessary in the near future.

The EIFEL sector has had another peaceful week while further North in the COLOGNE sector the rate of our advance has been slowed down - but by no means stopped - by increasingly bitter opposition as we close up to the ROER River. Our attacks in the HUERTGEN Forest area continue to threaten the enemy's flank, and wear down his strength. According to a reliable report the daily averages of a battalion's casualties in this sector during the second half of November amounted to 40 wounded, 7 dead and 35 PW. To make up wastage on this scale only one new arrival has been identified during the week - 2 Para Div from HOLLAND; but there are unconfirmed reports that the last of the Para Divs, the Fifth, and 2 S.S. Pz Div from 6 Pz Army are both on their way. Should these reports prove true, RUNDSTEDT's reserves will be reduced to two Inf Divs (331 and 85) and two Pz Divs (9 and 12 S.S., the latter less its Recce Unit), and it seems probable that he will be forced to continue yet further down the slippery slope of piecemeal reinforcement.

In the ARNHEM sector the area of flooding between the WAAL and the Lower RHINE has grown during the past week. Meanwhile 6 Para Div has been brought up from reserve and put into the line South East of ARNHEM. Whether the enemy's immediate intentions here are aggressive or purely defensive, is not yet clear, but certainly both flooding and reinforcement reflect his continued fear of an attempt to turn his right flank and encircle the RUHR from the North.

The problem facing the enemy has not changed, nor is it nearer to its solution. Though the rate of his casualties has dropped from 9,000 to 5,000 a day, it is still much higher than he can afford. And though he has been able to reduce the rate of our progress in the North, it is only at the expense of the Centre and South. To hold us at all points he needs heavy reinforcements, and at once; but since he has no pool of trained reserves, the only reinforcements immediately available are undertrained and underequipped; and among such troops casualties are necessarily high. It is, therefore, a vicious circle in which, so far as one can see, RUNDSTEDT will be compelled to turn until the last resources of German manpower have been drained.

....4. HUNGARY AND THE BALKANS.....

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4. HUNGARY AND THE BALKANS

In Northern HUNGARY fierce fighting has taken place throughout the week in the MISKOLCZ sector. Little progress has been made, but the Russians consolidated their previous gains by advancing some 5 miles along the railway leading North from the city.

Events to the North of the Hungarian capital have taken a new and dramatic turn and threaten to outshine the victories reported elsewhere by Marshal TOLBUKHIN. Marshal MALINOVSKY in a drive from the direction of HATVAN reached and captured VACS on the DANUBE, and striking North is reported to have reached the Slovakian frontier on a 15 mile front beyond BALASSAGYARMAT H 78. BUDAPEST, now surrounded from North, South and East, is facing the final phase of its period of German domination. Russian spearheads were 8 miles away to the North on the 10th while to the Northeast our Allies have reached to within 10 miles of the city. Roumanian troops are reported to be in the fore - and no better incentive could be offered to them than the capture of the Hungarian capital.

The Russian breakthrough in Southern HUNGARY has been further exploited. By 8 Dec the whole of the Southern shore of Lake BALATON was reported clear of enemy and a further crossing of the DANUBE South of BUDAPEST had been effected. Advancing N.E. from BALATON our Allies linked up in the area of Lake VALENCEI and are now threatening the important communications centre of SZEKES-FEHERVAR. The capture of this latter town would open up for the Russians one of the best routes to VIENNA. There is evidence that the enemy has hastily strengthened this sector, and one report states that the HUNYADI Armd S.S. Div is being hastily organised in the VARPALOTA D 89 area. This Div is composed of young Hungarian evacuees from TRANSYLVANIA.

Meanwhile, the enemy on the DRAVA flank, has been given no respite. The Russian crossed the river Southeast of BARCS on the 9th and claim to hold a substantial bridgehead. BARCS is firmly in Russian hands and unconfirmed reports state that VIROVITICA F 69 and SLATINA F 88 have fallen to our Allies thereby still further increasing the quandary of Army Group E.

To the Southeast fierce fighting is taking place in the SREM, centred on the Russian bridgehead at VUKOVAR X 18. German communiqués claim they have virtually eliminated the Russian forces to the N.E. of the city but the Russians and Partisans are advancing N.W. along the railway on VINKOVCI X 18 which they claim to be threatening. The capture of VINKOVCI by our Allies would render the German positions in VUKOVAR, and indeed the whole pocket from OSIJEK down the DANUBE to SOTIN, untenable.

The withdrawal of the tired forces of Army Group E is indeed a fighting one. 21 Mtn Corps in MONTENEGRO, is suffering afflictions in the shape of Partisan pressure and inclement weather. SJENICA H 75 was evacuated by Army Group E and promptly occupied by the Partisans and Bulgars. The tail, composed of forces from 91 Corps, appears to still have some sting as the evacuation was carried out almost without hindrance from the Partisans. However, each strongpoint given up by this force increases the threat to the forces trapped in MONTENEGRO. It remains somewhat problematical if the drive initiated by 21 Mtn Corps up the LIM Valley and the relief column of 91 Corps pushing down the MOJKOVAC - MITESEVO road can effect a junction in time to rescue the former force. Whatever the fate of troops concerned, they are unlikely to get out all their heavy equipment and MT, much of which will have been blocked by the destruction of bridges over the swollen rivers. A gap of some 10 miles is stated to still to separate the two forces, between which lie the Partisans, subject to the fire of both.

....Lt.Gen MUELLER.....

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Lt.Gen MUELLER, former G.O.C. CRETE, is reported to be commanding a Corps in the ZVORNIK area composed of 7 S.S. Prinz Eugen Mtn Div, 104 Jg Div and elements of another Div, presumably 11 G.A.F. Div.

5. At Appendix 'A' is a report on "Allied Air Attack on German Oil Resources.

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dated 12 Dec 44.

ALLIED AIR ATTACK ON GERMAN OIL RESOURCES

The overall German shortage of petroleum products is well known. In ITALY the enemy has been able to "get by" only by the strictest economy measures and the maximum use of rail facilities. A captured order from Headquarters 10 Army dated 27 August, 1944, directed a 60 per cent cut in fuel consumption and presumably a similar reduction applies to all other formations in ITALY. There have been many reports of various economy measures, a recent example being a Tac/R report on 10 Dec of a number of MT moving in groups of three, the lead vehicle towing the other two in each case; a similar practice has been reported in FRANCE.

The current enemy overall position is briefly set forth in the following extract from A.F.H.Q. Weekly Intelligence Summary of 20 November:

" The enemy European oil situation at the end of September may be summarised as follows (the 'normal output' (100%) represents production figures prior to the comprehensive Allied bombing of oil targets in enemy Europe which started in April):

	Metric Tons per Month	
Pre-raid normal output of finished products	1,344,000	(100%)
Estimated production in August	526,000	(39%)
September	314,000	(23.5%)
October	436,000	(32%)
November	616,000	(46.1%).

" Revised estimates of the output of principal refined products in October and November are summarised below:

	Per cent of Pre-raid Normal Output	
	October	November
Gasoline	31.5	50
Kerosine	18	25
Gas/Diesel oils	38.5	60
Fuel oils	38	41.5
Lube oils	24	32
	32.5%	46% "

The above figures speak for themselves, but what they imply in terms of Allied strategic air effort is perhaps not quite so well known. Thus the following unclassified report (extracted from MAAF Air Intelligence Weekly Summary of 4 December) by an R.A.F. Squadron Leader, recently broadcast by B.B.C., on how this reduction of German petroleum-products production has been accomplished is of interest:

" I want to say something tonight about the building by the Germans of an important oil industry in Europe and about our present campaign to destroy that industry again from the air.

" You'll remember that in the first year of the war many an optimistic article was written proving, with many a fact and figure, that Germany couldn't really be a serious menace because she simply didn't command the necessary oil to sustain a modern war. The facts and figures were all very impressive and nobody seemed to be able to contradict them. How then has Germany in fact been able to sustain five years of world war? Where has she found the oil to do it?

" She has done it in three ways. First, she has built about two dozen enormous synthetic oil plants. These plants turn a part of Germany's ample coal supplies into fuel oil and petrol. At the beginning of this year they were turning out enough

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oil to meet about forty per cent of Germany's needs; but that wasn't enough; where did the other sixty per cent come from: It came from two sources: first from the conquered Roumanian oil fields, and second - and this is the thing which I don't think many people have realised - from several new oil fields which the Germans had discovered in their own territory.

" The fact is that just before the war the Germans had struck oil on a considerable scale in the Reich itself. Then they found impressive oil deposits in both Austria and in Hungary. When we re-discover Central Europe we shall find that it has become a considerable new oil producing area. That's a new fact in the economic geography of the world.

" These three sources of oil, the great synthetics, the Roumanian oil field and the newly discovered wells of Central Europe were between them giving the Nazis over a million-and-a-quarter tons of oil a month at the beginning of this year. That was probably just about enough for their needs. But it wasn't by any means ample; the Germans were still after more oil; for instance, the strategy of their 1942 campaign in Russia was probably distorted by the need to break through to the huge oil sources of the Caucasus. Without them the Nazis can never have felt really happy and secure about their oil position. All the same, an output of a million-and-a-quarter tons a month was a most remarkable achievement. It was the fuel basis for the Nazis drive for world empire.

" Why did we let all this happen? Why did we let the Nazis build their huge synthetic plants, sink their new oil wells and build their refineries? It's true that you can't effectively bomb oil wells themselves; but you can bomb the refineries without which the output of the wells themselves is useless. Why then didn't we switch our air attack on to oil four years ago, as many people were always saying that we should?

"The answer is perfectly simple; we tried to do so and found we couldn't. In 1940 and 1941 R.A.F. Bomber Command, which was then the only bombing force in the field, made experimental attacks on several of the big synthetic oil plants such as the two Gelsenkirchen plants in the Ruhr for instance. But we soon found that we had neither the forces nor the operational technique to do them serious harm. In those days small precise targets such as oil plants were difficult to find. When they were found they couldn't be hit hard enough to put them out of action for long enough to matter; it wasn't the lack of will but the lack of means, which stopped us bombing oil in 1941.

" In the years that followed, two major developments in air warfare took place. First and foremost the American day heavies, the Fortresses and Liberators, with their attendant long-distance fighters, appeared in the skies of Europe; and, second, R.A.F. Bomber Command acquired the new scientific instruments, and learned the operational technique, needed to attack precise targets at night. Both these things had to happen before the two bomber forces could go for oil.

" Even then we couldn't start out on oil straight away. All this time the Nazis were not idle either. When, two years ago, the Forts and Liberators first cast their shadows on German soil, the Nazi leaders saw the red light; they began building defensive fighters on an altogether new scale. The leaders of the American Air Forces weren't unaware of this; they saw that if the Germans were allowed to carry through their huge program for mass producing single-engine fighters - literally on a scale such as the world had never seen - it might never be possible to strike at the vitals of Germany by daylight. And so the first task of the Forts and Liberators, before they could go for oil or anything else, was to strike down the rising defensive power of the German Air Force itself. For nine grim months, from about July 1943 to March 1944, the 8th and 15th American Air Forces went for the German fighter assembly plants, and the American escort fighters fought huge battles over the Reich. At all costs they had to nip the menace of the Germans' vast new fighter program in the bud.

" That struggle culminated in a spell of exceptionally clear weather in the final week of last February. In that week the Americans bombed almost every one of the basic German fighter assembly plants. The work of that week, and of all the other attacks on their aircraft industry, didn't prevent the Germans from turning out fighters. On the contrary, by a remarkable effort of dispersion they have managed

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to maintain a very considerable output. But what those attacks did do was to decide the balance of air power. They were decisive in the sense that never again has there been any doubt that the American day heavies could penetrate into every part of Central Europe. Those attacks meant that for the past six months American air power has been decisively ahead of the German defense.

" No sooner was that issue decided than it became essential to choose the next objective for attack. Air superiority had been won; the great question was how to use it? It's been used in two ways. In the first place air superiority has made possible the invasion of Europe by our land and sea forces; second, and hardly less important, it has made possible, at last, a sustained and concerted attack on Germany's oil resources. In April of this year that attack began.

" The two great American air forces of day, precision bombers - the 8th and the 15th - have played the predominant part in the campaign against oil. In the case of the 15th, based in Italy, we now know exactly what they achieved, for when the Russian troops entered Ploesti and so captured the Roumanian refineries they found that the output of Roumanian oil had been reduced to under a quarter of what it had been four months before. Thus the magnificent work of the 15th had meant that the Germans suffered the crippling loss of the bulk of their Roumanian oil as early as April and May.

" The Eighth U.S. Air Force, from this country, has taken as its specialty the synthetic plants of Central Germany - such as Louna, Brux and Politz. Each of these plants is an industrial monster, several square miles in extent. Many hundreds of tons of bombs must strike such a monster, not once but again and again, before it's finally put out of action. And many hundreds of tons are striking them.

"But the Americans have been the first to recognise that Bomber Command of the R.A.F. has proved able to play surprisingly large part in the attack on oil. In the early months of this year, Bomber Command proved that they had developed a new capacity to hit precise targets such as oil plants at night. Bomber Command can now find them with their instruments, light them with their flares, mark them with their target indicators, and hit them with their bombs. The most important synthetic oil plants of the Ruhr, were first put out of action in a series of successful night precision attacks during the early months of this summer. But with the advance of our Armies a new development has occurred. We can now give fighter cover to Bomber Command over the Ruhr, and in recent weeks the Ruhr plants have been attacked by R.A.F. Lancasters and Halifaxes in the middle of the day. Such day precision bombing of German targets is an entirely new development for Bomber Command, and it is a remarkable tribute to the versatility of the crews that they have been able to make a success of it.

"What have been the results of going for oil this summer? First a word of warning. We must not imagine that a particular day will dawn on which every German tank and lorry and car will stop dead in its tracks because its petrol tank has run dry, and every German aircraft will fall out of the sky! In real life things don't happen like that. I repeat that one of the greatest errors that we can make is to look at any one attack which we are making on the enemy by itself, because no one attack will win this war. What will win it is the air attack on oil, plus the ground attack on the German armies, plus the bombing of the German cities, plus the naval blockade, plus every other form of attack which all the Allies are making on the enemy. But having said that we can already state some very positive and definite results from our attack on oil.

"Last month the enemy managed to produce only a small proportion of the oil fuel which he produced in March, before our attacks began. I musn't tell you how small that proportion was: but I can assure you that it was so small that it will cripple the enemy's whole war effort, if only his oil output can be kept down for a few months more. Already, hardly a drop of oil is being used in German war industry. Every industrial lorry and truck runs on one of those clumsy producer gas gadgets, with all the loss of efficiency which that entails. But we also know from captured documents that actual German military operations at the fronts, both on the ground and in the air, are already being gravely handicapped for lack of oil.

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"Unquestionably, if only we can prevent the recovery of his oil industry, there will come a point when the work of the German Panzer Divisions and the German Air Fleets will be so crippled for lack of fuel that they won't be able to withstand the pressure of the Allied Forces. I say "if we can prevent a recovery", because you musn't for a moment suppose that the German oil production which we had destroyed by last month will stay destroyed, if we leave it alone. On the contrary, the Nazis are making the most extreme efforts to repair and rebuild their plants. They have now gone to the lengths of building permanent "repair camps" alongside the major synthetic oil plants, so that each time they are bombed the repair squads can rush into the plants almost before the smoke has cleared. Therefore the job ahead of the Allied Air Forces, the job of keeping down the Nazi oil industry, will be almost as big and difficult as the job of crippling that industry, the job they have done this summer. The struggle goes on! Much has still to be done, but more and more in the air, as on the ground, the balance tilts our way.

"After the war, the 1944 attack on German oil supplies will be studied as the first major air attack, with adequate resources, upon the economic vitals of an enemy power."

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 74

OF 19 DEC, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The defence of the HEIDEMARIE Line, based on the LAMONE, has now called in three fresh divisions from elsewhere. Last week 90 P.G. Division, under its new commander Graf von SCHWERIN, was unable to do more than arrest our advance West of FAENZA and this week it has been joined by 98 Inf Div from the SILLARO Valley and by 29 P.G. Div from reserve. In spite of this the enemy has been cleared from the line of the lower LAMONE and out of FAENZA and for all his reluctance to lose ground except under pressure he can scarcely stay much longer on the small strip of the river which he still holds North of FAENZA. In the meantime he has no reserve at all for the rest of the front apart from 26 Pz Div, which may now be available in that role, albeit severely reduced in infantry strength.

After successfully crossing the LAMONE in the area between the 42 and the 37 Northings on the night of 10/11 Dec, we were able to advance across the FOSSO VECCHIO to the NAVIGLIO canal taking some 250 PW from 114 and 356 Divs and successfully resisting a counter-attack by 190 Recce Unit which was rushed up with some Tigers in support as the only immediate available reinforcement. However on the night of 12/13 Dec 98 Div started to move off from the area of CASTEL SAN PIETRO, where it was holding a narrow front in the SILLARO Valley, and by 13 Dec both bns of 289 G.R. and II Bn 117 G.R. were already in action against a bridgehead over the NAVIGLIO which we had forced that night. At the time of the crossing we were opposed only by the "M.G. Bn Field Marshal Kesselring", not quite such a picked unit as it appears from the title, but of high morale. Subsequently the third regiment of 98 Div was identified and it appears that all six infantry bns and the recce bn are in the line. In the meantime we had resumed the attack South of route 9. Heavy fighting continued on the night of 14 Dec and all day 15 Dec, especially around the village of CELLE, M 2724, but by the night of 15 Dec the enemy had pulled back to the line of route 9 after 90 P.G. Div had lost some 220 PW out of a total of 450 for the whole of 8 Army front. By the morning of 16 Dec FAENZA had been evacuated, though 26 Pz Div still had 9 P.G.R. in the area in a very weak state, and 305 Div was back behind the SENIO.

By now the situation West of FAENZA was causing the enemy even more alarm than the northern bridgehead over the NAVIGLIO. 90 P.G. Div, rather shaken by its losses, was on a wide front in a peculiar salient, facing S.W. 305 Div on its right had the SENIO to protect it but was very weak and exhausted and 26 Pz Div on its left, though still fairly strong in tanks as German armoured divisions go, was so reduced in infantry that 9 P.G.R. could scarcely muster 100 men. It was necessary to bring up the last

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available reserve: 29 P.G. Div. On the night of 16 Dec 71 G.R. was coming in on the SENIO in the neighbourhood of the route 9 crossing, and by next day 15 G.R. was disposed along the line of the railway down almost as far as FAENZA. 992 G.R. had come in in the area of FAENZA itself, facing South, and 26 Pz Div had broken contact and passed across the SENIO to an unknown destination. 90 P.G. was also back across the river but it is presumably still manning the banks South of route 9; indeed a prisoner was taken from III Bn 361 G.R. at M 2325 on 18 Dec. The relief of 26 Pz Div by 29 P.G. was forecast by an intelligent prisoner from the latter some time ago, but it can safely be asserted that when 10 Army contemplated that relief they envisaged a later date and different circumstances. 71 G.R. had been out of the line since about 28 Nov but 15 G.R. was only relieved about 5 Dec, which does not allow it much rest. Indeed it appears that the decision to commit 98 Div has also involved a change of plan, for prisoners state that they had been reconnoitring billeting areas for it near BOLOGNA. 26 Pz Div is now therefore the only reserve, inadequate at least as regards its infantry, and the enemy may well be considering from where some further reserve can be drawn.

West of the SENIO there has been little activity. 334 Div lived up to its reputation for aggressiveness in the spirited action which led to the recapture of TOSSIGNANO and a special mention for I Bn 755 in the Wehrmacht communiqué. To its North the former sector of 98 Div, a very narrow one, has apparently been taken over by 1 Para Div and II Bn 4 Para Regt had moved its H.Q. to FORNACE, M 027290, by 14 Dec. Most of 1 Para Div is now probably in the line and on 13 Dec they tried another unsuccessful attack on M. CERERE. Moving still further West various identifications have shown that 65 Div retains its sector and apparently elements of all three regiments are forward. On the extreme West we have had our first deserter from ITALIA division, an engineer who says that his bn, together with the recce bn and some artillery, have arrived at AULLA, P 7821. Presumably these units are to represent the division, under command of Monte Rosa, just as a selection from the troops of San Marco div have also been brought forward to gain a little battle experience before passing on to diversify our PW cages.

There have been some changes in command. A captured document shows that 14 Pz Corps now controls the area formerly under command 51 Mtn Corps, i.e. between 76 Corps and 1 Para Corps. Presumably 51 Mountain Corps has moved to the coastal sector in a straight exchange, and the area is certainly sufficiently mountainous to provide a spurious excuse for substituting a more experienced and efficient Corps H.Q. at the point of greater importance. From other documents it appears that Gen LEMELSEN is at present commanding 10 Army. This may be a temporary arrangement while VIETINGHOFF is commanding the Army Group in Kesselring's absence. Gen BADE, G.O.C. 90 P.G. Div, has left for GERMANY where he is to be Inspector General of the Volkssturm and has been succeeded by Lt.Gen Graf von SCHWERIN, descendant of the victor of HOHENFRIEDBERG, and one of the earliest members of the Afrika Corps, but a failure as commander of 116 Pz Div in the West.

162 Division is reported to be moving away from the PIACENZA area in the direction of CREMONA. Another report, from a usually very reliable source, states that the division's anti-Partisan operation in the hills South of PIACENZA is considered as completed and it is to return to "the RAVENNA front". It is not very likely that 162 Div would be put in on an active front, particularly after the drastic purge of last month which removed so many of its German personnel, but it might be considered suitable for coastwatching North of the VALLI di COMMACCHIO and perhaps for the defence of the PORTO GARIBALDI isthmus. The Partisans South of PIACENZA though they have suffered losses and been driven from many positions can scarcely be said to have been mopped up by 162 Div's feeble operation but with ITALIA division arriving in the area the enemy may prefer to spare German blood by encouraging the fratricidal strife which is all the Republican divisions are suited for. A further problem on order of battle in the enemy's rear

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has been posed by pay-books of the Kesselring M.G. Bn which showed a recent alteration to 1227 Field Training Grenadier Regt of 155 Field Training division. This is the first we have heard either of the Regt or the div, and both appear to be newly created. It is clear that ITALY would be a very suitable place for a new Field Training division, as being one of the few bits of occupied territory still left to the Germans, and C in C S.W. may have demanded something to take the place of 44 and 71 Divs and have been glad to get a division of this type, even if he has to supply some of the cadres from his own resources. At any rate from the fact that the paybook entry had been altered after the troops had already been in ITALY for some time and that the new entry is apparently still valid we can at least deduce that 1227 Field Training Regt is in ITALY; we may perhaps derive some support for the presence of the division from the frequent reports of a 159 Div in N.E. ITALY, which was shown last week to be false as to the number. It is unlikely however, that such a formation, if it exists, can make any important contribution to the enemy's fighting strength in the near future.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

Very bad weather has hampered our air offensive against the North Italian railways during the past week and lack of PR makes any detailed assessment of the enemy communications situation very difficult. It is, however, probable that he has had little difficulty in maintaining an adequate flow of supplies into ITALY from the REICH.

BRENNER

The BRENNER line is believed to have been open during the early part of the week, but fighter bombers claim to have cut the tracks in several places between S. AMBROGIO and TRENTO on 15 and 16 December and to have blocked the TRENTO marshalling yards on the 17th; it is therefore probable that no through rail traffic was possible South of TRENTO on these three days. On 15 December heavy bombers attacked INNSBRUCK on the German side of the BRENNER Pass and cut all through lines. However, it is probable that at least one track could be re-laid within 24 hours and the whole line is now believed to be open. North of TRENTO the by-pass line between ORA (A 914550) and S. MICHELE (A 780376), which has been under construction since October, was shown by PR on the 10th December to be complete.

There have been several reports recently that the enemy is using the FORTEZZA (W 1900) - DOBBIACO (B 6595) - BELLUNO (B 6229) line which forms a convenient alternative to the Southern portion of the BRENNER route. This route includes a stretch of narrow gauge line between DOBBIACO and PIEVE di CADORE which will only carry 450 tons a day and necessitates re-loading twice; however, the enemy may prefer this delay to making long MT hauls down the BRENNER road. The Lake GARDA shipping makes a good alternative to the most vulnerable 70 Kms of the BRENNER line between ROVERETO and VERONA, and a ground source report dated 10 December states that craft carrying supplies sail regularly from RIVA (A 5505) to PESCHIERA and DESENZANO.

NORTH EAST ITALY

Throughout the past week through rail traffic is believed to have been possible from TARVISIO at least as far as the river BRENTA and probably as far as PADUA and VICENZA. 160 truckloads of ammunition and 32 tanks are reported to have passed through TREVISO in a Westerly direction during the first nine days of December.

PLAIN OF LOMBARDY

In the Plain of LOMBARDY, whilst all the bridges over the river PO remain impassable East of PIACENZA, the main approaches to the river from the North and North East are probably open. VERONA station and marshalling yards have been

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quite active and ground sources reported considerable movement of fuel and ammunition trains from VERONA to OSTIGLIA and MANTUA during the past week. The two bridges at MANTUA and the bridge at CALCINATO are still believed to be impassable; thus through traffic between North West ITALY and the railways to the REICH, except those through SWITZERLAND, is probably impossible. South of the river PO fighter-bombers have been very active during the past week and it is doubtful whether any large scale rail movement has taken place. It is probable however that the enemy will have concentrated on keeping at least one line open between the river crossings and the front, and traffic has been reported running into MODENA from the North during the night.

NORTH WEST ITALY

In North West ITALY the situation remains unchanged. Through traffic is still believed possible from TURIN to MILAN and GENOA whilst to the East the lines are open from MILAN via BERGAMO as far as CALCINATO, to PIACENZA, and probably to MANTUA via TREVIGLIO and CREMONA. On 13 December PR showed activity on the MILAN - BERGAMO and MILAN - TREVIGLIO lines, and on 14 December two train lengths of loaded flats were seen at ROVATO station. Ground sources report heavy traffic between TURIN and MILAN and on lines running East and Southeast from MILAN. Trains going East are probably loaded mainly with industrial material and other loot being evacuated to GERMANY, and those going Southeast with supplies from the large number of dumps concentrated between MILAN and Lake COMO, but at least two reports have recently been received of troop movements over these lines. These are probably connected with the move of 157 Mountain Division from North West to North East ITALY.

On the Ligurian coast the GENOA-SPEZIA line is still completely impassable, but the line has been open West of GENOA and two or three trains a day are reported to be running as far as IMPERIA.

SHIPPING

On the Ligurian coast at least two MT-ships as well as coasters and F-boats continue to ply between GENOA and SPEZIA, while SESTRI LEVANTE and other small ports East of GENOA continue to show a turnover of supply barges and F-boats. At SAVONA and IMPERIA, however, no activity has been noted during the past week and it is probable that shipping going Southwards from GENOA is now reduced to an insignificant trickle if not stopped altogether.

On the Adriatic, reports have been received that ammunition is being shipped from VENICE to CHIOGGIA. PR showed 30 barges at the latter port on 10 December and from earlier cover it is clear that the canal system leading South from here is in use for this traffic.

Coastal traffic between VENICE and TRIESTE and other Northern Adriatic ports has been normal, and there has been some revival of activity at POLA. A small amount of ship-building still continues on this coast as is indicated by the launching of a supply barge at PORTO MARGHERA and two F-boats at MONFALCONE during the past week.

EVACUATION OF MATERIAL

Reports from all parts of North ITALY indicate that the enemy continues to evacuate as much industrial material and food as possible to GERMANY. There have been several reports recently of rail lines and copper wire being removed from the TURIN - GENOA - CUNEO area and trains loaded with sheet-iron, ingots, scrap and industrial material are stated to be arriving at MILAN from TURIN. 20 train-loads of food supplies are stated to have left the UDINE area for GERMANY during the first week of December and trains going North East from TREVISO between 1 and 9 December were reported to be loaded with cattle, metal, wheat, sugar and MT.

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3. WESTERN FRONT

To the accompaniment of a barrage of guns and words, von RUNDSTEDT on 17 Dec launched a major counter-offensive on the Western Front. Supported by the strongest G.A.F. effort since D Day, the assault was launched on a 55 mile front between MALMEDY and TRIER. At least fifteen German divisions are at present involved in the attack and there are reports that more formations are waiting ready to take part in the battle, and may by now be involved. The spearhead of the attack was initially formed by 116 Pz Div brought down from the AACHEN sector and 2 Pz Div which had been missing from the line for some time. Since then three armoured divisions of 6 Pz Army including the battered Pz Lehr Div have been committed. Two further Pz Divs of 6 Pz Army still remain to be committed, and there are reports that at least two armoured divisions of 5 Pz Army are on their way to the battle area. Supporting the armour is the strong and reformed 5 Para Div plus nine infantry or Volksgrenadier divisions including two completely new formations formed in the REICH which have been identified for the first time since the attack started. The attack was preceded on the night of 16/17 Dec by the dropping of small parties of sabotage parachutists behind our lines, some of whom have now been liquidated, while most of the remainder have established contact with the German ground forces. Official reports so far available indicate that the enemy with an appreciable local superiority in men and material has succeeded in making penetrations of up to seven miles on a 25 mile front, while there are unconfirmed reports that the Germans have reached the Belgian town of ST.VELOT, 5 miles S.W. of MALMEDY, an advance of about 15 miles. It is clear from captured documents that this attack represents the beginning of an all out enemy effort, and that it has been planned by the enemy for some time. It is probable that when RUNDSTEDT saw that he could hold the Allied November attack without committing the Sixth Pz Army, his strategic reserve, he took the decision to launch a counter-offensive as soon as the Allied assault began to lose its momentum. The withdrawal of the bulk of the German armour from the line (except in the SAAR-KARLSRUHE sector) which has been taking place over the past fortnight was an indication that the offensive would not long be delayed. Whether the German main effort is to be concentrated in the present sector or whether this is a large diversionary attack is not yet clear. RUNDSTEDT may hope to achieve a major breakthrough into BELGIUM: in any case he will expect to draw Allied forces away from the AACHEN and SAAR sectors, and then launch subsidiary attacks to clear the Allies from these areas of GERMANY. The key to the situation is the commitment of 6 Pz Army. The fact that it has now been committed in the MALMEDY - TRIER sector is a good indication that this is the main sector of the battle.

On the remainder of the Western Front, there have been few startling developments. In ALSACE the enemy still resists strongly in the areas of MULHOUSE and SELESTAT. 19 Army has in fact been showing some aggressiveness in the Southern part of the ALSACE pocket and limited enemy infiltration into MULHOUSE itself is reported. A captured order of 708 Volksgrenadier division, one of 19 Army's formations, dated 20 November is of interest. It draws attention to the unduly high percentage of personnel reported in casualty returns as missing in action. The order lays down that a special report is to be submitted by Bn or Company Commanders whenever the proportion of missing is greater than 25% of battle casualties, the intention being to institute Courts Martial for desertion.

North of STRASBOURG the First German Army has been falling back under pressure to the German frontier, and at one point near WISSEMBOURG we have crossed into GERMANY and captured six villages. German opposition has been at its stiffest around BITCHE which has been entered by Allied patrols who later withdrew. Further West however, resistance to our advance into the SAAR Valley has to some extent lessened and better progress has been made.

In the AACHEN sector the withdrawal of the German armour from the line has led to some decrease in German resistance. The retirement to the ROER river has continued in this past week and we have closed up to

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the ROER South of DUREN against fairly light resistance. North of AACHEN the British Army Group front has remained very quiet all week. The floods in the ARNHEM sector have to some extent receded, but there is no indication of any change in the present enemy policy of holding firmly to his extended front in HOLLAND. There, as along the whole of the Western Front, eyes are centred on the EIFEL sector where in the coming week we may expect to see the shape of the present German strategy. It will certainly be a week of decisive importance. RUNDSTEDT is not playing for small stakes. Victory or death is what he promises his men. He does not exaggerate.

4. BALKAN FRONT

During the past week the most active sectors on the Hungarian front have again been to the North of MISKOLCZ and of BUDAPEST. The BALATON - DRAVA front appears to have been stabilized except for the area South of BARCS, where a Russian crossing of the DRAVA has met with some success.

The MISKOLCZ offensive, aimed primarily up the valleys of the SAJO and HERNAD rivers, met considerable opposition, especially along the railways. The Russian advance retained its impetus and the capture of BOLDVA J 9191 and SAJO SZT PETER to the West enabled Soviet forces to fan out on a wider front. To the East, along the BODROG river, good progress was made. Latest reports show that the Russians have reached and in places crossed the pre-MUNICH Czechoslovakian frontier on a 70 mile front, bringing them to within 10 miles of KOSICE (KASSA). This frontier lies in this area about 15-20 miles South of the German made 1938 frontier. The enemy is likely to defend KOSICE bitterly; not only is it the key to communications over the entire area but also a rich industrial centre with a modern, fully equipped airport adjoining its Southern suburbs.

In the battle for BUDAPEST, the Russians, while keeping up frontal pressure, are attempting to outflank the city from the North and South. Slight progress was, however, made to the N.E. where, after fierce fighting, the enemy were cleared out of FOT and MOGYOROD. Some Russian armour is reported to have reached UJPEST but here the enemy is holding firm and it is thought that the Russian effort was a reconnaissance in force rather than an all-out attempt to capture the suburb. Due North of BUDAPEST Soviet troops penetrated some miles into Czechoslovakian territory to capture SLAHY, while progress was made to the West at the DANUBE bend North of VACS. Our allies have maintained silence about progress towards SZEKES-FEHERVAR between the Lakes BALATON and VELENCEI, an example the enemy has also followed. It is known, however, that the threat of a left hook at BUDAPEST caused some regrouping of the enemy forces and considerable forces including armour are facing each other in this vital sector.

The enemy has succeeded in stabilising the front between BALATON and the DRAVA along a line running South from incl KERASZTUR, through MIKE A 74 to West of BARCS. A more economical line for 2 Pz Army would appear to run from BALATON some 15 to 20 Kms East of NAGYKANIZSA and thence down to the DRAVA. However, events in the South have no doubt dictated the choice of ground to Gen ANGELIS.

In JUGOSLAVIA Army Group E's painful withdrawal from SERBIA and BOSNIA has been further endangered by the Russian bridgehead extending from BARCS to MOSLAVINA across the DRAVA. If, as appears probable, the Red Army extends its drive to BROD, it will force Gen LÖHR's Army Group (E) to fight its way out to the N.W. through Central BOSNIA, a country strongly held by the Partisans and now in the grip of winter. The whole withdrawal movement hinges on the speed of 21 Mtn Corps' extrication from its precarious situation in MONTENEGRO. Only slight progress has been made by this Corps during the past week. Splitting forces at MATESEVO, the column taking the Northern route is stated to have reached KOLASIN (a mile or two further North), while progress along the Eastern loop was held up just short of ANDRIJEVICA. One column from 22 Inf Div, pushing down from BIJELO POLJE has arrived at

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BERANE where fighting is taking place; the other, the main relief column, using the more direct MOJKOVAC road, is held up just South of that town. The speed of this withdrawal is, it appears, dependent on the amount of bridging equipment at the disposal of the enemy. Partisan activity, inclement weather and R.A.F. strafing have all taken toll of the tired enemy whose losses are believed to be considerable. The Partisans are following up the enemy withdrawal and causing considerable rearguards to become involved in costly fighting. SPUZ M 97 and TUZI N 05 have been evacuated by the enemy and an unconfirmed report says that TITO's forces have entered PODGORICA. In the meantime the eventual escape corridor of 21 Corps is being whittled down to a long narrow salient. UZICE C 61 and LJUBOVIJA C 35 are now in Partisan hands and ZVORNIK is stated to be under Partisan attacks. The only Northward routes available therefore are that to SARAJEVO via VISEGRAD, or failing that via GORAZDE B 90. Both roads are flanked by strong Partisan forces and each has a number of river crossings, which may at this stage present greater difficulties than the Partisans.

In DALMATIA the Partisans have scored further successes following the fall of KNIN. SUCEVICI P 62, GRACAC P 42 and the road through MEDAK to exclusive GOSPIC have been captured and Partisan sources report the fall of SRB P 63 as imminent. 15 Mtn Corps, responsible for this sector, has to cope with extended supply lines running back to the ZAGREB-BROD railway, a task seemingly beyond its capabilities and manpower, and it is reported that 188 Res Mtn Div with commitments astride the neck of the Istrian peninsula has been called upon to aid the depleted forces at the disposal of the Corps. The despatch of two Bns of 138 Res Mtn Regt from FIUME to SENJ J 70 will enable a like force of 392 Legion Div ex SENJ to be switched against the Partisans to the Southeast. However, even with 188 Res Mtn Div extending its sphere of responsibility as far South as SENJ, the forces of 15 Mtn Corps would still appear inadequate, as reports continue to arrive of Cossacks moving out of the Corps area from the SISAK-ZAGREB sector to the North.

C R Morrison

BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

G.S.I.
HQ. 15 Army Group,
19 Dec 44.

NOTE:- At Appendix "A" is the Diary-Journal of a German Tankman.

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DIARY-JOURNAL OF A GERMAN TANKMAN

It is not known whether HANS HAUCK, tankman of the 11th Panzer Division, is a soldier by nature or developed into one out of necessity; but in his diary-journal covering the 7½ years of his army life there is no spirit of rebellion, no references to what else he might have been doing. He is a member of the German Army, a private, a corporal, and then a serjeant. He is a tankman and his horizon is bounded by what he sees or can hit from his tank. Tank warfare is a professional speciality which he is proud to master.

In this diary, as remarkable for what it doesn't say as for what it does, is reflected neither a HITLER fanatic nor a HITLER critic; the author stands rather as a matter-of-fact, unsentimental, hard-fighting German, out to do his duty whatever that may cost him. In the short description of 7½ years of Army life, years fraught with combat, hardships and dangers, there is not one word of complaint or a single expression of weariness.

The diary begins with mention of his labour service which HAUCK passed through from April to October, 1937. "Then right into the Army. After a tough training period the first experience, entrance into the SUDETANLAND. Christmas 38 I was made a Corporal and on 30 September 39 our service time was up. But by that time the war had started."

In June 1940 HAUCK "finally" was sent to FRANCE where he saw but little action. His unit returned to GERMANY and HAUCK was promoted to Sergeant and made an instructor of weapons.

In January 1943 HAUCK was transferred to the 3rd Company of the 15th Panzer Regiment and after training in FRANCE with the newest German tank, the Panther, and a talk to the men by GUDERIAN, HAUCK's battalion, "GERMANY's first Panther battalion", makes a blitz move to RUSSIA. "On 5 July 43 the battle at and around BJELGOROD. We are in support of the division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND... I experienced the first Russian bombing attack. The bombs are not particularly well aimed. They fall 200 metres away. Artillery firing at us falls a few hundred metres short. Also for the first time I experience the fire of the so-called Russian "STALINORGEL" -- It is similar to our WERFER. We receive reports that our first wave has destroyed 3 American tanks (Type Pilot) out of a total of 5. " The next day HAUCK's tank was put out of action by a direct artillery hit but he was unhurt. "Even the oldest tankfox said that the days at BJELGOROD were not easy. We lost many good comrades. We gained ground slowly, but lost tank after tank. Therefore we started to retreat after 4 weeks. "

Twice during action on some 10 Russian battlefields HAUCK's unit was trapped by the Russians for 3 days but managed each time to escape. During the time HAUCK destroyed 2 enemy tanks when his semi-disabled vehicle was attacked by 10 of the enemy, received the Iron Cross, did not abandon his tank when it got stuck in No-Man's Land but stayed with it for a whole night until he was pulled out.

"In January 44 -- I had just received the silver tank medal -- I get into a tank, and right away we are trapped by the Russians again. 3 days without food, ammunition or gas. In one day I finished off 3 tanks, my highest score so far. Finally we succeed in breaking through, my tank has to be hauled ..."

During a furlough taken at this time HAUCK records nothing except that fact although he takes note of almost everything he sees and experiences on the field of battle. He refinds his unit as his battalion CO was leading it out of the Russian lines, and notes in his diary that "on the day when the troops were free again, Major v. L. found the hero's death as a result of a direct bombing hit. "

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During the middle of June 1944 his Division, the 11th Panzer Division, is moved to FRANCE, and the diarist recorded "a wonderful trip through the Balkans ... GERMANY... FRANCE to BORDEAUX." When the Americans landed in South of FRANCE his division, which had been stationed in the TOULOUSE - CARCASSONE area, was shipped to NIMES, but HAUCK had to go by road through villages occupied by "terrorists" and crossed the Rhone by ferry in the fire of American planes. But though his tank was damaged and had to be blown up for lack of spare parts the emotional balance of Sgt HAUCK appeared unaffected. "The next day terrific artillery and mortar fire begins behind MONTPELLIER... Broken vehicles and dead everywhere. Our vehicles were sent singly through the fire. Those who were lucky got through. We were lucky."

At BELFORT, HAUCK is delighted to hear people say that his division, the Ghost Division, has destroyed 3 American divisions and has enabled a whole army to withdraw to the Reich. "In an American order of the day it says that the 11 Pz Div is an Elite Div which will fight very hard."

Concerning the German Army in the South of FRANCE Sgt HAUCK then records, "The Southern Army has not covered itself with glory. They had become soft in FRANCE...These airforce and marine soldiers only wanted to live well and to go home when the first shots were fired..."

Concerning American tanks (mostly Shermans) he writes that they fear the Panther and evade it. Otherwise, the Sherman is a snappy car with rubber treads, a so-called road tank of 28 tons and a rather quiet engine. But he shows great respect for American guns.

On 10 October 1944 HAUCK, who has been in reserve near SAARBURG for lack of tanks "finally...can get into a Panther again". The next day he is in action, defending a village the Americans are trying to take. The fire he encounters is so heavy that he cannot get out of his vehicle. "This morning I occupied a new position. Lt S. was killed by a shot in his head. Today we have also received a good deal of lead. The Americans have sent thousands of shells into the village, not a single house is intact."

The last entry was made on 13 October, when HAUCK says, "Yesterday we had another interesting day and an exciting night. During the night our artillery and mortars did quite a bit of shooting too, so the Americans asked for a truce to take care of the dead and wounded. This truce was of some advantage for us also because we could get out of the tank. The crew had already assumed submarine habits, heavy beards, not washed for days, we looked like escaped convicts, dirty, torn, but we stand. The Americans have not gained an inch of ground during the last days despite their material superiority."

(Extracted from Twelfth Army Group Weekly Intelligence Summary No 14, dated 13 November, 44.)

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 75

OF 27 DEC, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Generally the enemy on the Adriatic is now back on the IRMGARD line (the SENIO river), though North of FAENZA 278 Div and 356 Div are still forward of the river and are at present holding the NAVIGLIO Canal between the 30 and 35 Northings. Both divisions only withdrew under strong pressure from the banks of the LAMONE and have been very reluctant to give up any ground in their bridgehead across the SENIO. Further North 98 Div held firm North and South of BAGNACAVALLO till the 21 Dec, but then following a day's heavy fighting withdrew overnight behind the SENIO and gave up the town. The decision seems to have been taken suddenly in contradiction to previous orders to hold on to the positions as long as possible. As a result the withdrawal was not as skilfully carried out as normally and several interesting documents fell into our hands. One of these identified a new Corps H.Q. - 73 Inf Corps - which was shown to be at CHIESA NUOVA M 2050, and apparently commands the Eastern flank of 10 Army with 114 Jaeger, 98 Inf and 356 Inf Divs under its command. In 76 Pz Corps, to the West of 73 Corps, apart from the fighting in which 278 Div has been involved, there has been only patrol activity along the banks of the SENIO and in the SANTERNO Valley. Some regrouping has however been carried out. 26 Pz Div, taking with it the remnants of 20 G.A.F. Div, has vanished from the front and is now carried in reserve - unlocated but probably in the rest and refit area North and N.E. of BOLOGNA previously visited by 29 P.G. and 90 P.G. Divs. On the SENIO 90 P.G. Div has gradually extended its front South West, by switching 200 P.G.R. from its left to its right wing, and now appears to have taken over the whole of the sector originally held by 305 Inf Div. 29 P.G. and 90 P.G. Divs now hold a front along the SENIO about 13 - 14 Kms long with the CASTEL BOLOGNESE apparently inclusive to 29 P.G. Div. The only clue as to the whereabouts of 305 Inf Div was brought in on Christmas Day by a deserter who said that he left his Regt (578 G.R.) in IMOLA on the 22nd, and that it had just received orders to move to the BOLOGNA area. 305 Inf Div has therefore presumably joined 26 Pz Div in central reserve and is likewise resting and refitting.

Regrouping has not been confined to the Adriatic sector. South of BOLOGNA it is now certain that 16 S.S. Div has been withdrawn into reserve. An agents' report of 20 Dec stated that it had arrived in the PARMA area and since then prisoners have been taken from 10 Para Regt (4 Para Div) on the 83 Easting, who said that they had relieved S.S. troops. 10 Para Regt was previously out of the line resting and it looks as if with its return, almost certainly up to strength, 4 Para Div has extended its front West to include a large part if not all of 16 S.S. Div's sector. An agent's report that an Italian battalion - the LUPO Bn. - is also in the area is at present unconfirmed.

The decision to withdraw 16 S.S. Div from the line when two other divisions (26 Pz and 305 Inf Divs) were already moving into reserve, is difficult to explain: either 26 Pz or 305 Divs were so weak that the enemy did not feel that they could be regarded as immediate reserve, or

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else, encouraged by the preliminary success of the offensive in the West, the enemy decided to try his luck with an attack here in ITALY as well. It may be that HITLER has decided that the moment has arrived to make the supreme effort and by inflicting defeats on the Anglo-American Armies both in the West and in ITALY hopes to sow discord between the Western Powers and RUSSIA. If he decides to attack in ITALY the most likely part of the front is undoubtedly the Western Appennines, where he probably appreciates that the line is only thinly held by the Allies and where a quick success might enable him to seize the port of LEGHORN and also turn the whole of the Fifth Army's positions in the Mountains North of FLORENCE. It is undoubtedly significant therefore that 157 Mountain Div which started to leave N.W. ITALY in mid-November and which was apparently moving into N.E. ITALY (elements of a Mountain Div were reported arriving in the UDINE Plain in the first fortnight of December), was stated by a normally reliable source to have been ordered on 15 Dec to move to the SPEZIA area. Since then troops of the division have been seen moving South through PIACENZA, while concentrations of German mountain troops were also reported on 24 Dec at SARZANA R 7710 and also PONTREMOLI. Assuming that most of the division moved down from N.E. ITALY while the tail of it was diverted Southwards in MILAN, the division could by now be very nearly complete in its concentration area. Another division may also be moving South into the Western Appennines - the ITALIA Div - which has been concentrating in the PARMA area and S.W. of the town astride Route 62. Two battalions (the Recce and the Eng Bn) have been reported by deserters and by agents to be already in the SPEZIA area, while several reports have been received that the division is to move into the line. Heavy traffic was reported South through the CISA Pass between 17 - 21 Dec, connected, one source states, with the move of the ITALIA Div. On two occasions the morale of the division has been described as high (unusual for Republican formations) and one interesting report states that the division is not to be used in a defensive role but for counter-attack and that each infantry regt will be attached to a German Div.

The arrival of two more divisions in the SPEZIA area would be out of all proportion to the defensive requirements of the sector. If the statement about the role of ITALIA is accurate, relief of MONTE ROSA is not envisaged. And there seems little reason why 148 Div (which has been engaged in nothing more strenuous than patrol clashes) should be relieved, especially by a division which was in process of moving to N.E. ITALY at the time. The decision to send 157 Mtn Div down to the SPEZIA area clearly indicates a change of plan on the part of the Higher Command and the fact that it happened in the middle of December just when the attack was going in on the Western Front may or may not be a coincidence.

From several civilians who have crossed the lines come reports that the enemy is planning a counter-offensive on the West coast. According to two sources the Germans are feverishly rebuilding the bridges which they had previously blown on a stretch of the road North of CASTELNUOVO L 1209: this is confirmed by photographs. PR also showed a new bivouac area with fresh tracks and dumps some 12 Kms N.E. of SPEZIA on 25 December. Otherwise there are no visible signs of a build up for an offensive and there appears to have been no great increase yet in the gun strength, though artillery fire has been heavier than for some time. The evidence for a German offensive is based therefore largely on various agents and Partisan reports of considerable increase in the numbers of troops in the area.

Early on the morning of the 26th an attack was launched against our positions in the SERCHIO Valley. Some 4 or 5 German battalions have been reported engaged, together with some Italian troops. The enemy succeeded in capturing three villages in the hills East of the river (1,000 fresh troops are reported to have arrived recently in this area and to have taken part in the attack), while a battle raged all day for the village of CALOMINI L 1202. These enemy attacks necessitated a slight withdrawal on our part. The only identification so far obtained is from a corpse of II Bn 285 G.R. (148 Div). This is the first identification of this Regt which has until recently been reported in the GENOA area. The following day started quietly and it is too early yet to say whether these attacks in the SERCHIO Valley were an isolated action or a diversion designed to draw off reserves, prior to a larger scale attack down the coast. The timing of the attack depends probably on

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the enemy's appreciation as to how imminent he considers a renewal of the attack on BOLOGNA. He may decide either to strike first hoping to throw the Allies off their balance or else fight a protracted battle of attrition for BOLOGNA, and having worn the Allies down strike on the rebound. At the moment the first alternative seems the more likely. To some extent timing will also depend on the weather. Experience on the Western Front shows that he waited for a spell of cloud and fog in order to ground our air force. The force available to the enemy at present would appear to be 148 Div, 157 Mtn Div, ITALIA Div and the four bns of MONTE ROSA Div which have been in the SERCHIO Valley for some weeks; in addition, 16 S.S. Div may be made available from the PARMA area if the enemy considers 305 Div and 26 Pz Div sufficient reserve for the main part of the front. The prisoners from 10 Para Regt stated that the S.S. troops they relieved said they were moving West to attack.

In Western ITALY dispositions appear to be on the whole unchanged, though several reports suggest moves by 5 Mtn Div: but these are probably connected with the readjustment of sectors consequent on the withdrawal of 157 Mtn Div. From the coast between VENTIMIGLIA and CHIAVARI comes a report of thinning out by the Germans about 20 Dec: this was presumably 285 G.R. leaving the GENOA area and moving South to the SERCHIO Valley. 162 Division continues to be reported between PIACENZA and VOGHERA with one battalion as far West as OVADA 0 7575.

There is no more news of 155 Field Training Division though a report from a ground source mentions the fact that equipment was being collected in the TURIN area to form a new division. From N.E. ITALY there is an unconfirmed report that 188 Res Mtn Div is being upgraded to a Mountain Div.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

From 19 to 25 December bad weather again impeded our attacks on the North Italian railways, and it is possible that the enemy has been able to maintain an adequate flow of supplies into the country. Both photo recce and ground source reports indicate that there has been unusual activity over the lines between TARVISIO and the PADUA - VICENZA area during the latter half of the month, and this traffic appears to have included a certain amount of trooping. This information coupled with a report of MT and troop movements on the PARMA - SPEZIA road on 24 December, appears to fit in with the reported move of 157 Mountain division from UDINE to SPEZIA area.

BRENNER

There have been no medium bomber attacks on the BRENNER railway during the past week, but fighter-bombers claim to have cut the line in several places South of TRENTO on 20, 21, 22 and 25 December. However, no bridges were hit and though complete photographic cover is lacking, it is believed that no part of the line has been closed for more than a few hours. There has been a large turnover of rolling stock at both TRENTO and BOLZANO during the latter part of the week, and activity at ALA, ORA, S. AMBROGGIO and PERI. Light loading at the smaller stations is a further indication that there has been no major hold-up of traffic and that trains have been able to run right through without unloading and transhipment of stores. Activity continues in the marshalling yards at MERANO, on the line running North West from BOLZANO, and the presence there of 47 hospital coaches on 20 December seems to indicate that they are being used as an overflow for the BOLZANO marshalling yards. Some indication of the importance which the enemy attaches to the maintenance of the BRENNER line is given by a captured order dated 26 November which states that men returning from leave (except those whose divisions are in action) whose trains are held up may be put to work on the line. Similar action is authorised in the case of reinforcement trains, so long as those are not March or Convalescent units coming as

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reinforcements to fighting units.

On the German side of the Pass INNSBRUCK was again attacked on night 24/25 December. A ground source report dated 17 December stated that the attack on the 15th had stopped all traffic and that a by-pass line is now being laid from HALL (3 miles East of INNSBRUCK) to ZIRL (9 miles West) which will connect with the BRENNER line South of INNSBRUCK. The same source also reports that traffic for ITALY is now using the line from WÖRGL, 35 miles N.E. of INNSBRUCK, to MITTERSILL (X 3725) and LIENZ (X 0505), presumably joining the BRENNER line at FORTEZZA.

N.E. ITALY

Excepting the 23rd of December when the line was temporarily cut between SACILE (B 8407) and CONEGLIANO (B 7001), and West of MOTTA DI LIVENZA (D 9288), through traffic from TARVISIO to PADUA and VICENZA has been possible on at least one and probably two lines during the whole of the past week.

During the latter half of this month these lines appear to have been very active. According to one ground source 157 wagons full of troops, 187 cars of MT, 120 loaded with ammunition and 68 of horses, horse-drawn transport, guns and AFV's as well as 30 fuel tankers, passed through TREVISO in the direction of PADUA and VICENZA between 15 and 18 December. Another report stated that two trains of troops from NORWAY arrived at MOTTA DI LIVENZA on 18 and 19 December. Photo recce on 23rd showed a train of 27 covered wagons and 15 flats loaded with MT either loading or unloading in UDINE East marshalling yard and a train of 21 wagons and 12 MT laden flats standing by. On the same day a string of 15 flats and 12 wagons was seen on the tracks at C 096073 just West of CASARSA and another of 6 wagons and 25 flats loaded with MT, horse-drawn vehicles and other equipment near S. VITO and C 111023. All these trains had departed by 25 December, on which date activity was noted at nearly every station along a 65 mile stretch of line between CASARSA and CASTELFRANCO VENETO including two 35-wagon trains moving East near PORDENONE.

A report dated 21 December states that two or three ammunition trains and at least one fuel train pass through TREVISO every week. Any one line is sufficient to carry all military traffic, and trains are pushed through as rapidly as possible at night and remain halted on the main lines between stations during the day, locomotives being removed. Bridging material is kept in the immediate vicinity of all railway bridges, and repairs, which normally take from ten to twenty days, are carried out by Italian workmen. When the railways are working properly there is very little road traffic.

PLAIN OF LOMBARDY

On the main VERONA-MILAN line the bridge at CALCINATO (F 1960) remains impassable, and the bridge at CHIARI (K 7668) was destroyed on 25 December. The line between VERONA and BRESCIA has been less active than usual, but a certain amount of rolling stock has been cleared. Both lines running East from MILAN, however, appear to have been active and concentrations of rolling stock including loaded flats have been reported by PR throughout the week. On 22 December there was a train length of 44 loaded flats at OSPIDALETTO (K 9369) goods depot and a large number of stores including large machinery-type crates on the ground, while between CHIARI and ROMANO DI LOMBARDIA there were 700 goods wagons, 70 of which were loaded flats. This traffic seems to fit in with recent ground source reports of the transfer of industries from TURIN to the MILAN and BERGAMO areas.

On the line from PADUA to FERRARA the bridge North of ROVIGO remains impassable but the line is being used as is shown by the presence of 30 wagons standing just South of the bridge on 25 December and activity at ROVIGO station. Three train lengths totalling 144 wagons were seen on the line South of PADUA on the same day. The line from VERONA to OSTIGLIA has been open and active throughout the week and the VERONA-BORGOFORTE line

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was open from 22 December, when the two bridges at MANTUA were seen to be repaired, until 25 December when the tracks were cut between MANTUA and BORGOFORTE. Very little activity was noted on this line between these two dates, but the fact that the enemy took the trouble to repair both the bridges at MANTUA seems to indicate that the line is to be used, possibly in connection with the reported movement of troops from the UDINE to the SPEZIA area.

All rail bridges over the river PO East of PIACENZA remain impassable and there has been little apparent movement South of the river. Heavy road traffic and troop movements were, however, reported on the road running South from PARMA through PONTREMOLI, AULLA and PALLERONE (P 8121) on 24 Dec. The same report states that there are troop and vehicle concentrations and workshops at TERRAROSSA (P 7724).

N.W. ITALY

The bridge over the river PO at TORPEHERETTI remains passable, and that at CASALE was reported possibly passable on 24 December, thus there are now two routes open between GENOA and MILAN. Through traffic is also possible from GENOA to TURIN and from TURIN to MILAN.

A ground source report of 7 December stated that 75 trains of industrial material had left GENOA for MILAN since 23 Nov, and a further 45 were reported to have passed through ALESSANDRIA between 10 and 20 December. There have been no reports this week of traffic between TURIN and MILAN.

SHIPPING

The amount of traffic between GENOA and SPEZIA has increased slightly during the past weeks and there are now four KT ships and nine F boats on this run. Ground sources report that a regular convoy sails from GENOA going S.E. every evening and on 24 Dec four of these ships were reported to be loaded with fuel. Four F boats have also been engaged in evacuating stocks of iron and steel from MUGGIANO to GENOA. One coaster and two schooners are apparently still plying between GENOA and SAVONA and three F boats occasionally reach IMPERIA.

There has been little photo cover of the Adriatic coast during the past week, but traffic of coasters and M/Vs between VENICE, TRIESTE and POLA appears to continue as usual. There was no active shipping at either CHIOGGIA or PORTO MARGHERA on 22 Dec, but on 25th there were twenty barges in CHIOGGIA and two tows of 6 small barges moving South towards the harbour.

3. WESTERN FRONT

Maps captured during the past week have given us the picture of the German plan at the start of the present battle, and have enabled us to assess the developments of the situation after one week of fighting. The attack was launched on a two Army front, 6 S.S. Pz Army to the North, 5 Pz Army to the South. The former was to advance along the axis MALMEDY-LIEGE with II S.S. Pz Corps (2 and 9 S.S. Divs) right and I S.S. Pz Corps (1, 12 S.S. and possibly one other division) left, the intention being to reach the MEUSE from North of LIEGE down to HUY and establish bridges over the river. 5 Pz Army was to attack on the main axis MARCHE-NAMUR thrusting on to the MEUSE all the way between HUY and GIVET. On 5 Pz Army's left, 7 Army was to hold and protect the Southern flank of RUNDSTEDT's drive.

Viewing the situation after a week's fighting it is evident that the enemy has had to make considerable modifications in his plan - evident too that he was always prepared to adapt it to exploit any success

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achieved. 6 S.S. Pz Army's performance has doubtless been disappointing to the Germans. The stubborn Allied defence from STAVELOT to MONSCHAU prevented either of the Army's two Corps from achieving any decisive breakthrough. Indeed it may be said that II S.S. Corps on the right never really made any progress. Certainly RUNDSTEDT by the fourth day of the attack seems to have decided to abandon the Northerly thrust of 6 S.S. Pz Army in the MONSCHAU area and to concentrate the armour in the STAVELOT sector where all four S.S. Pz Divs of the Army have been identified. Even so its drive made only slow headway - thanks in large part to the magnificent defence of an American armoured formation in the ST. VITH sector. By the end of the first week there was evidence that RUNDSTEDT had decided, in view of the meagre success of 6 S.S. Pz Army, to concentrate his main effort further South.

Here 5 Pz Army attacking on the MARCHE-NAMUR axis has made considerable headway. With a spearhead of 2 Pz and 116 Pz Divisions, probably the two best armoured formations in the West, General MANTEUFFEL of Tunisian fame has driven across Northern LUXEMBURG and is within striking distance of the MEUSE itself. The general line VIELSALM - BASTOGNE, a front of some 25-30 miles, was reached very rapidly, but from then on the enemy advance was compressed into an ever narrowing front. VIELSALM held, and BASTOGNE, although surrounded, remained in Allied hands. The enemy pushed on to the line ST. HUBERT - HOTTON, this time a front of only 18 miles and here again the shoulders of the drive have held: ST. HUBERT is in our hands and we are holding firm at HOTTON. West of here the situation is still very fluid and no front line as such exists. As in 1940, the spearhead has pushed on, for the moment at any rate ignoring its flanks in the speed of its rapid advance Westwards. Further back however, RUNDSTEDT is now trying to push out his flanks to North and South. Northwards heavy pressure is being exerted against the American positions between MARCHE and STAVELOT while to the South the Pz Lehr Div, after a successful initial drive West and S.W. of BASTOGNE, has received some reinforcements in the form of two infantry divisions to meet the Allied counter-attack against the German Southern flank. This is mainly an armoured battle, however, and the chief interest is centred on the employment and disposition of the enemy's armour. In addition to 2, 116 Pz and Pz Lehr Divs, the enemy has brought up 15 P.G. and 9 Pz Divs from reserve, and at least part of 11 Pz Div from the SAAR sector to reinforce 5 Pz Army, and there are indications that two further mobile divisions, also from the SAAR Valley are moving up Northwards. Meanwhile elements of 2 S.S. Pz Div of 6 Pz Army were identified on Christmas Eve in the middle of 5 Pz Army's sector, suggesting that RUNDSTEDT's plan is now to reinforce the latter's success with all the forces available. Still further armour may become available. 10 S.S. Pz Div is still in the DUREN area uncommitted, and there are reports, so far unconfirmed, that the enemy has two more S.S. Pz Divisions somewhere South of TRIER which may have been resting in GERMANY from the Eastern front. Thus the position is that 5 Pz Army has got six, possibly seven, armoured divisions at present engaged in the battle while two more are believed coming up from the SAAR, and two others may possibly be available as a strategic reserve. 6 Pz Army has four or five armoured divs committed and may have one more available, although of course, any or all of these may be transferred South to exploit 5 Pz Army's success. The infantry has so far not been prominent in this battle, but there are by now at least thirteen infantry or parachute divisions committed and more may become available.

The attack has been carried out with a ruthlessness which is an indication of the importance attached to it by the enemy. The tactics and the rumours of 1940 have been well to the fore. The most interesting of the units so far encountered in the battle is 150 Pz Bde, a formation dressed entirely in American uniform with American equipment and Sherman tanks. In addition special sabotage units wearing American uniform are known to be operating in the battle area, one of which is thought to have been entrusted with the mission of assassinating the Supreme Allied Commander. The familiar rumours are also being spread

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with singular lack of originality, new were reports of groups of parachutists being dropped disguised as nuns and priests. None of these has so far any confirmation and they appear to rest only on a sense of what is historically fitting.

There is little to report from elsewhere on the front. In the South the French took a 3,000 ft hill North of MUNSTER, but lost it again to a violent counter-attack. German resistance on the COLMAR bridgehead remains fierce, and the reported recent visit of HIMMLER to this sector suggests that it needs watching carefully, although so far there has been no indication of any enemy thickening up. Further North the departure of 11 Pz Div from the SAAR has been compensated for by the arrival of a new Volksgren Div set up in GERMANY. In HOLLAND enemy patrols have been active across the MEUSE on several occasions obviously with the intention of discouraging any thinning out from the British Army Group sector.

Thus far, RUNDSTEDT need not feel dissatisfied with the results he has achieved. A deep breakthrough has been effected in the Allied line and the situation is still not stabilised. Already German patrols may be on the MEUSE. On the other hand he must pay some attention to the strong resistance being offered to the flanks of his salient, and it is to be expected that in the coming week we shall see determined enemy efforts to widen the breakthrough to North and South. But the most significant item of the week's news was the map which showed intended bridging points over the MEUSE. This is no limited offensive to drive us back to the line of the MEUSE or to clear us from the SAAR and RUHR areas of GERMANY. As RUNDSTEDT stakes all, so he must hope to gain all. By this stage the possibility of repeating the victories of 1940 must be very present in his mind.

4. BALKAN FRONT

This week has seen important developments in the battle for HUNGARY. While Soviet pressure has been maintained in the MISKOLCZ sectors, forcing the enemy to abandon his salient in the MATRA and BUKK mountains, the threat to BUDAPEST has developed with dramatic suddenness. The Germans had for some time been reporting Russian attacks in the sector Lake BALATON - BUDAPEST, and when last week the Soviet drive was resumed along the DANUBE North of the Hungarian capital, it was clear that a pincer attack on BUDAPEST was developing. This has made very considerable headway. North of the city the Russians advancing through very difficult country have forced a crossing of the IPOLY river and are now less than 100 miles from VIENNA itself, while to the South the ring around BUDAPEST has been closed and the DANUBE reached 25 miles N.W. of BUDAPEST. Further South the rail centres of SZEKES FEHERVAR and BICSKE have both been captured by the Russians. Thus a situation of some seriousness has arisen for the enemy. North of the DANUBE the Russians are emerging from close and wooded country into the flatter and more open terrain of the BRATISLAVA plain while South of the capital the capture of SZEKES FEHERVAR gives the Red Army control of the road and rail communications leading into western HUNGARY. The stage is however not yet set for a Soviet advance on VIENNA, for while BUDAPEST is still in enemy hands the Russians may be reluctant to push ahead. For that reason we may expect the enemy to cling on stubbornly to the city itself in order to deny to the Russians its communications network. In Southern HUNGARY the Germans have reported Soviet attacks in the area between Lake BALATON and the DANUBE, but these have apparently made little headway.

In YUGOSLAVIA it has been a fairly quiet week. There have been three main sectors of interest. In the North East the enemy appears to be abandoning the DRINA Valley altogether. The need for additional forces in the SREM to establish a firm front and to deal with the situation around the Russian bridgehead South of the DRAVA has probably forced this decision upon the enemy. 11 G.A.F. Div which was down in the DRINA Valley appears to be moving Northwards to the VINKOVCI (X 08) area, in which sector elements

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of 118 Jg and 264 Inf Divisions are also reported. The UZICE-ZVORNIK road has been completely abandoned and a Partisan attack is developing against BIJELJINA (X 22), the only large town now left to the Germans in the DRINA Valley. The enemy's main concern must now be to establish a firm front West of UZICE (C 61) in order to prevent Bulgar-Partisan exploitation Westwards along the UZICE-ZVORNIK road. The loss of VISEGRAD on this road, 30 miles West of UZICE, would force the three divisions now in MONTENEGRO to withdraw along one difficult mountain road running Northwest from PLEVLJA (H 16) to ROGATICA (B 91). Control of the enemy formations in Eastern and S.E. YUGOSLAVIA appears now to have devolved on 91 Corps as H.Q. 22 Corps which was last identified in the VISEGRAD area is reported to have left Central YUGOSLAVIA via SARAJEVO and BROD bound for HUNGARY. Thus, apart from 21 Mtn Corps still engaged with Partisans in MONTENEGRO, Army Group E has only 91 Corps to cope with developments on its Eastern flank South of the SAVA river. True, now that 21 Corps' relief has been effected, 91 Corps will be free to concentrate entirely on the East, but the commitment is none the less considerable.

In MONTENEGRO, now that the relief of 21 Mtn Corps by 22 Division has been effected we must expect the enemy's withdrawal to be effected relatively rapidly, although the Partisans are continuing to harass and attack the enemy's retreating columns. Latest information on the withdrawal is that LIJEVA RIJEKA (N 28), 25 miles N.E. of PODGORICA, has been evacuated. Shortage of fuel appears to be causing the Germans some concern, and several reports speak of MT having to be destroyed owing to the lack of petrol to remove them.

In DALMATIA there has been fierce fighting in the sector N.W. of KNIN. For some time a Partisan offensive has been in progress here and last week the town of SRB, 35 miles S.E. of BIHAC, fell to them. The enemy's reaction to this was to start a counter-offensive Southwards on both sides of the BIHAC-KNIN road which has made some headway in the areas N.W. and N.E. of SRB. This development was not altogether surprising. The enemy cannot afford to let a serious Partisan threat develop against BIHAC, the loss of which would deny to him the important network of main and subsidiary roads which centre on this town. There is indeed some evidence that the enemy is seriously concerned about the paucity of his forces in N.W. YUGOSLAVIA, and a certain amount of thickening up is apparent. 4 Croat Div which had been operating in the SRIM has been brought over to 15 Corps' sector, while 41 Fortress Div last week was reported to be moving through SARAJEVO en route for BROD and may be intended as further reinforcement, although of course it may equally well be following 22 Mtn Corps' footsteps towards HUNGARY. In any case further reinforcements for the North West should become available in a not too distant future when 2 Corps is once more safely back into Army Group E's fold.

George S Grant
Col GSC
for BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 75

OF 27 DEC, 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Generally the enemy on the Adriatic is now back on the IRMGARD line (the SENIO river), though North of FAENZA 278 Div and 356 Div are still forward of the river and are at present holding the NAVIGLIO Canal between the 30 and 35 Northings. Both divisions only withdrew under strong pressure from the banks of the LAMONE and have been very reluctant to give up any ground in their bridgehead across the SENIO. Further North 98 Div held firm North and South of BAGNACAVALLO till the 21 Dec, but then following a day's heavy fighting withdrew overnight behind the SENIO and gave up the town. The decision seems to have been taken suddenly in contradiction to previous orders to hold on to the positions as long as possible. As a result the withdrawal was not as skilfully carried out as normally and several interesting documents fell into our hands. One of these identified a new Corps H.Q. - 73 Inf Corps - which was shown to be at CHIESA NUOVA M 2050, and apparently commands the Eastern flank of 10 Army with 114 Jaeger, 98 Inf and 356 Inf Divs under its command. In 76 Pz Corps, to the West of 73 Corps, apart from the fighting in which 278 Div has been involved, there has been only patrol activity along the banks of the SENIO and in the SANTERNO Valley. Some regrouping has however been carried out. 26 Pz Div, taking with it the remnants of 20 G.A.F. Div, has vanished from the front and is now carried in reserve - unlocated but probably in the rest and refit area North and N.E. of BOLOGNA previously visited by 29 P.G. and 90 P.G. Divs. On the SENIO 90 P.G. Div has gradually extended its front South West, by switching 200 P.G.R. from its left to its right wing, and now appears to have taken over the whole of the sector originally held by 305 Inf Div. 29 P.G. and 90 P.G. Divs now hold a front along the SENIO about 13 - 14 Kms long with the CASTEL BOLOGNESE apparently inclusive to 29 P.G. Div. The only clue as to the whereabouts of 305 Inf Div was brought in on Chrismas Day by a deserter who said that he left his Regt (578 G.R.) in IMOLA on the 22nd, and that it had just received orders to move to the BOLOGN. area. 305 Inf Div has therefore presumably joined 26 Pz Div in central reserve and is likewise resting and refitting.

Regrouping has not been confined to the Adriatic sector. South of BOLOGNA it is now certain that 16 S.S. Div has been withdrawn into reserve. An agents' report of 20 Dec stated that it had arrived in the PARMA area and since then prisoners have been taken from 10 Para Regt (4 Para Div) on the 83 Easting, who said that they had relieved S.S. troops. 10 Para Regt was previously out of the line resting and it looks as if with its return, almost certainly up to strength, 4 Para Div has extended its front West to include a large part if not all of 16 S.S. Div's sector. An agent's report that an Italian battalion - the LUPO Bn. - is also in the area is at present unconfirmed.

The decision to withdraw 16 S.S. Div from the line when two other divisions (26 Pz and 305 Inf Divs) were already moving into reserve, is difficult to explain: either 26 Pz or 305 Divs were so weak that the enemy did not feel that they could be regarded as immediate reserve, or,

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else, encouraged by the preliminary success of the offensive in the West, the enemy decided to try his luck with an attack here in ITALY as well. It may be that HITLER has decided that the moment has arrived to make the supreme effort and by inflicting defeats on the Anglo-American Armies both in the West and in ITALY hopes to sow discord between the Western Powers and RUSSIA. If he decides to attack in ITALY the most likely part of the front is undoubtedly the Western Appennines, where he probably appreciates that the line is only thinly held by the Allies and where a quick success might enable him to seize the port of LEGHORN and also turn the whole of the Fifth Army's positions in the Mountains North of FLORENCE. It is undoubtedly significant therefore that 157 Mountain Div which started to leave N.W. ITALY in mid-November and which was apparently moving into N.E. ITALY (elements of a Mountain Div were reported arriving in the UDINE Plain in the first fortnight of December), was stated by a normally reliable source to have been ordered on 15 Dec to move to the SPEZIA area. Since then troops of the division have been seen moving South through PIACENZA, while concentrations of German mountain troops were also reported on 24 Dec at SARZANA R 7710 and also PONTREMOLI. Assuming that most of the division moved down from N.E. ITALY while the tail of it was diverted Southwards in MILAN, the division could by now be very nearly complete in its concentration area. Another division may also be moving South into the Western Appennines - the ITALIA Div - which has been concentrating in the PARMA area and S.W. of the town astride Route 62. Two battalions (the Recce and the Eng Bn) have been reported by deserters and by agents to be already in the SPEZIA area, while several reports have been received that the division is to move into the line. Heavy traffic was reported South through the CISA Pass between 17 - 21 Dec, connected, one source states, with the move of the ITALIA Div. On two occasions the morale of the division has been described as high (unusual for Republican formations) and one interesting report states that the division is not to be used in a defensive role but for counter-attack and that each infantry regt will be attached to a German Div.

The arrival of two more divisions in the SPEZIA area would be out of all proportion to the defensive requirements of the sector. If the statement about the role of ITALIA is accurate, relief of MONTE ROSA is not envisaged. And there seems little reason why 148 Div (which has been engaged in nothing more strenuous than patrol clashes) should be relieved, especially by a division which was in process of moving to N.E. ITALY at the time. The decision to send 157 Mtn Div down to the SPEZIA area clearly indicates a change of plan on the part of the Higher Command and the fact that it happened in the middle of December just when the attack was going in on the Western Front may or may not be a coincidence.

From several civilians who have crossed the lines come reports that the enemy is planning a counter-offensive on the West coast. According to two sources the Germans are feverishly rebuilding the bridges which they had previously blown on a stretch of the road North of CASTELNUOVO L 1209: this is confirmed by photographs. PR also showed a new bivouac area with fresh tracks and dumps some 12 Kms N.E. of SPEZIA on 25 December. Otherwise there are no visible signs of a build up for an offensive and there appears to have been no great increase yet in the gun strength, though artillery fire has been heavier than for some time. The evidence for a German offensive is based therefore largely on various agents and Partisan reports of considerable increase in the numbers of troops in the area.

Early on the morning of the 26th an attack was launched against our positions in the SERCHIO Valley. Some 4 or 5 German battalions have been reported engaged, together with some Italian troops. The enemy succeeded in capturing three villages in the hills East of the river (1,000 fresh troops are reported to have arrived recently in this area and to have taken part in the attack), while a battle raged all day for the village of CALOMINI L 1202. These enemy attacks necessitated a slight withdrawal on our part. The only identification so far obtained is from a corpse of II Bn 285 G.R. (148 Div). This is the first identification of this Regt which has until recently been reported in the GENOA area. The following day started quietly and it is too early yet to say whether these attacks in the SERCHIO Valley were an isolated action or a diversion designed to draw off reserves, prior to a larger scale attack down the coast. The timing of the attack depends probably on

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the enemy's appreciation as to how imminent he considers a renewal of the attack on BOLOGNA. He may decide either to strike first hoping to throw the Allies off their balance or else fight a protracted battle of attrition for BOLOGNA, and having worn the Allies down strike on the rebound. At the moment the first alternative seems the more likely. To some extent timing will also depend on the weather. Experience on the Western Front shows that he waited for a spell of cloud and fog in order to ground our air force. The force available to the enemy at present would appear to be 148 Div, 157 Mtn Div, ITALIA Div and the four bns of MONTE ROSA Div which have been in the SERCHIO Valley for some weeks; in addition, 16 S.S. Div may be made available from the PARMA area if the enemy considers 305 Div and 26 Pz Div sufficient reserve for the main part of the front. The prisoners from 10 Para Regt stated that the S.S. troops they relieved said they were moving West to attack.

In Western ITALY dispositions appear to be on the whole unchanged, though several reports suggest moves by 5 Mtn Div: but these are probably connected with the readjustment of sectors consequent on the withdrawal of 157 Mtn Div. From the coast between VENTIMIGLIA and CHIAVARI comes a report of thinning out by the Germans about 20 Dec: this was presumably 285 G.R. leaving the GENOA area and moving South to the SERCHIO Valley. 162 Division continues to be reported between PIACENZA and VOGHERA with one battalion as far West as OVADA 0 7575.

There is no more news of 155 Field Training Division though a report from a ground source mentions the fact that equipment was being collected in the TURIN area to form a new division. From N.E. ITALY there is an unconfirmed report that 188 Res Mtn Div is being upgraded to a Mountain Div.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

From 19 to 25 December bad weather again impeded our attacks on the North Italian railways, and it is possible that the enemy has been able to maintain an adequate flow of supplies into the country. Both photo recce and ground source reports indicate that there has been unusual activity over the lines between TARVISIO and the PADUA - VICENZA area during the latter half of the month, and this traffic appears to have included a certain amount of trooping. This information coupled with a report of MT and troop movements on the PARMA - SPEZIA road on 24 December, appears to fit in with the reported move of 157 Mountain division from UDINE to SPEZIA area.

BRENNER

There have been no medium bomber attacks on the BRENNER railway during the past week, but fighter-bombers claim to have cut the line in several places South of TRENTO on 20, 21, 22 and 23 December. However, no bridges were hit and though complete photographic cover is lacking, it is believed that no part of the line has been closed for more than a few hours. There has been a large turnover of rolling stock at both TRENTO and BOLZANO during the latter part of the week, and activity at ALA, ORA, S. AMBROGGIO and PERI. Light loading at the smaller stations is a further indication that there has been no major hold-up of traffic and that trains have been able to run right through without unloading and transhipment of stores. Activity continues in the marshalling yards at MERANO, on the line running North West from BOLZANO, and the presence there of 47 hospital coaches on 20 December seems to indicate that they are being used as an overflow for the BOLZANO marshalling yards. Some indication of the importance which the enemy attaches to the maintenance of the BRENNER line is given by a captured order dated 26 November which states that men returning from leave (except those whose divisions are in action) whose trains are held up may be put to work on the line. Similar action is authorised in the case of reinforcement trains, so long as these are not March or Convalescent units coming as

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reinforcements to fighting units.

On the German side of the Pass INNSBRUCK was again attacked on night 24/25 December. A ground source report dated 17 December stated that the attack on the 15th had stopped all traffic and that a by-pass line is now being laid from HALL (3 miles East of INNSBRUCK) to ZIRL (9 miles West) which will connect with the BRENNER line South of INNSBRUCK. The same source also reports that traffic for ITALY is now using the line from WÖRGL, 35 miles N.E. of INNSBRUCK, to MALLNITZ (X 3725) and LIENZ (X 0505), presumably joining the BRENNER line at FORTEZZA.

N.E. ITALY

Excepting the 23rd of December when the line was temporarily cut between SACILE (B 8407) and CONEGLIANO (B 7001), and West of MOTTA DI LIVENZA (D 9288), through traffic from TARVISIO to PADUA and VICENZA has been possible on at least one and probably two lines during the whole of the past week.

During the latter half of this month these lines appear to have been very active. According to one ground source 157 wagons full of troops, 187 cars of MT, 120 loaded with ammunition and 68 of horses, horse-drawn transport, guns and AFV's as well as 30 fuel tankers, passed through TREVISO in the direction of PADUA and VICENZA between 15 and 18 December. Another report stated that two trains of troops from NORWAY arrived at MOTTA DI LIVENZA on 18 and 19 December. Photo recce on 23rd showed a train of 27 covered wagons and 15 flats loaded with MT either loading or unloading in UDINE East marshalling yard and a train of 21 wagons and 12 MT laden flats standing by. On the same day a string of 15 flats and 12 wagons was seen on the tracks at C 096073 just West of CASARSA and another of 6 wagons and 25 flats loaded with MT, horse-drawn vehicles and other equipment near S. VITO and C 111023. All these trains had departed by 25 December, on which date activity was noted at nearly every station along a 65 mile stretch of line between CASARSA and CASTELFRANCO VENETO including two 35-wagon trains moving East near PORDENONE.

A report dated 21 December states that two or three ammunition trains and at least one fuel train pass through TREVISO every week. Any one line is sufficient to carry all military traffic, and trains are pushed through as rapidly as possible at night and remain halted on the main lines between stations during the day, locomotives being removed. Bridging material is kept in the immediate vicinity of all railway bridges, and repairs, which normally take from ten to twenty days, are carried out by Italian workmen. When the railways are working properly there is very little road traffic.

PLAIN OF LOMBARDY

On the main VERONA-MILAN line the bridge at CALCINATO (F 1960) remains impassable, and the bridge at CHIARI (K 7668) was destroyed on 25 December. The line between VERONA and BRESCIA has been less active than usual, but a certain amount of rolling stock has been cleared. Both lines running East from MILAN, however, appear to have been active and concentrations of rolling stock including loaded flats have been reported by PR throughout the week. On 22 December there was a train length of 14 loaded flats at OSPEDALETTO (K 9369) goods depot and a large number of stores including large machinery-type crates on the ground, while between CHIARI and ROMANO DI LOMBARDIA there were 700 goods wagons, 70 of which were loaded flats. This traffic seems to fit in with recent ground source reports of the transfer of industries from TURIN to the MILAN and BERGAMO areas.

On the line from PADUA to FERRARA the bridge North of ROVIGO remains impassable but the line is being used as is shown by the presence of 30 wagons standing just South of the bridge on 25 December and activity at ROVIGO station. Three train lengths totalling 144 wagons were seen on the line South of PADUA on the same day. The line from VERONA to OSTIGLIA has been open and active throughout the week and the VERONA-BORGOFORTE line

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was open from 22 December, when the two bridges at MANTUA were seen to be repaired, until 25 December when the tracks were cut between MANTUA and BORGOFORTE. Very little activity was noted on this line between these two dates, but the fact that the enemy took the trouble to repair both the bridges at MANTUA seems to indicate that the line is to be used, possibly in connection with the reported movement of troops from the UDINE to the SPEZIA area.

All rail bridges over the river PO East of PIACENZA remain impassable and there has been little apparent movement South of the river. Heavy road traffic and troop movements were, however, reported on the road running South from PARMA through PONTREMOLI, AULLA and PALLERONE (P 8121) on 24 Dec. The same report states that there are troop and vehicle concentrations and workshops at TERRAROSSA (P 7724).

N.W. ITALY

The bridge over the river PO at TORREBERETTI remains passable, and that at CASALE was reported possibly passable on 24 December, thus there are now two routes open between GENOA and MILAN. Through traffic is also possible from GENOA to TURIN and from TURIN to MILAN.

A ground source report of 7 December stated that 75 trains of industrial material had left GENOA for MILAN since 23 Nov, and a further 45 were reported to have passed through ALESSANDRIA between 10 and 20 December. There have been no reports this week of traffic between TURIN and MILAN.

SHIPPING

The amount of traffic between GENOA and SPEZIA has increased slightly during the past weeks and there are now four MT ships and nine F boats on this run. Ground sources report that a regular convoy sails from GENOA going S.E. every evening and on 24 Dec four of these ships were reported to be loaded with fuel. Four F boats have also been engaged in evacuating stocks of iron and steel from MUGGIANO to GENOA. One coaster and two schooners are apparently still plying between GENOA and SAVONA and three F boats occasionally reach IMPERIA.

There has been little photo cover of the Adriatic coast during the past week, but traffic of coasters and M/Vs between VENICE, TRIESTE and POLA appears to continue as usual. There was no active shipping at either CHIOGGIA or PORTO MARGHERA on 22 Dec, but on 25th there were twenty barges in CHIOGGIA and two tows of 6 small barges moving South towards the harbour.

3. WESTERN FRONT

Maps captured during the past week have given us the picture of the German plan at the start of the present battle, and have enabled us to assess the developments of the situation after one week of fighting. The attack was launched on a two Army front, 6 S.S. Pz Army to the North, 5 Pz Army to the South. The former was to advance along the axis MALMEDY-LIEGE with II S.S. Pz Corps (2 and 9 S.S. Divs) right and I S.S. Pz Corps (1, 12 S.S. and possibly one other division) left, the intention being to reach the MEUSE from North of LIEGE down to HUY and establish bridges over the river. 5 Pz Army was to attack on the main axis MARCHE-NAMUR thrusting on to the MEUSE all the way between HUY and GIVET. On 5 Pz Army's left, 7 Army was to hold and protect the Southern flank of RUNDSTEDT's drive.

Viewing the situation after a week's fighting it is evident that the enemy has had to make considerable modifications in his plan - evident too that he was always prepared to adapt it to exploit any success

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achieved. 6 S.S. Pz Army's performance has doubtless been disappointing to the Germans. The stubborn Allied defence from STAVELOT to MONSCHAU prevented either of the Army's two Corps from achieving any decisive breakthrough. Indeed it may be said that II S.S. Corps on the right never really made any progress. Certainly RUNDSTEDT by the fourth day of the attack seems to have decided to abandon the Northerly thrust of 6 S.S. Pz Army in the MONSCHAU area and to concentrate the armour in the STAVELOT sector where all four S.S. Pz Divs of the Army have been identified. Even so its drive made only slow headway - thanks in large part to the magnificent defence of an American armoured formation in the ST. VITH sector. By the end of the first week there was evidence that RUNDSTEDT had decided, in view of the meagre success of 6 S.S. Pz Army, to concentrate his main effort further South.

Here 5 Pz Army attacking on the MARCHE-NAMUR axis has made considerable headway. With a spearhead of 2 Pz and 116 Pz Divisions, probably the two best armoured formations in the West, General MANTEUFFEL of Tunisian fame has driven across Northern LUXEMBURG and is within striking distance of the MEUSE itself. The general line VIELSALM - BASTOGNE, a front of some 25-30 miles, was reached very rapidly, but from then on the enemy advance was compressed into an ever narrowing front. VIELSALM held, and BASTOGNE, although surrounded, remained in Allied hands. The enemy pushed on to the line ST. HUBERT - HOTTON, this time a front of only 18 miles and here again the shoulders of the drive have held: ST. HUBERT is in our hands and we are holding firm at HOTTON. West of here the situation is still very fluid and no front line as such exists. As in 1940, the spearhead has pushed on, for the moment at any rate ignoring its flanks in the speed of its rapid advance Westwards. Further back however, RUNDSTEDT is now trying to push out his flanks to North and South. Northwards heavy pressure is being exerted against the American positions between MARCHE and STAVELOT while to the South the Pz Lehr Div, after a successful initial drive West and S.W. of BASTOGNE, has received some reinforcements in the form of two infantry divisions to meet the Allied counter-attack against the German Southern flank. This is mainly an armoured battle however, and the chief interest is centred on the employment and disposition of the enemy's armour. In addition to 2, 116 Pz and Pz Lehr Divs, the enemy has brought up 15 P.G. and 9 Pz Divs from reserve, and at least part of 11 Pz Div from the SAAR sector to reinforce 5 Pz Army, and there are indications that two further mobile divisions, also from the SAAR Valley are moving up Northwards. Meanwhile elements of 2 S.S. Pz Div of 6 Pz Army were identified on Christmas Eve in the middle of 5 Pz Army's sector, suggesting that RUNDSTEDT's plan is now to reinforce the latter's success with all the forces available. Still further armour may become available. 10 S.S. Pz Div is still in the DÜREN area uncommitted, and there are reports, so far unconfirmed, that the enemy has two more S.S. Pz Divisions somewhere South of TRIER which may have been resting in GERMANY from the Eastern front. Thus the position is that 5 Pz Army has got six, possibly seven, armoured divisions at present engaged in the battle while two more are believed coming up from the SAAR, and two others may possibly be available as a strategic reserve. 6 Pz Army has four or five armoured divs committed and may have one more available, although of course, any or all of these may be transferred South to exploit 5 Pz Army's success. The infantry has so far not been prominent in this battle, but there are by now at least thirteen infantry or parachute divisions committed and more may become available.

The attack has been carried out with a ruthlessness which is an indication of the importance attached to it by the enemy. The tactics and the rumours of 1940 have been well to the fore. The most interesting of the units so far encountered in the battle is 150 Pz Bde, a formation dressed entirely in American uniform with American equipment and Sherman tanks. In addition special sabotage units wearing American uniform are known to be operating in the battle area, one of which is thought to have been entrusted with the mission of assassinating the Supreme Allied Commander. The familiar rumours are also being spread

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being dropped disguised as nuns and priests. None of these has so far any confirmation and they appear to rest only on a sense of what is historically fitting.

There is little to report from elsewhere on the front. In the South the French took a 3,000 ft hill North of MUNSTER, but lost it again to a violent counter-attack. German resistance on the COLMAR bridgehead remains fierce, and the reported recent visit of HIMMLER to this sector suggests that it needs watching carefully, although so far there has been no indication of any enemy thickening up. Further North the departure of 11 Pz Div from the SAAR has been compensated for by the arrival of a new Volksgren Div set up in GERMANY. In HOLLAND enemy patrols have been active across the MEUSE on several occasions obviously with the intention of discouraging any thinning out from the British Army Group sector.

Thus far, RUNDSTEDT need not feel dissatisfied with the results he has achieved. A deep breakthrough has been effected in the Allied line and the situation is still not stabilised. Already German patrols may be on the MEUSE. On the other hand he must pay some attention to the strong resistance being offered to the flanks of his salient, and it is to be expected that in the coming week we shall see determined enemy efforts to widen the breakthrough to North and South. But the most significant item of the week's news was the map which showed intended bridging points over the MEUSE. This is no limited offensive to drive us back to the line of the MEUSE or to clear us from the SAAR and ROER areas of GERMANY. As RUNDSTEDT stakes all, so he must hope to gain all. By this stage the possibility of repeating the victories of 1940 must be very present in his mind.

4. BALKAN FRONT

This week has seen important developments in the battle for HUNGARY. While Soviet pressure has been maintained in the KASSA and MISKOLCZ sectors, forcing the enemy to abandon his positions in the MATRA and BUKK mountains, the threat to BUDAPEST has developed with dramatic suddenness. The Germans had for some time been reporting Russian attacks in the sector Lake BALATON - BUDAPEST, and when last week the Soviet drive was resumed along the DANUBE North of the Hungarian capital, it was clear that a pincer attack on BUDAPEST was developing. This has made very considerable headway. North of the city the Russians advancing through very difficult country have forced a crossing of the IPOLY river and are now less than 100 miles from VIENNA itself, while to the South the ring around BUDAPEST has been closed and the DANUBE reached 25 miles N.W. of BUDAPEST. Further South the rail centres of SZEKES FEHERVAR and BICSKE have both been captured by the Russians. Thus a situation of some seriousness has arisen for the enemy. North of the DANUBE the Russians are emerging from close and wooded country into the flatter and more open terrain of the BRATISLAVA plain while South of the capital the capture of SZEKES FEHERVAR gives the Red Army control of the road and rail communications leading into Western HUNGARY. The stage is however not yet set for a Soviet advance on VIENNA, for while BUDAPEST is still in enemy hands the Russians may be reluctant to push ahead. For that reason we may expect the enemy to cling on stubbornly to the city itself in order to deny to the Russians its communications network. In Southern HUNGARY the Germans have reported Soviet attacks in the area between Lake BALATON and the DANUBE, but these have apparently made little headway.

In YUGOSLAVIA it has been a fairly quiet week. There have been three main sectors of interest. In the North East the enemy appears to be abandoning the DRINA Valley altogether. The need for additional forces in the SREM to establish a firm front and to deal with the situation around the Russian bridgehead South of the DRAVA has probably forced this decision upon the enemy. 11 G.A.F. Div which was down in the DRINA Valley appears to be moving Northwards to the VINKOVCI (X 08) area, in which sector elements

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of 118 Jg and 264 Inf Divisions are also reported. The UZICE-ZVORNIK road has been completely abandoned and a Partisan attack is developing against BIJELJINA (X 22), the only large town now left to the Germans in the DRINA Valley. The enemy's main concern must now be to establish a firm front West of UZICE (C 61) in order to prevent Bulgar-Partisan exploitation Westwards along the UZICE-ZVORNIK road. The loss of VISEGRAD on this road, 30 miles West of UZICE, would force the three divisions now in MONTENEGRO to withdraw along one difficult mountain road running Northwest from PLEVLJA (H 16) to ROGATICA (B 91). Control of the enemy formations in Eastern and S.E. YUGOSLAVIA appears now to have devolved on 91 Corps as H.Q. 22 Corps which was last identified in the VISEGRAD area is reported to have left Central YUGOSLAVIA via SARAJEVO and BROD bound for HUNGARY. Thus, apart from 21 Mtn Corps still engaged with Partisans in MONTENEGRO, Army Group E has only 91 Corps to cope with developments on its Eastern flank South of the SAVA river. True, now that 21 Corps' relief has been effected, 91 Corps will be free to concentrate entirely on the East, but the commitment is none the less considerable.

In MONTENEGRO, now that the relief of 21 Mtn Corps by 22 Division has been effected we must expect the enemy's withdrawal to be effected relatively rapidly, although the Partisans are continuing to harass and attack the enemy's retreating columns. Latest information on the withdrawal is that LIJEVA RIJEKA (N 28), 25 miles N.E. of PODGORICA, has been evacuated. Shortage of fuel appears to be causing the Germans some concern, and several reports speak of MT having to be destroyed owing to the lack of petrol to remove them.

In DALMATIA there has been fierce fighting in the sector N.W. of KNIN. For some time a Partisan offensive has been in progress here and last week the town of SRB, 35 miles S.E. of BIHAC, fell to them. The enemy's reaction to this was to start a counter-offensive Southwards on both sides of the BIHAC-KNIN road which has made some headway in the areas N.W. and N.E. of SRB. This development was not altogether surprising. The enemy cannot afford to let a serious Partisan threat develop against BIHAC, the loss of which would deny to him the important network of main and subsidiary roads which centre on this town. There is indeed some evidence that the enemy is seriously concerned about the paucity of his forces in N.W. YUGOSLAVIA, and a certain amount of thickening up is apparent. 4 Croat Div which had been operating in the SREM has been brought over to 15 Corps' sector, while 41 Fortress Div last week was reported to be moving through SARAJEVO en route for BROD and may be intended as further reinforcement, although of course it may equally well be following 22 Mtn Corps' footsteps towards HUNGARY. In any case further reinforcements for the North West should become available in a not too distant future when 21 Corps is once more safely back into Army Group E's fold.

George S Grant
Col GSC
for BRIGADIER,
B.G.S.(I).

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 76

OF 9 JAN, 1945

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The attack on our Western flank came to nothing in a rather unexplained way and part at least of the forces which were expected to take part in it have been shifted over to the extreme Eastern flank. In the latter area the enemy has had to pay for his policy of staying forward of the SENIO, and disproportionately highly. A new division has been identified in ITALY and KESSELRING, after a three month absence, has returned to reassure his troops in a New Year message that "I am leading you in the battles of 1945".

8 Army front was quiet over the last days of December but the Germans took the opportunity of pulling out 90 Div, a badly battered formation, and substituting the relatively fresh and up to strength 16 S.S. Division, extending the latter's sector to include some 2,000 yards of front previously held by 114 Jaeger Div. When our attack did start on 2 Jan it mainly hit the latter division and took 200 prisoners from it in the first two days. On 4 Jan the Wehrmacht communiqué claimed that a large scale attack had begun and we were able to clear our Northern flank right up to the South shore of the VALLI DI COMACCHIO, beating off with heavy losses a counter-attack by 16 S.S., supported by 26 Recce Unit, and clearing up the enemy Southern bridgehead between the SENIO and the M.VIGLIO Canal. The day's bag was over 500 prisoners and the enemy may well have feared that worse was to come, in particular no doubt an attack across the SENIO. At that point the weather closed down but as far as the enemy knows this may only be a temporary and fortuitous check on our programme. He must, indeed, so consider it if he still holds to the appreciation which was in the mind of the Intelligence Officer of 278 Division when he wrote his Intelligence Summary for 22 Dec. In this interesting document, which shows incidentally that propaganda is apparently allowed more weight in the assessment of enemy capabilities than a scientific approach to the subject should demand, it is stated that the Allies must at all costs break through to BOLOGNA as quickly as possible in order to free troops from ITALY to meet the German offensive in the West. The writer, who over-estimates the reserves available to 8 Army, considers that the main threat will be up route 9, using 1 Cdn Corps and 2 N.Z. Division. To meet this threat the enemy is clearly still concerned to reinforce his Eastern flank yet further. 114 Jaeger Division, which put up a very mediocre performance and must now be in a very weak state indeed, especially 741 Jg Regt, has been pulled out and it is not yet known what formation has relieved it; there may well be other changes: 356 Div, for instance, is in a bad way and 278 Div even more so.

An interesting identification on the extreme Eastern flank is of III Bn 740 G.R. of 710 Inf Div. The division has been in Southern NORWAY for the last three and a half years, and has never fought before. It left early in December and as far as is known only 740 G.R., plus some of the divisional artillery, is South of the PO. III Bn appears to be responsible for the defence of the isthmus between the sea and the lake and the other two battalions are dispersed between the lake and the PO.

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On the Western flank the enemy attack in the SERCHIO Valley which started on 26 Dec soon petered out and by the end of the month we had regained all the ground abandoned. The motives for the operation are a little mysterious; reinforcements had been brought up to the SERCHIO Valley in the form of 285 G.R., the regiment of 148 Div which had previously been in the GENOA area, the MITTENWALD Alpine Training Bn and 4 Alpine Bn, and either the whole or a greater part of the ITALIA Division. It is possible that the offensive was meant to have a more remote objective - LUCCA and LEGHORN, the troops had been told - but that it was cancelled when it became clear that surprise had been lost and the Allies had taken timely counter-measures. 157 Mtn Div was never definitely identified in the area; the two Alpine Bns might well account for reports of its presence and later evidence suggests that it was somewhere not far North of BOLOGNA at any rate by the end of December. ITALIA Division was certainly somewhere between the CISA Pass and SPEZIA and since it has not been used for a relief of MONTEROSA it might well have been intended for an offensive. 16 S.S. Division, at the time of the attack still unlocated in reserve, has turned up on 8 Army front; to their surprise, apparently, as when they were relieved by 4 Para Div they told the paratroopers that they were going West to attack. 305 Div, another reserve formation, was on 31 Dec in the area of BAZZANO, 16 miles East of BOLOGNA. 26 Pz Div is stated to be in the area FERRARA - CENTO - S. NICOLO FERRARESE (M 195715). Enemy dispositions are in fact, aligned for a defensive on the Eastern flank and give no hint of offensive intentions, for the present at least, on either the Central or Western sectors.

In North ITALY the only change has been the shifting of the 10 MAS Flotilla or the BORGHESE Division, as it is sometimes called from the name of its commander, to the UDINE - TRIESTE area. The spirit of the division, which is very much a private army belonging to Prince BORGHESE, is said to be as much anti-German as anti-Allied and its move to the TRIESTE area is said to be intended to guard against a Jugoslav coup-de-main in the event of a German collapse or withdrawal. One of its units, the LUPO Bn, is under command of 16 S.S. Div. On the French frontier, 5 Mtn Div, about whose movements there was some doubt, lost prisoners just North of the MADDALENA Pass on 7 Jan, and is undoubtedly still in the same general area.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) RAILWAYS

From 26 Dec up to 4 Jan excellent weather permitted us again to step up our air attacks against enemy communications after a period of about 10 days during which weather severely restricted operations. Since the 4th the weather has again closed in and total sorties by M.A.T.A.F. since then have averaged only about 200 a day as opposed to an average of about 1,200 for the period 26 Dec - 4 Jan. During this latter period railways in enemy-occupied territory were heavily disrupted. Whereas on 25 Dec the BRENNER railway and one rail route through N.E. ITALY were probably open to through traffic, on 4 Jan there were five cuts on the BRENNER railway and each of the three rail routes in N.E. ITALY were blocked at at least four points. (A sketch of the rail state as of 4 Jan appears on the following page). No through traffic in N.E. ITALY was possible between 26 Dec and 4 Jan and over the same period the BRENNER was continuously blocked with the possible exception of 1 or 2 days. Since 4 Jan no PR has been available but as of 8 Jan no through traffic is likely to have been possible in the N.E. and, on the basis of fighter-bomber claims, the BRENNER may perhaps have been still blocked. Aside from the high degree of rail interdiction achieved a development of major interest is the appreciable deepening of the zone of rail interdiction. The BRENNER line has been cut almost as far North as the BRENNER Pass and heavy attacks have been made on INNSBRUCK, the Northern terminus; in the N.E. the zone has been extended out to something over 150 kilometres from the PADUA area.


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Further South one or more of the many rail lines running South to the PO river have probably been open at all times up to or within 15 kilometres of the river, but all permanent bridges, both road and rail, over the PO East of PAVIA remain out.

(b) RAILWAY REPAIRS

The difficulties inherent under the circumstances of constant interruptions of the railways and shortage of petrol are obvious. The enemy has at least partially met the petrol shortage by strict economy measures and by use of substitute fuels. In the face of our air effort against railways, he has, abetted by adverse weather, only been able to move trains by virtue of a highly organised and efficient repair system. In one instance recently a bridge on the BRENNER was repaired in 48 hours.

In view of the enemy's lack of petrol and the relative inefficiency of substitute MT fuels, and further his none-too-adequate number of MT, the importance of his ability to keep the railways in operation cannot be over-emphasised. In this connection recent information from Ps/W is of interest. They state that there is a railway air raid warning service which works in conjunction with the civilian and Luftwaffe service. When enemy planes are reported mobile "Trouble-Shooter" railway repair crews in the area are immediately alerted. The message originates at the regular control warning stations and goes from there on to sub-stations to the "Trouble-Shooter" units. In the event that rail damage occurs, the exact information as to location and extent of damage is phoned or radioed to the railway station. From here necessary instructions are radioed directly to receivers aboard the repair train. Complete instructions are given as to necessary repair while the train is in transit. It is claimed that the entire German railway net-work has been carefully alloted to various of these units for the repair of all possible damage. These crews are briefed on the most important rail sections so that in the event these are destroyed, all the planning and preliminary preparations for repairs have been previously accomplished. The crews' headquarters are located at various large rail centres, from where they are dispersed to "waiting stations". These "Trouble-Shooter" crews are described as consisting of the following: one car for files on possible repairs with from 3 to 9 expert technicians, two to four "workshop" cars for welding equipment, cranes, tools, spare parts, ties, switches etc., one to two cars for quarters and kitchen facilities, one to two cars for spare rails and large replacement parts, one to two cars for cement, gravel, stone blocks, etc. for road-bed construction. Ground sources report, and PR tends to confirm, that essentially similar special railway repair trains are currently operating in ITALY.

Another item of interest in enemy railway repair effort is the practice of using a short temporary bridge span at night only, the span being removed during the hours of daylight to give the impression that the bridge is impassable. Ground sources report that this stratagem is used at six bridges, namely those near CALCINATO (F 1058) and PESCHIERA (F 4255) on the main MILAN-VERONA line, VOGHERA (K 0813) and RUBIERA (L 4667) on the main TURIN-PIACENZA-BOLOGNA line, LEGNAGO (L 8825) on a secondary line running N.E. to the PADUA area, and NERVESSA (G 6295) on the main VERONA-UDINE line. The use of such a span has been confirmed at CALCINATO bridge by night PR, but here the practice is currently no longer possible in as much as recent attacks have further damaged the bridge.

(c) SUPPLIES

While on the basis of the present scale of fighting the rail interdiction achieved has probably not resulted in any acute shortage of supplies, no build-up is likely to have been possible over the past two weeks, troop trains will have been delayed, and much movement made

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by MT with a consequent increase in motor fuel consumption which the enemy can ill-afford. AFR has shown road traffic in the BRENNER line area as far North as BOLZANO and a ground source reports that 300 MT with trailers loaded with ammunition for the front passed through TREVISO during 1 and 2 Jan. Other ground sources again report a shortage of fuel in North ITALY. The Germans are reportedly buying petrol on the black market (presumably for unofficial purposes) and one source goes so far as to indicate serious inroads into the stocks of spiritous liqours in North ITALY in reporting that the enemy is using GRAPPA, a "special high grade GRAPPA", as motor fuel. Other reports state that in ITALY the Germans continue to convert their MT to Gasogene burners and according to a PW a general order affecting all German MT has been issued directing the conversion of all vehicles to gasogene with the exception of tanks, SPs and heavy prime movers.

(d) SHIPPING

There has been little PR of the Ligurian ports since 26 December. However, it is known that one MT ship and a coaster reached SPEZIA from GENOA on 7 January and 4 F-boats were at active berths in the latter harbour on the same date. It is possible that two other MT ships and 11 F-boats which were seen at active berths in GENOA are also plying between these two ports. At least six F-boats are under repair at CANTIERI PONENTE ship yards.

West of GENOA there appears to have been some increase in activity at SAVONA, at least three coasters besides schooners and other small shipping are now operating between these two ports.

On the Adriatic traffic in coastal craft continues between VENICE, TRIESTE, POLA and FIUME on a somewhat reduced scale, whilst GRADO and other small ports show little or no activity since 28 December. However, the traffic in river barges from VENICE to CHIOGGIA and the inland canal system continues to be lively. Twenty-four barges were seen at CHIOGGIA on 27 December and 22 on 3 January, and activity has also been noted on the CHIOGGIA-CAVANELLA D'ADIGE-PORTO DI PO canal system.

There has been some increase in air activity against shipping along the Ligurian coast in the past week.

(e) ENEMY INSTALLATIONS, UPPER ADIGE VALLEY

All along the Upper ADIGE Valley, between MERANO (A 8291) and RIVA at the Northern end of Lake GARDA, the enemy has built up a considerable number of installations of all kinds. Twenty-nine have so far been identified from air photos including three fuel dumps, seven ammunition dumps, two MT spare-parts depots, three vehicle parks and fourteen general stores dumps, whilst a further fuel dump, six ammunition dumps and two workshops have been reported by ground sources but not yet confirmed by photo recce.

The majority of these installations, which hug the main BRENNER railway and subsidiary lines, have shown every appearance of activity of late, and it is probable that, whilst in the first place many of them were built up as a strategical reserve, they are now being used for the reception of stores unloaded from supply trains held up on this frequently-bombed stretch of line, thus preventing a pile-up of loaded rolling stock in the marshalling yards and along the tracks. These stores will be carried on to the PO Valley by MT, or by train when the line is cleared, according to the urgency with which they are required. Stores from those dumps in the vicinity of RIVA and ROVERETO are reported to be transported down Lake GARDA by ship.

Description and layout of installations in this area are given at Appendix 'A'.

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3. EASTERN FRONT

Captured documents and prisoners' statements leave little doubt that Field Marshal von RUNDSTEDT, having failed to reach the MEUSE in his pre-Christmas drive, decided to turn his main effort Northward in the direction of LIEGE. By the end of 1944, an extremely powerful concentration of German armour had become apparent along the Northern flank of the salient where five armoured divisions were contacted along a 10 mile front between HOTTON and GRANDMENIL, to be joined, according to PW, by two further mobile divisions from the SAAR and AACHEN sectors. The attack was to be launched as soon as unfavourable weather prevented the operation of the Allied air forces, and LIEGE was the objective.

It was not lack of determination on the enemy's part, but strong Allied pressure from the South which frustrated the German plan. The relief of BASTOGNE on 27 Dec caused a radical change in the situation on the enemy's Southern flank. From being an encircled garrison well behind the front line, BASTOGNE became a dangerous salient itself pointing deep into the flank of the German salient. Even prior to its relief very determined efforts had been made by 15 P.G. Div to capture the town, and after the relief, the enemy more than redoubled his efforts, clearly appreciating that the drive on LIEGE was impracticable so long as heavy pressure was being exerted against his left flank. Even before the end of the year 7 P.G. Div of 6 Pz Army had been transferred to the BASTOGNE sector and was followed soon after by 1 S.S. Pz Div. Since then we have seen a steady transfer of the enemy armour from the North flank of the salient down to the South. All of 6 Pz Army with the exception of 2 S.S. Pz Div has moved South; this, coupled with the arrival of two Volksgrenadier divisions from GERMANY has led to a concentration of fourteen enemy divisions in the area of BASTOGNE, half of which are mobile divisions. Heavy enemy pressure continues against BASTOGNE, so far with comparatively little success. West of the town, we have cut the BASTOGNE - ST. HUBERT road, while to the East limited Allied progress has been made in clearing the ground overlooking the ARLON - BASTOGNE road.

As a result of these moves the enemy's Northern flank has been left relatively thinly held, and such reinforcements as have so far appeared to make good the departures have been from other sectors rather than new Volksgrenadier divisions from the REICH. An infantry division from the area South of AACHEN has appeared and there has been a general tendency for the infantry to shift its weight Westwards. The strenuous opposition encountered by the Allied attack between AACHEN and VIELSALM has however tended to decrease latterly, and the advance is being slowed as much by mines and appalling weather conditions as by enemy opposition. The loss of the VIELSALM - LAROCHE road represents a serious setback to the enemy who has now only one road running Westwards from ST. VITH to the tip of his salient near ROCHEFORT, but there is as yet no sign of any counter-attack in this area. His infantry divisions in this offensive must have been a considerable disappointment to RUNDSTEDT. It is clear that the Volksgrenadier division makes a better showing on paper to the accompaniment of GOEBBELS' trumpets than on the inhospitable slopes of the ARDENNES. The failure of 6 Pz Army in the early days of the offensive was largely due to the inability of the supporting infantry to achieve their objectives, and now again in the present Allied attack the results have not been promising.

The enemy's position in the salient has thus undergone a substantial change in the past fortnight. An unforeseen and certainly unwelcome change in his plan has had to be made as a result of Allied pressure. From preparations for the offensive, he has been forced suddenly on to the defensive and has had to reshuffle and divide up his armoured force with some haste. He has now in the area of the salient some twenty-seven divisions of which one (11 Pz) is a doubtful starter having been missing since its fleeting appearance in the first days of the battle. There is so far no evidence of further immediate reinforcement for the ARDENNES battle, but 10 S.S. Pz Div may be in the offing and two parachute divisions from

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HOLLAND are also possible candidates.

Meanwhile the German winter offensive was carried a stage further on 1 January by the opening of a new attack in the SAAR sector between SAARGEMUND and ZWEIBRÜCK. This was launched initially by five infantry divisions and one mobile division, which have since been joined by one further mobile division - the missing 21 Pz - two further infantry divisions and one mountain division. The latter is 6 S.S. Mtn Division which left NORWAY at the same time as 710 Inf Division, now arrived in FRANCE. 2 Mtn Div from NORWAY is reliably reported to be following 6 S.S. Mtn Div. The SAAR attack has made considerable progress. All the ground which we held in GERMANY between the SAAR river and the RHINE has been lost and in its deepest penetration the enemy drive reached a point 12 miles from the important rail centre of SAARGAU, at the head of the so-called SAVERNE Gap. The BISCHWILLER - SAARBRÜCKEN railway has been cut at WINGEN and enemy pressure is still heavy. Apart from the push in the direction of SAARGAU, no particular Schwerpunkt is yet discernible in this attack and pressure seems to be general along the whole of the 35 mile front. A recent PW statement that the French S.S. Div CHARLEMAGNE is in the vicinity is however of some significance. This division is believed to be a semi-political formation on the lines of the LEGION units in BELGIUM and is likely to be present in any area where the enemy may hope to achieve a substantial incursion into FRANCE.

At the same time the enemy has been active in ALSACE. On 7 January he succeeded in establishing two bridgeheads across the RHINE North of STRASBOURG. About two bns of infantry supported by tanks appear to be involved and have cut the KARLSRUHE - STRASBOURG railway. Simultaneously an attack has been launched South of STRASBOURG on both sides of the RHONE-RHINE canal near RHEINAU. These moves may be the beginning of an encircling attack on STRASBOURG, or they may be diversionary and holding excursions to be exploited more fully if any weakening of Allied resistance becomes apparent. Certainly the reported presence of the notorious S.S. Reichsführer HIMMLER in this area is disturbing.

Elsewhere on the front there have been several interesting features. Prisoners taken in the AACHEN area have said that their task is to launch holding attacks and continue active patrolling. If the elusive 10 S.S. Pz Division last reliably reported at DUREN could be located, some confirmation of this information might be provided. As it is, the AACHEN area still needs careful watching. Further North in HOLLAND, there have been no further indications of the suspected enemy offensive across the MAAS near MERDYCK, but in Eastern HOLLAND the enemy remains in an aggressive mood. The enemy bridgehead over the MAAS North of ROERMOND was short-lived, but active patrolling intended to pin down Allied forces continues.

Nearly four weeks after his first attacks were launched the full scope of the enemy's plan is still not altogether apparent. Both in the South and the North his hand may not yet be fully revealed. It seems clear however that the principal part of the plan, the drive to LIEGE and ANTWERP has been frustrated. When RUNDSTEDT switched his armour Southwards to BASTOGNE it must have been with the realisation that this was to be no 1940. The projected push to ANTWERP constituted a formidable threat to the Allied position in Western EUROPE. With the change of plan there are no immediate war winning strategic objectives within RUNDSTEDT's grasp. Nevertheless, even if the German drive goes no further, the C in C West will have achieved certain important objects. Every day that he keeps the Allies on the defensive postpones the day of the final assault on GERMANY, increases the burden of war weariness, gives GERMANY opportunities of splitting the Allied bloc. These are not inconsiderable factors in the present situation.

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4. BALKAN FRONT

The new year has seen a slowing down of the Soviet offensive in HUNGARY and the commencement of German counter-attacks to relieve the encircled BUDAPEST garrison. In the area North East of the capital the front has assumed a static appearance in the winter-bound conditions of the TATRA mountains and the Soviet push on LOSONC has been temporarily halted some five miles short of the town. Further west a period of inactivity ensued after Russian forces had reached the HRON river and following familiar tactics established bridgeheads over it. In the past two days however, the Red Army has been able to push on beyond the river along the North bank of the DANUBE in the direction of KOMAROM. Forward Soviet troops are now eight miles from this town which stands on the NITRA river. The NITRA, and behind that the VAH river, both offer possible defensive positions for the enemy before he is forced to retire to the BRATISLAVA line covering AUSTRIA. A curious situation has now arisen. While the Russians push Westwards along the North bank of the DANUBE, German forces, separated from them only by the width of the river, have been attacking Eastwards along the South bank. They have captured ESZTERGOM and have reached DICSO, 20 miles West of BUDAPEST. The enemy counter-attacks have been launched with a considerable weight of armour estimated at some 300 tanks and with a force which includes two armoured divisions transferred from the Central sector - 3 S.S. Pz Div TOTENKOPF and 5 S.S. Pz Div WIKING. The arrival of these two divisions now brings the estimated strength of Army Group South, which is believed to be responsible for the battle in HUNGARY North of Lake BALATON, up to twenty-three German divisions of which eight are Panzer and three P.G. Divs. How much of this force is now locked up in BUDAPEST is not clear, but according to an unconfirmed report elements of six or seven German divisions are involved.

South of BUDAPEST there has been no change in the front line. 8 Pz Div from the Central sector has been identified N.E. of the Lake, and in the same area is the Fifth Gav Regt Feldmarschall von MACKENSEN, apparently an independent brigade which according to the German communiqué has covered itself with glory by its steadfastness in face of powerful Soviet attacks.

In YUGOSLAVIA, the enemy build up around the Soviet DRAVA bridgehead has continued. West of the bridgehead some 30,000 enemy troops including Croats and Cossacks are reported while to the East a large proportion of the troops formerly under Corps MUELLER in the DRINA Valley are now concentrated. These include elements of 11 G.A.F., 117 Jg, 7 S.S. and 264 Inf Divisions. 118 Jg Div which is also in the area, has been reported as entraining in the VINKOVCI area for GERMANY. The destination looks improbable, but there seems no reason why the division should not be withdrawn from the SRIM for employment elsewhere in view of the considerable reinforcements which have recently arrived in the SRIM. Meanwhile the enemy has been exerting pressure Eastwards against the Soviet line near VINKOVCI, and OTOK has been retaken. There are also indications that an attack on the Soviet DRAVA bridgehead is imminent. Already what appears to have been a reconnaissance in force has taken place. A force composed largely of Croats from 1 Croat Assault and 5 Croat Infantry Divisions captured PITOMACA, 12 miles N.W. of VIROVITICA and then advanced South East. However a sharp counter-attack by Yugoslav Partisans in the bridgehead restored the situation and PITOMACA is again in our hands. This can hardly have been an all-out enemy effort and a resumption of the attack is therefore to be expected. Meanwhile Russian reinforcements are being ferried across the DRAVA into the bridgehead area.

There is little fresh from the DRINA Valley where BIJELJINA remains in enemy hands and is probably held by elements of 7 S.S. Prinz EUGEN Mtn Div. Corps MÜLLER Headquarters itself is now in the SRIM and may have replaced Corpsgruppe KÜBLER as formation controlling the SRIM sector. General KÜBLER who is now reported to be commanding 1 Mtn Div has probably moved with his division from Southern HUNGARY.

21 Corps' withdrawal is proceeding rapidly despite extremely bad weather conditions. H.Q. 21 Corps has reached SREDNEVO by 4 Jan, and the Corps rearguards are well North of MAGLAJNO. Since leaving MATESEVO, ...the Corps

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the Corps has probably suffered comparatively light losses, but the troops must by now be in an extremely tired and dispirited mood, and there is ample evidence on the ground of the enormous MT losses suffered in their withdrawal from the MONTENEGRO pocket. At least a thousand MT were lost in the 25 mile stretch between PODGORICA and MATESEVO.

Further North the enemy attack on TRAVNIK is still bogged down some three miles from the town itself. Heavy snowstorms are reported to be hindering operations in this area. That the enemy is however prepared to make strenuous efforts to capture TRAVNIK and reopen the TRAVNIK - BIHAC road is shown by the presence of elements of 104 Jg Division in the area. This formation had been operating in the DRINA Valley early last month and had not since been satisfactorily located. Another new identification in the TRAVNIK area is 505 Recce Unit, presumably consisting of Army troops in view of its high number.

In SLOVENIA there has been considerable enemy activity during the past week. A series of mopping up operations in the CELJE area and to the West in which 13 S.S. Police Regt has been prominent, have seriously weakened the Partisan forces since large stores of food have been removed by the enemy and a number of farms burnt. At the same time a second drive has commenced in the area S.W. of the ZAGREB-LJUBLJANA road. No details are available as yet as to the composition of the forces engaged in this operation. What is clear however, is that as the German withdrawal from YUGOSLAVIA gains momentum the enemy is making determined efforts to clear up the areas through which his L of C will eventually run to the final defence line in N.W. YUGOSLAVIA.

5. At Appendix 'A' is a description and layout of installations in the Upper ADIGE area.

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APPENDIX 'A' TO H.Q. 15 ARMY GROUP
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 76 DATED
9 JANUARY, 1945.

ENEMY INSTALLATIONS UPPER ADIGE VALLEY

MERANO — MT park on the Eastern outskirts of the town at A 813902, contained at least 35 vehicles on 20 Dec 44. Two tronches and five buildings are possibly used for petrol storage. Barracks and stores depot 1 mile South of the town at A 825887, reported by ground sources to be ration and clothing depot. This depot was active on 25 Dec 44 when at least 25 vehicles were parked throughout the area.

LANA — Ammunition dump reported by ground sources at A 823853 on 20 Jul 44; has not yet been confirmed by PR.

VILPLANO — Stores depot consisting of six buildings and piles of stores in the open reported by ground sources to be an Army Group clothing dump, situated at A 87077 and connected to BOLZANO road and railway was active on 28 Dec 44.

NALLES — General stores dump consisting of a warehouse and eleven storage type buildings hidden in woods at A 854771 and connected to BOLZANO-MERANO road. Was active on 28 Dec 44.

TERLANO — A dangerous stores dump reported by ground sources to contain fuel and ammunition is situated West of the road between TERLANO and SETTEQUERCE stretching from A 890740 to A 900729. Has shown no signs of activity since the latter half of November.

BOLZANO — Barracks, general stores and MT park at A 950716, appears constantly active, up to 50 vehicles normally present.
Small ammunition dump at A 962690.
Large open stores dump in a ravine close to a small station on the BRENNER line at A 999702. Appears active.

LAIVES — Many buildings hidden in woods at A 954643, reported by ground sources to be a TODT depot. Shows many signs of activity and includes some half buried stores which might be fuel.
MT spare-parts depot, reported by ground sources to be sub-depot of 406 Central Spare-Parts Depot, at A 953622. Appears to be continually active, and as many as 55 vehicles have been seen there.

ORA — Fuel dump at A 935570 about one mile North of ORA station. Is one mile long and half a mile wide, and said by ground sources to be largest fuel dump in ITALY. In October it was reported that tunnels were being constructed for the storing of this fuel, but the dump was still active on 20 Dec 44. Dangerous stores dump at A 899592 appears active.
Ammunition dump at A 904558. This dump was attacked during the first week in October, but was still active on 23 December.
Open stores dump at A 943538, was active on 23 December.
Ground source report of 22 November stated that all cellars in ORA had been requisitioned for the storage of supplies and that material is dumped in holes between the road and the railway lines.

PALUDEL TORO — Ground source reports an ammunition dump in this area (A 8849).

CORTINA — Ammunition dump at A 834440, was active up to 28 November, but there have been no signs of activity since.

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MEZZOCORONA — MT depot at A 790409, was active and contained 155 vehicles on 28 December.
General stores depot at A 785326 lying along the TRENTO-BOLZANO railway line, consists of three areas located close together which include several buildings and a station. Shows considerable activity up to 30 December.
General stores dump consisting of stores piled in the open and several small buildings at A 786391. North of the railway sidings at MEZZOCORONA/S. MICHELE station. This dump was active on 30 December, but at least some of the stores are believed to be lumber.

ERMULO — 15 long low buildings at A 739551 reported by ground sources to contain MT spares from the 'OM' MT factory at BRESCIA.

S. GIACOMO — Ground sources report the existence of seven underground ammunition stores between S. GIACOMO (A 940375) and A 949374. No photo confirmation is available.

TRENTO — General stores dump consisting of seven buildings near the railway at A 775259.

MARGINE — Stores dump at A 863225, just S.E. of MARGINE station, consisting of two small buildings and unidentifiable stores stacked in the open.

CALDONAZZO — Large depot consisting of 20 buildings and stores stacked in the open, reported by ground sources to be fuel and Engineer depot, at A 904155. Served by main TRENTO-UDINE line and active up to 1 December.

LEVICO — Small fuel dump on Western outskirts of LEVICO at A 905170.

CALLINO — Ground sources report an ammunition dump at CASTEL PIETRA (A 748077). This has not as yet been confirmed by photo recce.

ROVERETO — Ground sources report that arms and ammunition are stored in a large house marked with the red cross at road fork A 707063. Ammunition is also reported to be stored in the church at A 707042. No photo confirmation of these reports is available. In ROVERETO marshalling yard (A 700034) and several adjoining industrial areas, the whole covering an area one mile long and a quarter of a mile wide, are quantities of stores piled in the open and an indication of stores in buildings. At A 707045 is a possible MT park.
A dangerous stores dump at A 686001, believed to contain ammunition showed indications of activity on 1 January.
Supply dump at A 675010, located at MORI station and including the station buildings and adjoining industrial area where stores are piled in large quantities. This dump suffered slight bomb-damage in December, some of the stores being destroyed, but it was still quite active on 1 January.

RIVA — Photo recce shows a possible ammunition dump at A 582020.
Ground sources report a fuel dump beside the road between RIVA and ARCO at A 567059. Photo confirmation is lacking.
A PW reports the existence of MT and WT repair shops in road tunnels at A 547029 and A 544020, and states that other supplies are also stored in tunnels along this road.

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
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ENEMY INSTALLATIONS - UPPER ADIGE

LEGEND

A	=	Ammunition Dump
F	=	Fuel Dump
S	=	General Stores Dump
MT	=	MT Park
MTS	=	MT Spare parts depot
WS	=	Workshop



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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 77 CF

15 JANUARY, 1945.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The week has been unusually quiet along the whole front, due largely to the rigours of the weather. The enemy has continued to make raids at various points, almost all with the object of taking prisoners for identifications, which indicates he is still rather nervous about our intentions. He has further strengthened his positions on his Eastern flank and this has involved a thinning out South of BOLOGNA.

On 10 January a tentative identification placed II Bn 25 Jaeger Regt on the Canadian Corps front. This was the first indication of the formation which had relieved the battered 114 Jaeger and it remained unconfirmed until the night of 14 Jan when a strong enemy raiding party lost a wounded prisoner who identified II Bn 40 Jaeger Regt. Next morning further evidence was provided by a long-range deserter from 1 Para Div who stated that 42 Jaeger Div was in the line from the RAVENNA-FERRARA railway to the North. 16 S.S. Div has therefore extended its sector Northwards. For this reason, probably, a further reinforcement has been brought up in the shape of 956 G.R. of 362 Division, both battalions of which have been identified in the area of the 40 and 41 Northings. More recently, I Bn 1060 G.R. has been identified further South at M 359341 which is well in 356 Div's area. It is possible that the intention is to relieve 356 Div although this cannot yet be considered as definite.

The departure of two adjacent divisions from the front East of route 65 has been compensated by bringing up a division from reserve. 305 Inf Div appears to have taken over the whole sector between the 89 Easting, 65 Div's left boundary and the 97 Easting, 1 Para Div's left boundary. This is a larger sector than has been customary in this area South of BOLOGNA, but it is not so important or accessible as the sectors on either flank, which include route 65 and MONTE GRANDE, and in any case the enemy appears still to be preoccupied by the threat from the East. It is perhaps a little surprising that the sector should be given to a division so recently relieved from the line as 305 Div, but the enemy has not much choice in the matter. 157 Mtn Div might have been considered as there are some indications that it is in the BOLOGNA area but possibly it is judged too inexperienced as yet.

The conclusion drawn last week from enemy dispositions was that he was aligned for a defensive on the Eastern flank and showed no sign of taking the offensive, for the present at least, in the Centre or West. This still remains true but as time goes on and the expected attack on the Eastern flank still does not materialise we must expect a change in the enemy's appreciation. He may even, with the force he has built up there, try to attack himself on the Eastern flank though if he did so it would more probably be in the nature of a spoiling attack than a serious attempt at a breakthrough.

....2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS...

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) GENERAL

This week the rail situation has, from our viewpoint, generally deteriorated owing to weather continuing to restrict our air attacks, particularly against the vital BRENNER and N.E. rail routes. On only two days, namely on 9 and 15 Jan, were medium bombers able to operate, and on 13th and 14th Jan MATAF was able to fly a total of only 14 and 9 sorties respectively. It seems likely that the BRENNER railway has been open for most of the week and that through traffic has been possible between the UDINE and PADUA areas for one or two days. The situation on the three frontier routes to the North and East of UDINE is not known, but all three may still be blocked. In any event it would seem that over the past week sufficient supplies for the currently low enemy requirements were getting into ITALY largely by rail.

(b) RAILWAYS

(i) Brenner Railway.

On 9 and 10 Jan PR of the BRENNER, while incomplete, indicated that the line was very probably open throughout. On the 15th over 100 medium bombers attacked the BRENNER at various points. Results were somewhat disappointing in that PR showed that only the approaches to two bridges had been cut. Between the 9th and 15th the BRENNER was attacked by fighter-bombers on several occasions; owing to lack of PR the cuts claimed cannot be confirmed and while these attacks will have slowed down traffic, the cuts in fact achieved are unlikely to have blocked the right of way for more than a matter of hours in any given instance. It seems probable therefore that the BRENNER has been open for most of the past seven days.

(ii) North East ITALY.

The situation on the three N.E. frontier rail routes to the North and East of UDINE is obscure owing to lack of PR. It is known that on the 15th the central route (of secondary importance) was still blocked but that by the 16th one of the two bridges down on the important TARVISIO route running North from UDINE had been by-passed by construction of a diversion. Whether or not the other bridge on the TARVISIO route and the bridge on the most Southerly frontier route are still unrepaired is problematical; they were last seen as cut on photos of 4 Jan and it is conceivable that they may still be down in view of their height making repair difficult and the fact that they are located at points where construction of a diversion would also be difficult. The only further information is a ground source report that the TARVISIO route was to be in operation on or about 20 Jan.

Between the UDINE and PADUA areas PR shows that by the 15th enemy repair efforts had almost opened up a through route; on that date the main line from UDINE to PADUA and VICENZA was closed only by virtue of damaged rolling stock blocking the line at one point. Also on the 15th the secondary line immediately to the South of the main UDINE - PADUA line was blocked only by track craters at two points. However, on the line nearest the coast at least three bridges remain, as usual, down. Hence no through traffic in this area was possible on the 15th, but a through route may well have been opened up by the 16th and in fact it is not unlikely that trains were getting all the way through without transhipment one or two days immediately prior to the 15th. In addition to this the loop line running from TRENTO, on the BRENNER railway, South East to CASTELFRANCO VENETO, 30 kilometres North of PADUA, has been open all week and by not later than the 15th trains from CASTELFRANCO VENETO could move more or less directly into the PO Valley and on down to or close to the river itself.

(iii) PO Valley.

The only new development in the PO Valley is that while

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through traffic remains possible between TURIN, GENOA and MILAN, this area was isolated from the Eastern portion of the Valley by attacks of 9 Jan. This will have slowed down the movement of industrial materials and foodstuffs to GERMANY, but is otherwise of no major consequence under present circumstances; in any event the bridges attacked on the 9th were only alternative targets, weather having prevented attacks on the primaries along the BRENNER and in N.E. ITALY. The rail bridges over the PO remain blocked with the exception of those West of PAVIA, though it is interesting to note that there was some evidence of possible repairs being made at CORBOLA (G 483050) and PONTELAGOSCURO (M 118916) rail bridges on 10 and 11 Jan respectively. Several of the many lines running South to the PO have remained open up to or almost up to the river.

South of the PO while a number of bridges remain out there is still considerable trackage open. One report of interest in this connection is that our forward troops on the nights of 13/14 and 14/15 Jan heard train movement on the railway running N.E. out of CASTEL BOLOGNESE (M 2427). These trains may have come from the BOLOGNA or FERRARA areas. CASTEL BOLOGNESE is only about 2 Kms beyond the front line and the fact that the enemy is willing to risk trains this far clearly indicates his policy of moving trains far forward in order to conserve MT fuel. Similar instances have been reported before.

(iv) Railway Repairs.

A recent study by 3rd Photo Group of air photos of seven rail bridges may well be the answer to certain unexplained delays in the repair and apparent inconsistencies in the maintenance of serviceability of rail bridges. This study suggests that under certain circumstances bridges are left only partially repaired by enemy design. This seems to be the case when: (a) an alternative route is open; or (b) other bridges on the same line are out and undergoing more extensive repairs; or (c) a diversion is open in the immediate proximity of the bridge; or (d) when it is desired to protect a bridge from further air attack and its present serviceability is secondary to a future use. In general, it would seem that the enemy's policy on certain bridges is not to make them serviceable if there is no immediate need of their use.

(v) Effect of Rail Interdiction on Troop Movements.

Owing to the comparatively limited scale of ground fighting during the past two months, heavy rail interdiction on the BRENNER and N.E. rail routes for considerable periods has not decisively affected the tactical situation. However, apart from generally disrupting the enemy's L of C, forcing him to devote considerable manpower and equipment to keeping his L of C sufficiently open to maintain himself in ITALY and causing the consumption of MT fuel which he can ill afford, these attacks have appreciably delayed troop movements from GERMANY to ITALY. This latter fact is indicated by two recent PW reports, which are, generally speaking, typical of troop movements into, out of and within ITALY.

In one case an Infantry March Bn of 500 men moved by rail from LINZ, GERMANY, to TRENTO. From TRENTO the battalion moved by bus to FERRARA, and then marched on foot to ARGENTA (M 2862) where they finally arrived on 31 Dec having left LINZ on 23 Dec. The rail trip from LINZ to TRENTO, which would ordinarily require less than 24 hours for a military train, took four days owing to the fact that the train was held up by breaks in the railway and eventually had to make a 300-kilometre rail detour and rejoin the BRENNER railway just North of BRESSANONE (B 2294). A point worthy of note is the fact that these troops were carried in open wagons and at various stations men had to be admitted to hospital owing to prolonged exposure to cold; the fact that open wagons were used suggests a shortage of coaches and covered wagons, or at least that the railway system in the REICH is so upset as to make distribution of rolling stock most difficult.

.....Another instance.....

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Another instance of interest is the move from NORWAY of 12 Coy, 740 G.R. (710 Inf Div), recently identified on 8 Army's right flank. The Company sailed from NORWAY on 26th Nov 1944 and left a Danish port by train for ITALY on 2 Dec. Coming down through MUNICH and SALZBURG the train entered ITALY over the TARVISIO route, passed through UDINE and arrived at TREVISO (G 6377) on night 9/10 Dec. Here the Company detrained and the following night marched 45 kilometres to an unidentified locality and after two days' waiting boarded a train which moved them down to the ROVIGO area. From here they were carried by bus and lorry to COMACCHIO (M 5669) where they arrived on night 16/17 Dec. It is noteworthy that at a time when rail interdiction in N.E. ITALY was comparatively light the trip from DENMARK to TREVISO, about 1,200 kilometres as the crow flies, took no longer than the move from TREVISO to COMACCHIO, a distance of about 100 kilometres by road. It is probable that the 45-kilometre night march from TREVISO was made in order to get across the BRENTA river (flowing from North to South just East of a line VICENZA-PADUA) over which all rail bridges were down at the time in question.

(c) SHIPPING

Owing to lack of photo cover there is no information this week on the Ligurian ports except that both LA SPEZIA and SAVONA were active on 11 Jan. A ground source report of 13 Jan states that all war material from the Tyrrhenian front is transported from GENOA to LA SPEZIA by sea, and this report appears to be substantiated by statements of two Italian merchant sailors who were recently employed on ships at GENOA.

According to these seamen, active merchant shipping in the Gulf of GENOA up to 2 Jan consisted of some Italian cargo ships, five German KT ships and 20 F-boats, whilst naval craft included two Italian corvettes, one torpedo boat of French origin, 10 V-boats for escort service, five armed tugs and twenty MAS. [illegible] and facilities are under control of the German Navy and are operated by both German and Italian Republican personnel.

Seven Italian coasters carrying from 200 to 1,000 GRT, are engaged in carrying coke from SAVONA to GENOA. These operate in convoys of three or four together with an escort of VP-boats; they leave GENOA at dusk reaching SAVONA and being loaded the same night, and sail again for GENOA at dusk the following day.

The KT ships and F-boats are employed in running ammunition and other supplies down to LA SPEZIA and evacuating industrial material back to GENOA. Convoys normally reach LA SPEZIA about 2030 hours and ammunition is unloaded directly into trucks and railway wagons, after which the ships are loaded with scrap metal and dismantled machinery and are ready to start the return trip between 1600 and 1800 hours the following day.

The arsenal and harbour of SPEZIA were almost completely dismantled and much of the machinery evacuated in December, but the submarine repair shops and another small workshop are still functioning, carrying out repairs to MAS and other small motor driven craft. The fitting out yards are said to have suffered from air attacks, but the machinery is still practically intact.

A PW from 13th Convoy Protection Flotilla (SICHERUNGSFLOTTILLE) states that the Flotilla is based on S. MARGHERITA (P 192386) but the escort craft lie up during the day in the various small ports and coves along the Ligurian coast.

On the Adriatic coast PR of 12 Jan showed continued barge activity at CHIOGGIA, and on the same day it was seen that demolitions were taking place at PORTO GARIBALDI, the railway areas having been extensively cratered. There was no cover of any of the other ports in the Adriatic, but a ground source report dated 11 Jan stated that, so as to relieve the coal shortage in VENETO, a 6,000 ton ship was expected to bring coal from ARSA to VENICE, whilst other loads were to be shipped by barge from GRADO.

....3. WESTERN FRONT.....

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A. WESTERN FRONT

The enemy is losing at least temporarily the initiative which he gained so dramatically and effectively in the middle of December. Except in the STRASBOURG area where gains of some consequence have been made in the past week, he has been unable to achieve any substantial success in the Southern part of the front, while up in the ARDENNES, RUNDSTEDT has abandoned his attempts to resume the attack towards the MEUSE. The German communiqué for 11 January reported that "the part of the front which protruded Westwards across the OURTHE has been taken back without being imperilled by the enemy", a confession that the long-range objectives of the ARDENNES drive had been abandoned, and indeed that the initiative in that area is no longer in German hands.

However, in the extreme South the German command, now reported to be in the ruthless if militarily inexperienced hands of HIMMLER is still forcing the Allies on to the defensive. The Northwards drive along both sides of the RHONE-RHINE Canal, carried out by two infantry divisions has made considerable progress bringing the enemy within 12 miles of STRASBOURG and cutting off a number of Allied troops. Pressure has been exerted Westwards as well as Northwards and the enemy has succeeded in cutting the COLMAR-STRASBOURG road. He is clearly trying to get the elbow room for manoeuvre in this area which the present narrow sector between the road and the RHINE does not give.

North of STRASBOURG there has been sharp fighting around the RHINE bridgeheads, where one enemy Infantry Division and an Armoured Brigade appear to be involved. The Bde, 106 Pz, is the only surviving independent Armoured Brigade in the West (apart from the sabotage formation 150 Pz Bde) and is reported to have about 40 tanks or SP guns. It appears to be dividing its efforts in the South between the COLMAR push and the RHINE bridgeheads.

Meanwhile on the SAAR-PALATINATE front the First German Army has been unable to maintain the successes of the early days of the offensive. Prisoners' statements suggest that this offensive did not in fact form part of the original plan and was only launched when it became apparent that the ARDENNES drive was not attaining its objectives. This seems quite probable, as all the armour now engaged in this sector was reliably reported to be moving Northwards at the height of the ARDENNES battle. During the past week a third mobile formation, 25 P.G. Division, together with 7 Para Div from HOLLAND, has appeared in the line to reinforce the efforts of the two mobile and eight Infantry Divisions previously involved. Both the new arrivals have come in on the extreme left of 1 Army in the area North of HAGENAU where 21 Pz Division was already operating. 17 S.S. P.G. Div which is in the line in the SAARGEMUND area has not however been moved East to reinforce the success achieved by the two other mobile formations in 1 Army, and it seems probable that the enemy has not yet given up hope of achieving a penetration in the SAAR region. The commander of 17 S.S. Div, Colonel LINGER, is now in our hands. However in a week of fierce attack and counter-attack, no substantial progress has been made by the enemy. The fiercest fighting has been in the region of WINGEN on the KARLSRUHE-SAARGEMUND railway. WINGEN has been cleared of the enemy and the railway is firmly in our hands.

The ARDENNES salient has been in a state of flux since the failure of RUNDSTEDT's second attempt to retake BASTOGNE. Despite the strong concentration of armoured and infantry forces which he had collected around the town, he at no time got nearer than 2 miles from BASTOGNE and by the middle of last week must have realised that his efforts were in vain. Failure there meant more than local failure, for the Allied hold in BASTOGNE was a threat to his whole position in the salient. The decision to pull back was made about 10 Jan, and the withdrawal has been carried out relatively successfully. Most of the armour seems to have got away

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without suffering serious harm, and the only black spot in the withdrawal was in the area S.E. of BASTOGNE. Here the enemy was not quite quick enough and lost 3,500 P.W. By 15 Jan only eleven enemy divisions were firmly identified West of the line VIELSALM-BASTOGNE, and the bulk of those are now East of the BASTOGNE-HOUFFALIZE road. The enemy withdrawal may well continue considerably further Eastwards than the line of the OURTHE, possibly to the line of the SALM-CLERF rivers. Much will depend on the success achieved by our new attack between STAVELOT and MALMEDY. In contrast to operations further West, we are encountering very stiff resistance here, which is likely to become stiffer as formations emerge from the narrowing Westerly tip of the salient. The enemy clearly cannot at this stage allow a serious threat to develop to ST. VITH.

North of the salient, the week has been quiet. The likelihood of a German offensive in HOLLAND has receded with the final departure of 711 Infantry Division for the Eastern front and the withdrawal of 7 Para Div from the line. 6 Para is still there but there have been no further indications of enemy offensive plans other than possible limited operations to tie down Allied forces.

No assessment of the present position in the West can be complete which does not take into account the situation in the East. Until major operations occurred on the Eastern front, it seemed probable that the enemy would be in a position to devote most of his available reinforcements to the war in the West, and indeed the flow of Volksgrenadier Divisions has lately been exclusively Westwards. Now however that the Russians have resumed the offensive on the grand scale, the problem of a three front war once again faces the enemy. Even before the Russian attack started, an Infantry Division had been transferred from HOLLAND to HUNGARY and now that "embittered fighting has started along the entire Eastern front" as the German communiqué puts it, the problem will assume an acuter form. Nevertheless the enemy may not yet have abandoned all offensive plans in the West. He has now one parachute, two Panzer and four Infantry Divisions "floating" in the West and there are reports of a concentration in the TRIER area which might conceivably be intended for an attack in the direction of LUXEMBOURG. Much has been at stake in the West and much still is. We have for that the evidence of an Officer P.W. who has given details of a conference held at the Reichs Chancellery about 10 December. This was attended by various Army, Corps, Division and Brigade Commanders from the Western Front and was addressed by HITLER. HITLER told his audience that the ARDENNES offensive was to reach the MEUSE in two days and ANTWERP in three weeks. The objectives were

a) the encirclement of 48 Allied Divisions or the enforcing of a general Allied withdrawal,
b) to gain time for consolidation of the German War Industry especially synthetic oil,
c) by accentuating political differences on the continent and by propaganda to detach one of the Allies from the war.

The enemy has failed in his first objective, and has little hope of success with his last. Whether the price in casualties which he has had to pay for the time he has gained was a fair one will be shown by future events, but in face of a major offensive in the East reinforcements are likely to be precious.

4. EASTERN FRONT

On 13 Jan, the Soviet winter offensive on the Central sector opened with an attack launched from the bridgehead over the VISTULA at BARANOW. Preliminary rumblings of the offensive had been heard four days earlier when the German communiqué spoke of lively fighting activity in the bridgehead area. Substantial gains were made first to the West of

.....BARANOW, resulting.....

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BARNOW, resulting in the capture of KIELCE and an approach to within 25 miles of CRACOW. These were followed by a break out from the Russian bridgeheads at PULAWY and MARK., South of WARSAW, to capture RADOM and an advance Westwards from the River NAREW North of the capital. Since then, to judge by the German communiqué, the advance has been rapid. Fighting is reported in the area of CZESTOCHOWA, Southwest of TOMASZOW MAZ and N.W. of WARSAW. Finally, the Russians claim the liberation of the capital. Further North a Russian advance is also reported along the INSTERBERG railway in East PRUSSIA, but the extent of this is not known. In a situation which is developing so rapidly that it is still confused, the one clear fact is that the offensive in the East is on a gigantic scale.

In HUNGARY, the past week has seen also a flare-up of the fighting N.E. of BUDAPEST where the Soviets have captured the rail junction of LOSONC and have pushed on across the post-MUNICH SLOVAK border. Further West, however, fighting has been on a lesser scale and the Russian push along the North bank of the DANUBE has been halted on the NITRA river. South of the DANUBE, the heavy German counter-attacks of the previous week have come to a halt around BICSKE, 17 miles West of BUDAPEST, and unless they can be resumed shortly on a major scale, the position of the BUDAPEST garrison appears hopeless. In PEST, the Russians have already captured the Parliament buildings which stand on the East bank of the DANUBE and it appears that the greater part of BUDA is now in their hands.

There has been little else of interest from HUNGARY apart from the startling identification by the Russians of 711 Infantry Division. This formation had been in HOLLAND near ARNHEM until the middle of December when it was pulled out of the line and left, according to one report, for GERMANY. It was presumed that this meant the usual rest and refit, and its unexpected reappearance on the Eastern front is significant in that it implies that the enemy has few, if any, surplus divisions ready in GERMANY to meet the needs of the moment. 711 Div's arrival raises the total strength of Army Group South to some twenty-four divisions, about eleven of which are mobile.

It has been a quiet week in YUGOSLAVIA with cold and snowy weather impeding any important operations. In the North, the Russian BARGS bridgehead has been quiet after the flare-up of the previous week. The enemy build-up in the SREM, East of the bridgehead, continues. The possible departure of 118 Jg Division reported in last week's Summary has been compensated for by the arrival of 41 Fortress Division which seems to have reached the end of its weary and hazardous journey from GREECE. The enemy lay-out in this area is now fairly clear. Immediately East of the bridgehead are elements of 264 Div with 11 G.A.F. Div on its right based on ERNESTINOVO. Adjoining it and apparently facing Eastwards is 117 Jg Division with a sector as far South as the VINKOVCI-BROD railway. From the railway down to the SAVA river is 41 Fortress Division, and South of the river with elements as far down as BIJELJINA is 7 S.S. Prinz Eugen Division. The remnants of 21 S.S. SKANDERBEG Division are in the general area of BRCKO. 118 Jg Division is reported to be moving to the ZAGREB area, where it may well be joined by 738 Jg Regt which it left behind at MOSTAR last October and which is reported to be moving Northwards.

Some reorganisation of the chain of command is taking place as a result of these moves. General KUBLER who commanded a Korpsgruppe in the SREM seems to have left with 1 Mtn Div (which he commanded) for HUNGARY. With his departure responsibility for the SREM is thought to have been taken over by Corps MULLER whion had been commanding operations in the DRINA Valley at the start of last month. A later report however, states that 34 Corps is in the SREM and it is possible that this is the same as Corps MULLER since there is hardly room for two Corps Headquarters in the limited area of the SREM.

In the South, H.Q. 5 S.S. Corps, for long in the SARAJEVO

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area, is reported moving Northwards to BROD. This seems reasonable as 21 Mtn Corps from MONTENEGRO has now reached SARAJEVO and may well have taken over command of 5 Corps' area. 21 Corps rearguards are now North of PRIJEDOLJE and there should soon be no enemy left South of the SARAJEVO-UZICE road.

Total enemy forces on the Eastern front are now estimated at 150 Divisions of which rather less than one third are in HUNGARY and YUGOSLAVIA.

E R Hirsch

BRIG.DIER, G.S.
A.C. C'S, G-2.

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23 JANUARY, 1945

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The whole front has been more than usually quiet, particularly in the latter part of the week. The enemy continues to make raids on 5 Army front, mainly for the purpose of obtaining identifications and keeping track on our reliefs, which he must suspect to be frequent. 1 Para Div has been, as might be expected, especially active in this line; it has been stiffened by the addition of two G.A.F. Penal battalions, 3 and 4 G.A.F. Jaeger z.b.V., which are apparently combined into a Regiment NEUKUM, no doubt called after the commander. This raises 1 Para Div to the unprecedented total of twelve battalions and a Recce Company. On 8 Army front the enemy reacted with strong patrolling to his discovery that an Italian division had come into the line, and on 17 Jan he put in quite a strong raid further South in the area East of FUSIGNANO which cost III Bn 36 S.S. heavy casualties for no gain. Since 21 Jan, however, the enemy appears to have gone over to a more passive defence on the SENIO, evacuating and demolishing houses on our side of the river which he previously held and generally pulling back to the west bank almost all along the line. He still, however, remains forward on the FOSSO VECCHIO at the Northern end of his position.

Unconfirmed indications put H.Q. of 356 Div in the area M.2978 on 18 Jan; if this is so it is most likely that the division has been relieved from the line, where we have had no indication of its presence for some time, and may have been replaced by 362 Div. The location given for Div H.Q. is far enough North to raise conjecture in present circumstances as to whether the division may not be on its way to an even more remote destination on the Eastern front, but of this there is no sign at all as yet.

The relief of 356 Div, if confirmed, will be the only change in enemy forward dispositions. In rear areas there have been a few changes and a few new identifications. 135 Fortress Bde is stated by prisoners to have moved from SPEZIA to GENOA. Elements of 162 Div have been reported North-East of TURIN and in the UDINE area while the bulk remains South of PARMA; since it is not, in its present state, likely to fight as a division it is not surprising to find it making detachments in battalion strength to widely separated areas. On the French frontier 5 Mtn Div has been firmly identified in its old place by prisoners taken from both of its Jaeger regiments; there have been reports of a move by 34 Div from its sector at the Southern end of the Franco-Italian frontier but these are not confirmed and are probably due to the employment of elements of the division in an anti-Partisan drive North of SAVONA. Various reports, none of them explicit, appear to locate the hitherto elusive 155 Field Training division at TREVISO, having collected thither elements from VERONA and BELLUNO. The S.S. KARSTWEHR division, which is apparently only in brigade strength, appears to have moved from ISTRIA or VENEZIA GUILIA to FRIULI; more information is needed on this formation which is probably only of value as an anti-Partisan force at present.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

BRENNER

After a period of seven days during which the BRENNER railway was

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probably open to traffic most of the time, it was interdicted on 15 Jan, again on 17 Jan and has been cut at one or more places South of BOLZANO ever since. On 22 Jan the bridges at LAVIS (A 7430) and ALA (F 6690) were both impassable, the through tracks were cut at TRENTO station and the approaches to the bridge at ROVERETO (A 6903) were blocked, making a total of four blocks on a 50 Km stretch of railway. It is interesting to note that whereas track cuts are normally repaired in a matter of hours, both the blocks at TRENTO and ROVERETO were two days old, whilst at one station in VERONA 60% of the undamaged stock was still inactive on 16 Jan due to unrepaired track cuts. This delay may be due to bad weather conditions or lack of materials and labour. That the interdiction of the BRENNER line has driven the enemy on to the roads is evidenced by the fact that heavy MT movement was observed from the air all along the ADIGE Valley and down both sides of Lake GARDA on night 17/18 Jan, whilst very little activity has been reported by PR along the line South of TRENTO between 16 and 20 Jan. Ground sources report that road traffic in this area is suffering badly from a shortage of tyre chains, and one case has been reported of a column of 600 vehicles being held up for 30 hours. A coal shortage was reported in the VERONA area earlier in the month and coal trains were said to be held up North of TRENTO.

NORTH EAST ITALY

On 15 Jan only one track cut prevented through traffic running between UDINE and PADUA, and at least one line was probably open on 16th. On 17 Jan a considerable bomber effort was put out over these lines and the total of destroyed bridges was brought up to 15, making four separate lines of interdiction through a zone about 100 Kms deep. Between the 18 and 22 Jan two bridges have been repaired, but it is still necessary to negotiate at least two blocks on every possible route between UDINE and the PADUA - VICENZA area. East of UDINE the bridge at BOROVNICA (D 283032) on the LJUBLJANA line was still out on 22 Jan and that at BODRAS (C 721231) on the Central Frontier route, which was impassable on 16 Jan, has probably not yet been repaired. The line from UDINE to TARVISIO, however, has been open and active since 17 Jan.

Whilst on 18 Jan, at any rate, there was considerable activity all alon the line from TARVISIO to UDINE, there have been little signs of activity West of UDINE during the past week and a considerable number of wagons made up into train lengths have been lying idle on the line between CITTADELLA and VERONA. As in the case of the BRENNER, the interdiction of the North Eastern railways appears to have forced the enemy to turn to his precious and overtaxed road transport; one report states that on 11 Jan 200 MT with trailers brought wheat to UDINE and reloaded with ammunition for the front. Coal shortages have also been reported at UDINE, TREVISO and VENICE earlier in the month, but these shortages were probably alleviated at any rate to a considerable extent on 15 and 16 Jan and it is probable that since the opening of the TARVISIO - UDINE line coal has been brought down to GRADO and shipped to VENICE by sea.

PO VALLEY

The enemy appears to have become more concerned about the railway bridges over the river PO of late, and during the past week he has managed to complete repairs on three of these bridges which had been impassable since the first air attacks in July, namely those at BRESSANA BOTTARONE (K 1624), PIACENZA (K 6216) and CORBOLA (G 4805). The most important of these is the bridge at PIACENZA which links the main BOLOGNA line with MILAN in the N.W. and VERONA in the North; this bridge was still open on 22 Jan. The bridge at CORBOLA is the most Easterly of the PO railway bridges and hence off the enemy's main L of C. It is also on a dead-end line which is believed to be inactive; the line running West from the bridge to ROVIGO is, however, open. It is unlikely that the enemy would repair this bridge without some special reason, but what that reason is is not readily apparent. In any event approaches to this bridge are now cut.

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On 20 Jan PR showed that the suspension cables which were strung across the 350 ft gap left by the destroyed mid-portion of the OSTIGLIA rail bridge early last month had been decked with planks forming a suspension bridge capable of carrying foot traffic, and possibly light vehicles. Similar arrangements exist at BORGOFORTE and CASALMAGGIORE, whilst other destroyed bridges have just the cables.

SHIPPING

There has been no photo cover of the Ligurian ports this week and no other reports on shipping in the Mediterranean have been received. On the Adriatic barge traffic from VENICE to the South continues via CHIOGGIA and coastal traffic continues between VENICE and TRIESTE including at least one MV and an oiler. Oil tankers were also seen at active berths in both these harbours on 18 Jan. There has also been MV and barge activity at PORTO NOGHERA and GRADO. The coal traffic from the ARSA Channel is being maintained by coasters and barges: one of the former has reached TRIESTE and another FIUME. The bauxite traffic from PARENZO is also being maintained, but by a few barges and small vessels only. The converted tanker PROMETHEUS, which was being used as a collier and was loading at ARSA Channel on 29 December, has not been seen since 2 January, when she was at POLA. As she was missing on the almost complete cover of the Adriatic ports obtained on 15 January, it is possible that she was the victim of the attack by bombers and R.P. aircraft of M.A.C.A.F. on the night of 4/5 January: they claimed to have engaged a "2,000 ton tanker" in the Northern Adriatic but could not observe results.

INSTALLATIONS

UDINE, which stands at the Eastern end of the N.E. Italian road and railway networks, forms a natural unloading point for reserve stores entering ITALY via the TARVISIO and PIEDICOLLE routes. This area, which was also the main forward dumping ground for the old Italian frontier defences, always contained a number of permanent military installations which the Germans have turned to their own use. These have been added to in the last year and especially since the attacks on the N.E. railway system have made it necessary to have storage facilities ready at all points. Dumps have also lately been reported in the TARVISIO area.

There are now a total of 43 reported installations in the UDINE - TARVISIO area including 4 ammunition factories and filling plants, 16 ammunition dumps, 8 fuel dumps and 15 general stores dumps, MT parks, workshops, etc. Of these all 4 factories, 9 ammunition dumps, 2 fuel dumps and 7 miscellaneous stores dumps have been confirmed by PR. Installations are grouped as follows :

TARVISIO - CAMPOROSSO (C 6469) area

Confirmed:	1 ammunition dump
	1 general stores depot
	1 MT park and repair depot
Unconfirmed:	1 fuel dump
	1 ammunition dump
	1 fuel and ammunition dump
	1 ration dump

TOLMEZZO (C 3458)

Confirmed;	1 ammunition dump
	1 MT depot and stores dump
	1 general stores depot

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OSOPPO (C 2941)

Confirmed: 1 very large MT depot and stores
1 ammunition factory. This factory was very severely damaged by sabotage in Nov, and may now be inactive.

Unconfirmed: 1 fuel dump

Area 10 miles radius of UDINE

Confirmed: 5 ammunition dumps
2 fuel dumps
2 general stores depots

Unconfirmed: 3 fuel dumps
2 MT parks
2 workshops

General area CODROIPO (C 2008) - S. DANIELE (C 2430) - VIVARO (C 0521)

Confirmed: 4 ammunition filling factories
1 ammunition dump
1 general stores dump

Unconfirmed: 2 fuel dumps
2 ammunition dumps
1 MT spare parts depot
1 general stores depot
1 workshop

3. WESTERN FRONT

Despite the winter-bound conditions of the Western Front, there have been developments of considerable significance in this past week. The threat to STRASBOURG from the North has increased as the enemy has linked up all his RHINE bridgeheads, while in the ARDENNES there are signs that a change of enemy policy has taken place. Two new Allied attacks have also started, one of which has led to yet another penetration of REICH territory.

The French attack in ALSACE between COLMAR and MULHOUSE gained initial surprise, and the enemy was forced back some three miles without great difficulty. He recovered rapidly, however, and, although we continue to gain ground, it is against a stiffening defence characterised by frequent local counter-attacks. The enemy has clearly no intention of yielding without a struggle the COLMAR bridgehead to which he has clung so doggedly over the past two months. He has, in all, elements of five divisions in the bridgehead area, but is reported to be transferring some forces from the bridgehead up to the area North of STRASBOURG. The troops actually holding the bridgehead are probably only in poor condition. They have had little rest since the heavy battles of the VOSGES in November and December, and have not had high priority in the matter of replacements. The position in ALSACE seems to be in fact that the enemy is content to conduct a stubborn defensive in the bridgehead area while he exploits and reinforces his successes achieved North of STRASBOURG. A recently captured document leaves little doubt of the enemy's intentions here. It is signed by SS OBERGRUPPENFUHRER von MAUR as or for C in C Army Group Upper RHINE - a new identification, but probably the new title for Army Group G. An Obergruppenfuhrer is the Waffen S.S. equivalent of a full general, but whether Von MAUR is in fact the Army Group Commander, or is only Chief of Staff to HIMMLER whom rumours would have as the Army Group Commander, is not clear. The document is of interest, however, in that after the usual preamble about the Hour of Destiny being at hand, STRASBOURG is indicated as the objective of the present offensive.

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The enemy has indeed made considerable headway North of STRASBOURG. On 17 January a third bridgehead was established over the RHINE North of STRASBOURG in the area due East of HAGENAU: the identification of 10 SS Pz Div, previously reported in the SAAR area, was an indication that this constituted a more serious threat than the previous bridgeheads. It was rapidly reinforced and the enemy succeeded in penetrating about three miles inland from the RHINE, cutting across the STRASBOURG - KARLSRUHE railway. At the same time renewed enemy pressure developed on the left wing of the First German Army in the area of HATTEN and a junction was effected between the new bridgehead and the First Army troops. This was followed by a link up of all three RHINE bridgeheads North of STRASBOURG, thus giving the enemy a continuous front West of the RHINE. First Army has continued the attack on its left wing and elements of 17 SS P.G. Div have been transferred from the SAARGEMUND area to reinforce the drive. The enemy has penetrated as far as the outskirts of BISCHWILLER and HAGENAU and strong pressure continues.

The PALATINATE front has been generally quiet, although in a limited offensive operation on German soil near REMICH we advanced about two miles and have clung to our gains despite counter-attacks conducted by 11 Pz Division, at last located after its disappearance in the latter half of December. It is worthy of record that the Russians claim to have identified 11 Pz Div on the Central sector during the past week, and as SHAEF reidentified it at REMICH on the following day, the Division seems to be as mercurial in its appearances as in its disappearances.

The ARDENNES salient had shrunk to a bulge by last week, and it seemed as if the enemy had decided to call a halt to his withdrawal. Resistance stiffened appreciably after the fall of HOUFFALISE, although we continued to gain ground, notably North of ST. VITH. The ARDENNES line was held in the main by infantry, and, although fleeting glimpses were observed of all the armour which took part in the December attack, these were in the main only rearguards, and not more than four mobile divisions have recently been firmly in contact. By 21 Jan it became apparent that a change in enemy policy was taking place. Resistance slackened, and close contact with the enemy was lost all along the front from DIEKIRCH to N.W. of ST. VITH. Conditions once more resembled those of the previous disengaging movement. Road blocks and heavy minefields constituted the main obstacle to the advance, and only in the area North of ST. VITH was there anything resembling the earlier heavy resistance. Considerable Eastward movement is reported as the enemy pulls back in the direction of his December start line, and heavy losses have been inflicted on him by the Allied air forces.

In HOLLAND, the week has been characterised by the opening of an Allied offensive North of SITTARD in the direction of HEINSBERG. This attack initially provoked comparatively little reaction from the enemy who seemed content to leave the sector in the hands of two low grade infantry divisions. The attack continued to make headway, penetrated across the German frontier due West of HEINSBERG, and is now about two miles from HEINSBERG itself, where enemy resistance is stiffening appreciably. This attack is not yet in contact with the main defences of the SIEGFRIED Line. Further North in HOLLAND, the enemy has been in aggressive mood and effected a local penetration in Bn strength into our positions N.W. of NIJMEGEN. This has now been eliminated. 344 and 712 Divisions, which have been missing from HOLLAND for some time, are now reported by the Russians to be in action on the Eastern front.

It is too early yet to say that the events on the Eastern front are affecting enemy policy in the West. The fact remains, however, that in the Northern half of the front RUNDSTEDT has not only lost the initiative, but is pulling back again to the shelter of his fixed defences. Only in ALSACE is the enemy now showing any real aggressiveness and the attack here is

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in the main political, designed to offer the German public something of a palliative in the form of STRASBOURG to compensate for the disappointments which the New Year has brought in the West. It does not of itself constitute a serious threat to the Allied strategical position in Western Europe. The identifications reported by the Russians of divisions transferred from West to East are so far tentative and await confirmation, but it seems clear that on the main sectors of the Western front RUNDSTEDT is pulling in his horns, perhaps as a consequence of the claims which have been made on his Army Groups.

4. EASTERN FRONT

East PRUSSIA and POLAND

The Soviet winter offensive is developing on the grand scale all along the vast front in East PRUSSIA, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA, at a speed greater even than that of the 1944 summer offensive. In the fluid and fast changing situation, four main drives are now apparent. Coming into East PRUSSIA from the North and East, General CHERNIAKOVSKY's Third White Russian Armies have been advancing along the axes of the TILSIT - INSTERBURG and the KOVNO - INSTERBURG railways. They have penetrated deeply into East PRUSSIA and have captured INSTERBURG itself, 45 miles from KONIGSBERG. Meanwhile further penetrations into East PRUSSIA have been made from the South by the Second White Russian Army Group under the command of Marshal ROKOSSOVSKY who, following the capture of WARSAW, has been attacking North-Westwards along the WARSAW - DANZIG railway. This was the thrust which led to the fall of ALLENSTEIN and the less important but historically gratifying capture of TANNENBERG.

Meanwhile South of the VISTULA two major offensives are in progress. On the right, the First White Russian Army Group under Marshal ZHUKOV attacking along the WARSAW - BERLIN highway, captured LODZ on 19 January and has since driven on to within 30 miles of POZNAN. This drive has cut the main trunk railway from BERLIN via POZNAN to East PRUSSIA at INOWROCLAW, 25 miles S.W. of TORUN and has led to the capture of BYDGOCZSZ Further South, Marshal KONIEV's First Ukrainian Armies have achieved the most spectacular, and for the enemy the most alarming, successes of the past week. In addition to capturing CRACOW, they threaten to outflank from the North the whole industrial region of SILESIA by a penetration to date 30 miles deep on a 45 mile front into German territory. This has been effected in the area S.E. of BRESLAU and has cut across the BRESLAU - KATOWICE railway at GROSS STREHLITZ. According to latest reports KONIEV's forces are now within ten miles of the ODER.

There has been little news so far of enemy counter measures to meet the grave situation. When the attack started the enemy had at least half of the total armour on the Eastern front concentrated in HUNGARY. As a result there were few mobile reserves in the centre to meet the Russian blow when it fell. It is possible that the long lull on the VISTULA front had tempted the enemy to appreciate that Soviet offensive efforts this winter were to be confined to HUNGARY, so that he took the chance of thinning out in the centre in order to counter the threat to AUSTRIA. It is just conceivable that in view of this a quick decision was made to pull back voluntarily from the VISTULA line, although the gloomy tone of the German communiqués this week and the absence of any references to a voluntary withdrawal, lends no support to this theory. However, voluntary or not, it seems apparent that the withdrawal has got out of hand. Very incomplete Soviet claims covering only part of the front put the prisoner total in nine days at 60,000, while German broadcasts suggest that there are still large

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numbers of enemy forces operating isolated behind the Soviet forward troops. In any case it is difficult to see what the enemy could gain by voluntarily allowing the Russians to penetrate deeply into the REICH and threaten a vital industrial area. Among the divisions which the Soviets claim to have identified on the Central sector in the past week are two infantry divisions last located in HOLLAND and 11 Pz Division from the ARDENNES. The latter seems a very dubious identification. Other identifications reported from the Central sector are normal and do not show as yet any thickening up of this sector at the expense of other areas.

HUNGARY

Except in the Slovak border region the front in HUNGARY appears to have been so far unaffected by the impact of events further North. The enemy has been pulling back from the mountainous salient in CZECHOSLOVAKIA which had developed as a result of the Russian drive across Southern POLAND. KOSICE has been evacuated and the withdrawal continues through the snow bound TATRA Mountains, probably without great interference from the Russians. In Central HUNGARY however, Army Group South is in an aggressive mood. Despite the loss of PEST and the greater part of BUDA vigorous efforts are being made by the enemy to relieve the remnants of the garrison he left behind in the Hungarian capital. The Germans have attacked in the sector between Lake BALATON and SZEKES FEHERVAR, and according to their own claims have reached the DANUBE, captured SZEKES FEHERVAR and are driving Northwards between Lake VELENCZE and the DANUBE. They now appear to be about 25 miles due South of BUDA. The relief of the beleaguered garrison, coupled with the recapture of STRASBOURG in the West, would paint one bright streak across the sombre picture of the present German situation, but the BUDAPEST effort is at any rate likely to be rather a sally in order to extricate encircled troops than a determined effort to recapture and hold the ruined Hungarian capital. In the past week the Rumanian General Staff has reported the presence of 3 and 6 Pz Divisions in HUNGARY. Both were previously in the Central sector and their arrival brings the total of Panzer Divisions in HUNGARY to ten.

YUGOSLAVIA

The enemy has been in aggressive mood in the SAVA. The long awaited operation to eliminate the Partisan-Soviet DRAVA bridgehead has started with attacks launched from both East and West. On the West the enemy has made little headway and the Partisans claim to be counter-attacking West of VIROVITICA. In contrast to operations earlier this month, which were handled by Croat forces, the present attack is being conducted by German troops. On the East side of the bridgehead the enemy has, however, succeeded in making a penetration of about seven miles, capturing the town of CADAVICA which is about 23 miles East of VIROVITICA. An offensive has also been launched Eastwards from the SAVA conducted, according to Partisan reports, by elements of four German Divisions, possibly 11 G.A.F., 117 Jg. 41 Fortress and 7 S.S. Mtn, all of which are in the area. The object of the attack is probably to regain the old German defence line which ran from VUKOVAR through SID to the confluence of the DRINA and the DRAVA. As the enemy is already reported to have recaptured SID, it seems that he is in a fair way to achieving this object.

Elsewhere in YUGOSLAVIA there has been little to report. Contact was lost with 21 Mtn Corps a week ago in the area North of PRIBOJ, owing to heavy snowstorms and nothing further has been heard of it. It is probable that there are now no German forces left South of the DRINA river. A withdrawal from the MOSTAR area would now seem reasonable, and reports received during the past week of Northward road movement from MOSTAR probably presage the beginning of this withdrawal.

In BOSNIA the enemy has renewed his attempts to capture TRAVNIK. An effort is now being made to capture the town from the North by means of an advance Westwards from ZENICA across the VLASIC Mountains. Last reports put German forces three miles from TRAVNIK.

....From N.W. YUGOSLAVIA.....

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From N.W. YUGOSLAVIA several reports have been received o considerable Northward rail and road movement from ZAGREB. On 21 Ju ZAGREB Marshalling Yards which had been almost empty on the previous contained over 900 trucks. This movement possibly represents the departure of 118 Jg Division which is said to be leaving for GERMANY. In view of what has happened in POLAND this week, the destination may after all be correct. There is need of more divisions in GERMANY.

5. At Appendix 'A' is a report on V-1 or Pilotless Aircraft.

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APPENDIX 'A' TO 15 ARMY GROUP
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.78 OF
23 JANUARY, 1945

V-1 OR PILOTLESS AIRCRAFT

1. The following is a brief account of some recent experiences.

2. The V-1 or pilotless aircraft, known officially as FZ G 76, has been employed in two ways - (i) launched from concrete platforms, (ii) launched from an aircraft. The average speed of both these types is about 300-350 mph.

3. Platform launched

Construction of the platform is generally known to most of us, as there have been pictures in the illustrated papers. They have been much used in FRANCE, both as a nuisance and aimed against big depots such as ANTWERP and LIEGE. In the recent offensive by von RUNDSTEDT in the ARDENNES, a great many were fired for 48 hours preceding the attack, mainly, it is thought, with the object of creating alarm and despondency in the rear and of keeping people awake, because the effect of these is extremely noisy, both in transit and in explosion. It is an interesting point that, despite intensive bombing from the air, the nuisance was not stopped, and this is true also of the period when these were launched from the North coast of FRANCE against the South coast of ENGLAND. Despite, therefore, our great air superiority and our very efficient photography, we should not count on destroying the menace before it can hurt us.

The range is about 250 miles, the warhead is one ton containing an unusually high explosive substance. About 20% hit the ground quite near to the launching site; the height of approach is about 2,000 feet or less. It is not an accurate weapon and the V-1 launched from a series of sites, as from the North of FRANCE, can be expected to fall within an area of 10 miles' radius and not less. They are useful therefore particularly against large towns such as LONDON.

4. Air launched

These are underslung on the parent aircraft, either Heinkel 111 or possibly Do 217 and several methods of direction finding have been used. Launching over the North Sea has been carried out with the aid of Pathfinder aircraft marking the track and point of release, although navigation has also been carried out by D/R and W/T means. The optimum height of release is 1,500 feet though this is not rigidly adhered to: the V-1 has been found to approach the coast at little more than 500 feet. They are most inaccurate and according to Radar plots not 50% reach the shore after launching. They have so far only been launched from the sea about 50 miles out from the coast.

The parent aircraft can be considered very vulnerable whilst making their launching runs, as they must reduce their speed to approximately 150 miles per hour.

5. The threat against this country

It would be possible for air launched V-1 to be directed against the coast ports of LEGHORN and ANCONA. It is not thought that platform launched V-1 could be despatched over the APENNINES, but this has not yet been proved. If launched across the coast at ports they would be difficult to deal with by gunfire, since the gun would be sitting on the VP itself and birds shot down would be apt to fall on the butts.

It is believed however, that the enemy has a maximum of 75 aircraft equipped for carrying V-1. These are at present based in North West GERMANY. It is considered very unlikely that, in view of their prior use against ENGLAND and the Western Front and, to a limited extent, on the Eastern Front, the enemy will be in a position to bring down even a few of these aircraft to operate against targets in this theatre.

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In the event of the V-1 being used in this theatre an efficient P....D. scheme would be essential. The V-1 is launched from aircraft by night invariably and special measures have been devised: e.g. at ANTWERP searchlights were used to provide illumination for squads digging people out of buildings that had been hit.

(Source: R.A. 15 Army Group).

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 79 OF

30 JANUARY, 1945

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(b) This Summary will be destroyed within 48 hours of receipt.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has been little activity along the front but considerable activity behind it and it appears that the crisis on the Eastern Front has at last begun to have an effect on the situation of Army Group C. One Division is already on its way out of ITALY and the reshuffling which has gone on suggests that it is intended to release other formations as well. As might have been expected the stress of great events has led to a plentiful crop of rumours that the Germans are evacuating the whole of Northern ITALY and although this is a cry which has become tedious from repetition during the past seventeen months the justified scepticism with which it has been received in the past should not prevent us from conceding that there may now be some truth in it.

At the beginning of the week Army Group C, as far as was known, had five divisions in reserve; it was well placed, therefore, to answer a sudden call for help. However not all of these divisions were suitable for despatch to the Eastern Front: not 157 Mtn Div, for instance, which was relatively inexperienced and in any case would find no mountains between the VISTULA and BERLIN, though many in ITALY; 26 Pz Div was the only mobile division available and perhaps KESSELRING still retains enough pull to make sure of keeping his only Armoured Division. It had been appreciated, therefore, that the first sign that reinforcements were on their way to GUDERIAN would be a quick reshuffle between the reserves and the front line divisions, and this expectation was not disappointed. On 24 Jan two prisoners were taken from II Bn 290 G.R. of 98 Div at M 3534; there was a little doubt whether they had relieved a unit of 356 Div or 1060 G.R. of 362 Div which had earlier been identified in that area. However it was clear that 356 Div was out of the line, which was confirmed by the location of Div H.Q. at M 2978. The next day revealed a more thorough change when two prisoners were taken from 3 Coy 11 Para Regt of 4 Para Div, at L 296286. From their story it appeared that they had been relieved in their former position, S.W. of BOLOGNA, by 157 Mtn Div and that they themselves had relieved 29 P.G. Div. This has since been confirmed by further indications of the move across of 4 Para Div H.Q. A recent deserter from 305 Div who lay concealed near CASTEL BOLOGNESE for some time and watched the coming and going gives more information. According to him troops of 29 P.G. Div on their way back to the front told him they were going to GERMANY. Unfortunately this is what troops just relieved from the line always say, and especially at a moment of crisis like this; however it may still be true. He also said that 4 Para Div was going to relieve 90 P.G. Div as well as 29 P.G. - not impossible in view of the great strength in infantry of 4 Para Div, but it does not seem to have happened yet since the main elements of the division were still in the line on 29 Jan. 90 P.G. might, however, be in process of moving over slightly to the West and allow the relief of either 715 or possibly 334 Div.

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Our appreciation of the destination of 356 Div was soon confirmed by reports from ground sources in the North East. On 25 Jan a great deal of loading activity was reported at various stations in the PADUA area - CITTADELLA, CASTELFRANCO VENETO and CAMPOSAMPIERO - and troops, MT and equipment were being shipped off in a Northeasterly direction. A later report stated both that this movement had been going on since 23 Jan, and that it was paralleled by heavy road movement, and also that the troops involved were from 356 Div. The divisional sign was observed on both the road and rail moves. Unusual concentrations of rolling stock have continued to be observed at various points in North ITALY on the routes leading out of the country and one cannot be certain that 356 Div will be ITALY's only contribution; 29 P.G. Div is at least a candidate for the Eastern Front and it is the type of division which would be most needed there. The enemy is in a strong position in ITALY; his reserves out of the line have never been so plentiful and it is suggested that he could spare up to five divisions without thereby abandoning a line South of the PO, holding more or less the same positions as now though perhaps with a slight withdrawal on his left flank. Any large contribution would probably involve a withdrawal to the line of the TICINO and the PO and subsequently to his strongest prepared line in N.E. ITALY, the ADIGE. Such a move would mean abandoning N.W. ITALY and it must be said at once that there have been several reports that such is in fact the German intention. These reports should not be given too much credence for the simple reason that many armchair strategists work out the reasons why such a move should be made, and most are not above representing speculations as facts. We must wait for harder evidence. There is one piece of evidence which might point that way; the heavier movement observed recently at night in the MILAN area, mainly in an Easterly and Northerly direction. But we cannot know what is being carried in these vehicles; if troops, the evacuation theory is strongly supported; if Fascist civilians fleeing the wrath to come, evacuation may be about to begin; but it may just as well be merely a rather larger consignment than usual of the loot in the form of industrial equipment and war material which the Germans have been removing from ITALY for many months past.

To recapitulate: one division has left ITALY and although a second may be on the way there is no firm evidence that any more are booked to go. The enemy can spare up to five divisions before he need think of withdrawing to the line of the PO and there is no firm evidence that he has any such intentions. On the basis of past precedents and in view of the travelling conditions between ITALY and GERMANY today, any help KESSELRING is likely to send to the Eastern Front will probably be too little and too late.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

The most important development on the enemy's L of C in the past seven days is the almost certain movement of troops out of ITALY. Movement appears to have taken place over the BRENNER and N.E. railways and rather heavy road movement has also been noted. Owing to the state of the railways and the enemy's shortage of transport generally, movement of troops will have been accomplished only with difficulty. At least one division appears to be on the move; whether or not additional troops are moving cannot, purely from the point of view of volume of rail and road movement so far observed, be definitely stated.

The only direct information on enemy supply recently has been reports on coal shortages for both railways and industries. Over the past two weeks these reports have been received from a considerable number of sources and it is thought that the information is correct. So far as supplies for the front itself are concerned there is no evidence of particular shortages at this time, though it is quite possible that damage to the railways, lack of coal for rail transport and demands made on transport

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facilities for troop movements, may, at least to some extent, have depleted stocks. However, no acute shortages are looked for on the basis of the current scale of fighting.

RAILWAYS

BRENNER ROUTE

Prior to 28 Jan the last date on which the BRENNER was known to be blocked was 22 Jan. Between the 22nd and 27th no PR of the line was available, but PR of the 28th showed that the line was open throughout, and it is estimated that it had probably been open since the 25th though fighter-bombers may well have achieved temporary blocks between these two dates. The line may have been closed on the 26th by attacks made subsequent to the PR sortie of the same day, which, as stated above, showed the line to be open. In any event on the 29th there were at least five rail cuts South of TRENTO and one to the North. Attacks against the line were continued and the line was still blocked on the 30th.

There was pronounced rail activity on the BRENNER on the 28th, with five trains seen moving North. A number of flat cars, both loaded and unloaded have been seen along the BRENNER since the 28th and a very large number of flats, a few loaded with AFVs, were seen at VERONA and immediately to the S.W. of VERONA on the 28th. The fact that the BRENNER railway has been blocked since the 28th, or at least the 29th, and the fact that when open it can probably handle only limited traffic owing to damage to the right of way and the necessity of using the less efficient steam instead of the normal electric traction, may account for the recent rather heavy Northward road movement at night in the area Westward of the BRENNER railway as far as MILAN. This road traffic appears to converge on the BOLZANO area, which would be a logical area to load trains in order to avoid the effect of our air attacks on the railway, these attacks having been almost exclusively confined to points on the line South of BOLZANO. That such may be the case is perhaps indicated, but by no means conclusively, by the fact that on the 29th PR disclosed in the immediate vicinity of BOLZANO an apparent shelter in the side of a mountain with three large entrances about which there was a great deal of pedestrian and MT activity.

NORTHEAST ITALY

Throughout the week all routes between the PADUA and UDINE areas have remained blocked. However, some repairs have been made and one of the possible routes has been blocked only at one bridge for the past several days. Fighter-bombers may have created further track cuts. Beyond UDINE both the Central and Southern frontier routes remain cut, but the remaining and most important route running North to TARVISIO has almost certainly been open throughout the week.

Rail movement in the North East does not seem to have been particularly heavy though a somewhat larger number of flat cars than usual have been noted since 28 Jan in the general area VICENZA - PADUA - TREVISO. However, PR available between 23 and 27 Jan, inclusive, was scanty and actual movement will be largely, if not exclusively, confined to the hours of darkness. In any event the ground report of troop movements by rail in this area towards UDINE on the 25th, is not disproved by rail movement in general and flat cars seen by PR tend to confirm a troop movement. In fact at one of the stations mentioned as a loading point by the ground source, PR picked up a number of empty flat cars. It is also of interest to note that on the night of 30/31 Jan seven trains were observed on the line between TREVISO and CASARSA (C 1108); the two trains whose direction of movement was observed were going East towards UDINE. It is not improbable that troops may still be passing through this area.

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PO VALLEY AND NORTHWEST ITALY

Of the three rail bridges over the PO which had long been impassable but had been repaired by the end of last week, two have again been knocked out, namely the one just South of PAVIA and that near CORBOLA (G 4805). The third bridge near PIACENZA is still open. All other rail bridges over the PO, with the exception of that at CASALE MONFERRATO (J 6432) remain out.

Interdiction in North West ITALY has been stepped up recently and at present the Eastern section of the PO Valley is isolated from the Western section. Between MILAN and TURIN through traffic remains possible but the main line has been blocked all week. Just East of TURIN on the main line running Eastward South of the PO it is curious to note that between 21 and 28 Jan the enemy removed a span of a bridge which some time ago had been fully repaired after air attacks. Alternative routes exist around this bridge and based on study of other bridges it would appear that the span has been removed in an attempt to protect the bridge from air attack thereby making it more readily available for a future use which for the moment is more important to the enemy than the present availability of the bridge. Alternatively the bridge might be in use at night, being made passable by means of a temporary span.

SHIPPING

Photo cover of 28 and 29 Jan shows that at least two KT ships besides smaller craft are still plying between GENOA and LA SPEZIA. On 28 Jan there were 18 F boats and 14 supply barges at active berths in GENOA harbour. There has been no cover of other harbours.

On the Adriatic, cover of 25 Jan shows that the traffic in coasters, KT ships and Siebel Ferries continues from VENICE to TRIESTE and other Northern ports. Barge traffic continues at CHIOGGIA.

3. WESTERN FRONT

Ever since it was reported in the West last November, the movements of 6 S.S. Pz Army have been a major consideration in assessing the enemy's long term intentions. As a strategic reserve it remained uncommitted West of the MEUSE during the November battles. As an armoured spearhead it played a leading part in the successes achieved by RUNDSTEDT's December offensive. Today its movements are still of predominant interest in the enemy situation on the Western Front. Since RUNDSTEDT decided (or had the decision made for him) some ten days ago to pull back from the general line DUNKIRK - HOUFFALIZE - ST. VITH to the shelter of the Siegfried defences, there has been little contact with 6 S.S. Pz Army. At least three if not all four of its armoured divisions are out of the line, and the ARDENNES rearguard action has been conducted by 5 Pz Army. Moreover, considerable and in the main industrious road movement has been in progress for several days from the ARDENNES, the trend of the traffic being for the most part Northeastwards. The suggestion that 6 S.S. Pz Army is to be the first of RUNDSTEDT's contributions to the Eastern front seemed to be confirmed by the heavy loadings at COLOGNE and other major Marshalling yards West of the RUHR on 23 Jan and subsequent days. This was followed by air reports of definite Eastward rail movement from MUNSTER, OSNABRUCK and HAM. A prima facie case does therefore seem to exist for the move of 6 S.S. Pz Army to the East. However a startling development ensued on 26 January with the capture on the body of a dead officer of an Operation Order signed by von DIETRICH the Commander of 6 S.S. Pz Army. This gave the routes for the move on the night of 22/23 Jan of I S.S. Pz Corps (1 and 12 S.S. Pz Divs) to the ROTTERDAM-UTRECHT area. The question arises whether this was a genuine document or a plant. While clearly there are important strategic objectives to be gained by an attack with an armoured force North

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of ANTWERP, it seems incredible that the enemy should split his still powerful Armoured Army, at a time when its employment as a whole on the Eastern Front might be of decisive significance in halting the Russian advance. It is of course just possible that II S.S. Pz Corps with 2 and 9 S.S. Pz Divs is in fact to go East alone, but until there is confirmatory evidence that I S.S. Pz Corps has appeared in HOLLAND, the evidence of the captured document is at least open to considerable suspicion.

With the withdrawal of 6 S.S. Pz Army the front in the ARDENNES has had few features of interest. Identifications have shown no surprises although 2 Pz and 9 Pz Divs of 5 Pz Army continue to lose prisoners and show no immediate disposition to yield place to infantry elements. Enemy resistance has been generally light throughout the week but the appalling weather conditions have considerably impeded Allied progress. Nevertheless by now the enemy is virtually back on the December start line and gives no sign of further aggressiveness in this area.

The whole front has indeed been quieter than for some time past. In the COLMAR pocket, the enemy has resisted vigorously the French attack near MULHOUSE and we have made little further progress. Elements of 106 Pz Bde which has been North of STRASBOURG have been identified in the pocket. North of COLMAR, however, the enemy seems to have been surprised by the American attack of 27 Jan and has given ground rather unexpectedly. We have reached the outskirts of COLMAR while to the East the RHONE-RHINE Canal has been reached without resistance. It seems evident that the enemy has no further intentions of developing the immediate thrust to STRASBOURG from the South.

North of STRASBOURG there has been little further to report. According to the German radio, HIMMLER is now on the Eastern Front, and has thus presumably left the Army Group Upper RHINE in the hands of the aged Von MAUR. The last firm date on which HIMMLER was still known to be in the West was 13 January when he addressed a congratulatory message to the troops in the then newly formed RHINE bridgehead North of STRASBOURG. Since HIMMLER's departure, Von MAUR seems to have felt the weight of his 81 years and has shown little further aggressiveness. The bridgeheads which were established over the MOTER river West of HAGENAU were short-lived and the attack has not yet been resumed. His failure to press home the attack on STRASBOURG suggests that the enemy may no longer feel it worth his while to maintain the initiative in the West as a matter of basic strategy. On 5 January Von MAUR had hoped to be able to tell the Führer "in a few days" that the Swastika again flew from STRASBOURG Cathedral. Being so far unable to say this, he may now be satisfied at having forced the Allies to pay attention to the Southern sector long after MODEL had lost the initiative in the Centre.

The only other area of interest in the West has been HOLLAND. In the region of the Dutch-German frontier, the British attack encountered rather stiffer enemy opposition after the capture of HEINSBERG, although no new divisions have been identified. However under pressure, the enemy has fallen back to the line of the ROER river, and we are now established along the West bank of this river all the way from its confluence with the MAAS to a point approximately 10 miles South of DÜREN. The enemy's front in HOLLAND remains thinly held and along its 200 miles there are now only thirteen divisions in contact. A new Army H.Q. - 25 Army - is now reliably reported in HOLLAND, and is believed to be commanding on the extreme right of the German line under Army Group H. We thus have eight Army HQs in the West controlling rather more than 80 divisions, a more generous allotment of Armies than is enjoyed by either the Eastern or Italian fronts.

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4. EASTERN FRONT

EAST PRUSSIA, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Soviet winter offensive sweeps on to the ODER without any apparent slowing down after eighteen days of battle. While in the North the Third and Second White Russian Army Groups are completing the conquest of East PRUSSIA, in the centre the First White Russian Army Group has reached across the German frontier to within 75 miles of BERLIN and cut the BERLIN - DANZIG railway. On the left Marshal KONIEV's First Ukrainian Army Group has completed the capture of the Upper Silesian industrial region. In CZECHOSLOVAKIA the German withdrawal has brought the Russians up to the HIGH TATRA Mountains.

After the capture of INSTERBERG General CHERNIAKOVSKY continued his advance due West in the direction of KONIGSBERG, at the same time pushing his left wing South and Southwestward to make contact with ROKOSSOVSKY's Army Group somewhere in the region of ALLENSTEIN. A two pronged thrust on KONIGSBERG has now developed from the North and from the South; both drives have reached the outskirts of the East Prussian capital. The Germans estimate that CHERNIAKOVSKY is using some forty-three Divisions in his present attack. On the enemy side the Russians have reported the destruction of 69 Inf Division in the Masurian Lake fighting, while 61 Inf and 31 Inf. Divisions have both received mentions from the German radio for their "defensive successes".

Meanwhile ROKOSSOVSKY, striking up the WARSAW-DANZIG railway with a force estimated by the Germans at fifty-eight divisions, has made spectacular gains. After making contact with the Third White Russian Group near ALLENSTEIN he has cut off East PRUSSIA from land communication with the outside world by a drive which has reached the Baltic at TOLKEMIT. What proportion of the German 3 Pz Army and 4 Army is now cut off is not known. Between them these Armies were thought to contain about twenty-four divisions. The enemy now appears to be launching counter-attacks against the Russian wedge from the area N.W. of ALLENSTEIN and claims to have reached PREUSSEN-HOLLAND.

In the central sector of the front Marshal ZHUKOV has continued his attack South of the VISTULA along the WARSAW-BERLIN railway. The Germans estimate that at least thirty-seven Soviet Divisions are engaged in this attack. (The German forces involved are the 2nd and 9th Armies probably worth about thirty divs). ZHUKOV has by-passed POZNAN and crossed the German frontier on both sides of SCHNEIDEMUEHL. His Army Group has cut the BERLIN-DANZIG trunk line at SCHNEIDEMUEHL and is now about 75 miles from BERLIN itself. On the 1st White Russian Group's left Marshal KONIEV, whose force (1st Ukrainian Army Group) the enemy has estimated at forty divisions, has now reached the ODER N.W. and S.E. of BRESLAU. It seems evident from German admissions, although the Soviets themselves say nothing, that KONIEV has succeeded in establishing at least one bridgehead over the ODER at STEINAU, 33 miles N.W. of BRESLAU and probably others to the Southeast. Meanwhile S.E. of BRESLAU the Russians have completed the conquest of the Upper Silesian industrial region with the capture of GLEIWITZ, KATOWICE and HINDENBERG. Opposing the advance of KONIEV's forces are the German 4 Pz Army and the 17 Army. Identifications reported on the First Ukrainian Front in the past week by the Russians include 25 Pz Division, routed in the RADOM battle, and 45, 68, 72, 75, 304 Infantry Divisions all of which are believed to have been badly knocked about. Between them the two German Armies involved are believed to control about twenty-five divisions. Further South the German withdrawal from CZECHOSLOVAKIA has continued without serious Russian interference. The enemy is now nowhere nearer to KOSICE than 30 miles and is generally back on the HIGH TATRA Mountains. 1st Pz Army is reported to be conducting this withdrawal.

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The situation developing on the great battlefield of the central sector is strangely analogous to that in Eastern POLAND in the summer of 1944. Once again the Russians are approaching a major river obstacle. Once again they are faced with the reduction of a large city on both banks of the river, and once again, as with every river they have ever reached, they are making determined efforts immediately to establish bridgeheads on the west bank. On the First Ukrainian Front KONIEV's efforts are already being directed to establishing firm bridgeheads and to reaching BRESLAU. Further North, however, the river has yet to be reached and the Russian drive has not yet lost its momentum. It seems possible that the Soviets have kept more forces in reserve in the Northern half of the central sector than in the South, so that the impetus of the advance could be maintained over the larger distances to be covered before reaching the ODER. The present Russian object is probably to close up to the ODER all along its length before a German counter-attack can be mounted, and to establish at least one firm bridgehead over it; but old German defences, which may have been modernised, exist between the ODER near ZULLICHAU, North of STEINAU, and the WARTHE at SCHWERIN, and may continue Northwards to the Baltic. Although these may not be strong, they may be sufficient temporarily to stem the Russian tide whose strength must be affected in some degree by the German held rocks of POSEN and THORN. But wherever the Germans may stabilise the reduction of East PRUSSIA can meanwhile be completed. The stage will then be set for the battles of the spring.

HUNGARY

The impact of events in the Central sector has not yet made itself felt on the Hungarian front and there is so far no evidence of any large scale enemy thinning out. Nevertheless with disaster at hand on the Central Front, it is to be expected that a major transfer of armour from HUNGARY to the North will soon take place, if it has not already started. The shortening of the line in CZECHOSLOVAKIA makes it possible however for the enemy to release a certain number of Infantry Divisions from there for use elsewhere, and it is conceivable that some of these may be used to cover the approaches to the BRATISLAVA Gap, as replacement for any armour withdrawn.

North of the DANUBE it appears that recent enemy efforts to clear the Russians from the East bank of the NITRA river and the area of KOMARON have met with some success. The Russian line is now reported to run through BATORKASZ and North of SUTTO - in other words, the Soviet held area West of the HRON river has been reduced to a comparatively small bridgehead.

In BUDA mopping up continues. South of BUDA the German drive reached the area of VAL, 17 miles S.W. of BUDAERSZ during the past week and appears to have halted there in the face of Russian counter-attacks. The Russians are attacking the long and awkward flanks of the German salient from both North and South and seem to have frustrated this second large scale German attack to relieve the Hungarian capital. On the other hand the enemy may feel that, although his main object has not been achieved, he has given the Soviets a sharp blow which may preclude an immediate resumption of the attack on BRATISLAVA.

Heavy road movement in the past week from ZAGREB Northwards to VARAZDIN suggests that 11th Pz Division may now be arriving on 2 Pz Army's front South of Lake BALATON.

YUGOSLAVIA

There has been little operational news from YUGOSLAVIA.

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After the sharp activity of the previous week the enemy attack on the BARCS bridgehead has once more subsided. This may in part be accounted for by the arrival of Bulgarian artillery reinforcements on the North bank of the DRAVA. Nonetheless it is strange that the enemy has not pressed home the successes which he so easily gained at the start of his attack on the bridgehead. - Further East, however, the attack in the SREM has continued and appears to have achieved its objective in regaining for the enemy the old VUKOVAR - SID - DRINA mouth defence line, which now seems to be firmly back in his hands. 297 Inf Division may well have been involved in the Southern flank of these operations as its presence in the SAVA Valley was reliably reported on 24 Jan.

The main feature of interest in YUGOSLAVIA in the past week has however been the temporary halt in the withdrawal of Army Group E. On 19 January the supplement to the German communiqué was devoted to a summing up of Army Group E's retirement from the S.E. and since that date no further towns have been evacuated by the enemy. On the contrary there is every evidence that he intends to hold on to the SARAJEVO area with advanced outposts at VLASENICA, VISEGRAD and MOSTAR. To the N.W. the enemy has in the past week cleared the SARAJEVO-VLASENICA highway and is now continuing offensive operations Northeastwards from VLASENICA; to the East he still holds on to the strong natural defensive positions at VISEGRAD and to the S.W. the enemy is not only conducting offensive operations in the MOSTAR region but he is actually reported to be reinforcing the area: 1,000 Germans and 800 Ustaschi troops have arrived there since about 15 January. It seems very probable, in view of this evidence, that a change in enemy policy has now taken place and that, until his higher policy dictates a further withdrawal, Gen LÖHR has decided for the time being to stay where he is. The present enemy held territory in YUGOSLAVIA corresponds very roughly to the borders of CROATIA. It is thus at least conceivable that HITLER has ordered LÖHR to halt his withdrawal on the present line in fulfilment of obligations he may feel towards the Croat State for its contribution to the German war effort. A brief word on the Croat Army may therefore be of interest at this juncture and is included at Appendix 'A'.

The only other area of interest in YUGOSLAVIA is TRAVNIK where the enemy after several unsuccessful efforts over the past two months has at last succeeded in capturing the town. This is of some importance in that it strengthens his hold on the L of C from SARAJEVO to BROD and may well be followed by further efforts to open up an additional L of C Northwestwards towards BANJA LUKA or BIHAC.

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APPENDIX 'A' TO 15 ARMY GROUP
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 79 OF
30 JANUARY, 45

THE CROAT ARMY

The Croat Army, as now mobilised, consists of sixteen divisions of various strengths and a number of independent Brigades. The C in C, General MATIJ. CANIC has his G.H.Q. at ZAGREB, while the divisions, seldom stronger than 8,000 men, are located as follows :

1 Assault Div :	BJELOVAR area. Took part in attack on Russian DRAVA bridgehead.
2 Inf Div	ZAGREB. In process of forming.
3 Inf Div	VINKOVCI X 08. Operational. Took part in fighting at OTOK X 06.
4 Inf Div	DVOR, K 81. Operational.
5 Inf Div	BJELOVAR. Operational.
6 Inf Div	BANJA-LUKA. Poor quality Div. Garrison duties.
7 Mtn Div	NOVA GRADISKA. Operational.
8 Inf Div	SARAJEVO area. Operational.
9 Inf Div	MOSTAR area. Operational.
10 Inf Div	BIHAC area. Operational.
11 Inf Div	OTOCAC G 98 Operational.
12 Inf Div	HRGKO W 93 Operational. S of SAVA.
13 Inf Div	KARLOVAC Reported to be a good Div
14 Inf Div	BROD. Guards railway BROD-ZAGREB
15 Inf Div	DOBOJ M 28. Newly formed. Believed to be of poor quality.
16 Rpl Div	ZAGREB. Purely a reinforcement Div.

These Divs, poorly armed and lacking in heavy weapons, are of problematical value, though the human material is good. Some effort has been made to bolster morale by mixing the fanatical USTASCHI with the less reliable DOMOBRAN or conscripted troops. However, numerous cases of desertion have been reported and TITO's amnesty to all who deserted, published recently, brought over a steady flow of Domobran, in many cases with their arms, to the Partisans. Nevertheless the Croats have proved a useful addition to the German Armed Forces and HITLER may feel that he must now discharge his debt by defending the frontiers of CROATIA.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 80 OF

6 FEBRUARY, 1945

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The patrol activity which has monopolised the communiqués of the last week has been most valuable in widening our picture of the enemy's dispositions and intentions. Assisted by the services of a larger number of deserters than usual the prisoners taken have confirmed in general terms the conclusions reached in our last Summary that no great changes in policy were yet being effected, though regroupings and reliefs continue.

On 8 Army front the main point of interest is the relief of part of 16 S.S. by 42 Jaeger Div. So far as our evidence goes only the Nothem battalion of the former has been relieved as yet though a deserter taken yesterday has a story which suggests that the Jaegers may now have taken over as far as the 418 Easting. The S.S. men themselves confirm that there is a strong rumour in the division that it is going to GERMANY; a story we have heard before of many divisions but three Alsatian deserters add corroborative detail. According to them I Bn 36 S.S. has already left for FERRARA and II Bn was expecting to go on the night 4/5 Feb (which was why they deserted). They had already seen the advance party of the relieving troops. It seems not unreasonable that the Reichsfuehrer S.S., who has just taken over the command in the vital sector of the Eastern Front, should wish to recall his own division from a secondary theatre, possibly to fill the gaps in 6 S.S. Pz Army which is also believed to be now on that front. At any rate we can accept the fact that 16 S.S. is in the process of being relieved.

Further South and West another reshuffle is taking place. 4 Para Div has taken over part of the former sector of 90 P.G. which in turn has relieved some of 715 Div and a deserter states that it intends to take over the whole of 715 Div's sector. It is not quite clear why this particular division should be relieved, especially since it means that 90 P.G. Div, a motorised formation, takes over a mountainous sector, and again the possibility presents itself that it may be required elsewhere. But there is no evidence whatever that this is so, nor even any good evidence that it has yet been wholly relieved.

Otherwise dispositions are normal. Prisoners have confirmed that it was 157 Mtn Div, as we expected, which relieved 4 Para Div West of route 65. 232 Div is still in its old position with four battalions forward and three in reserve. The 148 Division sector has been the scene of considerable vicissitudes during the past few weeks, due to political and psychological reasons rather than military. The main factor is the arrival of a regiment of ITALIA Division plus the divisional Engineer Bn; the other Regt is allegedly in the area South of PARMA and is not expected

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in the line till March. In the early part of the period the trend was to relieve forward German battalions by Italians to allow the latter to gain experience, and the former to rest. The most important sectors, e.g. the coastal plain, were still, however, held by German troops. The experiment has not been very successful as large numbers of the Italians began to come over to the Allies at once and the trend has had to be reversed; in the last few days the Germans have been taking over from the Italians again. The general picture remains the same, with Germans and Italians intermingled under German operational command, but the actual details of dispositions are not wholly clear, nor very important.

There has been no change visible in the aspect of the German reserves. 114 Jaeger Div is still reported from time to time in the area North of Lake COMACCHIO. 26 Pz Div has not been reported since about 15 Jan, when its divisional sign was seen in the area East of FERRARA, but there is no evidence that it has left or is intending to leave. 29 P.G. Div was in its old rest area, N.W. of BOLOGNA, between CENTO and S. GIOVANNI, on 29 Jan and there is likewise no evidence that it has moved from there. So far, therefore, KESSELRING is almost as strong as ever; his front line is still solidly held and he has one mobile division in reserve behind both the Fifth and Eighth Army fronts. Like MACMAHON on the MALAKOFF Redoubt, though with rather more anxious glances over the shoulder than the gallant Franco-Scottish Marshal allowed himself, KESSELRING can still say "J'y suis, j'y reste".

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

This week a fairly high degree of rail interdiction has been maintained. Medium bombers were able to operate on all but two of the past seven days and they have been supplemented by fighter-bomber attacks deep in the enemy's Italian zone of communications and attacks by heavy bombers against rail centres beyond the frontier. This pattern of attack is undoubtedly severely restricting any major enemy troop movements and demanding considerable effort by the enemy to maintain the flow of supplies into ITALY even though current administrative requirements are low. Shortage of coal, which ground sources continue to report, will also cause difficulties on steam-operated sections of the railways.

The BRENNER railway has been closed most of the week and at no one time is it likely to have been open to through traffic in excess of about 24 hours. In the Northeast all routes West of UDINE have remained blocked throughout the week at at least two points.

While reports of evacuation of ITALY by the enemy continue to be received, neither PR nor other observation of rail and road movement in the enemy rear justify a conclusion that any large scale evacuation is now in progress.

RAILWAYS

Brenner Route

The BRENNER route has probably been open to through traffic on only one complete day during the week. However, owing to the rapidity of repairs between attacks, it is likely that the line has been open a total of at least 48 hours. In any event, PR has shown the line to have been definitely blocked on 31 Jan, and on 4 Feb while perhaps the greatest degree of interdiction in some time was achieved on 5 Feb, on which date PR showed the line blocked at two, and possibly at five, points. Attacks on the 5th included an attempt to create a landslide near S. AMBROGIO at F 5267, about 15 Kms N.W. of VERONA; photos taken over an hour after the attack do not show results as far as blockage of the tracks is concerned, but at time

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of photography the valley was still full of smoke and/or dust, which suggests an effective attack. If successful this attack may well prevent through traffic on the BRENNER for a very considerable period.

Activity has been noted in practically every station South of BOLZANO. All major yards have been active; minor sidings have also shown a marked activity, notably at SAN AMBROGIO (F 5267) where there was a hundred percent turnover between 31 Jan and 4 Feb, while MATTERELLO (A 7717) showed a relatively large decrease of wagons. Even though the line was blocked on both 4 and 5 Jan, some movement took place between those two dates. Considerable activity was also noted on 4 Jan on the branch line between FORTEZZA (W 1901) and SPITTAL (X 6201). On this line most of the stations have shown a turnover and stores were seen at several.

North East ITALY

In the North East all routes between the PADUA and UDINE areas have been blocked at at least two, and probably three, points throughout the week. This contrasts favourably with last week when for several days the most Northerly, and most active, of the three routes was cut only at SACILE bridge (B 8407). On this Northerly route CASARSA rail diversion (C 1508) was cut on 31 Jan and though seen as repaired on 4 Jan another cut had by this date been established at PORDENONE rail diversion (B 9907), about 20 Kms to the West. (The regular bridges at both PORDENONE and CASARSA have long been impassable.) It is interesting to note that a point on the track just West of SACILE bridge which had been cratered on 31 Jan had not been repaired by 4 Feb; with repairs to more important breaks elsewhere on the same line remaining incomplete, failure to repair the track crater probably reflects the enemy policy of "maintenance of unserviceability".

There has been virtually no change for some time on either the central or Southerly routes in this area, though during last week and early this week interdiction on the Southern route was extended Eastward with the establishment of eight cuts, including four bridges, between LATISANA (H 2281) and MONFALCONE (H 6191). These cuts probably remain unrepaired, but in any event they do not appreciably affect the rail interdiction in the North East.

In as much as at least two blocks have existed since 31 Jan between the PADUA and UDINE areas, it is not unlikely that any troops which may have been leaving out of ITALY via the North East since 31 Jan, will have been forced to move by road all the way to the UDINE area before loading on trains; however they could, at considerable risk, move by rail from points in the PO Valley to as far as the TREVISO area. Supplies being brought through this area will very probably have been carried for at least 50 Kms by M.T.

Beyond UDINE the condition of the three frontier rail routes is somewhat obscure owing to lack of PR. The most Southerly route (POSTUMIA route) was last seen as definitely blocked on 29 Jan at BOROVNICA viaduct (D 2803) which probably remains cut. Also on 29 Jan BOIRES bridge (C 7223) on the central route (PIEDICOLLE route), was cut, but repairs had progressed so far at that time as to warrant an estimate of completion by the following day. It is probable, bearing in mind the importance of all rail routes in this area to the enemy at this time, that this bridge was in fact opened up shortly after the 29th; whether or not the attack of 4 Feb, claimed as successful, has again blocked this route cannot be confirmed owing to lack of PR. The Northern and most important of the frontier routes was open early in the week, but attacked at several points well North of UDINE on 2 and 4 Feb; success of these attacks cannot be confirmed owing to lack of PR.

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There has been noted activity along the entire TREVISO - UDINE line this past week, especially in the UDINE yards. The two Southerly routes have been comparatively inactive which is not surprising in view of the numerous unrepaired cuts along them.

Po Valley and North West ITALY

Only two rail bridges are at present known to be serviceable over the PO river. They are the PIACENZA bridge (K 6216) which has been passable since 18 Jan, and the CASALE bridge (J 6432) which has been open for at least a month. South of the PO there has been little sign of appreciable rail activity though there is evidence to indicate that the railways in this area are still being used.

In the North West although there is one through line open between MILAN and the VERON. - MANTOVA area, the main Northern line is out at PASCHIERA (F 4254) bridge and diversion, which were rendered unserviceable on 4 Jan, and possibly at two other points. Through traffic between MILAN and TURIN remains possible on several routes. The VILLAFRANCA D'ASTI bridge (J 2810) just East of TURIN, where last week a span was seen missing and thought to have been removed by the enemy, is now reported by ground sources to have been destroyed by Partisans.

Rail Diversions

The enemy has been forced in numerous instances to build rail diversions by-passing badly damaged bridges or viaducts. There are in all about 20 to 25 of these diversions in ITALY. In most cases they have been constructed when damage to the original line has been so severe that construction of a short stretch of new line adjacent to the original would be easier and faster than repair work. In some cases, however, diversions have been built prior to attacks on the original bridge, and not infrequently both the original bridge and the diversion have been simultaneously repaired, thereby making interdiction more difficult. In fact it is generally more difficult to keep the diversion blocked than the original bridge, diversions being in most cases a less vulnerable target from the repair point of view. About half of all the diversions in ITALY are, as would be expected, found on the BRENNER and North East rail routes. Only two rail diversions are known to exist along the BRENNER, though one, the 12-mile diversion by-passing both ORA (A 9354) and S. MICHELE (A 7837) bridges, is by far the longest in ITALY. These two diversions by-pass the only three main ADIGE river crossings between TRENTO (A 2578) and BOLZANO (A 9870). On the surface it may seem surprising that there are only two diversions on the BRENNER while there are eight on the North East lines. However, the bridges South of TRENTO, having no diversions are all relatively small and easily rebuilt by the very fast and efficient repair system maintained on the BRENNER. This alone makes the building of diversions around individual bridges almost unnecessary, although they could be easily and quickly constructed at any time desired except during the flood season. Another reason why the stretch of line between VERON. and TRENTO is void of diversions might be the existence of the loop-line from TRENTO to CASTELFRANCO which could serve as an alternative route in event of blockage between TRENTO and VERON.

No diversions appear above BOLZANO but that is explained by the fact that BOLZANO is the farthest North that the line has been consistently attacked, and in any case the precipitous slopes would make it a difficult, if not impossible, task.

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Between UDINE and the PADUA-VICENZA area there are eight known rail diversions. Most of these were built when T.A.F. started its heavy attacks in November on these lines. It is interesting to note that none of these diversions appear on the most Southerly route between MONFALCONE (H 6392) and MESTRE (G 6397). This may be explained by the fact that any construction over the TAGLIAMENTO and PIAVE rivers along the Southern route would prove most difficult. The absence of diversions and lack of repair work along this route bears out the conviction that the enemy has virtually abandoned the line in favour of diverting the majority of his engineering and construction facilities in the area to the two Northern routes, despite the fact that one is only single track.

EVACUATION OF SPEZIA ARSENAL - APRIL 1944

A P.W. from the SONDERFUHRERTRUPP NEISS of the 307 WIRTSCHAFTSKOMMANDO, the function of which is the dismantling and despatch to GERMANY of Italian industrial machinery and material, gives the following account of this unit's activities in SPEZIA between April and October 1944.

In April 1944 the Italian directors of SPEZIA Arsenal were informed that on account of Allied bombing the German High Command had decided to remove all machinery and stores from SPEZIA to a railway tunnel near GENOA which had been prepared for its reception and installation, and in which work was to be continued. The Italian staff at LA SPEZIA was encouraged to volunteer to accompany the machinery and stores to GENOA. German personnel had previously been warned not to disclose the fact that the true destination of the material was GERMANY. The Italian directors placed 45 Italian mechanics at the disposal of the Germans and the dismantling of machinery started immediately.

At the end of April 1944, the first train-load of industrial machinery left SPEZIA and moved to the MANAROLA railway tunnel (P 5811) just North of SPEZIA where, owing to Allied bombing and Partisan activities, it remained until June. This train consisted of 15 trucks. A second train consisting of 20 truck-loads of material reached MANAROLA tunnel at the beginning of June and two days later both trains proceeded to GRONDOLA railway tunnel (P 695457) on the SPEZIA - PARMA line, in which 600 - 700 trucks loaded with industrial material were stationed. PW heard later, but could not confirm, that all these trucks left for PARMA in October 1944.

The two train-loads from SPEZIA included: 65 lathes of various sizes, 60 steel rods, 2,000 bronze rods, 30 ships' propellers, 6 truck-loads of bronze bars, one truck-load of water-piping, electric motors, spare parts and driving belts.

The above account is believed typical of a long standing German policy, namely the stripping and despatch to GERMANY of Italian industries in so far as consistent with the continuance of active production in ITALY for the benefit of GERMANY. The report is of interest in indicating the deceit of the Germans as to the future use of the dismantled machinery, i.e. that it was to be further used in ITALY. The difficulties encountered in evacuating the material by rail are also of interest and not dissimilar to the situation now existing in the BRESCIA (F 0568) area where railway cars loaded with industrial materials have apparently been tied up for a matter of months owing to the interdiction of the railways.

3. WESTERN FRONT

Von RUNDSTADT's problem this week has been to form a

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strategic reserve which will at least in part compensate for the departure of 6 S.S. Pz Army. The four Armoured Divisions of the latter are now definitely away, although the six or seven Infantry Divisions which had been operating with them appear for the present to be staying. The destination of the armour is certainly Eastwards. If the captured document showing the move of I S.S. Pz Corps to HOLLAND was not a plant, it was at any rate outdated by events in the East. Although the farewell to the West has been a slow business with the weather and the air forces alternating in their efforts to protract it, it has none the less been final, 6 Pz Army's crowded and not inglorious hour in the West is over, though the East offers it prospects fateful as ever it has in the forests of the ARDENNES.

RUNDSTEDT's problem now, if he is allowed to keep the remaining seven Panzer Divisions, is to make them do the work of eleven or at any rate so to dispose them that he will still have some form of reserve on which to fall back when the next Allied attack starts. His first action has been to start reducing his unnecessary commitments in the West of which the COLMAR pocket was apparently judged to be the least essential. The effort has not been wholly successful. True the pocket is now virtually eliminated but the cost was probably higher than RUNDSTEDT had expected. At least two Infantry Divisions (708 and 16) have been reduced to remnants while 338 Infantry Division which had been defending the Western edge of the pocket collapsed quickly when the French attack on the VOSGES ridge started. French forces attacking from the South nevertheless have had a hard fight of it all week against 2 Mtn Div reinforced by elements of 5 Mtn Div from ITALY; harder by far than the French-American forces in the North of the pocket who took COLMAR, cut the COLMAR-BREISACH railway and reached the RHINE on a 35 mile front South of STRASBOURG against light to moderate resistance. The pocket is now half its size of a week ago and in view of the absence of any good roads, the German position West of the RHINE looks untenable. What economy RUNDSTEDT has effected by withdrawing is problematic but on the principle that every little helps, he may feel that the withdrawal has probably been worth his while.

While these operations were in progress in the South, the armour remaining in the West after the departure of 6 S.S. Pz Army was being quietly taken out of the line. In Northern ALSACE 25 P.G. and 21 Pz Divs are missing, although 10 S.S. Pz Div (NOT of 6 S.S. Pz Army) and 17 S.S. P.G. Div are still there. The former has helped the infantry of First German Army to offer surprisingly firm resistance to our attacks particularly around HAGENAU where we have made little headway. Extensive floodings, natural rather than Teutonic in origin, are adding to the difficulties in this sector. An increase in rail movement has been observed this week down the RHINE Valley from KARLSRUHE through HEIDELBERG. It need not necessarily imply further transfers from the West and probably does not, for the indications are that the RUHR is being reinforced at the expense of other areas.

The same thing has been going on all along the front. 11 Pz Division has been out of contact from the REMICH area for several days, while at the end of last week none of 5 Pz Army's armoured divisions were left in the line. The infantry remaining in the ARDENNES has fought an undistinguished but orderly rearguard in the area South of ST. VITH. Our bridgehead over the OUR river was quickly expanded and we have pushed across the German frontier to within 5 miles of PRUM, the first town of any size East of the frontier in this region. Now that we are in contact with the Siegfried defences once again, there is some stiffening of enemy resistance here.

However, RUNDSTEDT was not to solve his difficulty as easily as that. No sooner had he got a force of six armoured and three P.G. Divisions out of the line than a new crisis arose. The American First Army attack

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in the MONSCHAU forest seems to have caused some confusion in the enemy ranks. Resistance on the first day was light, and offered largely by a miscellany of dubious units ranging from a Home Guard Bn to elements of 15 Army's Engineer School. Considerable progress was made. We cleared the MONSCHAU forest and the high ground to the South before RUNDSTEDT's counter-measures started. The situation must have been sadly reminiscent to him of the days before 6 S.S. Pz Army appeared on the scene, when his armour had to be rushed to and fro to plug each hole as it appeared. First of all he put 3 P.G. Division back into the line and quickly after it came 9 Pz Div accompanied by 12 Volksgrenadier Division not yet properly recovered from its ARDENNES battles. So far there has not been any great stiffening in enemy resistance, and as we are astride both banks of the ROER river it would seem that the enemy must go back to the line of the ERFT river covering the GEMUND Forest. In this attack we have penetrated to points 12 miles inside GERMANY and are well into the SIEGFRIED defences, having gained most valuable ground for any resumption of large scale attacks towards the RHINE.

There are now five armoured and two Panzer Divisions unbeated in the West - almost exactly the same number as in the week preceding RUNDSTEDT's ARDENNES attack. The situation is far from analogous however. One has learnt by now the dangers of thinking the Germans to be wholly on the defensive at any time; but if only a limited and costly success could be achieved in December with the full employment of the fresh 6 Pz Army, the prospects of even a spoiling attack are at present slight. Moreover the departed Pz Army was the better of the two and in better shape when it left than is 5 Pz Army to-day. Of the rest of RUNDSTEDT's armour, 116 Pz Div is tentatively placed in the DUREN area, and the general trend of traffic suggests that a proportion of the remainder is moving into the area West of the RUHR. Confirmation is given to this suggestion by the identification of 8 Para Div from GERMANY in the VENLO area, an indication that RUNDSTEDT is once again worried about the security of the RUHR Valley, and is taking steps to thicken up the thinly held approaches to it from HOLLAND. The brief breathing space which he may hope to have before the spring will surely be spent in resting and strengthening the defenders of the RUHR. For what was said in this Summary long before the December battles has more force to-day than it ever had. Loss of the RUHR will finally decide the issue.

4. EASTERN FRONT

EAST PRUSSIA AND POLAND

There has been an appreciable slowing down of the Russian advance in this past week. The extended L of C, with POZNAN still in German hands, a stiffening enemy opposition, particularly in East PRUSSIA, and a premature thaw in the Central sector have all contributed to the Soviet difficulties. In East PRUSSIA, the Russians have now occupied about five-sixths of the entire province, and the defence of what is still left resolves itself for the enemy into the defence of KÖNIGSBERG and ELBING. He is clearly determined to hold on to these two ports as much to deny them to the Russians as for their own worth to him. The Soviets have already this week acquired one important naval base in the shape of MEMEL; they have also developed the threat to DANZIG and GYDNIA, while STETTIN itself is only 37 miles from the front. The whole German position in Eastern Baltic waters is thus endangered - a threat which if it matured would have the gravest consequences for the twenty-odd enemy divisions at present isolated in LATVIA. Fierce enemy resistance is to be expected as the Soviets draw nearer to these naval bases and ports. However the German efforts to break through the Russian wedge which isolates East PRUSSIA seem to have abated. The measure of success achieved by these attacks is not clear. There are no claims

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or admissions that the Soviet wedge has been broken, but this proves little, for the Russians might not admit a setback nor the Germans that they were ever really firmly isolated. It is clear however that in the past week, the Russians have been able to broaden their salient to the West and are within seven miles of DANZIG. Further to the S.W. ROKOSSOVSKY has made satisfactory progress in extending the left flank of his 2 White Russian Army Group across the German frontier on a broad front S.E. of STETTIN. SCHNEIDEMÜHL at the junction of seven railway lines remains however an isolated garrison in enemy hands behind the front. This obstacle combined with the marshy lake country of POMERANIA is likely to make the advance on STETTIN a formidable business.

Marshal ZHUKOV's First White Russian Army Group continues its advance to the ODER though at a much reduced pace. If the German defences between ZÜLLICHAU and MESENITZ proved no great difficulty to the Russians, the enemy hold on POZNAN and the rapidly lengthening L of C must do so. The ODER has been reached at only two points North of the bend at FÜRSTENBERG, and the direct assault on FRANKFURT and KÜSTRIN has not yet commenced. FRANKFURT at any rate is reported to be strongly defended and the reduction of both FRANKFURT and KÜSTRIN is likely to be a difficult task. FRANKFURT itself lies on both banks of the ODER, though KÜSTRIN is largely on the East bank. In this region the ODER reaches its widest point - about 200-250 yards - and remains at this width to its mouth. The establishment of Soviet bridgeheads on the West bank will probably present considerable difficulties, although the task would be easier now than in the thaw period when the current becomes fairly rapid. However ZHUKOV at this stage is probably more concerned with closing up to the East bank of the ODER on a broad front South and if possible North of KÜSTRIN than with establishing bridgeheads on the far bank. The Soviet line has now developed into a vast salient which narrows down through Western POLAND to its tip near FRANKFURT. As such it offers the enemy possibilities of counter-attack from North and South, and ZHUKOV must be anxious to get his flanks resting firmly and without delay on the natural protection of the ODER.

From the remainder of the Central sector, the only development of importance this week has been the German report of a new Soviet attack from the bridgehead over the ODER N.W. and S.E. of BRIEG. This has now been confirmed by the Russians, showing that the relative calm of the preceding week was probably put to good effect by KONIEV in bringing up fresh forces. The attack may be intended only to broaden and deepen the Soviet bridgehead, and to cut the main highway from BERLIN to Upper SILESIA; nevertheless the important nickel mines at FRANKENSTEIN, 35 miles S.E. of BRIEG, offer a tempting prize to KONIEV now that GERMANY has already lost her main nickel supplies at PETSAMO. In any case the next few days should show whether this is the end of an old battle or the beginning of a new.

HUNGARY

There has been little change in the situation in HUNGARY. The long battle for BUDAPEST seems to be drawing nearer its end and the garrison is reduced to a small force holding the area of the castle in BUDAPEST.

South of the capital the Soviet counter-attacks against the German salient are making good progress, although it is evident from the Soviet claims of towns recaptured that the German drive of a fortnight ago made more progress in a Southeasterly direction than had previously been thought. After recapturing SZEKES FEHERVAR, the enemy seems to have driven East to the DANUBE and S.E. towards DUNAFELDVAR with his left flank resting on the SARVIZ Canal. The Soviets have now counter-attacked Northwestwards along the same ground and are within eight miles of SZEKES FEHERVAR.

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No change in the enemy Order of Battle is reported from HUNGARY this week.

YUGOSLAVIA.

The main news of the week has come from DALMATIA where the enemy has carried out a strong sortie from the MOSTAR region, in the direction of the Dalmatian coast. This drive was conducted by elements of 369 Germano-Croat Division probably supported by 9 Croat Div and seems to have taken the Partisans completely by surprise. KAPLJINA (W 09) was quickly overrun and the enemy continued the attack as far as METKOVIC in the NERETVA estuary seven miles from the coast. A wedge was thus driven which prevented Partisan movement between Northern and Southern DALMATIA. A hint that the enemy occupation was not to be permanent however was given when the Germans blew the bridges over the NERETVA in the METKOVIC area. This was followed by a withdrawal from METKOVIC to KAPLJINA which was abandoned by the enemy on 4 Feb after heavy fighting. The Germans are thus almost back to their start line of a week ago. What exactly was the object of the operation is still not clear. If it was to interrupt the Partisan communications in DALMATIA a certain limited and temporary inconvenience has certainly been achieved. The Partisans however see more in the sally than this and suggest that it may have been designed to cover the withdrawal of supplies and troops from MOSTAR. Further reports have indeed been received this week of supplies leaving MOSTAR, but such stories have been coming in for nearly a month now, and stronger evidence will be needed before we can assume that the withdrawal from the SARAJEVO base has been resumed. A more plausible explanation is that the enemy wishes to tighten his hold on the bauxite mines in the MOSTAR area, and to disperse Partisan concentrations which might threaten them. Now that he has lost so much through Allied force of arms in Upper SILESIA, he may be loth to abandon voluntarily any source of economic supply, however small, in other regions.

There has also been a recrudescence of reports of heavy Eastward road movement from VISEGRAD to SARAJEVO. The only certain facts about all these rumours are that both MOSTAR and VISEGRAD are in enemy hands, and that VLASENICA, the third outpost covering SARAJEVO is being used by the enemy as a base for a new drive Northeastwards. This drive has led to the capture of DRINJACA in the DRINA Valley 50 miles N.E. of SARAJEVO, and the enemy is now advancing Northwards down the DRINA Valley in the direction of ZVORNIK. His objective here appears to be twofold; firstly to open up the L of C through the DRINA Valley to VUKOVAR; and secondly to follow last week's capture of the old VUKOVAR-DRINA mouth defence line by securing a firm Eastern flank for Army Group F in the Balkans along the line of the DRINA river.

The enemy layout in the SARAJEVO area has become clearer during the past week. H.Q. XXI Mountain Corps is at SARAJEVO with four divisions under command disposed as follows :

364 Germano-Croat Div	-	MOSTAR-TRAVNIK
104 Jg Div	-	TRAVNIK area
22 Inf Div	-	VLASENICA-DRINJACA (probably conducting the present DRINA Valley operations)
181 Inf Div	-	VISEGRAD-SARAJEVO road. (largely concerned with protecting Southern flank of 21 Corps).

H.Q. Army Group E which was at SARAJEVO appears to have left for the North and is variously reported at NOVA GRADISC and BROD, either of which would be a healthier location than SARAJEVO. Army Group F and the whole of C IN C S.E.'s staff is also said to have moved, abandoning its

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long though not wholly happy associations with ZAGREB for the more homely surroundings of the fatherland at GRAZ.

Other news from YUGOSLAVIA deals mainly with Order of Battle. In the SREM there appears to be some change in the chain ofcommand. A new German 41 Corps has been identified at DJAKOVO, N.E. of BROD. It seems possible that this formation has taken over command from 34 Corps. 11 G.A. Div and the FISCHER Battle Group (containing elements of 11 G.A.F., 41 Fortress and 264 Inf Divs) are certainly no longer under command of 34 Corps, and it is quite probable that the enemy may have decided to substitute a green headquarters in what now promises to be a quiet sector, thus releasing the experienced 34 Corps for a more active role. There has been some news too of 31 S.S. Division, which was identified on the DRAVA front last year and has not been heard of for some time. It is now reliably reported at MARIBOR where it is presumably refitting and training. Of 23 S.S. Division which has also been missing for several months there is still no news, and it now seems very doubtful whether this formation is still in YUGOSLAVIA or indeed whether it exists at all. It is tentatively dropped from the enemy Order of Battle in YUGOSLAVIA, thus reducing the present German garrison in YUGOSLAVIA to fourteen divisions of which three are Germano-Croat.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 81

OF 13 FEBRUARY, 1945

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There have been patrol actions and raids at many points along the front and a more ambitious reconnaissance in force on our part at the Western end, but no change in the dispositions of the opposing forces has been effected. Our picture of enemy order of battle is also unchanged and the general tendencies noted last week continue.

On the enemy's left it appears likely that 114 Jaeger Division is taking over part of the line S.W. of Lake COMMACCHIO. The intention no doubt is to allow 42 Jaeger Div to shorten its front since 16 S.S. must by now be all out of the line and its sector appears to be split between 42 and 362 Divs. Troops of 16 S.S. Div were probably passing through CASTELFRANCO (G 37) for TREVISO on 7 Feb and it may have been some of their equipment which was spotted by PR on the 12th at GEMONA, North of UDINE, where there were 37 flat cars loaded with AFV's. Evidence of any other Division following 16 S.S. from 10 Army is still very scanty: a prisoner has a credible story about 278 being due to leave, which might be supported by the fact that it has certainly been most inconspicuous of late but by no other evidence. There is nothing to show that 90 P.G. has taken over more of 715 Div's sector and a corpse from II Bn 735 in the area M 1420, though it may have been lying there since 4 Feb, is a slight indication that the latter Division is not after all intended for the East just yet. Going further West everything is usual; 148 Div, as expected, had to bring much more of its strength into the line to meet our thrusts in its sector. All three German regiments were identified among an assortment of Italian deserters, mainly from ITALIA Division. We took a fair number of prisoners in this area, though we failed to retain any ground gained, and the enemy must still be convinced of the necessity of keeping German troops at least available if his whole Western flank is to be prevented from dissolving.

The situation in rear remains much the same. There is further slight evidence that 29 P.G. Division was still in its old rest area N.W. of BOLOGNA on 8 Feb though a prisoner states that he saw troops from it crossing the PO on 21 Jan, alleging that they were bound for the Eastern Front. This part of his story is not considered very likely. 26 Pz Div has been reported sporadically up to 11 Feb as being in the area East and West of FERRARA; the places mentioned are fairly far apart and suggest a wide, but not improbable, dispersion. If 114 Jg Div has been definitely recommitted, as seems likely, it would leave these two mobile Divisions as the only reserve for the front: however it appears that another formation is on the way, no less than 162 Turcoman Division. According to a good source this Division left the TARO Valley, South of PIACENZA, for BOLOGNA on 5 Feb "hurriedly" and it has since been reported on 11 Feb on route 9, S.E. of BOLOGNA. Clearly the intention is to find some more active employment for the lame duck of Army Group C. It may be that the quality has been improved; according to one report recent drafts of Germans have considerably reduced the percentage of Turcomans in the Division.

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North of the PO there have been no important changes in the Alpine sector. In N.E. ITALY a good source puts 710 Div between UDINE and CHIOGGIA, a vague statement which suggests the Division may be engaged in the coastwatching duties to which it became so accustomed in NORWAY.

There is no change in enemy capabilities. If KESSELRING has been called on for more divisions than the two already surrendered he will no doubt comply as expeditiously as possible, but under present conditions, unless its onward journey is to be entirely by road, with consequent expenditure of precious fuel, it is calculated that not much less than fifteen days must elapse between the time a division is withdrawn from the line and the time it clears from ITALY. At this rate it will be the end of March before KESSELRING really begins to feel the pinch in ITALY and must begin to consider a withdrawal to a shorter line.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

While the weather has restricted our air effort during the past few days, heavy attacks were made during the first part of the week and a high degree of rail interdiction has existed throughout the week. All routes between the PADUA and UDINE areas have been continuously blocked at three or more points; in fact no through traffic has been possible in this area for about one month. However, repairs are being pushed and the main TREVISO-UDINE line may be opened to through traffic shortly unless further attacked soon. Beyond UDINE the Southern frontier route may still be out, the Central route continues blocked and the important Northern route has been closed to through traffic for at least two of the past seven days. It is almost certain that the BRENNER has been continuously closed to through traffic since 4 Feb, probably by no less than two blocks at any one time. Briefly, then, while the UDINE area has been accessible by rail from Southern GERMANY for most of the past week, the PO Valley has been wholly isolated from GERMANY in so far as through rail traffic is concerned for at least the past ten days. It is true that the Swiss rail routes have been open, but they should not be, and recent ground reports indicate that they are not in fact available for military traffic.

With the railways interdicted as above indicated considerable MT movement is to be expected, and in fact has been observed. While an appreciable portion of this road traffic can be attributed to the movement of military supplies to the front, and the continued transportation to GERMANY of industrial materials and foodstuffs, the volume is such as to indicate something more; this extra volume of road traffic might represent initial steps to a general evacuation, but, on the basis of ground reports and PR of the railways, it is far more likely to involve a troop movement, probably 16 S.S. P.G. Div departing from ITALY in as much as 356 Inf Div would appear to have cleared ITALY sometime during the first week of this month. (Further details on railways and shipping appear at Appendix 'A').

While troop movements may be making appreciable demands on enemy fuel stocks supply requirements for the present scale of fighting must be considered as very low and no real shortages are to be expected. However, PW information from FRANCE and economic considerations (see Appendix 'B') suggest that in addition to an overall fuel shortage, GERMANY is now also handicapped by a diminishing ammunition production. Though the enemy has long practised strict economy of artillery ammunition in this theatre and ammunition shortages have been reported from time to time, no evidence as yet has come to hand which directly attributes such shortages to reduced production. However, any fall-off in production is likely to have occurred subsequent to the last heavy fighting in this theatre, and hence indications thereof would not have become apparent here. So far as ITALY is concerned it is believed that the enemy holds reasonably satisfactory stocks of ammunition, but replenishment is of course always threatened by the vulnerability of his L of C.

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3. WESTERN FRONT

Last week saw the end of the German bridgehead in Southern ALSACE. Apart from a thinly held pocket North of CERNAY, which was quickly wiped out by French troops, the enemy succeeded in getting his forces back to the East bank of the RHINE without suffering many additional losses. However, most of the divisions which were in the pocket will have need of considerable rest before they are in any state to resume active operations. A probable exception is 2 Mtn Division which despite a notably bad performance appears to be leaving ALSACE, possibly for employment further North. The general trend of movement appears to be Northwards from Northern ALSACE as well as from the South and there are several notable absentees on First German Army's front. 25 P.G. Div is now probably in the East, while 21 Pz and 10 S.S. Pz Divs are both out of the line. This leaves twelve infantry divisions and one P.G. Div holding the First Army front between TRIER and the RHINE North of STRASBOURG. There is little evidence for the location or destination of the missing divisions. Rail movement continues N.W. from FRANKFURT as well as Eastward, suggesting that some forces at any rate are on the way to the RUHR sector.

There has been little fresh to report from the EIFEL. 11 Pz Division not conforming to the prevailing fashion in the West is still in the line and has been firmly reidentified in this past week in its old sector South of TRIER. It has in fact been indulging in limited and inconclusive aggressiveness. Further North, the infantry of the German Seventh Army continues to give ground albeit stubbornly. A notable success was gained last week when we cleared the enemy from the high ridge of the SCHNEE EIFEL overlooking the town of PRÜM. We have breached the Siegfried defences in this area and are fighting in PRÜM itself against fierce enemy opposition. The enemy seems to have been a little surprised at the comparative ease with which the Siegfried line was pierced, and has hastily brought up 2 Pz Div from reserve and 256 Infantry Division from ALSACE, both of which are now fighting in the PRÜM sector.

North of the EIFEL bulge, the stiffened enemy resistance in the SCHMIDT area following the arrival of 3 P.G. Div did not stop the American First Army reaching the ROER river along its whole front. As a result of the operations of the past three weeks we now hold all of GERMANY West of this river. A battle has now developed for the dams over the river. Although we were able to seize intact part of one dam, the enemy by blowing the outlet pipes on all three dams in the region has succeeded in raising the level of the ROER river by four feet, and a considerable stream is now running. Some flooding has been caused, and operations are proving extremely difficult.

Enemy reaction to the British attack in the REICHSWALD was at first slow, although extensive minefields were encountered. In the first five days of the attack elements of only three divisions were contacted amounting to some seven regiments in all. However with the fall of CLEVE, a considerable stiffening of German resistance has become apparent. 7 Para Div, missing from Northern ALSACE for over a fortnight, has put in an appearance; so has 116 Pz Division which had been in reserve in the DUSSELDORF area. Ground conditions in this sector, too, are difficult in the extreme, and one Allied Division at any rate is conducting its operations in assault boats.

The Western Front is now going through a transitional period. The great battles of the winter are over, and although many bitter actions are in progress at this present time they do not constitute the major battles which RUNDSTEDT must expect in the Spring and Summer. In fine weather with the ground hard the present operations on the Dutch frontier would be a serious threat to the RUHR and to the whole German line in the West. Even now when the prevailing conditions make progress of necessity slow, RUNDSTEDT has shown clearly that he is not disposed to take the threat lightly. He would probably at present like to play a waiting game, using the time still left to him to prepare for the battles of the Spring. There are at the moment out of the line one P.G. and three Pz Divisions, but little infantry.

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replacements which he did at the end of last year. True two divisions (233 Pz Trg and 166 Res) are at this time leaving DENMARK, destination unknown. In December there would have been a reasonable certainty that they were Westward bound, but there can be no guarantee of that to-day, nor that no further claims will soon be made on the West. Hence, uncertain of the future, RUNDSTEDT's policy must be to keep intact as much of his armour as he can, and to try to rest the infantry. His tardy reaction to the British attack is a measure of his reluctance to commit reserves. Nevertheless he is being forced to commit them, and he is succeeding neither in keeping his armour intact nor in resting the infantry. In these circumstances the success of our present attacks is to be measured as much by the extent to which they compel RUNDSTEDT to keep or commit in the line divisions which would otherwise be resting as by the territorial gains made.

4. EASTERN FRONT

(a) EAST PRUSSIA AND EASTERN GERMANY

Notable gains in East PRUSSIA and GERMANY have marked the opening of the second month of the Soviet winter offensive. In East PRUSSIA, the capture of ELBING has reduced the German hold to a small area South of KÖNIGSBERG and to the city itself which is still being stubbornly defended, although ROKOSSOVSKY continues to make slow progress from the South. ELBING was the second largest town in East PRUSSIA, its importance lying mainly in the SCHICHAU yards which were at one time producing six submarines a month as well as M.T.Bs. 170 Inf Div appears to have taken a heavy battering at the hands of the Soviets in the course of this battle.

No further progress has been made by the Russians in their drive on DANZIG but in POMERANIA the left wing of the 2nd White Russian Army Group has been extended in the direction of STETTIN. DEUTSCH KRONE, a junction of five railways and six highroads, has been captured while troops of the First Polish Army took MÄRKISCH FRIEDLAND to the N.W. The Russians are now within 10 miles of STARGARD having by-passed and encircled ARNSWALDE. The capture of STARGARD would cut the main trunk line from STETTIN to DANZIG and would confine land communication between BERLIN and the German forces in DANZIG and N.W. POLAND to the road and subsidiary rail network passing through the bottleneck at STETTIN.

While the First White Russian Group has been able to broaden the Northern flank of the Soviet salient pointing at BERLIN Marshal KONIEV has been securing the left flank of his First Ukrainian Army Group by a break out from the STEINAU bridgehead in the direction of GÖRLITZ. This drive has made very considerable headway. After cutting the BRESLAU-BERLIN highway, the Russians took LIEGNITZ and are now within 25 miles of GÖRLITZ. BRESLAU itself is in grave danger of encirclement from a a link-up of the two large Soviet bridgeheads over the ODER on both sides of it. This drive is undoubtedly the most important development of the past week. KONIEV is now in a fair way to getting his left wing resting safely on the RIESENGEBIRGE, a natural defence considerably more reassuring than that of the ODER. The prospects of a German counter-attack against the Central Soviet Army Groups have appreciably diminished. Not only has the latest Soviet advance reduced the vulnerability of the Soviet Southern flank, but equally important, any preparations for a counter-attack which the enemy may have been making South of FRANKFURT must have been seriously disrupted by the continued Soviet progress in the direction of Central GERMANY.

Some changes in the chain of command in the East have been reported during the past week. A document captured by the Russians is signed by Col-Gen SCHOERNER as Commander of Army Group Centre. SCHOERNER was last known as commander of Army Group North. There is no news of his successor in Army Group North, but on 6 Feb the VÖLKISCHER BEOBACHTER came out with the statement that HIMMLER had an Army Group on the Central sector. Another report associates him with POMERANIA. The situation is thus a little obscure. It is of course conceivable that the disasters in the East have led

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to a rapid change of commanders similar to that in the West last summer. However SCHOERNER is a violent Nazi and would probably be regarded as a reliable General at the present time. It seems more likely in view of this that a further Army Group has appeared in the East to relieve Army Group North of part of its present three front commitment in LATVIA, East PRUSSIA and N.E. POLAND. North could then be left to deal with the Latvian and possibly East Prussian battles while HIMMLER and SCHOERNER cope with the war on German soil. Excluding YUGOSLAVIA there would then be five Army Groups on the Eastern Front.

(b) HUNGARY

The main news from HUNGARY is of the fall of BUDA. An indication that the end was near came on Feb 12 when the Soviet night communiqué reported the capture in two days of 30,000 prisoners. By the following morning came the admission from BERLIN that resistance in the capital had come to an end. Thus ends the long protracted battle which has probably cost the Germans the better part of some six divisions, not to speak of the wasted efforts expended in two fruitless counter-attacks. For the Russians the capture of the city will vastly simplify the supply problem in any further advance into Western HUNGARY since all the main roads and railways of Central HUNGARY converged on the capital. Elsewhere in HUNGARY there has been little to report. Russian counter-attacks have continued S.E. of SZEKESFEHERVAR but without making any great headway.

A number of order of battle changes are reported this week. 44 Inf Div appears to have moved from the BALATON sector to the area North of the DANUBE near KOMAROM. In the same area 211 Inf Div has been identified. This is a new arrival in Army Group South; it was last identified in October 1944 on the Central sector. It now seems clear too that 2 Pz Army has passed from command of Army Group F to Army Group South. This would be a logical development since it extends Army Group South's sphere of command down to the Hungarian Southern frontier, thus confining Army Group F's command to the Yugoslav area. 2 Pz Army is believed to control 1 Mtn, 71 Inf and 118 Jg Divisions. As a result of these changes the strength of Army Group South is now estimated to be thirty divisions.

(c) YUGOSLAVIA

Events in the BARCS bridgehead have dominated the Yugoslav scene in this past week. An attack against the two-months old Partisan-Soviet bridgehead over the DRAVA was launched from the East and South on the morning of 8 Feb, and it soon became apparent that this operation was on a very much larger scale than either of the two previous attempts to eliminate the bridgehead. Elements of at least four German Divisions took part in the attack, from right to left, 11 G.A.F., 297 Inf, a battlegroup of 7 S.S. Mtn (from the BIJELJINA area) and the STEFAN Division. The latter is an ad hoc formation believed to be equated with 284 Reserve Division which has been consistently reported in YUGOSLAVIA over the past six months. The attack made considerable headway and was taken up by 1 Cossack Division from the West capturing VIROVITICA. Since then enemy progress has been rapid and it now appears that the whole of the bridgehead has been eliminated. As a threat to the BROD-ZAGREB railway it proved of considerable value in tying up German forces, but it was in fact never reinforced or exploited by the Russians on a scale sufficient to threaten the German position in YUGOSLAVIA.

In DALMATIA, the Partisans have made a rapid come-back after the German drive in the MOSTAR area. A counter-attack launched from the S.W. led to the fall of SIROKI BRIJEG, the important strongpoint covering MOSTAR from the West, causing the enemy no little alarm. It is clear however, that the Germans have still no intention of abandoning MOSTAR voluntarily, and there is evidence that some infatry and artillery reinforcements have recently arrived there.

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N.E. of SARAJEVO enemy operations in the DRINA Valley are continuing to make progress. Having captured ZVORNIK 22 Inf Div has been pushing Northwards to the BIJELJINA area where it has been engaged in heavy fighting. Something of a set-back has been suffered however by the Partisan recapture of VLASENICE on the main SARAJEVO-ZVORNIK road. 22 Inf Div storming Northwards may have swept the Partisans off the road itself, but that was about all it did; now that the storm has passed the Partisans have had little difficulty in re-assuming occupation of VLASENICE. Presumably 181 Inf Div will now be called upon to retake the town again.

The only interesting changes in enemy dispositions this week affect 104 Jg and 237 Inf Divs. The former was operating in the TRAVNIK area in the first week of February. However by 10 Feb elements of it were certainly back in the VUKOVAR region. A report from the BIHAC area that billets were being reserved for 3,000 troops gives rise to the theory that elements of the Division were going up there to strengthen the sadly weakened garrison of XV Corps. Possibly the Division may now be operating in two battle groups, one in Western YUGOSLAVIA, the other in the SREM.

A Partisan source states that II/1047 of 237 Inf Div is at LUPOGLAV. Of the fifteen Yugoslav villages which bear this name, that at J 6618 North of SENJ is the nearest to ISTRIA and the most likely location. Elements of 237 Division may well have been sent to DALMATIA possibly to reinforce the Island of KRK or to act as a counter-attack force in the event of an Allied landing. There is some evidence that the enemy is concerned about the security of this Island, and the garrison has recently been raised to 1,200 men by the arrival of 500 Ustachi troops.

From the SISAK area further reports have been received of a concentration of Cossack troops. An earlier report has stated that 2 Cossack Division was forming in this area, and while this lacks confirmation, it appears quite reasonable.

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RAILWAYS

BRENNER

The BRENNER railway has remained blocked throughout the week and in addition to attacks on the through right-of-way VERONA and TRENTO marshalling yards have been raided. All week we have kept reasonably well ahead of enemy repair efforts despite the fact that towards the end of the week weather appreciably cut down the scale of air attacks. Perhaps the most important development is that on 7 Feb we achieved for the first time in a considerable period heavy structural damage to bridges, thereby creating blocks of a more permanent nature than have heretofore existed. The number of cuts South of BOLZANO has varied between two and four; North of BOLZANO the line has remained, as usual, open. Unfortunately our attempt on 5 Feb to block the BRENNER just North of VERONA at F 5267 by creating a landslide, initially thought to have been successful, was seen on photos of 7 Feb to have failed to block the tracks.

As might be expected, in view of the existing interdiction, PR has shown little rail movement along the BRENNER South of BOLZANO. Some activity was noted on PR of 7 and 8 Feb and on the 11th two trains, moving in opposite directions were seen South of TRENTO. Good cover of VERONA marshalling yards on the 10th showed that there had been a considerable turnover of flat cars since the 29th, but whether these were cleared by way of the BRENNER is uncertain. South of BOLZANO there has been little, if any, indication of troops moving by rail; North of BOLZANO PR has not been available, but on the basis of road movement converging on the BOLZANO area it is quite possible that troops are loading here for movement to GERMANY.

N.E. ITALY

Between the UDINE and PADUA areas all rail lines remain blocked but appreciable repairs have been effected and activity has been noted. Despite repairs a high degree of interdiction appears to continue in this area but the exact railway situation is somewhat obscure. Definite activity has been noted over a relatively short stretch of open track East of PADUA though day PR shows that all bridges over the BRENTA river immediately East of a line VICENZA-PADUA are blocked. On 8 February in the area in question fighter-bombers attacked a train loaded with MT and AFVs and two lengths of wagons loaded with MT, and PR of the 13th revealed the presence of a probable troop train. Aside from these observations there is evidence to indicate that there is in fact a leak in the BRENTA river line of interdiction at the bridge immediately North of PADUA. This bridge had been repaired and been passable for a period of about two weeks when day PR of 6 Feb revealed that two spans had been removed and a few days later only one span was seen to be missing, the remaining gap being about 50 feet. Under the circumstances it seems probable that this bridge is being made passable at night by the temporary erection of the missing span.

Beyond UDINE the TARVISIO route, the most important of the three frontier routes, has been blocked at a point about 60 rail kilometres North of UDINE for at least two days during the past week, and there is fairly good evidence of troops having been transhipped around this break during the week. The central frontier route remains cut. The Southern route to LJUBLJANA has not been covered by PR since 29 Jan at which time the viaduct at BOROVNICA about 80 rail kilometres East of TRIESTE was still heavily damaged; this viaduct may, however, have been repaired by this time.

While little change in rolling stock is evident on the TREVISO-UDINE line, CASARSA (C 1508) and UDINE have shown some increase since last week; stations and yards, however, remain fairly heavily loaded, on the 8th fighter-bombers saw rolling stock loaded with AFVs and MT, and on the 13th PR showed a probable troop train at PLANZANO (B 6504). The two much

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battered routes to the South of the TREVISO-UDINE line have, as usual, shown almost no activity whatsoever. Further East on 8 Feb about 40 empty flat cars were observed between UDINE and GORIZIA which is unusual for this stretch of line. Along the UDINE-TARVISIO route there has been definite activity. Whereas some 45 flat cars were noted along this route on the 4th, PR of the 8th showed that this number had doubled; on the 12th 37 flats loaded with AFVs was seen at GEMONA (C 3443) and on the following day 13 flats, of which eight were loaded with AFVs or MT, were seen a little further North. On the basis of these observations a troop movement almost certainly seems to be in progress through N.E. ITALY.

PO VALLEY AND N.W. ITALY

There is no change in the rail bridges across the PO river. PIACENZA rail bridge has been attacked but PR indicates that it is still passable.

In the area generally between VERONA and MILAN interdiction has been somewhat stepped-up both on the main MILAN-VERONA route and the lines leading South therefrom. The main MILAN-VERONA line is definitely blocked and the secondary line paralleling the PO river to the South may also be blocked by virtue of cuts in the immediate vicinity of MANTUA.

While a rather large decrease in rolling stock was observed at MILAN between 31 Jan and 7 Feb no unusual rail activity has been noted in the N.W. South of the PO there continues to be but little activity although fighter-bombers on 12 Feb claimed to have strafed ten flat cars loaded with tanks on the line between PARMA and PIACENZA.

SHIPPING

On the Ligurian coast, the ports of GENOA, SPEZIA and SAVONA continue to be active. Since 31 Jan 3 MT ships have been plying between GENOA and SPEZIA and an MV, believed to be the 1,000 ton DOMINANTE which was previously sailing between GENOA and SAVONA, has made this run at least once. A MT ship is now sailing between GENOA and SAVONA besides the usual quota of small coasters, schooners and supply barges. There were 21 F-boats and 12 barges at active berths in GENOA harbour on 8 February, and there has been both F-boat and barge activity at SESTRI LEVANTE and SESTRI PONENTE during the past week. At SPEZIA a sunken 480' MV has been raised and moved from its position in the bay to a flooded dry dock. It is probable that this vessel will be used to close the remaining 400' of open channel at the S.W. entrance to the port.

Over of the Adriatic ports has been incomplete during the past week but at least four coasters over 2,000 tons were plying between VENICE and TRIESTE up to 6 Feb and 2 MV's arrived at the latter port from POLA and the ARSA Channel on 4 Feb. Another MV had left POLA by 8 Feb. The enemy is still making use of the lagoons and inland waterways North of VENICE, and barges were seen at TREVISO (G 6476), GRADO (H 5276), PORTO NOGARO (H 3992) and MURANO LAGUNARE (H 3586) on 8 Feb.

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GERMAN AMMUNITION SHORTAGE

The following information on a probable overall German ammunition shortage is extracted from SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary for the week ending 4 Feb '45.

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1. PW EVIDENCE

Over the past week there is ample evidence that the shortages previously reported by prisoners of war as prevalent in Wehrmacht formations continue to make themselves felt and influence operations in the West.

Foremost among these is the fuel shortage which continues to leave tanks stranded, which forces artillery units to employ horses as motive power and which restricts the use of those motor transport still available for the supplying of forward troops. These conditions are further complicated by the prevailing shortage of serviceable motor vehicles, whose ranks are increasingly depleted by air attacks and numerous mechanical failures.

However, more difficult to appreciate are the frequent references to shortages of ammunition, particularly the most commonly used types such as LFH and MFH ammunition. While prisoners occasionally report deficiencies of heavy mortar and werfer ammunition, the frequency with which support artillery and even 7.5 cm infantry gun ammunition is reported by enemy prisoners as being in short supply gives weight to the possibility that an overall shortage of one or all of these ammunition types may exist. The practice of rationing available stocks of artillery ammunition has been noted for several months, and a statement by a recently captured prisoner from the artillery regiment of 18 Volksgrenadier Division to the effect that owing to the necessity for saving LFH ammunition only interdiction missions could be fired, is but one of many reports which indicate that economies of this nature continue in effect. Another prisoner reported that his artillery battalion ran out of LFH ammunition completely and consequently had to withdraw. While it is probably true that ammunition difficulties are most frequently a result of the breakdown of supply transport, it is worth noting that enemy infantry units engaged in the front lines are rarely stated to be suffering from small arms or mortar ammunition shortages and sometimes are even reported as having so much on hand that it proves an encumbrance. Although the supply problem in the case of artillery is complicated by virtue of the weight of the ammunition itself, it would seem reasonable to suppose that with the advantage of more open road communications and the added protection of bad weather as well as periods of darkness, adequate supplies of these important types of ammunition would be on hand if indeed such were available.

References among enemy prisoners to shortages of these main ammunition types, while in themselves not concrete evidence that an overall shortage exists, have been mentioned with such regularity over the last few months that transport difficulties notwithstanding, the possibility remains and bears close watching that an artillery ammunition shortage in the overall sense has joined fuel and motor transport shortages in limiting the enemy's operational capabilities.

This suggestion of overall ammunition shortage arising from the statements of prisoners would appear to be borne out by economic evidence presented below.

2. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

A number of recent reports have indicated that the production of

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ammunition in general in GERMANY and German occupied territory has been on the decline. One of these reports stated that output of shells dropped during the last months of 1944, being only 12 million shells of all calibres during October, instead of 15 million required.

It is extremely difficult to check figures of this kind and to gauge their effects on the supply position. Nevertheless, the report was of interest as being the first to state that the drop in ammunition production which, on general grounds had been expected, had actually occurred.

Of the various processes involved in the production of ammunition - projectile body manufacture, high explosive manufacture, filling, etc - the one which ground reports had indicated as the weakest section of the industry up until the recent Russian occupation of the Silesian steelworks was propellant manufacture. The recent advances on the Eastern Front deprived the enemy of sources of explosive supply through the occupation of factories at PIONKI and BROMBERG. In 1942 PIONKI contributed 6 per cent of German propellant supplies for the Western theatre of war, besides an unknown proportion to supplies for the Russian front. The output of the factory was stepped up from 400 tons per month during the latter half of 1943 to nearly 700 tons per month in March 1944 and was no doubt part of a general drive by the Germans to increase production of propellants. BROMBERG contributed 6 per cent to German propellant supplies in the West in 1943, and its capacity for high explosives production and high explosives filling has been estimated to represent some 8 per cent of the German total at mid-summer 1944. At that time the factory was incomplete and had probably reached only about one-half of its intended ultimate production.

It is likely, therefore, that the loss of these two plants represents 10 to 15 per cent of German propellant supplies and about 10 per cent of German high explosives manufacturing and filling capacity at the end of 1944.

An estimated 12 per cent of the total German production of sulphite pulp, a product used in the manufacture of explosives, has been lost through the Russian occupation of the WALDHOF's mills at RAGNIT and TILSIT. It is thought that by substantially reducing sulphite pulp supplies for rayon, paper and board mill, the priority requirements of the explosives industry will probably continue to be met.

Though propellant manufacture may still remain a weak link in ammunition production, the recent loss of the Silesian steel industry will probably have created an even weaker link. It is thought that the loss of iron ore supplies may cause such a reduction in German steel output during 1945 as to interfere seriously with allocation of steel to shell production, the largest consumer. The occupation of SILESIA may well deprive German ammunition factories of at least 25 per cent of their supplies of shell bodies immediately. It seems very probable, therefore, that these factors, combined with the difficulties being experienced by the Germans in maintaining steel production in the RUHR as a result of the bombing of communications, may now mean that steel is an even more critical factor in ammunition than propellants.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 82

OF 20 FEBRUARY, 1945

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

16 S.S. Div is well on its way out of ITALY and may by now be clear over the border but there is as yet no sign of any other formation following it. There is, however, some reshuffling taking place on 8 Army front, the significance of which is not clear at the moment. Elsewhere dispositions are normal and evidence of a change in strategic intentions, despite a flood of rumours, is still to seek.

On the Eastern flank there is no further evidence that 114 Jaeger Div is taking over part of the front near Lake COMACCHIO; the dead men who provided the main weight for the theory could tell no tales and have not been corroborated by prisoners or deserters. The gap left by 16 S.S. Div has been filled mainly by an extension Northwards of the sector of 362 Div which has involved a move North by 98 Div also. In what was the extreme right-hand sector of the latter's front, held by 117 G.R., three deserters on 20 Feb identify both bns of 67 P.G.R. of 26 Pz Div. The Division has not been in action since before Christmas and there is no obvious reason why it should have come in again now. 278 Div has only been holding a regiment's worth of front and could easily have taken over another two bns' worth from 98 Div and the fact that it has not may give support to the idea that it is wanted elsewhere. If 9 P.G.R. comes in on the South of 67 P.G.R. we shall be fairly certain that the frostbitten deserter's story was right and General HOPPE is going off to seek new glory on the Eastern Front. It is perhaps worth pointing out that, although the chances are against such a move in the present strategic situation, the enemy could launch an offensive down route 9 and on to FAENZA from the North with 4 Para, 90 P.G. and 26 Pz Divs. An offensive in this area might perhaps have more point if it were intended as a cover to a withdrawal movement. In the meantime another candidate for release, 715 Div, now seems firmly in place and it appears that the sidestepping of 90 P.G. Div had as its purpose only the relief of 1028 G.R. for reasons not known to us but apparently urgent.

On 5 Army front our attack in the Monte BELVEDERE area seems to have hit the right flank of 232 Div, as expected, and prisoners have been taken from 232 Fusilier Bn and both bns of 1044 G.R. We appear to have achieved a fairly complete measure of surprise and enemy reaction so far has been slow. Prisoners provide evidence that both 4 Alpine Bn and the MITTENWALD Lehr Bn are still on our front; the former appears to be between 232 and MONTEROSA Divs and the latter may have moved forward to the same area from PONTREMOLI. 1 BERSAGLIERI Regt of ITALIA has provided a large number of deserters and has now been bolstered up by a bn from 2 BERSAGLIERI Regt which does not seem of any higher quality.

Behind the lines 162 Turcoman Division continues to concentrate. A battalion of its artillery regiment which was under command of 232 Div left about 14 Feb, presumably to rejoin. None of its units seems to have come into the line on 8 Army front; possibly it is intended for coast-watching North of Lake COMACCHIO. Further North still the S.S. KARST Division appears to have acquired the more official designation of 24 S.S. Mountain Div, but there is no evidence that the change involves either an increase in numbers or improvement in quality.

...2. ENEMY SUPPLIES.....

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Movement of troops continues to be the focus of interest on the enemy's L of C this week. Compared to last week there has been appreciably less road movement reported in enemy rear areas North of the PO, but this is thought attributable mainly to bad weather conditions. In any event ground sources continue to report troops on the move, and from PR of the railways it is certain that a large formation is on its way out of ITALY. The movement has been noted on both the BRENNER and Northeastern rail routes. It was known by last week that 16 S.S. P.G. Div was then in the process of following 356 Inf Div out of ITALY and the movement this week, in view of the degree of interdiction of the railways, is still believed to involve the S.S. Division and not a third formation.

As to the supply situation it can only be said that regardless of the enemy's transportation difficulties shortages are not likely to exist on the Appennine front at present in view of currently very low requirements. However, the enemy may well be having difficulty in providing sufficient fuel to move troops departing from ITALY with despatch. This is not only a logical assumption on the basis of what is known of the enemy's overall fuel position here as well as throughout German-controlled territory, but is also borne out by ground reports of troops moving on foot through rear areas and a report that MT carrying troops up the ADIGE Valley were held up when they exhausted their fuel.

As to the railways the degree of interdiction has somewhat fluctuated this week, but at no time during the week is it thought that through trains can have moved out of or into ITALY by way of any of the routes available for military traffic. Possibly the most important development during the week is the fact that our medium bombers have for the first time extended their zone of rail interdiction Northward on the BRENNER railway to a point only about 35 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass; this deepens what has heretofore been the normal zone of effective interdiction on the BRENNER by about 50 rail kilometres and will appreciably increase enemy transportation problems on this route.

Another point of interest with respect to the railways is that the enemy has seen fit to devote what must be considerable engineering facilities to repair of the very heavily damaged large rail viaduct at BOROVNICA on the TRIESTE-LJUBLJANA railway and to the construction of a difficult rail diversion at the same point. This obviously suggests that the enemy attaches considerable importance to this line, though it is essentially of secondary importance as compared to the BRENNER and TARVISIO routes. Behind this repair effort is seen the basic vulnerability of the enemy's L of C. The TRIESTE-LJUBLJANA route is one of only four railroads available for military traffic moving to or from points outside ITALY. (The other three are the PIEDECOLLE, or Central N.E. frontier route, the TARVISIO, or Northern N.E. frontier route, and the BRENNER). We have already demonstrated our ability to block all four simultaneously for a not inconsiderable period, even under rather unfavourable weather conditions. It has further become evident that owing to a number of transportation difficulties, among which rail interdiction is of basic importance, enemy troops now departing from ITALY are moving at a snail's pace, and the enemy must contemplate the coming of Spring and improved flying conditions with considerable apprehension for his L of C, particularly if his forces become involved in a major ground battle which will demand a large increase in essential supplies.

Enemy shipping in the Ligurian Sea and Northern Adriatic shows no unusual development this week. However, over the past month an increase in activity has been noted between TRIESTE and VENICE, presumably owing to the heavy rail interdiction obtaining in the N.E.

A detailed study of the state of the railways in ITALY and of the traffic by rail and sea is at Appendix 'A'.

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3. WESTERN FRONT

It is said of one of our great naval commanders when presented with a high award at a critical stage of the present war that he remarked "I would rather they had given me a squadron of Spitfires". A similar thought may have passed through Field Marshal von RUNDSTEDT's mind this week when he was awarded the Oak Leaves with Swords to his Rittorkreuz. It was a recognition of great services rendered and a reminder perhaps that greater tasks have still to be carried out. It was a portent too; for in these days medals are easier to come by than troops. Last week, RUNDSTEDT's attempts to extricate sufficient divisions from the line for a refit and to form a strategic reserve were no nearer solution. Against the two Volksgrenadier Divisions, the one Para Div and one Pz Div which had been withdrawn from the EIFEL front, had to be weighed the increased demands of the REICHSWALD battle into which have been drawn elements of four more divisions, and the certainty that further armour has left the Western Front.

In the South, the week has been quiet. 2 Mtn and 338 Inf Divs of 19 Army are still unaccounted for although train movement suggests that further forces are leaving ALSACE probably for the SAAR, and these two divisions seem to be the only ones to fit the present bill. 21 Pz Div has now been identified in the East, while 10 S.S. Pz Div is still missing but prisoners have said that it is leaving for GERMANY. It may be following the other S.S. Pz Divisions which have left the West. Only two S.S. Divisions - 17 P.G. and 6 Mtn are thus left on the Western Front. Apart from these absentees, all Army Group G's divisions are still in the line, although enemy reaction to our local attack West of BITCHE between the MOSELLE and SAAR rivers was initially slow. Further North, however, a number of limited counter-attacks, never more than a battalion strong, have characterised the week. In one of these near REICH, 11 Pz Div was engaged and lost five tanks. 11 Pz Div has now been out of contact for several days and is probably in reserve.

In contrast, the EIFEL-DÜREN sector was the quietest of the whole front last week. The enemy continued to offer only moderate resistance to Allied attacks near ECHTERNACH, and seemed content to let us expand our bridgehead over the SAUER river without undue interference. The bridgehead is now about four miles deep and twice as many wide. Nor did we have very great difficulty in capturing VIANDEN which fell after a short street battle. However, the enemy has been holding very firm in the PRÜM region and to the North, and we have made little further headway. It is clear however, that here he is trying hard to have his cake and eat it, for efforts are being made to get troops out of the line without thereby allowing us to exploit our penetration of the Siegfried defences. Armour is the crying need, but the one P.G. and two Pz Divisions in the area North of PRÜM are still engaged. Two Volksgrenadier Divisions and one Parachute Division have however been extricated, and are probably resting somewhere West of the RHINE.

The bitterest fighting of the week has been in the area of the REICHSWALD. When last week's Summary was written five enemy divisions had already been engaged in the battle, and in the past week a further four have appeared. The most interesting identification has been 15 P.G. Division which was brought back after a very brief period in reserve. It was the last uncommitted P.G. Div in the West. This has been followed by elements of one parachute division and one infantry division transferred from Western HOLLAND, and one parachute division from the ROERMOND area. Of the nine divisions engaged, four are thus parachute. As a result of these developments there has been a considerable stiffening of the enemy resistance in the CLEVE-GOCH area achieved partly at the expense of the now very thinly held front in Western HOLLAND. Another dam has been blown by the enemy during the week, this time North of CLEVE, and we are confronted with the worst floods of the whole campaign. Nevertheless appreciable progress has been made and we are now fighting in GOCH itself against embittered resistance.

RUNDSTEDT's account this week thus shows a slight increase in the amount of infantry which he has in reserve, but an appreciable deterioration in his armoured reserves. There are now five infantry or parachute divisions

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unaccounted for in the West, but at best only three Panzer Divisions and no S.S. Divisions at all. The dummies of the Eastern Front have indeed taken their toll. Excluding the four Panzer Divisions of 6 S.S. Pz Army which are all unlocated, at least seven divisions two of them mobile, have been transferred to the Eastern front since the beginning of this year. RUNDSTEDT may thus legitimately feel that he has done his part and may hope that no further major demands will be made upon him. For his own situation is not happy. The unforgiving minutes are passing and the sombre tune to which they are played is once more called by his enemies.

4. EASTERN FRONT

(a) East PRUSSIA and Eastern GERMANY

There has been little change in East PRUSSIA where ROKOSSOVSKY is making only slow progress in the approaches to KÖNIGSBERG. The death of General CHERNYAKOVSKY, Commander of the 3rd White Russian Army Group, is a serious loss to the Soviet forces in East PRUSSIA. CHERNYAKOVSKY was the youngest Army Group Commander in the Soviet Union and in the present campaign was responsible for the capture of TILSIT and the breakthrough the INSTERBURG Gap towards KÖNIGSBERG. He was, incidentally, the first Russian commander to penetrate into German territory last November.

On the main front in POLAND and GERMANY the enemy is offering fierce resistance to the Soviet forces in POMERANIA. No further Russian progress has been made in the direction either of DANZIG or of STETTIN, but the capture of CHOJNICE just West of the German border about 70 miles S.W. of DANZIG gives the Russians control of a useful road centre. Now that SCHNEIDEMÜHL has fallen, the Russians hold a 150 mile stretch of the BERLIN-DANZIG trunk line between KÜSTRIN and CHOJNICE. Further West there seems to be little doubt that Marshal ZHUKOV has crossed the ODER on the direct approaches to BERLIN in the FRANKFURT-KÜSTRIN area. For over a fortnight the Germans have reported several Soviet bridgeheads in this area, and they now speak of KUSTRIN as being practically surrounded. The Soviets have made no official claims of crossings, but have spoken for the first time of the battle for the fortified approaches to BERLIN. 25 S.S. Div from the Eastern Front seems to have been engaged in the battle for KÜSTRIN and is reported to have suffered severe losses.

Further South Marshal KONIEV's drive into Southern GERMANY has made slower progress during the week. The QUEIS and QUBISS rivers have been crossed and the Soviets stand 8 miles from GÖRLITZ. However, the advance seems to have slowed down in the past two days with KONIEV's left flank still just short of the RIESENGEBIRGE. This may be in part due to the recent thaw, in part to the development of the battle around BRESLAU. BRESLAU, as forecast last week, was encircled by a link-up of the two ODER bridgeheads North and South of the town, and the Soviet ring is closing in on the town. To the S.W., however, the Germans still cling to their bridgehead on the East bank of the ODER South of OPPELN. As this lies very close to the vital OBERSCHLESIEN industrial region, the enemy's continued retention of the bridgehead is a little disturbing and the area needs very careful watching.

Several interesting identifications are reported by the Russians from the Central sector. 21 Panzer Division from the West and 20 Pz Div from HUNGARY have been identified under Army Group Centre, together with a curious miscellany of new infantry divisions which appear to bear titles rather than numbers. Some of these may, of course, be S.S. Divs with an S.S. number, although none has been reported. Some of the titles suggest that they may be hastily formed Volkssturm Divs. They are as follows: Infantry Divs SCHMIDT, BERLIN, BRANDT, MARKISCH-FRIEDLAND, GROSS ADMIRAL DÖNITZ and (a new venture in German divisional terminology reminiscent of Italian Blackshirt practice) P.G. Div '30th January'. We know nothing of the quality of these formations, but there is certainly need of further forces in Eastern GERMANY. 4 Pz Army seems to have taken a particularly bad knock in the Silesian fighting, while Soviet claims for the whole front suggest that enemy casualties are averaging 5,000 men a day. Casualties in the West are

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at present about 2,000 men per day; so that the enemy is now losing roughly the equivalent of one division every two days.

(b) CZECHOSLOVAKIA and HUNGARY

4 S.S. P.G. Div, formerly in the LOSONC area, is reported to have left for the North. Otherwise there has been no major change in the situation in CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

In HUNGARY the week has seen renewed German counter-attacks in the area North of the DANUBE. The enemy has been able to gain some ground between the NITRA and the HRON rivers, and according to one report has been able to establish a small bridgehead from the South bank of the DANUBE West of ESZTERGOM on to the North bank in the area West of the HRON. There is so far no satisfactory evidence as to the scale or objective of these operations, but it may be of significance that 356 Inf Division from ITALY has already been identified in action N.W. of BUDAPEST.

The cost to the enemy of the defence of BUDAPEST is now clearer. Total German and Hungarian casualties amounted to some 175,000 men, and the Germans lost the bulk of, if not the whole of, the following five divisions under command of 9 S.S. Mtn Corps : 271 Inf, 13 Pz, 60 P.G., 8 S.S. Cav and 22 SS Cav Divisions. After the final reduction of BUDA was completed, a number of German forces attempted to break out to the West. A few of these seem to have succeeded in getting through to the German lines West of BUDAPEST, but the majority were destroyed North West of BUDAPEST. What remnants remained of 8 S.S. Cav Division after the BUDA battle seem to have been eliminated in this last desperate attempt.

(c) YUGOSLAVIA

There is evidence that the withdrawal of Army Group E which halted about a month ago South of SARAJEVO, has once more been resumed. Last week, two of the advanced outposts covering SARAJEVO, MOSTAR and VISEGRAD fell. The former was abandoned by the enemy after a sharp battle, the latter without any interference from Partisans. Rearguards of 21 Mtn Corps, consisting probably of elements of 369 Division are now about six miles N.E. of MOSTAR, while east of VISEGRAD considerable Westward road movement is reported. TRAVNIK, its garrison fatally weakened by the departure of 104 Jg Division for the SREM is again in Partisan hands. The suddenness of the German withdrawal from the DRINA line at VISEGRAD has not been without its embarrassments, particularly to the unfortunate 22 Inf Division at ZVORNIK which, as report would have it, is now reduced to eating fodder. Prior to the German withdrawal from VISEGRAD it was already cut off from SARAJEVO by the Partisan occupation of VLASENICA. Since then it has been engaged in very heavy fighting in the ZVORNIK area and is now reported to be isolated in three main pockets in the DRINA Valley - ZVORNIK, KOSLUK (C 19) and BRANJEVO (X 20). 7 S.S. Mtn Division, only recently arrived in the SREM from the DRINA Valley, has had to send down a relief force from DJEDINA to extricate the isolated forces and will no doubt succeed in so doing with the ruthlessness which has characterised its past two years of Balkan warfare.

Fighting has also been taking place South of the DRAVA in the PAPUK Mountains to which some of the former Partisan garrison in the BARCS bridgehead withdrew after the elimination of the bridgehead. DARUVAR, F 57 has been cleared by the enemy, but the Partisans seem to be retreating in good order into the hills.

Apart from those mentioned above, there have been few changes in enemy dispositions this week. No further reports of 104 Jg Div's arrival at DJAKOVO have been received, so the division has probably all gone to the SREM. A number of reports indicate that 369 or 373 German-Croat Division or both may be leaving N.W. YUGOSLAVIA. These reports are so far unconfirmed. There is however, good evidence that a Cossack Corps is setting up from 1 Cossack Division. Lt. Gen HELMUTH von PANNWITZ, ex G.O.C. 1 Cossack Div,

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is stated to be the new Corps Commander with H.Q. at KUTINA P 15. 2 Cossack Div is setting up in the SISAK-KUTINA area where 8 Cossack Regt, formed from recent arrivals from GERMANY, is located. The presence of 8 Cossack Regt in 2 Cossack Div presupposes the inclusion of 7 Cossack Regt also.

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RAILWAYS

RAIL STATE

BRENNER

The BRENNER is thought to have been blocked throughout the week raising the total number of days during which it has not been open to through traffic to 17. The major developments in the state of the BRENNER this week have been the possible opening of the VERONA-BOLZANO stretch to through traffic for the first time in about two weeks and the deepening of the zone of interdiction Northward. On 17 Feb PR North from VERONA to BOLZANO showed the line open with the exception of ALA bridge (F 668900) where, however, repairs had proceeded to such a point as to indicate that they would probably be complete within 24 hours. However, on both the 17th and 18th the VERONA-BOLZANO stretch was attacked and, while bombing conditions were difficult, fair to good results are claimed, so that it seems not unlikely that the line was never entirely opened up. In any event even though it is possible that the line between VERONA and BOLZANO may have been opened up by 18 Feb, a bridge North of BOLZANO at B 188908 near BRESSANONE was successfully attacked on the 17th and still seen to be out on the 19th, at which time repairs were seen to be in progress but damage was such as to require several days to repair. (BRESSANONE bridge had previously been attacked on 14 Feb and rendered impassable, but damage was slight and repairs may well have been completed before the attack of the 17th). The significant feature of the cutting of the BRESSANONE bridge is that it is the first time the BRENNER has been blocked North of BOLZANO in over two months and secondly, and perhaps most important, is the fact that it was done by medium bombers; before this the mediums had struck no further North than ORA (15 kilometres South of BOLZANO). Until now the enemy have had practically continuous use of the BRENNER railway North of BOLZANO, sporadic attacks by heavy bombers having been largely ineffective, but with the blocking of BRESSANONE bridge the zone of rail interdiction on the BRENNER is deepened by 50 kilometres and important rail facilities at BOLZANO become isolated. This will appreciably increase the enemy's difficulties in moving trains on this important route. Whether or not the mediums can continue to maintain effectively this deepened zone of interdiction remains to be seen, though on the basis of their past excellent performance there seems little doubt but that they can.

NORTH EAST ITALY

In the North East the degree of rail interdiction between the PADUA and UDINE areas fell off during the early part of the week. Sometime between 13 and 17 Feb it is not improbable that through traffic may have been possible for a brief period in this area assuming that either the bridge immediately North of PADUA or the diversion immediately East of CITTADELLA (G 2775) were "night operational". (As of 13 Feb a gap of 50 feet at PADUA North bridge and one of 12 feet at CITTADELLA diversion had been left unrepaired though the remainder of the bridge and diversion had been repaired for some time, strongly suggesting that the gaps seen on day photos were in fact being bridged by a span temporarily placed during the hours of darkness. Attacks on the 17th may, at least temporarily, have put a stop at these points to what has now become an obvious enemy stratagem). However attacks on 17th were very effective and the main line to UDINE was blocked at four points. After the 17th no PR has been available but limited attacks have been made on this line since and it is known that at one of the points cut on the 17th, namely POZZUOLO bridge (B 992070), damage was severe. It seems probable therefore that as of 20 Feb through traffic was still impossible between the PADUA and UDINE areas. The two alternative East-West routes South of the main line to UDINE, have, as usual, remained blocked throughout the week.

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Beyond UDINE all three frontier routes appear to have been blocked all week with the possible exception of the TARVISIO route which may have been open for one or two days.

On the Southern route leading from TRIESTE to LJUBLJANA the viaduct at BOROVNICA (D 2603), which was last week considered as possibly repaired, was in fact still seen as out on 17 Feb, at which time one long span of the nine destroyed on 20 December was still out. Thus this line has been impassable at this point for about two months. PR of 17 Feb also showed that considerable labour had been expended on the construction of a diversion here, but that it was in the elementary stages owing to the size of the project.

The Central frontier route was seen as definitely blocked on 11 Feb and in view of the major repairs then necessary to make it passable it probably remains out. The bridge here has been impassable ever since early January with the possible exception of two or three days at the beginning of this month.

The situation on the important TARVISIO route is somewhat obscure, but it seems not improbable that it has remained impassable throughout the week. It was attacked on the 13th and seen on photos of the 15th and morning of the 17th as blocked; since there appears to be no record of attack between the 13th and morning of the 17th, it is presumed that the bridge was out throughout this period. There has been no PR since that of the 17th, but that morning damage was such as probably to require several days to repair, and in the afternoon of the same day the bridge was again attacked with excellent results claimed; under the circumstances it is thought that the bridge is still impassable. The TARVISIO route has also been attacked at other points, but unsuccessfully.

PO VALLEY AND NORTH WEST ITALY

Lack of PR in this area makes a definite statement on the rail situation impossible. At the end of last week no through traffic between MILAN and VERONA was possible, but by virtue of repairs at MANTUA the secondary East-West line North of the PO has been opened up. It also seems probable, though PR confirmation is lacking, that the main MILAN-VERONA line is open by this time. Through traffic is possible between MILAN, TURIN and GENOA.

One point of interest is the fact that there is further evidence from PR that the bridge at LAGNAGO (F 893258) on the line between OSTIGLIA (a very important ferry and possibly pontoon bridge site on the PO) and the PADUA area is "night operational", a fact suspected and so reported by ground sources for some time.

On the PO itself the situation remains probably unchanged with PIACENZA (K 623168) and CASALE MONFERRATO (J 673322) bridges passable, the rest impassable.

Some activity has been seen South of the PO. It is of interest to note that two bridges South of the river and East of PIACENZA were repaired this week, this being further evidence of the enemy's continued reliance on rail transport in this area.

RAIL ACTIVITY

BRENNER

While loading at various stations on the BRENNER route has remained substantially the same during the past week, movement has been taking place as is evidenced by minor changes in most of the stations South of BOLZANO and moving trains at several points along the entire route. Troops definitely appear to be moving Northward on the BRENNER. On 17 Feb a total of 223 loaded and about 200 empty flats were seen between SAN AMBROGIO (just North of VERONA) and BOLZANO; it is thought that this is a considerably

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larger number of flats than heretofore observed, though the excellent quality of the photos makes comparison with previous recent photo cover difficult. However, of the loaded flats seen on the 17th South of BOLZANO, only 26 can definitely be said to have been loaded with military equipment, namely AFV's, and of these 16 were part of a military train steaming North just South of BOLZANO. Undoubtedly at least some of the loaded flats observed were carrying industrial materials. Also on the 17th just North of BOLZANO, a probable military train loaded with AFV's and/or MT was picked up. Further indications of troop movement on the BRENNER were again seen on the 16th (an empty military train length South of TRENTO) and on the 19th (5 flat cars carrying guns and limbers just North of BOLZANO).

NORTH EAST ITALY

In the North East, along the main TREVISO-UDINE line, PR has not been regular enough to permit a detailed study of traffic. However the UDINE yards have shown considerable turnover, and on 17th amongst the rolling stock present were 20 light flak guns mounted on rail cars and 93 flats, while photos of 19 Feb showed a total of 121 empty flats including three military train lengths. Although this increase might be somewhat due to better quality photos, troop movement seems evident. Elsewhere on this line at least some turnover has been noted at practically all stations, indicating definite activity, though it is extremely unlikely that this turnover reflects through traffic with the possible exception of one or perhaps two days. On the two more Southerly routes almost no activity at all has been noted.

Along the UDINE-TREVISIO frontier route there has been rather pronounced activity. At VENZONE (C 3450) on 15 Feb a probable loaded military train was seen facing North; two days later another military train loaded with MT and/or AFV's again facing North was picked up at VENZONE and at the same time an empty military train length was observed a short distance South at GEMONA (C 3344). Three moving trains were also seen on the 16th and 17th Feb and a considerable number of flats has been noted at many of the smaller stations along the entire route. Cover is lacking on the other North East frontier routes but they are not thought to have been unduly active owing to blocked bridges.

SHIPPING

In the Gulf of GENOA coastal traffic continues between GENOA, SPEZIA, SAVONA and SESTRI LEVANTE. Cover of 19 Feb showed 25 F-boats and 21 S-barges at active berths in GENOA harbour. At least two MP-ships, 4 F-boats and an S-barge made the run from GENOA to SPEZIA and back during the past week, but there has been no further sign of the MV which was plying between these two ports earlier in the month. At least one schooner and an S-barge reached SAVONA during the past week, whilst three small coasters sailed from this port to GENOA. S-barge traffic continues on a small scale between GENOA and SESTRI LEVANTE.

PR of the Northern Adriatic ports shows that there has been a fairly large influx of shipping at VENICE and PORTO MARGHERA from TRIESTE in the last two weeks. Arrivals at VENICE include an MV, a MP-ship, 2 coasters and a coastal tanker, whilst a coaster and an MV have reached PORTO MARGHERA. This volume of traffic is probably due to the interdiction of the railways between PADUA and UDINE. Traffic in small craft also continues along the VENETIAN coast, two F-boats, an oil barge an S-barge and 4 river barges were seen at active berths in VENICE harbour on 17 Feb and barge activity has been noted at GRADO, PORTO MARGHERA, CHIOGGIA and on the waterways leading inland from the latter port during the past week.

In the Eastern Adriatic there has been an increase in activity in the ARSA Channel and F-boats were seen there for the first time on 16 Feb when three had arrived from POLA. Three coasters, two of which originally came from TRIESTE, were also plying between these two ports last week. At TRIESTE sailings have been much more numerous since 10 Feb; 11 F-boats and 13 S-barges were at active berths there on 16 Feb. Both TRIESTE and FIUME were attacked by air last week; in TRIESTE many fires were started in the SAN MARCO shipyards and at FIUME extensive damage was caused to the ship-building yards including the floating dock which has been left submerged.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 84

OF 6 MARCH, 1945

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Enemy regrouping this week has been forced by our own action for the first time since January and the extent of his reaction to our attack in the CASTEL D'AIANO sector shows a certain nervousness about our intentions. The capture of the M. BELVEDERE feature and the ridge running N.E. from there to M. DELLA SPE represents a considerable territorial advantage to the Allies but the possession of this ground is still rather a long-term threat to the enemy's Appennine positions and an enemy who was thinking of a withdrawal from that position within, say, a month would scarcely have defended it with such stubbornness or counter-attacked with such violence or brought in two fresh divisions from a dwindling reserve. It looks as though there has been no change in the policy of resisting on the present line.

On 3 and 4 March Italian troops on our extreme right flank put in a limited attack to clear up some enemy positions on the Southern part of the GARIBALDI Isthmus. The operation was very successful and brought in 200 odd prisoners not only from 142 Fusilier Bn but also from 162 Division, confirming the information from prisoners of 114 Div that 162 Div had relieved them in this area. Both 303 and 314 G.R. were identified and prisoners say that 329 G.R. is also in the same area though it must have arrived there rather late since about 30 deserters came into our lines in the area L 2704 on 5 Army front having deserted on 22 Feb. 162 Div does not seem to have improved much in quality and Turcomans still represent about 60% of its strength. This was the main event on 8 Army front, apart from some bickering for the Eastern flood bank of the SENIO in 98 Div sector. We have, however, cleared up the enemy's order of battle in the area South of IMOLA; 278 Div may, as suggested last week, have taken over the Western part of 715 Div's former sector but it certainly also relieved 90 P.G. Division. Prisoners from 992 and 993 G.R. have been taken in the former area of 200 and 361 P.G.R. respectively. (Actually 4 Para Div has taken over a battalion's worth of 200 P.G.R's former sector and handed over a battalion sector on its left flank to 26 Pz Div). 90 P.G. Div appears to be in the BOLOGNA area, presumably as Central mobile reserve, a role in which it is all the more needed as 29 P.G. has been committed on IV Corps front.

The second phase of our attack S.W. of BOLOGNA opened on 3 March with an advance N.E. from M. TORRACCIA which once more seems to have caught the enemy in the middle of a relief. This time it was 721 Regt which was coming in and it lost over 500 prisoners, including the Bn H.Q. of III Bn, in fairly quick time. All three regiments of 232 Div were also identified and it appears that II Bn 1043, which had been taken out of the line in a weakened state to absorb reinforcements was rushed back in again. Our advance on 4 March continued with the capture of M. GRANDE D'AIANO, M. BACUCCO and M. della CROCE and the enemy clearly decided that a more powerful reinforcement was necessary. On 4 March heavier MT movement announced the

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arrival of a motorised formation and on 5 March prisoners were taken from four bns of 29 P.G. Div, representing both Panzer Grenadier Regiments. They appear to have started moving off late on the evening of 3 March from S. GIOVANNI (L 7765) and came straight into action. Both regiments were committed in the area of CASTEL D'ARANO (L 6025) with 15 P.G.R. East and 71 P.G.R. West. The Tank Bn seems to have preceded them since two Mk IV tanks were claimed knocked out on 26 Feb and two more on 5 March; there is a possibility, however, that one or other of these reports may refer to the Assault Guns of 914 Assault Gun Bde which is known to have been in support in this area. The result is that both 114 Jaeger and 232 Divisions have suffered fairly heavily in prisoners and casualties and must be considered as weakened in efficiency and 29 P.G. Div may have to remain in the area for some time to come even if the enemy were to appreciate that a large-scale renewal of the attack there is unlikely.

Although rail communications between ITALY and the rapidly dwindling Great German REICH remain frantically difficult there is evidence that more troops are attempting the passage of the BRENNER. On 2 March PR for the first time since 21 Feb showed a definite movement of military trains between VERONA and the Pass; this was continued on 3 and 4 March. This can scarcely still be 16 S.S. and must be the beginning of another troop movement. There are fewer candidates for this than usual and practically speaking the only likely starter is 715 Div which has been out of the line since about 25 Feb. It is not the division which one would have expected to be sent to a more vital front (nor was 356 Div) but all the other divisions in ITALY are firmly located.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Though weather has somewhat restricted air operations this week no through rail traffic has been possible between ITALY and the REICH over either the BRENNER or N.E. rail routes. In fact early in the week interdiction on the BRENNER was higher than at any time heretofore. However, toward the end of the week interdiction on both the BRENNER and N.E. rail routes fell off. On 28 Feb the BRENNER was cut at 10 points through a 200 kilometre zone extending from just North of VERONA to just South of the BRENNER Pass. The only new target of major significance on the BRENNER is the bridge about 5 kilometres North of VERONA which was hit on 28 Feb and has been out all week thereby isolating the BRENNER traffic from important marshalling yards at VERONA. However, repairs are being pushed here and the bridge may soon be passable. In the N.E. the three frontier routes to the East of UDINE continue blocked, with the heretofore most important of the three, the UDINE-TARVISIO line, blocked at five damaged bridges. On the other hand between UDINE and PADUA the situation is not quite so straightforward. All lines have remained blocked with the possible exception of the main PADUA-UDINE route where the prolific use of apparently night operational bridges greatly complicates the rail state picture.

Movement of troops out of ITALY by rail continues this week, notably on the BRENNER. From a logistical point of view it seems scarcely possible that this can still involve 16 S.S. P.G. Div which should have cleared the Italian frontier by not later than 1 or 2 March. Something else must therefore be on the way out. It is too early to say whether or not a major formation is involved in movement currently observed, but indications are that it is.

Reports on road movement North of the PO have been somewhat sporadic but on at least one night fairly heavy movement was picked up in the N.E. Heavy movement South of the PO has been seen, involving no doubt the shift of 114 and 29 Divs.

Some increase in the number of ground and PW reports of enemy shortages in fuel and ammunition has been noted recently. It is not thought that the enemy is threatened with any shortages so far as current supply demands are concerned, but that with the loss of important industrial areas in the West and East, and interdiction of the railways and troop movement here in ITALY making for transport difficulties and the consumption of precious

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MT fuel, it may well be that the enemy has been forced to cut ammunition expenditure and ordinary fuel consumption to the bone in order to conserve for the day when a heavy battle must be fought.

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3. WESTERN FRONT

The battle of the COLOGNE plain is nearly over with 15 and 1 Para Armies defeated and withdrawing as best they can to the safety of the East bank of the RHINE. The enemy disorganisation apparent last week became even more pronounced as the battle developed (a measure of it is the prisoner total of 9,200 in 24 hours on 27 Feb). With inadequate forces and even these mostly of doubtful quality the enemy has not since the start been able to make any effective stand, while in the area between MÜNCHEN GLADBACH and the RHINE his front collapsed completely. The four divisions hastily brought down from the HOCHWALD sector to stem the tide were certainly too little and probably too late to be of much avail. Nor did the enemy fight East of DÜREN with the tenacity to be expected of the rather better quality troops facing us there. 9 Pz Div proved a broken reed, and made little effort to halt us on the fortified ERFT line; 11 Pz and 3 P.G. Divs fighting on the COLOGNE Autobahn made a better showing but were unable to make any effective stand on the perimeter of COLOGNE, the Western part of which is now all in our hands.

The grave shortage of troops has become more and more apparent in every move RUNDSTEDT has made this week. In the South he has taken a chance and is making heavy inroads into the ranks of 19 Army across the RHINE South of STRASBOURG. Two of its divisions have been sent to the COLOGNE sector, and a third has moved up to the SAAR to relieve 6 S.S. Mtn Div, which is probably being sent to plug the hole torn open at TRIER. This leaves four weary infantry divisions to hold 19. Army's 90 mile front. These moves seem to represent very nearly the maximum contribution Army Group G can make to the sore need of the other Army Groups, for much more thinning out would let us into the SAAR basin, a disaster very nearly as bad as that which has already taken place further North.

In the TRIER-EIFEL sector the situation is as bad. On paper there is a fair number of infantry divisions in this area - adequate perhaps to hold us if they had been up to strength. But four have already been reduced to remnants, all are weary and none seem to have any early prospect of relief from the battle apart from that which extinction may bring. Certainly not one has been able to extricate itself this week to help the hard pressed defenders of the COLOGNE Plain. TRIER fell after a brief struggle and we took a bridge intact over the MOSELLE there. Its loss opened a dangerous gap in the front covering the MOSELLE Valley which has been exploited by the U.S. 3rd Army in the direction of COBLENZ. Further North BITBURG and SCHLEIDEN are both in our hands and we are now only 6 miles from BONN.

In the COLOGNE Plain a number of reinforcements have been making their tardy appearance. Elements of 189 and 338 Inf Divs and 106 Pz Bde from 19 Army have been contacted between DÜREN and COLOGNE, and the trend of rail movement suggests that the remainder of these formations is coming up and taking position on the East bank of the RHINE near COLOGNE, which we have now entered. The enemy has blown all the RHINE bridges as far North as WESEL, and we are closing up to the RHINE all the way between COLOGNE and WESEL. Enemy resistance has been generally light all week, although German armour showed some fight on the high ground of the VORGEBIRGE earlier in the week. Further North however the enemy situation became almost a rout. MÜNCHEN GLADBACH, KREFELD, URDINGEN and NEUSS were abandoned after little more than sharp skirmishes, although mopping up of isolated enemy pockets has taken some time. So rapid was our advance that one bridge over the RHINE was found intact when we entered WORRINGEN South of DÜSSELDORF.

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However even with a disorganised enemy, an intact RHINE bridge was too much to hope for, and it was not to be. The bridge went up before we were able to cross. It was not until reinforcements taken from the Canadian Army front appeared about 1 March that there was any attempt at a stand by the enemy North of KREFELD. Pz Lehr Div was the first to appear and was followed by 2 Para, 15 P.G. and 84 Inf Divs on 3 March. These, according to a captured map, hoped to hold a line from the RHINE through KREFELD to KEMPEN. They failed in this, but their arrival did at least help to re-establish some sort of a coherent front now consisting of a rapidly diminishing bridgehead covering the crossing at WESEL. With their move Southwards, only six divisions were left on the Canadian front and enemy resistance weakened considerably: contact was established between 1 Canadian Army and the U.S. 9 Army South of GELDERN, and the forces of 1 Para Army South of NIJMEGEN are now withdrawing across the RHINE via the WESEL crossing.

It has been a very bad week for RUNDSTEDT; almost a decisive week. For if he could not hold us with his inadequate but organised force before the attack what prospects has he now with his Armies in confusion and having suffered probably 100,000 casualties in a fortnight of whom about 60,000 are prisoners? From COBLENZ Northwards he may soon be able to disengage his divisions temporarily, but he cannot expect to do so for long and the next attack may be even heavier than this one. He must by now be reaching the stage where the element of desperation is entering into his strategy. For the first time there are signs of a serious decline in the morale of his troops - a tendency to surrender too early or at best to offer only feeble resistance when surrounded. Only the Panzers and Parachutists seem relatively unaffected, and they will surely fight on to the last, as too will RUNDSTEDT for he has no other choice. But there is no future in it now, nothing but final defeat, or at best the slender hope that some unexpected salvation may appear from the barren womb of time.

4. EASTERN FRONT

GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA and HUNGARY

The attack launched by the Second White Russian Army Group in the direction of the Baltic coast has achieved spectacular success. Pushing on from BUBLITZ, ROKOSSOVSKY's forces on 4 March reached the coast in the area West of KOLBERG thus cutting off the German forces in the Polish Corridor and DANZIG from those in the STETTIN area. It is not clear how firm this wedge is as yet, but to judge by Soviet announcements it appears that so far only light forces have reached the coast. The enemy put up very fierce resistance all through the week making the most of the flooded Pomeranian lake and forest terrain. 4 S.S. P.G. Div which left CZECHOSLOVAKIA about three weeks ago was heavily engaged at KOESLIN; so was a new S.S. Pz Division HOLSTEIN which has not previously been identified. The attack was taken up by the 1st White Russian Army Group operating on ROKOSSOVSKY's left which captured the two junction towns of STARGARD and NAUGARD. The former lies on the left bank of the IHNA river 22 miles East of STETTIN and is the junction of three main railways.

This operation was a necessary prelude to any large scale advance on the First White Russian front towards BERLIN. ZHUKOV's right flank is now very much more secure than before and the prospects of a successful German counter-attack from POMERANIA seem negligible. STETTIN itself stands in grave danger and if ROKOSSOVSKY can now clear up the enemy forces remaining in N.E. POMERANIA and DANZIG, his Army Group too should be in a position to play a leading part in the main assault on BERLIN. Nevertheless the operation was the end of an old battle: not the start of a new. It was the culmination of the Soviet winter offensive which has cost the enemy up to ¾ million permanent casualties. ROKOSSOVSKY has now done for ZHUKOV's right flank what KONIEV in the South has almost but not quite achieved for the left flank; he has secured for it the protection of a natural defensive barrier.

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Meanwhile along the rest of the front in GERMANY an uneasy lull has set in affecting even the battle for BRESLAU, which the Russians have not mentioned in their communiqué for the past four days. Amongst the identifications reported by the Russian General Staff this week are 2 and 9 S.S. Pz Divs of 6 S.S. Pz Army and 10 S.S. Pz Div. No location other than that of the Central sector is given. 2 and 9 SS Pz Divs belong to II S.S. Pz Corps which had previously been contacted on the Eastern front this year, although I SS Pz Corps has already been in action in HUNGARY. 10 S.S. Pz Div was on the Western Front up to about three weeks ago and was believed to have left the East, but this is the first confirmation received of its transfer.

On the 4th Ukrainian Front, PETROV's forces have been engaged in heavy fighting in the sector ZVOLEN - BANSKA STIAVNICA (usually referred to as the ALTSOHL - SCHEMNITZ area in the German communiqués). Limited progress has been made but the enemy appears to be fighting hard, and both ZVOLEN and BANSKA STIAVNICA are still in his hands.

There has been no change in the situation in HUNGARY.

YUGOSLAVIA

The heavy Westward movement from VIROVITICA to VARAZDIN mentioned in last week's Summary has been followed up by a reliable report that 11 G.F and 297 Inf Divs have crossed the DRAVA into HUNGARY South of NAGYKANISZA. The only independent confirmation of this is an air report of heavy troop concentrations East of ZAGREB which by 1 March appeared to be moving Northeastwards towards VARAZDIN. Meanwhile the Partisans continue to gain successes North of the PAPUK Mountains and it is evident that this area is now comparatively thinly held. One reason for this apart from the move of 297 and 11 G.A.F. Divisions lies in the deterioration of the enemy situation further South. Two serious threats have now developed against the withdrawal route of 21 Mtn Corps up the SARAJEVO - BROD L of C. The Partisans who captured TRAVNIK have advanced Eastwards and cut the main road at BUSOVACA while to the North a Partisan force from the TUZLA area is advancing towards DOBOJ from which it is only 5 Kms distant. To meet this threat the ubiquitous rescuer of isolated formations, 7 SS Mtn Div, has had to despatch post haste a force from the PAPUK Mountains, elements of which have arrived to reinforce DOBOJ while further elements had pushed South by 4 March and were in the ZENICA area. It is likely that the enemy will have no little difficulty in clearing the main road, for 21 Mtn Corps is in a depleted condition and the Partisans are in some strength in this area. Last week they captured one of their biggest prizes of the war in the person of Colonel EBERLEIN, one time Police Chief at MUNICH and the commander in GREECE of a Battle Group bearing his name. He was taken near ZENICA.

NORTH DALMATIAN ISLANDS

In the North Dalmatian Islands there has been some activity in the past week. On 24 February Partisans supported by our aircraft and light coastal forces landed on PAG and penetrated to the outskirts of PAG town without opposition. The enemy soon reacted sharply however and landed a force from the mainland about a battalion strong (probably of 392 Div) on the night of 25/26 Feb. As a result the Partisans were forced to withdraw from the island, and the enemy has now followed suit. He continues to show concern however about the whole of this island group. Civilian labour is being impressed for the construction of defence works on both LUSSIN and CHERSO and Naval reinforcements have recently arrived on LUSSIN. On KRK 700 enemy troops landed at the end of February and are engaged in mopping up operations, although their prolonged stay here looks unlikely.

At Appendix 'B' is a chart showing chain of command of the principal formations in Army Group 'F' together with names of commanders and latest reported locations.

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RAILWAYS

BRENNER

The BRENNER railway has remained heavily interdicted. Continuing the step-up in interdiction achieved towards the end of last week, the line between the Pass and VERONA has been cut at no less than 5 points during the period 27 Feb - 4 March inclusive. What is probably the highest degree of interdiction ever existing on the BRENNER was achieved on 28 Feb at which time the line was cut at ten points from VERONA Northwards approximately 200 kilometres; the North and South limits of this zone of interdiction were two damaged bridges, one about 10 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass, the other near PARONA about 5 kilometres North of VERONA. (The blocking of the bridge just North of VERONA is a new and important development; aside from adding to the degree of interdiction it also denies BRENNER traffic the use of important marshalling yards at VERONA). With bad flying weather heavily restricting our air effort on 1 and 2 March, and difficult bombing conditions over the BRENNER targets on the 3rd, the degree of interdiction fell off. However, on the 4th the line was still blocked at five points beginning with the bridge just North of VERONA, where repairs were still incomplete, and extending Northward to the bridge near BRESSANONE (about 40 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass) which had been cut since 28 Feb when hit by heavy bombers. On 5 March no attacks were made on the BRENNER and PR was very limited but the line undoubtedly was still closed to through traffic, though repair of at least two of the five blocks existing on the previous day are likely to have been effected.

A point of interest in connection with interdiction on the BRENNER is the fact that the bridge near CISMON (B 2505) on the secondary line running North from CASTELFRANCO VENETO to join the BRENNER at TRENTO was seen as passable on 4 March, and on the same day a train was seen moving South at a point not far North of the bridge. A single short span of this bridge has been missing for a long time, at least on day photos, and remained out even though cratered approaches were repaired. The bridge must either have been night operational or maintained as unserviceable in anticipation of a more important future use. The noteworthy feature of the full repair of this bridge is that it was effected at a time when VERONA and its important marshalling yards were isolated from the BRENNER by the blocking of the PARONA bridge just North of VERONA. With the CASTELFRANCO VENETO - TRENTO line opened up by the full repair of CISMON bridge, blocks between VERONA and TRENTO on the BRENNER are effectively by-passed, particularly if the BRENTA river line of interdiction in the VICENZA - PADUA area breaks down, (and as indicated below it has), in which event through traffic becomes possible between the PO Valley and TRENTO.

Although the BRENNER has remained blocked to through traffic all week, a considerable amount of movement has been seen. In addition to movement of rolling stock in general, PR has also revealed a total of at least twelve probable troop trains or troop train lengths during the week. Four of the twelve were almost certainly troop trains being loaded with MT, AFV's and other military equipment whereas another six, while empty, moved during the week. Two of the loaded train lengths were seen about 40 kilometres North of BOLZANO on 4 March, and on the same day a troop train loaded with MT was observed moving North into TRENTO. TRENTO yards and the tracks to the North and South in the vicinity thereof have been exceptionally active showing considerable turnover and much MT activity. On 3 March and again on the 5th loading or unloading of MT seemed to be taking place, possibly in connection with a transhipment. The three empty military train lengths seen at TRENTO had all departed by the end of the week.

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PERI (about 35 rail kilometres North of VERONA) has been heavily loaded and four troop train lengths were seen in the yards; two empty train lengths seen early in the week had departed by 4 March, on which date two other train lengths were present, one of which was loaded with MT and AFV's. With the bridge about 5 kilometres North of VERONA out all week, PERI may well be a loading point for troops, though movement Northwards from here would have had to have been well timed to get past the bridge at ALA about 15 kilometres to the North. It is true that ALA bridge, frequently attacked and frequently repaired, has been out on all days during the week with the exception of 2 March; however, the attacks this week have on no occasion succeeded in doing more damage than to block the approaches, and PR indicates that these are repaired very rapidly, probably in a matter of hours. For example, on 2 March the bridge and approaches were passable; on the 3rd it was attacked and the approaches cut; on the 4th the approaches were seen as repaired on photos taken at 1130 hours, the bridge was attacked at 1230 hours, and on photos taken at 1400 hours the approaches were again seen as cut. It is obvious therefore that in addition to being passable on 2 March the bridge in at least one instance was open in between attacks made on successive days. The only block throughout the week between PERI and TRENTO has been at the ALA bridge and the fact that the bridge has been open intermittently may account for the unusual amount of activity observed at PERI and TRENTO yards.

NORTH EAST ITALY

In the Northeast interdiction has remained high though the exact situation is somewhat obscure. East of UDINE it is clear that the three frontier routes have remained, as last week, blocked. The POSTUMIA route is cut at BOROVNICA Viaduct (D 2803) where work continues on the diversion first seen under construction over two weeks ago. The FIEDICOLLE line running Eastwards from GORIZIA while not recently photographed is very probably still not open to through traffic as when last seen on 28 Feb BODRES bridge (C 7223) was still heavily damaged. The TARVISIO route is still heavily interdicted with four bridges out up to 3 March and five since 4 March. While at least two bridges are being repaired it will be some time before this important route can be opened to through traffic.

West of UDINE to the PADUA area the situation is not quite so clear. The two Southerly lines that have been closed to through traffic for so long have remained out. The enemy has been working hard at repair, but by virtue of attacks made before repairs were complete the interdiction on both routes remains high. The status of the third and most active route in this area, namely that running from PADUA to UDINE via CASTELFRANCO VENETO and/or TREVISO to UDINE, is difficult to assess. There are six bridges on this route, namely from West to East, PADUA North (G 3553) and CITADELLA (G 2373), which are complementary in that they provide mutually by-passing routes, NERVESA (G 6493), SACILE (B 8407), PORDENONE (B 9907) and CASARSA (C 1508). There are rail diversions at all these bridges with the exception of PADUA North, which, however, is a night operational bridge. (The missing span at PADUA North was seen in place on the nights of 25 and 26 Feb, and missing on day photos of the same dates, clearly showing the bridge to be night operational. Subsequent attacks did make this night use of the bridge temporarily impossible, but then the diversion near CITADELLA, which provides an alternative route around PADUA North and where on day photos only a 12-foot gap had long been the sole damage, was opened up). While these points of interdiction appear to have been out most of the week all have been seen as passable at one time or another during the week with the exception of SACILE and PORDENONE. However, a usually very reliable ground source reports that SACILE may be passable at night and there is PR evidence to support this, and PR also strongly indicates that PORDENONE may be night operational. It is just possible that for a brief period through traffic may have been possible between the UDINE and PADUA areas. From the above the ever increasing importance of night operational bridges becomes apparent and a brief photo intelligence summary thereof appears below.

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In the VICENZA - PADUA - CASTELFRANCO VENETO area, five moving trains were seen during the week. In addition to normal activity a considerable number of flats has been seen at small stations just North of PADUA and in view of the numerous interdictions along the three routes to UDINE, it would seem that trains bound for UDINE were being held up or were being assembled there in anticipation of the line to UDINE being opened up. The presence of flats, although they are unloaded, suggests that troop movement might possibly be going on. Further East, little if any movement, as usual, has been seen along the two more Southerly routes. Along the main TREVISO - UDINE line, there has been limited activity, and on this line there has been some indication of rail troop movement though not to the same extent as on the BRENNER. Between CASARSA (about 25 kilometres West of UDINE) and UDINE itself, four empty troop train lengths were seen on 5 March, two of which had been first reported on 27 Feb.

The rail activity picture in the North East on the whole seems to suggest a certain amount of movement into the PADUA-TREVISO area to and from the PO Valley, transhipment from there to a point about 30 kilometres West of UDINE, with reloading and rail movement up the TARVISIO route to just South of the belt of interdiction and a further transhipment around the cuts to a point about 30 kilometres West of TARVISIO from where the line is open across the frontier.

PO VALLEY AND NORTH WEST ITALY

North of the PO the ROMANO bridge (K 622680) on the main MILAN - VERONA line has been repaired but the bridge near CHIARI at K 762686 about 10 kilometres further East lost a span without there being any record of attack. Just to the North PALAZZOLO bridge on the MILAN - BERGAMO (K 6388) - ROVATO (K 6872) loop line is said by a ground source to be night operational. Hence while day photos show through traffic to be impossible between MILAN and VERONA (possible secondary routes between MILAN and the Eastern PO Valley including VERONA are now cut by virtue of blocks at PIZZIGHETTONE (K 639501) and CREMA (K 634508) bridges), this status must be regarded with suspicion. Lines running South to the PO from the VERONA area remain open and active; aside from shifts in rolling stock evident from PR a train was seen on the night of 4 March moving North from OSTIGLIA (on the PO at F 7412). There is also considerable open trackage running South from the VICENZA - PADUA area toward the PO; one route South is blocked at LEGNAGO bridge (F 893258), which for the time being is no longer a probable night operational bridge owing to a recent attack, the main PADUA - FERRARA line is cut at a bridge just North of ROVIGO, and the most Easterly route South remains abandoned. Activity has been seen on the line between ROVIGO and the PO but any movement here is probably directed Northwest from ROVIGO toward VERONA and not along the blocked line running direct to PADUA. POLESELLA (M 2399) is one of the points where activity was noted South of ROVIGO and this is of particular interest in view of the existence of a nearby pontoon bridge across the PO which night PR on two recent occasions has shown to be assembled during the hours of darkness. POLESELLA may be a transhipment point.

Over the PO itself all rail bridges East from BRESSANA BOTTARONE (just South of PAVIA), inclusive, remain cut. To the West of this CASALE MONFERRATO (J 643322) remains open while TORREBERRETTI (J 776207) is reported by a ground source as night operational and on the basis of PR is in fact suspect.

South of the PO there has been some increase in the degree of interdiction but bombers report three moving trains in the areas just North and Northeast of BOLOGNA while ground sources report and PR indicates that the line running generally East and West immediately South of the PO is active between PARMA and SUZZARA (F 4406). Through traffic is no longer possible along the main BOLOGNA - PIACENZA line and the PARMA - SPEZIA railway is now cut.

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PHOTO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY - REPORT
ON NIGHT OPERATIONAL BRIDGES

The increased intensity of our attack on enemy rail bridges since the middle of January, has been partially met by an increase in attempted deception in the form of night operational bridges. The term "night operational" is used to include those bridges from which a span or spans are removed to make them appear unserviceable, and which are quickly made serviceable again at night, or at such time as may be desired.

Because of the missing span or spans, these bridges appear to be damaged to our air-crews who unless they are briefed to avoid the fallacy may withhold attack in favour of attacking other obviously serviceable, but possibly less important bridges.

In the last few weeks, the Bomb Damage Section of 3rd Photo Technical Squadron has reported the following bridges as night operational or very probably so : CALCINATO (F 1960), PADUA North (G 3553), TORREBERETTI (J 7720), LEGNAGO (F 8925), CISMON (B 2407), CITTADELLA (G 2373) and NERVESA (G 6493). Other bridges, namely those at SACILE (B 8407) and PORDENONE (9907), are at present under suspicion and are being observed.

The bridge at PADUA North is cited as an example to illustrate the pattern by which a night operational bridge can be recognised. A span, about 50 feet long, was seen to have been removed from the bridge between covers of 31 January and 6 February; there was no evidence of attack. The bridge was immediately regarded with suspicion. A search revealed that a crane, similar to that at CALCINATO, previously confirmed as night operational, was present at the nearby station yard. Subsequent covers showed that the approaches were persistently repaired following attack. Although a certain amount of inactive rolling stock was observed, a single track was always kept open. Activity studies revealed turnover of rolling stock on the lines on either side. Furthermore, the bridge was of the utmost importance, and a damaged span could have been easily repaired in a short time. On the basis of the accumulated evidence, the bridge was reported as night operational. Confirmation was received when a night sortie, flown the 26 February, revealed the span to be in place. Cover of that afternoon, and the following day, revealed the span to be removed.

The pattern by which a night operational bridge reveals itself is so consistently similar as to make its existence readily apparent.

1. It is usually first detected by the removal of a span or spans.

2. Subsequent damage is consistently repaired, although the missing span or spans are not replaced during the day.

3. The bridge is invariably a vital link in a line on which all other bridges are repaired following attack.

4. The spans are the standard girder type used by the enemy for construction and repair of bridges in Northern ITALY. They are of such a length that they can either be set manually or with a crane. In the latter case, the crane is often visible.

5. Although inactive rolling stock is sometimes kept on the approaches to create the impression of a block, at least a single track is kept clear.

6. Activity studies show movement of rolling stock on the lines on either side of the bridge.

It might be anticipated that should the condition of enemy communications continue to deteriorate, the greater will become his tendency

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to utilise deception in maintaining his serviceable bridges. Because of the engineering requirements of railroad structures, however, it is not thought likely that the method of deception can be varied appreciably from the pattern as described, and any new attempts can be readily detected by photo interpretation.

(SOURCE: Third Photo Group Interpretation Report No. 3DS 101 dated 5 March, 1945)

SHIPPING

PR of the Ligurian ports between 23 Feb and 3 March shows that a steady traffic in coastal shipping is being maintained in the Gulf of GENOA. Three MT ships, a small coaster and a number of F-boats and supply barges have been plying between GENOA and SPEZIA, whilst 2 210' MV, believed to be the DOMINANTE, was seen to be loading in the former harbour on 28th Feb and had reached SPEZIA by 3 March. A ground source report dated 24 Feb stated that troops were being convoyed from SPEZIA to GENOA in "ammunition barges", probably F-boats. SAVONA has also been active, and traffic between this port and GENOA included at least three coasters, two supply barges and two schooners. All other ports on this stretch of coast remain inactive, except for occasional traffic to SESTRI LEVANTE.

Owing, probably, to the severe bombing to which the larger ports were subjected during the third week of Feb, shipping in the Northern Adriatic was confined almost entirely to F-boats, supply barges and other small craft between 23 Feb and 3 March, the only exceptions being the sailing of a hospital ship from TRIESTE to VENICE, and a coaster from ARSA to FIUME. However, two MV's were seen loading at TRIESTE on 27 Feb, and both these vessels, together with a coaster appeared ready to leave on 3 March. Barge activity continues at GRADO and CHIOGGIA and on the inland waterways which connect up the lagoons along the Venetian coast. The building of F-boats continues at MONFALCONE where three were almost ready for loading on 3 March.

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ARMY GROUP 'F' - F.M. FREIHERR v.WEICHS (GRAZ) APPENDIX 'B' TO H.Q. 15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 84 DATED 6 MARCH, 1945

ARMY GROUP 'E' - Col. Gen LOEHR (ZAGREB)

- 21 Mtn Corps - Gen v. LEYSER (North of SARAJEVO ?)
  - 181 Inf Div - Lt.Gen HEYER ? (area NE of SARAJEVO)
  - 369 Legion Div - Maj.Gen REINECKE (SARAJEVO area)
  - 7 SS Mtn Div - SS Standartenführer KUMM (ZENICA M 12) ⁶⁶
- 15 Mtn Corps - Gen FEHN (BIHAC)
  - 392 Legion Div - Lt.Gen MICKL (OTOCAC O 98)
  - 393 Legion Div - Maj.Gen GRAVENSTEIN (OSTROZAC nr BIHAC)
- 34 Corps - Gen FELMY (NUSTAR X 18)
  - 22 Inf Div - Lt.Gen FRIEBE (BIJELJINA X 22 area)
  - 41 Inf Div - Maj.Gen HAUSER (BRCKO W 93)
  - 104 Jg Div - Maj.Gen LUDWIGER (IVANKOVO G 64)
  - 117 Jg Div - GOC not known (SREM)
- 91 z.b.V. Corps - Gen v. ERDMANNSDORF (directing ops PAPUK Mtns)
  - Stefan Div (MIKLEUS F 97 area)
  - 11 GAF Div - Lt.Gen KOHLER (moving to S HUNGARY ?)
  - 297 Inf Div - Lt.Gen BAUER " " "
- 69 Res Corps - Gen AULEB ? (ZAGREB)
  - 1 Cossack Div - Lt.Gen v. PANNWITZ # (BJELOVAR ? A 20)
  - 2 Cossack Div - GOC not known (SISAK K 85, setting up)
  - 1 Jg Res Regt - Col HAMMERSCHMIDT (KARLOVAC)

NOTES :

⁶⁶ May have elements in PAPUK Mountains with 91 z.b.V. Corps

A Cossack Corps has been reported, GOC Gen PANNWITZ, with 1 and 2 Cossack Divs under command. Col BOSSE ex C.O. 1 Don Bde is stated to command 1 Cossack Div. The formation of a Cossack Corps would leave 69 Res Corps without any major formations.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 83

OF 27 FEBRUARY, 1945

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The rumours of an imminent German withdrawal from ITALY have continued all last week with a great show of detail but with rather less conviction and there is rather more evidence to show that some at least are German-inspired. The remainder, based on intelligent anticipation of what OKW might be expected to do with the Russians so close to BERLIN and the Western Armies of Liberation so close to COLOGNE, are dying down and the intelligent anticipators are now veering to a conception of ITALY as the granary and, in part, workshop of the Nazi Alpine redoubt. The fact remains that no further formation has followed 16 SS Div out of the country yet and, so far as is known, none has even started. There are at the moment only two German divisions uncommitted, one recently withdrawn from the line, which is not excessive in view of the improvement in the weather, and the Westerly move of 114 Jaeger Div can scarcely be reconciled with any intention to withdraw. The Italian front is still, however, held in greater strength than either its intrinsic importance or Allied capabilities here could warrant and we must be prepared for it to be called on for further contributions to other fronts.

On 8 Army front 42 Jaeger Division is now known to command the whole sector from the GARIGLIANO Isthmus to about ALFONSINE. 162 Turcoman Division has apparently taken over from 114 Jaeger the responsibility of coastwatching in the area North of Lake COMACCHIO. The reshuffle last week gives 362 Div the sector from exclusive ALFONSINE to exclusive LUGO, then 98 Div as far as two kilometres up stream from COTIGNOLA and then 26 Pz Div which has taken over the small sector previously held by 278 Div together with part of 98 Div's previous sector. Both regiments of 26 Pz Div are in the line. The sectors of 4 Para and 90 P.G. Divs remain apparently unchanged but it looks as though 715 Div has been completely relieved, partly by the extension Eastwards of 334 Div's sector and partly by the recommittal of 992 G.R. of 278 Div. It is less likely, therefore, than it seemed last week when 278 Div was being relieved, for no apparent reason, by 26 Pz Div, that the former is to move out of ITALY, while in view of past disappointments it is dangerous to predict the same of 715 Div. There must be some reason for the latter's relief, however, and it must take 278 Div's place as favourite for withdrawal.

In our BELVEDERE attack, after the initial surprise, we had a certain surprise ourselves to identify prisoners from 114 Jaeger Div, although Tac R reports of the previous day prepared us for some new arrival. Prisoners taken on 26 Feb were from 741 Jaeger Regt, all three bns of which have since been identified. It does not appear that their arrival was due to early warning of our impending attack as the first elements started to move on 12 February and, according to prisoners, the division was intended for further West - LIGURIA according to some - and was diverted down the ZOCCA road on arrival at MODENA when news of our attack was received. The Recce Bn has been identified but not 721 Regt which is presumably West of the BELVEDERE area as the divisional Artillery Regiment has been reported by ground sources in the ABETONE area. The arrival of 114 Jaeger Div will allow 232 Div to sidestep Eastwards and take over some of 94 Div's sector, up to inclusive VERGATO according to one report. Also involved

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in unsuccessful counter-attacks were 4 Alpine Bn and the MITTENWALD Alpine Mtn Bn.

On the French frontier 5 Mtn and 34 Divs are still apparently in position. The Russians claim to have taken prisoners in East PRUSSIA from "a battle group of 34 Div" but we have also had prisoners from 107 G.R. of the division in the area N 7206 on 24 Feb. There is no confirmation, therefore, if reports of a withdrawal of German troops from this sector and reports of the thinning out of 5 Mtn Div in small detachments so as not to arouse suspicion can be explained by the fact that units of the division have been withdrawn to fight Partisans, e.g. in the area between ASTI and ALEXANDRIA as paybooks captured by the Partisans indicate. It is important, however, to keep a close watch on the movements of these divisions as, if the Germans are going to evacuate N.W. ITALY, they will be the first to depart.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

With improving weather conditions this week has been a bad one for the enemy's L of C. For the first time in a considerable period total MAAF sorties have averaged over 1,000 a day. Medium bombers have operated every day and both medium and fighter-bombers are operating over an area extending over deeper into the enemy's rear. The mediums attacked rail brid just South of the BRENNER Pass and fighters on one day paid a successful visit to the BERCHTESGADEN area. (BERCHTESGADEN is about 250 kilometres roughly due North of VENICE). As a result a very high degree of rail interdiction has been achieved and maintained this week.

The BRENNER railway has been blocked throughout the past seven days for the third and perhaps fourth successive week. Attacks have been extended still further North and as of 25 Feb two bridges were out at points about 10 and 15 kilometres respectively South of the Pass. There has been some movement on the BRENNER but no rolling stock will have gotten all the way through even by a process of shuttling past breaks in the line as they are repaired. In fact throughout the past week, while the enemy has pushed repairs, they have remained well behind our attacks with the exception of one 24 hour period when the line may have been blocked at only one point.

In N.E. ITALY the degree of interdiction is the highest ever heretofore achieved, and no through traffic has been possible at any time through a zone about 150 kilometres deep. In fact the zone of interdiction in the N.E. would extend 200 kilometres were it not for the fact that, as long suspected, the bridge just North of PADUA has been confirmed by night photos to be "night operational".

Rail activity generally has appeared slight recently on both the BRENNER and N.E. routes owing no doubt to the high degree of rail interdiction. There has been some evidence of continued movement of troops out of ITALY though very little towards the end of the week, and it seems probable that by this time 16 S.S. P.G. Div will have completed its move. Like 356 Inf Div it has taken about three weeks to get out.

No consistently heavy MT movement has been reported North of the PO this week, though on 23 Feb fairly heavy movement was seen in the ROVIGO (G 2712) - PADUA - TREVISO area. PR on two occasions also picked up a fair amount of MT parked at BOLZANO, and night bombers got many explosions out of on MT convoy in the ADIGE Valley North of VERONA; this is to be expected, however owing to the BRENNER rail interdiction. Night photos of the 25th again confirm that a pontoon bridge across the PO Northeast of FERRARA at POLESELLA (M 2299) is assembled at night; at time of photography (about 2330 hours) 10 MT and 1 motorcycle were proceeding North across the bridge.

Nothing particularly new is noted in the enemy's supply position. Reports continue to be received of a severe coal shortage in Northern ITALY - affecting both the railways and industry. A continued MT fuel shortage

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is indicated by reports of MT being towed by horses, of troops marching long distances on foot, of 16 S.S. P.G. Div having to buy petrol on the Black Market etc. One report from a usually reliable ground source states that enemy petrol reserves in ITALY are only about 130,000 US gallons which, while extremely small, may well be not far off the mark. Enemy ammunition expenditure has apparently been very low recently as is to be expected on the present scale of fighting. While there is no indication of any real shortages in ITALY further evidence of an overall German shortage of ammunition is found in a Corps order captured in FRANCE dated 1 Feb which states: "The situation on the Eastern Front forces upon us at present an economy of artillery ammunition which may seem unbearable. Especially the consumption of artillery howitzer ammunition must be reduced. The consumption of infantry howitzer ammunition must also be curtailed, although it is not as critical as the above mentioned. The same applies to mortar ammunition. The confidence of the riflemen in his weapons (MG, rifle or carbine) must be strengthened by all means. Sniper activity must be considerably increased".

3. WESTERN FRONT

HITLER, some months ago in a moment of unusual military clarity, pointed out that the great danger of a two front war lay in the fact that substantial forces are likely at any given time to be engaged not in fighting the enemy but in travelling from one front to the other. 6 S.S. Pz Army is a case in point. It was transferred to the East nearly a month ago, but played no part in halting the Russian advance, and now it is missing in the West at a critical moment when armour is in shorter supply than it has ever been.

By the end of last week RUNDSTEDT had three Panzer Divisions out of the line. They were 10 S.S. Pz, Pz Lehr and 11 Pz. No more of 10 S.S. Pz Div has been heard, and it seems likely that it has now left the West altogether. Pz Lehr Division has appeared in the REICHSWALD battle area, and 11 Pz Division moved from the Southern EIFEL up to the DUREN area. The Germans have been making determined efforts to extricate further forces from the line and during the few days preceding the Allied attack enjoyed rather greater success. 11 Pz Div was pulled out from the PRUM area and moved up to DUREN while elements of three battered infantry divisions were withdrawn from the area South of DUREN. This gave RUNDSTEDT by 25 February a mobile reserve of two Panzer and eight Infantry Divisions, of which both the Panzer Divisions have now been committed.

In the South, the Allied pressure in the SAARBRUCKEN area was beginning to tell however and two of the divisions in Army Group G reserve appeared on the First German Army front. These were 245 Inf and 2 Mtn Divisions. The latter had been in Southern ALSACE and with 338 Inf Div, was reported to be moving Northwards. Across the RHINE in Southern ALSACE there are still out of contact, apart from occasional patrol clashes, five other Infantry Divisions.

Meanwhile further North, the departure of 11 Pz Div from the MOSELLE - SAAR triangle had to be paid for. Confronted with our attack, the enemy withdrew rapidly behind the SAAR river. SAARBURG fell without difficulty, but the enemy was unable to prevent us establishing a bridgehead over the SAAR which is now 2 miles deep and four miles wide. Enemy resistance still remains moderate in this area.

In the Southern EIFEL, too, the enemy's resistance has been light. The enemy divisions in this area are now all in an extremely weary state. Most of them have had no rest since the ARDENNES offensive and they have nearly all been engaged in heavy fighting over the past fortnight. Even the arrival of 2 Pz Division from the PRUM sector did not help and there has been evidence of considerable disorganisation in the enemy ranks as we pressed home our attack. Two bridges were captured intact over the PRUM river and the fall of the road junction of BITBURG now seems to be imminent. One of the Infantry Divisions pulled out five days before has been hastily recommitted in this area.

.....The main battle.....

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The main battle of the week has been in the DÜREN sector where we attacked across the ROER river on a broad front North and South of DÜREN. Considerable progress has been made in this attack and for the first time since last summer there are signs of serious enemy disorganisation. The initial attack was taken by six infantry divisions all of them in their usual place, but as the attack developed, RUNDSTEDT was forced to draw more and more on his scanty reserve. 9 Pz Division which had scarcely extricated itself from the PRÜM sector was thrown in on the second day of the attack and was heavily engaged. I/10 P.G.R. provided a spectacle not seen in the West for long, when the whole Bn surrendered on 24 Feb. Since then 11 Pz Div which had only just arrived from the HERZIG area has been committed, and now 338 Inf Div from Southern ALSACE has been identified. These reinforcements have not been able to prevent an Allied break through. In the direction of COLOGNE, Allied armour operating in five columns on both sides of the AACHEN - COLOGNE Autobahn has reached ELATZHEIM, 15 miles from the HOHENZOLLERN bridge and 3 miles West of the ERFT river. The enemy may well hope to stand on this river, on which defences have long been developed. Further North, on the front North of LINNICH, Allied armour has reached a point four miles from MÜNCHEN - GLADBACH.

On the Canadian Army front the commitment of Pz Lehr Division raised to ten the number of enemy divisions engaged in the REICHSWALD battle. They present a formidable array for four are Parachute and three are good quality mobile divisions. However, with the ground to some extent drying, we have been able to make good progress, notably North of GOCH where CALCAR has been taken after heavy fighting. German resistance in the area remains heavy and so far the enemy armour is still fully committed.

RUNDSTEDT's situation is deteriorating rapidly. His lack of infantry in the REICHSWALD sector, which forced him to commit his scanty mobile reserves in that area, may cost him dear; for he can at present reckon only four somewhat doubtful Infantry Divisions and no armour at all amongst his reserves. And this, when in the really crucial sector of the front the Allies are advancing faster than they have ever done; when strong forces of his own are still fully engaged in the REICHSWALD battle; and when he is losing in prisoners alone about 3,000 men per day. It took us nearly a month of bitter costly fighting to cover the 15 miles from AACHEN to the ROER river; in three days now we have crossed one major river obstacle and gained seven miles. The road to COLOGNE was never likely to be an easy one, and there are still the defences of the ERFT to overcome, but it is becoming every day a shorter one, and RUNDSTEDT may soon be hard put to it to retain his position West of the RHINE.

4. EASTERN FRONT

Apart from the sharp battles in the area of the NEISSE river North of GÖRLITZ, there were signs last week that the great battles of the winter were over. The Soviet offensive was six weeks old on 26 February and as in the fifth week of last summer's offensive, seemed to have passed its peak. By 23 July last year, five weeks after the offensive started, the deepest Russian penetrations into POLAND had been made, and thereafter Soviet operations were primarily concerned with cleaning up the flanks, securing bridgeheads and preparing for the next major move. (Incidentally, this took place exactly four weeks later, but on a wholly different sector when the Russians attacked towards GALATZ). In East PRUSSIA last week, ROKOSSOVSKY captured ZINTEN, 18 miles South of KÖNIGSBERG, and further reduced the German East Prussian pocket by advancing across the main WORMDITT - KÖNIGSBERG road. In SAMLAND he was less successful and German counter-attacks in an Easterly direction seem to have reestablished land contact between KÖNIGSBERG and PILLAU.

In N.W. POLAND, despite an initially bitter resistance put up by the enemy along the front between encircled GRUDZIADZ and STARGARD,

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considerable Russian progress has been made. ROKOSSOVSKY has been able to achieve a deep breakthrough in the direction of the Baltic coast and has captured the road and rail junction of BUELITZ, about 25 miles from the coast, thereby threatening to split in two the enemy forces in the area between STETTIN and DANZIG. This move has incidentally done much to eliminate the danger to the long flank of the Russian Central Group of Armies.

Opposite BERLIN, ZHUKOV seems prepared to wait and build up for the bitter 38 miles which he must traverse to the REICH capital. Neither side leaves much doubt of Soviet preparations in this sector. If MOSCOW talks of thousands of guns and fleets of aircraft, the enemy is no less loth to concede "two huge tank armies preparing for the forthcoming assault on BERLIN". But this battle has not yet started, and a lull has fallen with the issue of the Soviet bridgeheads over the ODER still not clear; for the Germans do not claim their complete elimination, nor the Russians their very existence. Behind the front, however, POZNAN fell at last to ZHUKOV during the week.

On the First Ukrainian front, the battle for the NEISSE crossings has been bitter. Here again the Germans admit Soviet bridgeheads, while MOSCOW maintains its sphinx-like silence. Much is at stake in these operations. KONIEV's forces have maintained the impetus of their attack longer in the present offensive than any other of the Army Groups. Neither the ODER nor BOBER rivers checked them for long, and once across the NEISSE in strength only the lesser barrier of the SPREE river would stand between them and DRESDEN on the ELBE. Hence the desperate battles which have been in progress in the approaches to GUBEN and FORST, and the comparative slowness of KONIEV's progress. Behind the front the battle for BRESLAU is on, and the exhausting, costly, block by block reduction which characterised the BUDAPEST battle is apparently to be repeated. GLOGAU, too, has been encircled and may prove an additional drag on KONIEV's progress.

Further South there is little to report. The troublesome German bridgehead on the East bank of the ODER near GLEIWITZ has not yet been eliminated, although German reports of Russian attacks in the general area of RATIBOR suggest that KONIEV is continuing his efforts to eliminate this bridgehead.

There has been little interesting news of enemy dispositions this week. The bulk of 7 Pz Division seems to have been destroyed in the battle for ELBING, while the Russians report the presence of a battle group of 34 Infantry Division in East PRUSSIA. There is no confirmation, however, of this identification, and as prisoners have been taken this week from 34 Division on the Alpine front, the report looks doubtful; possibly a few diverted drafts have been encountered. Further evidence confirms that HIMMLER is commanding the more Northerly of the two Army Groups on the Central sector, as his Headquarters was at DEUTSCH KRONE on Jan 27.

HUNGARY

North of the DANUBE, the German operations to eliminate the Russian bridgehead over the HRON river have achieved their object, and the Soviets are now back on the East bank of the river from KOZAROVCE, North of LEVICE, down to the DANUBE. A startling identification was reported here last week. On 22 February the Rumanian General Staff, a normally reliable source, reported the identification of advanced units of 1 and 12 SS Pz Divs in the HRON river sector. These belong to I S.S. Pz Corps of 6 S.S. Pz Army. Whether the whole of 6 S.S. Pz Army is in HUNGARY or not, and if so, what its rôle is, we do not know. Prior to the Rumanian report, there had been some very slight indications that the Army was bound for the Southern and not, as had been expected, for the Central sector. A prisoner on the Western front said that he had heard AUSTRIA mentioned as the Army's destination, while another report has mentioned the HITLER Division as being in HUNGARY - probably a reference

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either to 1 S.S. Pz Div or to the Führer Escort Brigade of 6 S.S. Pz Army. Moreover there has been no satisfactory explanation for the heavy loadings of the GYOR marshalling yards seen a fortnight ago. There seems to be thus a prima facie case for placing 6 S.S. Pz Army in the AUSTRIA - Western HUNGARY area. Whether it has come as a replacement for armour withdrawn from HUNGARY to the Central sector or whether it is to have an offensive role is at present only a matter for speculation. The identifications on the ERON river suggest that even that limited German operation was beyond the resources of the existing enemy forces, and that 6 S.S. Pz Army had to be drawn upon for assistance. At this stage the holding of Western HUNGARY may well take a high priority in the German strategic plan. Considerations affecting this are no doubt the oil fields of S.W. HUNGARY, and the industrial areas of Eastern AUSTRIA including the a/c factories of GRAZ and WIENER NEUSTADT.

YUGOSLAVIA

The main news in YUGOSLAVIA comes from the SREM - DRAVA front, where there seems to have been a considerable thinning out in the enemy garrison. Important and surprising Partisan successes have been reported in the general area of the old BARCS bridgehead. The towns of VOCIN, HUM, PIVNICA, DARUVAR and SUHO POLJE have all been recaptured, thus largely neutralising the recent enemy gains. Immediately after the BARCS operation the enemy had a strong force of some five divisions in this area and it is quite inconceivable that the Partisans could have achieved the success they have unless a considerable thinning out had taken place. Heavy Westerly movement from VIROVITICA towards VARAZDIN has been reported, which suggests that some of the enemy forces between the DRAVA and SAVA may be about to leave the area of Army Group E. The effect this will have on the operations further South may be considerable. An early withdrawal from SARAJEVO itself seems inevitable, and H.Q. 21 Mtn Corps has already left for the North. How far the withdrawal will then go is not clear. If the SREM is to be abandoned, a halt short of the BALATON - SENJ line seems improbable. But this will probably mean the abandonment of the Hungarian oil, and is unlikely to appeal to the enemy. In present circumstances he will certainly prefer to cling to the SREM which in turn implies retention of the ZAGREB - BROD - VINKOVCI railway. The line of the SAVA South of this railway will bring the Partisans too close to it for comfort, so it is conceivable that the enemy may be planning to hold a line somewhere South of the river in sufficient depth to break up any Partisan attempt to cross it and threaten his main L of C.

NORTHERN ADRIATIC COAST

At Appendix 'B' is a sketch of enemy dispositions on the Northern Dalmatian Coast and Islands as known to date. The enemy, no doubt appreciating that the possession of KRK, CHERSO and RAB Islands would be a necessary preliminary to an Allied invasion of Northern YUGOSLAVIA, has recently shown an increased interest in the area. Garrisons have been strengthened, and defence works initiated or completed on all the most important islands as well as on the mainland.

The over-all enemy plan appears to be firstly to hold POLA as a fortress, thus denying us the use of the port, and secondly to have sufficient forces on the islands to prevent or hinder Allied landing attempts and to gain time to take counter-measures.

Not surprisingly FIUME and TRIESTE appear to be major strong points in the defence scheme. Besides their value as ports to be denied to the Allies, the system of strong points around the ports completes the VENA Mountain defence line across the neck of the Istrian Peninsula. To ensure sufficient forces for a counter-attack role on the islands and to prevent the fortress of FIUME being outflanked from the South, garrisons of varying strength have been placed between FIUME and KARLOBAG. These garrisons are situated in the small harbours on the mainland which have been turned into miniature fortresses. The bulk of these coastal garrisons

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is provided by 392 Legion Div, but 237 Inf Div is responsible for PCLA and is recently reported to have sent some elements to the SENJ area.

C E R Hirsch

C. E. R. HIRSCH,
BRIGADIER, G. S.
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APPENDIX 'A' TO 15 ARMY GROUP
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 83
OF 27 FEBRUARY, 45

RAILWAYS

THE BRENNER

The BRENNER railway has remained closed to through traffic throughout the week. Though on 21 Feb the line was blocked at only one point (LAVIS Viaduct and diversion just North of TRENTO) by the following day there were three blocks and as of 26 Feb the line was cut at seven points, of which two were broken bridges and one a severely cratered rail fill. As was the case last week, the most important development on the BRENNER has been the further extension Northward of medium-bomber attacks. Two bridges about 10 and 15 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass respectively, which have been attacked several times, were last seen as down on 25th and are very probably still cut. This deepens the interdiction of the BRENNER by about 30 kilometres which means that the zone of interdiction now extends Northwards from VERONA about 200 rail kilometres. Up until about ten days ago the line had not been cut, except on very rare occasions by heavy bombers, further North than about 125 rail kilometres from VERONA. The fact that these bridges are North of the point where the FORTEZZA (W 1902) - DOBBIACO (B 6996) - SPITTAL (X 6101) line joins the BRENNER, may divert considerable traffic to this secondary East-West route, a possibility supported by fighter-bomber reports of large numbers of wagons on the line on the 26th; however, these reports have yet to be confirmed by PR and in fact are considered somewhat exaggerated.

The enemy has effected repairs on the BRENNER, but he has been unable this week to keep up with our attacks. However, while it has been impossible throughout the week to get trains all the way through, some movement has been noted along the Southern portion of the line between VERONA and BOLZANO. This activity has consisted for the most part of turnover in yards and sidings varying from only three or four wagons up to over 100 in some of the larger stations.

Indications of troop movements have also been noted on the BRENNER. A total of five, possibly six, military train lengths have been seen on the line during the past seven days, two of which were North of BOLZANO, one being loaded with either motor or horse-drawn transport. Other evidence of moderate troop movement was seen at VIPITENO (about 10 kilometres South of the Pass) where five flats loaded with possible MT initially reported on the 23rd had departed by the 25th. In addition at a small station just South of BRESSANONE about ten flats loaded with MT or AFVs were gone on the 25th having been first seen two days previously.

Many flak wagons have been noted along the entire route, although it is difficult to say whether there has been an increase since last week or more have been observed simply owing to clearer and more extensive PR. It is of interest to note that these flak wagons initially appeared in substantial numbers both on the BRENNER and in the N.E. when the enemy began to move troops out of ITALY.

NORTH EAST ITALY

In the N.E. a higher degree of interdiction has existed over the past seven days than has ever heretofore been the case. All routes from the PADUA area N.E. across the frontier have been continuously blocked at four or more points. The most important development in the N.E. is the heavy interdiction on the TARVISIO frontier route running North from UDINE which, at least up till now, has been by far the most active of the three N.E. frontier routes. This line has been cut all week and by not later than 23 Feb four bridges were down over a stretch of line 20 kilometres long about half way between UDINE and TARVISIO. However, at the opposite end of the N.E. zone of interdiction there is a leak in the BRENTA river line of interdiction which is just East of a line VICENZA - PADUA. Photos taken at 2100 hours on

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the night of the 25th confirm what has recently been reported by ground sources and long suspected from day PR, namely that the rail bridge immediately North of PADUA on the main PADUA - CASTELFRANCO VENETO railway is "night operational". At that time the span continually missing on day photos, was seen to be in place and the bridge open to single line traffic; by 1300 hours on the following day the span had been removed. This definitely indicates rail movement between the PO Valley and the PADUA - TREVISO area. PR confirmation is still lacking on the other possible night-operational bridges in this area, namely the bridge just East of VICENZA at G 2373 where only a 12 foot gap has long been seen on day photos.

Rail traffic in the North East along the two Southerly routes between UDINE and the PADUA - VICENZA area has remained almost wholly stagnant and the main TREVISO - UDINE line has shown a marked decrease in activity, undoubtedly owing to the high state of interdiction recently attained along this route. Almost no movement has been noted since 20 Feb between TREVISO and CASARSA (about 30 kilometres West of UDINE), and so far as troop movements are concerned only one empty possible military train length has been seen on this stretch during the week. Further East between CASARSA and UDINE, while a military train length first reported on 17 Feb had left by the 21st, two empty military train lengths initially seen on the 21st were still in the same spot four days later. However at UDINE itself the yards have shown considerable activity. In view of the military train lengths seen here (a total of five was picked up during the week) it seems likely that at least some troop movement has been taking place with troops presumably loading somewhere along the line West of UDINE, and East of CASARSA. Other evidence of troop movement has been observed along the now heavily interdicted UDINE - TARVISIO frontier line. Two empty military train lengths were reported by PR South of the belt of interdiction between GENOVA (C 3344) and PONTEDDA (C 4930), while two more were seen to the North thereof. Between 22 and 25 Feb activity was noted at stations South of PONTEDDA but PR of the 26th showed no change at all since the previous day, and it seems probable that in as much as military train lengths have appeared on both sides of this belt of interdiction that transhipment is probably going on around these cuts. While this transhipment point is only about 75 rail kilometres from the CASARSA area, which is the most Westerly point at which troops moving towards UDINE could reload on to trains, it may well be that despite the delays of loading and reloading on to trains troops and materiel are nevertheless moved by rail over this comperatively short stretch owing to inadequate supplies of MT fuel.

NORTH WEST ITALY AND PO VALLEY

In the North West no unusual rail activity has been noted though moves are rumoured by ground sources. Since 21 Feb traffic between MILAN and VERONA has been blocked on the main line and also on the BERGAMO loop line. The secondary line to the South nearer the PO has, however, been open and through trains can reach VERONA from MILAN by way of CREMONA and MANTUA. Through traffic is still possible between TURIN, MILAN and GENOA, and in fact through trains can move all the way from TURIN almost to BOLOGNA. Several lines are also open from the VERONA area South to the BOLOGNA area with the exception of the PO river crossings. Troops in fact have been recently reported to load on trains at points not far North of the PO and rail lines South of the river are also still active. The only important development on the PO itself is that more detailed study of photos has shown the important bridge at PIACENZA to have been impassable for some time, though by this time it may again be open. Unless PIACENZA bridge is in fact open, there is only one rail bridge now operating over the PO, namely near CASALE MONFERRATO at J 643322.

SHIPPING

In the Gulf of GENOA two KT ships and four F-boats are still plying between GENOA and SPEZIA. One KT ship was seen unloading into

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nilitary wagons in the latter port on 23 Feb. Only one schooner and a supply barge are known to have sailed between GENOA and SAVONA during the past week, but it is probable that two small coasters which sailed from GENOA on 23 Feb were making this run. Small scale E-boat and supply barge activity was noted at SESTRI PONENTE.


In the Northern Adriatic, TRIESTE and POLA were bombed twice and FIUME three times this week, extensive damage being caused to ship yards, harbour installations and shipping. Since these attacks started there has been a noticeable drop in activity of the larger ships. Only two MVs and two small coasters reached TRIESTE from VENICE and PORTO MARGHERA between 20 and 23 Feb since when no departures or arrivals have been noted, whilst POLA, FIUME and ARSA Channel have been virtually inactive since 20 Feb. On the Venetian coast barge activity continues between VENICE and GRADO and South to CHIOGGIA.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 83

OF 27 FEBRUARY, 1945

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The rumours of an imminent German withdrawal from ITALY have continued all last week with a great show of detail but with rather less conviction and there is rather more evidence to show that some at least are German-inspired. The remainder, based on intelligent anticipation of what OKW might be expected to do with the Russians so close to BERLIN and the Western Armies of Liberation so close to COLOGNE, are dying down and the intelligent anticipators are now veering to a conception of ITALY as the granary and, in part, workshop of the Nazi Alpine redoubt. The fact remains that no further formation has followed 16 SS Div out of the country yet and, so far as is known, none has even started. There are at the moment only two German divisions uncommitted, one recently withdrawn from the line, which is not excessive in view of the improvement in the weather, and the Westerly move of 114 Jaeger Div can scarcely be reconciled with any intention to withdraw. The Italian front is still, however, held in greater strength than either its intrinsic importance or Allied capabilities here could warrant and we must be prepared for it to be called on for further contributions to other fronts.

On 8 Army front 42 Jaeger Division is now known to command the whole sector from the GARIB/LDI Isthmus to about ALFONSINE. 162 Turcoman Division has apparently taken over from 114 Jaeger the responsibility of coastwatching in the area North of Lake COMACCHIO. The reshuffle last week gives 362 Div the sector from exclusive ALFONSINE to exclusive LUGO, then 98 Div as far as two kilometres up stream from COTIGNOLA and then 26 Pz Div which has taken over the small sector previously held by 278 Div together with part of 98 Div's previous sector. Both regiments of 26 Pz Div are in the line. The sectors of 4 Para and 90 P.G. Divs remain apparently unchanged but it looks as though 715 Div has been completely relieved, partly by the extension Eastwards of 334 Div's sector and partly by the recommittal of 992 G.R. of 278 Div. It is less likely, therefore, than it seemed last week when 278 Div was being relieved, for no apparent reason, by 26 Pz Div, that the former is to move out of ITALY, while in view of past disappointments it is dangerous to predict the same of 715 Div. There must be some reason for the latter's relief, however, and it must take 278 Div's place as favourite for withdrawal.

In our BELVEDERE attack, after the initial surprise, we had a certain surprise ourselves to identify prisoners from 114 Jaeger Div, although Tac R reports of the previous day prepared us for some new arrival. Prisoners taken on 26 Feb were from 741 Jaeger Regt, all three bns of which have since been identified. It does not appear that their arrival was due to early warning of our impending attack as the first elements started to move on 12 February and, according to prisoners, the division was intended for further West - LIGURIA according to some - and was diverted down the ZOCCA road on arrival at MODENA when news of our attack was received. The Recce Bn has been identified but not 721 Regt which is presumably West of the BELVEDERE area as the divisional Artillery Regiment has been reported by ground sources in the ABETONE area. The arrival of 114 Jaeger Div will allow 232 Div to sidestep Eastwards and take over some of 94 Div's sector, up to inclusive VERGATO according to one report. Also involved

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in unsuccessful counter-attacks were 4 Alpine Bn and the MITTENWALD Alpine LEHR Bn.

On the French frontier 5 Mtn and 34 Divs are still apparently in position. The Russians claim to have taken prisoners in East PRUSSIA from "a battle group of 34 Div" but we have also had prisoners from 107 G.R. of the division in the area N 7206 on 24 Feb. There is no confirmation, therefore, of reports of a withdrawal of German troops from this sector and reports of the thinning out of 5 Mtn Div in small detachments so as not to arouse suspicion can be explained by the fact that units of the division have been withdrawn to fight Partisans, e.g. in the area between ASTI and ALEXANDRIA as paybooks captured by the Partisans indicate. It is important, however, to keep a close watch on the movements of these divisions as, if the Germans are going to evacuate N.W. ITALY, they will be the first to depart.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

With improving weather conditions this week has been a bad one for the enemy's L of C. For the first time in a considerable period total MATAF sorties have averaged over 1,000 a day. Medium bombers have operated every day and both medium and fighter-bombers are operating over an area extending ever deeper into the enemy's rear. The mediums attacked rail bridges just South of the BRENNER Pass and fighters on one day paid a successful visit to the BERCHTESGADEN area. (BERCHTESGADEN is about 250 kilometres roughly due North of VENICE). As a result a very high degree of rail interdiction has been achieved and maintained this week.

The BRENNER railway has been blocked throughout the past seven days for the third and perhaps fourth successive week. Attacks have been extended still further North and as of 25 Feb two bridges were cut at points about 10 and 15 kilometres respectively South of the Pass. There has been some movement on the BRENNER but no rolling stock will have gotten all the way through even by a process of shuttling past breaks in the line as they are repaired. In fact throughout the past week, while the enemy has pushed repairs, they have remained well behind our attacks with the exception of one 24 hour period when the line may have been blocked at only one point.

In N.E. ITALY the degree of interdiction is the highest ever heretofore achieved, and no through traffic has been possible at any time through a zone about 150 kilometres deep. In fact the zone of interdiction in the N.E. would extend 200 kilometres were it not for the fact that, as long suspected, the bridge just North of PADUA has been confirmed by night photos to be "night operational".

Rail activity generally has appeared slight recently on both the BRENNER and N.E. routes owing no doubt to the high degree of rail interdiction. There has been some evidence of continued movement of troops out of ITALY though very little towards the end of the week, and it seems probable that by this time 16 S.S. P.G. Div will have completed its move. Like 356 Inf Div it has taken about three weeks to get out.

No consistently heavy MT movement has been reported North of the PO this week, though on 23 Feb fairly heavy movement was seen in the ROVIGO (G 2712) - PADUA - TREVISO area. PR on two occasions also picked up a fair amount of MT parked at BOLZANO, and night bombers got many explosions out of an MT convoy in the ADIGE Valley North of VERONA; this is to be expected, however, owing to the BRENNER rail interdiction. Night photos of the 25th again confirm that a pontoon bridge across the PO Northeast of FERRARA at POLESELLA (M 2899) is assembled at night; at time of photography (about 2330 hours) 10 MT and 1 motorcycle were proceeding North across the bridge.

Nothing particularly new is noted in the enemy's supply position. Reports continue to be received of a severe coal shortage in Northern ITALY affecting both the railways and industry. A continued MT fuel shortage

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is indicated by reports of MT being towed by horses, of troops marching long distances on foot, of 16 S.S. P.G. Div having to buy petrol on the Black Market etc. One report from a usually reliable ground source states that enemy petrol reserves in ITALY are only about 130,000 US gallons which, while extremely small, may well be not far off the mark. Enemy ammunition expenditure has apparently been very low recently as is to be expected on the present scale of fighting. While there is no indication of any real shortages in ITALY further evidence of an overall German shortage of ammunition is found in a Corps order captured in FRANCE dated 1 Feb which states: "The situation on the Eastern Front forces upon us at present an economy of artillery ammunition which may seem unbearable. Especially the consumption of artillery howitzer ammunition must be reduced. The consumption of infantry howitzer ammunition must also be curtailed, although it is not as critical as the above mentioned. The same applies to mortar ammunition. The confidence of the rifleman in his weapons (MG, rifle or carbine) must be strengthened by all means. Sniper activity must be considerably increased".

3. WESTERN FRONT

HITLER, some months ago in a moment of unusual military clarity, pointed out that the great danger of a two front war lay in the fact that substantial forces are likely at any given time to be engaged not in fighting the enemy but in travelling from one front to the other. 6 S.S. Pz Army is a case in point. It was transferred to the East nearly a month ago, but played no part in halting the Russian advance, and now it is missing in the West at a critical moment when armour is in shorter supply than it has ever been.

By the end of last week RUNDSTEDT had three Panzer Divisions out of the line. They were 10 S.S. Pz, Pz Lehr and 11 Pz. No more of 10 S.S. Pz Div has been heard, and it seems likely that it has now left the West altogether. Pz Lehr Division has appeared in the REICHSWALD battle area, and 11 Pz Division moved from the Southern EIFEL up to the DUREN area. The Germans have been making determined efforts to extricate further forces from the line and during the few days preceding the Allied attack enjoyed rather greater success. 11 Pz Div was pulled out from the PRUM area and moved up to DUREN while elements of three battered infantry divisions were withdrawn from the area South of DUREN. This gave RUNDSTEDT by 25 February a mobile reserve of two Panzer and eight Infantry Divisions, of which both the Panzer Divisions have now been committed.

In the South, the Allied pressure in the SAARBRUCKEN area was beginning to tell however and two of the divisions in Army Group G reserve appeared on the First German Army front. These were 245 Inf and 2 Mtn Divisions. The latter had been in Southern ALSACE and with 338 Inf Div, was reported to be moving Northwards. Across the RHINE in Southern ALSACE there are still out of contact, apart from occasional patrol clashes, five other Infantry Divisions.

Meanwhile further North, the departure of 11 Pz Div from the MOSELLE - SAAR triangle had to be paid for. Confronted with our attack, the enemy withdrew rapidly behind the SAAR river. SAARBURG fell without difficulty, but the enemy was unable to prevent us establishing a bridgehead over the SAAR which is now 2 miles deep and four miles wide. Enemy resistance still remains moderate in this area.

In the Southern EIFEL, too, the enemy's resistance has been light. The enemy divisions in this area are now all in an extremely weary state. Most of them have had no rest since the ARDENNES offensive and they have nearly all been engaged in heavy fighting over the past fortnight. Even the arrival of 2 Pz Division from the PRUM sector did not help and there has been evidence of considerable disorganisation in the enemy ranks as we pressed home our attack. Two bridges were captured intact over the PRUM river and the fall of the road junction of DITBURG now seems to be imminent. One of the Infantry Divisions pulled out five days before has been hastily recommitted in this area.

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The main battle of the week has been in the DÜREN sector where we attacked across the ROER river on a broad front North and South of DÜREN. Considerable progress has been made in this attack and for the first time since last summer there are signs of serious enemy disorganisation. The initial attack was taken by six infantry divisions all of them in their usual place, but as the attack developed, RUNDSTEDT was forced to draw more and more on his scanty reserve. 9 Pz Division which had scarcely extricated itself from the PRÜM sector was thrown in on the second day of the attack and was heavily engaged. I/10 P.G.R. provided a spectacle not seen in the West for long, when the whole Bn surrendered on 24 Feb. Since then 11 Pz Div which had only just arrived from the MERZIG area has been committed, and now 338 Inf Div from Southern ALSACE has been identified. These reinforcements have not been able to prevent an Allied break through. In the direction of COLOGNE, Allied armour operating in five columns on both sides of the AACHEN - COLOGNE Autobahn has reached BLATZHEIM, 15 miles from the HOHENZOLLERN bridge and 3 miles West of the ERFT river. The enemy may well hope to stand on this river, on which defences have long been developed. Further North, on the front North of LINNICH, Allied armour has reached a point four miles from MÜNCHEN - GLADBACH.

On the Canadian Army front the commitment of Pz Lehr Division raised to ten the number of enemy divisions engaged in the REICHSWALD battle. They present a formidable array for four are Parachute and three are good quality mobile divisions. However, with the ground to some extent drying, we have been able to make good progress, notably North of GOCH where CALCAR has been taken after heavy fighting. German resistance in the area remains heavy and so far the enemy armour is still fully committed.

RUNDSTEDT's situation is deteriorating rapidly. His lack of infantry in the REICHSWALD sector, which forced him to commit his scanty mobile reserves in that area, may cost him dear; for he can at present reckon only four somewhat doubtful Infantry Divisions and no armour at all amongst his reserves. And this, when in the really crucial sector of the front the Allies are advancing faster than they have ever done; when strong forces of his own are still fully engaged in the REICHSWALD battle; and when he is losing in prisoners alone about 3,000 men per day. It took us nearly a month of bitter costly fighting to cover the 15 miles from AACHEN to the ROER river; in three days now we have crossed one major river obstacle and gained seven miles. The road to COLOGNE was never likely to be an easy one, and there are still the defences of the ERFT to overcome, but it is becoming every day a shorter one, and RUNDSTEDT may soon be hard put to it to retain his position West of the RHINE.

4. EASTERN FRONT

Apart from the sharp battles in the area of the NEISSE river North of GÖRLITZ, there were signs last week that the great battles of the winter were over. The Soviet offensive was six weeks old on 26 February and as in the fifth week of last summer's offensive, seemed to have passed its peak. By 23 July last year, five weeks after the offensive started, the deepest Russian penetrations into POLAND had been made, and thereafter Soviet operations were primarily concerned with cleaning up the flanks, securing bridgeheads and preparing for the next major move. (Incidentally, this took place exactly four weeks later, but on a wholly different sector when the Russians attacked towards GALATZ). In East PRUSSIA last week, ROKOSSOVSKY captured ZINTEN, 18 miles South of KÖNIGSBERG, and further reduced the German East Prussian pocket by advancing across the main WORMDITT - KÖNIGSBERG road. In SAMLAND he was less successful and German counter-attacks in an Easterly direction seem to have reestablished land contact between KÖNIGSBERG and PILLAU.

In N.W. POLAND, despite an initially bitter resistance put up by the enemy along the front between encircled GRUDZIADZ and STARGARD,

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considerable Russian progress has been made. ROKOSSOVSKY has been able to achieve a deep breakthrough in the direction of the Baltic coast and has captured the road and rail junction of BUBLITZ, about 25 miles from the coast, thereby threatening to split in two the enemy forces in the area between STETTIN and DANZIG. This move has incidentally done much to eliminate the danger to the long flank of the Russian Central Group of Armies.

Opposite BERLIN, ZHUKOV seems prepared to wait and build up for the bitter 38 miles which he must traverse to the REICH capital. Neither side leaves much doubt of Soviet preparations in this sector. If MOSCOW talks of thousands of guns and fleets of aircraft, the enemy is no less loth to concede "two huge tank armies preparing for the forthcoming assault on BERLIN". But this battle has not yet started, and a lull has fallen with the issue of the Soviet bridgeheads over the ODER still not clear; for the Germans do not claim their complete elimination, nor the Russians their very existence. Behind the front, however, POZNAN fell at last to ZHUKOV during the week.

On the First Ukrainian front, the battle for the NEISSE crossings has been bitter. Here again the Germans admit Soviet bridgeheads, while MOSCOW maintains its sphinx-like silence. Much is at stake in these operations. KONIEV's forces have maintained the impetus of their attack longer in the present offensive than any other of the Army Groups. Neither the ODER nor BOBER rivers checked them for long, and once across the NEISSE in strength only the lesser barrier of the SPREE river would stand between them and DRESDEN on the ELBE. Hence the desperate battles which have been in progress in the approaches to GUBEN and FORST, and the comparative slowness of KONIEV's progress. Behind the front the battle for BRESLAU is on, and the exhausting, costly, block by block reduction which characterised the BUDAPEST battle is apparently to be repeated. GLOGAU, too, has been encircled and may prove an additional drag on KONIEV's progress.

Further South there is little to report. The troublesome German bridgehead on the East bank of the ODER near GLEIWITZ has not yet been eliminated, although German reports of Russian attacks in the general area of RATIBOR suggest that KONIEV is continuing his efforts to eliminate this bridgehead.

There has been little interesting news of enemy dispositions this week. The bulk of 7 Pz Division seems to have been destroyed in the battle for ELBING, while the Russians report the presence of a battle group of 34 Infantry Division in East PRUSSIA. There is no confirmation, however, of this identification, and as prisoners have been taken this week from 34 Division on the Alpine front, the report looks doubtful; possibly a few diverted drafts have been encountered. Further evidence confirms that HIMMLER is commanding the more Northerly of the two Army Groups on the Central sector, as his Headquarters was at DEUTSCH KRONE on Jan 27.

HUNGARY

North of the DANUBE, the German operations to eliminate the Russian bridgehead over the HRON river have achieved their object, and the Soviets are now back on the East bank of the river from KOZAROVCE, North of LEVICE, down to the DANUBE. A startling identification was reported here last week. On 22 February the Rumanian General Staff, a normally reliable source, reported the identification of advanced units of 1 and 12 SS Pz Divs in the HRON river sector. These belong to I S.S. Pz Corps of 6 S.S. Pz Army. Whether the whole of 6 S.S. Pz Army is in HUNGARY or not, and if so, what its rôle is, we do not know. Prior to the Rumanian report, there had been some very slight indications that the Army was bound for the Southern and not, as had been expected, for the Central sector. A prisoner on the Western front said that he had heard AUSTRIA mentioned as the Army's destination, while another report has mentioned the HITLER Division as being in HUNGARY - probably a reference

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either to 1 S.S. Pz Div or to the Führer Escort Brigade of 6 S.S. Pz Army. Moreover there has been no satisfactory explanation for the heavy loadings of the GYOR marshalling yards seen a fortnight ago. There seems to be thus a prima facie case for placing 6 S.S. Pz Army in the AUSTRIA - Western HUNGARY area. Whether it has come as a replacement for armour withdrawn from HUNGARY to the Central sector or whether it is to have an offensive rôle is at present only a matter for speculation. The identifications on the HRON river suggest that even that limited German operation was beyond the resources of the existing enemy forces, and that 6 S.S. Pz Army had to be drawn upon for assistance. At this stage the holding of Western HUNGARY may well take a high priority in the German strategic plan. Considerations affecting this are no doubt the oil fields of S.W. HUNGARY, and the industrial areas of Eastern AUSTRIA including the a/c factories of GRAZ and WIENER NEUSTADT.

YUGOSLAVIA

The main news in YUGOSLAVIA comes from the SREM - DRAVA front, where there seems to have been a considerable thinning out in the enemy garrison. Important and surprising Partisan successes have been reported in the general area of the old BARCS bridgehead. The towns of VOCIN, HUM, PIVNICA, DARUVAR and SUHO POLJE have all been recaptured, thus largely neutralising the recent enemy gains. Immediately after the BARCS operation the enemy had a strong force of some five divisions in this area and it is quite inconceivable that the Partisans could have achieved the success they have unless a considerable thinning out had taken place. Heavy Westerly movement from VIROVITICA towards VARAZDIN has been reported, which suggests that some of the enemy forces between the DRAVA and SAVA may be about to leave the area of Army Group E. The effect this will have on the operations further South may be considerable. An early withdrawal from SARAJEVO itself seems inevitable, and H.Q. 21 Mtn Corps has already left for the North. How far the withdrawal will then go is not clear. If the SREM is to be abandoned, a halt short of the BALATON - SENJ line seems improbable. But this will probably mean the abandonment of the Hungarian oil, and is unlikely to appeal to the enemy. In present circumstances he will certainly prefer to cling to the SREM which in turn implies retention of the ZAGREB - DROD - VINKOVCI railway. The line of the SAVA South of this railway will bring the Partisans too close to it for comfort, so it is conceivable that the enemy may be planning to hold a line somewhere South of the river in sufficient depth to break up any Partisan attempt to cross it and threaten his main L of C.

NORTHERN ADRIATIC COAST

At Appendix 'B' is a sketch of enemy dispositions on the Northern Dalmatian Coast and Islands as known to date. The enemy, no doubt appreciating that the possession of KRK, CHERSO and RAB Islands would be a necessary preliminary to an Allied invasion of Northern YUGOSLAVIA, has recently shown an increased interest in the area. Garrisons have been strengthened, and defence works initiated or completed on all the most important islands as well as on the mainland.

The over-all enemy plan appears to be firstly to hold POLA as a fortress, thus denying us the use of the port, and secondly to have sufficient forces on the islands to prevent or hinder Allied landing attempts and to gain time to take counter-measures.

Not surprisingly FIUME and TRIESTE appear to be major strong points in the defence scheme. Besides their value as ports to be denied to the Allies, the system of strong points around the ports completes the VENA Mountain defence line across the neck of the Istrian Peninsula. To ensure sufficient forces for a counter-attack rôle on the islands and to prevent the fortress of FIUME being outflanked from the South, garrisons of varying strength have been placed between FIUME and KARLOBAG. These garrisons are situated in the small harbours on the mainland which have been turned into miniature fortresses. The bulk of these coastal garrisons

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is provided by 392 Legion Div, but 237 Inf Div is responsible for POLA and is recently reported to have sent some elements to the SENJ area.

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APPENDIX 'A' TO 15 ARMY GROUP
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 83
OF 27 FEBRUARY, 45

RAILWAYS

THE BRENNER

The BRENNER railway has remained closed to through traffic throughout the week. Though on 21 Feb the line was blocked at only one point (LAVIS Viaduct and diversion just North of TRENTO) by the following day there were three blocks and as of 26 Feb the line was out at seven points, of which two were broken bridges and one a severely cratered rail fill. As was the case last week, the most important development on the BRENNER has been the further extension Northward of medium-bomber attacks. Two bridges about 10 and 15 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass respectively, which have been attacked several times, were last seen as down on 25th and are very probably still out. This deepens the interdiction of the BRENNER by about 30 kilometres which means that the zone of interdiction now extends Northwards from VERONA about 200 rail kilometres. Up until about ten days ago the line had not been cut, except on very rare occasions by heavy bombers, further North than about 125 rail kilometres from VERONA. The fact that these bridges are North of the point where the FORTEZZA (W 1902) - DOBBIACO (B 6996) - SPITTAL (X 6101) line joins the BRENNER, may divert considerable traffic to this secondary East-West route, a possibility supported by fighter-bomber reports of large numbers of wagons on the line on the 26th; however, these reports have yet to be confirmed by PR and in fact are considered somewhat exaggerated.

The enemy has effected repairs on the BRENNER, but he has been unable this week to keep up with our attacks. However, while it has been impossible throughout the week to get trains all the way through, some movement has been noted along the Southern portion of the line between VERONA and BOLZANO. This activity has consisted for the most part of turnover in yards and sidings varying from only three or four wagons up to over 100 in some of the larger stations.

Indications of troop movements have also been noted on the BRENNER. A total of five, possibly six, military train lengths have been seen on the line during the past seven days, two of which were North of BOLZANO, one being loaded with either motor or horse-drawn transport. Other evidence of moderate troop movement was seen at VIPITENO (about 10 kilometres South of the Pass) where five flats loaded with possible MT initially reported on the 23rd had departed by the 25th. In addition at a small station just South of BRESSANONE about ten flats loaded with MT or AFVs were gone on the 25th having been first seen two days previously.

Many flak wagons have been noted along the entire route, although it is difficult to say whether there has been an increase since last week or more have been observed simply owing to clearer and more extensive PR. It is of interest to note that these flak wagons initially appeared in substantial numbers both on the BRENNER and in the N.E. when the enemy began to move troops out of ITALY.

NORTH EAST ITALY

In the N.E. a higher degree of interdiction has existed over the past seven days than has ever heretofore been the case. All routes from the PADUA area N.E. across the frontier have been continuously blocked at four or more points. The most important development in the N.E. is the heavy interdiction on the TARVISIO frontier route running North from UDINE which, at least up till now, has been by far the most active of the three N.E. frontier routes. This line has been cut all week and by not later than 23 Feb four bridges were down over a stretch of line 20 kilometres long about half way between UDINE and TARVISIO. However, at the opposite end of the N.E. zone of interdiction there is a leak in the BRENTA river line of interdiction which is just East of the line VICENZA - PADUA. Photos taken at 2100 hours on

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the night of the 25th confirm what has recently been reported by ground sources and long suspected from day PR, namely that the rail bridge immediately North of PADUA on the main PADUA - CASTELFRANCO VENETO railway is "night operational". At that time the span continually missing on day photos, was seen to be in place and the bridge open to single line traffic; by 1300 hours on the following day the span had been removed. This definitely indicates rail movement between the PO Valley and the PADUA - TREVISO area. PR confirmation is still looking on the other possible night-operational bridges in this area, namely the bridge just East of VICENZA at G 2373 where only a 12 foot gap has long been seen on day photos.

Rail traffic in the North East along the two Southerly routes between UDINE and the PADUA - VICENZA area has remained almost wholly stagnant and the main TREVISO - UDINE line has shown a marked decrease in activity, undoubtedly owing to the high state of interdiction recently attained along this route. Almost no movement has been noted since 20 Feb between TREVISO and CASARSA (about 30 kilometres West of UDINE), and so far as troop movements are concerned only one empty possible military train length has been seen on this stretch during the week. Further East between CASARSA and UDINE, while a military train length first reported on 17 Feb had left by the 21st, two empty military train lengths initially seen on the 21st were still in the same spot four days later. However at UDINE itself the yards have shown considerable activity. In view of the military train lengths seen here (a total of five was picked up during the week) it seems likely that at least some troop movement has been taking place with troops presumably loading somewhere along the line West of UDINE, and East of CASARSA. Other evidence of troop movement has been observed along the now heavily interdicted UDINE - TARVISIO frontier line. Two empty military train lengths were reported by PR South of the belt of interdiction between CREMONA (C 3344) and PONTEDDA (C 4930), while two more were seen to the North thereof. Between 22 and 25 Feb activity was noted at stations South of PONTEDDA but PR of the 26th showed no change at all since the previous day, and it seems probable that in as much as military train lengths have appeared on both sides of this belt of interdiction that transhipment is probably going on around these cuts. While this transhipment point is only about 75 rail kilometres from the CASARSA area, which is the most Westerly point at which troops moving towards UDINE could reload on to trains, it may well be that despite the delays of loading and reloading on to trains troops and materiel are nevertheless moved by rail over this comparatively short stretch owing to inadequate supplies of MT fuel.

NORTH WEST ITALY AND PO VALLEY

In the North West no unusual rail activity has been noted though moves are rumoured by ground sources. Since 21 Feb traffic between MILAN and VERONA has been blocked on the main line and also on the BERGAMO loop line. The secondary line to the South nearer the PO has, however, been open and through trains can reach VERONA from MILAN by way of CREMONA and MANTUA. Through traffic is still possible between TURIN, MILAN and GENOA, and in fact through trains can move all the way from TURIN almost to BOLOGNA. Several lines are also open from the VERONA area South to the BOLOGNA area with the exception of the PO river crossings. Troops in fact, have been recently reported to load on trains at points not far North of the PO and rail lines South of the river are also still active. The only important development on the PO itself is that more detailed study of photos has shown the important bridge at PIACENZA to have been impassable for some time, though by this time it may again be open. Unless PIACENZA bridge is in fact open, there is only one rail bridge now operating over the PO, namely near CASALE MONFERRATO at J 643322.

SHIPPING

In the Gulf of GENOA two KT ships and four F-boats are still plying between GENOA and SPEZIA. One KT ship was seen unloading into

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military wagons in the latter part on 23 Feb. Only one schooner and a supply barge are known to have sailed between GENOA and SAVONA during the past week, but it is probable that two small coasters which sailed from GENOA on 23 Feb were making this run. Small scale E-boat and supply barge activity was noted at SESTRI PONENTE.

In the Northern Adriatic, TRIESTE and POLA were bombed twice and FIUME three times this week, extensive damage being caused to ship yards, harbour installations and shipping. Since these attacks started there has been a noticeable drop in activity of the larger ships. Only two MVs and two small coasters reached TRIESTE from VENICE and PORTO MARGHERA between 20 and 23 Feb since when no departures or arrivals have been noted, whilst POLA, FIUME and ARSA Channel have been virtually inactive since 20 Feb. On the Venetian coast barge activity continues between VENICE and GRADO and South to CHIOGGIA.

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
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APPENDIX 'B'

ENEMY GARRISONS NORTHERN DALMATIAN COAST



27 February, 1945

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TOP SECRET

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 84

OF 6 MARCH, 1945

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Enemy regrouping this week has been forced by our own action for the first time since January and the extent of his reaction to our attack in the CASTEL D'AIANO sector shows a certain nervousness about our intentions. The capture of the M. BELVEDERE feature and the ridge running N.E. from there to M. DELLA SPE represents a considerable territorial advantage to the Allies but the possession of this ground is still rather a long-term threat to the enemy's Appennine positions and an enemy who was thinking of a withdrawal from that position within, say, a month would scarcely have defended it with such stubbornness or counter-attacked with such violence or brought in two fresh divisions from a dwindling reserve. It looks as though there has been no change in the policy of resisting on the present line.

On 3 and 4 March Italian troops on our extreme right flank put in a limited attack to clear up some enemy positions on the Southern part of the GARIBALDI Isthmus. The operation was very successful and brought in 200 odd prisoners not only from 142 Fusilier Bn but also from 162 Division, confirming the information from prisoners of 114 Div that 162 Div had relieved them in this area. Both 303 and 314 G.R. were identified and prisoners say that 329 G.R. is also in the same area though it must have arrived there rather late since about 30 deserters came into our lines in the area L 2704 on 5 Army front having deserted on 22 Feb. 162 Div does not seem to have improved much in quality and Turcomans still represent about 60% of its strength. This was the main event on 8 Army front, apart from some bickering for the Eastern flood bank of the SENIO in 98 Div sector. We have, however, cleared up the enemy's order of battle in the area South of IMOLA; 278 Div may, as suggested last week, have taken over the Western part of 715 Div's former sector but it certainly also relieved 90 P.G. Division. Prisoners from 992 and 993 G.R. have been taken in the former area of 200 and 361 P.G.R. respectively. (Actually 4 Para Div has taken over a battalion's worth of 200 P.G.R's former sector and handed over a battalion sector on its left flank to 26 Pz Div). 90 P.G. Div appears to be in the BOLOGNA area, presumably as Central mobile reserve, a rôle in which it is all the more needed as 29 P.G. has been committed on IV Corps front.

The second phase of our attack S.W. of BOLOGNA opened on 3 March with an advance N.E. from M. TORRACCIA which once more seems to have caught the enemy in the middle of a relief. This time it was 721 Regt which was coming in and it lost over 500 prisoners, including the Bn H.Q. of III Bn, in fairly quick time. All three regiments of 232 Div were also identified and it appears that II Bn 1043, which had been taken out of the line in a weakened state to absorb reinforcements was rushed back in again. Our advance on 4 March continued with the capture of M. GRANDE D'AIANO, M. BACUCCO and M. della CROCE and the enemy clearly decided that a more powerful reinforcement was necessary. On 4 March heavier MT movement announced the

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arrival of a motorised formation and on 5 March prisoners were taken from four bns of 29 P.G. Div, representing both Panzer Grenadier Regiments. They appear to have started moving off late on the evening of 3 March from S. GIOVANNI (L 7765) and came straight into action. Both regiments were committed in the area of CASTEL D'ALANO (L 6025) with 15 P.G.R. East and 71 P.G.R. West. The Tank Bn seems to have preceded them since two Mk IV tanks were claimed knocked out on 26 Feb and two more on 5 March; there is a possibility, however, that one or other of these reports may refer to the Assault Guns of 914 Assault Gun Bde which is known to have been in support in this area. The result is that both 114 Jaeger and 232 Divisions have suffered fairly heavily in prisoners and casualties and must be considered as weakened in efficiency and 29 P.G. Div may have to remain in the area for some time to come even if the enemy were to appreciate that a large-scale renewal of the attack there is unlikely.

Although rail communications between ITALY and the rapidly dwindling Great German REICH remain frantically difficult there is evidence that more troops are attempting the passage of the BRENNER. On 2 March PR for the first time since 21 Feb showed a definite movement of military trains between VERONA and the Pass; this was continued on 3 and 4 March. This can scarcely still be 16 S.S. and must be the beginning of another troop movement. There are fewer candidates for this than usual and practically speaking the only likely starter is 715 Div which has been out of the line since about 25 Feb. It is not the division which one would have expected to be sent to a more vital front (nor was 356 Div) but all the other divisions in ITALY are firmly located.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Though weather has somewhat restricted air operations this week no through rail traffic has been possible between ITALY and the REICH over either the BRENNER or N.E. rail routes. In fact early in the week interdiction on the BRENNER was higher than at any time heretofore. However, toward the end of the week interdiction on both the BRENNER and N.E. rail routes fell off. On 28 Feb the BRENNER was cut at 10 points through a 200 kilometre zone extending from just North of VERONA to just South of the BRENNER Pass. The only new target of major significance on the BRENNER is the bridge about 5 kilometres North of VERONA which was hit on 28 Feb and has been out all week thereby isolating the BRENNER traffic from important marshalling yards at VERONA. However, repairs are being pushed here and the bridge may soon be passable. In the N.E. the three frontier routes to the East of UDINE continue blocked, with the heretofore most important of the three, the UDINE-TARVISIO line, blocked at five damaged bridges. On the other hand between UDINE and PADUA the situation is not quite so straightforward. All lines have remained blocked with the possible exception of the main PADUA-UDINE route where the prolific use of apparently night operational bridges greatly complicates the rail state picture.

Movement of troops out of ITALY by rail continues this week, notably on the BRENNER. From a logistical point of view it seems scarcely possible that this can still involve 16 S.S. P.G. Div which should have cleared the Italian frontier by not later than 1 or 2 March. Something else must therefore be on the way out. It is too early to say whether or not a major formation is involved in movement currently observed, but indications are that it is.

Reports on road movement North of the PO have been somewhat sporadic but on at least one night fairly heavy movement was picked up in the N.E. Heavy movement South of the PO has been seen, involving no doubt the shift of 114 and 29 Divs.

Some increase in the number of ground and PW reports of enemy shortages in fuel and ammunition has been noted recently. It is not thought that the enemy is threatened with any shortages so far as current supply demands are concerned, but that with the loss of important industrial areas in the West and East, and interdiction of the railways and troop movement here in ITALY making for transport difficulties and the consumption of precious

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MT fuel, it may well be that the enemy has been forced to cut ammunition expenditure and ordinary fuel consumption to the bone in order to conserve for the day when a heavy battle must be fought.

3. WESTERN FRONT

The battle of the COLOGNE plain is nearly over with 15 and 1 Para Armies defeated and withdrawing as best they can to the safety of the East bank of the RHINE. The enemy disorganisation apparent last week became even more pronounced as the battle developed (a measure of it is the prisoner total of 9,200 in 24 hours on 27 Feb). With inadequate forces and even these mostly of doubtful quality the enemy has not since the start been able to make any effective stand, while in the area between MÜNCHEN GLADBACH and the RHINE his front collapsed completely. The four divisions hastily brought down from the HOCHWALD sector to stem the tide were certainly too little and probably too late to be of much avail. Nor did the enemy fight East of DÜREN with the tenacity to be expected of the rather better quality troops facing us there. 9 Pz Div proved a broken reed, and made little effort to halt us on the fortified ERFT line; 11 Pz and 3 P.G. Divs fighting on the COLOGNE Autobahn made a better showing but were unable to make any effective stand on the perimeter of COLOGNE, the Western part of which is now all in our hands.

The grave shortage of troops has become more and more apparent in every move RUNDSTEDT has made this week. In the South he has taken a chance and is making heavy inroads into the ranks of 19 Army across the RHINE South of STRASBOURG. Two of its divisions have been sent to the COLOGNE sector, and a third has moved up to the SAAR to relieve 6 S.S. Mtn Div, which is probably being sent to plug the hole torn open at TRIER. This leaves four weary infantry divisions to hold 19 Army's 90 mile front. These moves seem to represent very nearly the maximum contribution Army Group G can make to the sore need of the other Army Groups, for much more thinning out would let us into the SAAR basin, a disaster very nearly as bad as that which has already taken place further North.

In the TRIER-EIFEL sector the situation is as bad. On paper there is a fair number of infantry divisions in this area - adequate perhaps to hold us if they had been up to strength. But four have already been reduced to remnants, all are weary and none seem to have any early prospect of relief from the battle apart from that which extinction may bring. Certainly not one has been able to extricate itself this week to help the hard pressed defenders of the COLOGNE Plain. TRIER fell after a brief struggle and we took a bridge intact over the MOSELLE there. Its loss opened a dangerous gap in the front covering the MOSELLE Valley which has been exploited by the U.S. 3rd Army in the direction of COBLENZ. Further North BITBURG and SCHLEIDEN are both in our hands and we are now only 6 miles from BONN.

In the COLOGNE Plain a number of reinforcements have been making their tardy appearance. Elements of 189 and 338 Inf Divs and 106 Pz Bde from 19 Army have been contacted between DÜREN and COLOGNE, and the trend of rail movement suggests that the remainder of these formations is coming up and taking position on the East bank of the RHINE near COLOGNE, which we have now entered. The enemy has blown all the RHINE bridges as far North as WESEL, and we are closing up to the RHINE all the way between COLOGNE and WESEL. Enemy resistance has been generally light all week, although German armour showed some fight on the high ground of the VORGEBIRGE earlier in the week. Further North however the enemy situation became almost a rout. MÜNCHEN GLADBACH, KREFELD, URDINGEN and NEUSS were abandoned after little more than sharp skirmishes, although mopping up of isolated enemy pockets has taken some time. So rapid was our advance that one bridge over the RHINE was found intact when we entered WORRINGEN South of DÜSSELDORF.

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However even with a disorganised enemy, an intact RHINE bridge was too much to hope for, and it was not to be. The bridge went up before we were able to cross. It was not until reinforcements taken from the Canadian Army front appeared about 1 March that there was any attempt at a stand by the enemy North of KREFELD. Pz Lehr Div was the first to appear and was followed by 2 Para, 15 P.G. and 84 Inf Divs on 3 March. These, according to a captured map, hoped to hold a line from the RHINE through KREFELD to KEMPEN. They failed in this, but their arrival did at least help to re-establish some sort of a coherent front now consisting of a rapidly diminishing bridgehead covering the crossing at WESEL. With their move Southwards, only six divisions were left on the Canadian front and enemy resistance weakened considerably: contact was established between 1 Canadian Army and the U.S. 9 Army South of GELDERN, and the forces of 1 Para Army South of NIJMEGEN are now withdrawing across the RHINE via the WESEL crossing.

It has been a very bad week for RUNDSTEDT; almost a decisive week. For if he could not hold us with his inadequate but organised force before the attack what prospects has he now with his Armies in confusion and having suffered probably 100,000 casualties in a fortnight of whom about 60,000 are prisoners? From COBLENZ Northwards he may soon be able to disengage his divisions temporarily, but he cannot expect to do so for long and the next attack may be even heavier than this one. He must by now be reaching the stage where the element of desperation is entering into his strategy. For the first time there are signs of a serious decline in the morale of his troops - a tendency to surrender too early or at best to offer only feeble resistance when surrounded. Only the Panzers and Parachutists seem relatively unaffected, and they will surely fight on to the last, as too will RUNDSTEDT for he has no other choice. But there is no future in it now, nothing but final defeat, or at best the slender hope that some unexpected salvation may appear from the barren womb of time.

4. EASTERN FRONT

GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA and HUNGARY

The attack launched by the Second White Russian Army Group in the direction of the Baltic coast has achieved spectacular success. Pushing on from BIELITZ, ROKOSSOVSKY's forces on 4 March reached the coast in the area West of KOLBERG thus cutting off the German forces in the Polish Corridor and DANZIG from those in the STETTIN area. It is not clear how firm this wedge is as yet, but to judge by Soviet announcements it appears that so far only light forces have reached the coast. The enemy put up very fierce resistance all through the week making the most of the flooded Pomeranian lake and forest terrain. 4 S.S. P.G. Div which left CZECHOSLOVAKIA about three weeks ago was heavily engaged at KOESLIN; so was a new S.S. Pz Division HOLSTEIN which has not previously been identified. The attack was taken up by the 1st White Russian Army Group operating on ROKOSSOVSKY's left which captured the two junction towns of STARGARD and NAUGARD. The former lies on the left bank of the IHNA river 22 miles East of STETTIN and is the junction of three main railways.

This operation was a necessary prelude to any large scale advance on the First White Russian front towards BERLIN. ZHUKOV's right flank is now very much more secure than before and the prospects of a successful German counter-attack from POMERANIA seem negligible. STETTIN itself stands in grave danger and if ROKOSSOVSKY can now clear up the enemy forces remaining in N.E. POMERANIA and DANZIG, his Army Group too should be in a position to play a leading part in the main assault on BERLIN. Nevertheless the operation was the end of an old battle: not the start of a new. It was the culmination of the Soviet winter offensive which has cost the enemy up to ¾ million permanent casualties. ROKOSSOVSKY has now done for ZHUKOV's right flank what KONIEV in the South has almost but not quite achieved for the left flank; he has secured for it the protection of a natural defensive barrier.

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set in affecting even the battle for BRESLAU, which the Russians have not mentioned in their communiqué for the past four days. Amongst the identifications reported by the Russian General Staff this week are 2 and 9 S.S. Pz Divs of 6 S.S. Pz Army and 10 S.S. Pz Div. No location other than that of the Central sector is given. 2 and 9 SS Pz Divs belong to II S.S. Pz Corps which had previously been contacted on the Eastern front this year, although I SS Pz Corps has already been in action in HUNGARY. 10 S.S. Pz Div was on the Western Front up to about three weeks ago and was believed to have left the East, but this is the first confirmation received of its transfer.

On the 4th Ukrainian Front, PETROV's forces have been engaged in heavy fighting in the sector ZVOLEN - BANSKA STIAVNICA (usually referred to as the ALTSOHL - SCHEMNITZ area in the German communiqués). Limited progress has been made but the enemy appears to be fighting hard, and both ZVOLEN and BANSKA STIAVNICA are still in his hands.

There has been no change in the situation in HUNGARY.

YUGOSLAVIA

The heavy Westward movement from VIROVITICA to VARAZDIN mentioned in last week's Summary has been followed up by a reliable report that 11 G.F and 297 Inf Divs have crossed the DRAVA into HUNGARY South of NAGYKANISZA. The only independent confirmation of this is an air report of heavy troop concentrations East of ZAGREB which by 1 March appeared to be moving Northeastwards towards VARAZDIN. Meanwhile the Partisans continue to gain successes North of the PAPUK Mountains and it is evident that this area is now comparatively thinly held. One reason for this apart from the move of 297 and 11 G.A.F. Divisions lies in the deterioration of the enemy situation further South. Two serious threats have now developed against the withdrawal route of 21 Mtn Corps up the SARAJEVO - BROD L of C. The Partisans who captured TRAVNIK have advanced Eastwards and cut the main road at BUSOVACA while to the North a Partisan force from the TUZLA area is advancing towards DOBOJ from which it is only 5 Kms distant. To meet this threat the ubiquitous rescuer of isolated formations, 7 SS Mtn Div, has had to despatch post haste a force from the PAPUK Mountains, elements of which have arrived to reinforce DOBOJ while further elements had pushed South by 4 March and were in the ZENICA area. It is likely that the enemy will have no little difficulty in clearing the main road, for 21 Mtn Corps is in a depleted condition and the Partisans are in some strength in this area. Last week they captured one of their biggest prizes of the war in the person of Colonel EBERLEIN, one time Police Chief at MUNICH and the commander in GREECE of a Battle Group bearing his name. He was taken near ZENICA.

NORTH DALMATIAN ISLANDS

In the North Dalmatian Islands there has been some activity in the past week. On 24 February Partisans supported by our aircraft and light coastal forces landed on PAG and penetrated to the outskirts of PAG town without opposition. The enemy soon reacted sharply however and landed a force from the mainland about a battalion strong (probably of 392 Div) on the night of 25/26 Feb. As a result the Partisans were forced to withdraw from the island, and the enemy has now followed suit. He continues to show concern however about the whole of this island group. Civilian labour is being impressed for the construction of defence works on both LUSSIN and CHERSO and Naval reinforcements have recently arrived on LUSSIN. On NRK 700 enemy troops landed at the end of February and are engaged in mopping up operations, although their prolonged stay here looks unlikely.

At Appendix 'B' is a chart showing chain of command of the principal formations in Army Group 'F' together with names of commanders and latest reported locations.

for BRIGADIER, G.S.
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G-2, 15 Army Group

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APPENDIX 'A' TO H.Q. 15 ARMY GROUP
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 84 DATED
6 MARCH, 1945

RAILWAYS

BRENNER

The BRENNER railway has remained heavily interdicted. Continuing the step-up in interdiction achieved towards the end of last week, the line between the Pass and VERONA has been cut at no less than 5 points during the period 27 Feb - 4 March inclusive. What is probably the highest degree of interdiction ever existing on the BRENNER was achieved on 28 Feb at which time the line was cut at ten points from VERONA Northwards approximately 200 kilometres; the North and South limits of this zone of interdiction were two damaged bridges, one about 10 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass, the other near PARONA about 5 kilometres North of VERONA. (The blocking of the bridge just North of VERONA is a new and important development; aside from adding to the degree of interdiction it also denies BRENNER traffic the use of important marshalling yards at VERONA). With bad flying weather heavily restricting our air effort on 1 and 2 March, and difficult bombing conditions over the BRENNER targets on the 3rd, the degree of interdiction fell off. However, on the 4th the line was still blocked at five points beginning with the bridge just North of VERONA, where repairs were still incomplete, and extending Northward to the bridge near KLESS..NONE (about 40 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass) which had been cut since 28 Feb when hit by heavy bombers. On 5 March no attacks were made on the BRENNER and PR was very limited but the line undoubtedly was still closed to through traffic, though repair of at least two of the five blocks existing on the previous day are likely to have been effected.

A point of interest in connection with interdiction on the BRENNER is the fact that the bridge near CISMON (B 2505) on the secondary line running North from CASTELFRANCO VENETO to join the BRENNER at TRENTO was seen as passable on 4 March, and on the same day a train was seen moving South at a point not far North of the bridge. A single short span of this bridge has been missing for a long time, at least on day photos, and remained out even though cratered approaches were repaired. The bridge must either have been night operational or maintained as unserviceable in anticipation of a more important future use. The noteworthy feature of the full repair of this bridge is that it was effected at a time when VERONA and its important marshalling yards were isolated from the BRENNER by the blocking of the PARONA bridge just North of VERONA. With the CASTELFRANCO VENETO - TRENTO line opened up by the full repair of CISMON bridge, blocks between VERONA and TRENTO on the BRENNER are effectively by-passed, particularly if the BRENTA river line of interdiction in the VICENZA - PADUA area breaks down, (and as indicated below it has), in which event through traffic becomes possible between the PO Valley and TRENTO.

Although the BRENNER has remained blocked to through traffic all week, a considerable amount of movement has been seen. In addition to movement of rolling stock in general, PR has also revealed a total of at least twelve probable troop trains or troop train lengths during the week. Four of the twelve were almost certainly troop trains being loaded with MT, AFV's and other military equipment whereas another six, while empty, moved during the week. Two of the loaded train lengths were seen about 40 kilometres North of BOLZANO on 4 March, and on the same day a troop train loaded with MT was observed moving North into TRENTO. TRENTO yards and the tracks to the North and South in the vicinity thereof have been exceptionally active showing considerable turnover and much MT activity. On 3 March and again on the 5th loading or unloading of MT seemed to be taking place, possibly in connection with a transhipment. The three empty military train lengths seen at TRENTO had all departed by the end of the week.

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PERI (about 35 rail kilometres North of VERONA) has been heavily loaded and four troop train lengths were seen in the yards; two empty train lengths seen early in the week had departed by 4 March, on which date two other train lengths were present, one of which was loaded with MT and AFV's. With the bridge about 5 kilometres North of VERONA out all week, PERI may well be a loading point for troops, though movement Northwards from here would have had to have been well timed to get past the bridge at ALA about 15 kilometres to the North. It is true that ALA bridge, frequently attacked and frequently repaired, has been out on all days during the week with the exception of 2 March; however, the attacks this week have on no occasion succeeded in doing more damage than to block the approaches, and PR indicates that these are repaired very rapidly, probably in a matter of hours. For example, on 2 March the bridge and approaches were passable; on the 3rd it was attacked and the approaches cut; on the 4th the approaches were seen as repaired on photos taken at 1130 hours, the bridge was attacked at 1230 hours, and on photos taken at 1400 hours the approaches were again seen as cut. It is obvious therefore that in addition to being passable on 2 March the bridge in at least one instance was open in between attacks made on successive days. The only block throughout the week between PERI and TRENTO has been at the ALA bridge and the fact that the bridge has been open intermittently may account for the unusual amount of activity observed at PERI and TRENTO yards.

NORTH EAST ITALY

In the Northeast interdiction has remained high though the exact situation is somewhat obscure. East of UDINE it is clear that the three frontier routes have remained, as last week, blocked. The POSTUMIA route is cut at BOROVNICA Viaduct (D 2803) where work continues on the diversion first seen under construction over two weeks ago. The FIEDICOLLE line running Eastwards from GORIZIA while not recently photographed is very probably still not open to through traffic as when last seen on 28 Feb BODRES bridge (C 7223) was still heavily damaged. The TARVISIO route is still heavily interdicted with four bridges cut up to 3 March and five since 4 March. While at least two bridges are being repaired it will be some time before this important route can be opened to through traffic.

West of UDINE to the PADUA area the situation is not quite so clear. The two Southerly lines that have been closed to through traffic for so long have remained cut. The enemy has been working hard at repair, but by virtue of attacks made before repairs were complete the interdiction on both routes remains high. The status of the third and most active route in this area, namely that running from PADUA to UDINE via CASTELFRANCO VENETO and/or TREVISO to UDINE, is difficult to assess. There are six bridges on this route, namely from West to East, PADUA North (G 3553) and CITADELLA (G 2373), which are complementary in that they provide mutually by-passing routes, NERVESA (G 6493), SACILE (B 8407), PORDENONE (B 9907) and CASARSA (C 1508). There are rail diversions at all these bridges with the exception of PADUA North, which, however, is a night operational bridge. (The missing span at PADUA North was seen in place on the nights of 25 and 26 Feb, and missing on day photos of the same dates, clearly showing the bridge to be night operational. Subsequent attacks did make this night use of the bridge temporarily impossible, but then the diversion near CITADELLA, which provides an alternative route around PADUA North and where on day photos only a 12-foot gap had long been the sole damage, was opened up). While these points of interdiction appear to have been out most of the week all have been seen as passable at one time or another during the week with the exception of SACILE and PORDENONE. However, a usually very reliable ground source reports that SACILE may be passable at night and there is PR evidence to support this, and PR also strongly indicates that PORDENONE may be night operational. It is just possible that for a brief period through traffic may have been possible between the UDINE and PADUA areas. From the above the ever increasing importance of night operational bridges becomes apparent and a brief photo intelligence summary thereof appears below.

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In the VICENZA - PADUA - CASTELFRANCO VENETO area, five moving trains were seen during the week. In addition to normal activity a considerable number of flats has been seen at small stations just North of PADUA and in view of the numerous interdictions along the three routes to UDINE, it would seem that trains bound for UDINE were being held up or were being assembled there in anticipation of the line to UDINE being opened up. The presence of flats, although they are unloaded, suggests that troop movement might possibly be going on. Further East, little if any movement, as usual, has been seen along the two more Southerly routes. Along the main TREVISO - UDINE line, there has been limited activity, and on this line there has been some indication of rail troop movement though not to the same extent as on the BRENNER. Between CASARSA (about 25 kilometres West of UDINE) and UDINE itself, four empty troop train lengths were seen on 5 March, two of which had been first reported on 27 Feb.

The rail activity picture in the North East on the whole seems to suggest a certain amount of movement into the PADUA-TREVISO area to and from the PO Valley, transhipment from there to a point about 30 kilometres West of UDINE, with reloading and rail movement up the TARVISIO route to just South of the belt of interdiction and a further transhipment around the cuts to a point about 30 kilometres West of TARVISIO from where the line is open across the frontier.

PO VALLEY AND NORTH WEST ITALY

North of the PO the ROMANO bridge (K 622680) on the main MILAN - VERONA line has been repaired but the bridge near CHIARI at K 762686 about 10 kilometres further East lost a span without there being any record of attack. Just to the North PALAZZOLO bridge on the MILAN - BERGAMO (K 6308) - ROVATO (K 8872) loop line is said by a ground source to be night operational. Hence while day photos show through traffic to be impossible between MILAN and VERONA (possible secondary routes between MILAN and the Eastern PO Valley including VERONA are now cut by virtue of blocks at PIZZIGHETTONE (K 609301) and CREMA (K 634508) bridges), this status must be regarded with suspicion. Lines running South to the PO from the VERONA area remain open and active; aside from shifts in rolling stock evident from PR a train was seen on the night of 4 March moving North from OSTIGLIA (on the PO at F 7412). There is also considerable open trackage running South from the VICENZA - PADUA area toward the PO; one route South is blocked at LEGNAGO bridge (F 893258), which for the time being is no longer a probable night operational bridge owing to a recent attack, the main PADUA - FERRARA line is cut at a bridge just North of ROVIGO, and the most Easterly route South remains abandoned. Activity has been seen on the line between ROVIGO and the PO but any movement here is probably directed Northwest from ROVIGO toward VERONA and not along the blocked line running direct to PADUA. POLESELLA (M 2399) is one of the points where activity was noted South of ROVIGO and this is of particular interest in view of the existence of a nearby pontoon bridge across the PO which night PR on two recent occasions has shown to be assembled during the hours of darkness. POLESELLA may be a transhipment point.

Over the PO itself all rail bridges East from BRESSANA BOTTARONE (just South of PAVIA), inclusive, remain cut. To the West of this CASALE MONFERRATO (J 643322) remains open while TORREBERETTI (J 776207) is reported by a ground source as night operational and on the basis of PR is in fact suspect.

South of the PO there has been some increase in the degree of interdiction but bombers report three moving trains in the areas just North and Northeast of BOLOGNA while ground sources report and PR indicates that the line running generally East and West immediately South of the PO is active between PARMA and SUZZARA (F 4406). Through traffic is no longer possible along the main BOLOGNA - PIACENZA line and the PARMA - SPEZIA railway is now cut.

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PHOTO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY - REPORT
ON NIGHT OPERATIONAL BRIDGES

The increased intensity of our attack on enemy rail bridges since the middle of January, has been partially met by an increase in attempted deception in the form of night operational bridges. The term "night operational" is used to include those bridges from which a span or spans are removed to make them appear unserviceable, and which are quickly made serviceable again at night, or at such time as may be desired.

Because of the missing span or spans, these bridges appear to be damaged to our air-crews who unless they are briefed to avoid the fallacy may withhold attack in favour of attacking other obviously serviceable, but possibly less important bridges.

In the last few weeks, the Bomb Damage Section of 3rd Photo Technical Squadron has reported the following bridges as night operational or very probably so : CALCINATO (F 1960), PADUA North (G 3553), TORREBERENTI (J 7720), LEGNAGO (F 8925), CISMON (B 2407), CITTADELLA (G 2373) and NERVESA (G 6493). Other bridges, namely those at SACILE (B 8407) and PORDENONE (9907), are at present under suspicion and are being observed.

The bridge at PADUA North is cited as an example to illustrate the pattern by which a night operational bridge can be recognised. A span, about 50 feet long, was seen to have been removed from the bridge between covers of 31 January and 6 February; there was no evidence of attack. The bridge was immediately regarded with suspicion. A search revealed that a crane, similar to that at CALCINATO, previously confirmed as night operational, was present at the nearby station yard. Subsequent covers showed that the approaches were persistently repaired following attack. Although a certain amount of inactive rolling stock was observed, a single track was always kept open. Activity studies revealed turnover of rolling stock on the lines on either side. Furthermore, the bridge was of the utmost importance, and a damaged span could have been easily repaired in a short time. On the basis of the accumulated evidence, the bridge was reported as night operational. Confirmation was received when a night sortie, flown the 26 February, revealed the span to be in place. Cover of that afternoon, and the following day, revealed the span to be removed.

The pattern by which a night operational bridge reveals itself is so consistently similar as to make its existence readily apparent.

1. It is usually first detected by the removal of a span or spans.

2. Subsequent damage is consistently repaired, although the missing span or spans are not replaced during the day.

3. The bridge is invariably a vital link in a line on which all other bridges are repaired following attack.

4. The spans are the standard girder type used by the enemy for construction and repair of bridges in Northern ITALY. They are of such a length that they can either be set manually or with a crane. In the latter case, the crane is often visible.

5. Although inactive rolling stock is sometimes kept on the approaches to create the impression of a block, at least a single track is kept clear.

6. Activity studies show movement of rolling stock on the lines on either side of the bridge.

It might be anticipated that should the condition of enemy communications continue to deteriorate, the greater will become his tendency

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to utilise deception in maintaining his serviceable bridges. Because of the engineering requirements of railroad structures, however, it is not thought likely that the method of deception can be varied appreciably from the pattern as described, and any new attempts can be readily detected by photo interpretation.

(SOURCE: Third Photo Group Interpretation Report No. 3DS 101 dated 5 March, 1945)

SHIPPING

PR of the Ligurian ports between 23 Feb and 3 March shows that a steady traffic in coastal shipping is being maintained in the Gulf of GENOA. Three MT ships, a small coaster and a number of F-boats and supply barges have been plying between GENOA and SPEZIA, whilst 2 210' MV, believed to be the DOMINANTE, was seen to be loading in the former harbour on 26th Feb and had reached SPEZIA by 3 March. A ground source report dated 24 Feb stated that troops were being conveyed from SPEZIA to GENOA in "ammunition barges", probably F-boats. SAVONA has also been active, and traffic between this port and GENOA included at least three coasters, two supply barges and two schooners. All other ports on this stretch of coast remain inactive, except for occasional traffic to SESTRI LEVANTE.

Owing, probably, to the severe bombing to which the larger ports were subjected during the third week of Feb, shipping in the Northern Adriatic was confined almost entirely to F-boats, supply barges and other small craft between 23 Feb and 3 March, the only exceptions being the sailing of a hospital ship from TRIESTE to VENICE, and a coaster from ARSA to FIUME. However, two MV's were seen loading at TRIESTE on 27 Feb, and both these vessels, together with a coaster appeared ready to leave on 3 March. Barge activity continues at GRADO and CHIOGGIA and on the inland waterways which connect up the lagoons along the Venetian coast. The building of F-boats continues at MONFALCONE where three were almost ready for loading on 3 March.

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OF 13 MARCH, 45

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has been very little change in the enemy's dispositions and attitude so far as can be definitely established but there have been various small incidents and pieces of information which suggest that something is going on. What it is exactly is hard to see; on the face of it the enemy's main preoccupation should be to create a larger reserve for the main front than is at present available. The position will no doubt become clearer when the reliefs now apparently in progress are completed.

On 8 Army front 162 Div continues to lose deserters and shows itself to be even more worthless as a fighting formation than in its previous turns in the line. It is only engaged on the very narrow front presented by the isthmus between the lake and the sea but it seems to regard this not so much as a front as a funnel to the comforts of Allied PW camps and, for the Turcomans, eventual repatriation. On the SENIO front the situation is more obscure. 98 Div appears to be extending its sector Southwards to relieve part of 26 Pz Div and is being relieved in turn in its Northernmost sector by 362 Div. This may call for a complementary move South by 42 Jaeger Division, which is feasible, especially if 142 Fus Bn returns from the isthmus. More surprising is the identification of 992 G.R. in TOSSIGNANO; if we believe the deserter both bns are there, having arrived night 10/11 March. There has been a good deal of movement in this area of late though it would be surprising if 278 Div were to take over the whole of 334 Div's sector. Perhaps if the intention is to take out 334 Div 1 Para Div might extend its front Southwards to assist in the relief. It remains to be seen what the result of these moves will be but it looks as though some division or other is going out into reserve, possibly preparatory to leaving the country.

On the Western part of the front the week has been fairly quiet. Recent deserters confirm that the losses inflicted on 114 Jg Div were heavy; 721 Regt in particular, according to them, has now been reorganised as a single battalion. Both it and 232 Div, however, which also suffered severe losses, are still in the line. The position of 29 P.G. Div, on the other hand, is more obscure; the Recce Unit was identified on 7 March but since then we have had no contact with the division. It is reasonable to assume that, as soon as the immediate danger was felt to be over, the enemy would like to pull out the formation to its more natural and useful rôle of mobile reserve. 90 P.G. is, indeed, available in its old area East and Northeast of BOLOGNA but with the improvement in the weather and increasing likelihood of a resumption of the Allied offensive, a second reserve division must appear necessary.

In North East ITALY both 188 Reserve and 237 Divs appear to be taking a greater interest in Northern DALMATIA and elements from both are reported on the islands of the QUARNERO. Otherwise they have changed little; 188 still has its four regiments and must be busy at its primary job of training the young intake. ITALY is now the most favoured site for training in what remains of German-occupied EUROPE.

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Good weather throughout this week has enabled us to keep the railways well interdicted and again no through traffic has been possible on either the BRENNER or N.E. rail routes.

The BRENNER railway has been continuously out South of BOLZANO, the high watermark of the week being 12 March when the line between VERONA and BOLZANO was impassable at fifteen points including four bridge blocks. North of BOLZANO conflicting PR reports make an assessment difficult but one, perhaps two, bridges may have been impassable for several days. However, the enemy continues a strong repair effort and is even attempting to repair the heavily damaged long viaduct near LAVIS (A 7430). Repairs at the VERONA PARONA bridge just North of VERONA were completed this week but it was again knocked out by heavy bombers on the 10th. At no time has the enemy been able to repair as fast as we have destroyed, but the heavy concentration of flak (one third of the total heavy flak in ITALY is disposed along the BRENNER) demands its toll; on one day this week we lost four medium to the BRENNER flak and it is a rare mission that does not return from the BRENNER with at least some aircraft holed. The importance the enemy attaches to this rail route is obvious.

In the N.E. the situation at the end of last week was confused by the probable existence of a number of night operational bridges, and it is possible that for a brief period the enemy were getting trains through to the UDINE area from the PO Valley. This week, however, further attacks have sealed most, if not all, of these possible leaks. Beyond UDINE the three frontier routes remain, as last week, closed to through traffic. In the N.E., and in fact elsewhere in ITALY, with the exception of the BRENNER, there is strong evidence from PR that the enemy may be suffering from a shortage of structural members for the repair of rail bridges. A report on this appears at Appendix 'A'.

Some troop movement by rail out of ITALY has been noted recently on the BRENNER and to a very limited extent in the N.E. While such movement as has been observed has been small, the fact that it continues this week, as last, tends to indicate that a formation of at least divisional strength is on the move.

Perhaps the most important development affecting the enemy's L of C in ITALY is the announcement of an Allied economic agreement with the Swiss whereby, among other matters, rail traffic from GERMANY to ITALY via SWITZERLAND is evidently to be severely restricted. With heavy rail interdiction existing on all other railroads into ITALY, the Swiss rail routes have been of great value to the enemy in getting foodstuffs, industrial products and loot into GERMANY from ITALY, and for the importation of coal and raw materials into ITALY for industries and the railways. The enemy will be seriously embarrassed by the loss of this valuable traffic and in fact its loss has already been felt. Industrial output in Northern ITALY is reported to have been heavily curtailed owing to lack of coal and raw materials. More important from an operational viewpoint is the lack of coal for the railways which threatens the movement of essential supplies for German forces in ITALY. Ground sources report that no coal arrived from SWITZERLAND during the latter part of February and it may be more than coincidental that several coal trains have been seen recently on the already overlooded BRENNER railway. Transfer of troops out of ITALY and the lack of MT fuel will certainly make the supply problem all the more difficult.

Under the conditions above discussed it can only be presumed that the enemy's administrative position in ITALY is severely threatened. If he is now meeting current low supply requirements it is only with great difficulty and if these are substantially increased it seems unlikely that he can maintain his forces for any length of time without a large amount of MT, which at the moment at least, is not thought to be available in ITALY. In addition, and perhaps more important, is the well known acute shortage of MT fuel, and reports indicate that the enemy is making every effort to increase the

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use of MT fuel substitutes. Among those is Methane, of which there is a considerable amount in certain areas of the PO Valley. A Methane pipe line is known to run from MILAN South to PIACENZA and on to MODENA, and a ground source reports that it has been extended into BOLOGNA and from there up to FERRARA. While Methane is not a suitable fuel for combat vehicles, it should be adequate for rear area administrative vehicles and hence be very useful in the saving of petrol and diesel. Other substitute or supplementary MT fuels reported in use by the enemy are alcohol and benzol which can be mixed with petrol in a proportion of one unit of substitute to three units of petrol, thereby giving about a 25% saving in petrol. In addition to using these substitutes the enemy seems to find it worth his while to operate at least some of the few small oil fields in ITALY; in one recent instance he was said to be working a well which produced only about 1,000 gallons a day.

3. WESTERN FRONT

The disaster which befell 1 Para and 15 Armies a week ago has spread itself to 5 Pz and 7 Armies this week. The Allied attack has indeed developed on a classical model. To meet the attack of the Canadian Army in the REICHSWALD area, the enemy had been forced to send reserves in support of 1 Para Army. When the Allies struck North of the COLOGNE Autobahn in the direction of KREFELD, a hasty reshuffle had to be made in order to create some sort of a front covering the RHINE crossings at WESEL. Before this could be properly effected, the Americans struck in the sector North of the MOSELLE Valley, where 5 Pz Army and 7 Army were stretched tight and denuded of reserves. Of the four German armies which have been involved in the past fortnight's débacle, those in the centre have probably suffered most. In the extreme North, 1 Para Army fought with traditional vigour and efficiency and held the WESEL bridgehead long enough to get a substantial proportion of men and equipment back across the RHINE. In the South, 7 Army, though heavily battered, has been able to retain some sort of coherence as it fell back to the RHINE pivotting on 2 Pz Division, which has been fighting hard East of WITTLICH. In the Centre, however, 15 Army and 5 Pz Army have presented a sorry spectacle. The former, though it got some forces back across the RHINE, never offered much more than feeble resistance to our drive on KREFELD and NEUSS. The latter has suffered a major disaster, the full extent of which it is still too early to assess. Few elements succeeded in crossing to the far bank of the RHINE, and the remainder of the Army has found itself split into large and small pockets which are being eliminated. The extent of the disorganisation prevailing is shown by our capture intact of the bridge at REMAGEN. 167 and 326 Inf Divs have probably been wiped out and the Commander of 3 Parachute Division is in our hands. How many other divisions have been submerged in the flood and will not again come to the surface it is still impossible to say, but the cost to the enemy has been heavy.

On the Central sector of the front, two major problems confront the enemy and demand immediate solution if worse disasters still are not to ensue. The first is the elimination of the REMAGEN bridgehead, and the other is the establishment of a firm front along the MOSELLE so as to form a right flank for the SAAR. The reaction to the REMAGEN bridgehead has naturally been fierce. On the ground 11 Pz Div has been launching heavy counter-attacks and fighting extremely well; but it alone is not enough to deal with an increasingly firm Allied position, and further reinforcements are to be expected. There are indeed signs that Pz Lehr Div is also coming down from North of COLOGNE to join 11 Pz. However, by this stage it is doubtful in the extreme whether anything short of a carefully prepared counter-offensive can have a decisive effect upon the bridgehead. In addition to the intact rail bridge we now have two pontoon bridges across the RHINE and several ferries operating. The enemy artillery is shelling the crossings heavily and is causing a certain amount of interference. However, the chances of putting the crossings permanently out of action can now be regarded as non-existent. The G.A.F. has made a token effort. Almost as if a Spanish galleon had come sailing up the RHINE, and about as effective, was the appearance of three Stukas over the bridge on 10 March. It was a gesture

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reminiscent of the Blenheims on the MEUSE crossings in 1940 and as costly. All three were shot down.

On the MOSELLE, the enemy is now trying to build up a coherent front. If, as seems possible, a proportion of 7 Army lives to fight another brief day, a temporary stand on the MOSELLE may be feasible. The enemy is reinforcing the area to the best of his ability. 159 Inf Div has moved up from FREIBURG to the COCHEM area, and 6 S.S. Mtn Div seems to have shifted Northward to take up positions covering the river N.E. of TRIER. Even so it will be a thinly held front and is in danger of being turned by Allied progress South of the MOSELLE beyond TRIER, where 2 Mtn and 79 Inf Divs are offering moderate resistance to our pressure. Elsewhere, the picture on the front is little changed and shows clearly the growing shortage of enemy reserves. On the Upper RHINE 19 Army has now surrendered four divisions and an armoured brigade since the start of the offensive and is left with three divisions to hold its 90 mile front. On the SAAR - PALATINATE front the enemy's strength is unchanged, and there are still ten divisions between SAARLOUIS and the RHINE. It is unlikely, however, that we shall see much thinning out here, for it will be hard enough to defend the SAAR on the MOSELLE line without running the risk of letting the Allies in by the front door. In HOLLAND, the front remains thinly held, and there are at least 1½ divisions holding from the RHINE mouth to EMERICH without much hope of reinforcement.

Strategically the enemy's situation has deteriorated still further by the failure to blow the bridge at REMAGEN, for he can now no longer count upon the respite he might otherwise have expected while the Allies prepared for a major crossing of the RHINE. Moreover, any stabilisation he can achieve on the Centre is at the expense of the North and South. The front in HOLLAND has long been thinly held, but that in the South has never looked as bare as at present, and the potential danger of an Allied encircling movement down the RHINE Valley from STRASBOURG is a risk which the enemy has got to accept. The dividend on the faulty strategy of the past four months has to be paid - the strategy which in November and December sent to the West to be decimated in the COLOGNE plain divisions which should have gone to the East; and which in January took away from the West to send to the East a Panzer Army which has so far never effectively operated in the East. The dividend has to be paid and RUNDSTEDT is bearing the cost.

4. EASTERN FRONT

GERMANY

The Baltic coast from STETTIN to the German frontier with the exception of the pockets at KOLBERG and N.E. of KÖSLIN has now been virtually cleared by the First and Second White Russian Army Groups, and the Soviets despite strong enemy resistance are steadily closing in on DANZIG and GDYNIA. In the past week, TCZEW, MEWHEROWO and PUCK, the latter a port of some importance in the Bay of DANZIG some 20 miles North of GDYNIA, have all fallen to the Russians. The German forces in this area are thus compressed in a narrow wedge of land between PUCK and a point West of TIEGENHOF running as far South as the almost encircled town of MARIENWERDER. DANZIG itself stands in grave danger and fighting is reported to be in progress in the outskirts. To the West the present Soviet offensive operation has been carried one stage nearer completion by Marshal ZHUKOV whose forces have closed up to the East bank of the ODER from KÜSTRIN Northwards. The Russians are now on the shores of the STETTINER HAVEN, North of STETTIN itself and the port has been rendered virtually useless to the enemy. In the fighting at the approaches to STETTIN, prisoners were taken from 1 Marine Division, a new identification, probably either a U-boat or similar formation or an ad hoc Army division scraped together from the land-locked sailors of STETTIN. Further South KÜSTRIN is in Russian hands. This is on the East bank of the ODER on the direct route to BERLIN. Despite German reports of a renewed offensive by ZHUKOV in the direction of BERLIN, there is no indication that the Russians are yet ready for the kick off, though the capture of KÜSTRIN would of course be a necessary preliminary.

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The rest of the front in GERMANY has been relatively quiet. Fighting of local importance has taken place to the West of the besieged city of BRESLAU. Here the Germans claim to have encircled the Soviet forces in STRIEGAU, a claim on which the Russians have remained silent. A report received in the past week refers to an Army Group KURLAND. This is a new identification and to judge by the title is responsible for operations in LATVIA. Whether its responsibilities extend to East PRUSSIA and DANZIG is not known, but the probabilities are against it. It is none the less conceivable that there might be another Army Group in the latter area since there are at least two Armies there. On the main front, HIMMLER and SCHOERNER have again had recent mentions from the German radio as commanders of Army Groups and it is clear that "reliable" hands are still at the head of operations in Eastern GERMANY.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In CZECHOSLOVAKIA fierce fighting has taken place between BANSKA STIAVNICA and ZVOLEN but the Russians, apart from the capture of the former town, have made little progress. IV Pz Corps and Pz Corps Feldherrnhalle have been identified in action under Army Group South during the week.

It is now clear that the enemy is undertaking an operation of major proportions in HUNGARY. The Schwerpunkt appears to be just North of Lake BALATON where the enemy claims to have made gains on both sides of the SARVIZ Canal and no doubt hopes to reach the DANUBE. The Russians report enemy attacks in some strength to the South of the Lake and a report, to be treated with reserve, states that three Pz Divs are engaged in this area. 1 Mtn, 118 Jg and 13 SS Divs are probably engaged and there may also be present elements of 297, 11 G.A.F. and 104 Jg Divs. Simultaneously, the enemy has crossed the DRAVA at DONJI MIHOLJAC and VALPOVO and established bridgeheads on the North bank in spite of Russian and Bulgarian resistance. At the former locality the enemy has erected a pontoon bridge and it appears that his intention is to clear the whole of Southern HUNGARY up to the DANUBE. The formations employed in these crossings are believed to be 297 Inf and 11 G.A.F. Divs less those elements which may have transferred to HUNGARY.

JUGOSLAVIA

Apart from the DRAVA operation, mentioned above, there has been little activity. The situation in which XXI Mtn Corps now finds itself is very much the same as it faced in MONTENEGRO. Then 22 Inf Div was sent South to open up an escape route, now 7 SS Mtn Div "Prinz Eugen" has been alloted the same task. The precarious plight of XXI Corps is evident from the fact that 7 SS Div, probably the best division in YUGOSLAVIA, which otherwise could and probably would have been employed in the attack in Southern HUNGARY, has been sent to its aid. Fighting its way down from the DOBOJ area this veteran Balkan Div cleared the whole of the BOSNA Valley down to ZENICA. Here it was engaged in heavy fighting with the Partisans and has finally succeeded in reopening the SARAJEVO-BROD road. German counter-attacks are reported to the East of SARAJEVO; these are probably not so much an indication that the enemy intends to remain in the area as an attempt on his part to get elbow room to allow a withdrawal. 181 Inf is in the SARAJEVO area and is no doubt detailed to act as Corps rearguard.

Confused fighting continues in the BIHAC area but here the enemy situation seems to be easier than hitherto. A Partisan success was however reported near BUNIC where SALAMUNIC P 2963 fell into their hands. This village forms the Southern suburbs of BUNIC proper and straddles a road crossing of some importance.

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DALMATIAN ISLANDS

The enemy continues to show a degree of nervousness in the islands where defence work goes on apace. The latest development is the despatch of some 800 troops to LUSSIN via CHERSO. The garrison, already believed to be about 500 troops will therefore amount to 1,300 - the highest figure yet reported for the island. In this connection it is of interest that 6 Coy 1047 G.R. of 237 Inf Div was manning a strong point on the Island when our raiding forces paid a profitable visit on the night 8/9 March. It would appear that 392 Legion Div hitherto responsible for the Islands, has its hands full on the mainland and troops from Army Group C have been called upon to help. An unconfirmed report places elements of 188 Res Mtn Div on KRK, this would appear reasonable as 138 Res Mtn Regt has its main forces in the FIUME area.

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RAILROADS

BRENNER

The BRENNER has, as is now usual, been closed to through traffic for the past seven days. The degree of interdiction had fallen off late last week but with good flying weather on all days this week it has been built up again and on 12 March the line between TRENTO and VERONA was blocked at 13 points, including three bridges with spans out. This is the highest degree of interdiction ever achieved on this section of the BRENNER. VERONA PARONA bridge about 5 kilometres North of VERONA, attacked and knocked out by heavy bombers on 28 Feb, was repaired by 6 March, but again attacked by a strong force of heavies and again heavily damaged. ALA bridge about half way to TRENTO, frequently attacked but never suffering greater damage than blocked approaches, was finally completely destroyed by medium bombers on the 12th. Earlier in the week, on the 8th, the mediums also made an effective attack on ROVERETO bridge (about 20 kilometres South of TRENTO) and it was still out on the 12th though at that time repairs were seen to be in progress. These three bridge blocks have been supplemented by track cuts and cratered fills, which, though rapidly repaired in most instances, appreciably add to the degree of interdiction. North of TRENTO the main line and the 12 mile diversion between ORA (A 9155) and S. MICHELE (A 7831) have been blocked all week. Further North between BOLZANO and the BRENNER Pass the status of the line has been somewhat indefinite, but it may have been blocked all week at VIPITENO bridge just South of the Pass, and for two or three days at BRESSANONE bridge some 30 kilometres to the South.

As heretofore indicated in this Summary the railway running Eastward from the BRENNER line at FORTEZZA (about 30 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass) to join the VILLACH-SALZBURG line just N.W. of SPITTAL (X 0161) assumes increased importance with the blocking of BRENNER bridges North of its junction with the BRENNER. This line has been struck by fighter-bombers fairly recently and it was attacked on 11 March for the first time by mediums which succeeded in cutting the approaches to a bridge on the Austrian section of the line. This alternative rail route into GERMANY is definitely active, but so far no pronounced increase in activity has been noted.

The BRENNER route on the whole has been comparatively quiet during the past week. However, despite the high state of interdiction, activity has been noted. Between VERONA and TRENTO, rolling stock appears to have been almost at a standstill with the exception of TRENTO station which has shown considerable turnover. North of TRENTO there has been greater activity but no unusual amount of movement has been seen.

There seems to have been a limited amount of troop movement on the BRENNER. During the week two new empty possible troop train lengths have been seen, one about 40 kilometres North of VERONA and the other approximately 30 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass. The four loaded troop trains and three empty troop trains seen last week have left. It is interesting to note that approximately 380 flats were seen on the route on 10 March, and although this is not an unusual number, 140 were at FORTEZZA, about 45 rail kilometres North of BOLZANO, while another 100 were on a 20 kilometre stretch of line not far North of TRENTO. In view of the existing interdictions on the Southern portion these might be possible loading points for troops.

NORTH EAST ITALY

At the end of last week there was a strong possibility that the enemy might have been getting trains from the PO Valley through N.E. ITALY to the UDINE area by use of a number of night bridges on the main PADUA-UDINE railway. Attacks this week have, however, at least for the time being created sufficient damage to make this strategem impossible. While PR has been

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somewhat limited in this area it seems certain that the line has at no time been open to through traffic. To the South the main MESTRE - MONFALCONE - TRIESTE line remains unrepaired and to all intents and purposes abandoned. The central single track railway, where extensive repair efforts have heretofore been observed but never completed owing to repeated attacks, has remained blocked and there are indications that this line may also have been abandoned.

To the East of UDINE all three frontier routes are blocked and have been now for just about a month. Some repair work has been done to the broken bridges on the TARVISIO line but four are still out. The PIEDICOLLE line remains blocked at BODRES bridge, and while the enemy continues to work on the uncompleted diversion around the damaged BOROVNICA Viaduct (D 2803) on the POSTUMIA route he now has another broken bridge to contend with on this line, namely the bridge just West of the frontier at J 146882 which was successfully attacked on 12 March.

In the North East, undoubtedly owing to the heavy interdiction maintained during the week, practically no movement has been seen between the VICENZA - PADUA area and UDINE. UDINE itself has shown considerable activity, but along the heavily interdicted UDINE - TARVISIO frontier route little movement has been seen. The only indication of troop movement was two empty military train lengths seen North of the belt of interdiction. The POSTUMIA route, on the other hand, has been quite active, but lack of continuous PR makes comparison difficult. No definite statement can be made on the PIEDICOLLE route because of lack of PR; however, it is thought that limited activity continues.

INDICATIONS OF A DEVELOPING SHORTAGE
IN RAIL BRIDGE REPAIR MATERIALS

There have been indications in the last few weeks that a shortage in certain types of bridge repair materials may be developing.

These indications have been in the form of unusual activities, observed from the study of photographs, at the sites of various rail bridges. They have been separated, for the purpose of this report, into three categories.

1. Girders and Piers Removed from Damaged Structures

A most striking example is the recent dismantling and removal of all seven of the remaining 30' to 35' piers at the North end of the PO bridge at PONTELAGOSCURO (M 1191). The operation took place between 13th and 20th February. At the same time, the girders, which had been on the approach since they had been stripped from the bridge early in December, have been taken away until now only three of about eighteen remain.

Another example can be drawn from the sequence of events which has recently taken place at LATISANA (H 2287). In the early part of January a single 35' pier was destroyed. By the end of January the base for a new pier had been set. The effort ceased at that time, however, and on later cover it was seen that not only had work been abandoned on the erection of a new pier, but an apparently undamaged 35' steel pier had been removed.

2. Bridges Awaiting Steel Erection

Should there actually be a steel shortage, it would explain why repairs at certain bridges are behind schedule at the present time. Two, those at PALAZZOLO SULL OGLIO (K 8076) and CHIUSAFORTE (C 4356), require high steel piers similar to that removed from the damaged structure at LATISANA.

It is estimated that repairs at PALAZZOLO SULL OGLIO should have been completed by the end of February. The base of the required new pier had been prepared for steel erection by 24 February but the necessary steel pier, (such as had been previously used on similar repair jobs to the same bridge)

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had not, as of 7 March, been brought up. Since the bridge is a vital link in the by-pass route from MILAN to BRESCIA, and the line which it by-passes is out by virtue of the severely damaged bridge at CHIARI (K 7668), it is thought certain that repairs are not being deliberately delayed for the purpose of forestalling attack.

The demands of the bridge at PONTE DI PIAVE (G 7981) are slightly different, where approximately 300 feet of short steel spans remain unset since early February. It is true that the bridge has been relentlessly attacked during that time to thwart the persistent repair effort, but on at least one occasion all piers were erected, and all that remained was to set the spans, which was not done.

Although there may be other factors involved, such as overtaxed repair crews, a steel shortage might also partially explain the notoriously slow progress that has been made on those diversions under construction at LATISANA, SACILE (B 8407) and PIAZZOLA SULL BRENTA (G 2863).

3. Spans removed from the area of attack for their protection

At the PORDENONE rail diversion, bomb strike photos taken just before the recent attack on 6 March revealed that none of the four steel girder spans were in place. All piers had been completely erected by 27 February, and between that time and the attack, a varying number and arrangement of spans had been in place on intervening covers. Thus, it was obviously not a case of the bridge not having been fully repaired. It is significant too, that the girders were first removed to the approach of the diversion, and were later seen to have been removed to the main line, several hundred yards further away from the area of attack.

It is known that spans are removed from serviceable bridges to make them appear unserviceable, seeking thus to protect them from attack. It has been the practice in the past to remove only one or two spans, so that their replacement when desired can be more quickly accomplished. The operation at PORDENONE, however, is the first instance where all spans have been removed, and is an indication that, more than desiring deception, the enemy is being exceptionally zealous in safeguarding his steel girders from being damaged. It would seem that his primary interest is to protect what may be the dwindling supply of steel girders on the all-important route to TARVISIO.

If a shortage exists of repair materials, it is apparently only in its early stages, since the BRENNER line to date has not noticeably suffered from a lack of materials. The BRENNER line, however, has enjoyed a topmost priority, is near the industrial centres of supply, and would logically be the last place to show symptoms of want. It must remain to be seen from close observation in the next few weeks whether the indications of the developing shortage increase with the demands made upon stock-piles by continued attacks.

Should there actually exist a shortage of certain steel structural members, it would constitute an almost overwhelming handicap to the enemy repair organisation.

(Source: 3rd Photo Group Interpretation Report No. 3DS 108 dated 10 Mar '45)

SHIPPING

In the Gulf of GENOA PR between 3 and 12 March shows that activity between GENOA and SPEZIA continues to be lively. All four KT ships are now engaged on this run together with at least two supply barges and 4 F-boats, whilst the 1,000 ton MV which arrived in SPEZIA from GENOA on 3 March had made the return trip by the 6th. SAVONA harbour was inactive between 3 and 6 March,

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but two coasters had arrived there from GENOA by the 8th and returned the same night. Five supply barges and two schooners are also employed on this run. Small scale barge activity continues at SESTRI LEVANTE.

Since 4 March there has been a revival of coaster activity in the Northern Adriatic. At least one coaster and an oil barge have reached VENICE from TRIESTE, and four coasters left POLA probably for TRIESTE where an increase of five was noticed on 7 March. A KT ship sailed from TRIESTE to POLA and then on to ARSA where it is now aground. Small craft activity along the Venetian coast and inland waterways between GRADO and CHIOGGIA continues normally, but PORTO MARGHERA has been inactive since 4 March.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 85

OF 13 MARCH, 45

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

There has been very little change in the enemy's dispositions and attitude so far as can be definitely established but there have been various small incidents and pieces of information which suggest that something is going on. What it is exactly is hard to see; on the face of it the enemy's main preoccupation should be to create a larger reserve for the main front than is at present available. The position will no doubt become clearer when the reliefs now apparently in progress are completed.

On 8 Army front 162 Div continues to lose deserters and shows itself to be even more worthless as a fighting formation than in its previous turns in the line. It is only engaged on the very narrow front presented by the isthmus between the lake and the sea but it seems to regard this not so much as a front as a funnel to the comforts of Allied PW camps and, for the Turcomans, eventual repatriation. On the SENIO front the situation is more obscure. 98 Div appears to be extending its sector Southwards to relieve part of 26 Pz Div and is being relieved in turn in its Northernmost sector by 362 Div. This may call for a complementary move South by 42 Jaeger Division, which is feasible, especially if 142 Fus Bn returns from the isthmus. More surprising is the identification of 992 G.R. in TOSSIGNANO; if we believe the deserter both bns are there, having arrived night 10/11 March. There has been a good deal of movement in this area of late though it would be surprising if 278 Div were to take over the whole of 334 Div's sector. Perhaps if the intention is to take out 334 Div 1 Para Div might extend its front Southwards to assist in the relief. It remains to be seen what the result of these moves will be but it looks as though some division or other is going out into reserve, possibly preparatory to leaving the country.

On the Western part of the front the week has been fairly quiet. Recent deserters confirm that the losses inflicted on 114 Jg Div were heavy; 721 Regt in particular, according to them, has now been reorganised as a single battalion. Both it and 232 Div, however, which also suffered severe losses, are still in the line. The position of 29 P.G. Div, on the other hand, is more obscure; the Recce Unit was identified on 7 March but since then we have had no contact with the division. It is reasonable to assume that, as soon as the immediate danger was felt to be over, the enemy would like to pull out the formation to its more natural and useful rôle of mobile reserve. 90 P.G. is, indeed, available in its old area East and Northeast of BOLOGNA but with the improvement in the weather and increasing likelihood of a resumption of the Allied offensive, a second reserve division must appear necessary.

In North East ITALY both 188 Reserve and 237 Divs appear to be taking a greater interest in Northern DALMATIA and elements from both are reported on the islands of the QUARNERO. Otherwise they have changed little; 188 still has its four regiments and must be busy at its primary job of training the young intake. ITALY is now the most favoured site for training in what remains of German-occupied EUROPE.

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Good weather throughout this week has enabled us to keep the railways well interdicted and again no through traffic has been possible on either the BRENNER or N.E. rail routes.

The BRENNER railway has been continuously out South of BOLZANO, the high watermark of the week being 12 March when the line between VERONA and BOLZANO was impassable at fifteen points including four bridge blocks. North of BOLZANO conflicting PR reports make an assessment difficult but one, perhaps two, bridges may have been impassable for several days. However, the enemy continues a strong repair effort and is even attempting to repair the heavily damaged long viaduct near LAVIS (A 7430). Repairs at the VERONA PARONA bridge just North of VERONA were completed this week but it was again knocked out by heavy bombers on the 10th. At no time has the enemy been able to repair as fast as we have destroyed, but the heavy concentration of flak (one third of the total heavy flak in ITALY is disposed along the BRENNER) demands its toll; on one day this week we lost four mediums to the BRENNER flak and it is a rare mission that does not return from the BRENNER with at least some aircraft holed. The importance the enemy attaches to this rail route is obvious.

In the N.E. the situation at the end of last week was confused by the probable existence of a number of night operational bridges, and it is possible that for a brief period the enemy were getting trains through to the UDINE area from the PO Valley. This week, however, further attacks have sealed most, if not all, of these possible leaks. Beyond UDINE the three frontier routes remain, as last week, closed to through traffic. In the N.E., and in fact elsewhere in ITALY, with the exception of the BRENNER, there is strong evidence from PR that the enemy may be suffering from a shortage of structural members for the repair of rail bridges. A report on this appears at Appendix 'A'.

Some troop movement by rail out of ITALY has been noted recently on the BRENNER and to a very limited extent in the N.E. While such movement as has been observed has been small, the fact that it continues this week, as last, tends to indicate that a formation of at least divisional strength is on the move.

Perhaps the most important development affecting the enemy's L of C in ITALY is the announcement of an Allied economic agreement with the Swiss whereby, among other matters, rail traffic from GERMANY to ITALY via SWITZERLAND is evidently to be severely restricted. With heavy rail interdiction existing on all other railroads into ITALY, the Swiss rail routes have been of great value to the enemy in getting foodstuffs, industrial products and loot into GERMANY from ITALY, and for the importation of coal and raw materials into ITALY for industries and the railways. The enemy will be seriously embarrassed by the loss of this valuable traffic and in fact its loss has already been felt. Industrial output in Northern ITALY is reported to have been heavily curtailed owing to lack of coal and raw materials. More important from an operational viewpoint is the lack of coal for the railways which threatens the movement of essential supplies for German forces in ITALY. Ground sources report that no coal arrived from SWITZERLAND during the latter part of February and it may be more than coincidental that several coal trains have been seen recently on the already overloaded BRENNER railway. Transfer of troops out of ITALY and the lack of MT fuel will certainly make the supply problem all the more difficult.

Under the conditions above discussed it can only be presumed that the enemy's administrative position in ITALY is severely threatened. If he is now meeting current low supply requirements it is only with great difficulty and if these are substantially increased it seems unlikely that he can maintain his forces for any length of time without a large amount of MT, which at the moment at least, is not thought to be available in ITALY. In addition, and perhaps more important, is the well known acute shortage of MT fuel, and reports indicate that the enemy is making every effort to increase the

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use of MT fuel substitutes. Among these is Methane, of which there is a considerable amount in certain areas of the PO Valley. A Methane pipe line is known to run from MILAN South to PIACENZA and on to MODENA, and a ground source reports that it has been extended into BOLOGNA and from there up to FERRARA. While Methane is not a suitable fuel for combat vehicles, it should be adequate for rear area administrative vehicles and hence be very useful in the saving of petrol and diesel. Other substitute or supplementary MT fuels reported in use by the enemy are alcohol and benzol which can be mixed with petrol in a proportion of one unit of substitute to three units of petrol, thereby giving about a 25% saving in petrol. In addition to using these substitutes the enemy seems to find it worth his while to operate at least some of the few small oil fields in ITALY; in one recent instance he was said to be working a well which produced only about 1,000 gallons a day.

3. WESTERN FRONT

The disaster which befell 1 Para and 15 Armies a week ago has spread itself to 5 Pz and 7 Armies this week. The Allied attack has indeed developed on a classical model. To meet the attack of the Canadian Army in the REICHSWALD area, the enemy had been forced to send reserves in support of 1 Para Army. When the Allies struck North of the COLOGNE Autobahn in the direction of KREFELD, a hasty reshuffle had to be made in order to create some sort of a front covering the RHINE crossings at WESEL. Before this could be properly effected, the Americans struck in the sector North of the MOSELLE Valley, where 5 Pz Army and 7 Army were stretched tight and denuded of reserves. Of the four German armies which have been involved in the past fortnight's débacle, those in the centre have probably suffered most. In the extreme North, 1 Para Army fought with traditional vigour and efficiency and held the WESEL bridgehead long enough to get a substantial proportion of men and equipment back across the RHINE. In the South, 7. Army, though heavily battered, has been able to retain some sort of coherence as it fell back to the RHINE pivotting on 2 Pz Division, which has been fighting hard East of WITTLICH. In the Centre, however, 15 Army and 5 Pz Army have presented a sorry spectacle. The former, though it got some forces back across the RHINE, never offered much more than feeble resistance to our drive on KREFELD and NEUSS. The latter has suffered a major disaster, the full extent of which it is still too early to assess. Few elements succeeded in crossing to the far bank of the RHINE, and the remainder of the Army has found itself split into large and small pockets which are being eliminated. The extent of the disorganisation prevailing is shown by our capture intact of the bridge at REMAGEN. 167 and 326 Inf Divs have probably been wiped out and the Commander of 3 Parachute Division is in our hands. How many other divisions have been submerged in the flood and will not again come to the surface it is still impossible to say, but the cost to the enemy has been heavy.

On the Central sector of the front, two major problems confront the enemy and demand immediate solution if worse disasters still are not to ensue. The first is the elimination of the REMAGEN bridgehead, and the other is the establishment of a firm front along the MOSELLE so as to form a right flank for the SAAR. The reaction to the REMAGEN bridgehead has naturally been fierce. On the ground 11 Pz Div has been launching heavy counter-attacks and fighting extremely well; but it alone is not enough to deal with an increasingly firm Allied position, and further reinforcements are to be expected. There are indeed signs that Pz Lehr Div is also coming down from North of COLOGNE to join 11 Pz. However, by this stage it is doubtful in the extreme whether anything short of a carefully prepared counter-offensive can have a decisive effect upon the bridgehead. In addition to the intact rail bridge we now have two pontoon bridges across the RHINE and several ferries operating. The enemy artillery is shelling the crossings heavily and is causing a certain amount of interference. However, the chances of putting the crossings permanently out of action can now be regarded as non-existent. The G.A.F. has made a token effort. Almost as if a Spanish galleon had come sailing up the RHINE, and about as effective, was the appearance of three Stukas over the bridge on 10 March. It was a gesture

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reminiscent of the Blenheims on the MEUSE crossings in 1940 and as costly. All three were shot down.

On the MOSELLE, the enemy is now trying to build up a coherent front. If, as seems possible, a proportion of 7 Army lives to fight another brief day, a temporary stand on the MOSELLE may be feasible. The enemy is reinforcing the area to the best of his ability. 159 Inf Div has moved up from FREIBURG to the COCHEM area, and 6 S.S. Mtn Div seems to have shifted Northward to take up positions covering the river N.E. of TRIER. Even so it will be a thinly held front and is in danger of being turned by Allied progress South of the MOSELLE beyond TRIER, where 2 Mtn and 79 Inf Divs are offering moderate resistance to our pressure. Elsewhere, the picture on the front is little changed and shows clearly the growing shortage of enemy reserves. On the Upper RHINE 19 Army has now surrendered four divisions and an armoured brigade since the start of the offensive and is left with three divisions to hold its 90 mile front. On the SAAR - PALATINATE front the enemy's strength is unchanged, and there are still ten divisions between SAARLOUIS and the RHINE. It is unlikely, however, that we shall see much thinning out here, for it will be hard enough to defend the SAAR on the MOSELLE line without running the risk of letting the Allies in by the front door. In HOLLAND, the front remains thinly held, and there are at least 1½ divisions holding from the RHINE mouth to EMERICH without much hope of reinforcement.

Strategically the enemy's situation has deteriorated still further by the failure to blow the bridge at REMAGEN, for he can now no longer count upon the respite he might otherwise have expected while the Allies prepared for a major crossing of the RHINE. Moreover, any stabilisation he can achieve on the Centre is at the expense of the North and South. The front in HOLLAND has long been thinly held, but that in the South has never looked as bare as at present, and the potential danger of an Allied encircling movement down the RHINE Valley from STRASBOURG is a risk which the enemy has got to accept. The dividend on the faulty strategy of the past four months has to be paid - the strategy which in November and December sent to the West to be decimated in the COLOGNE plain divisions which should have gone to the East; and which in January took away from the West to send to the East a Panzer Army which has so far never effectively operated in the East. The dividend has to be paid and RUNDSTEDT is bearing the cost.

4. EASTERN FRONT

GERMANY

The Baltic coast from STETTIN to the German frontier with the exception of the pockets at KOLBERG and N.E. of KÖSLIN has now been virtually cleared by the First and Second White Russian Army Groups, and the Soviets despite strong enemy resistance are steadily closing in on DANZIG and GDYNIA. In the past week, TCZEW, MEWEROWO and PUCK, the latter a port of some importance in the Bay of DANZIG some 20 miles North of GDYNIA, have all fallen to the Russians. The German forces in this area are thus compressed in a narrow wedge of land between PUCK and a point West of TIEGENHOF running as far South as the almost encircled town of MARIENWERDER. DANZIG itself stands in grave danger and fighting is reported to be in progress in the outskirts. To the West the present Soviet offensive operation has been carried one stage nearer completion by Marshal ZHUKOV whose forces have closed up to the East bank of the ODER from KÜSTRIN Northwards. The Russians are now on the shores of the STETTINER HAVEN, North of STETTIN itself and the port has been rendered virtually useless to the enemy. In the fighting at the approaches to STETTIN, prisoners were taken from 1 Marine Division, a new identification, probably either a E-boat or similar formation or an ad hoc Army division scraped together from the land-locked sailors of STETTIN. Further South KÜSTRIN is in Russian hands. This is on the East bank of the ODER on the direct route to BERLIN. Despite German reports of a renewed offensive by ZHUKOV in the direction of BERLIN, there is no indication that the Russians are yet ready for the kick off, though the capture of KÜSTRIN would of course be a necessary preliminary.

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The rest of the front in GERMANY has been relatively quiet. Fighting of local importance has taken place to the West of the besieged city of BRESLAU. Here the Germans claim to have encircled the Soviet forces in STRIEGAU, a claim on which the Russians have remained silent. A report received in the past week refers to an Army Group KURLAND. This is a new identification and to judge by the title is responsible for operations in LATVIA. Whether its responsibilities extend to East PRUSSIA and DANZIG is not known, but the probabilities are against it. It is none the less conceivable that there might be another Army Group in the latter area since there are at least two Armies there. On the main front, HIMMLER and SCHOERNER have again had recent mentions from the German radio as commanders of Army Groups and it is clear that "reliable" hands are still at the head of operations in Eastern GERMANY.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In CZECHOSLOVAKIA fierce fighting has taken place between BANSKA STIAVNICA and ZVOLEN but the Russians, apart from the capture of the former town, have made little progress. IV Pz Corps and Pz Corps Feldherrnhalle have been identified in action under Army Group South during the week.

It is now clear that the enemy is undertaking an operation of major proportions in HUNGARY. The Schwerpunkt appears to be just North of Lake BALATON where the enemy claims to have made gains on both sides of the SARVIZ Canal and no doubt hopes to reach the DANUBE. The Russians report enemy attacks in some strength to the South of the Lake and a report, to be treated with reserve, states that three Pz Divs are engaged in this area. 1 Mtn, 118 Jg and 13 SS Divs are probably engaged and there may also be present elements of 297, 11 G.A.F. and 104 Jg Divs. Simultaneously, the enemy has crossed the DRAVA at DONJI MIHOLJAC and VALPOVO and established bridgeheads on the North bank in spite of Russian and Bulgarian resistance. At the former locality the enemy has erected a pontoon bridge and it appears that his intention is to clear the whole of Southern HUNGARY up to the DANUBE. The formations employed in these crossings are believed to be 297 Inf and 11 G.A.F. Divs less those elements which may have transferred to HUNGARY.

JUGOSLAVIA

Apart from the DRAVA operation, mentioned above, there has been little activity. The situation in which XXI Mtn Corps now finds itself is very much the same as it faced in MONTENEGRO. Then 22 Inf Div was sent South to open up an escape route, now 7 SS Mtn Div "Prinz Eugen" has been alloted the same task. The precarious plight of XXI Corps is evident from the fact that 7 SS Div, probably the best division in YUGOSLAVIA, which otherwise could and probably would have been employed in the attack in Southern HUNGARY, has been sent to its aid. Fighting its way down from the DOBOJ area this veteran Balkan Div cleared the whole of the BOSNA Valley down to ZENICA. Here it was engaged in heavy fighting with the Partisans and has finally succeeded in reopening the SARAJEVO-BROD road. German counter-attacks are reported to the East of SARAJEVO; these are probably not so much an indication that the enemy intends to remain in the area as an attempt on his part to get elbow room to allow a withdrawal. 181 Inf is in the SARAJEVO area and is no doubt detailed to act as Corps rearguard.

Confused fighting continues in the BIHAC area but here the enemy situation seems to be easier than hitherto. A Partisan success was however reported near BUNIC where SALAMUNIC P 2963 fell into their hands. This village forms the Southern suburbs of BUNIC proper and straddles a road crossing of some importance.

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DALMATIAN ISLANDS

The enemy continues to show a degree of nervousness in the islands where defence work goes on apace. The latest development is the despatch of some 800 troops to LUSSIN via CHERSO. The garrison, already believed to be about 500 troops will therefore amount to 1,300 - the highest figure yet reported for the island. In this connection it is of interest that 6 Coy 1047 G.R. of 237 Inf Div was manning a strong point on the Island when our raiding forces paid a profitable visit on the night 8/9 March. It would appear that 392 Legion Div hitherto responsible for the Islands, has its hands full on the mainland and troops from Army Group C have been called upon to help. An unconfirmed report places elements of 188 Res Mtn Div on KRK, this would appear reasonable as 138 Res Mtn Regt has its main forces in the FIUME area.

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RAILROADS

BRENNER

The BRENNER has, as is now usual, been closed to through traffic for the past seven days. The degree of interdiction had fallen off late last week but with good flying weather on all days this week it has been built up again and on 12 March the line between TRENTO and VERONA was blocked at 13 points, including three bridges with spans out. This is the highest degree of interdiction ever achieved on this section of the BRENNER. VERONA PARONA bridge about 5 kilometres North of VERONA, attacked and knocked out by heavy bombers on 28 Feb, was repaired by 6 March, but again attacked by a strong force of heavies and again heavily damaged. ALA bridge about half way to TRENTO, frequently attacked but never suffering greater damage than blocked approaches, was finally completely destroyed by medium bombers on the 12th. Earlier in the week, on the 8th, the mediums also made an effective attack on ROVERETO bridge (about 20 kilometres South of TRENTO) and it was still out on the 12th though at that time repairs were seen to be in progress. These three bridge blocks have been supplemented by track cuts and cratered fills, which, though rapidly repaired in most instances, appreciably add to the degree of interdiction. North of TRENTO the main line and the 12 mile diversion between ORA (A 9155) and S. MICHELE (A 7831) have been blocked all week. Further North between BOLZANO and the BRENNER Pass the status of the line has been somewhat indefinite, but it may have been blocked all week at VIPITENO bridge just South of the Pass, and for two or three days at BRESSANONE bridge some 30 kilometres to the South.

As heretofore indicated in this Summary the railway running Eastward from the BRENNER line at FORTEZZA (about 30 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass) to join the VILLACH-SALZBURG line just N.W. of SPITTAL (X 0161) assumes increased importance with the blocking of BRENNER bridges North of its junction with the BRENNER. This line has been struck by fighter-bombers fairly recently and it was attacked on 11 March for the first time by mediums which succeeded in cutting the approaches to a bridge on the Austrian section of the line. This alternative rail route into GERMANY is definitely active, but so far no pronounced increase in activity has been noted.

The BRENNER route on the whole has been comparatively quiet during the past week. However, despite the high state of interdiction, activity has been noted. Between VERONA and TRENTO, rolling stock appears to have been almost at a standstill with the exception of TRENTO station which has shown considerable turnover. North of TRENTO there has been greater activity but no unusual amount of movement has been seen.

There seems to have been a limited amount of troop movement on the BRENNER. During the week two new empty possible troop train lengths have been seen, one about 40 kilometres North of VERONA and the other approximately 30 kilometres South of the BRENNER Pass. The four loaded troop trains and three empty troop trains seen last week have left. It is interesting to note that approximately 380 flats were seen on the route on 10 March, and although this is not an unusual number, 140 were at FORTEZZA, about 45 rail kilometres North of BOLZANO, while another 100 were on a 20 kilometre stretch of line not far North of TRENTO. In view of the existing interdictions on the Southern portion these might be possible loading points for troops.

NORTH EAST ITALY

At the end of last week there was a strong possibility that the enemy might have been getting trains from the PO Valley through N.E. ITALY to the UDINE area by use of a number of night bridges on the main PADUA-UDINE railway. Attacks this week have, however, at least for the time being created sufficient damage to make this strategem impossible. While PR has been

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somewhat limited in this area it seems certain that the line has at no time been open to through traffic. To the South the main MESTRE - MONFALCONE - TRIESTE line remains unrepaired and to all intents and purposes abandoned. The central single track railway, where extensive repair efforts have heretofore been observed but never completed owing to repeated attacks, has remained blocked and there are indications that this line may also have been abandoned.

To the East of UDINE all three frontier routes are blocked and have been now for just about a month. Some repair work has been done to the broken bridges on the TARVISIO line but four are still out. The PIEDICOLLE line remains blocked at BODRES bridge, and while the enemy continues to work on the uncompleted diversion around the damaged BOROVNICA Viaduct (D 2803) on the POSTUMIA route he now has another broken bridge to contend with on this line, namely the bridge just West of the frontier at J 146882 which was successfully attacked on 12 March.

In the North East, undoubtedly owing to the heavy interdiction maintained during the week, practically no movement has been seen between the VICENZA - PADUA area and UDINE. UDINE itself has shown considerable activity, but along the heavily interdicted UDINE - TARVISIO frontier route little movement has been seen. The only indication of troop movement was two empty military train lengths seen North of the belt of interdiction. The POSTUMIA route, on the other hand, has been quite active, but lack of continuous PR makes comparison difficult. No definite statement can be made on the PIEDICOLLE route because of lack of PR; however, it is thought that limited activity continues.

INDICATIONS OF A DEVELOPING SHORTAGE
IN RAIL BRIDGE REPAIR MATERIALS

There have been indications in the last few weeks that a shortage in certain types of bridge repair materials may be developing.

These indications have been in the form of unusual activities, observed from the study of photographs, at the sites of various rail bridges. They have been separated, for the purpose of this report, into three categories.

1. Girders and Piers Removed from Damaged Structures

A most striking example is the recent dismantling and removal of all seven of the remaining 30' to 35' piers at the North end of the PO bridge at PONTELAGOSCURO (M 1191). The operation took place between 13th and 20th February. At the same time, the girders, which had been on the approach since they had been stripped from the bridge early in December, have been taken away until now only three of about eighteen remain.

Another example can be drawn from the sequence of events which has recently taken place at LATISANA (H 2287). In the early part of January a single 35' pier was destroyed. By the end of January the base for a new pier had been set. The effort ceased at that time, however, and on later cover it was seen that not only had work been abandoned on the erection of a new pier, but an apparently undamaged 35' steel pier had been removed.

2. Bridges Awaiting Steel Erection

Should there actually be a steel shortage, it would explain why repairs at certain bridges are behind schedule at the present time. Two, those at PALAZZOLO SULL OGLIO (K 8076) and CHIUSAFORTE (C 4356), require high steel piers similar to that removed from the damaged structure at LATISANA.

It is estimated that repairs at PALAZZOLO SULL OGLIO should have been completed by the end of February. The base of the required new pier had been prepared for steel erection by 24 February but the necessary steel pier, (such as had been previously used on similar repair jobs to the same bridge)

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had not, as of 7 March, been brought up. Since the bridge is a vital link in the by-pass route from MILAN to BRESCIA, and the line which it by-passes is out by virtue of the severely damaged bridge at CHIARI (K 7668), it is thought certain that repairs are not being deliberately delayed for the purpose of forestalling attack.

The demands of the bridge at PONTE DI PIAVE (G 7981) are slightly different, where approximately 300 feet of short steel spans remain unset since early February. It is true that the bridge has been relentlessly attacked during that time to thwart the persistent repair effort, but on at least one occasion all piers were erected, and all that remained was to set the spans, which was not done.

Although there may be other factors involved, such as overtaxed repair crews, a steel shortage might also partially explain the notoriously slow progress that has been made on those diversions under construction at LATISANA, SACILE (B 8407) and PIAZZOLA SUL BRENTA (G 2863).

3. Spans removed from the area of attack for their protection

At the PORDENONE rail diversion, bomb strike photos taken just before the recent attack on 6 March revealed that none of the four steel girder spans were in place. All piers had been completely erected by 27 February, and between that time and the attack, a varying number and arrangement of spans had been in place on intervening covers. Thus, it was obviously not a case of the bridge not having been fully repaired. It is significant too, that the girders were first removed to the approach of the diversion, and were later seen to have been removed to the main line, several hundred yards further away from the area of attack.

It is known that spans are removed from serviceable bridges to make them appear unserviceable, seeking thus to protect them from attack. It has been the practice in the past to remove only one or two spans, so that their replacement when desired can be more quickly accomplished. The operation at PORDENONE, however, is the first instance where all spans have been removed, and is an indication that, more than desiring deception, the enemy is being exceptionally zealous in safeguarding his steel girders from being damaged. It would seem that his primary interest is to protect what may be the dwindling supply of steel girders on the all-important route to TARVISIO.

If a shortage exists of repair materials, it is apparently only in its early stages, since the BRENNER line to date has not noticeably suffered from a lack of materials. The BRENNER line, however, has enjoyed a topmost priority, is near the industrial centres of supply, and would logically be the last place to show symptoms of want. It must remain to be seen from close observation in the next few weeks whether the indications of the developing shortage increase with the demands made upon stock-piles by continued attacks.

Should there actually exist a shortage of certain steel structural members, it would constitute an almost overwhelming handicap to the enemy repair organisation.

(Source: 3rd Photo Group Interpretation Report No. 3DS 108 dated 10 Mar '45)

SHIPPING

In the Gulf of GENOA PR between 3 and 12 March shows that activity between GENOA and SPEZIA continues to be lively. All four KT ships are now engaged on this run together with at least two supply barges and 4 F-boats, whilst the 1,000 ton MV which arrived in SPEZIA from GENOA on 3 March had made the return trip by the 6th. SAVONA harbour was inactive between 3 and 6 March,

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but two coasters had arrived there from GENOA by the 8th and returned the same night. Five supply barges and two schooners are also employed on this run. Small scale barge activity continues at SESTRI LEVANTE.

Since 4 March there has been a revival of coaster activity in the Northern Adriatic. At least one coaster and an oil barge have reached VENICE from TRIESTE, and four coasters left POLA probably for TRIESTE where an increase of five was noticed on 7 March. A KT ship sailed from TRIESTE to POLA and then on to ARSA where it is now aground. Small craft activity along the Venetian coast and inland waterways between GRADO and CHIOGGIA continues normally, but PORTO MARGHERA has been inactive since 4 March.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 86

OF 20 MARCH, 45

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

The past week has been a quiet one, and the enemy has been able to continue his regrouping undisturbed. The reason for the reshuffling which was noted along the SENIO in last week's Summary has proved to be the withdrawal of 334 Division from the TOSSIGNANO sector, and the division is now carried in unlocated reserve. Regrouping on the 5 Army front which is going on at present in the 114 Jaeger, 232 Inf and 29 P.G. Div sectors has not so far resulted in any of these divisions moving into reserve (all three have been identified in the last 48 hours) and consequently the enemy has three divisions committed in a comparatively unimportant part of the front where previously one sufficed. This is obviously a situation which the enemy will seek to remedy as soon as possible.

On the 8 Army front we have seen little of 162 Div, and the only interesting comment on its activities comes from a Turkoman Sjt-Major who said that it was rumoured that all Turkomans on the COMACCHIO Spit are to be replaced by Germans. This is hardly a surprising step in view of the unreliability of the Turkomans, and it is a little difficult to see why the enemy persists in retaining this division as a fighting formation. The identification of M.G. Bn Kesselring No.2. by a document in the area North of Lake COMACCHIO shows that this battalion is needed to stiffen the units of 162 Div holding the Northern shores of the Lake.

Along the SENIO there is further evidence to show movement Southwards by each division. 42 Jaeger Div is believed to have stretched some 2,000 yards S.W. of ALFONSINE at the expense of considerable thinning out North of the 50 grid. As a result 1060 G.R. is now the left hand regiment of 362 Div, and 1059 G.R. which has been squeezed out is rumoured by prisoners from 117 G.R. (98 Div) to be due to take over their sector between LUGO and COTIGNOLA. This will give 362 Div, with its 7 bns and the Italian LUPO Bn, a very extended front of about 11,000 yards. 98 Div would gain by this move and its sector, unless it also sidesteps to take over from part of 26 Pz Div, would be from inclusive COTIGNOLA to about the 31 Easting. 26 Pz Div is at present on a 5,000 yard front from the 31 Easting to just short of the main BOLOGNA-RIMINI railway. When 117 G.R. is relieved both divisions will have a regiment in reserve, though this may be only a temporary measure. 4 Para Div is still astride Route 9 and now probably extends as far West as ISOLA M 1622. On the 16th March II Bn 11 Para Regt carried out a strong attack on our outpost position South of the river at point 92 M 1922. The enemy raid was successful. On the 16th we counter-attacked and drove the parachutists back North of the river, capturing some eight prisoners and killing at least 20 enemy. 11 Para Regt had previously been North of Route 9 and was relieved by 26 Pz Div to move across to the West

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flank of 4 Para Div to take over from 278 Div. The latter is now believed to stretch from ISOLA to the boundary with 1 Para Div on M. MIGGIORE M 0526, having relieved 334 Div. The only clue as to 334 Div's movements is the statement by a parachutist prisoner from III Bn 3 Para Regt (taken in the normal area) that he had met a friend from 756 G.R. on 12 March North of IMOLA who said his Regt had been relieved suddenly in the line and was bound for an unknown destination.

South of BOLOGNA there has been no apparent change in the enemy layout. A copy of a Mountain Unit newspaper found in the area L 7728, together with the recent statement by a prisoner from II Bn 276 G.R. (94 Div) that his battalion was expecting to be relieved in this very area by Mtn troops, suggests that 157 Div has extended slightly Westwards and that its right boundary may now be along the 77 Easting. In the area behind M. BELVEDERE and CASTEL D'ALANO various sources have reported much movement of troops, and prisoners and deserters from 114 Jaeger Div, 232 Div and 29 P.G. Div have all brought rumours of reliefs. These are now beginning to take shape. 232 Div appears to be relieving 114 Div in the area West of MONTESE L 5524 - prisoners from 741 Regt taken in that area were expecting their relief on 15 March, and since then 1044 G.R. has been placed between the 48 and 54 Eastings. On 19 March I Bn 741 Regt lost prisoners 1,000 yards N.E. of MONTESE, previously the sector of the Mittenwald Mountain Bn which has gone into reserve, and prisoners from 114 Recce Unit were taken near MONTESE on the same day. At the moment therefore, it looks as if the divisional boundary between 232 and 114 Divs is about 1,000 yards S.W. of MONTESE. 1043 G.R. of 232 Div is said to have been temporarily cannibalised to bring the other two regiments up to strength, but 1045 G.R. is not yet identified and it may come in East of 1044, thus involving a further shift Eastwards by 114 Div. How far Eastwards 114 Div extends now is unknown, nor is it known to what extent 29 P.G. Div is still in the line. Despite a rumour in 15 P.G.R. that the Regt was going into reserve East of BOLOGNA, prisoners were taken from II Bn on night 19/20 March at L 6326.

The enemy's Central reserve now amounts to two divisions - 90 P.G. East of BOLOGNA near BUDRIO and 334 Inf Div unlocated. There have been many agents' reports of movement of troops across the PO towards the BRENNER and N.E. ITALY, proving conclusively that a division is involved. Though there has been no identification of 715 Div, there is no other candidate at the present, so it is assumed that 715 Div is leaving the country. Though most of 29 P.G. Div appears to be still committed S.W. of BOLOGNA it is believed that the enemy will make every effort to withdraw this division into Central reserve, as soon as 114 and 232 Divs have been more firmly re-established in the line.

In Western ITALY, MONTE ROSA Div is reported arriving in the area N.W. of TURIN from the SERCHIO Valley, where it has handed over to the ITALIA Div (included in the hand-over is Gen CARLONI who is now said to command ITALIA Div). Its arrival in Western ITALY thickens up the defenders of the Alpine Passes, and though some of its units have replaced units of 5 Mtn Div in the line, there is nothing to suggest that these are more than routine reliefs. Both Regts of 5 Mtn have been identified on the Alps in the last week. From the Southern sector of the line there have been reports of a Northward move of part of 34 Div towards PINEROLO but it is too early to say how much truth there is in them.

In N.E. ITALY 710 Div has been identified coastwatching near the mouth of the TAGLIAMENTO river, with elements of the division engaged in fighting Partisans N.E. of GORIZIA at CHIAPOVANO C 8417. Of the progress in building up 155 Res Training Division there is no further news.

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2. DAILY SHELLS AND COMMUNICATIONS

This week has seen no relief for the enemy in the many difficulties he is encountering on his L of C. In fact during the past seven days we have pushed our attacks against his already heavily interdicted rail net further North than ever before. These attacks were successfully directed against a bridge about 40 kilometres N.E. of INNSBRUCK on the main line from INNSBRUCK to MUNICH and a bridge about 10 kilometres N.W. of SPITTAL (X 6101) on the VILLACH-SALZBURG line. Both routes are highly important lines between ITALY and GERMANY, probably in fact the two most important beyond the Italian frontier. As usual the BRENNER and N.E. rail routes have continued closed to through traffic. South of BOLZANO the BRENNER was cut at many points and at least one bridge was out for several days near the BRENNER Pass. In the N.E. repairs to two rail diversions, one being night operational, has opened up the rail net sufficiently to permit through movement from the PO Valley to a point about 60 kilometres West of UDINE. However, movement will have been very limited owing to frequent cratering of the tracks. In any event, despite some repairs, the frontier routes beyond UDINE remain well interdicted.

Some troop movement by rail has been picked up this week. Definite movement of troops has been seen on the upper stretches of the BRENNER beyond BOLZANO and to a very limited extent on the TARVISIO route. This will no doubt be 715 Inf Div, which, on the basis of the present state of the railways and the rate of movement of 356 and 16 SS Divs, cannot be expected to clear ITALY before the end of March. (Further details on the railways and shipping appear at Appendix 'A').

MT movement has been seen North of the PO this week but nothing out of the ordinary. It is clear that troops departing over the BRENNER have moved by road at least as far North as BOLZANO before loading on trains, and in fact road movement has been observed even beyond BOLZANO. Aside from the ADIGE Valley, roads to the West thereof as far as MILAN continue active and a fair amount of movement is evident in the TRENTO-PADUA-VERONA area. Ground sources also report road movement through N.E. ITALY with supplies being brought by road to the front from points beyond UDINE.

The general state of the enemy's L of C is well exemplified by a PW's account of his movement to and from ITALY while on leave. Typical is the fact that owing to lack of transport it took him a week to get from TRENTO to MANUA. This is thought to be neither an exaggeration nor a case of a soldier attempting to delay his return to the front as long as possible. (Further details on this PW's movements appear at the end of Appendix 'A'). A PW from a battalion of 114 Div states that his battalion marched on foot from the CORNACCHIO area to MONTESE (L 5524), a distance of at least 100 kilometres. Other PWs report that supplies are being moved over long distances by horse drawn transport. These statements typify the difficulties existing on the enemy's L of C as a result of heavy rail interdiction and lack of sufficient MT fuel. Under present circumstances such difficulties do not vitally affect operations on this front, but they may well play an important part in the enemy's eventual defeat when heavy fighting develops.

3. WESTERN FRONT

Last week another German Army was drawn into the maelstrom of defeat which has engulfed the Western Armies this Spring. This time

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it was the First Army which found itself in imminent danger of a major disaster. At the time of writing last week, the Allies were closing up to the line of the MOSELLE, where the enemy might have hoped to reestablish a firm front. Events rapidly proved this to be a vain hope. No attempt was made at even a temporary stand on the river, which we crossed against negligible opposition. Yet the enemy did not lack due appreciation of the seriousness of the new threat to the PALATINATE and attempts were certainly made to stiffen and reinforce the MOSELLE front. Their failure was due to lack of forces and lack of mobility on the part of such forces as existed, rather than to any decision voluntarily to pull back. The whole line East of the RHINE is now yielding. Between KARLSRUHE and SAARBRÜCKEN the enemy retains a fairly coherent front, but has pulled back rapidly to the Siegfried defences where a certain stiffening of resistance is apparent. However, the decision whether or not to stand on the Siegfried line is likely to be dictated by developments further North where the right wing of First Army and the whole of Seventh Army have collapsed. The outwardly healthy appearance of the SAAR front, reinforced this week by one infantry division from reserve, was of small avail when a deadly virus had penetrated the interior. The American drive swept over the NAHE river as quickly as it did the MOSELLE and is rapidly eliminating all enemy North of the river where a pocket consisting of some 2,000 enemy troops has been cut off. The MAINZ - SAARBRÜCKEN railway has been cut and a very real danger exists that the remaining withdrawal routes for the First and Seventh Army fronts will be cut. There is no sign of any stabilisation on the Northern flank of the enemy pocket West of the RHINE despite the arrival of a limited number of reinforcements. These have again been largely drawn from the ranks of 19 Army. 198 and 159 Infantry Divisions have both left the Upper RHINE area leaving probably only one and at best two infantry divisions to hold the 100 mile front along the RHINE North of BASLE. Other reinforcements for the Northern flank of the PALATINATE front have been drawn at the expense of the TRIER-SAARBRÜCKEN sector, from which at least one infantry division has been transferred to the area of BAD KREUZNACH. Apart from these, the action South of the MOSELLE, in so far as it has been fought at all, has been conducted by the remnants of 7 Army's divisions, amongst which 2 Pz and 6 S.S. Mtn appear to be rather less battered and more aggressive than the rest. There is now a serious danger that the enemy may fall between two stools. Last week he had the possibility either of holding on the MOSELLE-SIEGFRIED line thus defending the SAAR basin, or of cutting his losses in the SAAR and pulling back to the shorter line of the RHINE. The first alternative has proved beyond his capabilities and he must reckon with the early loss of the SAAR, while his lack of reserves and mobility now make it doubtful whether he can withdraw to the RHINE without suffering a major disaster en route.

Meanwhile on 15 Army front the REMAGEN bridgehead has been the main cause of concern to the enemy. Despite his very determined efforts in this past week to contain it, the bridgehead has continued to expand in ominous fashion. It constitutes a double embarrassment to the enemy. In the first place the establishment of a bridgehead on the East bank of the RHINE at all is a very serious threat to the enemy position in Western EUROPE. There is more to it than that, however. Strategically the REMAGEN bridgehead is not particularly well chosen, and were it not for the windfall of the intact LUDENDORFF bridge it is doubtful whether we should ever have attempted to cross the RHINE in what is a relatively unpromising sector. Thus to a certain extent the strategy of both sides is at present governed by an unexpected chance. The point is, however, that by establishing the bridgehead at REMAGEN we have forced the enemy to make heavy inroads on the reserves which he would otherwise have been holding in readiness against Allied crossings at a later stage and in other sectors. Already eleven divisions, including four mobile, have been committed around the perimeter and the build-up is clearly still inadequate to contain the bridgehead, let alone amble the enemy to launch a decisive counter-attack.

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Indeed the enemy's own rate of attrition around the bridgehead has been such that 3 Para Div has now wholly disintegrated. Its Commander and staff were captured some eleven days ago. The spell of office of their successors was brief but hectic; eight days only after they arrived to replace the original staff, both the new commander and his staff followed them into captivity. Hence, if further crossings are effected in other sectors of the front, the old dilemma resulting from his inadequacy of troops once more confronts the enemy, with as little likelihood of solution East of the RHINE as there was West of it.

The rest of the front has been quiet. It is a measure of the extensive thinning out on 19 Army's front that our patrols across the RHINE North of EMMERICH on 17 March found a casemate empty and made no contact with the enemy in a radius of a quarter of a mile. Movement behind the front shows no striking reinforcement, although it seems very probable that 1 Para Army in the North is getting a priority in replacements. This Army is now probably in better shape than any other in the West and indeed needs to be for its sector is vital. From SCANDINAVIA there are reports that another division, 199 Inf, is now on its way from NORWAY after an interval of about three weeks since the departure of 169 Inf Div. There is so far no indication of its destination.

4. EASTERN FRONT

EAST PRUSSIA AND EASTERN GERMANY

The reduction of the East Prussian garrison has been carried a stage further this week by the Russian push to the Baltic coast S.W. of KONIGSBERG. This has split the East Prussian Army Group in two. One pocket is still left holding KONIGSBERG and the SAMLAND peninsula, while the other pocket consists of a narrow coastal stretch around HEILIGENBEIL. Enemy resistance continues to be stubborn, and the HERMANN GOERING Pz Corps has been given a special mention this week by the German radio for its distinguished conduct of the operations. Further West, the Russians are still held at the approaches to DANZIG and GDYNIA, and it is clear that the enemy intends to make a determined effort to hold these two ports. GROSS DEUTSCHLAND P.G. Div has been heavily engaged in this area. It is of interest that on 1 to 4 March, on which date a serious threat was developing to GDYNIA, the pocket battleships LUTZOW and SCHEER and the 5.9" cruiser LEIPZIG were all present at GDYNIA.

In Northern POMERANIA with the reduction of the KOLBERG garrison, the whole Baltic coast between the STETTINER HAFF and the German frontier is clear of the enemy. 23 SS Division NEDERLAND was identified at the approaches to KOLBERG last week; this is an interesting identification, as 23 SS KAM Division was in the Balkans up to the end of last year when it was no longer accepted on grounds of inadequate evidence. It now seems clear that it was in fact disbanded and its SS number transferred to a newly forming SS Division.

The remainder of the German front was relatively quiet until about March 10th with the exception of heavy fighting around the German bridgehead East of STETTIN which has now been eliminated by the Russians. On 10 March, however, according to the Germans, attacks by Marshal KONIEV's forces South of CRITZEN culminated in deep penetrations on both sides of LEOBSCHUTZ and near NEUSTADT. There has so far been no confirmation of these reports from Soviet sources but there seems no reason to doubt them. The attack looks like an attempt by Marshal KONIEV firstly to eliminate the German OPPA bridgehead South East of CRITZEN and then to continue the offensive so as to establish his left flank firmly on the RIESENGEBIRGE, which his earlier efforts had failed to do. The attack may well represent too the final phase of the cleaning up operations on the Soviet flanks prior to

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the resumption of the offensive into Central GERMANY. To judge by his public statements, the enemy considers that this will not now long be delayed.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY

In the sector North of BUDAPEST limited progress has been made by the Russians West and S.W. of ZVOLEN (C 74). The terrain is very difficult here, reminiscent of the worst sectors of the Italian front, and the enemy who has been fighting hard in the ERZGEBIRGE does not appear to be unduly concerned at the Russian pressure. German Alpine troops in this area were given a mention in the Wehrmacht communiqué on March 19, a reference probably to either 3 or 4 Mountain Division.

In HUNGARY there has been a considerable change in enemy fortunes this week. It is clear now that the operations of the past fortnight represented a large scale and carefully planned German counter-offensive which has so far proved almost completely unsuccessful. The attack had been preceded by the elimination of the Soviet bridgehead over the HRON river at the end of February thus reducing the prospects of an early Russian break through towards BRATISLAVA. This having been done, the main offensive started. It developed as a three-pronged attack. N.E. of Lake BALATON the enemy attacked on both sides of the SARVIZ Canal with at least five Panzer divisions. The five were an interesting assortment. Three of them (1 SS Pz, 2 SS Pz, 12 SS Pz) belonged to 6 SS Pz Army, all of which bar one division has now been committed. The other two divisions were 5 SS Pz, transferred South from the HRON river sector, and 23 Pz which has long been in HUNGARY South of the DANUBE. The enemy also attacked South of Lake BALATON, but there are unfortunately no identifications of the forces engaged in this sector apart from a rather vague Russian reference to three Panzer divisions. It is clear that this attack was wholly unsuccessful. Finally, Army Group F supported the operation by the establishment of bridgeheads over the DRAVA at DONJI MIHOLJAC (G 29) and VALPOVO (G 48). Elements of 297 Inf, 104 Jg and 11 G.A.F. Divs were involved.

It is evident that the Russians have reacted sharply to this offensive and have now themselves counter-attacked on a large scale. Their greatest success has been N.E. of Lake BALATON where they threaten to outflank SZEKES FEHERVAR by a thrust North of the town which has penetrated as far west as the VERTES Mountains North of AJKA (Y 81). The Russians have also been attacking hard to eliminate the DRAVA bridgeheads and have had some success as the Germans admit the loss of the DONJI MIHOLJAC bridgehead and now speak of "the DRAVA bridgehead" in the singular.

YUGOSLAVIA

It has been an unusually quiet week in YUGOSLAVIA and the only operations of any note have been in the SARAJEVO area. H.Q. 7 SS Mtn Div has moved South into the town which suggests that the division may be intended to form the rearguard for XXI Mtn Corps when the latter's withdrawal is resumed. There is no evidence however that this is imminent and indeed the indications are that the enemy proposes to cling to SARAJEVO for some time yet. 7 SS Div has been launching sharp counter-attacks South of the town and has retaken JAHLANICA (R 57) and TRNOVO (R 58).

Reports received during the past fortnight suggest that 14 SS GALIZIEN Div has arrived in the OSIJEK (D 93) area from the Central sector. The division is said to have arrived in SLOVENIA to fight Partisans and according to one report, three of its companies have already attempted to desert to the Partisans. The area in which the division is reported is roughly the same as that vacated by 31 SS Division on its departure for GERMANY

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three weeks ago, and like 31 SS Div, 14 SS may have arrived for a rest and refit. The evidence so far available is not altogether strong enough to accept it as a firm identification, and the total strength of Army Group F is still placed at thirteen divisions.

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APPENDIX 'A' TO H.Q. 15 ARMY GROUP
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 86 DATED
20 MARCH, 45

RAILWAYS

BRENNER

The BRENNER has remained heavily interdicted all week and no through traffic has been possible between VERONA and BOLZANO; for at least four days there could have been no through traffic between BOLZANO and INNSBRUCK. Up until the 17th the line was blocked each day at not less than ten points. Most of these cuts have, as usual, been between VERONA and BOLZANO, but many have varied more or less from day to day and in spite of the enemy's repair effort we have been able to keep this stretch heavily interdicted only by virtue of attacks constantly repeated by both medium and fighter-bombers. Not infrequently breaks are repaired overnight only to be knocked out again the next day or a new cut established elsewhere. The extent of the enemy's strong, though on the whole fruitless, repair effort is exemplified this week by the completion of repairs at the heretofore heavily damaged viaduct near LAVIS, just North of TRENTO, around which he has a frequently attacked and almost as frequently repaired two-mile diversion. The viaduct itself had been out continuously for about two months when finally opened to single line traffic on 18 March. With the prospect of it remaining passable for only a brief period and with the main line and 12 mile diversion just to the North between S. MICHELE and ORA almost constantly blocked, it is somewhat curious that the enemy should have undertaken such major repairs at LAVIS viaduct. In fact it is not wholly apparent why he attempts any repairs at all on the lower reaches of the BRENNER. For example, though the repair effort by 19 March had been such that the BRENNER remained blocked at only four points (all bridges however) as opposed to being cut at over ten points on all days between the 13th and 16th, the four blocks existing on the 19th still very effectively interdicted the line, and there is very little prospect of these four being fully repaired before they are again cut or other cuts established elsewhere. The effect of our interdiction is indicated in the very slight degree of movement South of BOLZANO and by the fact that all signs of troop movement are seen North of BOLZANO. The probable answer is that by making repairs on the lower portion of the BRENNER the enemy ties down a certain proportion of our air effort to keeping this stretch of track blocked, thereby preventing us from intensifying interdiction elsewhere. Thus, on 14 March when there were many cuts South of BOLZANO we attacked and knocked out bridges further North in the region of the BRENNER Pass; this deepened the zone of interdiction by about 50 to 60 kilometres thereby creating appreciably greater difficulties in moving both troops and supplies. (At least one of these bridges remained out until the 17th). Following up this policy on the 16th, medium-bombers penetrated further North than ever before to make a successful attack on a bridge on the main INNSBRUCK-MUNICH line at a point about 40 kilometres N.E. of INNSBRUCK. This bridge is some 300 rail kilometres North of VERONA, and while an alternative route from INNSBRUCK to MUNICH exists, troops from ITALY destined for the Eastern Front will have to make an appreciable detour in order to by-pass this bridge.

Night-operational bridges have yet to make their appearance on the BRENNER, but this line is the scene of the enemy's latest rail-status deception. Recently 15 black dots ringed with white were painted on the tracks at the North choke point of TRENTO marshalling yard. Presumably they were to give the impression that craters blocked the line. Our photo interpreters were not deceived.

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The two secondary routes leading off the BRENNER, one from TRENTO running S.E. to join the N.S. ITALY rail net at CITTADELLA (G 2957) and CASTELFRANCO (G 3978), the other running Eastward from near FORTEZZA (W 1802), have both been successfully attacked several times this week. Their exact status throughout the week is unknown owing to lack of PR but it is probable that they have remained out most of the time.

Movement on the BRENNER line South of BOLZANO has been slight this week, although in general more day to day changes have been noted than were seen last week. Towards the end of the week, the Southern portion of the lin has shown increasing activity as repair work has decreased the intensity of our interdiction. None of this movement reflects through traffic, but simply a more or less local shifting of rolling stock.

North of BOLZANO considerable movement has been noted during the entire week. Activity in BOLZANO has increased, and rolling stock in almost every station between BOLZANO and INNSBRUCK has shown a considerable turnover, while at least four moving trains have been seen on day photos. It should be noted, however, that this is the first time the Northern portion of the BRENNER has been covered extensively enough to make a day by day comparison of station loading possible.

In so far as troop movement is concerned, judging solely from PR, there seems to be some movement going on. Such indications of troop movement as have been seen, have been North of BOLZANO, and in view of the state of the railway and on the basis of PR of road activity it seems certain that troops are moving by road from the VERONA area to the BOLZANO area. In fact with the line blocked North of BOLZANO for several days this week and with the secondary line running Eastward from the BRENNER to SPITTAL (X 6401) out, troops will have had to move by road almost all the way to the BRENNER Pass or, if still loading in the BOLZANO area, transhipping after a rail movement of only 65 kilometres. Under these circumstances it is quite clear why enemy formations departing from ITALY require such a long time to clear.

NORTH EAST ITALY

In the North East the degree of interdiction has somewhat fluctuated but in general has remained highly satisfactory from our point of view. On several days all river lines of interdiction between PADUA and UDINE, namely the BRENTA, PIAVE, LIVENZA and TAGLIAMENTO, have been blocked and at the same time two or more cuts existed on the frontier routes beyond UDINE. However, on 18 March the BRENTA interdiction was broken with the opening of the diversio near CITTADELLA (G 2875), and that night photos taken at 2030 hours confirmed the suspected leak in the PIAVE interdiction near NERVESA at G 6493, where the two short spans missing from the diversion bridge during the day were seen to be in place. With the BRENTA and PIAVE bolts thus pierced, at least at night, only a 15 kilometre road transhipment around SACILE (B 8407) and PORDENONE (B 9907) bridges is necessary to complete movement between the UDINE area and the PO Valley. Thus while PR has picked up little movement of rolling stock in this area it is obvious that movement is taking place. Similar indication of use is indicated by the fact that whereas on the 14th the short stretch of track between CASTELFRANCO VENETO and UDINE was cratered and impassable at four points, it was passable throughout when next photographed on the 18th. Elsewhere between the PADUA and UDINE areas there is little new to report. Both the Central and Southern rail routes remain out at the usual points. However, it is of interest to note that on the Southern railway the enemy has begun to construct a diversion around a bridge about 10 kilometres West of MONFALCONE (H 6491) which fighter-bombers have attacked twice this week but not cut. It is also in point that a diversion is under construction around LATISANA bridge (H 220873) on the same line about

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SECRET

15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 87 OF 27 MAR '45

NOTE: The security classification of this Summary has now been downgraded to SECRET. In view of this, the publication of "15 Army Group Intelligence Notes" has been discontinued and all recipients of the latter have been placed on the distribution of this Summary.

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

Once more 29 P.G. Div is in reserve, having been relieved in the CASTEL D'ALANO sector by 334 Inf Div. The first evidence of this change was provided by two prisoners taken early on the morning of the 24th near CASIGNO L 6425. They said that 756 Regiment had come into the line on the 21st March after having marched across from IMOLA. That same night a sharp patrol encounter 3,000 yards to the West resulted in several enemy being killed and documents taken from one body identified the Engineer Bn of 334 Div in a sector previously associated with 15 P.G.R. Since then, though there have been no further contact identifications of 334 Div, we have had several reports of the divisional sign being seen in the area South of MODENA. In addition tanks of 29 P.G. Div were seen on the 24th March as far North as MIRANDOLA L 6893 while a battalion of the div was reported by O.S.S. just West of CARPI L 5281 on the same day. It is safe to assume therefore that 29 P.G. Div is in reserve in the general area North of MODENA.

There is little other news from the Fifth Army front, where activity has been confined to normal patrolling on both sides. 114 Div is still carried in and N.E. of MONTESE L 5524 with probably at least two battalions of 721 Regt still out of the line reforming. Identifications of 1044 G.R. and 1045 G.R. confirm that 232 Div has taken over West of 114 Div and its responsibilities apparently include the defence of the ABETONE Pass, where we continue to get prisoners from III Bn 5 SAN MARCO Regiment which is under its command. Within the division the lay-out is 1045 G.R. on the West and 1044 G.R. in the MAMBERE sector on the East, while the divisional boundary with 114 Div apparently runs North West from M. TORRACCIA L 5520. 1043 G.R. is unlocated and must still be in reserve reorganising. Even supposing that the whole of 334 Div is committed in the line this leaves the enemy approximately four battalions (two from 114 Div and two from 232 Div) in immediate reserve West of VERGATO.

In the SERCHIO Valley we have now identified the Recce Unit of the ITALIA Division and the whole division appears to be complete in this area. We have had no recent prisoners or deserters from MONTE ROSA Div and it can be assumed that all its elements have now left for North West ITALY. To the East of 334 Div there has been a steady trickle of deserters from 94 Div, none of them bringing any startling information but all providing useful confirmation that the divisional sector remains unchanged, except on its extreme left flank where 157 Mtn Div has apparently taken over responsibility for MONTE SOLE L 7828. We know from prisoners that the mountaineers have under their command 7 G.A.F. Bn s.b.V. which is holding from M. SOLE to the SETTA river.

From 1 Para Div sector come reports which hint at a relief on the Northern slopes of M. GRANDE. In the sector where we had previously identified II Bn 4 Para Regt, troops were seen on the 25th wearing a different type of uniform and helmet, and it is possible that some Infantry unit may have taken over from the Parachutists in this sector. Possibly connected with this is a report from a source in BOLOGNA that troops of 65 Div who had been billetted in the Southern outskirts of the city for the last two months had moved away about the

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18th March. 65 Div has been on its present narrow sector, with four battalions in reserve, since the end of last year and should any regrouping take place South East of BOLOGNA it would be reasonable to expect this division to assume somewhat larger responsibilities. 65 Div may, therefore, have extended Eastwards into 305 Div's sector to allow the latter to take over part of 1 Para Div's sector on M. GRANDE. This is very much in the realm of speculation, especially as there is still no good reason forthcoming as to why the Parachutists should contract their sector. East of 1 Para Div, 278 Div is now responsible for the sector previously occupied by 334 Div. Although the exact location of its right divisional boundary cannot be fixed with certainty, it is definitely North of the SANTERNO as two prisoners from II Bn 994 G.R. placed their Bn North of the river on 22 March. On the GESSO General HOFER's private force of Italians - the ARDITI of FORLI - is holding part of the cliff South East of TOSSIGNANO.

Along the SENIO the enemy has put in several sharp raids clearly with the intention of securing prisoners. One on the 26th was put in by 7 Coy 9 P.G.R. in strength of about a platoon in the area M 3030. This particular raid was singularly unsuccessful and cost the enemy two killed and five wounded and left us with fourteen prisoners including one officer. II Bn is the Northernmost one in the divisional sector and its right neighbour is I Bn 9 P.G.R. Apart from rumours that 26 Recce Unit was on the right flank of the div, we had no firm identifications until the 25th when a deserter arrived from II Bn 67 P.G.R. in the area M 2828. It is still not certain whether the other battalion of this regiment provides the divisional reserve or is also in the line. Further downstream the occupants of the sector immediately East of LUGO who had escaped identification for some time are now known to be 1059 G.R. - the right hand regiment of 362 Div. Up till the 24th only one battalion of the Regt had been forward, the other being in reserve supervising Italians constructing the SANTERNO defences. It is now rumoured by prisoners that both battalions are forward and that I Bn has relieved the Northernmost battalion of 98 Div - a relief that was expected by prisoners taken over a week ago. Whether this has occurred or not 362 Div still remains on a very extended front. Yesterday there were two useful identifications from the COMACCHIO Spit where 142 Recce Unit still has a squadron on the Western shores of the Spit while elements of the Kesselring M.G. Bn No.2. are at the mouth of the RENO. There have been no recent deserters from 162 Turcoman Div so that the story that the Turcomans were going to be relieved by Germans may well have come true.

Prisoners taken recently on the Eighth Army front from 26 Pz Div said that the enemy is expecting an Allied attack to be launched shortly either up the axis of Route 9 or directed on LUGO. The enemy is showing similar anxiety on the front S.W. of BOLOGNA where he apparently construed our attack at the beginning of the month West of VERGATO as a preliminary to the launching of a larger scale offensive in that sector. The committing of 29 P.G. Div from reserve is proof enough of this and its more recent replacement by 334 Div, probably the best Infantry Div in ITALY, shows that the enemy is still unwilling to take a risk here. In view of the enemy's anxiety as to our intentions a brief comparison of his present situation with that at the beginning of the year is not without interest. Early in January the enemy line was held by sixteen German divisions and one Italian division, while there were four divisions in immediate reserve North of BOLOGNA. Of these sixteen divisions nine held from the Adriatic to M. GRANDE, the remaining seven being on the 5 Army front. By the middle of the month 356 Div had been taken out of the line on the SENIO front and was on its way out of ITALY and one division had been switched from the 5 Army to the 8 Army front. At present there are fifteen divisions in the line, seven of which are East of M. GRANDE representing a loss of two divisions on this front between the middle of January and now, with a corresponding gain on the 5 Army front. (162 Div was switched during February from Western ITALY to North of Lake COMACCHIO but its poor fighting qualities restrict its activities to coastwatching, and its arrival merely offsets the departure for N.W. ITALY of the battalions of 710 Div previously in that sector). There are, however, only two divisions (both mobile) in reserve as compared with four early in January, the net loss being

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accounted for by the departure of 16 S.S. and 715 Divs, the latter by now probably clear of ITALY. It would be misleading however to regard the departure of three divisions as implying that the enemy's fighting strength is proportionately lower now than it was at the beginning of January, since during the interim period, which has been a quiet one, the enemy has undoubtedly been able to build up again those divisions which at the beginning of the year were below strength. Although the enemy has lost some twenty battalions of infantry South of the PO, replacements for the divisions in the line and in immediate reserve will have probably very nearly made good the difference if expressed in terms of numbers of fighting men.

The situation confronting KESSELRING's successor might be a great deal worse. He has at least the satisfaction of taking over an unbroken fighting force composed of some of the best divisions now available anywhere to the German Army, and he has two good mobile divisions (29 P.G. and 90 P.G.) in reserve, which is apparently all that KESSELRING found awaiting him when he assumed the appointment of C in C West. We still lack definite evidence as to who has taken over Army Group C, but providing that the report that he was hurt in a car crash is false, Col.Gen VIETINGHOFF who deputised for KESSELRING when the latter was injured in December, is the most likely choice. Assuming that no one has been brought in from outside ITALY General LEMELSEN, G.O.C. 14 Army, would be second favourite. Whoever the successor is, it is unlikely that there will be any major change of strategy in ITALY. Despite the loss of three divisions the enemy commander has still been able to remain on the same line as at the beginning of the year (though in the ROMAGNA Plain this is not the shortest line he could choose) and he shows no sign of relinquishing it voluntarily. On the Eighth Army front he has appreciated that the main blow is likely to be struck up Route 9 or between here and FUSIGNANO, and it is on this sector that he has concentrated three good divisions (4 Para Div, 26 Pz Div and 98 Div) at the expense of thinning out to the North and South. On the key feature of M. GRANDE, despite some local regrouping is 1 Para Div, while the approaches to BOLOGNA are covered by a highly developed system of defence works. In the sector West of VERGATO, where prisoners expect a renewal of the attack, he has placed his best Infantry division - 334 - and has also at least some four battalions as local reserve should we launch an attack. In general reserve South of the PO are two mobile divisions with which the C in C S.W. may hope to influence the battle. Except for the need to keep three divisions West of VERGATO where previously one had sufficed, the enemy's dispositions are the most economical he can make with the forces available, - always provided he is not called upon to give up any more divisions. And at present there is no sign that any formation is following 715 Div out of the country.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

This week no major developments are apparent on the enemy L of C and railways remain well interdicted. On the BRENNER, due to bad weather on 26 and 27 March and the fact that a large portion of our medium bomber effort against the BRENNER has fallen on the upper stretches of the line, considerable repairs have been effected between BOLZANO and VERONA. It is probable that by the 28th the line may be open as far North as TRENTO. In the N.W. enemy repairs are slow and all lines from the PADUA area across the frontier are blocked at many points. Through traffic is also impossible from the middle PO Valley to MILAN.

Only slight indications of rail troop movement have been picked up recently, again on the BRENNER North of BOLZANO, and it is most probable that by this time 715 Inf Div has cleared ITALY.

North of the PO no pronounced road movement has been seen from the air and little reported by ground sources. Ground reports covering the last week of February and the first half of March show that troops going North along the axis VERONA-BOLZANO-INNSBRUCK moved largely by road, thereby confirming the effectiveness of our rail interdiction. One report shows that in late February a considerable number of troops were forced to march by road all the way to the BRENNER Pass; these troops will have been the tail of 16 S.S. Div. It is probable that a fairly large proportion of 715 Div has been forced to do the

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some thing. Another ground source states that large amounts of goods and materials destined for GERMANY are stored in the ADIGE Valley owing to transportation difficulties; unless moved by MT there is little likelihood that they will ever reach their destination.

No major changes have been noted of late along the PO river where all traffic West of PIACENZA continues to cross by ferry or night pontoon bridges. None of the pontoon bridges have been seen assembled this week but night PR has shown activity at CASALMAGGIORE (F 1704), BORGOFORTE (F 4911), S. MICOLO (F 5112) and OSTIGLIA (F 7411). With very few of our aircraft operating on 26 and 27 March the PO crossings may have been operating 24 hours a day.

No change is evident in the enemy's supply position. Reports continue to be received of the enemy's shortage of petrol and many indicate an extensive use of methane as a substitute. According to a PW who formerly belonged to a tank recovery unit, vehicles frequently ran out of petrol and had to wait on the road until more was brought up from their own workshops. The situation which this type of report reflects is unlikely to be remedied by the recent offer made by 90 Div to award 1,000 cigarettes to any man who returns from patrol with a can of captured petrol.

3. WESTERN FRONT

The line of the RHINE has been finally broken this week. Before the last German had been cleared from the West bank South of LUDWIGSHAFEN, new crossings had already been effected in the Northern and Southern sectors to supplement the steadily expanding Allied bridgehead at REMAGEN. Three major bridgehead areas are now discernible - in the DARMSTADT-FRANKFURT area, at REMAGEN and North of the RUHR in the WESEL sector. These are in addition to a large number of subsidiary crossings, which are being rapidly merged into the larger bridgeheads as the latter expand. The quality and degree of enemy resistance at each is in direct proportion to the success achieved by the enemy in withdrawing his forces across the RHINE in the various sectors; only the quality of inadequacy is common to all.

In the South the battle West of the RHINE ended with the almost complete destruction of the German Seventh Army and the partial elimination of the First Army. Seventh Army had definitely lost all hope of withdrawal across the RHINE by about March 19th when Allied columns striking through BAD KREUZNACH reached the MAINZ-WORMS area. Prior to that very little had been able to escape. The collapse of the Seventh Army affected the right wing and centre of the First Army holding the Siegfried line West of WISSEMBOURG, and the front folded up from North to South with very heavy losses to the enemy. Only on the extreme left of First Army did the line hold firm; here one P.G. and two infantry divisions fought very hard to cover the crossings at SPEYER and KARLSRUHE, and were themselves able to pull back over the RHINE in reasonably good order. Before this happened Allied forces were able to exploit the disorganisation of the few enemy forces in the area South of MAINZ. Meeting disorganised resistance from Volkssturm, Officer Cadet Schools and miscellaneous Rear Army units we have been able to achieve very deep penetrations into Central GERMANY. FRANKFURT AM MAIN has been by-passed, the MAIN crossed near ASCHAFFENBURG and according to enemy reports we are striking North Eastwards up the KINZIG Valley in the direction of KASSEL. There is still no sign of any effective enemy opposition and apart from the miscellaneous units mentioned above, only remnants of two low-grade infantry divisions have been contacted.

In the REMAGEN bridgehead area, the enemy's main concern has been with his Northern flank which he reinforced with two additional infantry divisions brought down from the COLOGNE plain during the week. He made some efforts to extract some armour from the line and indeed nearly succeeded in extricating 3 P.G. Div, only to recommit it hastily as the Allied armour started to exert pressure. The reinforcement of the Northern flank did not however, take into account the disastrous weakness of the centre and the Southern flank of the bridgehead. Here at least four infantry divisions had ceased to exist

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as fighting formations. An indication of the state these forces were in lies in the fact that 26 Volksgrenadier division had three infantry divisions under its command. An average of 1,000 daily has been taken over the past seven days in the bridgehead and the inevitable has now occurred. Allied armour has broken out of the bridgehead and is pushing East against decreasing enemy resistance.

Further North, the large scale Allied RHINE crossing in the WESEL area has produced no surprises, neither for the enemy who was probably expecting the attack, nor for us in the form of unexpected identifications. In the first 36 hours three parachute and three infantry divisions were contacted by our forces; these have now been joined by the two mobile divisions held in Army Group H reserve - 116 Pz and 15 P.G. The enemy as might be expected in view of the better quality of his troops here is fighting harder than in most other sectors of the front. The trouble is that he has not enough of anything and already an ominous expansion of this bridgehead is taking place. A few more troops may perhaps be spared from HOLLAND to reinforce the area: KESSELRING has now the bulk of four divisions in the area between the Dutch coast and EMMERICH, excluding the elements of an unidentified parachute division which are reported to have arrived recently in HOLLAND. Even with all these reinforcements (and they are the best 1 Para Army can hope for) the enemy has virtually no prospect of reducing or containing the bridgehead.

KESSELRING when he arrived in the West is alleged to have informed his staff that he was the new V-3 secret weapon. He needs to be, for there is little prospect of anything else arriving in the West in time to save the situation. The courses open to the enemy are now limited. The basic choice lies between fighting until his armies are destroyed in detail or accepting unconditional surrender. There is still no indication that the enemy is in any way disposed to follow the second course and it must be assumed that he intends to fight on so long as organised resistance is a possibility. This granted, he must without delay stabilise the front, and it is now extremely doubtful whether this lies within his capabilities. Two essential conditions are needed. The first is adequate forces. It is now abundantly clear that the enemy is in no position to contain any single one of the present Allied bridgeheads let alone all of them. Only a rapid and substantial reinforcement of all threatened sectors can retrieve the position. This appears to be beyond the enemy's present capabilities. Apart from a possible two divisions in HOLLAND which might be spared, all the divisions on the Western Front are either wholly committed or destroyed. 19 Army has been drained dry and 5 Pz Army's forces in the RUHR area are of the slenderest. There are certainly outside the Western Front forces which could be spared, a dozen divisions in NORWAY, possibly half a dozen from the BALKANS, at least that number from ITALY and a few from the Eastern Front. But these are not in any true sense available. The enemy's transportation situation is such that before the first of these could make its appearance, the whole front in the West may have collapsed. It now takes a month to get a division out of NORWAY; it takes rather longer to transfer a division from East to West, and judging by the speed at which 715 Inf Div is leaving ITALY, the next military age group will have reached the call-up age before anything substantial comes from this theatre. For manpower, then, KESSELRING will have to rely on any scrapings of the Wehrkreise which may become available. It is in fact evident that there is next to nothing available. All through this week there has been virtually no important military movement behind the whole Western Front area and the RUHR area has been almost completely dead. It seems that no early reinforcement is thus to be expected.

The second essential for stabilisation is to have a defence line on which to stand. It is not easy to see where the enemy can now hope to do this. The Siegfried and the RHINE lines were the best and most economical available to him in the West. No other position now offers similar advantages. A line running from EMDEN along the EMS down to the RHINE near EMMERICH has been reported. This is in danger of being turned by the expansion of our WESEL bridgehead. Apart from this the only prepared defence line of any sort is a series of fortifications

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built in the area East of FRANKFURT prior to the German re-occupation of the RHINELAND. The state of these is not known but it is unlikely to be very satisfactory. There is thus small prospect that KESSELRING can quickly stabilise the situation. His main hope must now be to inflict the maximum casualties upon the Allies in the hope that like the Soviet advances, our attack will lose its momentum in time for some fresh forces to come up. On the present form it now seems within our power to inflict a crippling disaster on the enemy, and so to isolate and disorganise his Army Groups that it will not be possible for him to pull any substantial forces from the Western Front back to the last ditch positions in the Austrian National Redoubt where the Germans may hope to end the war.

4. EASTERN FRONT

EAST PRUSSIA AND GERMANY

There have been few developments of importance in this past week. South of KÖNIGSBERG, the enemy pocket around HEILIGENBEIL has been eliminated, but little further headway has been made towards KÖNIGSBERG itself by the Third White Russian Army Group. In the area of GDYNIA and DANZIG stiff enemy opposition continues and ROKOSSOVSKY's forces have been held to small gains, although by the capture of ZOPPOT, a wedge has been driven between GDYNIA and DANZIG. One of the pocket battleships which was at GDYNIA at the start of this month has now been transferred to SWINEMUNDE and it is possible that the other has followed it.

There has been no activity of importance on the main front in GERMANY as far South as the Upper Silesian region. In this latter area, progress has been made by Marshal KONIEV's forces towards the SUDETEN Mountains, but without knowing the full extent of KONIEV's objectives, it is difficult to assess the success of this attack. The German bridgehead over the ODER S.E. of OPPELN has been eliminated, itself a development of some significance. Apart from that however no success of major strategic importance seems to have been achieved, nor has KONIEV yet got his flank resting firmly on the SUDETEN mountains. Moreover it is clear that by the time the Russians gave the news of the attack, it had in fact virtually come to an end, and little further progress has been made in the past few days. The attack may of course be the prelude to an all-out offensive by the First Ukrainian Army Group across the SUDETEN mountains towards OLMÜTZ and the Bohemian plain. To judge by the comments of German military spokesmen, this is a Soviet capability which the enemy considers to be current and likely.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY

The Czechoslovak and Hungarian region has seen the most important Soviet progress on the Eastern Front in the past week. North of BUDAPEST, the enemy, possibly fearful of deep Soviet penetrations into his rear across the SUDETEN mountains, has been pulling in the Southern flank of his long salient in SLOVAKIA. The pace of the German withdrawal has been rather less leisurely than in previous weeks and he seems to have abandoned the road centre of BANSKA BISTRICA (C 76) in the heart of the Slovak mountains in some disorder. An interesting development has been the transfer of 3 SS Pz Division from the area South of the DANUBE to the HRON river sector North of the DANUBE.

South of the DANUBE, the enemy has suffered a heavy set-back this week. The Russian counter-offensive North of Lake BALATON has made very considerable headway. Striking initially North Westwards, the Russians reached the DANUBE at DUNAÚJVÁROS (Y 95) thereby forming a German pocket South of the DANUBE between DUNAÚJVÁROS and ESZTERGOM (Z 27). This has now been virtually eliminated. Meanwhile driving West and South West other Soviet forces have captured the road and rail centres of SZÉKESFEHÉRVÁR and PÁPA (Y 30), the latter 30 miles from the Austrian frontier and are reported to be pushing on to SZOMBATHELY (C 78), 65 miles S.E. of VIENNA. Latest reports place the Russians less than 30 miles

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From the Austrian border. Considerable casualties have certainly been inflicted on the enemy, although the Russian claim virtually to have destroyed 6 SS Pz Army as a fighting formation is probably somewhat exaggerated. 350 Inf Div, formerly North of the DRAVA, has been heavily engaged in the Lake BALATON area, while 6 Pz Div has been identified in the same sector. At least six German Pz divisions have thus been recently identified on the 20 mile front between Lake BALATON and SZEKSZARD.

The events in HUNGARY are likely to have a very profound influence on the whole German position in South-Eastern EUROPE. It seems clear that the enemy retreat has not been voluntary, and suggestions that he is pulling back to a shorter line so as to release 6 SS Pz Army for re-transfer to the Western Front are not at present supported by any independent evidence. What has happened in fact is that after an ambitious and unsuccessful counter-offensive, the enemy with fairly heavy losses to himself has been forced off one of the few defensive lines he held forward of the Inner German Fortress. By withdrawing to a defence line in the SOUTH EASTERN area. They will have forced the enemy to reconsider his whole basic strategy in the SOUTH EASTERN area. Having failed to move his DRAVA-BALATON-DANUBE front forward to the line of the DRAVA, the enemy can now have no logical or strategical reason for continuing to cling to the extended front he still holds in YUGOSLAVIA. Unless the situation in N.W. HUNGARY deteriorates still further he may temporarily try to hold a defence line in Southern HUNGARY from Lake BALATON down to the DRAVA so as to cover the Hungarian oil fields, although even this is now becoming difficult. In YUGOSLAVIA however a withdrawal from the SAVA and the SARAJEVO salient would now appear probable and prudent. It would not be without its disadvantages, particularly with regard to the administrative and economic difficulties likely to arise with the Croats. It would have the disadvantage too of giving the Partisans much greater freedom of movement between Eastern and Central CROATIA on the one hand, and BOSNIA and SLOVENIA on the other hand. Nevertheless a front running from Lake BALATON to the DRAVA at EROS (A 61, thence South Westwards towards the Adriatic coast at SAW (G 70) would have the double advantage of leaving the Germans still in possession of the NAGY KANIZSA oilfields and of being infinitely easier to hold than the present awkward front. It would entail too a certain, though not a large economy in forces.

YUGOSLAVIA.

There are signs that the policy outlined above is now being put into effect in YUGOSLAVIA. Throughout the past week considerable Northward road movement has been seen along the SARAJEVO-BROD (G 12) Highway, and 1st Inf Div is reported to be moving up to BROD. A number of small villages in the area 5 - 10 miles South of SARAJEVO have been abandoned and everything now seems ready for a rapid withdrawal from the town whenever the word is given. On 25th March too, there was heavy movement West and South West from the SARAJ towns of OSIJEK (G 67) and DONJ MIHOLJAC (G 29) towards NASICE (G 26). It is still too early to assess the full extent of this movement, but it may imply the start of a transfer out from the SARAJ area. It is likely that some of the forces involved in the above are going to the DRVAR (F 40) area where the Partisans last week launched a highly successful offensive from the S.W. leading to the fall of DRVAR and the capture of over 500 prisoners with much booty. Enemy reactions to the attack have so far been moderate, but it is to be expected that some reinforcement for the demoralised Croat forces in the area will soon appear. The possibility of a Partisan attack Northwards from DRVAR towards ZAGREB is one which the enemy cannot rightly ignore.

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The events in HUNGARY are likely to have a very profound influence on the whole German position in South-Eastern EUROPE. It seems clear that the enemy retreat has not been voluntary, and suggestions that he is pulling back to a shorter line so as to release 6 SS Pz Army for re-transfer to the Western Front are not at present supported by any independent evidence. What has happened in fact is that after an ambitious and unsuccessful counter-offensive, the enemy with fairly heavy losses to himself has been forced off one of the few defensive lines he held forward of the Inner German Fortress. By yielding the BALATON position, the Soviets have done more than force the Germans off one defence line on to another. They will have forced the enemy to reconsider his whole Grand strategy in the South Eastern area. Having failed to move his DANUBE-BALATON LINE front forward to the line of the DRAVA, the enemy can now have no logical or strategical reason for continuing to cling to the extended front he still holds in YUGOSLAVIA. Unless the situation in N.W. HUNGARY deteriorates still further he may temporarily try to hold a defence line in Southern HUNGARY from Lake BALATON down to the DRAVA so as to cover the Hungarian oil fields, although even this is now becoming difficult. In YUGOSLAVIA however a withdrawal from the SAVA and the SARAJEVO salient would now appear probable and prudent. It would not be without its disadvantages, particularly with regard to the administrative and economic difficulties likely to arise with the Croats. It would have the disadvantage too of giving the Partisans much greater freedom of movement between Eastern and Central CROATIA on the one hand, and BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA on the other hand. Nevertheless a front running from Lake BALATON to the DRAVA at EROS (X 61, thence South Westwards towards the Adriatic coast at SAK (G 70) would have the double advantage of leaving the Germans still in possession of the NAGY KANISZA oilfields and of being infinitely easier to hold than the present awkward front. It would permit too a certain, though not a large economy in forces.

YUGOSLAVIA

There are signs that the policy outlined above is now being put into effect in YUGOSLAVIA. Throughout the past week considerable northward road movement has been seen along the SARAJEVO-BROD (G 12) highway, and 1st Inf Div is reported to be moving up to BROD. A number of small villages in the area 8 - 10 miles South of SARAJEVO have been abandoned and everything now seems ready for a rapid withdrawal from the town whenever the word is given. On 25th March too, there was heavy movement West and South West from the SARAJEVO towns of OSIJEK (G 67) and DONJI MIHOLJAC (G 29) towards MASICI (G 26). It is still too early to assess the full extent of this movement, but it may imply the start of a withdrawal not from the SARAJEVO area. It is likely that some of the forces involved in the movement are going to the BIHAC (F 40) area where the Partisans last week launched a highly successful offensive from the S.W. leading to the fall of BIHAC and the capture of over 500 prisoners with much booty. Enemy reactions to the attack have so far been moderate, but it is to be expected that some reinforcement for the demoralised Croat forces in the area will soon appear. The possibility of a Partisan attack Northwards from BIHAC towards ZAGREB is one which the enemy cannot lightly ignore.

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MILLER, G.S.
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RAILWAYS

The BRENNER has remained blocked to through traffic all week, although in general our belt of interdiction on the Southern portion was seen to be breaking down on photo cover of 25 March, and may by 28 March be serviceable. The blocks on the Northern stretch of the route seem to be holding up quite well.

Through traffic between VERONA and TRENTO was impossible at least to the 25th by virtue of the PARONA (F 6158) bridge and the SAN AMBROGGIO bridge (F 5164) remaining out. On 20 March there was a total of six blocks on this section of line, one of which had been repaired by the following day. Attacks of the 22nd again raised the total of cuts to six, but by the following day repairs had rendered two points of interdiction passable. On the 24th while repair work continued, no change was noted except that another block was effected. Photos of the 25th, the most recent available cover, showed that two cuts had been made passable but three bridges still were down effectively blocking through traffic. Between TRENTO and BOLZANO both the S. MICHELE bridge and diversionary line remained cut all week, while between BOLZANO and INNSBRUCK on the Northern stretch of the BRENNER, PR of 25 March showed two bridges were still out, one having been impassable all week.

Complete overcast on 26 and 27 March held MAAF's operations to a minimum, no attacks being made on the BRENNER line, and it is probable that the line will be open to through traffic from VERONA to as far North as TRENTO by the 28th.

North of INNSBRUCK the ARZBERG (E 1279) bridge on the main INNSBRUCK-MUNICH line was attacked and badly damaged on 22 March and was seen to be still out on 25 March; it is probably still out. On the alternative INNSBRUCK-MUNICH route the bridge at MURNAU (D 6261) was seen on the 22nd to have cratered approaches which did not appear to have been repaired by the 25th.

The BRENNER, while closed to through traffic all week, has shown a certain amount of localised movement. Just North of VERONA a decrease of rolling stock has been noticed between the destroyed S. AMBROGGIO bridge (F 5164) and the VERONA PARONA bridge (F 6158). In view of the fact that the PARONA bridge needs very little repair work to render it fully serviceable, all factors point towards its being "night-operational".

As the enemy repairs our interdictions on the BRENNER South of BOLZANO activity, as is to be expected, increases. TRENTO yards, for example, show more movement than last week, but are by no means as active as they were at the beginning of the month. North of BOLZANO the line is appreciably more active though some drop in overall movement has been noted over the past seven days, owing no doubt to stepped-up interdiction.

Troop movement along the BRENNER line this week continues on a limited scale. Some flats loaded with AF have been noted on the Northern portion and although empty flats have shown a certain amount of activity, it is not possible to state definitely that this ties in with troop movement.

In the VICENZA-PADUA-TREVISO area there were on 25 March a total of ten blocks effectively cutting all lines in the sector, with all the BRENTA river bridges impassable. This is the heaviest interdiction accomplished in this area for some time. The main TREVISO-UDINE line is also heavily interdicted and no through traffic has been possible on the line for at least a month. Although PR of 25 March is the most recent cover available, the line is believed to have been still impassable as of the 27th.

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The main TARVISIO frontier route was seen blocked at four bridges on the 25th and it does not seem likely that the route could be open yet. The PREDIGOLIM route remains closed to through traffic by virtue of an impassable bridge, while two heavily damaged bridges block the POSTUMIA route.

The PADUA-VICENZA-TREVISO area has remained quiet during the week, although some movement has been noted on the line between CASTELFRANCO VENETO and TREVISO. Further East along the routes to UDINE activity continues to be slight. The main TREVISO-UDINE line has shown almost no movement as far East as CASARSA (about 25 miles West of UDINE). Activity has, however, been noted between CASARSA and UDINE itself. This activity undoubtedly reflects rail movement between C.SARSA and GEMONA (C 3240) just South of our belt of interdiction. UDINE yards have shown slight movement during the week; ten loaded flats were seen here on 21 March and 20 loaded flats in another yard on the 25th. The Central and Southern routes West of UDINE are now beginning to show activity on a very limited scale.

The TARVISIO frontier route has been in use both North and South of our belt of interdiction while the POSTUMIA and PREDIGOLIM routes lack adequate PR for any definite statement.

SHIPPING

In the Gulf of GENOA 4 MT ships continued to move rapidly in pairs between GENOA and SPEZIA from 19 to 24 March, and there has also been the usual turnover of F-boats and S-barges. SAVONA, however, has apparently been inactive since 22 March.

There has been no photo cover of the Northern Adriatic ports since 23 March, but two coasters reached VENICE from TRIESTE between 19 and 22 March, while a MV and another coaster arrived from PORTO NOGARO during the same period. At TRIESTE on 20 March two coasters arrived from VENICE and one from MARENZO, whilst a further coaster had arrived from VENICE by the 22nd. Both POLA and ARSA Channel were inactive up to 23 March and there was only light ferry and F-boat activity at FIUME. There was the usual barge activity along the Venetian coast.

MAIN ENEMY DUMPING AREAS NORTH OF RIVER PO

1. Upper ADIGE Valley. There are a considerable number of dumps and installations of all kinds along the main BRENNER railway line between TRENTO and BOLZANO and the branch line from BOLZANO to MERANO. Further North there are a few installations scattered along the line which runs East from FORTEZZA (W 1502) to LIENZ (X 1505). South of TRENTO as far as VERONA there are no important installations except for two large dumping areas round the stations of ROVERETO (A 7043) and RORI (A 6701) which are adjacent to the Northern end of Lake GARDA.

There are at least five MT parks, two workshops and a spare-parts depot scattered throughout the above area. The spare-parts depot is situated at LAIVES just South of BOLZANO and there are workshops at MERANO (A 8190) and MAIA of BRENNO at A 729475, and a park at A 790409 which contained 150 MT on 9 Jan '45. In the far North there is an MT park, reported to be No. 575, North of BRUNECKEN (B 1890) and two more along the FORTEZZA-LIENZ road. South of TRENTO there is a possible MT park at ROVERETO.

2. VERONA. Owing to its geographical condition, VERONA is the ideal off-loading and forwarding point for stores coming down the BRENNER railway and thus, in the area VERONA - S. AMBROGGIO - PESCHIERA there is the largest single concentration of dumps in the whole of enemy occupied ITALY. It is notable, however, that there are very few fuel dumps in this area, those are mainly scattered over the Lombardian plains or South of the River PO. West of VERONA along

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the road and railway line to MILAN there are small concentrations of dumps and installations at both BRESCIA and BERGAMO, and the road tunnels on the West shore of Lake GARDA are all reported to be used for storage or workshops.

Only two of the MT installations reported by ground sources in the VERONA area and confirmed by PR are still active; these are the SPEER vehicle park at ZEVIANI (F 4254) and an MT stores depot at F 711545. Besides these there is a possible MT park at F 711545 and a block of barrack buildings known to exist at F 6354 is reported to contain a Base Ordnance Workshop. It is also possible that some of the many installations which are known to be active but whose function and contents cannot be identified by PR are workshops or spare-parts stores. West of Lake GARDA there is an MT park at DESENZANO and another at CAVRIANO (F 2271) whilst an installation at FORNO D'ALLIONE (A 1528) is reported by a PW to be the 115 Central Spare-parts Depot. North of BERGAMO at ALBINO (K 7394) there is an MT workshop which was extensively damaged in Dec 44.

3. MILAN In the industrial areas of MILAN, MONZA and BUSTO ARSIZIO (J 98), and as far North as the line VARESE (D 8.06) - COMO - LECCO (E 4305) there is a considerable number of installations of all kinds. These include a relatively large amount of fuel. Ground source reports, which cannot be confirmed by PR, indicate that the railway tunnels on the net work of secondary lines in the MONZA - COMO-LECCO triangle are being used to store fuel and ammunition. N.E. of MILAN along the railway and road that runs East from COLICO (E 4330) to TIRANO (.. 0443) there is a row of ten permanent installations the contents of which are not known.

In the area round MILAN there are MT depots near BUSTO GAROLFO (J 8295) and MONZA (K 3478) and a large one at K 255620. In addition there has been a number of MT parks and workshops reported in MILAN itself which cannot be confirmed, and it is probable that the large factories such as ISOTTA FRASCHINI, BIANCHI and ALFA ROMEO are all working for the enemy as well as the WAFF and other maintenance depots.

4. The Plain of LOMBARDY There are 66 confirmed installations of all types, 25 of which are fuel dumps, refineries or alcohol refineries scattered over the plain North of the River PO and South of the MILAN-VERONA-PADUA road and railway line. Of these the majority cling to the main lateral CREMONA-MANTUA-PADUA road and the roads running South to the River PO crossings from MILAN, BRESCIA, VERONA and PADUA with a small concentration at MANTUA which forms the main communications centre of the central plain.

There appear to be very few workshops or other ordnance installations in the plain. The main ones believed to be active at present are an anti-tank artillery depot at CREMONA, an MT spare-parts depot at CASTELFRANCO SUL GARIGLIO (F 1524), an MT park at GOITO (F 3935) and a reported transit park for MT and AFVs at LONIGO (F 9647).

5. N.E. ITALY There is a fair number of installations, including a relatively large quota of fuel dumps in the PADUA-VICENZA-BASSANO-VERONA quadrilateral with a small concentration of fuel and ammunition at PONTEDA. (B 4100). There is a further concentration, mainly ammunition, immediately West of the River TAGLIAMENTO North of CASARSA on the main UDINE-TREVISO railway line and about a dozen spread out along the Valley North of UDINE as far as TOLMEZZO (C 2358). There are also two fuel, one ammunition and a general stores dump on the railway line North of GRADO (M 5277) from where stores are shipped by barge to VENICE.

North of UDINE there is an MT park and workshops near CAMPOROSSO at C 648689 and a park at TOLMEZZO (C 2456). There are also workshops and a large park at OSOPPO (C 2841). S.W. of UDINE there is an MT repair depot at BASILIANO (C 3113), and in the TREVISO-VICENZA area there is an MT workshop at S. FLORIAN near TREVISO and an artillery workshop at MONTE BELLUNA (H 4969).

.....6. N.E. ITALY.....

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6. N.W. ITALY Most of the TICINO river there are comparatively few installations; those which there are are grouped around the cities of GENOA, ALESSANDRIA and TURIN.

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 88 38

DATED 3 APRIL, 1945

1. ENEMY SITUATION

On 2 April a small scale attack was made by 8 Army against enemy positions on the COMACCHIO Spit. Two forces crossed the S.E. corner of the lagoon to land on the Western shores of the Spit while a third force pushed up the tongue of land between the RENO and the sea, captured the small island at M 6358 from a squadron of 236 Recce Unit (162 Div) and struck West across the river. By the end of the day all enemy resistance had ceased between the RENO and the small ditch which runs East and West on the 605 Northing. An extremely successful operation brought in a bag of about 800 prisoners; some 300 are Turkomans and twelve are German officers. Today our forces advanced North across the ditch, and reached the Canale VALETTA at PORTO GARIBALDI meeting negligible opposition on the way and picking up only 30 prisoners.

This attack has brought in no surprising identifications. 142 Recce Unit lost heavily, and the Bn Commander is a prisoner and most of his officers either killed or captured; a Company of KESSELRING M.G. Bn 2 was badly knocked about; and 162 Div provided a large number of Turkomans from I Bn 314 G.R. and 236 Recce Unit. A Russian officer prisoner gave some interesting information: he placed two bns of 162 Div along the Northern shore of the Lake between COMACCHIO Village and OSTELLATO M 3774 and confirmed that II Bn 329 G.R. remained behind in the PIACENZA area when the rest of the division moved Eastwards. 303 G.R. is believed to be coastwatching North of PORTO GARIBALDI. Our troops met stiffer opposition when they reached the banks of the CANALE VALETTA this evening, and the enemy must be expected to resist strongly any further attempt on our part to develop an outflanking movement Westwards along the Northern shore of Lake COMACCHIO. Tac R has revealed no reaction to this attack on the part of 90 P.G. Div in the BOLOGNA area and the enemy is obviously not prepared to commit his reserves prematurely. But Tac R on the evening of 3 April noticed about 30 MT and 12 AFVs moving North West along Route 16 from ALFONSINE passed ARGENTA, which does suggest that 42 Jaeger Div may be detaching a reserve battalion with some armoured support to move round to the Northern shores of the Lake. On the 42 Div front the difficult nature of the terrain favours defence, and this would probably allow the division to thin out to the extent of a battalion.

Along the SENIO the front has been quiet and there have been no major changes in dispositions. 362 Div is at last confirmed as having taken over from the Northernmost battalion of 98 Div and its right boundary is now on the 37 Northing. The Italian battalion under command of 362 Div just East of LUGO has been identified as the N.P. (Parachute) Bn of the 10 FLOTMAS Inf Div: it apparently replaced the LUPO Bn now resting North of the PO. 362 Div has also an Italian artillery bn (COLLEONI) under command. 98 Div has a bn of 117 G.R. in reserve and the division is now on a 7,000 yard sector between the 37 and 32 Northings. It is still not clear whether all four infantry bns of 26 Pz Div are in the line, but the Recce Bn is definitely in reserve. Astride Route 9, we have only one identification from 4 Para Div (I Bn 12 Para Regt in its normal area) and a trace of our positions between the 17 and 22 Eastings headed "Positions in front of 4 Regt", taken off an Italian saboteur captured near CUFFIANO M 2023, has given rise to much speculation. This may refer to 4 Para Regt which has been unlocated since relieved on M. GRANDE by 305 Div. It is not impossible, therefore, that part of it at least is now on the SENIO under 4 Para Div, though the reason for this curious move is obscure. At any rate a prisoner from I Bn 993 G.R., the left hand Regt of 278 Div, has placed the divisional boundary between 4 Para Div and 278 Div on the 170 Easting, so it is clear that 4 Para Div has taken over no further commitments.

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The indications of a relief of the parachutists on the Northwestern slopes of M. GRANDE noted in last week's Summary, were confirmed by the capture of a prisoner from II Bn 578 G.R. (305 Div) at L 9832 on 1 April. This Regt was previously on the Western flank of 305 Div, and it has apparently been relieved in that sector by 65 Div because II Bn 146 G.R. was identified on the same day on the 918 Easting. In short, 305 Div has taken over a two-battalion sector from 1 Para Div and 65 Div has had to extend its left boundary to include the former sector of 578 G.R. This should still leave 65 Div with two bns as local reserve astride the main BOLOGNA-FLORENCE road.

On the rest of 5 Army front little change has been noted, and from East to West the enemy line is held by 157 Mtn, 94 Inf, 334 Inf, 114 Jaeger, 232 Inf, ITALIA and 148 Inf Divs. The enemy is still anxious lest we should renew the attack Northwards from CASTEL D'AIANO and 334 Div has directed civilians to evacuate all buildings South of a line L 5828 - L 6330 by 5 April. The reason given was that this area is likely to become one of heavy fighting early in April.

The enemy general reserve remains two P.G. Divisions. 90 P.G. Division is still carried in the area North and North East of BOLOGNA, but we have received a number of reports from agents on the activities of 29 P.G. Div. It moved as we saw last week out of the line into the area between MODENA and the PO, where elements of the division took part in a successful anti-Partisan drive near CARPI L 5381 late last month. As early as the 23rd however, movement started Northwards across the PO, and one source has reported 3,000 troops with supporting arms (with the 29 P.G. Div sign) crossing the PO between the 23rd and the 26th. This amounts to about a regimental group. Destination was given as the area MIRAN.R. F 9822 - MONTAGNANA G 0130. Since then there have been other reports of units of the division moving North from the area MIRANDOLA L 6893, but it is not clear whether these are delayed reports on the earlier move or whether they indicate that more of the division has crossed over. According to one source units of the division were due to move on beyond the PO Plain 300 Kms to the North, but this is as yet unconfirmed by any other agents, and it seems more likely that the enemy is placing the division where it can intervene either on the main front or near VENICE, should we try a seaborne landing. Agents in N.E. ITALY have sent in many reports which imply that the enemy is extremely worried about a possible Allied landing in the Northern Adriatic: civilians have been evacuated from the coastal strip GRADO-LIGNANO (and troops are also reported arriving in this area) while flooding precautions have been taken between LISOLO G 9461 and GRADO H 5276. In addition many current rumours indicate that we intend to carry out a seaborne operation. To meet this the enemy has 237 Div in ISTRIA, with some of its troops reported South of FIUME, 188 Div in the TRIESTE area and 710 Div in UDINE Plain. We have less evidence for troops in the VENICE area. 155 Training Div has according to one source moved down from the BELLUNO area toward TREVISO, but it is not known whether it is yet sufficiently strong to undertake any active rôle. The move of 29 P.G. Div North of the river may therefore be explained by anxiety lest we should land near VENICE, thereby threatening the whole enemy forces South of the PO. (Its role may also be to prevent any Allied airborne force from seizing the PO bridges). This same preoccupation with his coastal flanks was very evident last year before the May offensive, and the enemy may fear that a landing is intended in the Northern Adriatic to link up with the Russian drive into AUSTRIA. The recent talks between Field Marshals ALEXANDER and TOLBUKHIN may have given rise to this anxiety.

From N.W. ITALY there is little to report: 5 Mtn and 34 Inf Divs are still in Western ITALY, and though there has probably been some local readjustment of sectors, there is no sign that either division intends to leave its present area.

.....2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS..

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

The bad weather which set in at the end of last week continued until 29 March and consequently rail interdiction dropped off, notably on the BRENNER which might just possibly have been open all the way from VERONA to INNSBRUCK on one, perhaps two, days. In any event attacks on 29 March closed the BRENNER and on 2 April, the date of the most recent cover, the line was out at four points South of BOLZANO and three to the North. While it was thought that the enemy would be able to open a through route between the PO Valley and UDINE this now seems improbable particularly since PR shows that at least two rail diversions were washed out owing to rising water in the river. Beyond UDINE all three frontier routes remain blocked and there is evidence to indicate that the enemy may have abandoned his effort to repair the TARVISIO route which hitherto has been the most important of the three frontier routes.

In the PO Valley rail interdiction has been appreciably stepped up. As of 1 April only three of the twelve lines running South to the PO between VENICE and MILAN were open; the three open were the VERONA-ROVIGO, VERONA-OSTIGLIA and MILAN-PIACENZA lines. The MILAN-PIACENZA line does remain out at the PO river bridge and all other PO bridges West of the one South of PAVIA inclusive remain down. Railways South of the PO are still active. A report places an enemy railhead at VIGNOLA (L 6347) and another states that the railway running Southeast from FERRARA to RAVENNA operates as far South as the RENO river, thus indicating a continuance of the enemy's policy of running trains well forward.

The cutting of the railway running Southwest from VIENNA in the WIENER NEUSTADT area by the Russians is unlikely to affect the situation in either ITALY or YUGOSLAVIA. If, however, the line is out further South in the area West of GRAZ, which would entail about a 70-kilometre advance by the Russians, the only rail lines available between GERMANY and both ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA will be the BRENNER and the SALZBURG-VILLACH (C 8880) lines. That they will be adequate seems at best extremely doubtful, particularly in view of the damage done to and the attacks continuing against railways in Southeastern EUROPE by heavy bombers of the 15th Air Force, a report on which appears at Appendix 'B'.

At the Western end of his L of C the enemy already appears to be fairly well strangled owing to heavy restrictions on railway traffic through SWITZERLAND. According to an official report from LONDON, under the agreement with the Allies on March 8th, the Swiss have added coal, iron, steel and scrap iron to the list of goods which they will not accept for transit from GERMANY to ITALY. In addition, they have agreed to limit such traffic as is permitted in any one month to the tonnage which passed in February, 1945 - that is about 8,200 tons per month Southbound. In regard to the Northbound traffic from ITALY to GERMANY, all traffic will be regarded as "loot" or "goods sold under pressure" and therefore prohibited until the contrary is proved; the maximum Northbound traffic permitted in any one month will be 5,900 tons. For practical purposes the Germans have now lost the use of the Swiss routes by which in the first half of 1944 the average monthly tonnage of transit traffic was 404,000 tons Southbound and 56,000 tons Northbound.

From an operational viewpoint the above is significant in that no longer will the enemy be able to bring coal into ITALY via SWITZERLAND. There already exists in ITALY an acute coal shortage and according to reliable reports this is affecting operation of the railways.

There is little new information of significance on the enemy overall supply position. With current requirements very low and a brief partial breakdown of rail interdiction, supplies in ITALY may have increased but no major change is likely to have occurred. Reports continue to indicate a rather extensive use of methane as a substitute MT fuel, but attacks are now being made on the methane distribution system which should shortly effectively deny to the enemy this source of fuel. The enemy continues to take material, including foodstuffs, out of ITALY, but the amount must be strictly limited owing to rail interdiction. In connection with the general German food situation it is reported that two million Italian workers and "internees" are returning from GERMANY owing to shortage of food; because of lack of transport they are said to be coming by foot - a long walk!

.....3. WESTERN FRONT.....

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3. WESTERN FRONT

The disintegration of the German Armies in the West has continued all week. For the enemy it has now become a question of offering effective local resistance whenever enough forces can be scraped together, rather than of attempting to build up any sort of coherent continuous front. Two major strategical developments in the enemy situation have occurred during the week. One is the encirclement in the RUHR of Army Group B; the other is the apparent decision to pull out of HOLLAND. The full extent of the disaster which has overtaken Army Group B cannot yet fully be assessed. Probably up to 100,000 men comprising elements of as many as twenty-five different German divisions have been cut off including possibly the Army Group Headquarters and its commander Field Marshal MODEL, branded as a war criminal by the Russians. In HOLLAND there have been clear indications that the enemy is pulling back although there is not yet sufficient evidence to assess the full extent of the withdrawal. If he withdraws at all, it looks as if he must go back to the fortified line of the EMS river. Defences have, it is true, been reported running South Eastwards from the ZUIDER ZEE to ARNHEM. Unless however, the enemy's intention is to hold Western HOLLAND as a fortress, it is unlikely that he will stand on such a line. The present Allied thrust in HOLLAND is in a Northerly direction just West of the German frontier, so that any forces facing Westwards and trying to hold the ARNHEM-ZUIDER ZEE line would already find themselves outflanked. The enemy still disposes of two divisions between ARNHEM and the Dutch coast, while six divisions are in contact between ARNHEM and MUNSTER.

In the central sector of the front it is now possible to see something of the plan KESSELRING adopted to meet the situation arising from the Allied breakthrough. His main object was to hold the flanks of our penetration. Hence the strongest resistance we have encountered has been in the area of ASCHAFFENBURG to the South of the U.S. Third Army's breakthrough, and along the SIEG river on the Northern flank of First U.S. Army's old REMAGEN bridgehead. The former area was held by 2 Mtn and 6 S.S. Mtn Divs, the Northern area by a force which contained the remnants of at least four Panzer divisions and five infantry divisions. Having secured the flanks, it seems probable that KESSELRING hoped to blunt the Allied drive North and N.E. towards PADERBORN and FULDA by shifting the armour on the SIEG river Eastwards and attacking the left flank of the great Allied salient extending up to PADERBORN. On paper it was not a bad plan, as good as could be devised in the circumstances of the moment. On the ground it was completely valueless for although the enemy achieved a measure of relative stability on our flanks at ASCHAFFENBURG and SIEGEN, there were no forces at all to stem or even oppose the Allied forces which covered the 55 miles from North of FRANKFURT to the PADERBORN area in one day. When the enemy eventually attempted to shift his armour Eastward to attack the left flank of our penetration, he only involved himself in worse trouble, for the remnants of the armoured divisions were merely swept aside by the impetus of our advance. Elements of 11 Pz Division were contacted over an area of 60 miles. On the front of one Allied armoured division alone, no less than elements of seven different German divisions were contacted in one day. By this time any hope KESSELRING may have had of carrying out the plan suggested above will have vanished with the link up between Allied forces at LIPPSTADT and our penetration into SIEGEN which has greatly weakened the enemy resistance on our North flank.

In the confusion which is general along the Western Front it is impossible to draw any clear picture of the enemy's present dispositions, certainly on the Central sector of the front. In the South it looks as if the remnants of Army Group G have been pushed Southwards as the result of the Allied breakthrough North and N.E. of FRANKFURT. Indeed one of the reasons for the relatively feeble resistance which the enemy offered in the FRANKFURT sector was that Army Group G, having got its remnants back across the RHINE, was much too far South when the breakthrough occurred to play any effective part in the battle. Of the twenty six divisions originally in Army Group G, twelve have probably been destroyed completely, and of the remainder it is doubtful if more than two are even of average strength. Nevertheless with Army Group B written off as nothing more than a delaying factor to the Allied advance, Army Group G is now probably the stronger of the two Army Groups left to KESSELRING.

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So far as the enemy's prospects of obtaining [illegible] concerned, the situation in the West has changed since last week only in its further deterioration, not in the emergence of any new factors. One new division has been contacted this week, but it was a case of the mountain division coming to Mahomet: 166 Res Division did not come up to the front; the front overran it. Other than this nothing new has appeared. The rail network in Western and N.W. GERMANY during the week has been almost completely dead. The only movement seen was on 30 March when a little traffic was moving West on railways into the RUHR. The journey for which no return tickets were necessary. Moreover, even if there had been no major disaster in the West this Spring it is doubtful whether the enemy would have been able to procure much in the way of replacements from Central GERMANY. Total replacements in the West for February were only 12,000 compared with an average of 30,000 per month over the previous eight months. For March the figure was probably smaller still and perhaps no one will ever know the figure for April. It is no exaggeration to describe the situation as desperate, and there is little KESSELRING can do to remedy it. A situation has arisen where he is Commander in Chief in name only for he has neither a central reserve nor the power to influence the battle decisively by transferring forces from one Army Group sector to another.

4. EASTERN FRONT

EAST PRUSSIA AND EASTERN GERMANY

The fall of DANZIG has been one of the principal events in an extremely quiet week. Enemy resistance in the port proved tough, and according to prisoners, the garrison had received orders from HITLER to hold on to the last. Enemy casualties in killed alone were estimated by the Soviets at 40,000 while 10,000 PW were taken in the town. KÖNIGSBERG remains now the only garrison holding out behind the Northern half of the Eastern Front.

There has been no change on the main front opposite BERLIN. The Commander of 402 Adn Divisional Staff has been captured recently in this sector and states that a number of military schools in POMERANIA have been brought up to the front and incorporated in existing divisions. Further South, Marshal KONIEV has scored two notable successes this week in the reduction of GLOGAU and the capture of RATIBOR. BRESLAU is now the only fortress left in GERMANY behind the Russian rear. The capture of RATIBOR gives the Soviets a road and rail centre of considerable importance for any advance Southwards through the OSTRAVA gap into CZECHOSLOVAKIA. An interesting identification on the First Ukrainian front this week has been that of both regiments of 715 Inf Div (which left ITALY in March) in the area of SORAU (North of GÖRLITZ) on March 27.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY

Although there has been a lull in the fighting in CZECHOSLOVAKIA during the week, Soviet progress in HUNGARY has been such that further German withdrawal from the Slovak salient is now very likely. The enemy still has the tip of his salient based on the High Tatra Mountains and may well be holding this natural defensive position and the Niske Tatry Mountains further South to cover an extensive thinning out.

In HUNGARY it has been a very bad week for the Germans. The Soviet offensive last week extended to the North bank of the DANUBE where MALINOVSKY has made surprisingly rapid progress along the axis of the ESZTERGOM - BRATISLAVA - VIENNA railway. The enemy seems to have been badly disorganised and offered little effective resistance on either the NITRA or VAH rivers. Soviet forces are now some seven miles from BRATISLAVA and only 27 miles from the oil field at ZISTERSDORF (S 63) 30 miles N.E. of VIENNA. This has a maximum annual capacity of 1¼ million tons and following the loss of the NAGYKANIZSA fields becomes an increasingly important factor in the enemy's present oil situation.

....South of the DANUBE....

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South of the DANUBE the Soviets are advancing on two main axes - along the GYOR - VIENNA railway and the SOPRON (X 63) - VIENNA highway. The former thrust is not yet across the Austrian border but the latter has thoroughly pierced the enemy's frontier defence line running from the NEUSIEDLER SEE Southwards through KÖRMEND (C 76) and has led to the fall of WIENER NEUSTADT (X 34). Further South there are some indications that the Russians have effected a deep penetration into the Upper MURA Valley towards GRAZ (B 86). PR of 1 April saw fighting in progress at FELDBACH (C 25), 22 miles East of GRAZ, and on the following day all towns in the area East of GRAZ were seen to be burning, as too was WIENER NEUSTADT. It is clear that the enemy intends to adopt a scorched earth policy in AUSTRIA as he withdraws. Meanwhile South of Lake BALATON the Russians have captured NAGYKANISZA (A 26) and are penetrating into the BUDAFAPUSZTA and LOVASZI oil region. The exact importance of these fields is difficult to assess. By the end of 1943 it is probable that they were producing as much as 1,800,000 tons of crude oil annually. By this year bombing and transportation difficulties will appreciably have reduced output, but they may still have been worth a million tons annual crude oil to the enemy.

A very serious situation with far reaching implications has thus arisen for the enemy. Quite apart from the complete loss of the Hungarian oil fields which may be expected in the coming week, the Soviet advance open up a grave threat to the main supply routes from GERMANY into ITALY. The Russians are now only a few miles from the main railway line South from VIENNA to BRUCK (B 69); if they cut it, all Yugoslav and some of the Italian rail traffic will have to be routed to BRUCK via subsidiary lines West of VIENNA. Moreover if the Russian drive along the MURA Valley continues to make headway there is a likelihood that the Soviets may soon be across the BRUCK-MARIBOR (E 27) railway - the only double track main line into YUGOSLAVIA. Russian progress further West still into the BRUCK - ST. MICHAEL (D 48) area which is now only about 50 miles behind the front would make the use of the North Eastern routes into ITALY extremely difficult for the enemy, especially as Army Group E would be using the VILLACH and KLAGENFURT junctions for its own traffic. An attempt at a stand by the enemy East of BRUCK is therefore likely, but with the defensive positions on the Austrian frontier pierced, it is not thought that the enemy has any prepared defence lines left in AUSTRIA. It is possible that he may try to hold the Russians in the mountainous terrain South of VIENNA then along the FISCHBACHER Alps as far as the MURA river somewhere East of BRUCK, thence Southwards along the MURA river. This would entail the loss of the BRUCK-MARIBOR railway but would keep the Soviets away from the rail junctions at LEOBEN (B 59) and ST. MICHAEL where subsidiary lines from the area West of VIENNA join the VIENNA-KLAGENFURT line.

The only interesting identification reported from HUNGARY this week comes from the Roumanians who place 16 S.S. P.G. Division (ex ITALY) in the area of Army Group South. No location has been reported but it has probably been incorporated into 6 S.S. Pz Army whose Commander Sepp DIETRICH has been entrusted with the defence of VIENNA.

YUGOSLAVIA

The heavy Westward road movement from the SREM reported last week has continued throughout this week. 297 and 11 G.A.F. Divs are reported to be associated with the movement, but it is likely that in fact all the German forces are beginning to thin out from the SREM. The curious thing is that there has been no sympathetic withdrawal from the SARAJEVO salient. It is clear that the thinning out of the SREM front leaves 21 Mtn Corps for the third but undoubtedly the last time in danger of complete isolation from the rest of Army Group E; none the less there are no fresh indications that the enemy is going to abandon SARAJEVO yet.

So far no firm destination is apparent for the troops leaving the SREM apart from the elements of 104 Jg Div which have gone to BELG. On 2 April, the

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trend of of traffic in N.W. YUGOSLAVIA appeared to be generally Northward. At this late stage it is improbable that the enemy will send any forces across the DRAVA or MURA into HUNGARY to support 2 Pz Army. More probably he is trying to build a front along the DRAVA or MURA in anticipation of the Soviet arrival on the North bank.

More of 104 Jg Division from the SREM has arrived in the BIHAC sector this week. The initiative in this area however is still in Partisan hands. They have advanced some 25 miles North of BIHAC along the BIHAC-KARLOVAC (K 25) road and have reached a point 22 miles from KARLOVAC. 373 Germano-Croat Div is reported to have suffered very heavily in the recent battles.

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3 April 1945.

RAILWAYS

BRENNER

The BRENNER railway probably remained blocked all last week though owing to poor flying weather the enemy undoubtedly came very close to getting it open to through trains all the way from VERONA to INNSBRUCK. The bad weather which set in on 26 March continued for three consecutive days during which air operations were severely restricted and no attacks were made on the BRENNER. The weather broke sufficiently on 29 March to permit fighter-bomber attacks on this vital railway, but the medium bombers were unable to attack until the 30th and even then only a limited effort was possible. In fact it was not until 2 April that the mediums were able to put up a good effort against the BRENNER having been forced until then to attack less vital railways as alternate targets. Lack of PR early in the week makes day by day assessment of the status of the BRENNER impossible, but it is clear that interdiction dropped off appreciably; by the end of the week, however, interdiction had been built up again.

The first PR since 25 March was on the morning of the 29th, at which time the line was seen as open from VERONA up to within about 30 Kms of BOLZANO, with the exception of PARONA bridge just North of VERONA, which, however, is confirmed as operational when desired (see below). The block South of BOLZANO on the 29th was between S. MICHELE (A 7837) and ORA (A 9254) at two bridges on the main line and 12 mile loop-line respectively; since photos of the 25th also showed these two bridges as impassable and no attacks were made between the 25th and 29th it is presumed that the BRENNER was continuously blocked at these points. However, it seems curious that at least one of these bridges was not repaired in view of repairs made elsewhere on the BRENNER, and it is suspected that the S. MICHELE main line bridge may be operational when desired; PR of this bridge tends to support this suspicion. In any event it is now known that there is at least one bridge on the BRENNER which is operational when desired. As indicated above this is the PARONA bridge over the ADIGE just North of VERONA at ? 611505; this bridge, twice knocked out by heavy bombers, has been suspect for some time and night photos taken at 2150 hours on 2 April showed the two 60 foot spans, invariably missing on day photos, to be in place and the bridge passable to single line traffic. If the S. MICHELE bridge, like PARONA bridge, was in fact operational when desired the BRENNER was open almost all the way to the Pass for at least part of the time between 25 and 29 March. However, of the three bridges in the area of the Pass itself (one to the South and two to the North) seen as blocked on the 25th, at least one probably remained blocked up until the 28th. Thus, in as much as fighter bomber attacks of the 29th blocked the lower stretches of the BRENNER, it is very unlikely that the line was open throughout, i.e. from VERONA to INNSBRUCK, for more than one day, perhaps two at the most, even if it is assumed that S. MICHELE bridge was operational. In any event the BRENNER has been blocked continuously since the 29th South of BOLZANO and since the 31st North of BOLZANO. On the latest available cover, that of 2 April, the line was seen as cut at four bridges between VERONA and BOLZANO, not including the PARONA bridge which operates at night, and beyond BOLZANO approaches to one bridge just South of the Pass were cut while North of the Pass two bridges were impassable, one with cratered approaches the other very severely damaged.

The two bridges beyond INNSBRUCK, one to the N.W. the other to the N.W. are now known to be passable.

Though the BRENNER may have been blocked to through trains all week, it has shown a great deal of activity. This movement, which has been noted for the most part North of BOLZANO, undoubtedly reflects the movement of

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material along the axis of the railway by means of transhipment. Due to adverse weather conditions, no photo cover was available between 25 and 29 March, but cover on the 29th revealed an unusual amount of movement since the 25th along the entire line, while subsequent daily cover has continued to show considerable activity, and it is evident that the enemy took full advantage of the several days of bad flying weather. No signs of rail troop movement have, however, been picked up. More activity than usual was also noted on the secondary railway running Eastward from the BRENNER at FORTEZZA (W 1802), though this line appears to have been blocked for most of the week.

NORTH EAST ITALY

The rail state in the North East remains highly satisfactory with all routes cut at many points. While PR was not available for several days and it was thought possible that through rail traffic might have been possible from the PO Valley to the UDINE area early in the week, subsequent PR indicates that this is extremely unlikely. That the interdiction has held up, however, is probably largely due to the fact that our rail interdiction effort has been materially assisted by rising rivers which have partially washed out two diversions on the main TREVISO-UDINE line. It is also now evident that beyond UDINE all the frontier routes remain cut. In fact there is evidence to indicate that the enemy has abandoned his effort to keep the TARVISIO route open; four bridges still effectively cut this line. It is interesting to note that progress still continues on the rail diversion around the heavily damaged viaduct at BOROVNICA on the line to LJUBLJANA which was recently seen as 75% complete, though considerable work remains to be done.

Relatively little rail activity is evident in the North East. Although the VERONA-VICENZA-TREVISO line has been in use during the week, no unusual activity has been seen, while the general PADUA-VICENZA-TREVISO area has remained only very moderately active. The main TREVISO-UDINE line has been quiet, as is to be expected in view of the heavy interdiction, while the Central route remains little used. Traffic on the Southern route is still stagnant West of CERVIGNANO (H 4693), but East of the ISONZO River interdictions an unusual amount of rolling stock has arrived on the line going towards TRIESTE.

The main UDINE-TARVISIO frontier route, while it has remained closed to through trains all week, has, like the BRENNER, been quite active both North and South of the belt of interdiction. This activity undoubtedly reflects transhipment around these cuts. The PREDICOLLE and POSTUMIA routes have both been in use though no unusual activity was noticed.

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APPENDIX 'B' TO H.Q. 15 ARMY GROUP
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 68 DATED
3 APRIL, 45

MAAF BOMBERS AID SOVIET ARMIES

The devastating blows which aircraft of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces are striking against the enemy in Southeastern Europe aim at paralyzing rail, road and river traffic carrying troops and supplies to the Wehrmacht on the Red Army fronts. At the same time, crippling blows have been dealt the enemy's few remaining sources of fuel in Austria and Hungary. This article, taken from "15th Air Force - Operations in Southeastern Europe," gives the overall plan behind these attacks.

In November, 1944, the Fifteenth Air Force, realizing that the drive of the Russian armies through Hungary provided an exceptional opportunity to utilize its striking power to prevent the adequate and timely supply, replacement and reinforcement of the defending axis troops south of the TATRA mountains, undertook a detailed analysis of the rail transportation systems in Austria, Western Hungary and Yugo-slavia. A comprehensive photo reconnaissance program was initiated, and the resulting information, combined with reports from ground agents and prisoners of war, had by the end of the year, revealed a reasonably clear picture of the flow of traffic to meet the urgent needs of the hard pressed axis forces in Southeastern Europe.

On 23 December, the Russian High Command requested Strategic bombardment of rail lines leading from the Linz area in Northwestern Austria to Hungary and Yugoslavia, and connecting lines to Northeastern Italy. Plans were made immediately to comply with this request. The rail system analysis showed clearly that no major lines of interdiction, such as the DANUBE or TIZA rivers, existed in Austria or Western Hungary. However, it did seem possible at the appropriate time to sever the rail connections between Yugoslavia and Hungary at the DRAVA river, thus supplementing the isolation of the axis forces in Italy achieved by the Italy-based Tactical Air Force. In view of weather uncertainties and the then relatively light scale of ground activity, it was decided to postpone this program until a time when temporary interdiction by bombardment of bridges would seriously affect the mobility of the enemy forces. Another limitation on the scope of the original plan was the bomb line, which excluded targets in Hungary from strategic attack.

The plan as finally developed involved the immobilization of marshalling and major handling facilities at the rail centers on the main lateral double-track rail line running from VIENNA through WIENER NEUSTADT, BRUCK A.D. MUR, GRAZ and MARIBOR to ZAGREB, from which virtually all lines to the front branch to the East and Southeast; followed by the progressive destruction of supplies, rolling stock and facilities in the rail yards west of this lateral line as military trains backed up following the initial attacks. The execution of this plan was hampered by extremely adverse weather during January, but attacks were made whenever possible. Starting 13 February improved conditions permitted a series of heavy blows which virtually immobilized most of the rail yards from VIENNA to ZAGREB. As had been appreciated, traffic immediately backed up in the LINZ area, where attacks were then commenced. At the same time, occasional attacks on the line connecting BRUCK A.D. MUR with Northeastern Italy served to strain further the enemy's available repair effort and hamper the use of by-pass lines.

As the attacks progressed, certain tactical factors became clear. Interdiction of through lines by bombardment of rail yards was temporary at best. Likewise, destruction of repair facilities caused only inconvenience, as abundant alternative facilities were available in most areas. However, it was soon found that a heavy density of bombs in a crowded yard caused maximum destruction of rolling stock and in many cases immobilized for some time all undestroyed stock.

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Thus, while a through line could generally be put in operation in a few hours, in many cases no substantial amount of rolling stock was moved in or out for one to three weeks. It therefore became the policy of the Air Force to select fleeting targets - the yards most heavily loaded with military supplies as revealed by current daily photography - and to concentrate on each a sufficiently heavy tonnage to immobilize it while the remaining yards in the same system were attacked in similar fashion. Thus, each attack, by restricting handling capacity in the area, automatically tended to set up another good target.

By the end of February, most of the important rail centers in the areas selected had been attacked and their handling facilities severely damaged. The efficient German repair system had been strained too far. Repairs were lagging far behind the damage being caused, and drastic alternatives came into use. Stock piled up in the Hungarian yards east of the main lateral line, with every indication that supplies were being pushed through the blasted belt between LINZ and the Hungarian border, and reclassified into divisional trains in Hungary. At the same time, the Russian High Command requested the attack of the major rail centers along the two main lines running east from VIENNA, north and south of the DANUBE. This request was supplemented on 12 March with the addition of targets in north Yugoslavia and Austria.

Forthwith, a supplemental photo reconnaissance program was initiated, giving almost daily coverage of the Hungarian rail system, and a plan for the immobilization of handling facilities between the VIENNA - ZAGREB line and the front was put into operation. The major portion of this plan has been carried out.

Recent reports indicated that strong formations of axis troops have been moving from Yugoslavia north presumably to join in the German offensive northeast of Lake BALATON. Consequently the DRAVA interdiction program has been put into operation and partially completed by the virtual destruction of the rail bridge at PTUJ and a successful strike at the VARAZDIN yard.

Bombardment was not the only available weapon. The inherent weakness of the German defensive fighter force resulting from the 1944 all out strategic bombing of the fighter aircraft and fuel industries, combined with the committment of the available fighters in the Southeastern area to ground cooperation tasks, reduced the necessity for large scale escort for our bombers and permitted the use of strategic fighters for strafing and dive bombing. The dive bombers have been used to attack pinpoint targets not readily identifiable from high altitude. The strafing plan, carried out in conjunction with virtually every bombing attack, was designed to add to the mounting total of destroyed locomotives and rolling stock, and in addition to achieve a major degree of traffic interdiction by wrecking moving trains at numerous points on the main lines.

Communications were the principal targets. However, attacks on industrial installations contributed materially to the success achieved. In line with strategic bombardment policy, the communications plan was supplemented by attacks on fuel and tank production and storage facilities in Southeastern Europe, which it was clear were producing primarily for the axis troops in that area.

The rich Hungarian oil fields, whose crude oil yields an exceptionally high percentage of gasoline, were still in German hands. Refining capacity in the VIENNA area, including the large new plant at MOOSBIERBAUM, was capable of a monthly output of over 10,000 tons of gasoline, enough to support a substantial scale of effort on the Hungarian plain. During the course of attacks on these plants, intelligence revealed that the modern SZONY and ALMASFUZITO refineries near KOMAROM,

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heavily bombed last year, had been repaired and were capable of substantial production. It seemed probable that these plants, ideally situated near the active front, were processing Hungarian crude oil for the supply of the attacking panzer forces northeast of Lake BALATON. Forthwith they were attacked.

Several large tank depots, repair and production plants had been spotted by photo reconnaissance - notably at VIENNA, whose great arsenal was teeming with tanks, at LINZ and in the KAPFENBURG area. These two felt the destructive weight of aerial bombs, for the Germans could not transport to the front products destroyed before they started.

Thus, the plan has unfolded, always flexible and capable of alternation to fit current intelligence and the enemy's defensive moves, always directed at a single overall objective; to prevent axis men, weapons and supplies from reaching the Russian armies.

(Source MAAF Air Intelligence Weekly Summary No. 123, dated 25 March, 1945).

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 89

OF 9 APRIL, 1945

1. ENEMY SITUATION

On both flanks of the Appennine Line we have in the past week mounted successful limited attacks. The operations on the GARIBALDI Isthmus came to a close on the 4th by which date the whole spit of land South of the Canale VALETTA had been swept clear of the enemy, the total prisoners reaching the figure of 850, of which over half were Germans and the remainder Turkomans. The Northern bank of the Canal is now held for the most part by the Kesselring M.G. Bn 2, with 303 Regt (162 Div) as lay-back along the Adriatic coast to the North. On the 5th, we captured four small islands in the Lagoon which the enemy had used as O.Ps. This resulted in an interesting identification the following day. Three boats put out from COMACCHIO Village to investigate what was going on on the islands, and we captured the crew of one boat, which included three men from 129 Recce Unit as well as a couple of signallers from 162 Div. The first was a somewhat surprising identification, as reports from various ground sources had suggested that 29 P.G. Division had transferred North of the PO in the latter part of March and the first days of April. But the prisoners soon allayed our fears: they said the Recce Bn was about to cross over the river to join the rest of the division which was already North of it, when the plans were changed and it was sent early on the 4th to take up positions along the North shore of the Lake between COMACCHIO Village and the 50 Easting. Although we have no further information the battalion is probably still there as the enemy obviously does not trust the ability of the Turkomans to hold unaided the left flank of the line. An unidentified Italian battalion is reported to be East of the Recce Unit.

Disaster has overtaken another battalion of 42 Div. Having lost the greater part of its Recce Unit in the Spit operations, it has now had III Bn 25 Jaeger Regt cut to pieces by an attack we launched across the RENO in the S.W. corner of the lake. We have advanced some 4,000 yards and pushed the enemy back behind the Navigation Canal between the Lake and the RENO. This attack has brought in about 250 prisoners, nearly all from III Bn, and has forced the rest of 25 Jaeger Regt to pull its main positions back to the SENIO. In the circumstances a prisoner's statement that most of the Field Replacement Bn was due to move into the front line on 8 April is hardly surprising. The enemy shows every sign of nervousness as to our intentions on Route 16 and in the Lake area.

On the rest of the 8 Army front there has been no change in dispositions, and between 42 Div and M. GRANDE the enemy holds with from East to West, 362, 98, 26 Pz, 4 Para, 278 and 1 Para Divs. The first three divisions have each a bn in reserve while 4 Para may have up to two out of the line. There have been plenty of signs of jumpiness on the enemy's part along the SENIO and prisoners say that they have been warned to expect operations to start any moment. They also say that divisions have been on continuous alert since about the 2 April. On the night of the 6th the enemy was particularly windy and put down heavy defensive fire and counter-battery fire both North and South of Route 9. This same apprehension has already been noted on 334 Div front, while reports from N.E. ITALY bring further confirmation that steps are being taken to meet an expected Allied landing there.

South of BOLOGNA prisoners taken on the 910 Easting from I Bn 147 G.R. provide further evidence of 65 Division's extension Eastwards to relieve the right hand regt of 305 Div which in turn took over from 4 Para Regt on M. GRANDE.

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Confirmation is still lacking that 4 Para Regt is on the SENIO under command 4 Para Div, but as it has not reappeared on 1 Para Div's sector its reported move Eastwards may well be true. There is clearly considerable reorganisation going on in the parachutist divisions. Prisoners from 12 Para Regt stated that III Bn had left about three weeks ago for Northern ITALY to provide a nucleus for a new division, and it is reported that the other two regiments also had to give up a battalion. Ground sources have reported movement of parachutists Northwards towards the PO and in one case stated that three trainloads arrived in INNSBRUCK over the BRENNER from ITALY. At the same time we have received reports of parachutists arriving in ITALY, and the only reasonable deduction is that 1 Para Corps has had to give up some of its seasoned warriors in exchange for recruits. Exactly to what extent that has affected the fighting quality and strength of 1 and 4 Para Divs it is too early to say.

West of 65 Div, identifications yesterday of 1057 Recce Unit and 296 Mtn Regt show that 157 Mtn Div is unchanged, and 94 Div to its right is still believed to be on an extended front across the RENO Valley. The third regiment of 334 Div (755 G.R.) is still unidentified but it has not taken over any part of 114 Div's sector. The latter division has at the moment three battalions forward on a 4,500 yard front (114 Recce Unit and I and II Bns 741 Jaeger Regt) while two independent sources place the other regt (721) between SASSUOLO (L 4455) and MODENA where it is said to be reforming with recently arrived replacements. 232 Div, West of 114 Div, is still believed to be reduced to two regiments of two bns each, persistent reports having come in that 1043 G.R. has been dissolved.

On the night of 4th April we launched an attack against 148 Div in the Coastal Plain forward of MASSA and along the high ground overlooking it. M. CARCHIO P 9501 was captured the following day, from where we exploited to seize M. BELVEDERE (P 9401) against strong opposition. At the same time our forces in the Plain had advanced their positions astride Route 1 to within 2 miles of MASSA. By the 8th MONTIGNOSO was in our hands and we had reached the outskirts of MASSA, and that night troops in the plain withdrew behind the FRIGIDO River. This operation has so far brought in about 400 prisoners. Opposition was entirely by German units - 281 G.R. and I Bn 285 G.R. - reinforced on the 7th by the Kesselring M.G. Bn No.1. which came down from the SPEZIA area. Otherwise there has been no important reaction to our attack.

If our interpretation of agents reports is correct there is now only one mobile division left in reserve South of the PO - 90 P.G. Div - of which we have heard very little apart from one report that troops of the division are immediately West of BOLOGNA astride Route 9. Following the move reported last week of a regimental group of 29 P.G. Div into the area N.W. of ROVIGO, one source has told us that the Divisional H.Q. was to move on the night 2/3 April to BONDENO, a route followed by other units of the division crossing the PO. Since then agents have reported movement of troops in considerable numbers N.E. as far as PIAVE River (29 P.G. Div is not specifically associated with these troops but from the reports a motorised formation appears involved) while one source has gone a step further and said that troops of 29 P.G. Div which staged in the area MERLARA F 9822 - MONTAGNANA G 0130 about 24 March, continued on toward TARVISIO. We have however, still no firm evidence that 29 P.G. Div is leaving ITALY, and the only other explanation for its move must be a very real fear of an Allied seaborne landing in the Northern Adriatic. Ground reports bear out that the enemy is particularly sensitive to this threat and is at the moment putting into effect anti-invasion preparations. For the present therefore, 29 P.G. Division is carried North of the PO, its exact location unknown but suspected to be N.E. of ADRIA. Its Recce Unit has remained behind and it is possible that some of its armour has also not crossed the PO.

The departure of 29 P.G. Div on the eve of 8 Army's attack is most opportune for us. VIETINGHOFF, who is believed to be C in C South West, has now to make a ticklish decision. Is he justified in assuming that no landing will in fact take place and that the whole weight of 15 Army Group is to be thrown against his forces South of the PO, or must he wait a few days to find out whether the 8 Army attack is not merely meant to distract his reserves? Having moved 29 P.G. all the way by road, a costly incursion into his limited petrol resources, he may well

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hesitate to rush it down South of the river straightaway. One way or another the choice is a gamble, and a faulty decision may jeopardise his forces South of the PO.

Nearer at home the enemy is faced with much the same decision in respect to 90 P.G. Division. Is he to commit the whole division against 8 Army thus leaving no mobile reserve opposite 5 Army? If the battle goes right for us he is almost certain to have to send at least a regimental battle group across to the SANTERNO. Immediate reinforcements for the threatened sector are otherwise limited to battalions or even regiments which might be withdrawn from quiet parts of the line to stiffen resistance at the key points. Parachutists are likely candidates for such a rôle. One thing seems clear, there is no sign that the enemy intends to fight a delaying action and withdraw across the PO. He appears to have committed himself to another battle of attrition, along the lines of those we have previously met in ITALY, and he will only withdraw under pressure. Once again he hopes to be able to wear down our attack and finally bring our offensive to a halt. If he fails he risks the major part of his Armies South of the PO.

2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

During the past week the rail situation has remained difficult for the enemy. No through trains have moved over the BRENNER and all three of the North East frontier routes have remained cut. Interdiction between the PADUA-VICENZA area and UDINE has held up during the entire week, though repair activity seems to be making some progress here. All rail bridges as far West as PAVIA remain cut on the PO river where ferries and pontoon bridges continue to be active. Night photos showed the pontoon bridge at POLESELLA (M 2299) completely assembled on two nights out of the four it was covered. North of the PO interdiction in the plain remains effective though the important lines leading South from VERONA to OSTIGLIA and ROVIGO are still open. South of the PO attacks by both medium and fighter-bombers have blocked some of the lines leading into the general area of BOLOGNA.

The BRENNER railway has been blocked throughout the week under continuous attacks by heavy, medium and fighter-bombers and high water in the ADIGE river has been slowing up repair activity. (See Appendix 'A' for effect of recent high water-levels on enemy communications). Photos of 8 April showed the BRENNER to be cut at no less than fourteen points, the majority of these cuts being the result of that day's attacks. Interdiction extends as far North as the VIPITENO bridge about 15 rail kilometres South of the frontier. Most of these cuts are cratered tracks and bridge approaches, but three bridges are down on the main line and an additional two bridges block the ORA - S. MICHELE diversion South of BOLZANO. If weather conditions were to prevent further attacks on the BRENNER (this is highly improbable), it is thought that the existing interdiction would prevent through traffic till 11 or 12 April. On the TRENTO - CASTELFRANCO loop line the CISMON bridges (B 2407) remain cut while further North the line running Eastward from the BRENNER at FORTEZZA has been impassable all week by virtue of the damaged bridge at PERCA (W 4608) as well as the cut approaches to the OB DRAUBURG bridge (C 2295).

Activity on the BRENNER railway has been moderate with movement decreasing towards the end of the week in inverse proportion to increasing rail cuts. TRENTO continues to be one of the more active stations while ORA and BOLZANO have also shown a fair turnover. Practically all of the smaller stations have shown at least some increase or decrease during the week, undoubtedly reflecting localised movement. North of BOLZANO the tempo of activity seems to have definitely decreased as compared to previous weeks. It is believed that no large turnover has been taking place on the BRENNER for a considerable period though it is of interest to note that whereas in February rolling stock between inclusive BOLZANO and exclusive VERONA totalled about 1,500 wagons, this increased during March to between 3,000 to 3,500 and the average so far for April is roughly the same.

In the N.E. rail activity has been on an extremely small scale. Between the PADUA and UDINE areas little movement has been noted and both the POSTUMIA and PIEDICOLLE frontier routes appear to be relatively inactive. On the

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TARVISIO route however definite signs of activity have been noted. On 8 April a number of apparent troop train lengths including about 50 flats loaded with MT or HDV and equipment were seen in UDINE and on the following day at least some of these were picked up further to the North on a point not far South of the TARVISIO route interdiction belt. This strongly suggests that troops are moving out of North East ITALY by way of the TARVISIO route but it is too early as yet to state how many troops may be involved.

With the railways disrupted and MT fuel in short supply it is considered that the enemy in ITALY faces our Spring offensive with a vulnerable administrative position. No early collapse is expected by reason of lack of supplies, but it is expected that with rising supply demands appreciable difficulty in moving the necessary tonnage to meet battle requirements will develop.

For the past eight months the German Command in ITALY has done everything in its power to cut down on the consumption of petrol and diesel, both by the use of substitute fuels, heavy reliance on horse-drawn transport, movement of troops on foot and other varied economy measures. However, the continual dislocation of the railways during the past several months has nevertheless forced him to use a large number of MT. It is also known that for some time no major MT fuel reserves have existed in North ITALY. These facts coupled with the overall German fuel position and air attacks on fuel dumps and production centres in ITALY are believed to have reduced fuel stocks in North ITALY to a critical level.

Since 1 April our aircraft have been paying considerable attention to the enemy's substitute fuel sources. Attacks have been carried out against oil and gas fields, and methane compressor plants in the PIADENA-PIACENZA area and the ROVIGO-FERRARA area. The attacks on compressor plants have destroyed at least four and done considerable damage to others. A methanol plant near BOLZANO and a sugar refinery in the ADRIA (G 4508) area, believed to be producing alcohol, were also attacked with good results during the past week.

As regards ammunition the enemy is very much better off than he is for MT fuel. There are a relatively large number of ammunition dumps both North and South of the river PO and the enemy has been making use of Italian production facilities. Furthermore during the past few months his expenditure has been negligible so that while it is not thought that he has built up large ammunition reserves he now does probably have in North ITALY about a month's supply of ammunition for hard fighting. Distribution, however, to meet the demands of heavy fighting is likely to be affected by the shortage of MT fuel.

A report from a usually reliable source states that since March 1944 all rations for the German forces in ITALY have been drawn from Italian resources. These supplies are normally requisitioned by the Republican Government but major German formations are in the habit of taking direct action to ensure their own ration supply by commandeering what they need and German units on the move are in the custom of requisitioning as they go. In addition to the regular consignments of foodstuffs supplied by the Republican Government for shipment to GERMANY, the Germans have in the last two months alone carried off from the PO Valley 100,000 tons of corn, 50,000 head of cattle and large quantities of pork and fats.

3. WESTERN FRONT

The enemy's efforts to stabilise the front in the West have enjoyed little more success this week. Such slowing down as has occurred in the Allied advance has been in the main due to factors other than enemy resistance. Only in limited sectors has KESSELRING been able to build up any sort of coherent front and even there the structure is flimsy and liable to topple quickly under pressure.

Such a sector is that part of Army Group G's front covering STUTTGART and NURNBERG. The original plan of Army Group G after the initial Allied breakthrough in the FRANKFURT sector was probably to build up a front based on the MAIN, the ODENWALD and the NECKAR, with the main defensive effort at ASCHAFFENBURG. Apart from some strong resistance at ASCHAFFENBURG itself this plan proved completely

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beyond the enemy's resources, and KESSELRING had to resort to a modified version of the original plan. Scraping together all the elements and remnants of the Army Group's weakened divisions, he tried and to some extent succeeded in establishing a coherent, if not a stable front, covering STUTTGART and NÜRNBERG. Elements of sixteen divisions have been identified between KARLSRUHE and WÜRZBURG. The state of some of these is shown by the fact that 47 Volksgrenadier Division last week had three other divisions under command. The main weight of Army Group G is now concentrated in the area North of STUTTGART where we have encountered moderate to heavy resistance this week. Heavy fighting is however the one thing which the enemy must avoid and already there are signs that he is paying the price for his brief moment of coherent battle. To the East of HEILBRONN the front has once more sagged and we have advanced 25 miles to capture the road junction of CRAILSHEIM. In the KARLSRUHE region too, resistance is less stiff and we have penetrated into PFORZHEIM. A document captured on Army Group G front this week is of some interest. It is dated March 26th and is an authorisation from 11 SS Pz Army at NÜRNBERG for Ersatz Bns of 9 and 12 SS Pz Divs going to 17 SS P.G. Division to draw fuel on the way. This is the first identification of 11 SS Pz Army. Its function is not wholly clear, for it is certainly not operational, nor would there at the present time appear to be need for a further Army headquarters on any front. Its interest in Ersatz Bns may imply some connection with the handling of replacements while its location in Southern GERMANY might have some bearing on recent reports of S.S. troops arriving in the National Redoubt. In this connection a statement by a PW in the GOTHA area may be relevant. He says that on 31 March all higher headquarters in the GOTHA and OHRDRUF areas were ordered to move South to join the Wehrmacht Führungstab in the KIRCHTASGADEN area.

On the front that used to be Army Group B's responsibility before the latter's unfortunate isolation in the RUHR pocket, enemy resistance continues to be disorganised. Only in the KASSEL area where 166 Res Div made ineffectual but determined efforts to break through to the RUHR pocket, has there been any semblance of organised opposition. Otherwise resistance has been offered by the now conventional assortment of Homeguard, NCO's schools and other miscellany which have so far not been given the usual formality of a divisional number. There are some indications that sterner stuff may be on the way however. A prisoner has said 18 SS P.G. Division is coming up to the Western Front from the East and there is some support for this from the trend of rail movement in Central and West Central GERMANY. Moderate loadings were apparent in the BERLIN area on 6 April, while nearer the Western Front, considerable activity was seen on the GÖTTINGEN and NORDHEIM yards West of LEIPZIG. The only identification so far on the ground is one regiment of 356 Inf Div in the GOTHA area. This should be treated with reserve as a second regiment of 356 Div was identified in the VIENNA area on 4 April. Nevertheless some fresh arrivals may be expected on the Central sector during the week.

North of KASSEL and as far over as the line of the ISSEL river in HOLLAND, the enemy completely lacks the initiative and is at present in no position to recover it. Our most rapid advances have been in the direction of BREMEN and HANNOVER but good progress has also been made in HOLLAND between the EMS and IJSSEL rivers. Further West the enemy has offered stubborn resistance along the IJSSEL line to our attempts at pushing Westwards into Western HOLLAND. It is too early yet to say that a decision has been made to hold Western HOLLAND as a fortress. However a certain amount of reorganising and incorporation of administrative units into divisional frameworks is at present in progress in Western HOLLAND, and at this late stage it is unlikely that the enemy would follow such a course of action unless he intended to hold at least the ports of Western HOLLAND as fortresses.

Two interesting identifications are reported from HOLLAND this week. The Dutch S.S. Division is now known to be 34 S.S. Div, while PW have been taken from a regiment of 11 Para Div, the first identification of this formation on the ground. It is interesting that one PW taken in HOLLAND this week said he belonged to a Division GERICKE. GERICKE was commander of 11 Para Regt in ITALY and is thought to have left ITALY fairly recently, possibly to take charge of the setting up of 11 Para Div.

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In the RUHR pocket, on the basis of identifications during the past week it now seems unlikely that more than twenty divisions are isolated. The bulk of the armour consisting of four Panzer divisions plus an armoured brigade has been concentrated in the N.E. corner of the pocket and initially made determined efforts to break out. With the failure of the attacks, and the consequent abandonment of all hope of escape, the enemy has gone back on to the defensive and his resistance appears to be weakening slightly although he still maintains a coherent front and is making a fight for every inch of ground gained.

To sum up, the events of this week have clearly shown that the enemy is still unable effectively to build up and maintain a coherent front line. There are however at last indications that forces are being transferred to the Western Front from the East. Whether they will arrive in time and in adequate quantities to stabilise the front is questionable. What is beyond doubt however is that this is a policy of despair. Not only is it a confession that KESSELRING is at the end of his resources, it is an illustration of the desperate shortage of available reserves that the only source apparently capable of assisting the Western Front is the inadequately held East Front. The enemy's policy cannot even be described as one of buying time, since it is too late now for forces transferred from East to West to have any decisive effect on the Western battle, and the only effect thinning out from the Eastern Front is likely to have is to precipitate the final Russian assault.

4. EASTERN FRONT

EAST PRUSSIA AND EASTERN GERMANY

In East PRUSSIA the Russians have captured the fortress of KÖNIGSBERG. The attack was launched on 8 April after a three hour artillery barrage and met at first considerable opposition from the extensive belt of fortifications around the town which includes 13 large forts. The reduction of the fortress was however completed within 36 hours.

North of GDYNIA, Soviet forces have cleared the last pocket of enemy resistance in POLAND, a small group of which was holding out on the TUNZINGER WICK.

The rest of the front has been quiet apart from considerable enemy air activity against Soviet troop concentrations in the KUSTRIN area, which suggests some enemy nervousness about the progress of the Russian build-up in this area.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY

This week the enemy has started pulling back the flank of his long salient in SLOVAKIA without apparently being unduly troubled by Soviet pressure. It is not clear whether the HIGH TATRA mountains are still in enemy hands: in any case he must soon abandon them in view of his withdrawals West of the HIGH TATRA along the ORAV and NITRA Valleys. Further West the Soviet advance along the North bank of the DANUBE has led to a further crossing of the post-MUNICH Czech border in the BRATISLAVA-TRNAVA region. Both the latter towns have fallen to MALINOVSKY's forces who have now cut the VIENNA-BRNO railway N.W. of BRATISLAVA. So far as can be seen the Second Ukrainian Army Group is advancing in two main directions. One force is pushing Northwards along the BRATISLAVA-BRNO railway towards BRNO, making slow progress in difficult country and against tough resistance. A second force North of the DANUBE is attacking due West towards VIENNA and has linked up with the Third Ukrainian Army Group in the VIENNA region.

South of the DANUBE, the main Russian thrust has been in the direction of VIENNA and has outflanked the capital by a drive which has reached the DANUBE N.W. of the city. It seems clear that the enemy is resolved to let VIENNA share the same fate as BUDAPEST, although the Russians are making

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such satisfactory headway that this plan may be frustrated. 6 S.S. Pz Army is believed to be defending the capital with the assistance of elements of the 6th Army which includes 356 Inf Div identified in the VIENNA region this week.

Further South the Russian thrust down the RABA Valley towards BRUCK has not developed during the week although South of the river some progress has been made in the high ground East of the FISCHBACHER Alps. It seems evident as was suggested in last week's Summary that the enemy will attempt to hold us in the high terrain covering BRUCK (B 69), GRAZ and MARIBOR (E 27). 2 Pz Army is now right across the Yugoslav frontier and appears to be falling back to the DRAVA river as no attempt was made at a stand on the MURA river South and S.W. of MAGYARMISZA. The Russians supported by Bulgarian forces have in fact established a bridgehead over the DRAVA near the confluence of the DRAVA and MURA rivers. However the Soviets have in the past been noticeably reluctant to operate in the area South of the DRAVA and may be content to leave operations here in the hands of the Bulgars while they concentrate on the situation in Eastern AUSTRIA.

YUGOSLAVIA

The tempo of the enemy withdrawal has quickened as the enemy situation deteriorates in AUSTRIA and HUNGARY. The heavy Westward road movement from the SREM has continued all the week and there can be little doubt that the enemy will soon have to abandon this area completely. Meanwhile the thinning out on this front had by last week reached a stage where the enemy forces further South in the SARAJEVO salient stood in serious danger of isolation from the rest of Army Group E, and on the morning of 5 April the last German forces pulled out of SARAJEVO. Considerable damage was done to enemy traffic moving Northwards along the SARAJEVO-BROD road and it is likely that XXI Mtn Corps will have no easy passage back North. As the road bridges at both ZENICA (H 12) and BROD have been destroyed considerable bottlenecks are likely to arise in the course of the withdrawal.

In N.W. YUGOSLAVIA the Yugoslav offensive is making rapid headway. Last week another important enemy base - GOSPIC (F 05) fell to the Yugoslavs who are now advancing along the GOSPIC-SENJ road towards the Adriatic coast. A second Partisan force advancing along the West road has captured KARLOBAG (0 85) and is reported to be 12 miles due South of SENJ. On 4 April the Yugoslavs with Allied artillery, air and naval support, landed on PAG island, opposite KARLOBAG and in an extremely successful operation cleared all enemy from the island within 48 hours.

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APPENDIX 'A' TO 15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 89 DATED 9 APRIL, 1945

THE EFFECTS OF RECENT HIGH WATER LEVEL ON ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS

The recent high water level reached by many of the rivers and streams in North ITALY has joined MTAF in further disrupting enemy communications. This assistance, not totally unexpected, has been manifested in two forms, namely the destruction of existing bridges, diversions, and roads, and the hindering of repairs to already damaged lines and structures. Two outstanding examples of the former can be seen in damage inflicted upon the NERVESA (G 6493) and CITTADELLA (G 2373) rail diversions.

The diversion at NERVESA, an important rail crossing over the PIAVE river, was severely damaged when the swollen current washed several spans away and undermined and destroyed much of the fill embankment.

Night photographs of CITTADELLA taken on the 29th of March showed that the rising of the BRENTA river had inundated approximately 400' of the existing rail diversion, swept away part of the diversion under construction, and almost completely submerged the road diversion to the North. Photographs taken after the water had receded showed 250' - 260' of the existing diversion completely washed away and another 100' damaged by the current. Fifty feet of the new uncompleted diversion had been destroyed and the road diversion cut and left partially submerged.

Other interesting examples include the road diversions at CASARSA, which had about 1,000' of its length submerged by high water, and at PONTE DI PIAVE, where a smaller section was also under water when last photographed.

Although the extent to which repairs have been retarded cannot be gauged, it is very probable that high water has created a difficult soil condition on the sites of certain damaged rail bridges and fills on the BRENNER route, and retarded repairs which were underway. The situation was probably aggravated by the fact that in performing quick repair jobs the enemy has not always provided adequate drainage facilities at the repair sites. Considerable difficulty has apparently been encountered by repair crews at the SAN MICHELE (A 8141) rail diversion bridge, and at ROVERETO (A 6903). In other cases, such as MONTEBELLO (F 9755), where repairs were underway, water has backed up on the formerly dry river bed and hindered repair crews working on the base of a new pier.

Although unfavourable weather at the end of March grounded many of our medium fighter-bombers thus preventing our customary strikes against enemy communications, the high water which occurred during this period certainly had somewhat of a compensating effect.

(SOURCE: 3 PRS Interpretation Report 3DS 137)

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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 90

OF 17 APRIL, 1945

1. ENEMY SITUATION

GENERAL

The Allied spring offensive has started inauspiciously for Army Group C. Since the beginning of the month VIETINGHOFF, confirmed by a captured document as successor to KESSELRING as C in C South West, has lost close on 10,000 prisoners (6,000 of whom have fallen to 8 Army in the last eight days), at least four of his divisions have been badly cut up (148, 42 Jaeger, 98 and 362) and he has been forced to dig into his meagre reserve and commit both 29 P.G. and 90 P.G. Divisions. At the time of going to press 10 Army is being pushed relentlessly back to the IDICE river line while on the 14 Army front after two days of very stubborn fighting the enemy suddenly cracked yesterday on the right wing of 94 Div and we have now advanced rapidly along the mountain ridge West of the RENO to capture M. MOSCOSO L 6935. On the West coast what started out as a minor attack has developed into a very successful operation leading to the capture of CARRARA, and we are still on the move. Only immediately South of BOLOGNA where an attack yesterday made very little progress, has the enemy any solid grounds for satisfaction. Nor can the successful development of operations for the Allies be ascribed to any sudden break in enemy morale, due to the disaster on the Western Front: the enemy has fought hard and at times desperately and the only difference between his fighting spirit today and that of last May is that when cut off or threatened with being cut off the German soldier surrenders more easily. War weariness and a sense of the futility of the struggle against overwhelming material superiority lead him to give in more readily, but it would be dangerous to see in this any sign of an imminent collapse in morale. As has been pointed out so often the divisions in ITALY represent some of the best troops left in the German Army, and while they have weapons and ammunition to fire we must expect no easy victory. They are likely to fight with what KESSELRING in his last Order of the Day called the "old unbowed bearing of the German troops in ITALY".

EIGHTH ARMY MAIN FRONT

Our attack on the SENIO came as no surprise to the enemy. The troops in 76 Pz and 1 Para Corps had been alerted since the beginning of the month, and a renewal of the offensive from the CASTEL D'ALANO sector was expected. On both coastal flanks the anti-invasion scare has been in full swing: all troops along the Ligurian coast were alerted in the first week of April, and in the Northern Adriatic the enemy was so sensitive that he considered it necessary to move 29 P.G. Div North across the PO into the PADUA area. The weight of our attack, preceded by carpet bombing by heavies in the immediate rear of the front line and supported by a concentrated artillery bombardment and by extensive use of flamethrowers, shook the troops which bore the brunt of our attack. For the third time in the last seven months 98 Inf Div, a Crimean veteran, has been badly cut up. On the evening of the 9th we seized a considerable bridgehead West of COTIGNOLA on the front of 289 G.R. and 290 G.R., and another one N.E. of LUGO in the 362 Div sector. Some 700 prisoners were taken in the first 12 hours. Meantime our Southernmost assault was meeting very stubborn resistance from 26 Pz Div North of Route 9. By the afternoon of the 10th FUSIGNANO, LUGO and COTIGNOLA were clear and that evening we had reached the SANTERNO on a 3½ mile front. By then 98 and 362 Divs had each lost some 600 prisoners. 26 Pz Div continued to fight fiercely, but in the

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bulge South of IMOLA the enemy began to withdraw as early as the night 10/11th. This was a notable step because a year ago the parachutists would certainly have held on to their positions considerably longer and not withdrawn till the last moment. But on this occasion the enemy changed his policy and the reason is clear - by pulling back in the bulge the enemy could find much needed reinforcement for the main battle area. That is in effect what happened and 278 Div was squeezed out between 1 and 4 Para Divs and by the evening of the 12th was already largely in reserve. By the 14th it was again in the line having relieved 98 Div astride the MEDICINA-MASSA LOMBARDA railway opposite the bridgeheads we had by then seized over the SILLARO river. Withdrawal to the SILLARO, carried out on the 13th, had been forced on the enemy by his failure to drive in our bridgeheads over the SANTERNO: in the resulting confusion we were able to get a tenuous foothold on the West bank of the SILLARO. Even the arrival of a fresh formation (278 Div) failed to reduce our hold and bitter counter-attacks against our bridgeheads all morning on the 14th met with no more success than previous attempts to drive us back over the SANTERNO.

THE ARGENTA GAP

Meantime at the Northern end of the line amphibious operations across the COMACCHIO Lake were started on the 11th, where we landed near MENATE M 4158 and quickly pushed inland to capture some 200 PW from 42 Jaeger Div. At this time the enemy was already withdrawing voluntarily from the ALFONSINE sector. Starting on the 12th 42 Div began to pull back its forces into the ARGENTA Gap, the name given to the narrow strip of land astride Route 16, with flooded areas to East and West. 42 Div offered stubborn resistance in this withdrawal, especially at FILO M 3557, while troops of the division were engaged in heavy fighting for the BANDO bridge M 3362 near which we made another landing on the 13th. The fighting for this bridge continued for three days and it was not captured till early on the 17th. It was near here that the first prisoners were taken from 29 P.G. Div on the 13th. All six infantry battalions of this division have now been identified in the ARGENTA Gap, as well as the Recce Unit. It is known from prisoners' statements that I Bn 15 P.G.R. did not leave the PADUA area till the evening of the 11th while other units of the division are believed to have come from further North-east. The division has taken over the ARGENTA area allowing at least part of the battered 42 Div (it has lost 1,400 prisoners) to join 362 Div in the marshy ground West of Route 16. Against stubborn opposition we have made good progress in the Gap. ARGENTA was captured tonight and our troops have crossed the MARINA Canal. We are now up against the Genghis Khan position at its Northeastern extremity and the enemy cannot fail to be anxious lest we should break through at this point towards FERRARA, thus threatening all his forces South of the PO. 29 P.G. Div is likely therefore to get assistance from 42 Div and if needed from one of the divisions refitting (98 Div or 26 Pz).

THE IDICE LINE

Immediately West of Route 16 is an area of floods, extending as far over as the 10 Easting and garrisoned at present by 362 Div and elements of 42 Div - both divisions badly knocked about but still able to hold a sector which is unlikely to see heavy fighting. From MEZZOLARA M 0758 to Route 9 the Genghis Khan Line follows the IDICE River and defences have been well developed. Having been pushed back off the SILLARO and across the MEDICINA Canal (in the process of which the infantry of 26 Pz Div were squeezed out into reserve between 278 Div and 4 Para) the enemy is tonight back on the GAIANA River from the marshes South to Route 9. Although the enemy will continue to offer stubborn resistance on the canals forward of the IDICE it is doubtful if he can now make a determined stand till he reaches the IDICE itself. To hold the line between MEZZOLARA and Route 9

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S.E. of BOLOGNA he will have 278 Div (at the moment being cut up and having already lost 600 prisoners), 4 Para Div, 1 Para Div and 305 Div, the latter anchoring the III CE position on to the defences South of BOLOGNA. The only other reserve available is either 98 Inf or 26 Pz Div so that the enemy will have none too many troops to hold this last line covering the city. True, he has two untouched Parachutist Divisions, but both have recently had to give up fairly large drafts of trained personnel, which will inevitably affect to some extent their fighting quality.

FIFTH ARMY MAIN FRONT

South of BOLOGNA there has been little change. 305 Div has been unaffected by the offensive, but to its West 65 Div was involved in an attack launched by us yesterday morning. It resisted very strongly and we made only small gains. On its right it is now known that 157 Mtn Div has been renumbered 8 Mtn Div for some reason best known to the German Command. Only the Western wing of the division has so far been drawn into the battle, where we have captured M. SOLE L 7829 and M. RUMICI L 8428 from 296 G.R. after encountering very extensive minefields. Early on the 14th, 5 Army attacked North from CASTEL D'AIANO. Heavy opposition was encountered all day from 334 Div but by the evening we had pushed forward 2 Kms, while on the 94 Div front we had entered the Southern outskirts of VERGATO. To the West 114 Div was driven out of MONTESE. All the following day very bitter fighting raged with 334 Div and 94 Div, with heavy casualties to both sides. But on the 16th the right wing of 94 Div collapsed and capturing TOLE L 6530 we advanced rapidly N.E. to reach M. MOSCOSO L 6935 early next morning. Here prisoners were taken from 190 Recce Unit, and later in the day II Bn 361 F.G.R. was identified some 3,000 yards to the West at S. PROSPERO L 6634. Despite the deteriorating situation East of BOLOGNA the enemy had stolidly refused to move 90 P.G. Division from the area IMOLA-FAENZA, where it had been placed in evident anticipation of a renewal of the 5 Army attack. In view of the heavy losses suffered by 334 and 94 Divs it is not surprising therefore that 90 P.G. should move down to assist, apparently coming into the line between the two of them. Operations on this front have now resulted in the capture of VERGATO and progress has been made up the West bank of the RENO as far as the 30 Northing, while striking N.E. from TOLE Allied troops are tonight reported to have reached M. TRAMONIO L 7434. N.W. of CASTEL D'AIANO 334 Div still holds M. RIGHETTI L 6029 where 754 G.R., the Westernmost Regt has been [illegible] attack. In the MONTESE area there has been little further activity. The enemy now has both 232 and 114 Divs sitting in the mountains off the main axis of our attack, and since reinforcements will be badly needed soon between the SAMOGGIA and RENO rivers, we may expect to see some thinning out from their sectors West of M. BELVEDERE. 721 Jaeger Regt (114 Div) which has been resting for a month may well reappear South of CASTELFRANCO. Total prisoners in the 5 Army attack so far is believed to be about 2,000.

WEST COAST

On the West coast we have now captured some 1,400 prisoners since 5 April when operations started. On the 11th Partisans captured CARRARA and our troops advancing from MASSA linked up with them the same day. Since then enemy resistance has been scrappy, despite the despatch of a battalion of 90 P.G. Div (I Bn 361 F.G.R.) which came down to counter-attack on 13 April and lost some 40 prisoners. We are now some 8 - 10 Kms beyond CARRARA due East of SARZANA and just short of FOSDINOVO P 8112; further inland we are on TOMMGGIORA P 8514. 148 Div has taken a bad knock, despite the assistance of various units [illegible] - the M.G. Bn Kesselring 1, 4 High Mtn Bn, I Bn 361 F.G.R., and I Bn 286 G.R. (brought from the SERCHIO Valley). There are now signs that the Italians in the SERCHIO Valley are beginning to thin out, and their front may well be pulled back to conform with the present line on the coast.

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ENEMY RESERVES

The enemy situation is becoming critical. Within eight days of the start of the Allied offensive both reserve divisions have been committed and in exchange the enemy has only managed to withdraw from the line one battered division (98 Div) and one wounded division (26 Pz). Both are held at the moment opposite 8 Army, where they are probably absorbing replacements from the divisional replacement battalions which were believed to be up to strength before the battle. They are unlikely then to be out of the line for long. Apart from divisional replacement units there appears to be no immediate sign of any further reinforcement for the main front. Both 5 Mtn and 34 Divs are probably fully occupied in Western ITALY, particularly following the start of a French offensive over the Alps, and in N.E. ITALY there are only 155 Div and 710 Div available. Fear of an Allied landing must retain at least one there, while recent photo cover has noted troop movement over the TARVISIO route from the UDINE Plain so that it is possible that either or both of these divisions are being called on to provide units for the Austrian front. In other words, 8 Army has to be held on the IDICE with the enemy's present resources, and now that 90 P.G. Div has been committed West of BOLOGNA the enemy can only draw on units from unaffected parts of the line to hold off 5 Army from the Plain.

ENEMY POLICY

If VIETINGHOFF persists in his present policy of trying to wear down our attacks he must accept heavy losses with the prospect, should he fail to halt us, of being so crippled as to be unable to withdraw his armies intact across the PO. The alternative is to decide now, for time is short, on a fighting withdrawal to the PO. Such a decision would be contrary to previous policy, and its implementation will depend primarily on whether the German Command merely intends to stand and fight to the last man, or whether it will disregard prestige (which could not matter less at this stage of the war) and try to withdraw Army Group C North of the PO, possibly with an eye to employing it in the Redoubt. Supply problems and petrol shortage may influence the decision, especially if we are to believe a normally reliable ground source that the enemy has only sufficient petrol to get 10 and 14 Armies to VERONA and Army Liguria to BRESCIA. Other agents report several high powered meetings early this month, at one of which, attended by VIETINGHOFF and MUSSOLINI, it was decided to withdraw to the ADIGE. This report is completely without confirmation from other sources but we cannot ignore it entirely as a withdrawal is an enemy capability. At present the enemy's policy continues to be one of fighting hard for every feature and every delaying position. The next few days should show whether he intends to alter that policy, or fight it out to the finish.

2 ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

There has been no radical change in the overall rail picture in enemy occupied ITALY during the past week. Although close support targets in connection with the ground offensive have greatly reduced the medium and fighter bomber effort on the railways, they have by no means been neglected, especially in the NE and along the BRENNER where the heavy bombers have done good work.

The BRENNER line remains well blocked South of BOLZANO and the three NE routes between the PADUA - VICENZA area and UDINE continue to be heavily interdicted. The three NE frontier routes are also closed to through traffic. (For the status of enemy railways as of 16 April see map attached.) Traffic on the BRENNER line has been normal this week and though transhipment is still necessary at several points between VERONA and BOLZANO, through traffic has been possible on most days from BOLZANO North. In the NE there has been an exceptional amount of traffic on the UDINE - TARVISIO

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line and PR reveals strong indications of a movement of troops Northwards from the UDINE area, with transhipment taking place at the three damaged bridges about half-way between UDINE and TARVISIO. Although it is as yet too early to make any definite statement as to what is moving, it would appear to be a fairly large formation, possibly as much as a division.

All permanent road and rail bridges over the river PO East of PAVIA remain impassable. Night activity has been noted at pontoon bridge and ferry sites, but only one of the four pontoon bridges heretofore seen to be operating during the past week, and no pronounced increase in the volume of traffic crossing the river has been noted. However, night PR is of necessity limited in its scope and 29 P.G. Div was able to cross undetected. Some increase in traffic has undoubtedly occurred, but to what extent it is impossible to state. In any event it is apparent that so far the enemy has not been forced to use the river crossings during the hours of daylight to any appreciable extent.

With successful attacks on MT substitute fuel resources and the continued blocking of the railway routes from the REICH, shortage of fuel continues to be the enemy's main supply trouble, and now that the battle necessitates a heavier expenditure and, consequently a large demand for ammunition by the forward troops, the position is undoubtedly deteriorating. On 10 April a ground source reported that in the case of a general withdrawal fuel stocks were then only enough to take 10 and 14 Armies' vehicles as far as VERONA and those of Army LIGURIA to BRESCIA. This report is considered reasonable, and the estimate presumably made no allowance for fighting which might occur meanwhile.

Second only to the shortage of fuel is the shortage of coal. Practically no coal is produced in Northern ITALY, and except for a small amount from ISTRIA, all the coal required by both the German armies and the Italian industries and railways has to be imported from the REICH. Up to 1 March the majority of this coal supply was directed through SWITZERLAND; however on or about that date the Swiss Government placed an embargo on the passage of coal, and by mid-March it was reported that only one fifth of the daily requirements were reaching ITALY. Coal stocks in the country were at that time reported to be sufficient for 30 to 40 days and it is probable that they are now much lower. In any event it is known that railway steam engines have been forced to burn wood.

Two reports have lately been received to the effect that all the ammunition for the German Armies on this front is now being manufactured in ITALY, and, whilst this is not believed to be correct, it is thought that the enemy has for some time been making use of Italian factories and filling plants for certain types of ammunition. These have been attacked from time to time. On 14th April the ammunition factories at AVIGLIANO (H 8131), SPILLIMBERGO (C 1526), MILCONTENTE (G 6019) and ANDRUZZA (G 5206) were attacked by heavy bombers with excellent results, whilst on 10 April a shell filling plant at PIACENZA was completely destroyed by fighter-bombers.

Enemy supply difficulties are not confined to ammunition and fuel nor to this theatre. A captured order dated 10 Feb of 47 Volksgrenadier Div (now fighting in South GERMANY) shows that rations and clothing have been in short supply on the Western Front. Extracts from this order appear at Appendix 'A'.

3. WESTERN FRONT

Two new developments have altered the situation in the West this week. One is the growing proximity of the West Front to the East Front

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which has made the transfer of enemy forces from one to the other a relatively simple process: the other, connected with the first, is the division of responsibility between KESSELRING and BUSCH. Both are the direct result of the collapse on the central sector of the Western Front. The picture of enemy resistance has not materially altered during the week. In the main it has changed only in its deterioration. In the South the tenuous coherence of Army Group G's front is breaking. No fresh divisions have been contacted North of the STUTTGART-NÜRNBERG line, and those that are there have been heavily engaged. The greatest weakness is apparent in the NÜRNBERG rather than the STUTTGART area, and we are now fighting in the outskirts of NÜRNBERG. If the enemy has any intention of withdrawing into a National Redoubt in AUSTRIA, it must be a major concern of KESSELRING to keep intact the forces of Army Group G. They alone of the troops in the West can be expected to make any substantial contribution to the Redoubt. It may be of significance that 19 Army, the most Southerly of the German Armies in the West, has recently acquired a new commander in the form of an SS Obergruppenführer - one KEPPLER by name. Vague reports have been circulating in the past week of heavy movement back to the Austrian area. These so far lack any reliable confirmation from the air.

The centre of the front remains a wide open gap. In the earlier part of last week it looked as if the enemy was trying to build up a front somewhere East of KASSEL, where we identified two Panzer and two Parachute divisions. The attempt was vain. Before this small concentration of forces was able to take any offensive action, 166 Res Div in the KASSEL area crumbled, and the enemy concentration was dispersed. Since then the situation on the Central sector has been completely out of hand. Such resistance as has appeared comes from miscellaneous independent battalions of whatever shape or size is currently available. Some fight well - officer or NCO schools can always be relied upon to put up stubborn local resistance. Others less well: the calibre of such units as the Stomach Battle Group contacted last week is perhaps not all it might be. However until we reached the ELBE there was little coherent resistance of any kind. We crossed the great river without undue difficulty but on the East bank the enemy has fought harder. Identifications of units operating East of the river show them to be in the main ad hoc formations operating under the courtesy title of a division. Divisions SCHARNORST, POTSDAM and VON HUTTEN have been contacted. In view of the proximity of the Western Front to the East these are probably made up in part of rear units servicing the Eastern Front. Far behind the front Army Group B in the RUHR pocket has already lost over 200,000 PW and appears to be near the end of its resources. The Army Group Commander, Field Marshal MODEL, is reported to have avoided the sombre fate which threatened him as a war criminal by taking his own life.

There is still coherent enemy resistance along the front from South of HAMBURG to HOLLAND. Two parachute and elements of four Infantry divisions are in contact and show no disposition to give ground unless forced to. Only between the EMS and the IJSSEL has opposition been relatively weak and in the corridor between the two rivers we have been able to push on to the North sea. Further West, the decision has been taken to retain Western HOLLAND as a fortress, and very heavy resistance has been encountered by our forces attacking Westwards over the IJSSEL river. The reorganisation of coast defence units into divisional frameworks mentioned in last week's Summary has now produced at least six new divisions. These represent no increase in real strength, but may represent some increase in the enemy's capabilities for organised resistance.

No official details have yet been received of the new division of command in the West. Field Marshal BUSCH who is reported to have command of the Northern half of the front, commanded Army Group Centre in the East

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until June of last year. The split in the command is certainly in anticipation of an early link up of the Anglo-American and Soviet forces, which would substitute for the present East and West fronts, receding Northern and Southern fronts. The assumption cannot however be excluded that there is a more sinister significance to it than that. With reports of the National Redoubt now being received from all quarters, the choice of an expert in defensive mountain warfare to man the Southern part of the Western Front is ominous. If they are going back to the Redoubt it is time now for the Nazis to make their final arrangements. There is not much future left in the West. Last February, we know from a captured document, the enemy was preparing to set up the 33rd wave of new divisions which was to be ready about the end of May or early June. These will be comprised in the main of the 1928 class. A number of these divisions were setting up in DENMARK and it is significant that many of the miscellaneous battalions recently contacted in the West have come from DENMARK. The implication is that the embryo divisions have been milked of their drafts to meet the requirements of the deepening crisis. It looks unlikely that we shall see any of the 33rd wave. Meanwhile the thinning out from NORWAY continues at the tantalisingly slow pace which Allied anti-shipping strikes have imposed. 199 Inf Div has now started disembarking in DENMARK. It is to be followed according to one report, by 7 Mtn Division. After that there will be ten more divisions to leave at the rate of one a month. Their prospects are not bright.

4. EASTERN FRONT

EAST PRUSSIA AND GERMANY

Enemy resistance continues on the SAMLAND peninsula, where the port of PILLAU is still in German hands.

Details of operations on the ODER front come so far wholly from enemy reports. According to these, the Russians have attacked on both sides of FRANKFURT AN DER ODER on an 80 mile front between FÜRSTENBERG and SCHWEDT. Fighting is reported at SEELOW, 10 miles West of the ODER and 30 miles from the centre of BERLIN. The two Soviet bridgeheads at KIENITZ and LEBUS reported by the enemy over a month ago are said to have joined up near SEELOW.

A captured document has clarified the lay-out of Army groups in the East. LATVIA is the responsibility of Army Group VISTULA, and the East Prussian battle was conducted by Army Group North under the command of Col-Gen RENDULIC formerly commander of 20 Mtn Army in FINLAND. On the main front in GERMANY there are two Army Groups. In the Northern half of the front is Army Group VISTULA under HIMMLER, while further South is Army Group Centre commanded by Field Marshal SCHOERNER. CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA are the responsibility of Army Group South.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AUSTRIA

While the enemy accelerates his withdrawal from the high terrain of Eastern SLOVAKIA the Soviets appear to be developing their offensive in Southern SLOVAKIA along the Northwesterly axis of the LUNDENBERG - BRNO road and railway. Enemy resistance is so far moderate. Now that the Germans have given up the HIGH TATRA and NISKE TATRY mountains, the rest of the terrain through which they must withdraw from SLOVAKIA slopes gradually downwards to the MORAVSKA OSTRAVA gap, and is generally less suitable for defence than that which they have abandoned. In view of this, the enemy's plan may now be to pull right back behind the gap to the mountainous terrain of Central MORAVIA, thereby ironing out his Slovak salient and eliminating the danger of a link up between the First and Third Ukrainian Army Groups. Some thinning out of the German forces in SLOVAKIA is already in progress and 3 Mtn Div formerly in the Slovak region has recently been transferred to Southern AUSTRIA.

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In AUSTRIA, the reduction of VIENNA was accomplished rather more easily than had been expected. While there is no evidence of any serious demoralisation on the part of the German armed forces, it seems clear from all reports that the Austrian civilian population is not showing that degree of hostility and fear towards the invaders which has characterised the occupied provinces of Eastern GERMANY. North of the DANUBE, the Russians have now captured the large oil field at ZISTERSDORF. This has an annual capacity of 1¼ million tons and was the last major source of natural crude oil now available to the enemy. The whole of 6 SS Pz Army has been identified in the VIENNA region during the past week. II SS Pz Corps with 2 and 9 SS Pz Divs, as well as 3 SS Pz Div, and possibly 6 Pz and elements of 13 Pz Division are all believed to be operating North of the DANUBE and are trying to block Soviet progress Northwestwards towards the Czechoslovakian frontier. South of the DANUBE the enemy forces appear to be less strong, probably because the ground is more suitable for defence than it is North of the river. 1 and 12 SS Pz Divs are believed to be in the ST POLTEN area and 37 SS Cavalry Division was identified in the same area on 12 April. This is a new formation and bears the highest number yet contacted. It is believed to include those remnants of 8 and 22 SS Cavalry Divs which escaped from BUDAPEST. So far the enemy has not been able to bring the Soviet progress along the LINZ gap to a halt, and it seems likely that he has underestimated the Russian strength in this area. The picture of his dispositions suggests more concern with the Russian progress towards CZECHOSLOVAKIA than towards LINZ which is nevertheless ultimately of far greater significance. Further reinforcement may be on the way, however. 10 SS Pz Div was reported to be moving Southwards from PRAGUE on 9 April and may be destined for Army Group South. Its arrival would raise the total of SS Divs in Army Groups South and E to eleven.

Between the DANUBE and GRAZ the enemy is resisting strongly in the high terrain of the FISCHBACHER Alps covering the BRUCK - MARIBOR railway. Some Soviet progress has however been made along the RAAB Valley where FELDBACH (C 15) 24 miles from GRAZ is in Russian hands. PR shows several sectors of anti-tank ditch recently constructed along the general line MARIBOR-GRAZ. Probably the enemy is prepared to give ground gradually under pressure forward of this line but he will try to hold the Russians on a line covering the railway.

YUGOSLAVIA

In YUGOSLAVIA there has been no change in the situation along the DRAVA. The enemy's withdrawal from the SREM and the SARAJEVO areas is now well under way. In the SREM 41 Inf and 11 G.F Divs appear to be conducting the retreat North of the SAVA with 22 Inf Div to the South of the river. OSIJEK, VINKOVCI and DRCKO are now all in the hands of the Yugoslavs who are however, following up the enemy retreat rather than driving him out. The only area where Yugoslavs are really troubling the enemy's withdrawal is in the DOBOJ (M 28) sector. This town lies on the main SARAJEVO - BROD highway and its capture would cut off the forces of XXI Mtn Corps still fighting their rearguard action in the area of ZEPCE (M 24). Heavy fighting has been in progress to the East of DOBOJ all this week, but the town still remains in enemy hands. In general it looks as if the enemy withdrawal from both the SREM and SARAJEVO areas is going rather better than might have been expected. Although sporadic sharp engagements are reported, the enemy has been able to avoid heavy fighting except in the DOBOJ area, and seems able to conduct the withdrawal in his own time and without undue Partisan interference.

It is not so in Western CROATIA. Here the Yugoslav 4th Army's offensive is in its fourth week. This is the largest and most successful operation which has ever been mounted by Tito's forces. Considerable

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territorial gains have been made and at least two enemy divisions - 392 and 373 Legion - have both been badly battered. Two Yugoslav thrusts are now apparent, and each is being countered by a division which was not in Western CROATIA when the offensive started. It is in fact clear that the enemy can no longer place any reliance upon the Legionary divs which are near disintegration, and is having to call upon proper German formations. One Yugoslav column is pushing Northwestwards along the coast road to FIUME and has now reached CRIKVENICA 15 miles S.E. of FIUME. Elements of 237 Inf Division have come down from the FIUME area and 1048 G.R. has now been contacted near CRIKVENICA. The second Yugoslav thrust is in a North Easterly direction towards KARLOVAC (K 25). Here the enemy seems to have the situation rather more in hand and 104 Jg Div is offering stubborn resistance about 12 miles S.W. of KARLOVAC. Meanwhile further successes have been achieved in the QUARNERO island group and RAB was captured by the Yugoslavs last week.

5. Distributed with this Summary is a paper on the German National Socialist Redoubt.

F.R Rawes Lt Col

C.E.R. HIRSCH,
BRIGADIER, G.S.
A.C. OF S, G-2.

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APPENDIX 'A' TO H.Q. 15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 90 DATED 17 APRIL, 1945

EXTRACTS FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENT

47th VOLKS-GRENADIER DIV
The Commanding General

Div GP, 10 Feb 45.

SUBJECT: General Supply Situation

++++++++++++++++++

The supply situation, which continues to grow more and more serious, necessitates utmost economy and retrenchment in all classes of supplies. I reproduce below the instruction of Army Group G for the benefit of subordinate commanders, to acquaint them with the supply situation. I expect units to appreciate the prevailing conditions and use supplies as thriftily as possible. This instruction will be destroyed after having been received and noted by the persons concerned. Its contents will be disseminated orally to the commanders of lower formations and units. Report of execution will be filed with Div QM by 15 Feb 45.

"According to a report by the German Army QM on the supply situation, based on the 1944 harvest and the stocks of raw material for clothing and equipment available after the loss of the enemy-occupied territories in the EAST and WEST, it appears that the supply situation must be regarded as critical:

"The following appears to be the picture as presented by the above report:

1. Rations

As rations decrease, increasing stress must be placed on the complete utilization of all available food and on increased care in its preparation. ++++++++++++++++

It is not permissible to ask automatically for increased rations when a unit is subjected to added strain. ++++++++++++++++++++

According to the yield of the grain and roughage harvest it can be expected that fodder rations will be further reduced. ++++++++++++++++++

2. Clothing and Equipment

At the end of our withdrawals it was clearly demonstrated to what extent the combat efficiency of an army is dependent upon the state of its clothing.

Losses, such as suffered last summer by faulty orders or neglect, must not occur again, since the scarcity of raw materials prohibits replacement. The soldier is punished if he loses his weapon. Appropriate measures will be taken in future if clothes and equipment are lost. ++++++++++++++++++++

Unfortunately the soldier cannot be issued a second pair of boots which would allow him to change and facilitate repairs; all that can be used for this purpose are the modest unit reserves. Therefore the footgear in possession of the individual must especially be cared for; the necessary leather grease has been issued.

There is sufficient basic winter equipment for every soldier. Extra winter equipment for the WEST has not been authorised; substantial quantities have nevertheless been issued, but these are destined for the combat troops only. No extra winter equipment may therefore be used in rear of regtl Hqs. If every soldier realises that clothing is obtainable at home almost exclusively for bomb casualties, he will take the right attitude toward these measures.

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3. Quarters

The general shortage of raw materials for textiles also affects the available supplies for quarters, especially blankets and sheets. ++++++++++
The difficulties in the supply of greases necessitate far reaching economies in the use of candles of all kinds." +++++++++

(signed) DORK, Maj-Gen,
Commanding.

(SOURCE: II Corps G-2 Report No. 603
dated 14 Apr 45)


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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 91

OF 24 APRIL '45

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1. ENEMY SITUATION

On the evening of the 20th the enemy suddenly started a general withdrawal from the BOLOGNA area. But VIETINGHOFF had already fallen between two stools - he had not ordered (or more likely Hitler's intuitive genius for strategical misappreciation had not allowed him to order) a fighting withdrawal to the PO and he had not succeeded in halting the Allied offensive on the Appennine line. Consequently, when withdrawal was forced upon him as the only alternative to annihilation South of the PO, he found that his Armies were already battered, he had no reserves, and his pace of withdrawal was limited to that of the foot soldier. As a result of the heavy casualties he had endured in trying to blunt our offensive he had not the force left to prevent 5 Army breaking through 90 P.G. and 94 Inf Divs and fanning out into the plain to the West and N.W. of BOLOGNA. He rapidly lost control of this part of the front and with it his chance of conducting an orderly withdrawal to the PO. Only by such an orderly withdrawal could he have hoped to offset our high morale, our greater mobility and overwhelming armoured and air superiority. Although further East 76 Pz Corps and 1 Para Corps have conducted a skilful and desperately fierce withdrawal the enemy is paying a bitter price for the collapse of 14 Pz Corps. It is still too soon to tell the extent of the disaster which has befallen the enemy, but at the moment of writing he has lost over 50,000 prisoners, large quantities of equipment and very many vehicles. We have seized several crossings over the PO, and the escape route of 51 Mtn Corps from the PARMA area and of the German forces from Western ITALY is gravely threatened. Army Group C is experiencing its most crushing defeat in the Italian campaign and one that bids fair to be decisive.

The critical moment of the battle prabably came when 8 Army smashed through the Genghis Khan positions in the ARGENTA Gap on the 18th and advanced rapidly up to PORTOMAGGIORE and the canal running East and West through the town. At this time the enemy was still holding firm South of BOLOGNA though in the mountains to the West of the city our attack was gaining momentum despite the attempts of 90 P.G. Div to halt it. A breakthrough to FERRARA from ARGENTA would have endangered the bulk of his armies South of the PO and the divisions then available to 76 Pz Corps (29 P.G. Div, 42 Jaeger Div, which had already lost 2,000 prisoners, and 362 Div, roughly handled in our attacks on the SENIO and S.INTERNO) could not have prevented this break out unaided. The only reserve the enemy had was 98 Div, resting and refitting near S. NICOLO FERRARESE after suffering heavily in the first few days of the offensive, and 26 Pz Div, still comparatively fresh and undamaged after four days of fighting in the BUDRIO area. Both were at once committed against the right wing of 8 Army, leaving the enemy with no Central reserve. This weakness soon became glaringly apparent. Making much swifter progress through the mountains than the enemy obviously thought would be possible, 5 Army tore a great hole in 94 Div, and brushed aside 90 P.G. Div. The only reinforcement the enemy had time to bring up was the Fusilier Bn of 65 Div. He had probably intended bringing round 114 Div or part of 334 Div from the West, but movement out of the mountains was very slow and we did not contact 114 Recce Bn until we had crossed route 9.

Fifth Army reached the highway just before midday on the 20th, and although the enemy forces ahead of us were broken and disorganised, 90 P.G. Div harassed the Eastern flank of our thrust all day. South of BOLOGNA 65 Div had withdrawn under pressure on to the HERMANN line (running along the 28 Northing) the previous night. N.E. of the town, 1 Para Corps had been pushed off the MEDICINA Canal, and after a temporary pause on the GAINA river had been thrown back into the Genghis Khan positions along the IDICE river on the night 19/20. By midday on the 20th we had

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seized small bridgeheads across the IMOLA. Faced with a breakthrough N.E. and West of BOLOGNA, the enemy abandoned the city that night. Leaving the two Para divisions and 278 Div to fight their way back towards the RENO bend North of CENTO, VIETINGHOFF tried desperate measures to stop 5 Army breaking out across the plain. 305 Div was rushed through BOLOGNA on the night 20/21 April in an attempt to bring it round West of the RENO into the area S. GIOVANNI in PERSICETO.

8 Mtn and 65 Divs, both of which had had heavy casualties, also tried to withdraw to cover 1 Para Corps' flank. But these moves came too late and could not prevent a break out Northwestwards between route 9 and S. GIOVANNI towards the PANARO, where only miscellaneous and isolated battlegroups opposed our advance. By the 22nd we had reached the PO at GUASTALLA L 3598 and S. BENEDETTO F 5810 and had seized a crossing at the latter point. The enemy armies South of the PO were split.

The collapse of 14 Pz Corps uncovered the flanks of 1 Para Corps and 51 Mtn Corps. The two parachute divisions conducted a skilful withdrawal towards the RENO bend North of CENTO, but there found themselves threatened from both flanks. 362 Div had been unable to hold an armoured column which swept out from ARGENTA along the North bank of the RENO to POGGIO RENATICO; we captured the latter on the night 21/22 April despite the arrival of assistance from 362 Div's right neighbour 278 Div. By the following night we had reached the outskirts of BONDENO through which ran 1 Para Corps' axis of withdrawal. On the Western flank of the parachute divisions the remnants of 65 Division (whose Commander Gen PFEIFFER was killed on the 22nd), of 8 Mtn Div (which had many of its guns overrun) and of 305 Division fought bitterly to keep the escape route for the parachutists open. A desperate battle took place on the 22nd in the Northern corner of the RENO pocket and between the RENO and the PANARO N.E. of CENTO. Our tanks inflicted heavy damage on enemy columns trying to fight their way along the corridor to the only escape route across the PO remaining to the Para Corps - between OSTIGLIA and BONDENO. Fighting is still going on for this bridgehead to-day and we cannot yet tell exactly how much damage has been done to the enemy. But the capture of the G.C.C. of 305 Div, Gen SCHELLWITZ, with his Artillery Commander, in his car while looking for a crossing over the PO, gives some idea of the confusion that reigns. The enemy has no bridges he can use, only ferries, and there is a fair chance that a large part of 1 Para Corps will not reach the North bank of the river.

To the West 90 P.G. Div, 114 and 334 Divs have been slowly withdrawing up Route 9 towards PARMA covering the withdrawal of 232 and 148 Divs from the mountains. The latter was still offering stubborn resistance near SARZANA on the West coast on the 22nd, and only seems to have started its withdrawal the following day. Our patrols entered SPEZIA on the 24th. It is a long and weary trek through Partisan infested country to the crossings North of PARMA, and the capture of REGGIO may force 148 Div to use those still further West. Meantime troops are urgently required in the MANTUA area to seal off our bridgehead which is steadily expanding. As quickly as 51 Mtn Corps can transfer troops across the PO they will march Eastwards.

The enemy's situation is desperate. We have a substantial bridgehead across the PO at S. BENEDETTO, we are in process of establishing another one at OSTIGLIA and patrols have crossed North of FERRARA. He is not only preoccupied with evacuating 76 Pz Corps across the river East of FERRARA and withdrawing what he can of 1 Para Corps between BONDENO and OSTIGLIA, but he still has to extricate 51 Mtn Corps as well as get his forces out of Western ITALY. (Various ground sources report that 75 Corps did not start its withdrawal till the 23rd and that the German garrison of GENOA began its move Northwards on the same day). And his major worry must be that unless he can seal off our bridgehead at S. BENEDETTO he is faced with a potential threat to MANTUA followed by a drive North to Lake GARDA which would cut off his troops to the West and also make havoc of the extensive dumping area around VERONA. We have so far only identified opposite the S. BENEDETTO bridgehead Flak units, convalescents rushed straight from hospital, training units and parachutist companies, made up of recruits who have arrived in ITALY to replace the cadres sent away by 1 and 4 Para Divs in March. Some 3-4,000 of the latter

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are said to have reached ITALY. Apart from ad hoc units it is difficult to see where reinforcement can be obtained apart from 51 Mtn Corps, but some of 5 Mtn Div may intervene if it can move across quickly enough from the TURIN area. To the East 1 Para Corps and 76 Pz Corps are probably too preoccupied with their own worries to give any help.

We cannot yet estimate exactly how seriously the enemy divisions crossing between MANTUA and the Adriatic have been cut up. 8 Mtn Div has lost over 3,600 prisoners (most of them combat troops) and is in no position to fight as a division, 94 and 65 Divisions have also had heavy losses. 278 and 305 Divs have both probably suffered considerable casualties in the fighting for the 1 Para Corps bridgehead, and of the two Para divisions 4 Para is known to have lost over 1,200 prisoners alone. The losses of the parachute divisions in killed is believed to be heavy. We do not know how many of them escaped, but 1 Para Corps as a whole undoubtedly lost heavily in equipment. In 76 Pz Corps three of the infantry divisions had had heavy losses before they reached the PO - 42 Jaeger, 98 and 362 Divs, while the fourth 162 Div has only two regiments (329 G.R. being West of PIACENZA), and has so far escaped comparatively lightly. 26 Pz and 29 P.G. Divs have been covering the withdrawal of 76 Pz Corps across the Po with infantry units probably under command; and these mobile divisions have had considerable though not crippling losses. In addition the enemy has lost heavily in armour on the 8th Army front: 27 Tigers and 13 Panthers are in our hands which is about two thirds of the total with which the enemy is believed to have started the battle.

The battered state of his divisions makes it quite impossible for the enemy to hold the PO as a defence line. He would undoubtedly like to make it a delaying line until he can withdraw 51 Mtn Corps and the troops in Western ITALY East of the line MANTUA - Lake GARDA. But 1 Para Corps and 76 Pz Corps are dangerously extended between the Adriatic and OSTIGLIA, while 14 Pz Corps at MANTUA is still trying to scrape together a fighting force. It is doubtful if either of these three Corps can withstand a major attack, and attacks launched simultaneously against all three will force the enemy to fight a withdrawing action to the Venetian Line - running along the line of the lower ADIGE to FORGOFORTE C 3719, thence N.W. to MONSELICE and the twin hills of EUGANEI and BERICI, and from here West along the foothills of the Alps to Lake GARDA. We have in the past appreciated that the enemy would require at least eleven divisions at full strength to hold this sector of the line with another division plus some attached independent mountain bns to hold from Lake GARDA to the Swiss frontier. The enemy should get a nominal 12 - 14 divisions back on to this line from 1 Para, 14 Pz and 76 Pz Corps, but it is doubtful if their combined infantry strength even allowing for rapid absorption of L of C units, battle schools and Replacement units etc. will amount to much more than six divisions. Their artillery regiments will also be below strength. The only divisions the enemy can bring up to assist are 155 Div, and that has already given off quite considerable numbers of replacements to 98 Div, and a low category formation, the S.S. KARST Division, which is coastwatching in the UDINE Plain. 710 Division which would have been a candidate is now known to have left ITALY early this month and has been identified on the Russian front. Divisions in YUGOSLAVIA are fully engaged trying to keep TITO's forces from reaching FIUME and no immediate reinforcement seems available from there, though 188 Mtn Div might send some replacements to 8 Mtn Div. It is therefore imperative for the enemy that he gets what is left of 51 Mtn Corps East of MANTUA before it is cut off. It looks as if 148 Div and 232 Divs are unlikely to make the grade in time, but we may expect elements of 114, 334, and 90 P.G. Divisions to turn up. If he fails to stop us from cutting across to Lake GARDA the forces in the West will have only two ways of escape, North from MILAN through the VAL TELLINA and North of BERGAMO to EDOLO and then round to TRENTO. Troops using this circuitous route are unlikely to reach the Venetian Line in time to influence the battle. Of the Italian Republican Divisions only small numbers of troops are likely to reach the new line: the rest will disperse on the way back. Despite the strength of the Venetian line defences, which have been worked on continuously since last August and are believed to be the strongest yet encountered in ITALY, the enemy is going to find himself in grave danger of being jumped on this line owing to insufficient troops with which to successfully man it.

....2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS...

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2. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

During the past week it is believed that the enemy supply position had rapidly deteriorated. In his retreat to the PO crossings he must have been forced to use up a large part of his already very low MT fuel stocks. At the same time he has lost or is about to lose the PO Valley methane resources, the distribution system of which had already been heavily damaged by air attack. In addition such alcohol producing factories as have not been bombed but should for the most part shortly fall into our hands and he therefore can no longer count on alcohol to stretch his meagre stocks of petrol. Producer gas probably remains the only substantial source of substitute MT fuel but its use will be limited to rear areas. Barring the arrival of considerable stocks of petrol and diesel from GERMANY 10 and 14 Armies must be very close to a point where continued large scale MT movement will be impossible. What the fuel position of Army LIGURIA may be is not known, but the ground report that it had enough fuel to get its MT back to the BRESCIA area probably still holds good.

It is extremely improbable that the enemy will have been able to evacuate any substantial amount of the supplies which he held in dumps South of the river PO and thus a large part of 10 and 14 Army ammunition stocks will have been expended or overrun. While it is doubtful whether the enemy has either the transport, the fuel or time to evacuate the dumps in the N.W., the majority of the dumps North of the PO are in the VERONA area, along the Upper ADIGE Valley and along the North Eastern road and rail networks between the PADUA-VICENZA area and UDINE. Ammunition stocks in these areas are estimated to be sufficient to maintain ten full strength divisions for one week to ten days of hard and continuous fighting. That this situation can be saved by stopping up deliveries from GERMANY seems unlikely and whether or not ammunition available in Northern ITALY can be moved to the right place at the right time in the required amount is problematical.

During the past few days the enemy has been forced to move a considerable number of vehicles during the hours of daylight, and, taking advantage of this, our aircraft on 22 and 23 April destroyed or damaged a total of 2650 MT and 1,250 MW. (These figures are reminiscent of last spring and bring the total of vehicles destroyed or damaged since 9 April by air attack alone to 3,371 MT and 1,983 MW). This is a rate of loss which the enemy can not long stand. In addition the amount of transport overrun or destroyed by our ground troops must be considerable. Thus, though a shortened L of C will to some degree compensate for the losses suffered, the enemy may well be threatened with a shortage of transport.

Aside from the loss in transport the enemy's road net is being showed up by air attack. There is such an extensive road net in the PO Valley that road interdiction perhaps achieves in most instances no more than a local effect. However, except for possibly one, all of the road bridges over the ADIGE from VERONA inclusive to the sea have been knocked out and the enemy is now forced to get across this major barrier largely by the slow process of ferrying. Just how laborious a method of crossing this can be we have seen on the PO the last few days, where thousands of prisoners and considerable amounts of equipment and vehicles have fallen into our hands because they were unable to get across the river. In addition the BRENTA river crossings are now under attack. With the BRENNER and N.E. rail routes still well interdicted the enemy cannot count on the railways to relieve the present situation. (For details on the state of the railways see Appendix 'A').

3. WESTERN FRONT

The enemy's strategy in the West is governed by his expectation of an early Russo-American link up in the Central part of the front. Here resistance has been light, but on his Southern and Northern flanks the enemy is still striving to maintain the coherence of his front. Fearful of Allied exploitation along the axis NURNBERG-LINZ, he has transferred the main weight of

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his forces in Army Group G from the Upper RHINE area to the sector South and S.E. of NÜRNBERG. On the enemy's extreme left, French forces have advanced against crumbling resistance to the Swiss border, cutting off some Volkssturm and Fortress troops under 805 Adm Div in the area East of the RHINE. The reshuffle in Army Group G was not rapid enough to prevent the fall of NÜRNBERG while STUTTGART was occupied after a sharp battle. The enemy's left flank is now swinging back rapidly to the Lake CONSTANCE area and the whole line S.W. of NÜRNBERG seems to be going back to the DANUBE. It is doubtful in the extreme whether the enemy can achieve any prolonged stabilisation of the front on the DANUBE, especially as we have already crossed it in the ULM region. Between Lake CONSTANCE and the DANUBE at DONAUWÖRTH there are some ten nominal divisions all in a very weakened state. Nearer NÜRNBERG the enemy situation is brighter. His traditional skill in producing divisions out of a hat has not failed him and at least three z.b.V. or Mobilisation divisions have appeared in the general area South of NÜRNBERG. These represent an effort on the enemy's part to bring some sort of order into the confusion of miscellaneous battalions which has existed over the past three weeks. With their help some coherence has been achieved in the front line both South and North of the Western Czechoslovak tip.

North of CHEMNITZ enemy resistance has been weak and he now appears to be reconciled to an early Allied link up in the area of LEIPZIG and DRESDEN. The front is still desperately thin all the way from LEIPZIG to WITTENBERG. The only arrival of note during the week has been Pz Div CHEMNITZ, an ad hoc formation consisting of good quality Pz Training Units which put up a stiff fight for the town of DESSAU and also launched a sharp counter-attack last week in the area N.E. of BRUNSWICK. Otherwise there has been the usual conglomeration of training units and Home Guard battalions, most of which are suffering heavily, particularly when engaged in open country. In the towns and villages, resistance is usually heavier. A point which has become evident lately is that in the towns the enemy seems to be having difficulties in sorting out the chain of command as between Army and Party. When the Party prevails, resistance tends to be tougher and the enemy's readiness to surrender less apparent. In the area behind the Central sector of the front, the enemy pocket in the HARZ Mountains has been eliminated yielding a good prize in the form of 50,000 PW and the Commander of 11 S.S. Pz Army which arrived in the West from the Eastern Front only a month ago.

In the North the enemy has continued to offer stubborn resistance before the North Sea ports. It is to be expected that he will try to hold these as fortresses, with the aid of newly mobilised naval units. Nor is the picture greatly different in HOLLAND. Here the incorporation of Coast Defence and Marine units has so far produced six nominal new divisions. German resistance is heavy and the enemy has a powerful weapon at his disposal in the shape of flooding. He has already breached the ZUIDER ZEE causeway, and it lies within his capabilities to flood virtually the whole of HOLLAND still remaining to him apart from a narrow coastal strip.

The enemy must this week expect a link-up between the Western Allies and the Soviet forces in the general area S.E. of LEIPZIG. When this has occurred, he is likely to hold for the time being in the South a front running along the Northern frontier of CZECHOSLOVAKIA thence Southwestwards covering MUNICH down to the DANUBE. The state of the frontier defences built by the Czechs in the pre-MUNICH days is not known but they may still be in good enough condition to enable the enemy to fight a delaying action. The crucial sector is, however, that between the Western tip of CZECHOSLOVAKIA and the DANUBE. Here the enemy line is still not being held, and here it must be held, for he cannot afford to see another Allied link-up in the LINZ area in the immediate future. We are likely then to see a determined effort on the part of KESSELRING to halt the Allied advance on Army Group G's front before it draws much nearer to the Redoubt area. He may even be able for this purpose to make some call on the resources of Army Group South whose front has for the time being been stabilised.

The reduction in the past week of the enemy pockets on both sides of the GIRONDE estuary has drawn attention once more to the existence of the various fortress ports of FRANCE which are still in enemy hands. Throughout the

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winter the Germans have held five pockets, four of which cover the ports of DUNKIRK, LORIENT, ST. NAZAIRE and LA ROCHELLE, while the fifth, now eliminated, controlled both banks of the GIRONDE estuary covering the port of BORDEAUX. DUNKIRK, whose dockyards are largely destroyed, is held by a garrison now estimated at 10,000 (two thirds its original strength) and its defences include dense minefields and extensive flooding. The garrison lives on very short commons - 250 kg of bread daily with a little pulse and occasionally a little horse-flesh; but fortunately the town's civilian population was evacuated by agreement before the winter.

At the submarine base of LORIENT, an area some 230 Kms wide and 12 Kms deep and including the ISLE DE GROIX is defended by a well organised garrison of 25,000 men collected by Arty General FARNBACHER (formerly commander of the LORIENT garrison) from troops dispersed during the NORMANDY campaign as well as from A.A. units, Marines and submarine crews. Morale and supplies are excellent, while 500 arty pieces provide a formidable defence against attack from land, sea or air.

Between the LORIENT pocket and the neighbouring pocket of ST. NAZAIRE sea communications are still maintained under cover of the CD batteries on the ISLE DE GROIX and BELLE ISLE. The latter island is part of the ST. NAZAIRE pocket which measures on the mainland some 60 Kms wide by 45 Kms deep. But the perimeter is less definitely marked than that of the LORIENT pocket and the investment looser. The garrison, some 30,000 strong, has been able to make several forays to collect food from the surrounding country; and supplies appear plentiful. Evacuation of the sick and wounded among the civilian population, and of the aged and young, has taken place on several occasions under the auspices of the Red Cross.

The LA ROCHELLE pocket extends for about 20 Kms between the MARINS and the CHARENTE and includes the islands of RE, OLERON and AIX. Its garrison has been continuously on the defensive and many attempts have been made by both sides to negotiate an armistice but they have failed owing to the Germans' unwillingness to surrender their arms to the F.F.I., and their fear of reprisals at home. Meanwhile the VICHY appointed Prefect of LA ROCHELLE is retained in office by the Germans and acts as intermediary between the besieged and besieging forces in their negotiations for civilian supplies and evacuation.

The fifth pocket, liberated by French forces early this month occupied the area between MORENNES and ROYAN on the North bank of the mouth of the GIRONDE estuary and the PTE DE GRAVE on the South bank. It was held by a garrison of 10,000 men, whose positions North of the estuary were defended by a system of concrete pillboxes and bunkers and on the South by an anti-tank ditch running right across the PTE DE GRAVE. There were also strong A.A. defences. The elimination of this garrison which had been ordered to hold out to the last opens to the Allies the only intact French port and one capable of handling a very large volume of supplies at a cost of 15 francs per ton as against 170 francs per ton at MARSEILLES. It should do much to ease the French supply situation.

4. THE NATIONAL REDOUBT

Reports received on the National Redoubt during the past week indicate a continued build up of dumps and supplies mainly in the SALZBURG and BREGENZ (V 53) areas. Recent reports lay more emphasis on activity in the region of the Swiss frontier South of BREGENZ than on fresh developments around SALZBURG, possibly because enemy preparations in the latter region are nearer completion. Reports on the BREGENZ sector mention the requisition of hotels and large buildings, and the utilisation of spinning mills for food depots.

A report from 12 Army Group indicates that elements of OKH may have arrived in the SALZBURG area, while an interesting message from SWITZERLAND quotes an alleged order of C in C Home Army dated 1 March that 45% of all recruits from Wehrkreis V (STUTTGART) are to be sent to AUSTRIA. These recruits are said to be receiving special training.

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A limited amount of PR is now available on the Redoubt, but shows no major defensive activity. Some 69 cave and tunnel entrances in the VORARLBERG, the Upper Inn Valley and the SALZKAMMERGUT between BERCHTESGADEN (Z 90) and BAD ISCHL (V 51) were covered during the first ten days of April. All but 13 showed varying degrees of activity which might be consistent with continued ground reports of underground installations.

The announcement that HITLER and GOEBBELS are still in BERLIN raises several questions regarding the enemy's plans in the Redoubt. If the Führer in fact does choose to stay in the capital to the end (which, be it noted, he has not promised to do), the Redoubt would be, to say the least, a poorer place without him, and much of the enthusiasm of its future occupants is likely to diminish if they have to fight there without the inspiration of the Führer's presence. It is significant that the Nazi public press and radio announcements have never made any reference to continued resistance in the Redoubt, while all reports received have laid constant emphasis on the SS nature of the Redoubt. HIMMLER is apparently not in BERLIN - HITLER and GOEBBELS are. In these circumstances consideration should be given to the possibility that the Führer is either unaware of or does not associate himself with the Redoubt; that in fact the scheme in so far as it exists at all is one sponsored and fostered by HIMMLER who hopes to continue his resistance there even if all around him fall.

5. EASTERN FRONT

EASTERN GERMANY

The resumption of the Russian offensive across the ODER found the Germans in little better shape to resist it than they were two months ago when ZHUKOV came to a halt on the great river obstacle before BERLIN. Between STETTIN and BERLIN, the Russians have established bridgeheads in the area of GREIFENHAGEN but have not exploited them. The main Soviet offensive has developed in two major thrusts. The 3rd White Russian Army Group attacked due west along all roads to BERLIN between FRANKFURT and SCHWEDT; its left neighbour, the 1st Ukrainian Army Group, developed its offensive in the form of a right hook which was launched initially Westwards towards DRESDEN and then swung Northwards to make contact with ZHUKOV's forces in the area S.W. of BERLIN. A very grave situation has thus arisen for the enemy. In the North his capital city has been entered. So far Russian progress in BERLIN's Eastern suburbs has been reasonably swift, and there are indications that the enemy is concerned at the tendency of the civilian populace to hang out white flags whenever they deem the Russians to be near. Nevertheless, the enemy has had time to prepare defences in the capital, and the example of BUDAPEST has shown just how prolonged and difficult a task the Russians may have ahead of them. A factor of some importance is the attitude which the Nazi leaders are likely to adopt. GOEBBELS has publicly announced his intention of staying in BERLIN and HITLER according to an official spokesman is still in the capital, but we have no guarantee that he will stay there. Meanwhile in Central GERMANY an early link-up between Soviet and American forces is imminent.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AUSTRIA

There are indications that the enemy is going to put up a stiff fight to defend BOHEMIA and MORAVIA. According to the German radio HITLER regards the defence of both BERLIN and PRAGUE as vital for the continued existence of EUROPE, and the present German attitude in the field is consistent with this attitude. In the North the natural protection of the SUDETEN Mountains has for many months prevented any Soviet incursion into Czechoslovak soil and the Russians still stand far from the frontier. To the East, Army Group Centre is still withdrawing, but in its own time and without losing grip of the situation. As was suggested last week an eventual withdrawal behind the MORAVSKA OSTRAVA gap may be envisaged by the enemy; this however will still leave the rest of BOHEMIA and MORAVIA in his hands. From the South the picture of enemy dispositions shows a determination to block the Russians on a line running S.W. from BRNO to the DANUBE, thus preventing any Soviet exploitation along the VIENNA-PRAGUE axis.

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between BRNO and the DANUBE there are probably six Panzer divisions and as many infantry divisions. These are believed to include one Panzer division transferred from Army Group Centre. With this force the enemy has succeeded in effecting a temporary stabilisation of the front North of the DANUBE. In the DANUBE Valley the threat to communications between CZECHOSLOVAKIA and BAVARIA has for the time being diminished, now that the enemy has been able to hold the Soviets at ST. POLTEN. A similar attempt to prevent Allied incursion into CZECHOSLOVAKIA and to keep open communications Southwards from PRAGUE is apparent on the Western Front. One reason for this anxiety to hold CZECHOSLOVAKIA may be a desire to retain the SKODA works in the PILSEN area. It is not known to what extent these are still functioning. However, heavy traffic Southwards along lines South from PRAGUE during the past week may imply the removal of supplies and industrial equipment from the Czechoslovak armaments industry to AUSTRIA. Until their intentions in this respect have been carried out the Germans are likely to make determined efforts to prevent an Allied breakthrough into CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

There has been little fresh from AUSTRIA. A captured map shows that Army Group South's right boundary now stretches down to the DRAVA river. On its right is 2 Pz Army on a sector between the DRAVA and RABA rivers. 6 Army is between the RABA and MURA rivers and 6 SS Pz Army between the MURA and the DANUBE. 6 Army holds the front from the DANUBE to the boundary between Army Groups South and Centre in the area West of BRNO. No further details are available regarding the progress of defences between KARLSOR and GRAZ but North of the DANUBE some defences have been seen between KREMS (R 80) and HORN (R 83), which might conceivably form part of a defence line running North from GRAZ. The Russians this week have reported the identification of 710 Inf Div (from N.E. ITALY) in the Southeastern area, but so far give no more detailed location. In view of the enemy's attempts to thicken up 2 Pz Army with infantry and mountain divisions in the Alpine foothills West of GRAZ, he may have decided to employ it in that area.

YUGOSLAVIA

The Yugoslav offensive in Western CROATIA has made further progress this week. On the mainland the enemy has been forced back along the coast to the immediate approaches to FIUME. SUSAK, the Eastern suburb of FIUME, is in Yugoslav hands, and demolitions are reported in the FIUME port area. These operations, now in their fifth week, are proving a serious drain on the enemy's resources. Two Germano-Croat Divs have almost ceased to exist as effective fighting formations. 237 Inf and 104 Jg Divs which were brought up to take their place have been heavily engaged and are alone unable to check the Yugoslavs. A report this week says that another enemy formation is due to arrive shortly in the area. This seems likely. It is known that 91 Corps H.Q. from the SKEN has been transferred to CROATIA and it is unlikely to come alone.

From the rest of YUGOSLAVIA, the story is of a rapid and relatively unhindered enemy withdrawal from what remains of the SREM-SARAJEVO salient. It is now three weeks since SARAJEVO was evacuated and within another week the whole enemy salient West of a line from VIROVITICA to the SAVA river should be eliminated. On the whole the enemy may feel well satisfied with the success of his withdrawal movement. Casualties have been relatively light and even 369 Germano-Croat Division has been saved from complete disintegration by the precaution of putting it at the head and not the rail of the withdrawing column. It may not have lived to fight another day, but at least it has lived.

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Despite the enemy's feverish repair activity, the BRENNER railway has remained blocked to through trains for another seven days. Notwithstanding well-dispersed interdictions, the rolling stock has continued to be moderately active with most of the movement seen to be North of BOLZANO. This activity does not reflect through traffic, but it is probably localised stock movements and/or transhipment. Each of the three lines leading towards Central GERMANY from INNSBRUCK is blocked by a badly damaged bridge.

In N.E. ITALY the main TREVISO-UDINE line, on which there appears to have been very little movement, had by the end of the week been repaired to a point where only one bridge blocked through traffic. The bridges at SACILE (B 8407) and PORDENONE (B 9909) have now been repaired to a point where they could be made "operational at will", leaving NERVESA bridge (G 6493) as the only block on this line; west of TREVISO, however, all bridges over the BRENTA river are out. The two more Southerly routes remain well interdicted with traffic appearing to be almost stagnant.

The TARVISIO frontier route remains interdicted by virtue of three badly damaged bridges and although activity continues to be evident, no definite signs of troop movement have been seen since around 20 April. Ground sources report that the formation picked up by PR some time ago moving out of N.E. ITALY was 710 Inf Div, and this division has in fact been identified on the Russian front. No statement concerning activity on the interdicted PIEDICOLLE or POSTUMIA routes is possible owing to lack of PR: however, it is safe to assume that small scale movement continues. Work on the rail diversion by-passing the destroyed BOROVNICA Viaduct (D 2303) is nearing completion, and the POSTUMIA route might thus be re-opened during the next week barring further attacks. In the PO plain North of the river there was little overall clearage except for repair of a bridge near MANTUA and the return of LEGNAGO bridge over the ADIGE on the OSTIGLIA-LEGNAGO stretch to night operational status. (For status of enemy railways as of 25 April see attached map).


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15 ARMY GROUP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 92

OF 1 MAY, 1945

1. ENEMY SITUATION

Army Group 'C' is smashed, and only battered remnants of VIETINGHOFF's well equipped and experienced divisions have escaped back into the foothills of the Alps. The defeat inflicted on 10 and 14 Armies South of the PO is greater than we had at first imagined, not so much in the numbers of prisoners taken as in the crippling losses suffered in armour and equipment South of the river. In the stretch between PONTELAGOSCURO and POLESELLA alone, where 76 Pz Corps crossed, 900 vehicles, 100 guns of all calibres and 59 Mk IV tanks were counted on the Southern bank of the PO; and this Corps probably escaped in better shape than either 1 Para or 14 Pz Corps. With no reserves, very short of infantry replacements and having lost over 500 guns and the major part of his armoured force (some 200 tanks and assault guns), VIETINGHOFF was powerless to prevent us exploiting across the PO, and once we were across in strength he was totally unable to hold any coordinated line of defence.

The course of the battle in the last week can be told quite briefly. VIETINGHOFF must have realised only too well how great was the danger precipitated by 5 Army's rapid seizing of bridgeheads S.E. of MANTUA, for unless he could seal off our advance here he was faced with an Allied thrust to Lake GARDA which would split his armies in two. But he was completely unable to scrape together a force sufficient to meet this threat; 1 Para Corps and 76 Pz Corps were too busy desperately trying to save their own skins to spare troops for the MANTUA area and 51 Mountain Corps was being pushed further and further West in its vain attempts to find crossings over the PO. All that could be brought up to the MANTUA area were miscellaneous battlegroups composed of rear area and training units. 5 Army, quick to seize its opportunity, crushed the enemy opposition and swept North to reach VERONA on the 25th. By the following day all lateral communication between the German forces in the plain was cut and the only route of escape left open to 51 Mountain Corps and Army LIGURIA was by way of MILAN and BERGAMO into the Alps. But even this corridor was short-lived. The enemy tried to bring 51 Mountain Corps across the PO between PIACENZA and PARMA to cover the flank of Army LIGURIA but only a battlegroup of 90 P.G. Div reached the REGGIO area and the other formations of the Corps (334, 114, 232 and 148 Divs) were still struggled across the plain, or else on the axis of route 9 South of the river or, in the case of 148 Div, still in the mountains S.W. of PARMA. The enemy was completely unable to offer any real resistance to our armoured columns which pushed through BRESCIA and REGGIO to reach GENO on the 28th. Meantime, GRAZIANI had started the withdrawal of Army LIGURIA on the 23rd with orders that all his forces were to be behind the TICINO-PO line by 6 May. That the German Command should have left the withdrawal in the West so late, shows how completely by surprise the enemy was taken by the rapidity of our drive across the PO and the ensuing exploitation Westwards. By the 28th, when all escape from Western ITALY Northwards into the Alps was cut, 5 Mountain Div had not started its move from West of TURIN where it had been waiting for 34 Div to evacuate S.W. PIEDMONT.

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It was by then apparent that the enemy had not the strength to attempt a coordinated attack Northwards to force a passage into the Alps or to menace the long open flank of 5 Army. The formations of 51 Mountain Corps were strewn on both sides of the PO and were being mopped up in thousands each day. There was complete disorganisation which culminated in the surrender of almost the whole of 148 Div S.M. of PARMA on the 29th with 1,000 MT and 6,000 troops led by its Commanding General. The garrison of GENOA was hemmed in on all sides by Partisans and after a couple of days of negotiations, Major-General MEINHOLD finally surrendered all his troops on the 27th. At the moment of writing all effective resistance in Western ITALY has ceased: 5 Mtn Div is mainly West of TURIN and 34 Div is by now South of the city and spreads Eastwards to ALESSANDRIA, and both divisions are adopting an attitude of passive resistance until Allied forces arrive to whom they can formally surrender. Any account of the battle in Western ITALY would be incomplete without a reference to the magnificent cooperation of the Partisans who seized many key points in advance of the Allied troops and effectively helped to harrass and block the enemy escape routes.

East of VERONA progress was initially slower. Here we were faced with the possibility that the Germans would try to delay us on the Venetian Line running behind the ADIGE river. Though his forces were totally inadequate for a determined stand on this line - the effective strength of 1 Para, 14 Pz and 76 Pz Corps at this stage probably did not exceed that of seven full strength divisions, where as it had been estimated that at least eleven would be required to man the positions - it did seem the enemy's last chance of holding any sort of line forward of the Alps. 1 Para Corps had however, suffered such heavy losses that it could not take up its positions astride the VERONA-VICENZA road in time and 76 Pz Corps, with its two mobile divisions, was still struggling to cross the ADIGE and so could not spare any reinforcement for the Northern part of the line. By the 27th we had bridgeheads across the ADIGE, not only East of VERONA but also opposite LEGNAGO, where stiff resistance was encountered from the Parachutists, and also North of BADIA and ROVIGO. By the next morning, when we attacked towards VICENZA, negligible resistance was encountered until we reached the city and it was apparent that the enemy had abandoned the ADIGE line and was withdrawing his forces in haste to the North. That same day PADUA was entered and the next morning we were across the BRENTA, advancing towards VENICE which was by this time mainly in Partisan hands. Confused as identifications were it was clear that the bulk of 76 Pz Corps was withdrawing directly Northwards towards the foothills of the Alps leaving 362 and 162 and elements of 155 Divs to offer ineffective opposition to our push along the Adriatic shore. By the 30th we had crossed the PIAVE and reached PORTO GRUARO meeting scattered resistance from coastal units trying to cut across the line of our advance and reach the Alps; further inland our troops were probing into the foothills of the Alps and captured BELLUNO on the 1st May.

The battle of ITALY is over, and the remnants of VIETINGHOFF's once proud divisions have taken to the Alps. Of the divisions which have defied us so long in ITALY probably only four have reached the Alps as fighting formations fit to give battle: these are the two Para Divs, (though 4 Para Div has suffered very heavy casualties) and 26 Pz and 29 P.G. Divs. The two mobile divisions, in particular 26 Pz, have fought magnificently but by now probably have next to no tanks left. The other mobile division, 90 P.G., has been destroyed for the second time in the Mediterranean Theatre and Von MEHR the

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divisional commander is a prisoner in our hands. Of the remaining divisions 8 Mtn, 42 Jaeger, 162 Turkoman, 148 Inf, 232 and 305 Inf Divs can now be considered destroyed though some elements may have escaped to the North. In addition, 65, 94, 98, 114, 156, 278, 334 and 362 Divs have either been completely destroyed or else are so battered that they are unable to fight as formations. 5 Mtn and 34 Divs wait to surrender in toto. In the N.W. what is in effect probably merely a low category brigade (24 S.S. KURSK Division) has not yet been contacted but is now probably in full retreat towards the TARVISIO Pass. Of the two divisions in ISTRIA 188 and 237 Divs are now known to have passed with 97 Corps to command of C in C S.E. about the middle of April. In any case they are being cut up by the Yugoslav drive which has cut off FIUME and has reached the outskirts of TRIESTE.

The total count of prisoners and captured equipment is not yet complete but we know that over 150,000 only are already in our hands and there are many more to be rounded up in Western ITALY. Some 13 Generals have fallen into our hands in the last ten days including the Commander of Army LIGURIA (GRAZIANI) and his Chief of Staff (Lt.Gen FRANKEL), the Commander of 76 Pz Corps, Gen von SCHLEBRIN, who decided on the 25th that the German Armies in ITALY were broken and so surrendered to our troops South of the PO, Lt.Gen BOEHLKE Commander 334 Div, Lt.Gen FRETTER PICO, 44 Div, and several generals holding administrative and L of C appointments. All testified to the helplessness of the situation and to the utter confusion which existed in the latter stages of the battle. We now look to see whether VIETINGHOFF will try to collect his remaining forces for the defence of the Southern Alps, on what is virtually the perimeter of the Redoubt; Von SCHLEBRIN said that as long as telephonic communication existed with HITLER's Headquarters VIETINGHOFF would continue to resist, but since HITLER has decided to stay in BERLIN and HIMMLER has been associated with proposals for surrender to the Western Allies, it looks as if the German High Command has abandoned any intention it may have had of holding the Southern Redoubt. Suffice it is to say for the moment that our troops who have advanced up both sides of Lake GARDA are now encountering stubborn resistance from the Northern end of the Lake, but that on the far side of the Alps American forces have broken into the perimeter of the Redoubt and are now within 13 miles of INNSBRUCK. From a purely military point of view the enemy's chances of holding the Southern Redoubt begin to look a bit thin. Troops which should have provided the most stalwart garrison for it - those of Army Group 'C' - have been decisively smashed and with them has probably been smashed also such fanciful ideas as may ever have existed of holding the Southern fortress.

2. NORTH GERMAN ZONE

The great enemy pocket created in North GERMANY and DENMARK as a result of the Allied link-up at TRAVE, is shrinking steadily. To the East, Marshal ROKOSSOVSKY is advancing on a broad front running Southwards from the Baltic coast to West of BERLIN against decreasing resistance, while ZHUKOV's Third White Russian Army Group completes the reduction of the German capital. Meanwhile S. of BERLIN the long German salient which protruded as far South as LEIPZIG is being progressively worn down by successive links-up between American and Soviet forces. The exact number of German divisions in the Northern pocket is not known. Excluding NORWAY and the Dutch pocket there are unlikely to be more than 40 nominal divisions. These probably include some fourteen mobile divs, three from the West and eleven from the East, and at least four parachute divisions of reasonably good quality; in addition a number of embryo divisions may now be setting up

....in DENMARK. .....

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in DENMARK. From the information available on allocation of drafts and recruits, it seems likely that up to six new divisions are now being set up in DENMARK. The enemy's present attitude is consistent with a determination to fight for the North German ports as long as possible and as for South as possible. His resistance is at its weakest against the Russians who are further from the major ports of GERMANY than the other Allies. It is at its stiffest around HAMBURG and at the approaches to WILHELMSHAVEN where 1 Para Army, making the most of difficult marshy country and extensive minefields, is causing our progress to be slow. There has been a certain amount of rail movement from DENMARK Southwards towards HAMBURG during the week, suggesting that the enemy is determined to make an even stiffer fight there than he did at BREMEN. New identifications during the past week have largely reflected the results of the fusion of the two fronts. North of the link-up, apart from a number of miscellaneous battlegroups, three divisions which had formerly been fighting the Russians have appeared on the Anglo-American front. The reshuffle of enemy divisions appears so far to be wholly Westwards and we have no evidence that enemy divisions have moved to the Russian sector which had previously been on the Anglo-American front.

Meanwhile further North the move of 199 Inf Div from NORWAY to DENMARK should now be nearly complete, and the next formation due to come over, reported to be 7 Mtn Div, may be forming up. The difficulties of transfer across the SKAGERRAK are likely to increase sharply from now on as the number of targets available to the Allied Air Forces decreases. The morale of the garrisons in NORWAY is reported to be low in the extreme. Many of them Austrians, lacking both the stiffening presence of S.S. formations, and the stimulus of battle conditions, they are likely to be of limited value when organised German resistance in Central EUROPE has ended.

3. SOUTH GERMAN ZONE

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AUSTRIA

The enemy is still showing considerable determination to prevent Allied incursions into BOHEMIA and MORAVIA although few new factors have emerged in the Czechoslovak situation during the week. Army Group Centre is conducting a skilful withdrawal from SLOVAKIA, suffering relatively few casualties as it pulls back. The main enemy weakness has been near the boundary between Army Groups Centre and South at BRNO. This is a fairly recent alteration in boundary, and 29 Corps which as a result passed from Army Group South to Centre seems to have been a little unsettled by the change, for it gave up BRNO rather readily. Army Group South now under the command of Col-Gen RENDULIC, one time commander of 20 Mtn in FINLAND, continues to offer stubborn resistance along the whole front from BRNO to the DANUBE. In the DANUBE Valley the front has remained quiet and the main development has been the transfer of 2 S.S. Pz Div from East to West. It has moved from the ST. POLTEN sector to PASSAU where it has been in contact with the Seventh U.S. Army. In the ST. POLTEN area the Soviets have now identified all three regiments of 10 Parachute Div. What appears to be its sister formation, 11 Parachute Division, is reported to be in the GRAZ area. Between the DANUBE and the DRAVA a certain amount of reshuffling is taking place on 6 Army and 2 Pz Army front, the effect of which has been to strengthen the approaches to GRAZ along the RABA Valley at the expense of the MARIBOR sector. 2 Pz Army whose sector lies between the RABA and DRAVA rivers is believed to have passed back to command of Army Group E from Army Group South.

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At the Western approaches to AUSTRIA, the 19 Army in the Black Forest has completely collapsed. The small pocket believed to contain miscellaneous elements of 805 Administrative Staff was encircled and speedily eliminated and the enemy is no longer offering any effective resistance along the Swiss frontier. Nor is the situation on the remainder of Army Group G's front much healthier. The temporary show of coherence which had been achieved as a result of the switch over of forces from the Upper RHINE to the NUREMBERG area was short lived. New divisions such as 20 S.S. NIEDERWEN composed largely of 17 year olds with two weeks training have appeared; so too have a few ad hoc mobilisation divisions: but they have been of little avail in stemming the Allied advance. For the first time there have been indications of serious internal unrest amongst the Germans and about 28 April an attempt at seizing control of the MUNICH Radio Station seems to have been made by the representatives of the so-called Bavarian Freedom Party. No reliable details of this are available; in any case the city was in Allied hands two days later.

The enemy situation on Army Group G's front has deteriorated most rapidly in the region East and N.E. of Lake CONSTANCE. Here our forces advancing into Alpine terrain North of INNSBRUCK have so far met only scattered opposition, and demolitions on terrain have imposed more serious delays than any resistance. Latest reports put them some 10 miles North of INNSBRUCK which is well into the area reported to constitute the National Socialist Redoubt. There are however reports that the enemy opposition is stiffening in the area of MITTENWALD (D 67), although no reliable identification of the enemy forces offering the resistance has been reported. North of MUNICH opposition is at its stiffest along the ISAR river, but in general there is no coherence about the enemy's resistance and isolated units are left to fight on long after the others have withdrawn. There is still the framework of at least 26 divisions within Army Group G and this includes four ad hoc divisions which have appeared within the past few days. The enemy's skill at pulling new divisions out of the bag is shown by the appearance on the Anglo-American fronts (including the fortress of West HOLLAND) of fifteen new divisions in the past three weeks. This compares with the appearance of only seven divisions formerly opposing the Russians.

YUGOSLAVIA

In SLAVONIA, the story is of a rapid and successful enemy withdrawal not seriously hampered by Yugoslav action. The enemy line between the DRAVA and SAVA rivers is held by 15 Cossack Corps to the North and 21 Mtn Corps to the South with 1 Cossack, 11 G.A.F., 41 Inf, 7 S.S. Mtn and 22 Inf Divs all in contact with the Yugoslavs. It now seems improbable that the enemy will halt until he is back in the LJUBLJANA area and the whole of the Balkan salient has been finally eliminated.

Meanwhile on the 4th Yugoslav Army front spectacular headway has been made. A landing was effected at PARENZO (J 11) on the East coast of ISTRIA on 26 April and drove Westwards as far as PISINO (H 92) and Northwards to BUZET (H 23) against light enemy resistance. Meanwhile, striking North of FIUME, the main Yugoslav force has cut across the neck of the Istrian peninsula with remarkable speed. TRIESTE has been captured after the bulk of the Istrian garrison had pulled back into the city. Virtually all ISTRIA apart from POLA is now lost to the Germans. Further South, FIUME itself has fallen. The Yugoslavs believe that the bulk of the 188 Mtn Div had moved down to FIUME from the TRIESTE area, and that this like 237 Inf Div was trapped in FIUME.

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Apart from these two divisions there have been no identifications of note in the past week. The division which has recently arrived in the KARLOVAC (H 25) area from the SREM is reported to be 181 Inf Div.

THE NATIONAL REDOUBT

Developments on Army Group C's front have seriously affected the enemy's capabilities of prolonged resistance in the Redoubt. The deep penetration in the direction of INNSBRUCK strikes into an area where according to one source the supreme headquarters of the Redoubt is to be located. It is too early yet to say that the concept of the Redoubt is nullified by these developments; but the speed of our advance has been such that it is doubtful whether the enemy will have time to withdraw any substantial forces back into AUSTRIA before the Allies are there. Already the BREGENZ area, consistently reported as a large headquarters and dump region, is outflanked to the East. Nevertheless supplies are still coming in to AUSTRIA from CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and the heavy Southward movement along the PRAGUE - LINZ line has continued throughout the week. There has been no further photographic evidence of defensive measures nor of dump construction, while ground reports on the build-up of stocks become progressively wilder as the war draws nearer its end. KESSELRING and SCHORNER (of Army Group Centre) vie for place as the C in C of the Redoubt according to ground reports, with the odds slightly on KESSELRING. From the mass of reports available it does seem fairly certain that a major headquarters, possibly O.K.W., is now in the SALZBURG area. A report from SHAEF suggests that OKH and OKW have now both split into two distinct commands, North and South, and it is at least feasible that the Southern halves should set themselves up in the reasonably central location of SALZBURG. The suggestion is confirmed by air reports of hutted camps being built near SALZBURG. However all reliable reports received latterly deal with headquarters and personalities and not with troops; and without troops the Redoubt will not be of much value. Moreover with HIMMLER now toying with the idea of peace, the fanatical enthusiasts to man the Redoubt may be hard to come by. The German soldier is losing heart everywhere and he will not much relish the Redoubt idea now. The end of the war is imminent and he has lost it. And he knows it.

Col GSC


for C.B.R. HIRSCH,
BRIGADIER, G.S.
A.C. OF S, G-2.

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THE SEVENTH ARMY IN SICILY

PUBLISHED SEPTEMBER 1943 BY
THE STAFF OF THE SEVENTH ARMY

REPRODUCED BY
THE 62ND ENGINEER TOP COMPANY

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO #758 U.S. Army

1 October 1943.

SUBJECT: Report of Operations.

TO : Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 10 of Army Regulations 345-105, as changed to include March 9, 1943, there is submitted herewith the report of operations of the United States Seventh Army in the Sicilian campaign. This report includes the planning phase as well as the operations. The operations phase covers, specifically, the period July 10 to August 17, 1943.

2. Inasmuch as this report on operations is reproduced by multiple copy methods, the original records called for in paragraph 11 of the Army Regulations above cited, are being submitted to your office only. They have not been reproduced for the general distribution being given this report.

For the Commanding General:

ROBERT E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Deputy Chief of Staff (A)

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FOREWORD

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO # 758
U.S. Army

Palermo, Sicily
15 September 1943.

This report is submitted in considerable detail in that it describes a complete operation of the Seventh Army from its inception to its victorious conclusion.

During the course of this campaign every type of operation, every type of arm - some improvised - was employed, and every sort of obstacle surmounted.

As is ever the case, the success was achieved through the untiring efforts of the staff; through the brilliant leadership of our officers from corps and division commanders to platoon leaders - but chiefly and above all, through the disciplined heroism and tireless devotion of that incomparable fighting man - the American Soldier.

G. S. Patton, Jr.

G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.



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The scheme followed throughout this report is for each staff section to submit a complete report of the activities as apply to the section concerned. Part I, "Summary of Operations", is followed by "Lessons Learned" from the Army point of view. In all other cases, in Part II the conclusions and recommendations have been included in section sub-reports. However, for the purpose of emphasis, it is deemed advisable to preface this report by outlining in brief some of the basic and common mistakes which have been obvious in the two amphibious operations conducted by this Headquarters, namely, TORCH and HUSKY.

I - CHANNELS OF COMMAND

Definite channels of command should be set up immediately after the conception of the operation. The channel of command, from the task force commander to the highest authority, should be definite and direct. No subsidiary or adjacent headquarters should be included in this command channel.

II - ASSIGNMENT OF TROOPS

All troops selected for the operation should be placed directly under the command of the task force commander. This command should be all-embracing. Troops should not be under one command for training, and under another command for administrative purposes.

III - T/O STRENGTH

All combat units should be brought up to T/O strength, plus 15% for enlisted men and officers of junior grade, and all personnel frozen. This is of vital importance if the small combat units such as boat teams, platoons, etc., are to go into action full strength. It should be a recognized fact that due to sickness and other reasons, approximately 10 to 15% of any command will not be available to the commander on D-day. Therefore, in order to have completely trained teams made up of men accustomed to working together, an over-strength must be provided at the earliest possible moment.

IV - JOINT PLANNING

In operations of an amphibious nature, it is absolutely essential that all services represented, i.e., Ground, Air and Navy, should be housed together or adjacent to each other during the entire planning stage. Failure to do so results in confusion, inefficiencies, and unwarranted delay.

V - FORCES NEEDED

Competent authority should decide exactly what forces are needed to accomplish the mission, and then shipping should be provided to lift the forces, rather than the customary method of reducing the forces estimated to be needed to fit the shipping available.

VI - OFFICIAL OBSERVERS - VISITORS

The exact number of official observers and/or visitors from higher headquarters should be known to the commander well in advance of D-day; this, in order that proper accommodations and space may be allotted to them on the different ships, and in order to prevent last minute interruptions and changes.

VII - VISITORS TO COMBAT AREA

No official observers or visitors should be allowed to come to the combat area without receiving prior authority from the force commander. Reports made by said observers should be submitted through the headquarters of the force commander.

VIII - G-2 ACTIVITIES

All persons connected with intelligence activities should be placed under one head, namely, the task force commander, who would exercise this authority through his Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. It is worthy of note that in the HUSKY operation there were many uncorrelated G-2 activities which resulted in no little confusion.

IX - MESSAGE CENTERS

The message center of the force commander is the nerve center of the entire operation. It should be in charge of at least two officers of field rank, and officers of mature and seasoned judgment.

X - HEADQUARTERS

Headquarters, whether on land or sea, must be adequate in size to accommodate all personnel concerned, and the communication set-up must be ample to handle the heavy traffic that normally accompanies amphibious operations, both during the planning and the operational phase.

XI - MILITARY DISCIPLINE-COURTESY, UNIFORM REGULATIONS

Higher headquarters should make clear to all services, and to all Allied Forces, where applicable, that the task force commander is responsible for, and will make rules concerning, good order, military discipline, courtesy, uniform regulations, etc., within the theater of operations.

XII - REPLACEMENTS

In order to provide proper means for handling of replacements and for the handling of men released from hospitals, a Replacement Battalion should be assigned to the force and should be brought into the combat zone as soon as practical. The number of replacements needed should be anticipated well in advance of the operation. Replacements should be available to task force commander well in advance of D-day and throughout the entire operation so that units can be kept up to efficient operational strength.

Hobart R. Gay

HOBART R. GAY,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

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NOTE: Page numbers for each section of the report are preceded by the letters listed above.


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PART I

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

a. the Plan



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The United Nations' transition from the "end of the beginning" to the "beginning of the end" is spanned by the history of the United States Seventh Army.

For though it had a new name - acquired at sea as its embattled convoys bore down upon the Sicilian coast - the Seventh Army was not a new organization. The same Commander, essentially the same staff, and many of the same troops had once before shared the title "greatest amphibious force in history." As the Western Task Force, they had ended the beginning with the assault on North Africa in November, 1942. As the Seventh Army they began the end with the attack on Sicily that opened the first breach in the European fortress.

That continuity of history had a profound effect on the success of the Sicilian assault for the staff as well as the troops had had the benefit of experience. Lessons of the "Torch" operation were well learned; its mistakes were rectified, and the result was an operation as well planned and as smoothly executed as the uncertain fortunes of war permit.

The Torch operation was hardly three months past, its lessons were still being studied, when the decision to put that experience to a new test was made. The Western Task Force had reassumed its old name, the I Armored Corps. It was based at Casablanca, French Morocco, in January, 1943, when at that very place, though unknown to most of its members, its future was being decided.

In the suburb of Anfa, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met to discuss the future conduct of the war. They and their staffs, looking months ahead to the successful conclusion of the North African campaign, planned the knock-out of Italy - to start with the invasion of Sicily in July.

Less than three weeks after the end of the Anfa Conference, the complex machinery of planning had been set in motion. On February 12, Planning Instruction No. 1 was issued by Force 141, the planning headquarters set up in Algiers under General Sir Harold Alexander.

The "favorable July moon" was designated as the target date. The forces were to be of sufficient strength to guarantee success and were to consist of:

Combined Allied Forces

Commander in Chief	General Eisenhower
Force 141 (Combined Allied Ground Forces)	General Alexander
Force 545 (One British Field Army)	General Montgomery
Force 343 (American Task Force)	Lt. General Patton
American and British Naval Forces	Admiral Cunningham
American and British Air Forces	Air Chief Marshal Tedder

Although the planning instruction anticipated that I Armored Corps' planning work would be done initially at Casablanca, then probably at Oran, an interim move to Rabat was already under way when the instructions were issued. An advance detachment had left on the ninth of February and had chosen the Chamber of Commerce building in the Moroccan capital for the headquarters. On the 23rd the move was completed.

By this date, chiefs of the principal staff sections had been informed that the headquarters was entering a planning phase, and on the fifth of March a letter from Allied Force Headquarters designated the units to be assigned to Force 343, for an amphibious operation to begin as soon as possible after the end of the Tunisian Campaign.

They were: Headquarters, I Armored Corps; Headquarters, VI Army Corps; one Combat Command of 2nd Armored Division; 3rd Infantry Division; 36th Infantry Division; 45th Infantry Division from the United States and the 1st or 9th Infantry Division.

On March 11, the G-2 section opened the special planning room in the basement of the headquarters building in Rabat and began assembling research material on Sicily. This section was the first to detail personnel on a full time basis to the HUSKY plan, realizing that it would have to lay intelligence groundwork before other sections could begin planning. One officer, a draftsman and a stenographer became the nucleus of a planning staff which, within a few months, was to total hundreds of workers.

This group began work on an "Outline of Intelligence Information on Sicily", known to the staff as the "Black Book". Composed principally of extracts from secret reports, the Black Book summarized all information available at that time. It covered general topography, communication and transportation facilities, beaches, defenses, military resources and battle order, and financial, political and social factors.

To point up essential features of the island, an early G-2 project was the preparation of special overlays for general display. Drawn in color on translucent acetate sheets, the overlays showed terrain, roads, railroads and disposition of enemy troops. They were made to fit over the standard 1:100,000 map of the island, but a more impressive use of them was on a specially-built backlighted frame that made it possible to view at once any desired combination of features. Used by G-2 itself for making estimates of enemy capabilities, the overlays were also kept on permanent display for the use of any member of the planning staff.

Hardly less important, in the early phase, was G-2's responsibility for securing of the headquarters and its growing files of military secrets. The principle established was that the personnel informed of the plan should be kept to a minimum and that those informed should be given only such information as their particular duties required. A classification system, covering both officers and enlisted men, was set up, and the Provost Marshal section provided special guards for the planning room to which only classified personnel were admitted. The list was lengthened whenever necessary, but even at embarkation time, there were still some members of the headquarters who did not know where they were going.

The reversion of Western Task Force to a type corps had involved the loss of a substantial portion of its experienced personnel. The new assignment imposed on G-1 the task of bringing all sections up to the strength required by rapidly growing duties. On March 18, G-1 directed the staff sections to submit personnel requirements, together with names of those specially desired. On the 27th, the first large request was submitted: 14 officers by name from the Fifth Army, 13 from Atlantic Base Section, 11 from other units; and 17 by qualification from units or replacement depots. Soon afterward, arrangements were made with ABS and MBS depots for lists of available officers and for personal interviews by G-1. NATOUSA gave authority to select any in grade of Captain and higher. On April 6, T/O 110-1, modified, was approved for the headquarters, authorizing a strength of 178 officers. Actual strength at that time was 85.

Probing both past and future for data on which to base an estimate, G-1 on March 26 submitted its first requisition for medals for the Sicilian Campaign. They ranged from eight Medals of Honor to 15,000 Purple Hearts and 125,000 African Campaign Medals and battle stars. These represented one-half of the estimated requirements.

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FISH FORCE
36 (–IRCT)
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GROG FORCE
RCT 36 DIV
RCT 45 DIV

HOOK FORCE
45 (–IRCT)
R

HOOK
GROG
FISH

26
TRAPANI
CASTELLAMMARE
D+5 ASSAULT

PALERMO
203
PARTS OF DIVISION INCORPORATED IN
208
AND
213
BY APRIL 25

208
TAKEN OVER BY 213 BY 25 APRIL

MESSINA
S. AGATA DE MILITELLO
S. STEFANO
S. FRATELLO
NASO
RATTI
RACCUIA
BARCELLONA
CASTROREALE
NOVARA
S. TERESA DI RIVA
208
TAORMINA
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MARSALA
MAZARA DEL VALLO
CASTELVETRANO
CAMPOBELLO DI MAZARA
SALEMI
S. NINFA
GIBELLINA
PARTANNA
S. MARGHERITA
SAMBUCA
MENFI
OBJ D+4
A
B
G
OBJ D+2
CORLEONE
S. CIPIRELLO
CHIUSA
CALTAVUTURO
PETRALIA
GANGI
CERDA
B
C
G
H
26
NICOSIA
SIXTH
AGIRA
LEONFORTE
REGALBUTO
CENTURIPE
ADRANO
BRONTE
RANDAZZO
CESARO
LINGUAGLOSSA
GIARRE
C
H
J
TREMESTIERI
ACIREALE
CATANIA
PATERNO
BELPASSO
MASCALUCIA
202
ENSA FORCE
3
A
2
D+2 ASSAULT
FROM ROME (STAGING FOR TUNISIA) BY 7 APRIL
XXX
XXVIII
X
54
54
PIAZZA ARMERINA
RAMACCA
CALTAGIRONE
GRAMMICHELE
MILITELLO IN VAL DI CATANIA
LENTINI
AUGUSTA
207
AMERICAN XXXX
BRITISH XXXX
OBJ D+2 BY 25 APRIL
D–DAY ASSAULT
SIRACUSA
COMMANDO
ACID FORCE
5
56
DIME
OBJ D+2
VITTORIA
MODICA
RAGUSA
NOTO
AVOLA
F G
L M
G H
M N
H J
N O
206
CENT 78
BARK FORCE
231
SICILY
SCALE 1:750000

ALLIED FORCES BLUE
COASTAL FORCES GREEN
ITALIAN FIRST LINE TROOPS BROWN

PLANNING PHASE
MARCH – APRIL
- PLATE I
SHOWING ORIGINAL ALLIED PLAN
(HUSKY)

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INITIAL PLAN

Meanwhile initial plans for the assault were being developed. A preliminary discussion was held at Force 141 headquarters on March 18 where Forces 141, 343, and 545 were represented. One week later the outline plan was issued. (See Plate 1) It called for a British assault on Southeastern Sicily, between Augusta and Gela, on D-Day, and two distinct American assaults: The ENSA Force (3rd Division Reinforced) was to attack the Sciacca-Mazara area of Southwestern Sicily on D plus two; and on D plus five, the FISH Force (36th Division) was to land in the Castellamare area; the HOOK Force (45th Division) in the Capaci area, and the GROG Force (1 RCT of 36th Division and 1 RCT of the 45th Division) in the Trappeto area, all in Northwestern Sicily. 82nd Airborne Division, less parachute elements assisting ENSA, was to be prepared to assist the western assault on call after D plus two.

This entire plan was predicated upon the North African Campaign ending by April 30. The sustained drive of the British Eighth Army across Libya, the operations of the American II Corps and British First Army in Tunisia, were closely followed by the Force 343 planning staff - not only because the outcome of that campaign would have a decisive effect on their own, but also because there were many specific lessons to be learned.

One of the most important of these was the necessity for being able to pass minefields, planted profusely by retreating German units. The Engineer Section, early in the planning period, undertook an extensive program of mine training and experimenting. During March the 17th Armored Engineers were experimenting in the use of bangalore torpedoes to clear minefields and at the end of the month an Engineer detail was also sent to the Eighth Army mine school at Tripoli to study British methods. A special convoy was sent to Tunisia to collect German mines for experiment and training. So important was this type of training considered that it was proposed to fly sufficient mines to the United States to enable the 45th Division to load them on its transports for study during the trans-Atlantic crossing. This plan was found impractical. Throughout the planning period close liaison was maintained with the Fifth Army mine school and with mine instruction at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center, and during June officers of the Engineer Section visited all Army Engineer Units to supervise mine, as well as camouflage, training.

OTHER SPECIAL TROOPS

Other special Army troops also engaged in training programs throughout the Spring. Pending arrival from the United States of the motorized chemical battalions assigned to the operation, tests of white phosphorus shells, colored smoke grenades and flame throwers were conducted by units already in North Africa. On orders of the Commanding General efforts were made to obtain as large a supply as possible of WP smoke grenades. Following the arrival of the three chemical battalions, demonstrations of the 4.2 inch chemical mortar, firing high explosive and white phosphorus, were held for the Chief of Staff. To reduce the weight carried by assault troops, the Chemical Section also arranged for all troops in the assault to be equipped with training gas masks, in place of the bulky service masks.

Basic first aid training was checked in all units by the Medical Section, which also made complete studies of intelligence material on Sicily to prepare for special medical problems likely to be encountered during the operation. All hospitals, as well as hotels and schools that might serve as emergency hospitals, were listed, and information on diseases peculiar to the island was studied. Army medical units were requisitioned and assembled for training, and plans for evacuation of casualties drawn up.

The training of Signal troops presented a problem during the planning phase because only one Signal battalion and two division Signal companies had had any combat experience. The units which took no part in the Tunisian Campaign had been operating the communication agencies at various headquarters and had little or no opportunity to carry on an adequate Signal training program. Most of the available Signal training schools had lengthy courses (six weeks to three months), and it was felt that there was not enough time to send troops to these schools.

The training of all radio operators in Link sign procedure, as ordered by AFHQ, was begun with two one-day schools at Mostaganem. Representatives of most of the Signal units attended.

Training in the use and maintenance of the British Speech plus Simplex and Speech plus Duplex equipment was given at the request of the Signal Officer, I Armored Corps, for members of the 1st Armored Signal Battalion to whom the equipment was to be made available.

Training in the installation, operation and maintenance of Signal Corps carrier equipment was given at a seven day school conducted by the Mediterranean Base Section for a limited number of men.

In the selection of Quartermaster troops for the operation, training of units had to be taken for granted. Those already in the theater were engaged in the same type of work expected of them in the operation, but under different conditions. Those enroute to the theater arrived too late to enter into any comprehensive training program.

ASSAULT UNITS

The movement, training, and staging of major assault units scheduled for the HUSKY Operation during the planning phase was centered about the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center at Port Aux Poules, Algeria (Arzew Area). This area was made available for the amphibious training of the 1st Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 2nd Armored Division, 1st Engineer Amphibious Brigade, and later, the 45th Division. The 82nd Airborne Division did not move into the Arzew area, but moved directly from Casablanca to its training area near Oujda and finally to the staging area near Kariouan, Tunisia.

The 45th Division was combat-loaded in the United States and reached Oran on June 22nd. This division conducted its rehearsal in Arzew gulf on June 24-25, and after five days' conditioning training at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center reloaded for the operation. Movement of assault units attached to the various sub-task forces was accomplished during the period May 1 to June 22, 1943. This movement involved the use of road, rail, water, and airborne transportation facilities from one end of Africa to the other.

The special training for the operation consisted of amphibious full scale rehearsals by the separate sub-task forces. Amphibious training by units consisted of loading units with all personnel and equipment into ships and craft (as planned for the operation), and then approaching a selected beach and debarking under simulated combat conditions during daylight and in darkness. These exercises were conducted at least once by each unit while training at FAITC, and more than once by most units.

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PLANNING PHASE
SHOWING FINAL ALLIED PLAN
MAY – JUNE
(HUSKY)

208 213 202 207 206

PALERMO TRAPANI MARSALA MESSINA CATANIA SIRACUSA

CENTRAL SUPPORT GROUP, SIZE UNKNOWN

XXXX SIXTH

ALLIED TROOPS
COASTAL TROOPS
ITALIAN FIRST LINE TROOPS
GERMAN TROOPS
(B.G. = BATTLE GROUP)

BLUE
GREEN
BROWN
RED

JOSS FORCE
3
2
3 RNG.

AMERICAN LANDING

DIME FORCE
1 (-18 RCT)
1 RNGR
4 RNGR
1 E 39 (C)

PARA TASK FORCE
505 RCT
3 504

SHARK FORCE

CENT FORCE
45
753 (M)

RESERVES
IN NORTH AFRICA
82 A/B (-)
9

AFLOAT KOOL FORCE
HQ 2
B 2 (-)
18 RCT

LINE BLUE
LINE YELLOW
LINE

3 DIV

BRITISH LANDING
ACID
BARK
FORCE 343
FORCE 545
1 CAN
SICILY BRITISH 12TH ARMY
78 (RESERVE)

SCALE 1:750 000

PLATE 2

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Various types of training for small units in special operations were conducted in conjunction with amphibious training. Other special training included the use of live ammunition, simulating battle conditions to such an extent as to give the individual soldier the maximum of preparation for battle, Beach defenses were constructed to give the troops opportunity to by-pass such obstacles.

Units which did not engage in unit amphibious training at the FAITC sent selected cadres to schools in water-proofing of vehicles for driving in water, transport loading, and unloading of ships and craft. These cadres were then returned to their units to instruct the remaining personnel.

Special courses in driving and maintenance Dukws (2½ ton Amphibious trucks) were conducted by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade at Port Aux Poules in order to train drivers for the large numbers of Dukws received just prior to the operation.

It was impossible to conduct rehearsals with all units participating, but rehearsals followed the same scheme of maneuver as planned for the actual operation and were on a scale as near full strength as possible. It gave all sub-task forces the benefit of a dry-run.

Following the rehearsals, sub-task forces were assembled in staging areas for final loading of units to ship in the assault movement. Location of staging areas was determined by location of sub-task forces at the end of rehearsals, available bivouac areas, dock space for loading ships, protection of ships and craft from enemy sea and air, the necessity for maintaining the maximum secrecy, and the type of ships or craft in which units were to be lifted.

In late April, Headquarters I Armored Corps moved from Rabat, Morocco, to the same stretch of Algerian coast where many of its major units were training and rehearsing for the HUSKY operation. The forward echelon was officially established in the College Communal in Mostaganem on the 26th. Three days later, the classified HUSKY planning group, which still comprised only a small portion of the staff, arrived in Mostaganem by a special, fast, heavily-guarded convoy. Its maps and overlays, and its files of planning instructions and intelligence material, were deposited in the secret joint map room which had been prepared in advance.

Soon, however, the volume of planning work had grown to such an extent that it overflowed the confines of the joint map room. More and more personnel of the staff sections were classified, more and more offices in the school building were roped off, placed under special guard and given over exclusively to planning work.

While the HUSKY plan was being worked out in Mostaganem, the headquarters rear echelon was operating at Oran. Routine administrative and personnel matters were handled there, as well as details of the HUSKY supply plan that required coordination with SOS NATOUSA.

Communication and liaison between staffs working on the HUSKY plan were in themselves major operations. The 343 staff was split into two widely separated echelons. Some troops under control of Force 343 were on the east coast of the United States, others were scattered from Casablanca to Bizerte, a distance of over 1,000 miles. Headquarters at Oran, Mostaganem, Algiers, La Marsa, Malta, and even Cairo had to be tied together into fast-working channels. A constant stream of intelligence material, directives, requisitions, inquiries and miscellaneous correspondence flowed back and forth across half a continent - and on to London and Washington.

Preparing, sending and receiving and safeguarding an immense volume of highly classified matter taxed to the utmost the facilities and personnel of the Adjutant General and Signal Sections. Hundreds of papers were registered daily. Special courier routes were established, direct teletype lines installed between major headquarters, radio nets and their accompanying code rooms placed in constant operation, and telephone circuits opened and kept open.

But there is no adequate substitute for direct contact and throughout the planning period general and special staff officers attended conferences and visited back and forth to discuss the manifold problems presented by the plan.

On April 23, there was a meeting at Headquarters Force 343, Rabat, presided over by the Commanding General and attended by senior commanders, and senior staff officers of I Armored Corps, and representative of Force 141. At this meeting General Patton gave an introduction and the general plan for the HUSKY Operation.

The next day Force 141 decided, in response to a request from Force 343, to substitute the 1st Infantry Division for the proposed 36th Infantry Division if the Tunisian Campaign ended in time to make the change possible. Just a month later, after the Tunisian Campaign closed, the II Corps was substituted for the VI Corps.

CHANGE IN PLAN

On May 3, the plan of attack of Force 343 was changed from the western end of the island to the beaches between Pozzalo and Licata in the southeast. The outline plan of the new JOSS-DIME-CENT assault was published on the 18th of May. The general mission was to assault the southeastern portion of Sicily in conjunction with the 12th British Army and capture it as a base for further operations. (See Plate 2).

The specific mission of the new assault plan called for landing and operating west of the line VIZZINI - RAGUSA - POZALLO, all exclusive; to seize and hold the airfields just north of Comiso and at Ponte Olivo and the air landing fields at Biscari and northwest of Licata; to seize and operate the small port at Licata; and to prepare for further operations under the directions of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force.

The scheme of maneuver was to make a simultaneous assault in the Licata - Gela - Sampieri area in order to capture the airfields and the port of Licata by dark on D plus 2; to extend the beachhead to the general line (YELLOW), PALMA DI MONTECHIARO - CAMPOBELLO - MAZZARINO - CALTEGIRONE - GRAMMICHELE, and to the east to contact the British in the vicinity of RAGUSA; to include (BLUE) the high ground in the vicinity of PIAZZA AMERINA - AIDONE to prevent hostile interference from the Northwest.

The CENT - DIME Assault was to be under the immediate command of Lieutenant General O. N. BRADLEY, II Corps. The participating troops were to be the 1st Division (-1 RCT), 45th Division, 2 Ranger Battalions, 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, Paratroops (82nd Airborne Division), and supporting troops.

This Assault Group had three immediate missions: (1) Under cover of darkness to D Day to land in the Gela - Sampieri area and to capture and secure the airfield at Ponte Olivo by daylight on D plus one; the airfield north of Comiso by daylight of D plus two, and the air landing field north of Biscari by dark of D plus two. (2) To extend the beachhead to YELLOW and gain contact with the British in the vicinity of Ragusa to make contact with the 3rd Infantry Division on the left.

The JOSS assault, commanded by Major General L. K. TRUSCOTT, was to comprise the 3rd Infantry Division, Combat Command A of the Second Armored Division, one

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
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VISUAL OBSERVATION PLAN D DAY TO D+5 INCL

PLATE 3



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Ranger Battalion and supporting troops, and was to land in the Licata area. It was to capture and secure the port and airfield by dark of D Day, extend the beachhead to YELLOW, protect the left flank of the operation against interference from the northwest, and on its right flank, to make contact with II Corps.

The Force 343 Reserve was to consist of three principal elements: The KOOL force, under Major General HUGH GAFFEY, made up of elements of the Second Armored Division (less Combat Command A), one RCT of the 1st Infantry Division, and supporting troops, was to sail with the assault and be prepared to land in support of any of the assaults; the 82nd Airborne Division less paratroop elements was to be prepared to support the assault on call after H-Hour on D-Day; 1 RCT and Division artillery of the 9th Infantry Division was to be alerted to move from Bizerte on call of the Commanding General, Force 343, after D-Day.

The WOLF Force composed of one Parachute RCT reinforced, from 82nd Airborne Division was to assist DIME Force in landing and capture of airfield in vicinity of Ponte Olivo night of D minus 1, D-Day (prior to seaborne assault) and be attached to II Corps upon contact on land.

In the case of some staff sections, the change in plan had little effect and they continued working along the same lines as before. In the case of others, however, many weeks of work had to be done over from the beginning.

Again much of the initial burden fell on G-2, whose intelligence material had to be amended and supplemented to cover the new area. A new intelligence plan and new G-2 estimates were written during subsequent days. New overlays, similar to those covering the western half of the island, were prepared first for the southeast, and then for the northeast portions of the island. Frequent conferences were held with the Engineer Section to rearrange priorities on map publication.

Arrangements were also made to transfer to Force 343 the beach models for the Gela and Licata sectors. These relief models, produced by Army Engineers showed beaches, towns and terrain features in exact detail; a model of its own landing area was delivered to each sub-task force involved. In addition, a 1:100,000 terrain model of the entire island was made during the planning phase, and carried with the G-2 combat intelligence section throughout the operation.

As additional intelligence information became available, a steady stream of battle order, terrain and miscellaneous information emanated from G-2 to the other staff sections and the sub task forces. On May 10 the first of a series of general information bulletins was published, the series continuing until the end of the operation.

Photographic intelligence became the principal source of detailed information during the planning period. Starting with only one officer in March, the photo interpretation section expanded steadily until by D-Day it comprised 35 Officers and 70 Enlisted Men. Prior to D-Day, sorties flown by the North African Photo Reconnaissance Wing, yielded 195,000 prints and 1,400 assembled mosaics.

Information gleaned by interpreters was disseminated in special over-printed collation maps and a series of written interpretation reports.

To take full advantage of this important activity and its immediate effect on operations during a critical period, there were arranged plans for both visual air observation (Plate 3) and photographic reconnaissance from D to D+5 (plate 4). These were to be used in case of emergency in the event of unsatisfactory communications, bearing in mind that radio silence was to be effective until ordered lifted on the morning of D Day.

During the operation proper, there was considerable satisfaction in knowing that these two important activities were being provided for, even though it was impossible to gain contact through direct channels. Arrangement was made with the tactical reconnaissance unit, which was performing the visual observation, that lacking suitable communications, steps would be taken through air command channels for the honoring of requests against targets so disclosed, and arrangements were also made in advance for the reporting of any results of photographic reconnaissance for immediate action from Africa, where both of these units had to be located initially. Bombardment missions were executed without further orders from this headquarters as a result of the combined activities, and the Navy interpreters who had joined the Interpreters Group transmitted over radio broadcast channels, such information as it was deemed essential either for the landing or against targets found subsequently based on both of these services.

SUPPLY

The section principally affected by the change in plan was G-4, which had to revamp its plan of supply. As originally outlined, the Force 343 operation would have included early capture of the port of Palermo, and smaller ports in the west of the island. But the new area did not boast a single important port and plans therefore had to provide for supply over the beaches for a period of thirty days, if necessary, before a port could be captured.

The force was to be initially equipped, and supplied until D plus 14, from North African sources. On D plus 14, the first convoy loaded in the United States was to put in at Sicilian ports.

The basic supply plan was to provide the soldier with the essentials for combat and not overload him or the beaches with unnecessary supplies.

The general plan for execution of the supply mission was that sub-task force commanders were to be responsible for their own supply from ships and other landing craft over the beaches or through any sub-ports, to include the operation of all beachheads until that duty was taken over by Force 343.

When the supply activities were to be taken over by Force 343, the Commander, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, would assume command of the beach groups and of all non-divisional and non-corps units attached thereto and such necessary service units as might be attached by the Commanding General, and also be responsible for the execution of all supply plans within the theater of operations emanating from Force 343, including the operation of any seized ports.

Force 343 was to be responsible for the coordination with Headquarters SOS NATOUSA in the assembling of supplies at various ports of embarkation and their transportation to the theater of operations, and that supplies would be obtained from SOS NATOUSA and forwarded on an automatic basis or on special request by Task Force and Sub-Task Force Commanders.

The administrative channel for supply was to be from the Sub-Task Force Commanders and Army troops direct to Force 343. The II Corps was to have no administrative functions other than those pertaining to its Corps troops, except in emergency.

Initial maintenance was to be over the beaches until such time as a major port could be captured. Plans were accordingly made for continued beach maintenance for a period of at least thirty days. In the event that beach maintenance should prove inadequate, arrangements were made for a partial use of the Port of Syracuse after D plus 14. A force of 2,500 service troops loaded on one troop-


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PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE PLAN D DAY TO D+5 INCL

PLATE 4



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ship, two MT Store ships and two LST's were scheduled to arrive at Syracuse on D plus 10. Known as the American Liaison Group, these troops were intended to establish depots in the vicinity of Syracuse and to ship supplies forward to the Seventh Army.

Special staff sections with supply functions developed their plans to fit into this broad G-4 scheme. Service troops needed to execute the supply mission were obtained, requisitions were submitted to bring all units up to TBA and items unobtainable in North Africa were ordered from the United States.

Quartermaster submitted to SOS NATOUSA overall requisitions for Class I, II, III and IV supplies for an average strength of 130,000 troops for the period to D plus 30. Shortages of life belts, water cans and gasoline cans were anticipated and made up. Quartermaster innovations in this operation were such items as assault packs, an especially packed hospital supplement of the ration, a high proportion of pre-broken-down rations (5-in-1) and a large number of individual cook stoves.

Ordnance Supplies

Requisitioning of Ordnance supplies for the operation had begun in April, and by the end of the combat phase on August 17 had yielded 140,551 tons of Ordnance materiel. Phased requisitions for ammunition were so planned as to build up from the two and one half units of fire combat loaded for assault troops to a reserve of seven units of fire by D plus 40. In practice there were 80,000 tons of ammunition in Sicily by D plus 45.

The Ordnance planning section also arranged for preparation of "Assault and Follow Up Kits" of maintenance parts, including essential unit assemblies, standard hardware, special tools and cleaning and preserving materials. The assault kits were so packed that the heaviest of them could be carried easily by two men, no kits exceeding 100 pounds.

Artillery, Medical, Signal, Chemical Warfare and Engineer Sections also compiled detailed supply plans for the troops under their control, arranging for requisitioning, waterproofing, and packing of supplies and delivery to beach dumps.

Coordination and execution of these supply plans involved creation of two special agencies. One was the First Engineer Special Brigade, charged with unloading of craft and over-the-beach maintenance of the force; the other the G-4 Transportation Section, whose highway, water, rail and petroleum subsections grew to a total of 11 officers and 19 enlisted men to channel the movement of supplies.

Months of careful planning to assure that combat troops would never be wanting for any essential items bore their fruit in the success of the operation itself - and in records showing that 104,134 deadweight tons of supplies were moved over the beaches of Southern Sicily between the tenth and thirty-first of July.

As the planning phase entered into its critical final weeks, in mid-May, many major questions regarding the operation remained to be settled. Coordination with Air and Navy began to develop on the 19th and 20th of May, respectively, when an Air Corps liaison officer from Force 141 and a Naval liaison officer from Headquarters COMNAVNAW reported to 343.

At this time many of the units to be involved in the operation were not up to full strength - of a total of 9,250 replacements received after May 1, over one thousand reported during the last week before D-Day. Not until June 16 were personnel of HUSKY troops units frozen, preventing transfer to units not scheduled for the operation.

A definite channel of command was first established on June 10, when I Armored Corps, Reinforced, was relieved from assignment to the Fifth Army and assigned to Force 141. Until this time the headquarters had operated through dual channels, dealing directly with Force 141 on HUSKY matters, and through Fifth Army on routine administrative matters.

Air and Navy Targets

The vitally important decision on targets to be bombed by the Allied Air Forces before and during the operation and the selection of Naval gunfire targets was made after Force 343 submitted its third list of suggested targets on June 20th.

These were considered in great detail (see Plate 5). The targets were numbered in lettered category and by number in order of priority. Series "B" (one to nine in red in Plate 5), were considered as pre-D Day aerial bombardment targets, consisting of:

"1. A heavily fortified area consisting of 2 - 4 gun medium coastal batteries, numerous pillboxes and machine gun positions to important beaches where landings were contemplated.

2. A heavily fortified area between the highway and the sea consisting of 2 - 4 gun dual purpose batteries, many pillboxes and machine gun positions, all of which command the approaches to 3 beaches which were to be used. Troops approaching these beaches would be in full fire of this strongly fortified area.

3. A heavily fortified area consisting of 2 batteries. One battery was a 4 gun medium coastal battery commanding 4 beaches. The other battery was a 4 gun dual purpose commanding the approaches to 3 beaches.

4. A strongly defended area one mile North of the coast consisting of a 4 gun medium howitzer battery and machine gun positions. This point commanded the approaches to 2 important beaches.

5. A heavily fortified position on a knoll between the sea and the road and railroad one mile North. A 4 gun battery in the middle of the area. This position commanded the approaches to beaches directly in front, to the West, and to the East of the position. There were 10 pillboxes and 15 machine gun positions in the area.

6. A strong point consisting of pillboxes, machine guns and AA guns concentrated on the beach East of the town on both sides of the river. This strong point overlooked 2 beaches.

7. A strong point astride an important highway.

8. A newly constructed 4 gun medium coastal battery commanding the approaches to five beaches which were to be used.

9. A 4 gun medium coastal battery commanding the approaches to four beaches."


Series "C" were considered as special air targets and were listed as:

"1. A special air mission was suggested for both of these targets simultaneously. The town (B) was a focal highway and road center besides being the living quarters for troops who could interfere with the paratroop landing. The other area (a) was a strong point in the middle of the paratroop drop area. These targets were to be attacked just prior to the paratroop attack.

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LEGEND:

Pre D-Day Air Targets & D-Day Naval Targets.

Pre D-Day Air Targets.

Special Air Targets.

Pre D-Day Air Beach Targets.

D-Day Naval Targets.

NOTE:

Letter beneath target indicates paragraph number; Number indicates priority.

Scale 1:250,000

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PLATE 5

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2. A special air mission consisting of four concentrated areas in the PORTO EMPEDOCLE area. These targets to be attacked on D-Day with bombs and smoke.-

a. An area consisting of the town. There were 11 batteries of guns as well as many machine gun positions.

b. A heavily defended point consisting of 3 light or medium coastal batteries and many machine gun positions.

c. An area consisting of 3 light or medium coastal batteries.

d. A heavy strong point consisting of a light or medium coastal battery and many machine guns and pillboxes."

Series "D" (Plate 5) were considered D Day Naval targets. All targets were to be bombed prior to the movement of the troops to the target area. In addition, the Navy would take under fire all gun positions listed in Series "B", which were not silenced by pre-D Day air attacks. No priority numbers were assigned those targets.

"1. A heavily fortified area in the dock area of LICATA, consisting of 2 batteries and numerous machine gun positions. A railway battery of 4 coastal guns and a battery of 2 light AA guns are in the Eastern mole. A 3 gun dual purpose battery was behind the quay in the Western part of the town. Numerous machine guns and pillboxes were in the area. These positions command the approaches to 4 beaches in the area.

2. A strong point built around 2 R.D.F. stations. Numerous pillboxes, machine gun positions and AA guns commanded the approaches to a beach.

3. An important strong point commanding the road running parallel to the coast. It was composed of pillboxes, mortars, and machine gun positions.

4. A strong point of mortars and pillboxes capable of preventing the extension of the beachhead.

5. A heavily fortified strong point consisting of many machine guns and pillboxes.

6. A newly constructed 4 gun medium coastal battery commanding the approaches to five beaches which were to be used.

7. A 4 gun medium coastal battery commanding the approaches to four beaches.

Series "E" (Plate 5) were considered pre-D Day air beach targets. The defenses within those areas were composed of machine gun positions and pillboxes and were designated to be bombed, insofar as possible, as near dusk of D-1. All targets in that category were to be considered in lower priority than targets described in "B" and "C". The priorities established were those as indicated.

Thus the softening of the areas in which landings were scheduled was assured.

As these and other crucial final touches were being put to the plan, troops were being moved into staging areas and loaded aboard their ships and craft. The Third Infantry Division and Combat Command A of the Second Armored Division mounted at Bizerte; the First Infantry Division at Algiers; the Ninth Infantry Division, in reserve, and the Forty-Fifth Infantry Division, remounting in the ships in which it had come from the United States, at Oran; and the Eighty Second Airborne Division at Kairouan, 2nd Armored Division (-CC "A") from the Oran area.

The first echelon of Headquarters Force 343 to mount for the operation was the reserve staff which, together with Headquarters Company personnel and part of the First Armored Signal Battalion, went aboard LST 325 at Mostaganem on June 24. The ship arrived at La Goulette (Tunis) on June 28, and left on July 8, accompanying the KOOL force to Sicily.

The tactical headquarters of Force 343 went aboard the headquarters ship Monrovia in Algiers harbor on June 29. A transport, rather than a warship, was used because of experience gained in the TORCH operation when the Western Task Force command post on the cruiser Augusta lost touch with the forces ashore each time the Augusta went into action. A combined operations room, shared by Army, Navy and Air staffs, was established in limited space available aboard the ship. The Monrovia left Algiers on July 6th with the DIME force.

At sea, at one minute past midnight on the tenth of July, I Armored Corps and Force 343 ceased to exist and in their stead the United States Seventh Army came into being.

The formal directives from which the plans for the use of Force 343 were made came from Force 141, dated 12 February 1943 and 19 May 1943. Copies of these are shown as exhibit "I". The outline plan prepared by Force 343, 18 May 1943, is exhibit "II".

The plan of the Air Force in support of Task Force 343, dated 7 June 1943, is shown as exhibit "III". The plan of the Western Naval Task Force dated 25 May 1943 is listed as exhibit "IV".

The foregoing exhibits will be found on pages d-1 to d-50 of part I.

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SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

6. the Operation



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The operation justly began with the following announcement by the Commanding General:

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH UNITED STATES ARMY
A. P. O. NO. 758, U. S. Army

At sea

Soldiers of the 7th American Army:

We are indeed honored in having been selected by General Eisenhower as the American component of this new and greater attack against the Axis. We are teamed with the justly famous British 8th Army, which attacks on our right, and we have for the Army Group Commander that veteran and distinguished soldier, Sir Harold Alexander.

In addition to the two armies, our attack will be supported by the annihilating might of the Allied Navies and Air Forces.

Owing to the necessity for secrecy, I am unable to put in writing the location of our impending battle. However, I hereby direct the officers who will read you this after you are at sea to tell you where you are going and why.

When we land we will meet German and Italian soldiers whom it is our honor and privilege to attack and destroy.

Many of you have in your veins German and Italian blood, but remember that these ancestors of yours so loved freedom that they gave up home and country to cross the ocean in search of liberty. The ancestors of the people we shall kill lacked the courage to make such a sacrifice and remained as slaves.

During the last year we Americans have met and defeated the best troops Germany, Italy and Japan possess. Many of us have shared in these glorious victories. Those of you who have not been so fortunate, now have your opportunity to gain equal fame.

In landing operations, retreat is impossible. To surrender is as ignoble as it is foolish. Due to our Air Force and our Navy the enemy is unable to evacuate prisoners. Therefore, our soldiers who are taken prisoner, will remain to starve and run the added risk of being bombed or shelled by their own comrades who will be unable to tell prisoners from the enemy.

Above all else remember that we as the attackers have the initiative. We know exactly what we are going to do, while the enemy is ignorant of our intentions and can only parry our blows. We must retain this tremendous advantage by always attacking; rapidly, ruthlessly, viciously, and without rest. However tired and hungry you may be, the enemy will be more tired and more hungry — Keep punching! No man is beaten until he thinks he is. Our enemy knows that his cause is hopeless.

The fact that we are operating in enemy country does not permit us to forget our American tradition of respect for private property, non-combatants, and women. Civilians who have the stupidity to fight us we will kill, those who remain passive will not be harmed but will be required to rigidly conform to such rules as we shall publish for their control and guidance.

The glory of American arms, the honor of our country, the future of the whole world rests in your individual hands. See to it that you are worthy of this great trust.

God is with us. We shall win.

/s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.
G. S. PATTON, JR.
Lieut. General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

A rare summer windstorm kicked the Mediterranean into a white-capped frenzy the morning of July 9, 1943. Now wallowing in the troughs of the twenty to thirty foot sea, now turning and plunging their noses into green water and shaking spray off their superstructures, the ships of history's greatest armada converged toward Malta, Battleships and monitors, cruisers, destroyers and escort vessels shepherded their flock of transports and invasion ships across the heaving sea. Occasionally a flight of bombers swept overhead against the storm, intent on their mission of softening enemy defenses before the invasion.

More than seasickness was caused by that storm. In the command posts above decks there was consternation. The whole delicately timed plan, culminating in the in the moment for which the whole world was waiting, hung subject to the caprices of nature. What if the sea was too high for the small boats to land? What if the high wind scattered the troop carriers of the airborne assault? Plans were made to delay the invasion one day.

But by late afternoon, as Malta appeared abeam and then dropped astern, with the Sicilian coast only 90 miles away, the wind seemed to slacken and the sea to level off. The decision was made to carry on as planned. The gray ships that covered hundreds of square miles of ocean maintained their northward course. And far behind them, at Kairouan in Tunisia, the fleet of C-47 transports received orders to warm up and take aboard their cargo of parachutists (elements of the 82nd Airborne Division - the 505th Parachute Regt and 3 bn of the 504th). A few hours later, the air fleet roared over Malta to strike the first blow of the long-planned assault.

But that first blow was destined to be the one that missed its target. A 40-knot headwind was still blowing as the Parachute Task Force searched southern Sicily for its drop zone - the high ground north and east of Ponte Olivo airport, 6 miles northeast of Gela. Buffeted from their courses, the planes failed to reach the drop zone at the proper times (2356B, 9 July, for the 505th; 2330B for the 3rd Battalion of the 504th), and the parachutists were strewn over a large part of southern Sicily, from Ponte Olivo to Niscemi, Vizzini, Ragusa and as far east as Noto in the British Eighth Army sector.


Meanwhile, the assault convoys were nearing their transport areas. At 2330, deck watchers could see fires along the Gela seafront, presumably started by the pre-D-Day bombings. Just before midnight bursts of tracers were seen reaching up into the blackness - enemy anti-aircraft gunners were searching out the paratroops' planes. Searchlights flashed briefly, but failed to pick up the ships offshore.

NOTE: Field Order No. 1 is exhibit V in section "d" of Part I. All other orders were issued in the form of directives or letters of instruction which are recorded in the G-3 Section of this report.

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"H-Hour" was set for 0245 on the 10th. Shortly after midnight, assault troops of the sub-task forces began moving toward the beaches in their landing craft.

Enemy searchlights continued sporadic activity and as early as 0158 aircraft were hanging parachute flares over the landing areas. But large scale enemy resistance at the water's edge never materialized during the initial landings - an eloquent indication that elaborate security precautions had succeeded in insuring complete tactical surprise.

The Shark Force (II Corps) had been assigned a sector covering approximately 57 miles of beach. The sub-task force Cent (45th Division) went ashore on its right, covering beaches from Scoglitti to Fiume Agata, 10 miles southeast of Gela; the Dime Force (1st Division minus the 18th RCT) landed between Fiume Agata and Gela, with the Ranger force on its left assaulting Gela frontally. The Joss Force, composed principally of the 3rd Infantry Division, Reinforced by CCA of the 2nd Armored Division, attacked from six miles east to six miles west of Licata.

As H-Hour arrived the heavy sea of the preceding day had not yet fully subsided and was a principal factor in the failure of some assault waves to hit the beaches exactly on schedule. The actual times of landings were:

45th Division

Beaches	Unit	Time
66B	179 RCT	0350B
66B	180 RCT	0434B
65C	157 RCT	0420B
65B	157 RCT	0515B

1st Division

Beaches	Unit	Time
67	16 RCT	0245B
67	26 RCT	0245B
68	Ranger Force	0245B

3rd Division

Beaches	Unit	Time
70A	30 RCT	0415B
70A	15 RCT (-2d Bn)	0430B
73	7 RCT	0430B
71 & 72	3d Ranger Bn w/2d Bn 15th Inf atchd	0515B

All landings had been successfully accomplished by 0600 of the 10th. By then enemy air forces had begun to throw against the beaches and transport areas the series of bombing and strafing attacks which later turned out to have been the major enemy air effort of the campaign. The Gela transport area was first bombed at 0530B, again at 1840B and intermittently by small formations until 2200B. Principal targets were the LST's and landing craft discharging reinforcements and material on the beaches.

The KOOL force, the floating reserve (consisting of the 18th RCT, detached from the 1st Div, and the 2nd A D less Combat Command A) was held off Gela throughout the early part of D-Day, prepared to land in support of any of the initial assaults. At 1520B it was ordered to land on the Dime beaches just east of Gela, to assemble and remain in Army reserve. As units debarked beginning at 1800B, they closed in assembly areas north of the coastal highway (No. 115) and east of Gela.

Presaging the heavy fighting that was to come in this sector, enemy tanks had been reported moving toward the First Division as early as 0830B. At 0925B, 24 of them were near a point about 6 miles east of Gela. Allied air forces attacked enemy tanks and trucks on the Vizzini-Comiso and Caltagirone-Biscari roads, and at 1320B reported good results. Small columns were reported moving south from Barrafranca and a large column moving southeast from Riesi.

Meanwhile, the parachutists who had been scattered across southern Sicily were reforming to the best of their ability and preparing to assist assault units in consolidating ashore. Two battalions, dropped south of Vittoria and Comiso, succeeded in assembling by noon of D-Day, and in heavy fighting protected the left flank of the 45th Division. One battalion, dropped in the vicinity of Syracuse, fought side by side with the British until July 15. Some elements of the 505th Parachute Combat Team, dropped near Ponte Olivo airfield, were contacted by the 1st Division during the day.

By the end of D-Day all beachheads were secure. II Corps held its assigned sector from Gela, on the left of the 1st Division, to Scoglitti, on the right of the 45th Division. The 3rd Division, which had met some enemy resistance just east of Licata, had captured the town and pushed strong combat patrols inland toward Palma di Montechiaro and Campobello. The two distinct Seventh Army beachheads extended two to four miles inland.

That first day had yielded 4,265 Prisoners of War. American casualties, caused both by enemy fire and by land mines along the beaches, totalled 58 killed 700 missing in action and 199 sick and wounded. 105 of the latter were evacuated by water, the bulk of them being taken aboard the U.S.S. Dickman, some aboard the flagship U.S.S. Monrovia. A civilian hospital was requisitioned in Gela.

D plus 1, 11 July

After taking a full day to evaluate the situation and group forces for a counter attack, the enemy, on the morning of July 11, launched his major effort to throw the invaders back into the sea.

At 0800B, both German and Italian units counterattacked the II Corps, their greatest weight coming to bear on the 1st Division near Gela. Twenty Mark IV tanks attacked south on the Ponte Olivo-Gela road, breaking through the 26th Infantry and approaching to within two thousand yards of Gela, before being stopped by artillery fire. Enemy infantry following the tanks was driven off by small arms fire. Attacking across the front of the 16th Infantry, a force of about 40 Mark IV tanks were stopped only by the combined fire of rocket guns, antitank grenades, tanks and artillery. A lighter attack carried out by Italian infantry and ten Italian tanks, was repulsed by the Ranger force.

At approximately 1630 in the afternoon the last counter-attack of the day by the enemy was launched down the Butera road against Gela. This attack was successfully broken up by the combined action of Naval gunfire, a Ranger Force as supported by one battalion (less a company) of the 41st Infantry and the Engineer Shore Group which was called forward from their beach duties.


The left flank of these enemy attacks against II Corps extended across the Acate River and was directed against the 180th Infantry (45th Division) and the 505th Parachute Combat Team. In this sector also, the enemy attack was repulsed. On the extreme right of the II Corps front, Comiso and Ragusa were taken.

In the Licata Sector, 3rd Division extended its beachhead beyond the town pushing the 7th and 15th Regimental Combat Teams to the line Palma di Montechiaro - Naro - Campobello - Riesi. It had thus accomplished its initial mission by reaching the line "Yellow."

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By the end of D + 1 the Seventh Army had extended its beachheads inland on both its right and left flanks, and had withstood determined counterattacks at its center.

The enemy air attacks that had begun on D day were maintained, with repeated raids on beaches and transport areas, by both high altitude and dive bombers. Early in the morning, the command ship U.S.S. Monrovia suffered a near miss at 50 feet. The air attacks continued throughout the day until 2400B.

Our losses for the day stood at 117 killed, 1894 missing and 466 wounded. A total of 4390 prisoners were taken. By 1400B about 400 prisoners had been gathered on the Gela beach awaiting evacuation by sea to Africa.

Among documents found in an enemy headquarters captured in Gela was an Italian map giving the location of minefields along the south coast and the coastal roads. After translation, copies were sent to the Divisions.

D plus 2, 12 July

The second lift of the 82nd Airborne Division was due to land in Sicily from North Africa the night of the 11th-12th. But for the second time an unfortunate incident of war interfered with the execution of the airborne mission. The transport planes arrived over the beachhead area simultaneously with a fleet of enemy bombers. In the two hours that followed many paratroopers missed their mark.

On the ground, the enemy again launched counterattacks against the II Corps, throwing both infantry and tanks into battle south of Niscemi. The attack was repulsed by the First Division supported on its right by elements of the 2nd A. D. and by 1400B the enemy had been forced to abandon his last attempt to prevent our establishment of a secure beachhead. During the morning the Ponte Oliva airfield had been captured.

D + 2, 12 July

On the extreme right of the Seventh Army sector, elements of the 45th Division in Ragusa, contacted elements of the British Eighth Army under General Montgomery.

However, the Seventh Army beachhead was still divided into two distinct sectors. The 3d Division advanced rapidly against scattered enemy infantry and tank units, pushing its line to Canicatti and improving positions at Palma di Montechiaro and Riesi; but on its right, patrols contacted enemy elements south of Riesi between the 3d and 1st Divisions. Except for this gap, the Seventh Army foothold on Sicily extended from eight miles deep at Gela to 15 miles on each flank by the end of D + 2.

The Engineers had removed obstructions from the runways of the landing field west of Gela, and, acting quickly to cut mine fuses, had saved the runways of Ponte Olivo from destruction. Straggler control and traffic direction were organized in Gela and the security of enemy ammunition dumps and abandoned enemy headquarters was assured. The advance Army command post moved ashore from the Monrovia in mid-afternoon, established one echelon in a school building in Gela and another in a grove north of the town. In short, the critical phase of the assault had been passed, and the Seventh Army was ashore to stay.

Enemy air action had been reduced considerably during the day, but some bombing and strafing continued. One LST was bombed, burned and sunk.

Against the loss of 29 killed, 106 missing, 13 reported captured, and 183 wounded, we had taken 4,206 prisoners during the day. The unsuccessful enemy counter attacks against the 1st Division during the 11th and 12th had cost him 4 Mark VI, 29 Mark III and IV, and 10 Italian tanks.

D + 3, 13 July

Field Order No. 1 had ordered each sub-task force to extend its beachhead to the line "Yellow" immediately after securing its initial beachheads. When the enemy had been driven back to this line, his long range artillery would be unable to reach the airfields at Ponte Olivo, Comiso, and Biscari, and these fields, together with the port and airfield at Licata, would be usable by the Seventh Army.

On the 13th, a Seventh Army directive made some revisions in the order. The 3d Division, which had already reached "Yellow" was directed to continue reconnaissance to Agrigento, and hold Canicatti and the road junction two miles east of Riesi. 2d Armored Division (less Combat Command A), together with the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, were detached from II Corps and assigned to Army reserve. II Corps was then to continue on its original mission of securing the "Yellow" line. 82d Airborne Division, in Army reserve, was to continue reorganization. The 18th RCT was released to the 1st Division.

The major enemy effort at this time seemed to be east and west of a general line Caltagirone - Gela. Elements of the Hermann Goering Division, estimated as an armored regiment, were in action in this area. All Seventh Army forces advanced and further deepened the beachhead.

II Corps advanced to high ground 5 miles north of Chiaramonte Gulfi, 5 miles northwest of Comiso airport and 4 miles north of Biscari on its right (45th Division) flank; and to the high ground 3 miles north of Niscemi and Ponte Olivo in the 1st Division sector. 3d Division continued its aggressive reconnaissance toward Agrigento and the north. 2d Armored Division, with the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, advanced to Mt. Nicola, 8 miles northwest of Gela, and continued toward Butera.

Now firmly established on the island, Seventh Army was preparing to put captured airfields and communications in early operation. The airfield at Ponte Olivo, a glider strip northwest of Gela, and a landing strip 2 miles east of the town, were ready to receive planes. A newly constructed landing strip was also ready at Licata, and 3 P-38's came in to the field on the 13th.

On 13 July, 2033 prisoners were taken, and by this time the mounting total of captured and deserting enemy troops, principally Italian, had presented a difficult problem. Divisions were burdened with hundreds of prisoners, and Corps and Army lacked sufficient transportation to provide substantial relief. Additional prisoner of war guards were requested to take over the processing of captured enemy personnel.

The civilian medical problem had also become acute, due to an apparent lack of adequate local facilities. Prevented from shouldering the full civilian medical burden by the limitation of its own supplies, the Army had to limit civilian hospitalization to rendering first aid to cases in danger of death.

American casualties for the day totalled 58 killed, 36 missing, 4 reported captured, and 157 wounded.

Tactical air reconnaissance kept close watch on enemy movements, and frequently its reports led directly to bombardment missions. Bombers also served as a source of valuable information, reporting their observations through the XII Air Support Command on returning from missions.


Late in the evening of the 13th, a battle group of the Hermann Goering Division was reported near H-4540, about 5 miles east of Niscemi. An American officer who had been captured by the Germans and then escaped confirmed previous

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208
213
202
MOVING EAST REDUCED
BY NUMEROUS DESERTIONS
OBJ
PALERMO
TRAPANI
MARSALA
CASTELVETRANO
CASTELLAMMARE
PARTINICO
CORLEONE
SANTO STEFANO
CASTELTERMINI
S. CATALDO
CALTANISSETTA
AGRIGENTO
PORTO EMPEDOCLE
CAMPOBELLO
PALMA DI MONTECHIARO
SCIACCA
MENFI
SALEMI
ENNA
PIAZZA ARMERINA
GANGATTI
SOMMATINO
MAZZARINO
RAMACCA
CALTAGIRONE
LICATA
SEVENTH XXXX
EIGHTH
PROV XXX
XXXX SEVENTH
FIRST ELEMENTS IDENTIFIED
DELAYED ACTIONS
NOTE 103 NEVER LEFT MAINLAND
MESSINA
S. AGATA DI MILITELLO
S. FRATELLO
PATTI
BARCELLONA
CASTROREALE
RACCUJA
NOVARA
S. TERESA DI RIVA
FALCONINA
LINGUAGLOSSA
TRONTE
RANDAZZO
CATANIA
GOERING
SCHMALTZ
AUGUSTA
SIRACUSA
MILITELLO IN VAL DI CATANIA
SCORDIA
PALAZZOLO
FLORIDIA
NOTO
AVOLA
PACHINO
CAPO PASSERO
REGALBUTO
CENTURIPE
ADRANO
PRIZZI
BISACQUINO
CHIUSA
CASTELVETRANO
MAZARA DEL VALLO
CAMPOBELLO DI MAZARA
SCIACCA
RIBERA
CASTELTERMINI
S. CATALDO
CALTANISSETTA
SERRADIFALCO
RACALMUTO
GANGATTI
SOMMATINO
MAZZARINO
PIAZZA ARMERINA
RAMACCA
CALTAGIRONE
LICATA
NICOSIA
AGIRA

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estimates that there were two German divisions on the island, the Hermann Goering and the 15th Panzer Divisions. In addition, four companies of Mark VI tanks were reported to be in Sicily.

D + 4, 14 July

By the 14th it was apparent that the frustration of enemy counterattacks on the Gela sector on the 11th and 12th had led to a decision to withdraw, fighting only delaying actions and making local counterattacks. Air reconnaissance revealed a general enemy movement toward the Catania plain, and there were also signs of enemy withdrawal northward along highway 124 beyond Caltagirone.

Orders from higher headquarters (the 15th Army Group) now swung the effort of the Seventh Army toward the northwest. A new boundary between the Seventh and Eighth Armies extended from Vizzini along the road to Caltagirone, Piazza Amerina and the road junction ten miles southwest of Enna.

II Corps continued its rapid push northward on its extreme right and reached the line Yellow near Vizzini. In the center the left of the 45th Division sector, stiffer opposition was met, but units advanced to the high ground five miles southeast of Caltagirone and also captured Biscari landing field.

On the II Corps left, the 1st Division took Niscemi and Mazzarino and held positions controlling the road junction three miles southeast of Caltagirone. A small pocket of resistance between the 1st and 45ht Division was still being mopped up, but contact had been established here - as well as between the 1st and 3rd Divisions on the left of II Corps and between the 45th Division and the British on its right - thus assuring a continuous Allied beachhead across southeastern Sicily with both flanks anchored on the sea. 3rd Division maintained its positions, with active reconnaissance north and west; Combat Command B of the 2nd Armored Division and the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions operated on the II Corps front, the former helping to clean out the enemy pockets near Niscemi, and latter capturing Butera, with the aid of effective Naval bombardment.

The capture of Biscari airfield reported repairable within five to eight hours, had marked completion of the initial missions assigned to Seventh Army.

The 4th Tabor of Goums, from the "Goums Marocains" of the French North African Army, landed at Licata on the 11th and were attached to the 3rd Division. Corresponding in strength to an infantry battalion, the 4th Tabor fought with the 3rd Division during its advance on Sciacca, and later was attached to II Corps for operations in the rugged country of northeastern Sicily. It gave a good account of itself throughout the campaign.

G-2 estimated that by D + 4, 13,000 prisoners of war had been captured, the enemy had suffered 1,400 casualties, dead and wounded, had lost 85 aircraft captured, and 67 guns larger than 75mm captured and destroyed, sixteen Mark III and IV tansk and 7 Mark VI tanks were taken as well as nine other tanks whose classification was not reported.

All prisoners except Italian medical officers and chaplains, and Italian soldiers of Sicilian birth were being evacuated to North Africa as rapidly as facilities permitted. A Red Cross hospital was later opened for Prisoner of War patients, who were, so far as possible, cared for by Italian personnel.

Many of the Italian prisoners expressed great bitterness toward the Germans, whom they accused of sacrificing Italians to cover their own withdrawals. On one occasion the Germans had withdrawn ahead of the Italians and had mined the roads as they went, trapping the Italians between Americans on their front and minefields in their rear.

D + 5, 15 July

15 July marked the first major change in the composition and direction of advance of the Seventh Army. Line 'Yellow' was occupied, the new Seventh-Eighth Army boundary would bring the EighthArmy across the present front of the 45th Division and on the left, the time was ripe for a major drive westward and northwestward through the island.

First of the changes to be affected was the creation of a Provisional Corps, comprised of the 3rd Division, reinforced by the 3rd Ranger Battalion, Fifth Armored Field Artillery Group and other supporting troops, and the 82nd Airborne Division. This latter division had completed reorganization and was reinforced by the 39th RCT of the 9th Division, 34th Field Artillery Battalion of the 9th Division, the 83rd Chemical Weapons Battalion and other troops.

Accordingly during the next two days II Corps pivoted on the Provisional Corps to swing the entire Seventh Army front to the north and northwest in preparation for the drive to the north coast.

The 45th Division, on the right flank, assisted the 1st Canadian Division of the British XXX Corps in the capture of Vizzini, occupied the remainder of the high ground south of the Vizzini - Caltagirone road, and thus completed the initial mission of II Corps in this sector. The 1st Division continued its advance, moving north of Mazzarino toward Barafranca, and the 3rd Division, now part of Provisional Corps, sent strong patrols into Favara and Ragalmuto and reconnaissance patrols four to five miles north of Canicatti and Riesi. 82nd Airborne Division continued reassembling in preparation for its Provisional Corps role, and the 2nd Armored Division, which regained Combat Command A from the 3rd Division, assembled in the Campobello area under Army control.

The initial objective of the combined Seventh American and Eighth British armies (Fifteenth Army Group) as stated in the directive was the line Catania - Palma Di Montechiaro.

An Army directive issued on the 15th extended the left boundary of II Corps to Palermo and the right boundary to the north coast.

II Corps mission was to capture Caltanissetta and secure the highway north from Caltanissetta, and to be prepared for further action by dark July 19.

Provisional Corps' 3rd Division was to secure the highway from Canicatti - San Cataldo and be prepared for further action by July 19. The 82nd Airborne Division was to assemble Palma Di Montechiaro and relieve elements of the 3rd Division at that location by dark July 17 in preparation for a westward advance.

As final preparations shaped up for the next phase of the campaign, the box score thus far stood as follows:

A total of 15,500 prisoners had been taken, with no breakdown available as to the proportion of Germans to Italians. The enemy had lost an estimated 1900 dead and wounded, 112 aircraft had been captured or destroyed on the ground, and 80 guns, larger than 75 mm, 24 Mark III and Mark IV tanks, and 7 Mark VI tanks had been captured.

Total strength of the Seventh Army then stood at 203,204.

In preparation for continuing operations, a map depot was established at Gela, remapping of units began and the initial waterpoint was opened at Gela with an estimated capacity of 25,000 gallons per day.

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D + 6, 16 July

In general enemy resistance during the day was light. Withdrawal to the north continued, covered by counterattacks in which tanks were used - the strongest was by a force of 16 tanks operating south of Barrafranca. The 1st Division repelled the attack and by dark had entered Barrafranca with the 70th Tank Battalion moving north of the town.

The pivoting of the II Corps began. The 45th Division was ordered to move south and west to Gela, then north to the vicinity of Mazzarino prepared to continue the operation on the left of the 1st Division.

The 3d Division continued aggressive reconnaissance west and northwest from Palma di Montechiaro and Canicatti and set the stage for the capture of Agrigento and the subsequent breakthrough to the west. Porto Empedocle was taken by the 3d Ranger Battalion, and the capture of highground north of Agrigento yielded 4,000 Italian prisoners.

D + 7, 17 July

Aided by excellent naval gunfire support, 3d Division continued its assault on Agrigento during the night and by morning had captured the city. The balance of Provisional Corps was preparing to undertake its assigned missions - 2nd Armored Division continued its move into the Campobello area, and the 82nd Airborne Division, its reassembly completed, began shuttling by motor into an area five miles south of Agrigento.

II Corps also continued the regrouping of its forces. 45th Division captured Pietrapersia (H16) and Salso River crossings south of Caltanissetta and took up postions on the left of the 1st Division. Enemy tanks were again used in support of local counterattacks delaying our advance to the north. Against this stiff opposition, 1st Division pushed northward to Salso River crossings six miles east of Caltanissetta. XII Air Support Command aided the advance by assigning bomb targets in the Caltanissetta - Caterina area. In all, 6506 prisoners of war were captured during the day, most of them taken when resistance collapsed at Agrigento.

Seventh Army was now consolidated on its new front, extending from Porto Empedocle to Racalmuto to Serradifalco and the high ground seven miles southeast of Caltanissetta. Facing it, from west to east, were the 207th Coastal Division (Italian), the 4th Livorno Division (Italian), the Hermann Goering Division (German) and the 54th Napoli Division (Italian). The latter had been reported virtually destroyed by the British.

Ponte Olivo airfield had become the principal focal point for the efforts of enemy air forces operating over the army rear areas, and the recurrent attacks had led to the decision of the XII Air Support Command to base fighter planes on the new fields east and west of Gela until the raids on Ponte Olivo stopped.

D + 8, 18 July

During the night of the 17th - 18th, the enemy withdrew from general contact along the entire front, and only slight resistance was offered. Seventh Army units advanced in all sectors, encountering many mines and booby traps along the routes of advance.

In the II Corps sector, the 1st Division pushed forward toward Villarosa (H-18) and Enna (H-28) and reached the vicinity of Mt. Capodarso, between Enna and Caltanissetta. The latter town was occupied by the 45th Division, which then continued northward and had reached a point two miles northwest of S. Caterina by dark.

Provisional Corps, with the 3d Division still in front, occupied the line Raffadali (G-56) - Aragona (G-66) - S. Cataldo (G-97). On the left of the 3d Division, elements of the 82d Airborne Division, to which were attached elements of the 39th RCT of the 9th Division, took over their assigned coastal sector, extending along the south coast road.

The 39th RCT passed through units of the 3d Division at daybreak and advanced along the main coastal road to positions about two miles east of Realmonte, 6 miles west of Agrigento. The 504th Parachute Regiment passed through the 39th and siezed crossings of the Fiume Della Canne, about eight miles west of Porto Empedocle. 2d Armored Division completed reassembly near Campobello.

A gauge of the lightness of resistance during the day was the G-1 report that 720 prisoners were taken, and that American troops had lost three killed, four missing, and 275 sick and wounded. Up to date, a total of 4114 admissions had been made to medical installations. 1427 casualties had been evacuated by water, and 210 by air.

The Licata prisoner of war cage, with an operating capacity of 8,000 prisoners, was taken over from 3d Division by Seventh Army.

D + 9, 19 July

A new directive, issued on the 18th, had outlined the missions now assigned to the Allied armies attacking Sicily. The British Eighth Army was to drive the enemy north and east into the Messina Peninsula. The general Seventh Army mission was to drive north and northwest to capture Palermo. Accordingly, II Corps was directed to secure a strong base in the rear of the Eighth Army, advance to the north and northwest, cutting the coast road, the Nicosia-Cerda road, and the Enna-Alia road, and be prepared to attack Palermo from the east.

Provisional Corps was to advance to the northwest, prepared to attack Palermo from the south and southwest. It was to be followed closely by the 2d Armored Division, which was to be prepared to exploit a breakthrough or extend envelopment to the west.

Envelopment of the Palermo area, as called for by this directive, gathered headway on the 19th against only light enemy opposition. In the west, the enemy attempted to hinder the advance with bridge and road demolitions and minefields. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 15th Panzer Division (German) was identified in the Enna area, with a German battalion combat team supported by a regiment of artillery astride the Army boundary near H-2580.

1st Division, now on the right of II Corps sector, contacted the enemy at Villarosa and advanced on Enna. On its right flank, the 1st Canadian Division bypassed Enna to the east, thus leaving a pocket of strong enemy resistance south of the town. The pocket was reduced by the 1st U. S. Division. In II Corps' left sector, the 45th Division contacted the enemy four miles south of S. Caterina and, advancing to the north and west, sent strong patrols as far as Marianopoli.

Provisional Corps also advanced westward, the 3d Division crossing the Platani River and taking Casteltermini (G-68) and Mussomeli (G-78). 82d Airborne reached the stream crossings six miles west of Ribera on the coastal highway, and 2d Armored Division began its move to the vicinity of Agrigento.

American casualties were again light, with 3 killed and 47 missing. 2,852 Italian prisoners were taken, and a prisoner of war cage was opened at Porto Empedocle, with a capacity of 20,000.

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D + 10, 20 July

An Italian battalion, reinforced by two R-35 tanks at Vallelunga, offered the strongest enemy resistance encountered by the Seventh Army during the day, although minefields and demolitions were increasing as the enemy speeded his withdrawal.

II Corps captured Enna, near which the 1st U.S. Division contacted the 1st Canadian Division, and went on to take Villapriola, 8 miles northwest of Enna, and advanced on Alimena. Repulsing the Italian battalion and its two tanks, the 45th Division reached the point where the railroad cuts Highway 121, south of the town.

On the Provisional Corps front, 3d Division, with strong reconnaissance forces ahead, captured the high ground three miles north of Mussomelli (G-78) and reconnoitered as far west as Villafranca. The 30th Infantry took San Stefano (G-59). 82d Airborne Division captured Sciacca (G-17) and Menfi (G-08). 2d Armored Division arrived at march assembly areas near Ribera and was attached to the Provisional Corps. Casualties were light.

D + 11, 21 July (See plates Nos. 9, 14, 15)

As the advance CP of the Seventh Army moved from Gela to Agrigento, the Army drove farther north and west, encountering organized opposition only on the II Corps front. Reports of enemy movements, including that of 15 tanks going north out of Alimena (H-19), and heavy traffic on the Petralia (C-01) - Nicosia (C-30) road, indicated that shuttling of enemy troops was probably in progress.

1st Division extended the II Corps front through Alimena toward the coast road north of Castelbuono (C-03), encountering demolitions and minefields, as well as artillery and mortar fire. Considerable sniping and street fighting marked the capture of Alimena. 45th Division moved north and northwest with the Torto River as its objective.

The possibility of a breakthrough to the north and west, anticipated when the 2d Armored Division was assigned to Provisional Corps, now became more fully apparent as the Provisional Corps went forward along its entire front. 3d Division occupied Corleone. Patrols reached Highway 121, north of Lercara Friddi (B-60) and established roadblocks, and also contacted the 45th Division on the right. One RCT pushing toward the Belice River reached a point six miles northwest of Bisacquino (B-30). The 82d Airborne Division, from which the 39th RCT had now been detached, occupied St. Margherita (C-19). The 39th RCT, 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, and 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery (155 How) were formed into Task Force "X", which secured Castelvetrano and covered the assembly of the 2d Armored Division, northeast of the town.

The stage was set for a rapid drive on Palermo, and the "touchdown play" was called.

D + 12, 22 July

2d Armored Division moved to the line of departure, its left and rear covered by Task Force X, which secured the line Marsala (A-61) - Salemi (A-91). The division moved rapidly northeastward from Castelvetrano, through Camporeale (H-12), San Giuseppe, and Monreale to the high ground five miles below Palermo. Meanwhile, the 3d Division was deploying along high ground southeast of the city, and to the right, in the II Corps Sector, the 157th Infantry reached the main north coast road six miles east of Termini Imerese (B-73). Moving forward from San Caterina, the 180th RCT also reached the outskirts of Palermo, where it contacted the 3d Division.

A coordinated attack on the city was planned, but no resistance materialized, and at 2000B that evening, the 2d Armored Division entered Palermo, where the Commanding General of the Provisional Corps received the surrender of the city.

Thus, the second phase of the Seventh Army's mission in Sicily was virtually completed. The initial beachhead had been fully secured with the occupation of line Yellow on D plus 4. Now the island was cut in two and only isolated units in the west remained to be mopped up before the Seventh Army could devote its full attention to the final phase - driving the enemy back through the Messina Peninsula.

The final battles for the northeast portion of the island were already beginning to shape up. In the II Corps sector, the 1st Division continued to move northward, occupying Bompietro against continued artillery and mortar fire, tanks, mines, and demolitions. Enemy artillery fire increased between Roccapalumba (B-61) and Leonforte (H-39). The Italian 28th Aosta Division was in defensive positions along the line Caltavuturo (B-81) - Petralia (H-11) and southeast to Leonforte. German troops were reported concentrated between Regalbuto (H-59) and Catenanuova (H-68).

D + 13, 23 July

The final clean up of Western Sicily was now underway, and among the 9,562 prisoners taken was the Commanding General of all Italian coastal divisions in the west. 82d Airborne Division, with Task Force X now returned to its control, moved north and northwest, captured Trapani (A-63) and thus reduced the Marsala - Trapani area.

Against stiff resistance on the right of the II Corps sector, the 1st Division captured Petralia (C-01) and cut Highway 120. Patrols cleared the road from Petralia to Gangi (C-11). The 45th Division sent one battalion of the 157th Infantry west on Highway 113 to Termini, while the remainder of the regiment advanced east through Campofelice and on toward Cefalu (C-03). The 179th Infantry took Collesano (B-92) and continued east toward Castelbuono, encountering German reconnaissance units. The enemy had undertaken extensive bridge demolitions ahead of the II Corps and anti-tank ditches and roadblocks were found on the Caltavuturo-Termini and Alimena - Petralia roads.

Consolidation in the large part of Sicily now under Seventh Army control required immediate repairing of roads, railroads and public utilities throughout the area. A major task was the clearing of the Palermo harbor, where sunken ships, demolished quays, and mines made use of the port by large ships impossible. Clearing and repairing were undertaken by the Navy.

Many other major construction and salvage tasks to make safe the movement of supplies had been undertaken since the operation began.

During the first three days of the operation, 8,215 tons of supplies had been unloaded over the beaches, and a total of 120 small vessels unloaded hourly. Meanwhile, the port of Licata provided facilities for handling five LST's simultaneously, and was put into use on the morning of July 12.

To speed the movement of supplies ashore, it was decided to bridge the gap which the enemy had blown in Gela pier at the beginning of the invasion. Work was begun on the installation of two pontoon causeway sections.

As early as July 13, D+3, a railway was serving the advance of Seventh Army units. From Licata, the railway was in operation as far as Campobello. Thirty cars were being spotted daily at Yellow Beach (three miles east of Licata) to move supplies inland.

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XXXX SEVENTH

CAPTURED 22 JULY

PALERMO

TRAPANI

CAPTURED 22 JULY

MARSALA

PROV XXX

REMNANTS

45 XX

28 SEVENTH XXXX EIGHTH

MESSINA

XXXX SIXTH

CATANIA

AUGUSTA

SIRACUSA

EIGHTH

SEVENTH

F G

L M

G H

M N

H J

N O

ALLIED FORCES BLUE

ITALIAN FIRST LINE TROOPS BROWN

GERMAN TROOPS RED

(BG=BATTLE GROUP) RED

DISPOSITIONS

21-27 JULY 1943

PLATE 9

SICILY

SCALE 1:750 000

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Palermo

A week later, July 20, sixteen steam locomotives and 100 cars were located at the Caltanissetta railroad yards.

On July 28, six days after the fall of Palermo, the first coasters (cargo ships) arrived for unloading in the harbor. At this time, work was underway on the removal of sunken hulks in the harbor.

After the fall of Palermo, it was found that the standard gauge railway between Palermo and Messina was reported in good condition from Palermo to Termini, with a considerable amount of available rolling stock. On July 29, the first train along the northern Sicilian coast railway was operated between Palermo and Cefalu. By this time, unloading of supplies on the southern coast was tapering off as the main axis of supply for the Seventh Army shifted to Palermo.

Four days later, July 17, construction was started on a bulk fuel storage tank at Gela.

The next day, a cache of 16,000 gallons of oil and 13,000 gallons of gasoline was found at Comiso airfield. By July 20, the bulk fuel storage tank, with a capacity of 5,000 barrels and a pipeline with a 1,000 barrel capacity tank, were ready for operation at Ponte Olivo airfield.

Two waterpoints were operating at Licata, one at Campobello, and work was underway on the drilling of a well at the Ponte Olivo airfield.

The first valuable underground bulk fuel storage tanks were found at Ponte Olivo on July 13. These tanks had a capacity of 42,000 gallons. Reconnaissance was then made for additional storage tank sites, and for a pipeline to be constructed at the Gela pier.

D / 14, 24 July

Beginning the Seventh Army's change of front for the drive to Messina, the II Corps turned eastward, with the 18th RCT of the 1st Division reaching Gangi (C11) and continuing five miles east toward Nicosia (C30). Contact was maintained with the enemy elements withdrawing toward the east. The 45th Division took Cefalu (C03) and reached the stream crossing three miles east of the town. Progress was slowed by demolitions on Highway 113. Inland, the town of Castelbuono (C02) was taken.

Seventh Army took its greatest bag of prisoners on the 24th - 11,540 of them, mostly Italians rounded up in the west where Provisional Corps was cleaning up pockets of resistance around Palermo and Castellammare Del Golfo and disarming the many disorganized Italian units.

An indication that future operations in Sicily might be conducted principally against German units was the identification of all three battalions of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment in the area north of Alimena-Leonforte.

D / 15, 25 July

To provide II Corps with adequate artillery support for its eastward drive, Army shifted the bulk of available artillery to the Corps. The 77th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Battalion of the 36th, the 34th Field Artillery Battalion and the 5th Armored Artillery Group were relieved from attachment to Provisional Corps and attached to II Corps. The transfer was affected on the 25th and 26th and the units began moving eastward to join II Corps near Alia (B70). Additional fire support was provided the infantry by extensive use of 4.2" chemical mortars, which proved extremely effective in mountainous terrain.

On the front, II Corps improved its positions along both Highways 120 and 113, The 1st Division repelled an enemy counterattack and held position five miles east of Gangi, and the 45th Division advanced along highway 113 to a point north of Pollina (north of Castelbuono).

To assure adequate supplies for forth coming operations, 45 LST's were allotted to Seventh Army until 8 August. It was anticipated that Palermo harbor, capable of handling regular cargo ships, would be in operation by then.

In continuing the clean up of western Sicily, 7,237 prisoners were taken. The total of prisoners captured to date thus increased to an estimated 52,000, plus 7,000 enemy dead and wounded. Booty included 227 aircraft, 220 guns of 75mm or larger caliber, 159 tanks of all types, including 43 Mark III and IV and 22 Mark VI's. Advance CP of the Seventh Army opened at Palermo.

D / 16, 26 July.

As II Corps advanced eastward against increasing resistance, it was apparent that the enemy intended to impose maximum delay on our further progress, and that the rapid withdrawal of the previous ten days had come to an end. Air reconnaissance reported an increase in the flow of reinforcements across the Straits of Messina, and the enemy was reported digging in west of Sperlinga (C30) and along the general line Hill 794 (C3109) - Hill 776 (C3204) - Hill 749 (C3106). The 1st Division moved forward north and south of Highway 120 (Petralia-Randazzo), the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron reached the road junction about five miles southwest of Nicosia, and the 45th Division got as far as the road junction north of San Mauro (C12).

The Seventh Army was displacing supply, service and rear combat elements forward. The 39th RCT and the 3d Chemical Weapons Battalion were relieved of attachment to Provisional Corps and attached to II Corps.

First reports of the downfall of Mussolini and the succession of Badoglio began to circulate and gave the Allies in Sicily the satisfaction of knowing that their assault on the island had already brought about the first crack in the Axis political structure. That Mussolini and the Fascists had little support had been eloquently demonstrated many times during the campaign. Almost without exception, high ranking Italian Army and Navy officers (five captured generals and one admiral were being evacuated to North Africa) had showed little hesitation in voicing disgust for Mussolini and his government; and the civilian populations of captured towns had everywhere greeted the Americans as liberators.

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ASSEMBLING

NOTE XX 54 DEFINITELY ELIMINATED

PALERMO
TRAPANI
MARSALA
MESSINA
CATANIA
AUGUSTA
SIRACUSA

A B C D
E F G H J
F G H J
L M N O

ALLIED FORCES COASTAL UNITS — BLUE
ITALIAN FIRST LINE TROOPS — BROWN
GERMAN TROOPS — RED
(BG = BATTLE GROUP) — RED

DISPOSITIONS
28 JULY - 3 AUGUST 1943
PLATE 10

SICILY
SCALE 1:750000

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D ∕ 17, 27 July.

Enemy resistance was increasing on the northern flank where, it was estimated, the German 29th Motorized Division would oppose our advance on the north coast road. The 15th Panzer Division faced the Seventh Army right flank. It was estimated that of Italian units, the 202, 206 and 207 coastal divisions had been completely destroyed, the 208th Coastal Division 75 percent destroyed and the 28th Aosta Division 60 percent.

Considerable enemy movement had been noted north and northeast out of Nicosia, and there were additional indications of movement into, but not out of, the area bounded on the east by San Fratello (C35), Troina (C51) and Regalbuto (H59). From these signs it was concluded that an organization of defensive positions had been taking place in that area.

Preparing for a major II Corps attack eastward, the 1st Division cleaned out several enemy strong points along highway 120 and advanced to within six miles of Nicosia. The 4th Tabor of Goums, covering the left flank of the 1st Division, moved cross-country toward the Nicosia-San Stefano (C33) road. 45th Division reached Castel di Tusa, five miles west of San Stefano, on highway 113, and San Mauro (C12), in the interior. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was covering the right flank of the 1st Division and maintained contact with the 1st Canadian Division.

Prisoners taken in the west continued to be a serious administrative problem. 3,411 new ones were reported on the 27th. Approximately 37,000 were in the stockade at Prizzi (B40).

Palermo harbor began operation when the first craft (LCT's) arrived.

D ∕ 18, 28 July.

With the enemy withdrawing to the Troina (C51) - San Fratello Line, the Seventh Army was in position west of San Stefano (C33) to Nicosia, prepared to attack eastward.

The most bitterly fought battle of the campaign was to follow in a matter of hours. The Battle of Troina lasted from August 1 to August 6, when the enemy withdrew from their positions after launching twenty-four counter-attacks during the five days. Nearly as bitterly contested was the Battle of San Fratello, which began August 4 and ended August 8. The demoralizing result of these two battles started the enemy on his hurried way to Messina and evacuation to the Italian mainland.

In the II Corps sector, on July 28, the 1st Division captured Nicosia and the road net east and north of the town--then continued to attack eastward. The 45th Division advanced eastward against determined enemy resistance east of Castel di Tusa, five miles west of San Stefano. By 2200B advanced elements had reached a point four miles west of San Stefano. Meanwhile, patrols of the 1st and 45th Divisions made contact near Mistretta (C32).

The Air Force reported for July 28 that there was heavy traffic from Troina to Randazzo (C82) with a concentration of up to 200 motor transports in and around Cesaro (C61) early in the day. During the day enemy air activity increased, and that the enemy was concerned by the threat of the Seventh Army against the north flank was shown by the types of defense and the advent of the German 29th Motorized Division into the North coastal area.

D ∕ 19, 29 July

Increased resistance to the drive on Troina and San Fratello was encountered west of San Stefano and as far south as Mistretta in the Northern Zone. Patrols encountered no resistance north and northeast of Nicosia. An indication of the enemy concern on the threat to their defenses was that Germans evacuated Spirlinga (C-30) rapidly, leaving considerable dead and much equipment. During the night of July 28-29, three battalions of German infantry were reported as having moved through Nicosia.

The Seventh Army drive under the direction of II Corps Headquarters saw the 1st Division advancing north and east fron Nicosia, reaching the outskirts of Mistretta on the north and a point four miles from Cerami (C-41) on Highway 120.

The 45th Division advanced east of Tusa River along the coast, sending one of its infantry units to flank the enemy in the vicinity of San Stefano from the south. Another infantry unit moved cross country and entered Mistretta.

Pocket of resistance were silenced by the end of the day, while operations were underway to flank the enemy south of San Stefano on the northern axis.

Only 1,555 prisoners were reported taken this date, indicating that the round-up of Italian prisoners in Western Sicily was nearly complete. Authority was granted to parole Sicilian enlisted prisoners of war.

D ∕ 20, 30 July

Resistance was continuing west of San Stefano, but the enemy was forced to withdraw northeast from Mistretta. Intense rear guard action was felt east and northeast of Nicosia. The defense of San Stefano was conducted by the 71st Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the German 29th Motorized Division.

News arrived that the islands of Favignana, Marettimo, and Levango, off Trapani, surrendered unconditionally to the 82nd Airborne Division.

The 1st Infantry Division had pushed the enemy back toward Troina. With the 39th RCT and 4th Tabor of Goums attached, the division advanced along the Nicosia - Cerami road, reaching the road junction two miles west of Cerami and high ground south of Capizzi. Meanwhile, its patrols reached Cerami with only slight resistance. The 91st Rcn. Sqdn. maintained contact with the 1st Canadian Division on the right flank.

The 45th Division pushed toward San Stefano against stiff resistance to their pincer movement on that city. One infantry unit moved eastward from Pittineo (six miles southwest of San Stefano) to Reitano (C-33) and prepared to attack San Stefano from the south.

The number of prisoners taken on July 30 dropped to 372, the lowest day's catch to date in the campaign. The aggregate for the campaign to date was estimated at 80,000.

Our losses to date were: Killed - 713, Wounded - 2,616, Missing - 713.

D ∕ 21, 31 July

A directive was issued on July 31 stating that the Seventh Army would attack east along the north coast road, the road from Nicosia to Randazzo, and thence northeast on Messina, driving the enemy out of the peninsula.

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II Corps (1st Division, 9th Division, 3rd Division, replacing the 45th Division, 70th Tank Battalion, 753rd Tank Battalion, 4th Tabor Goums, 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, 19th and 39th Engineer Regiments, 13th Field Artillery Brigade, 77th Field Artillery Regiment, 5th Armored Field Artillery Group, 2nd and 3rd Chemical Battalions, and the 106th Coast Artillery Battalion), was to advance east on two axes along the north coast road and the road from Nicosia to Randazzo. It was to maintain a relentless drive until the enemy was decisively defeated.

Provisional Corps (45th Division, 2nd Armored Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division) were to organize and secure the west portion of Sicily, protect Palermo and the rear of II Corps, prepared to support the advance of II Corps by moving reinforcing troops to the east in II Corps zone.

The enemy was driven from San Stefano during the night of July 30-31. The town of Rietana was evacuated during the night, and Capizzi and Cerami, which had been held by one company to each town, were taken during the day. Stubborn resistance was offered by the German rear guard in Gagliano, but that town was also taken.

Along the entire Seventh Army front the enemy was evacuating north and east. Photo reconnaissance failed to reveal organization of defensive positions although time had been ample for such work. Appearance of German units in the north continued to indicate the importance attached to the threat of Seventh Army.

San Stefano fell to II Corps' 45th Division, with the USS Destroyer "Rowan" furnishing naval fire support for the advance of the infantry units on the coast road. The 3rd Division had been designated to relieve the 45th Division in this area, and took over at 1530B.

In darkness, the 1st Division moved to within five miles of Troina after capturing Cerami (C-41) on the way. On the division's left flank, the 4th Tabor of Goums captured Capizzi (C-41). The 1st Division was now in a position from which II Corps could start an attack on the enemy stronghold of Troina.

The rapidly moving situation put a severe strain on map supply agencies. It was necessary to deliver maps from Seventh Army rear Headquarters by plane, and surplus maps held by II Corps were turned over to the 3rd Division on its re-entry into action. Seventh Army strength on July 31 was 201,928.

D ∕ 22, 1 August

Seventh Army was continuing its steady advance eastward on two axes against stubborn enemy delaying action. Reinforcements of artillery concentrations in the Troina (C-51) area slowed the advance. (See G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation #6 for long range capabilities.)

II Corps units were still pushing forward. Forward elements of the 1st Division were keeping the enemy busy on the outskirts of Troina, while the 26th RCT moved north of the 39th RCT to flank the enemy positions at Troina. The 91st Rcn Squadron entered Gagliano, seven miles southwest of Troina.

Headquarters II Corps moved to a point four miles northeast of Nicosia from which spot Troina and the surrounding hills could be observed.

The 3d Division completed taking over the sector of the 45th Division in the San Stefano area and continued the attack along Highway 113. On its relief, 45th Division was attached to the Provisional Corps and began assembly in the area between Termini and Cefalu. Continuing the attack along Highway 113, the 30th RCT advanced east along the road to about four miles east of San Stefano.

The 9th Division (less the 39th RCT)which was already in action, arrived in Palermo Harbor on August 1, and began assembling near the city.

Palermo Harbor and airfield were bombed by nine or more enemy planes at 0410B, some damage being done at the docks.

Paroling of enlisted men of the Italian Army whose residence was on the island of Sicily began. Both prisoners and hospital patients were now being evacuated from Cefalu to Palermo by train. The train was in daily service, attended by U.S. Army Medical Corps and Italian medical personnel.

D ∕ 23, 2 August

The stage for the Battle of Troina was set. Preparations were completed by II Corps for strong attacks on both axis. A preliminary fight had opened up at dusk, August 1, during which the enemy, with an estimated 200 men, attacked at hill C-5018 near Troina but were repulsed.

Our advance was constantly delayed by blown bridges, badly damaged roads at places which required engineer rebuilding, and heavily laid minefields. The 1st Infantry Division completed its plans for a coordinated attack. The 3d Division consolidated its positions in the San Stefano - Coronia (six miles east of San Stefano) area preparatory to resuming the eastward advance.

The 9th Division began assembling in the Nicosia - Cerami area, and the 45th Division completed assembling in bivouac in the area between Termini and Cefalu.

Straggler collecting points were established at Termini Imerese, Caltavatura, (B-81), and San Caterina (H-08). The large number of prisoners sent to North Africa had reached the capacity of existing facilities there and the Commanding General, Eastern Base Section, notified Seventh Army that no more could be handled until a later date. Admissions to medical installations this date were 848, and total admissions to date were 11,877.

D ∕ 24, 3 August

The Battle of Troina was underway. Coordination of ground and air forces brought effective results against formidable enemy counterattacks, and the Seventh Army continued its drive to capture the town.

Extremely bitter fighting which began August 2 went over into August 3d with increased vigor, indicating that the enemy intended to make his first determined stand against our advance.

An attack was planned by II Corps for 1st Division units. The attack jumped off as scheduled at 0330 hours. The 16th Infantry replaced the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, for the attack, and was to move north of the 39th to cut the road east of Troina while the 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry (Mtzd), moved via Agira and Gagliano to envelope the enemy position south of Troina.

Stubborn resistance throughout the day found enemy elements southwest of Troina slowly withdrawing under the pressure. The 1st Division captured high ground west and north of the town. During the attack by the 16th and 18th Infantry units, the enemy was showered with heavy artillery.

The 3d Division, aided by naval gunfire, advanced slowly along the coast road, encountering numerous demolitions, mines, and sporadic artillery fire, to within two miles of Fiume Furiano (running north, two miles west of San Fratello).

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The 60th RCT, 9th Division, completed movement from Palermo to Nicosia, while the 47th RCT completed debarkation at Palermo and began movement to the Nicosia area.

D + 25, 4 August

Stiff, determined opposition retarded the advance of Seventh Army on both fronts. Late in the afternoon a full scale attack was launched against the Troina position, by the 1st Division.

Enemy artillery had been noted in increasing numbers along the coast road, and it was indicated that stubborn fighting and defense astride Highway 120 was anticipated to keep the line of communication around the base of Mt. Etna open until enemy evacuation had been completed from that area.

During the morning, routes across the river were reconnoitered and that afternoon, the 15th Infantry launched an unsuccessful attack supported by one cruiser and two destroyers. The 15th Infantry then moved up the valley three or four thousand yards the next day, attempting to find better routes across the river.

The 1st Division opened the attack on Troina with a fifty minute artillery and air preparation at 1645B hours. Eight and a half artillery battalions were firing on enemy positions, and 72 A-36 Fighter-bombers in two waves of 36 planes carrying a 500-pound bomb each dropped its load on Troina's defenders. The terrific casualty and demoralizing effect of this bombardment was attested to later by many German prisoners of war.

At 1735B hours the infantry jumped off. All the regiments made successful advances, but the battered German defenses still held doggedly and no general break-through occured.

The 60th Infantry with two battalions of artillery and some attached engineers were sent to threaten enemy observation and artillery positions north and northwest of Cesaro, supporting the enemy position at Troina. This movement undoubtedly had considerable influence on the results of the Battle of Troina.

Despite the pounding given the enemy, the progress of forward elements north, west, and south of Troina, was impeded by heavy enemy fire and minefields.

At the same time Navy Task Force 88 assisted the 3d Division by naval gunfire on Cape Orlando (C-65), and San Agata (C-54), and bridges and defiles on Highway 113. The 7th RCT with attached corps artillery was shuttled by sea in landing craft to the area behind the 15th RCT (about one mile west of Furiano River and two miles west of San Fratello) in preparation for an attack on San Fratello Ridge (C-53).

Palermo Harbor and airfield were bombed again at 0405B by more than 25 enemy planes using low level and dive bombing tactics. Meanwhile, 9th Division completed its assembly at Nicosia and was attached to II Corps.

G-1 reported that for August 4 there were 823 prisoners taken. The total now stood at 91,600 taken by Seventh Army. Our losses to date included: Killed - 851, Wounded - 3,379, Missing - 860.

D + 26, 5 August

The enemy was now fighting for time in which to carry out an evacuation. This became evident through reports of large vessels in the Messina Strait.

Catania had fallen. Troina still offered extremely stubborn resistance. Demolitions impeded progress on the north coast road. From San Fratello (C-54), south to Mount Pellato, the enemy withdrew only under pressure. The line of Mount Pellato (C-42), south to Mount Acuto (C-51), was well organized and strongly supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire.

A horseshoe type of defense was noted from Mount Dellacroce (C-51), then west of the town to Mount Gregegio (C-50). On the south, this area was well defended, organized in depth, and occupied by a determined enemy.

In the British Eighth Army sector, the Canadians forced the enemy east of the Troina River. The British XIII Corps captured Catania and Misterbianco (H-87) and pushed patrols as far north as Paterno (H-78).

The 1st Infantry Division, with the 39th RCT attached, continued its relentless attack on enemy positions at Troina. High ground south of the city was captured by the 18th Infantry. The 1st Division drive was directly supported by XII Air Support Command which conducted three dive bomber missions against enemy defense positions in the vicinity of Troina.

Meanwhile the 3d Infantry Division continued its attack toward San Agata with the 30th Infantry (all under II Corps Command) attacking San Fratello Ridge from the southwest.

At the close of the day, the II Corps units had captured the high ground dominating Troina, and had opened its attack from the south on San Fratello Ridge.

D + 27, 6 August

Aided by dive bombers, the 16th RCT of the 1st Infantry Division took Troina and pushed one mile east of town where vigorous enemy resistance was again encountered.

The Advance Command Post of the Seventh Army moved from Palermo to San Stefano at 1200B, and that afternoon several bombs landed near the CP during an attack on naval craft loading at San Stefano beach.

Enemy planes raided Palermo Harbor area at 0425B. Flares were dropped over the area but all bombs landed outside the harbor.

The enemy continued to hold San Agata and San Fratello in the north. Mines, demolitions, and booby traps were widespread and hampered the movement of the Seventh Army for the remainder of the campaign.

While the 16th RCT was entering Troina, the 60th RCT of the 9th Infantry Division, captured the high ground seven miles to the north of Troina. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron and the 4th Tabor of Goums were attached to the 9th Division, protecting its left flank.

Units of the 3d Division were, on August 6, attacking enemy positions on the west bank of the Furiano River and succeeded in gaining a foothold. But during the afternoon a counter-attack by the enemy forced withdrawal of 3d Division units to the west bank.

D + 28, 7 August


Strong opposition across the entire front held up the advance along the coast, but progress was made east of Troina. The coastal resistance by the enemy was supported by heavy concentrations of artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. A local counter-attack by the enemy north of San Fratello prevented any further advance during the day.

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In the Troina sector, the enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his forces and engaged in stubborn rear guard action, retiring only under pressure toward Cesaro (C-61). Six enemy tanks were destroyed in the fighting.

The Battle of Troina having been concluded, II Corps relieved the 1st Division and replaced it with the 9th Division. On August 7, units of the 9th Division attacked east from Mt. Pelatto, eight miles north of Troina. They advanced slowly, encountering strong enemy resistance five miles east of Mt. Pelatto. Another unit advanced eastward from Troina and reached the Troina River.

The 3d Division was gaining a foothold on the east bank of the Furiano River during the day, and by dark held high ground north of San Fratello. Strong enemy positions on Mt. Fratello were bombed by A-36's from the XII Air Support Command to support the 3d Division attack.

A smoke screen 900 meters in length was maintained for 13½ hours to screen the movements of the 7th Infantry in preparation for the attack on Fratello Ridge. The screen was put up by 4.2" chemical mortars which maintained great accuracy despite continuous fire.

Enemy shells landed at half hour intervals in the vicinity of the Advance Command Post of the Seventh Army, beginning at 0100B, and lasting until daylight. At 1130B, enemy aircraft bombed shipping near the San Stefano beach. One small ship was hit and beached.

D ∕ 29, 8 August

The Seventh Army advanced eastward on both axes during the day, driving the enemy from the San Agata and Cesaro positions, and capturing San Fratello.

Plans had been initiated by Seventh Army Headquarters for an amphibious operation by II Corps units against the enemy's rear. It was carried out successfully, with landings two miles east of San Agata, at 0400 hours. The enemy was completely surprised. The landing force was composed of the 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry, a tank platoon of the 753rd Tank Battalion, and two batteries of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, loaded at San Stefano. It landed at a point two miles east of Torrenova (six miles southwest of Cape Orlando) at 0400B without opposition and captured high ground south of the highway. This operation broke enemy resistance on Mt. Fratello, while the 15th and 30th Infantry units captured the town of San Fratello. The 7th Infantry, advancing under a smoke screen, captured San Agata, mopped up pockets of resistance, and gained contact with the special landing force at 1600B.

Enemy resistance in the San Fratello sector ceased during the night of August 7-8, and approximately 1500 prisoners of war were captured. The heights of Mt. Fratello were reached early on the morning of August 8.

The German and Italian defense of the San Fratello position had been bitter and determined, and as in the Battle of Troina, the enemy was forced to withdraw only after the full weight of superior fire power and maneuvering had been brought to bear.

Enemy forces were retreating east of Cesaro at 0800B, heavily mining the road from Cesaro to Randazzo. The 47th Infantry of the 9th Division entered Cesaro, where many bridges were found blown. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, captured Mt. Camolato, six miles northwest of Cesaro.

Ustica Island surrendered unconditionally on August 5, to a combined naval and military force. The Germans had departed on July 11. Five enemy E-boats made an unsuccessful attack on Palermo Harbor, being driven off by destroyers.

Total admissions to medical installations reached 16,853, which included about 1500 enemy sick and wounded. The total evacuated to date by water was 3,750, and by air, 3,447.

D ∕ 30, 9 August

The enemy was conducting a continuous rear guard action along the entire front. At this time, however, the 9th and 3d Divisions were consolidating elements in preparation for a coordinated attack against known enemy positions.

Enemy forces in the north coast sector withdrew east of the Zappula River, and the road from San Fratello south to Cesaro was also evacuated. On the road to Randazzo, the enemy retired to the Simeto River, 10 miles west of Randazzo. But all along the front, the enemy continued delaying action with mines, mortar fire, and heavy artillery concentrations.

Air reconnaissance reported that the enemy had Milazzo Harbor in use for some time, and further reported increased landing craft activity in the Messina Straits on August 7, when approximately 40 craft were seen.

Reconnaissance elements of the 3d Division worked east of Torrenova, six miles southwest of Cape Orlando, to envelope enemy positions. The 30th Infantry passed through the 7th Infantry and continued to attack eastward along highway 113, reaching a point three miles east of Torrenova. The 47th Infantry of the 9th Division continued its attack east of Cesaro, on Highway 120.

D ∕ 31, 10 August

Slowly, because of the heavy concentration of mines, demolition, and other obstacles, but steadily, the Seventh Army advanced. By 1600B, the enemy had withdrawn west of the Zappula River and had accupied the high ground west of Naso. No organized defensive positions were noted in the coastal sector.

On the road to Randazzo, the enemy withdrew east of the Simeto River. During the withdrawal, extensive minefields and numerous demolitions of bridges were completed along Highway 120 from Cesaro. And a few isolated pockets of resistance still existed in the coastal area between San Marco and the Zappula River.

The convergence of the 15th Panzer Division, elements of the Herman Goering Division, and portions of the 3rd Parachute Division in the center, indicated strong resistance to be offered in that area.

During the day the 9th Infantry Division's 60th Infantry advanced along the line of hills in the section of II Corps zone to Mt. Saro, eight miles north of Cesaro. At the same time the 47th Infantry advanced along Highway 120 to the road junction seven miles north of Bronte.

The 3rd Division beat off a strong counter-attack during the afternoon southwest of Cape Orlando and then crossed the Zappula River. Inland, via Militello (four miles southwest of San Agata), the 15th Infantry advanced across the Rosmarino against stiff opposition.

A hospital train was performing invaluable service transporting casualties from Cefalu to Palermo, carrying as many as 300 a trip. As of this date, the strength of Seventh Army was 197,836. Our total losses to date were: Killed - 1,113, Wounded - 4,308, Missing - 939.

D ∕ 32, 11 August


Efforts of the enemy to reform and reorganize for a defense on the Cape Orlando - Naso line were broken by a strong 3rd Division attack. This involved a second en-

Army Strength!

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velopment by sea, with a landing at Brolo. Protected by air cover and supported by naval gunfire from Naval Task Force 88, the 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry, reinforced with armored artillery and tanks landed successfully two miles east of Cape Orlando and captured a position astride the highway and railroad two miles west of Brolo.

This force was counter-attacked during the day but held its position. The 7th RCT pushed along the coast road, crossing the Zappula River while the 15th RCT advanced northward and captured Naso.

No enemy attempt to evacuate south along the Naso - Randazzo road had been made. He continued rear guard action along Highway 120 to Randazzo, using mines and demolition. Although indicated earlier, no strong defensive position northwest of Randazzo had been located by our troops moving in from the northwest. Other than isolated pockets of resistance in the vicinity of Naso, which were nearly surrounded, and the enemy continued rear guard action along the entire front of the Seventh Army.

The 60th Infantry of the 9th Division was continuing its march eastward across extremely rough terrain toward Floresta. In most places the regiment had to build its own roads. The 39th RCT passed through the 47th RCT and established contact with the 78th Division of the Eighth Army which was moving on Maletto. The 39th continued to attack eastward toward Randazzo against strong enemy resistance.

By the end of the day, the II Corps units were closing in on Randazzo.

D ≠ 33, 12 August

Enemy evacuation across the Messina Straits was underway on a large scale. Eastbound enemy traffic was fully loaded and westbound vessels were empty. Air photographs which covered the Messina Straits on August 11 showed 33 water craft, including 10 Seibel ferries.

Enemy forces were withdrawing east of Patti (C-84), breaking contact during the night of August 11-12. The defense of Randazzo consisted mainly of mined roads defended by artillery, mortar, and long range small arms fire. Generally, the enemy continued delaying action in the north in the Seventh Army zone. In the center, the enemy evacuated Floresta (C-83) and was withdrawing east of the Naso - Randazzo road.

Before the British Eighth Army, the enemy's retrograde movement reached Riposto (D-01) without indications of an organized defense. In the 9th Division zone the 60th RCT captured Floresta, ten miles north of Randazzo, cutting the Cape Orlando - Randazzo road.

The 3rd Division's 7th RCT advanced along the coast road and captured Cape Orlando. Both the 7th RCT and the 15th RCT made contact with the special landing force West of Brolo (C-75). The 30th RCT passed through the 7th Infantry, and aided by naval gunfire moved rapidly along the coast road to capture Brolo. Elements of this regiment also entered Ficarra (five miles south of Brolo).

Meanwhile the British XIII Corps 78th Division pushed north of Maletto to high ground south of Randazzo to effect a pincer movement on the city with the 9th Division attacking from the north and west.

At the close of day, the 9th Division was in an advantageous position north and west of Randazzo to wage an all-out attack on the city. The 3rd Division was advancing along Highway 113.

D ≠ 34, 13 August

Once more enemy withdrawals were characterized by heavy demolitions and minefields to impede the advance of the Seventh Army. In the northern sector there was a general enemy withdrawal and apparent disorganization. Little contact was made west of Patti (C35).

In the vicinity of Randazzo, the enemy withdrew under cover of darkness, supported by occasional artillery and mortar fire. A large concentration of motor transport was observed in the vicinity of Messina (D35), and three small freighters and 30 small boats were seen at Porto D'Olivieri, (C94).

By nightfall the 9th Division had captured Randazzo, the last strong enemy position on the southern axis. The 39th RCT captured the city against stubborn resistance, while the 60th RCT continued the attack eastward from Floresta (C83). The 47th RCT passed through the 39th RCT on the eastern outskirts of Randazzo.

In the 3rd Division zone, the 30th RCT continued its advance to the east within two miles of Patti, while the 15th RCT and 3rd Ranger Battalion cleared pockets of resistance southwest of Patti. The advance past Cape Calava, four miles northwest of Patti, was impeded by a large crater blown in the road at the eastern end of the Calava tunnel where the road had been carved from solid rock mountainside. LCT's were used to ferry infantry and artillery past this block, which required 24 hours to repair.

A specimen of incendiary-filled 32 CM. (German rocket shell) was taken from a captured German ammunition dump.

The number of prisoners taken this date rose to 2,532 following the breaking up of remaining Italian units in northeast Sicily.

D ≠ 35, 14 August

The enemy was by this time concentrating almost exclusively on trying to evacuate the island of Sicily successfully. Enemy air operations during this phase were confined to scattered night bombing raids and an occasional daytime strafing and bombing mission along the coast road.

The enemy evacuated east of Falcone (C94) during the night of the 13-14 August. Mild contact was gained at noon, northwest of Funari (seven miles southwest of Barcellona (83)), but the enemy was primarily concerned with withdrawal.

Montalbano (C83) was also evacuated during the night of August 13-14. That evacuation was continuing along the coast was evidenced by air reconnaissance which reported two troop transports in the Milazzo Harbor early in the morning. A prisoner of war stated that evacuation to Italy had been ordered on August 8th.

The 18th RCT of the 1st Infantry Division passed through the 39th and 47th RCT's of the 9th Division and advanced eight miles east of Randazzo along Highway 120. The advance was hampered by blown bridges and minefields.

Meanwhile, the 9th Division continued its advance northwest and gained contact with the 3rd Division in the vicinity of Montalbano. The 3rd Division advanced rapidly to the east, capturing Oliveri (six miles east of Patti), and Falcone. Then they advanced three miles east of Barcellona on the coast road.

D ≠ 36, 15 August

The enemy evacuated east of Spadafora (D25), however, some attempt of organized resistance was encountered in the capture of Barcellona. Further activity was observed in the Messina Straits and the enemy was reported to have lost four craft in the Messina Straits because of Allied air action. In the British Eight Army

18th RCT still in line


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
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
G-2 RUNNING ESTIMATES ON GERMAN AND ITALIAN LOSSES



DEAD, WOUNDED, AND PRISONERS OF WAR



AIRCRAFT, ALL TYPES CAPTURED OR DESTROYED



GUNS, 75mm & LARGER CALIBERS

TANKS




PLATE 13

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sector, Castglione (C92) and Taormina (D11) were captured. It was further reported that the headquarters of the Hermann Goering Division was located at S. Lucia (D45) on the Calabrian Peninsula. During this evacuation period twelve long range guns were firing from the mainland of Italy covering the Messina Straits.

The 18th Infantry of the 1st Division moved north of Francavilla and concentrated in the vicinity of Novara (C93). A reinforced company was sent north to contact the 3rd Division on the coast road. Further advance of other elements of the 1st Division was stopped, by Army order.

The 9th Division advanced no further; elements were north and west of Randazzo. The 3rd Division's 7th RCT advanced rapidly along the coast road capturing Spadafora 12 miles east of Barcellona.

Meantime, the advance Command Post of the Seventh Army moved from San Stefano to the vicinity of Naso (C64), six miles south of Cape Orlando, at 1200B.

An enemy chemical warfare dump at Caltanissetta was found to contain mustard and other lethal gases.

That night a third amphibious landing was made on the north coast. The 157th Infantry of the 45th Division (under Army control) was selected for the operation. The force was to land in the vicinity of Falcone, but the troops advancing overland were moving ahead so rapidly that the landing point for the 157th was changed to the beaches northwest of Barcellona, a point in the rear of 3rd Division advance elements. The landing was made at 0230B of the 16th, without incident.

D ≠ 37, 16 August

The first shots fired onto the Italian mainland from Sicily were 100 rounds of 155 MM (HE) fired by guns of the 36th Field Artillery at located enemy batteries in the vicinity of Villa San Giovanni

Enemy batteries on the mainland counter-batteried our artillery and attempted to slow the advance of the infantry. The 7th Infantry continued its advance across country from the vicinity of Spadafora toward its objective on the ridge four miles west of Messina. Contact was maintained with light enemy rear guard forces during the day. By dark, the 7th Infantry had reached the road junction at Divieto where Highway 113 turns southeast to Messina.

During the night of August 16-17, the 7th RCT advanced east of Spadafora and pushed strong patrols into Messina, the first patrols arriving at 162000B.

Enemy rear guard elements withdrew east of D-2761, covering the withdrawal with artillery. In evacuating Cape Milazzo approximately 150 motor transport were left undemolished and no serious effort had been made by the enemy to destroy fixed guns.

In the British Eighth Army sector, the enemy retreated north of Savoca (D-13).

The last German forces embarked from the island during the night of August 16-17, abandoning a large amount of undestroyed materiel, supplies, and Italian troops in their haste.

Organized resistance was at an end. Only small, scattered groups of the enemy were found in the Messina area.

The Surgeon reported a total of 21,883 patients had been admitted to medical installations during the campaign -- 19,923 of them from the United States Army. A total of 5487 were evacuated by air to North Africa and 5391 by water. One thousand and eighty prisoners were taken on this date.

The G-1 report showed Seventh Army strength as 195,617. Our losses to date were: Killed - 1233, Wounded - 4695, Missing - 968.

D ≠ 38, 17 August

A light conclusion to the delaying action by the enemy on the Island of Sicily was offered by the withdrawal of final remaining forces on the night of 16-17th of August.

Along the British Eighth Army sector, Scaletta (D-24) was successfully occupied by landing forces on the night of August 15-16, and the coastal area north of Scaletta for a short distance was the only remaining territory not under complete control of the Allied forces.

The continued absence of the Italian Navy from Sicilian waters and the lack of activity of Axis aircraft was further evidence that the enemy considered the Sicilian campaign a closed issue. Only isolated groups of Germans in civilian clothes and Sicilians still loyal to the Fascist regime remained as the last sentence in the final chapter of the Sicilian operation.

The 3d Division encountered only isolated pockets of resistance and occasional artillery fire from the mainland of Italy. A small group of British tanks joined the 3d Division at Messina at 1000B, the 7th Infantry having entered the city at 0610B. The 30th Infantry advanced along the north coast road to Capo Di Faro, clearing the Capo Di Faro Peninsula of all remaining resistance.

At 1015B the Commanding General of the United States Seventh Army entered Messina.

The fall of Messina was the fall of Sicily itself. Thirty-eight days after the landing, the campaign had ended. The first United States field army to fight as a unit in this war had accomplished its mission with complete success. Long, hard months of training and of battle experience, the vast productive power of America and the courage and vision of its leaders had combined to demonstrate to the world that the unprepared nation of two years before had arrived on the scene of battle as a full-fledged fighting power.

In their efforts to prevent, or at least delay, our conquest of Sicily, the enemy had lost 100,000 prisoners of war, an estimated 12,000 killed and wounded. 267 aircraft were accounted for by capture or on the ground. 293 guns, of 75mm caliber and larger, 43 Mark III and IV tanks, 22 Mark VI's, and 123 tanks unclassified, had been taken. The only small measure of success gained by the enemy was his evacuation of a large part of the German forces to the Italian mainland.

But Italy, far from being a safe refuge, was now on the verge of becoming a battlefield itself. The collapse of Sicily ended forever the enemy's dreams of domination of the Mediterranean. His last strong outposts were gone. The continent itself, goal of months of Allied planning and preparation, was within reach. And the "handwriting on the wall" had been seen by the Italian people, as it would soon be seen by other nations of occupied Europe.

Many hard battles remained to be fought before the enemy could be decisively beaten. But the Seventh Army had helped pave the way toward final victory, and, justly proud, was ready for its next mission.

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D-DAY - 10 JULY, 1943

PLATE 14

PROGRESS MAP
OPERATION "HUSKY"

LINES SHOW POINTS OF FARTHEST ADVANCE OF SEVENTH ARMY UNITS ON DATES INDICATED

BRITISH EIGHTH ARMY
PROGRESS LINES
BASED ON DATA AVAILABLE
AT THIS HEADQUARTERS

LEGEND

SICILY

SCALE 1:750000


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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO # 758
U.S. Army

22 August 1943

GENERAL ORDER)
:
NUMBER 18)

Soldiers of the Seventh Army:

Born at sea, baptized in blood, and crowned with victory in the course of 38 days of incessant battle and unceasing labor, you have added a glorious chapter to the history of war.

Pitted against the best the Germans and Italians could offer, you have been unfailingly successful. The rapidity of your dash, which culminated in the capture of Palermo, was equalled by the dogged tenacity with which you stormed Troina and captured Messina.

Every man in the Army deserves equal credit. The enduring valor of the Infantry, and the impetuous ferocity of the tanks were matched by the tireless clamor of our destroying guns.

The Engineers performed prodigies in the construction and maintenance of impossible roads over impassable country. The services of Maintenance and Supply performed a miracle. The Signal Corps laid over 10,000 miles of wire, and the Medical Department evacuated and cared for our sick and wounded.

On all occasions the Navy has given generous and gallant support. Throughout the operation our Air has kept the sky clear and tirelessly supported the operation of the ground troops.

As a result of this combined effort, you have killed or captured 113,350 enemy troops. You have destroyed 265 of his tanks, 2,324 vehicles, and 1,162 large guns, and in addition, have collected a mass of military booty running into hundreds of tons.

But your victory has a significance above and beyond its physical aspect - you have destroyed the prestige of the enemy.

The President of the United States, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, General Alexander, General Montgomery have all congratulated you.

Your fame shall never die.

G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding

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CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES

From the President of the United States:

"ALL OF US ARE THRILLED OVER THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN NOW SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TIMING AND PLANNING OF THE ALLIES. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE WHEN WE REALIZE THAT THE ENEMY FORCES IN SICILY AMOUNTED TO FOUR HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND MEN. THE EVENTS OF THE PAST THIRTY EIGHT DAYS SHOW WHAT CAN BE DONE BY TEAM WORK BASED ON PREPARATION TRAINING TIMING AND ABOVE ALL ON GALLANTRY ON LAND ON SEA AND IN THE AIR. FROM THE ANCIENT CITADEL OF QUEBEC I SEND YOU MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN UNDER YOUR COMMAND BRITISH CANADIAN FRENCH AND AMERICAN MY THANKS AND ENTHUSIASTIC APPROBATION. TELL THEM WELL DONE".

From His Majesty King George VI:

"ON THE FINAL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE OCCUPATION OF SICILY I WISH TO SEND TO YOU AND TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE FORCES THAT YOU COMMAND WITH SUCH DISTINCTION MY HEARTFELT CONGRATULATIONS ON A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT. THROUGHOUT THE BRITISH EMPIRE WE HAVE WATCHED WITH ADMIRATION THE ORDERED PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN BY SEA AND BY LAND AND BY AIR AND WE REJOICE AT ITS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONVEY TO MY BRITISH AND CANADIAN TROOPS A SPECIAL ASSURANCE OF MY PRIDE IN THEIR SHARE IN THIS VICTORY".

From General Marshall:

"YOU HAVE DONE A GRAND JOB OF LEADERSHIP AND YOUR CORPS AND DIVISION COMMANDERS AND THEIR PEOPLE HAVE MADE AMERICANS VERY PROUD OF THEIR ARMY AND CONFIDENT OF THE FUTURE. GIVE THEM MY PERSONAL THANKS AND CONGRATULATIONS".

From General Eisenhower:

"I HOPE YOU WILL EXTEND TO GENERAL MONTGOMERY AND PATTON AND TO THE MAGNIFICENT TROOPS SERVING UNDER THEM MY COMMENDATIONS AND CONGRATULATIONS FOR THEIR ENERGY DETERMINATION AND AGGRESSIVENESS IN DRIVING THE ENEMY OUT OF SICILY".

From General Alexander:

"I SEND YOU, YOUR STAFF, AND EVERY AMERICAN SOLDIER IN YOUR SEVENTH ARMY, MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS AND THE EXPRESSIONS OF MY SINCEREST ADMIRATION FOR NOT ONLY YOUR RECENT GREAT FEAT OF ARMS IN TAKING MESSINA, BUT FOR THE SPEED DASH AND SKILL YOU HAVE SHOWN IN THE SICILIAN OPERATIONS. YOUR COUNTRY WILL BE VERY RPOUD OF YOU AND SO AM I TO HAVE THE HONOR OF HAVING UNDER MY COMMAND SUCH MAGNIFICENT TROOPS".

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SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

c. Lessons Learned



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I. ORGANIZATION

1. Composition of an Army:- While an Army is a nebulous organization, it is felt that as a datum plane a minimum Army should consist of two infantry corps of three divisions each. Each corps should be reinforced by a corps artillery brigade. The necessity for three divisions is that by using them it is possible to maintain the pressure. Very rarely do situations arise where a two division corps can rest one of its divisions.

2. Troop Lists:- a. In making up the troop list for the assault convoy, it must always be remembered that while men and equipment to operate harbors, beaches, graves registration, hospitals, or to restore and maintain airfields are necessary, they are utterly valueless until the fighting infantry, supported by artillery and tanks, has captured a beachhead.

b. From our experience units not engaged in the initial fight at the beaches are always super-optimistic as to how long it takes to secure a beachhead. Non-killers must be held to an irreducable minimum in early echelons.

3. Staff Sections:- Each staff section should be at full strength when the initial directive is received and planning initiated. The volume of work is usually greater during this phase than it is during the operational stage. Augmenting the staff immediately prior to the campaign is unsatisfactory. Officers thrust into the middle of the planning with a necessarily inadequate background are placed at a disadvantage which materially lessens their value.

4. Additional Staff Section:- No T/O allows sufficient personnel for the G-4 Section in a landing operation. A transportation section in G-4 as an additional special staff section on the Army level is an essential adjunct to the successful operation of the supply functions of a modern corps, field army, or amphibious task force. It should contain from ten to twelve officers and about twenty enlisted men. This is probably the most important section in G-4.

5. G-2 Activities:- All persons connected with intelligence activities should be placed under one head, namely, the task force commander, who would exercise this authority through his Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. It is worthy of note that in the HUSKY operation there were many uncorrelated G-2 activities which resulted in no little confusion.

6. Intelligence:- A service to provide for the interception of radio messages between subordinate units of the command and particularly between other friendly major units engaged in the operation, similar to the British "J" Service, should be established as a permanent unit.

7. Air:- A staff officer for air should be assigned to the G-3 Section of all divisions and higher units. He should be from the air force, preferably of field grade and thoroughly trained in air-ground support.

8. Army Liaison System:- The Army liaison system must be further developed. A separate liaison section should be established in Army headquarters. Personnel should be carefully selected equipped and trained. It is important that they be available and function at the inception of planning. Adequate provision for lateral liaison must be worked out.

9.. Troop Movements:- It is recommended that the G-3 Section be responsible only for establishing the priority of movement of units, and that a G-4 Transportation Section, or a separate Movements Section, be responsible for issuing detailed orders, providing the necessary additional means, and coordinating and controlling the movement.

10. Near Shore Control:- An Army near shore control organization should be perfected at the inception of planning. This group should be completely staffed with informed representatives of all section necessary to the operational phase. In "HUSKY" due to initial staff shortages and for other reasons it was not feasible to erect such an organization until shortly before D Day.

11. Corps Artillery:- The corps artillery brigade should consist of one regiment of 155 guns, one regiment of 8 inch howitzers, and one regiment of 4.5 inch guns, also one observation battalion. All corps artillery should be provided with M-4 tractors now used by the CA AA.

12. Engineer Units:- In fighting in bad country against an enemy who trusts to demolitions for delay, it is conceivable that the ratio of Engineer regiments to Infantry regiments should be fifty-fifty. Certainly every Infantry division actively engaged requires the services of one Engineer regiment in addition to its divisional Engineers. The Corps Artillery certainly requires an Engineer regiment, and others must be utilized to see that the supplies brought up by the Army reaches the Corps and Divisions.

II. ADMINISTRATION

1. Changes by Higher Headquarters:- There is never enough preparation time. Changes in plans and the specifying of minute details should therefore be avoided insofar as possible by higher headquarters. Valuable time during the training period can thus be saved and lower units be given its benefit for assembly, equipping, and training.

2. Channels of Command:- Definite channels of command should be set up immediately after the conception of the operation. The channel of command, from the task force commander to the highest authority, should be definite and direct. No subsidiary or adjacent headquarters should be included in this command channel.

3. Assignment of Troops:- All troops selected for the operation should be placed directly under the command of the task force commander. This command should be all-embracing. Troops should not be under one command for training, and under another command for administrative purposes.

4. T/O Strength:- All combat units should be brought up to T/O Strength, plus 15% for enlisted men and officers of junior grade, and all personnel frozen. This is of vital importance if the small combat units such as boat teams, platoon, etc., are to go into action full strength. It should be a recognized fact that due to sickness and other reasons, approximately 10 to 15% of any command will not be available to the commander on D-day. Therefore, in order to have completely trained teams made up of men accustomed to working together, an over-strength must be provided at the earliest possible moment.

5. Record of Units Joining Sub-Task Forces:- A check system must be established which will provide for an accurate record of the dates on which units and parts of units join sub-task forces. This is especially necessary for the operational phase.

6. Headquarters Accomodations:- Headquarters, whether on land or sea, must be adequate in size to accomodate all personnel concerned, and the communication set-up must be ample to handle the heavy traffic that normally accompanies amphibious operations, both during the planning and the operations phase.

7. Designation of Ports and Units to Participate:- In planning for an amphibious operation it is essential that the designation of ports, embarkation points and final staging areas be included in the initial directive. Designation of units to comprise the force and provision for the release of these units to the task force concerned must also be accomplished with the start of planning so that priorities

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for equipping, movement and the prescribing of training to utilize the maximum amount of time available may be promptly established.

8. Control of Loading:- Control of the loading of personnel, supplies and equipment should not be too greatly decentralized. It is true that division of the parent force into numerous commands places initial responsibility upon sub-task force commanders, which should permit to a certain degree his absolute decisions as to loading of personnel and supplies. The possibility of asumption of control at an early date by the higher headquarters, however, demands adequate control to insure proper arrival of troops and supplies based on the overall picture. The advisability of the task force retaining a small part of the shipping space provided each sub-task force until all last minute requirements are known should be considered to provide for unexpected late demands on the task force as a whole.

9. Loading:- a. Loading of items of a complicated or highly technical nature must be supervised by personnel capable of identifying parts and who realize the necessity for orderly placement on shipboard. A Bailey bridge lacking an essential part might better remain on the dock in a base area than take up valuable space on a transport.

b. Medical personnel, their equipment, and vehicles should be loaded, insofar as possible, on the same ship. Under no circumstances should the personnel and equipment be shipped on separate convoys.

10. Communications:- Means must be made available early in the planning stage for the establishment of direct communication channels between Army headquarters and units on the troop list.

11. Message Centers:- a. The message center of the force commander is the nerve center of the entire operation. It should be in charge of at least two officers of field rank, and officers of mature and seasoned judgement.

b. There must be a redefinition of the Adjutant General's mail and distribution sections, and the Signal Corps Message Center duties. Messages incoming and outgoing are unnecessarily delayed by having to pass through two offices at one headquarters before delivery to the addressee.

12. Public Relations:- Efficient operation of Public Relations personnel requires that transportation be available for all correspondents to perform their legitimate missions. Rapid means of clearing dispatches, either by a separate radio channel or by air courier service, is necessary. It is particularly desirable that a special channel be provided aboard the principle command ship, and later ashore, to handle press dispatches. The use of command channels for the transmission of press material is impractical, since such use cause interruptions in tactical traffic. It may however be necessary to modify Naval policy to permit of individual transmission of press reports.

13. Official Observers - Visitors:- a. The exact number of official observers and/or visitors from higher headquarters should be known to the commander well in advance of D-day; this, in order that proper accommodations and space may be allotted to them on the different ships, and in order to prevent last minute interruptions and changes.

b. No official observers or visitors should be allowed to come to the combat area without receiving prior authority from the force commander. Reports made by such observers should be submitted through the headquarters of the force commander.

14. Civilian Agencies:- a. It should be made clear to civilian agencies with the task force that they must work through the appropriate task force section as long as operations require.

b. It is incumbent upon the Provost Marshal, Civil Affairs Officers, and Counter Intelligence agencies to coordinate their plans, beginning during the initial planning stages and continuing through the completion of the operation.

They must, at all times, keep one another jointly informed as to the matters pertaining to the function of their own activity to prevent inefficiency, misunderstanding, and over-lap.

15. Reports and Records:- Forms for the reports and records required by higher headquarters should be issued to subordinate units at the inception of planning together with full instructions as to when and how they are to be submitted. This will enable participating organizations to promptly accumulate and provide in a uniform manner, essential data as to requirements in respect to personnel, vehicles, and equipment necessary for troop movement, staging area needs, allocation of shipping and other necessary information.

16. Casualty Reports:- a. Battle casualty reports, as submitted by G-1 and the Adjutant General, will rarely agree during the operational phase. The G-1 report conveys to the commander the effective strength of his troops, which includes all ailments which render a man incapacitated for duty. It is not an accurate personnel accounting. The battle casualty report, on the other hand, reports those men actually casualties through the action of the enemy, and is an accurate personnel account.

b. Misinformation:- A source of much misinformation is unauthorized data on casualties, which reaches the United States mail in spite of censorship regulations. This is borne out by the constant stream of inquiries directed to the Theater Commander by the War Department based on letters received from relative of soldiers. Unit and other censors, and specially hospital censors, must be ever on the alert to delete this information, which not only embarrasses the War Department but may directly affect civilian morale.

17. Identification of Personnel:- The identification of our personnel killed in action was greatly facilitated by the requirements in some units of identifying every officer and enlisted man by having his identification marked on the inside of each legging.

18. Replacements:- a. In order to provide proper means for handling of replacements and for the handling of men released from hospitals, Replacements Battalions should be assigned to the force and should be brought into the combat zone as soon as practical. The number of replacements needed should be anticipated well in advance of the operation. Replacements should be available to task force commanders well in advance of D-day and throughout the entire operation so that units can be kept up to efficient operational strength.

b. When active operations are in progress, divisions do not and cannot provide even educated guesses as to the number of replacements necessary, therefore, during active operations, calls for replacements should be based on experience tables. When a lull occurs, accurate check-ups can be made and inequalities then corrected. However, we will always be short. In providing replacements it is the experience of Morocco, Tunisia, and Sicily that at least 75 percent of casualties occur in the riflemen of the rifle companies, therefore, in training replacements, this consideration should be borne in mind.

19. Hospital Ships:- A great saving in non-fighting men and heavy hospital equipment can be effected by providing hospital ships. The presence of these ships removes the initial necessity for hospitalization and provides much better care for the wounded men. However, steps must be taken to see that the Navy provides a list of wounded taken on board and turns this over to the Army prior to sailing, otherwise, men will be reported missing who are actually on the hospital ship or transports.

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III - TRAINING

1. Debarkation:- Too much time is devoted to teaching soldiers to debark from large craft into small craft. This is a very simple operation and can be very readily accomplished. A great deal of time should be put on teaching soldiers to get out of small craft on the run and keep running across the beach.

2. Reconnaissance:- a. Air. Modern aircraft precludes detection of details by visual air reconnaissance; such as gun installations, except where guns are firing. Dispersed front line troops, and pinpoint targets cannot be located easily, as the pilot must observe, fly his ship, and read his map in one operation. The lack of understanding of ground officers as to the capabilities and limitations of tactical reconnaissance and strategical photo reconnaissance aircraft leads to a waste of effort.

b. Ground. From the highest units down there is a notable lack of understanding of the value of reconnaissance and how to execute it. Unquestionably, the reconnaissance troop in the infantry division is not adequate in size. It should certainly be doubled. Further, all infantry rifle soldiers must be taught how to scrutinize the country for concealed or camouflaged gun implacements and pillboxes.

3. Night Combat:- Night combat has such an important place in war and is so disliked by the Germans that we should specialize in it. Great improvement in night operations, particularly with regards to eyesight is produced by practice.

4. Innovations:- Experimentation must be completed prior to the commencement of the training period, or failing that, be conducted by troops other than those involved in the operation. By this is meant primarily, innovations in landing methods, passage of obstacles, and related subjects. Continual changes in the standard operating procedures can lead only to confusion and a failure to complete proper training.

5. Camouflage:- Care in the placing of obstacles, particularly barbed wire, in front of well camouflaged fortifications is important. Many exceptional examples of camouflage of fortifications were encountered, but in many cases the value of the camouflage was lost because the locations were given away by the barbed wire around them and by lack of track discipline.

6. Air Support Parties:- a. Air support parties should train under the supervision of the G-3 for air. Frequent and regular exercises with the ground units with which they are to work during combat should be held. Pilots who are to fly missions in the anticipated operation would benefit immeasurably by participating in this ground training.

b. The radio communication of air support parties may be improved by better and more intensive training of operators.

7. Battle Order:- The subject of enemy battle order presents a most difficult training problem. The importance of this subject must be appreciated, as it requires long and comprehensive study by competent personnel. In operations it becomes instantly vital to success.

8. Simulated Battle Conditions:- Some of the battle practice to which our troops have been subjected is more sensational than battle and as a consequence gives a false idea of the violence of war, with the result that some troops are unduly perturbed. It is certainly necessary that troops be fired over at very close heights by their own supporting weapons. They should also be habituated to following closely on artillery preparations, both percussion and air bursts. In doing so, they should have targets at which they fire so as to habituate them to fire while moving and to using their own arms in addition to the fire protection provided by the supporting arms. On the other hand, firing towards our troops close over their heads and bursting unduly large number of small mines amongst them as they move forward under circumstances which almost invariably inhibit their firing, have a bad effect. Troops must always fight back, not just take it.

9. Hardening of Troops:- Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the physical condition of officers and men. Only by being extremely inured to terrific hardships can they produce successful results under the conditions of actual war.

10. Mutual Air - Ground Recognition:- The ground troops and the Navy, particularly in the case of Navy small boats and non-AA ground troops, must be trained never to fire at airplanes unless they are attacked or the planes are so close that there is no possible doubt as to their nationality. If this is not done, we simply deprive ourselves of air support by shooting our own planes, or demand of our own aviators very high courage, which, to their credit, they have often been seen to display in flying through our own AA fire. Our Air Force must be equally well trained not to attack friendly troops or craft.

11. Detection of Mines:- The detection of mines by all types of troops must be stressed and each infantry rifle company should be provided with ten mine detectors. Owing to the fact that mine explosions are usually fatal, and we do not classify the cause of death, it is impossible to say what percent of our losses were due to mines. It is estimated that not over ten percent of our losses were thus caused. Mines are mental hazards and must not be over-emphasized in training.

12. Evaluation of Terrain:- Sub-Task Force Commanders should be given a free hand in planning the details of their operation, but they should make their plans conform to the terrain. By the same token the training of their troops must conform to the type of terrain over which they will fight.

IV. EQUIPMENT

1. Individual Equipment:- a. The equipment of troops engaged in landing operations must be reduced to the minimum. For the infantry rifleman, who has the hardest job, a hundred rounds of ammunition, one canteen, one or two grenades, and probably the light type of gas mask are sufficient. Supporting troops should, in addition to the grenades, or as an alternative to them, depending on the circumstances, carry one light trench mortar projectile a piece.

b. For landing operations the use of A or B bags for the initial assault is expensive and valueless. All they need in the way of extra equipment is a toilet set, including shaving equipment, towel, and soap.

c. As soon as the beaches are taken over by the Army, additional clothing and equipment in appropriate sizes must be immediately made available for issue. In the Sicilian Campaign we carried in the assault convoy, but in a late priority to land, waterproof bags containing full field equipment, including pistol and pistol belts for 5 percent of the assault infantry. The contents of these bags are for the purpose of immediately replacing equipment lost or destroyed during the landing. Experience indicates that the ratio could be reduced to 2½ percent of the assault infantry.

2. Gas Stoves:- The issue of individual gas stoves on a basis of one per squad in infantry divisions contributed substantially to the health and morale of troops denied organization cooking.

3. Weapons and Vehicles:- Major weapon and vehicle casualties are generally complete casualties. There is, in the main, little chance for economical repair, and spare parts should be limited to organic loads in line organizations and ordnance maintenance organizations for the first 30 days, supplemented generally by replacement of vehicles and complete weapons. All replacements must be complete and ready for combat.

4. DUKWS:- In the unloading of supplies the Dukw has proved an exceptionally fine piece of equipment and has accentuated the importance of bulldozers on the beaches early in order to properly construct the necessary roads, and it has also made the sleds previously used by the shore units obsolete.

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5. Mine Detectors:- In Sicily we met only one new type of non-metallic mine. The charge in this mine was a plastic explosive wrapped in heavy paper or burlap and tied with string. The firing mechanism consists of a bakelite igniter containing a metal striker and detonator with flash cap attached. However, it is certain that this type will become more and more prevalent. It is felt confidently that the inventive genius of America can devise some device for locating such mines. Certainly an intensive study for the creating of such a device should have a very high priority.

6. 4.2 Mortars:- The 4.2 mortar firing a white phosphorus or high explosive shell is a terrifically destructive weapon, but as its present mount is almost wholly immobile it can only be used in the first phase of an attack. If it could be provided with a tractor-drawn mount from which it could fire, it would be tremendously valuable. The range should be increased to 4,000 to 4,500 yards.

7. Illuminated Sights: - a. None of the mortars provided American troops have any means of illuminating the sight for night firing. This is a grave defect. The Germans have a small flashlight strapped around the forehead under the helmet which throws a pencil of light on the elevating and traversing mechanism of the mortar. Some such device for all our mortars should be developed.

b. The tank 75, the 57, and 37, as well as all larger calibers, should all be provided with illuminated sights for night firing. The tank is particularly valuable in firing at point targets at night, provided these targets have been picked out in the daytime. The direct fire from the tanks in turret defilade can be kept up, especially while firing uphill, until the infantry attack is within 50 yards of the target.

8. Artillery Ammunition:- a. Modern warfare emphasizes artillery weapons. The proportions of artillery ammunition must be determined after a careful analysis of the probable tactical employment of artillery for a particular operation.

b. In Sicily we had nothing but armor-piercing ammunition for the 57. Ten percent of the rounds for a 57 should be armor-piercing, and the rest should be 20 percent white phosphorus and 70 percent high explosive.

c. If a projectile can be developed for the 37 with more penetrating effect, it is superior to the 57 as an offensive antitank weapon for two reasons: First, it can be pulled by the low-relief ¼-ton truck. The 57 cannot and must be pulled either by a half-track or a high-relief 3/4-ton truck. Second, with the limited crews available, the 57 cannot be manhandled any distance over bad country while the 37 can. Even with present ammunition the 37 is deadly against tanks up to 400 yards.

9. Hand Grenades:- The majority of opinion favors the percussion grenade over the fragmentation grenads. This is based on the fact that at the close ranges, at which grenade fights take place, the shocking effect of the percussion grenade is sufficient to let troops in with bayonets, whereas if they use fragmentation grenades, they have to take cover and lose time getting close. The troops in Sicily were not provided with any means of carrying grenades. This is an error and should be corrected. Thermite and white phosphorus grenades in the ratio of 5 percent each should be available in a theater.

10. Bazooka:- On four specific occasions the Bazooka accounted for Mark-4 tanks. It is believed that if the Bazooka were provided with a personnel shell with an "all-way" fuse in addition to its armor-piercing shell, its effectiveness would be materially improved. Most of the officers prefer the rifle grenade to the Bazooka as a close range antitank weapon.

11. Amphibious Radios:- It is essential that high powered radio channels be established ashore at the earliest possible moment. This was effectively accomplished by installing water-proofed sets, SCR-299, in 2½-ton amphibious trucks. Two such units should be provided for each Army, Corps, and Division Headquarters and loaded in such a manner as to permit of unloading over the ramps of landing vessels while still some distance off shore.

12. Gadgets:- In planning landing operations, there is an invariable tendency to put too many gadgets in the small boats and consequently to overcrowd them. The only accessories necessary are the following: One grapnel projectile for 81-mm mortars in the ratio of one per assault company. In the same ratio there should be a four section bangalore torpedo raised on skids to a height of four feet. These are used for opening lines through minefields. Every assault platoon should have two pairs of bolt cutters. One wire mat per small landing boat is useful for crossing entanglements and does not take up too much room. The above applies to assault waves only.

13. Animals:- The pack animal is a definite asset in modern mountain warfare and should be provided.

V. SUPPLY

1. Decentralization:- The initial supply for all classes must be decentralized to the Sub-Task Forces. The amount and character of supply will depend on circumstances, which are governed by the character of the terrain, the type of beach or port, and the distance from home. In any event the Force Commander should not attempt to intervene in the supply problem until the initial objectives of the landing have been attained. Then the G-4 of the Army and his assistants, with the aid of special beach engineer battalions, should take over the beaches. As the operation progresses, the G-4 of the Army should be relieved by units from the SOS who take over the harbor and other successive supply installations as the Army moves forward. To make this transition smooth, it is desirable that representatives of each section of the SOS accompany the G-4 of the Army.

2. Detailed Requisitions:- Detailed requisitions should not be necessary to include all items of all classes of supply for an entire task force and for an entire operation projecting such requirements as far as five months beyond D Day. Tables of experiences should permit the flow of such requirements beyond the initial operational stages.

3. Critical Items:- Some critical items of supply require at least 90 days between requisition and delivery. The mission must be defined in ample time to complete the plans for and delivery of those items requiring that time lag.

4. Build-Up:- In the TORCH Operation, due to time and space, the earliest probable build-up was 60 days after landing, which meant that the initial landing lived or died on what it took with it. In the Sicilian Campaign, and in other possible operations, the second and third convoys can arrive sooner, and in fact, ships making the assault landing will return and bring up the successive increments. There is a tendency to arrange the sequence in which these increments will arrive. This is wrong. The best a Commander can do is to estimate what he would probably want, but the action of the enemy will determine the order in which he will want them. An officer of force and experience must remain behind to command these build-up increments and send whichever type is called for promptly and completely.

5. Rations:- a. Troops in combat require one and one-third rations per day.

b. The "B" 5-in-1 ration plays an important part with the emergency rations "C" and "K" for use by combat troops in that it permits issue of a balanced "B" ration during a fast-moving campaign wherein the time element prohibits the breakdown and shipment of the normal "B" ration.

c. The "Hospital Supplement" ration was extremely successful and filled a definite need for use in sustenance of sick and wounded prior to the issue of the straight "B" ration.

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6. Engineers:- The faster an Army intends to go and the more violent the blows it intends to strike, the larger must be the tail. Without tremendous supplies of gasoline, ammunition, and other stores, an Army cannot develop its elasticity or striking power. It cannot attain these supplies except through the use of a tremendous number of troops behind the front line. At one time in the Sicilian Operation, the Seventh Army had thirteen Infantry regiments and nine Engineer regiments, besides Ordnance, maintenance, and other non-fighting but vitally essential units.

VI. AIR - NAVY - GROUND

1. Joint Planning:- a. In operations of an amphibious nature, it is absolutely essential that all services represented, i.e., Ground, Air, and Navy, should be housed together or adjacent to each other during the entire planning stage. Failure to do so results in confusion, inefficiencies, and unwarranted delay.

b. The naval and air arms participating must plan in conjunction with the ground force. In "HUSKY" as in "TORCH" the Army and Navy staffs were widely separated during the critical period of planning. In both operations this resulted in needless misunderstandings and the loss of valuable time. The plan for a combined operation must be developed in close cooperation by all participating arms. This requires that ground, naval, and air force staffs be immediately and continuously available to each other so that all the details of training, rehearsals, movement to staging areas, loading of convoys and embarkation may be effectively coordinated. It is essential that the air service command be represented on the air planning staff. Representatives of air tactical units are not sufficiently familiar with air service units to indicate with the required exactness service command requirements for shipping space.

2. Liaison:- Constant liaison must be maintained with all supply agencies of higher and subordinate headquarters, air, ground, and navy, during the planning and operational stages of an amphibious operation.

3. Selection of Objectives:- The general area to be attacked is selected by the High Command. It then becomes the duty of the Force Commander, in conjunction with the Navy and with the Air Force, to determine the precise localities where the various landings will be attempted. The interest of the Navy in this is a determination of the beaches which, from a naval standpoint, are available. The interest of the Air is largely where and to what extent fighter cover can be provided. Time and argument will be saved if the Navy, Army, and Air planning staff, with their respective commanders, make this decision immediately after the amount and type of lift is determined. The reason that the lift must be determined first is that on the lift depends the amount of troops available, and on the amount of troops available depends the number of landings which may be attempted.

4. Extra Personnel:- The Navy and Air Force through their senior officers must state their requirements for men and equipment. Since these requirements will invariably be excessive, the Ground Force Commander, the Navy, and the Air must thrash the matter out under the presidency of the senior officer from the office of the Commander-in-Chief who can make the final decision. Not only must this final decision state the number of men and amount of equipment but it must also specify in which convoy they will be carried. After these decisions have been reached, nothing except enemy action should in any way reduce the list of vessels or change the order of loading.

5. Mutual Recognition by the Air and Ground:- It is very important that more instruction be given both ground troops and air troops in recognizing each other. It is believed that the number of friendly planes shot down by ground troops in any operation is considerably less than the number of friendly vehicles destroyed by our air. This fact is not an argument against close air-ground support which is of sufficient value to warrant the casualties above mentioned, but it is regrettable that such casualties occur, and more thorough training would certainly reduce their number.

6. Surprise Element:- If surprise can be insured until H minus 1 hour, the chances of landing successfully are greatly enhanced. Owing to the noise of the ships in the transport area, it is highly improbable that surprise later than H minus 1 hour will ever be secured. This being so, it is very desirable that the air assault the selected beaches between H minus 30 minutes and H minus 15 minutes. It must be definitely arranged that if for reasons of weather or other causes the air is unable to attack before H minus 15, the air attack must be dispensed with.

VII. NAVY

1. General:- From the standpoint of the ground troops, it is vital that before planning starts a definite agreement be secured from the Navy as to the number and type of ships available, and the depth of loading permissible in the smaller craft.

2. Joint Operations:- Joint operations subsequent to the initial phase require a well qualified naval liaison officer working in full cooperation with the G-3 Section of Army. Direct communications with naval headquarters for this officer are vital. Naval support during phases of the action subsequent to the initial landing must be carefully coordinated. The premature withdrawal of naval liaison personnel makes such coordination difficult.

3. Command Ships:- a. A combined Army, Navy, and Air Force command ship is necessary not only for the Task Force Commander but for the Sub-Task Force Commanders and even as far down as the Regimental Combat Team Commanders. The complexity of the installations diminishes with the size of the unit involved.

b. Command ships should be specially constructed and not improvised at the last moment. They should in no case be naval fighting ships since involvement in a fire fight results in immediate disruption of all radio communication channels.

c. A suitable office must be provided for each of the following: The Commanding General, Chief of Staff, G-3, G-2, and Air Support.

d. Each command ship should have three separate code rooms: One for the Army, one for the Navy, and one for the Air Force code sections. Each of these code rooms must be large enough to permit of efficient operation of British and American Code Teams. The message center room should be convenient to the code rooms, and of sufficient size to accomodate the three message center installations, namely, Army, Navy, and Air Corps. All three services, however, may use a common radio operation room. Also a British Code Room must be provided wherever a joint operation is planned. We had such a code room on the "Monrovia".

e. The Task Force Commander's headquarters ship should be accompanied by an alternate command ship carrying sufficient radio equipment to take over the channels if the principal headquarters ship is lost. Where possible all command ships should have alternates particularly when the unit in question equals or exceeds the size of a division.

4. Training of Navy Personnel:- More emphasis must be placed by the Navy on training coxswains to handle boats and to find the proper beaches. Also more training is necessary in the arrival at and the manipulation of vessels in the transport area.

5. Beach Parties:- a. Combined Army and Navy beach parties are of great potential value but very seldom produce the results they should. This is due to the lack of force of character in the men of the Army and Navy commanding them.

b. They also have a tendency to develop unnecessarily complex forms of procedure. A solution is to have a senior Naval and Army officer on each beach who are known to possess sufficient force and drive to see that things work.

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6. Speedboats:- There should be--and this need is vital--at least two speedboats solely for Army use which should lie close to the command ship. There are innumerable occasions when the possession of such speedboats to take messages would facilitate matters because, up to a distance of fifteen to twenty miles, a staff officer in a speedboat can deliver and receive messages far faster than they can be coded, sent, and decoded. When the headquarters goes ashore speedboats should still be available till communication is assured.

7. Controlled Shipping Off Shore:- Better means should be provided to insure control of shipping off shore. Supplies carried on the ships are needed by the units ashore, and the points to which they are delivered should be determined by those for whom the supplies are intended. Otherwise, as in past operations, supplies will often be landed distant from the point where they are required.

8. 'Closing-in' of Transports:- As soon as the enemy shore batteries are put out of action, the transports should close on the beach. There are two reasons for this from the Army standpoint. First, it greatly facilitates the speed of unloading by shortening the turn-around. Second, the air cover, which is protecting the beach, is also available to protect the ships. This is not true if the ships are lying nearer the horizon.

9. Combat Loaders:- When combat loaders are used and loading for the assault is to be done at night, it is most desirable that they have sufficient landing craft carried in davits to lift a complete assault unit without having to call on other ships to supply small craft.

10. Naval Gunfire Support:- Whether or not Navy gunfire support is to be used prior to H hour, must be definitely determined for the entire force. It is the opinion of this Headquarters that Navy gunfire support should not be used sooner than H minus 1 hour and then only against enemy units which are firing, or against searchlights. In the daytime, Navy gunfire support is of immeasurable value, and the means now developed by the Navy for putting it on are extremely efficient.

11. Medical:- The hospital carrier equipped with water ambulances are far superior to any other manner of water evacuation from the beaches.

12. Feeding Prisoners:- Arrangements must be made with the Navy for a definite responsibility for the feeding and guarding of prisoners of war. If this guarding cannot be done by the Navy, additional MP Battalions must be provided. However, to put such men in the assault convoy reduces the assault personnel. Food for prisoners of war while on board ships should be provided by the Navy.

VIII. AIR

1. Air Support: - a. Air support divides itself into three phases. The first one is the removal or control of hostile air activities in the air. This is solely a function of the air. The next one is bombing ahead of the ground forces. This has been in the past satisfactorily accomplished by the ground stating those targets on which an attack would apparently facilitate the movements of the ground troops or hamper those of the enemy, and by the establishment of a bomb line. The bomb line should err on the side of being too far in front of our own troops, and it should be picked out after consultation with air officers so that it will be delineated by terrain features easily discernible from the air. To draw a line between map coordinates is quite dangerous because people passing over the ground several hundred miles an hour have difficulty in picking out hypothetical land marks.

b. Finally, we come to what is known as close air support; that is, utilizing airplanes to attack in conjunction with and close to an attack put on from the ground. However, until definite air units can be provided to train with ground troops and to have as a primary mission the duty of attacking targets which are adversely affecting the progress of the ground troops at the time called for by the ground, it is illusory to count on a very great effect. On the other hand, the ground troops have a tendency to expect more prompt assistance from the above form of attack than is always possible. They must be taught that it requires quite a while to mount an attack with the appropriate bombs, etc.

c. The tendency to credit air attacks on roads and railways with the capacity of destroying such arteries is also illusory. In the first place the chances of getting a direct hit with a bomb on a vulnerable place are very small, certainly no better than the chances of getting a point hit with long range artillery, but this is not the primary defect. We all know that a demolition to be effective must be defended or else it will be readily removed. This fact is equally true whether the demolition is caused by a mine planted in the ground or by a bomb dropped from the air.

2. Recognition Signals:- a. A point which should be settled at the commencement of the planning is whether or not air support will be supplied during the landing and subsequent to the landing, and the nature of support in each case. If close air support is to be supplied, an effort must be made to utilize directional smoke. This directional smoke, produced either by shells or hand grenades, come in three colors and is analogous to recognition lights.

b. For instance: On D Day, from zero to 2400 hours, yellow smoke means friendly troops; red smoke means enemy. Where the front line is uncertain, or if friendly air attacks our own troops through error, yellow smoke is put out by the use of hand grenades. When the front line is marked by yellow smoke, anything beyond it in the direction of the enemy may be attacked by close support airplanes. If, on the other hand, some particularly obnoxious enemy installation is beyond the power of the ground troops, e.g., a reverse slope position, and is in artillery range, it will be outlined in red smoke. From zero to 2400 D plus 1, red smoke will indicate friendly troops; blue smoke enemy, etc.

c. It is felt that could our airplanes utilize some method of showing a recognition signal of the same color as that which has been designated for friendly troops on that day, it would reduce accidental firing at them.

3. Communications:- All Signal Corps agencies of the various sections of the Air Corps must be coordinated under a single head. All Air Corps sections have important operating requirements, both for wire and radio. These requirements must be coordinated by an Air Corps officer. In this operation, all sections of the Air Corps seemed to be working independently. Requirements were never made known until the last possible moment. This lack of adequate supervision often delayed installations of Air Corps communication channels. This was especially true when wire circuits had to be constructed for the Air Corps by Army Ground Force Signal Troops.

IX. TACTICAL

1. General:- The plans for a landing operation must be simple, not only for the Force as a whole but also for the Sub-Task Forces. In order to insure coordinated effort, the Commanders of the Sub-Task Forces should be assembled and the general plan and objectives of the landing should be explained to them so that in the inevitable fog of war, in which they will find themselves, they can use their best efforts for the accomplishment of the general end.

2. Function of Force Commander:- a. The Force Commander should interfere as little as possible until the artillery line has been reached by the Sub-Task Forces. This having been done, he can issue orders for the grouping of the units for the further operations which present themselves. However, the physical presence of the Force Commander on shore during the early and generally critical phases of the operation is very important.

b. Every effort should be made never to issue orders below the next echelon of command. The higher an officer is, the greater temptation he seems to undergo to by-pass his juniors by telling them the size and type of unit with which they are to execute instructions.

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3. Initial Assault Equipment:- All boats which are capable of being beached, from the LSF on down should approach the beach with mortars or tank guns and machine guns emplaced to fire. The support battalions in the initial assault must be equipped with the antitank guns and tanks, also with self-propelled dual-purpose antitank, antiaircraft guns on half-tracks.

4. Speed Over the Beach:- The primary function of a landing operation is to secure a beachhead which means we must get ashore and proceed far enough inland to insure that we will not be evicted. The greatest importance must be placed on the rapid leaving of the landing craft and of the rapid and relentless advance across the beach. Troops must not stop on the beach.

5. Mine Detecting:- Engineer personnel with mine detectors or personnel trained in prodding must precede vehicles coming ashore. Mines were encountered on practically all beaches, and valuable equipment was lost because of a failure on the part of beach groups to properly provide for their removal prior to the arrival of motor equipment.

6. Field Artillery:- Probably the outstanding lesson for Field Artillery was the feasibility of landing light, medium, and heavy artillery materiel early in an assault, from modern landing craft. The 105-mm Howitzer M7 (SP) proved to be one of the best non-amphibian landing vehicles of any arm. This vehicle was debarked in as much as six feet of water, but came ashore under its own power without difficulty. It was found that on a soft sloping beach, operation must be perpendicular to the water-line since travel parallel to water-line causes a thrown track due to sand banking up inside the track. Other types of Field Artillery materiel landed successfully on D Day included the 105-mm Howitzer M2 (towed), 155-mm Howitzer M1918 A3, 155-mm Howitzer M1 and 155-mm Gun M1.

7. Ordnance Company:- In amphibious operations, Ordnance Ammunition Companies should accompany the assault. Proper ratio 1 company per Infantry Division.

8. Balloons:- Balloon barrages do not justify the amount of space and trouble they take in the assault wave. If it is necessary to put balloons on the beach, they should not be emplaced until the arrival of the reserve wave when space is not so important.

9. Initial Objective:- The first objective for a sub-task force is to secure before dawn a well-marked terrestrial objective, far enough inland and so situated that its capture prevents the enemy from putting small arms and mortar fire on the beach. It is permissible to reorganize on this line. However, if the enemy is retiring, do not stop to reorganize but push on to what is called the artillery line; that is, a terrestrial objective which will prevent the enemy, either through distance or by depriving him of observation, from bringing effective artillery fire, except by very large pieces, on the beach or shipping.

10. Mental Attitude:- a. The greatest importance must be placed on enthusiastic elan and self-confidence on the part of the troops making the initial assault. Battle is a violent and elemental occupation. Men to conquer in battle, particularly in a night landing, must be imbued with this elemental viciousness. A landing operation which does not continue its attack is bound to fail.

b. Nothing is more subversive of morale than retrograde movements during combat, even when these movements are for the purpose of reforming troops. When the movements take place at night, they are doubly disadvantageous. Generals and staff officers must consider this danger whenever issuing orders for movement.

c. It is necessary that officers and non-commissioned officers prevent the men from remaining prone and passive after they have been induced to lie down by enemy fire. Men in such positions offer ideal targets and the enemy fire will increase. Therefore, they must be required to move forward or, if that is impossible, to at least open fire. During the forward movement the troops should fire not rapidly but continuously. The act of firing produces self-confidence on the part of the firers and reduces the self-confidence on the part of the recipients of the fire.

d. It is believed that the construction of numerous powerful defensive works has a very bad effect on the morale of the troops constructing them, because, not trusting to their own weapons and courage, they begin to place confidence in wire and concrete. Wire and concrete are valueless against any enemy who will not be fooled into frontal attacks, or who, in the case of a landing operation, passes through the obstacles prior to dawn.

11. "Dig or Die":- The expression, "dig or die" is not only untrue but harmful. Troops must not be permitted to dig until they have reached the final objective.

12. Confusion:- In any landing operation confusion is bound to occur. This is due to the fact that in spite of the best intention, landing craft do not land where they are supposed to and stores get ashore regardless of categories. The main thing is to get the man and the stores ashore. If they are there they can be used. If we waste time trying to get them ashore in some preconceived order, they will not be available.

13. Night Attacks:- a. There is considerable feeling in favor of night attacks. When these are used, and to be successful one must attack both day and night continuously, they should be executed by taking advantage of the moon, or they should be put on about 2½ hours before dawn if there is no moon, in either case on a limited objective. The heavy weapons and artillery should be put into position and registered the night before. They can then cover the attack until the flashes of the loading infantry show they are coming close to the objective.

b. A night attack, whether executed by moonlight or just prior to dawn, must be confined to limited objectives and these objectives must be carefully reconnoitered the previous day, and the men who made the reconnaissance must lead the units to the objectives. In making this reconnaissance it is sometimes necessary for patrols to expose themselves in order to draw fire.

c. Night attacks against unreconnoitered positions, particularly in hilly country, are very apt to fail because viewed against the stars or moonlight, one hill looks like another and troops misjudge their locality by as much as a thousand yards.

14. Counterattack:- a. The German will invariably counterattack immediately after dawn and is very adept in supporting this with artillery and mortar fire. After he believes the position has been softened by supporting fire, he advances on it from the front with a small number of infantry and seeks to envelop one or both flanks with the majority of his infantry. This infantry starts to attack between 800-1000 yards and comes forward at a continuous fast walk using marching fire or firing from the halt, or from the kneel.

b. In no case where our infantry utilized the full power of their rifle did a German counterattack get home. In fact, our troops looked forward to the German counterattack as the surest and most effective way of killing Germans. Nevertheless, the certainty of receiving such an attack makes it very evident that the position gained at night must be ready for an attack by daylight.

c. If the observers from the batteries are in contact, it frequently is possible to stop the counterattack by a combination of percussion and air bursts. Only one case is known where the German, stopped by artillery fire, resumed his attack. Normally, he moves forward until human nature can stand no more then quits. While going forward he shoots a great deal and makes all the noise he can. However, his small arms fire is of little value.

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15. Aircraft vs Counterattack:- In any landing operation, the most critical period is from about noon on D Day to the night of D plus 1, because during that time we are probably inferior to the enemy in guns and possibly in infantry, and he has had time to make his reconnaissance and bring up reserves. It is therefore essential that if the mastery of the air permits, we have suitable aircraft aloft to be used against hostile counterattacks. A solution is to have these aircraft wait on over-head for ten minutes in every hour. They can have a secondary bombing mission to which they can proceed and drop their bombs at the close of their ten minute wait. They should be replaced in fifty minutes by another similar group with a similar secondary target. These airplanes must be in radio communication with the air support unit on the ground. By such a method any counterattack can be met from the air.

16. The Infantry Regiment in Close Country:- In deep penetrations against an active enemy, particularly if he is provided with tanks, it has been found expedient to leap-frog battalions. The leading battalion advances and occupies or captures a limited objective on a commanding site. The second battalion passes through the first battalion which immediately begins to organize a defensive position. When the new leading battalion has reached a suitable limited objective further to the front, it will halt and the third or rear battalion will pass through it. The second battalion then begins to organize. In this way the danger of a counterattack is materially reduced, since, if the deployed leading battalion is over-run, the enemy comes up against a partially prepared position, and if this is broken through he finally strikes a fully prepared position.

17. Infantry Regiment in Open Country:- Except in particularly difficult country, it is usually possible through the use of engineers to maintain two battalions abreast. These engineers, working at night behind an infantry screen, make extemporized roads up which the necessary vehicles can move in support of their battalions. As the fight moves on the engineers must extend the roads.

18. Maps:- a. All personnel should have a greater appreciation of the value of maps. Unreasonable requests for maps during the operation probably resulted because initial issues were generous, giving the impression that maps were available to be expended as desired.

b. There is a definite need for a mobile map depot company or similar organization. One of the most vital functions of the engineer during the operation has been the supply of maps. The volume, because of the unexpectedly large number of troops concentrated in a small area, has been tremendous. In many instances additional personnel was required to assist the small map depot detachments in the sorting, packaging and issue of maps. In addition, with a rapidly moving force, the map supply must be mobile so that maps are steadily available when and where called for. A recommended T/O is attached as Inclosure #4.

19. Air Photos:- a. Based particularly upon the ingenuity of the enemy, photographs of usable future areas must be taken for purpose of comparison over a long period of time. In that way can new defenses which are immediately camouflaged and blended well into surroundings be tetected.

b. A set of aerial photos covering the Division reoutes of advance should be furnished each Division and Corps Engineer well ahead of the front lines. All sorties flown should be inspected by an Engineer photo interpreter for minefields, obstacles and bypass sites. The reports must be gotten into the hands of the Division and Corps Engineers by cub plane courier, daily in time to be of value.

20. Security - Recognition:- Countersigns and paroles are of great value but must be kept under Army control and must be published by Army headquarters at least seven days in advance. These should then be disseminated by lower echelons with decreasing time intervals so that the company receives them approximately 24 hours in advance. Great care must be taken that Army and Corps troops receive them through proper channels.

21. Amphibious Attacks:- When a parallel flank commanded by the Navy exists, it is very important to use amphibious attacks in rear of the enemy's position. These amphibious attacks should be in a strength at least equivalent to a reinforced combat team, because such a force can land further in rear of the enemy and can be self-sustaining for a period of days. Navy gunfire support is vital.

I. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Geneva Conventions:- Field Manual 27-110, "Rules of Land Warfare" is not sufficiently clear in that it lacks interpretation and explanatory data of the general terms of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, particularly with reference to the distinction between private and public public property and its use by an invading force. There is also an insufficiency of material dealing with prisoners of war and ways that they may be legally utilized.

For the Commanding General:


G. KEYES,
Major General, USA,
Deputy Commander

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SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

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EXHIBIT I

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 141

PLANNING INSTRUCTION NO. 1

COPY NO. 2

12 February 1943.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed that an attack will be launched in 1943 against SICILY with the target date the period of the favorable July moon. The C-in-C, Allied Forces, has been designated as Supreme Commander for the operation, with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham as Naval Commander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

2. The central planning and operational Headquarters for Operation HUSKY, known as Headquarters Force 141, is being organized at ALGIERS under the supervision of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Documents and correspondence transmitted to this Headquarters by courier, or mail, should be addressed:

Headquarters Force 141,
A.P.O. 512.

The telegraphic address is "FORTUNE ALGIERS" and all cables and messages transmitted to this Headquarters should be so addressed.

3. The plan calls for

a. Main U.S. assault from NORTH AFRICA - Western Task Force

b. Main British assault from MIDDLE EAST - Eastern Task Force

4. Recommendation has been submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the appointment of General Montgomery and General Patton as Eastern and Western Task Force Commanders, respectively.

5. The general function and locations of the respective commanders and staffs concerned in preparing the operation are:

	Function	Responsible	Remarks
a.	Outline Planning Coordination of detailed planning	Force 141	Focus of planning will be at ALGIERS where HQ will be located.
b.	Detailed planning	Western Task Force Commander & Staff	Focus of planning will be in NORTH AFRICA Initially at CASABLANCA probably moving to ORAN.
		Eastern Task Force Commander & Staff	Focus of planning will be in NILE DELTA probably at CAIRO.
c.	Initiation of Executive action to mount Operation.	AFHQ	

	Function	Responsible	Remarks
d.	Agencies responsible for mounting the operation	AFHQ for forces from NORTH AFRICA. U.S. Chiefs of Staff for forces from U.S.A. C-in-Cs Middle East for Forces from Middle East British Chiefs of Staff for division from U.K.	

These proposals are illustrated in Diagram I attached.

6. It has been decided that Headquarters Force 141 will use the British Staff system. Its relation to AFHQ is illustrated at Diagram II.

7. Pending the issue of directives to the Commanders Eastern and Western Task Forces, and the completion of an outline plan for the operation aproved by the Commanders referred to in para 1, the following documents are forwarded to the Commanders Eastern and Western Task Forces:

JP(43)7 (Final) dated 10 January 1943.
COS 161/1 dated 21 January 1943.

These are to be regarded as preliminary documents for information and are subject to modification: they are supplied in order that delay may be avoided in consideration by the Eastern and Western Task Forces of the problems involved and in the organization of their planning and operational staffs. The study so far made by HQ. Force 141 indicates, however, that the approved outline plan will follow, in general, the tactical plan prepared by the Joint Planning Staff.

8. The Naval, Ground and Air forces to be allotted, so far as at present known, are shown in Appendix A. Alterations to these lists will be notified as they occur.

9. Application has been made for a Central Cover Plan for this operation, which will be forwarded to all concerned in due course. A central list of code names and security instructions are being issued separately.

(S) ARTHUR S. NEWINS,
ARTHUR S. NEWINS,
Brigadier General,
(BGS) Plans, Hq. Force 141.

Distribution: (Eliminated)

APPENDIX A

FORCES AVAILABLE

A. NAVAL.

It may be assumed that the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleets will make available the necessary forces outlined in COS 161/1 dated 21st January 1943 Annex A in sufficient time to carry out the final rehearsals and to comply with the operation orders of the Naval Commander.

B. AIR FORCES

Air forces of the following order are expected to be available in the theater in sufficient time for this operation:

	BRITISH	U.S.	Total
S.E.F.	24 Squadrons	6 Groups	912 Aircraft
TEF (Day)	3 Squadrons	3 Groups	294 Aircraft
TEF (Night)	3 Squadrons	- - -	54 Aircraft
Light Bombers	6 Squadrons	1 Group	165 Aircraft
Medium Bombers	6 Squadrons	5 Groups	375 Aircraft
Heavy Bombers	2 Squadrons	7 Groups	281 Aircraft
GR	3 Squadrons	- - -	48 Aircraft
TB	4 Squadrons	1 Group	137 Aircraft
PRU	3 Squadrons	1 Squadron	48 Aircraft
Transport	3 Squadrons	3 Groups	210 Aircraft
		Total	1586 Aircraft

If airborne operations are to be undertaken on a large scale, the allotment of transport aircraft will have to be considerably increased.

If a division is to be lifted, there will be a requirement for approximately 320 aircraft of the C-47 type.

C. MILITARY FORCES LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE.

WESTERN TASK FORCE - US

	Unit	At present in	To be trained in	Mounted from	Remarks
Assault Force	(3 Div	North Africa	North Africa	North Africa	
	(One Armd Bn				Note 1
	(Two) Divs	(USA	USA	North Africa Or USA	
	(Two Armd Bns				Note 1
	(Special Service (Bde(to form Commando Units)	USA	USA	do	
Follow-Up	(One Div from 1, (or 9 or 34 Divs	North Africa	North Africa	North Africa	

EASTERN TASK FORCE - BR

	Unit	At present in	To be trained in	Mounted From	Remarks
Assault Force	(5 Div	PAIC	ME	ME	
	(56 Div	PAIC	ME	ME	
	(One Div	UK	UK	ME	Note 2
	(One Tank Bn	ME	ME	ME	
	(One Armd Bn	ME	ME	ME	
	(One Div	UK	UK	UK	
	(One Inf Bde Gp	UK	UK	UK	
	(Two Commandos	ME	ME	ME	
Followup	(One Inf Div	ME	IE	ME	

Note 1: Three armored bns (one armored regt) either from 2 Armored Div at present in North Africa or 3 Armored Div at present in INDIA.

Note 2: Alternatively may be mounted in North Africa.

AIRBORNE TPS

	Unit	At present in	To be trained in	Mounted From	Remarks
BR	(1st Parachute Bde	North Africa	North Africa	North Africa	
	(2nd Parachute Bde	UK	UK	do	
US	(to be notified later.				

Copy No. 2

141 FORCE OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 1

19 May, 43.

OPERATION HUSKY

1. It has been decided that an operation is to be prepared to seize and hold the island of SICILY as a base for future operations.

2. The operation as a whole will be under the command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Naval forces will be under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean; the Ground forces under the command of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces; and the Air Force under the command of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The system of joint command will apply.

3. The intention of the Allied Commander-in-Chief is to seize and hold the island by operations in five phases.

Phase 1. Preparatory measures by Naval and Air forces to neutralise enemy naval efforts, and to gain air supremacy.

Phase 2. Pre-dawn seaborne assaults, assisted by airborne landings with the object of seizing airfields and the ports of SIRACUSA and LICATA.

Phase 3. The establishment of a firm base from which to conduct operations for the capture of the ports of AUGUSTA and CATANIA, and the GERBINI group of airfields.

Phase 4. The capture of the ports and airfields outlined in Phase 3.

Phase 5. The reduction of the island.

4. Commanders of forces have been appointed as follows:-

(a) Naval.

(i) Naval Commander Eastern Task Force. Admi Ramsay.

(ii) Naval Commander Western Task Force. Vice Admi Hewitt (U.S.N.)

(b) Army.

(i) Force 343. Lieut-General PATTON.

(ii) Force 545. General MONTGOMERY.

(c) Air.

(i) North West African Tactical Air Force. (N.A.T.A.F.) Air Marshal Conyngham.

(ii) Force 343. Col. Hickey. (U.S.A.A.F.)

(iii) Force 545. Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst.

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5. Tasks will be carried out as follows: -

(a) Force 545.

(i) The assault between SIRACUSA and POZZALLO, supported by such parachute troops as can be lifted in one third of the available transport aircraft.

(ii) Capture of the port of SIRACUSA and the airfield at PACHINO.

(iii) Establish itself on the general line SIRACUSA - PALAZZOLO - RAGUSA, which place will be inclusive to Force 545 and where touch will be gained with Force 343.

(iv) The rapid capture of the ports of AUGUSTA and CATANIA and the GERBINI group of airfields.

(b) Force 343.

(i) Assault between CAP SCARAWIA and LICATA, supported by such parachute troops as can be lifted in two-thirds of the available transport aircraft.

(ii) Capture of the port of LICATA and the airfields of PONTE OLIVO, BISCARI and COMISO.

(iii) Establish itself so as to gain touch with Force 545 at RAGUSA, and protect the airfields and port in sub-paras (b) (ii) above.

(iv) Subsequently to prevent enemy reserves moving eastwards against the left flank of Force 545.

6. The dividing line between Force 545 and Force 343 all inclusive to Force 545 will be VIZZINI - CHIARAMONTE GULFI - RAGUSA - POZZALLO.

7. Further operations will be designed to establish Force 141 across the S.E. corner of the Islands from CATANIA to LICATA, with a view to final operations for the reduction of the Island.

8. Owing to the lack of ports for the maintenance of Force 343, it will be necessary for Force 545 to assist Force 343 in its maintenance, and the Commanders concerned will jointly decide the allocation of port capacity.

9. The Naval Task Force Commanders are charged with the escort and landing of Force 545 and Force 343, and for their subsequent support. The Naval Commanders are also responsible for seaborne diversions.

10. The primary role of the Allied Air Forces in all phases will be to neutralise the enemy air forces and to provide maximum security for shipping and beaches against air attack. Whilst enemy air forces can still operate from Sicilian bases, the provision of this security is of such overriding importance that the scale of air effort available for the direct support of land forces will be strictly limited.

The Air Officer Commanding (A.O.C.), N.A.T.A.F. will command all the air forces, including those at MALTA, giving direct support to the operations undertaken by Forces 343 and 545.

To each Task Force Commander an Air Officer will be allotted who will command the air units assigned to him as shown in the Allied Air Force Order of Battle for HUSKY. In the opening stages of the campaign, the limited area of land operations will permit the operation of one air control only. This will be exercised by A.O.C. Force 545 as soon as units are able to operate from SICILY. During this stage A.O.C. Force 343 will operate under the direction of A.O.C. Force 545.

The second control to cover the Force 343 zone will be operated as soon as land forces have enlarged the front sufficiently to allow the effective operation of two controls. When this stage is reached, A.O.C. Force 343 will operate independently subject to co-ordination by A.O.C., N.A.T.A.F.

The Air Outline Plan gives the detail of system governing command for the whole Allied Air Forces which are participating in HUSKY.

11. Task Force Commanders are responsible for planning the assaults in conjunction with the Naval Task Force Commander and the North African Tactical Air Force Commander, and for planning and carrying out any subsequent operations by the forces under their command which may be required to enable them to complete their mission.

12. Under the general direction of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Task Force Commanders are responsible for supervising the training of their forces and, in addition, in conjunction with the Naval Commanders concerned, for prescribing the lines on which amphibious training should be carried out.

Task Force Commanders are responsible for the general direction of training of the airborne division allotted to them, through the Divisional Commander concerned. Copies of all airborne training instructions will be sent to the Commanding General, Fifth Army.

13. Task Force Commanders will be in executive control of their forces from the time the troops composing it are placed under their command, except that the Naval Commander will be in executive control during the period at sea, and until the forces are firmly established ashore.

14. The forces allotted are shown in the Order of Battle, which will be issued to Task Force Commanders separately.

15. Your Outline Plan, if not already forwarded, should be forwarded with the least possible delay.

(S) A. A. RICHARDSON,
A. A. RICHARDSON,
Brigadier,
C.G.S.

Distribution: (Eliminated)

EXHIBIT II

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343

18 May 1943
S-E-C-R-E-T

OUTLINE PLAN	:Auth CG IAC : :Initials :
JOSS - DIME - CENT Assault	:18 May, 1943 :

I. MISSION

1. General:
a. To assault the southeastern portion of HORRIFIED in conjunction with the 12th British Army and capture it as a base for further operations.

2. Specific: Landing and operating west of the line VIZZINI - RAGUSA - POZALLO, all exclusive.
a. Seize and hold the airfields just north of QUEENBEE and at HOMESPUN and the air landing fields at PARKHEAD and northwest of FIBULA.
b. Seize and operate the small port at FIBULA.
c. Prepare for further operations under the direction of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force.

3. Scheme of Manoeuver:
a. Make a simultaneous assault in the FIBULA - FEDERAL - SAMPIERI area in order to capture the airfields and the port of FIBULA by dark D/2.
b. Extend the beachhead to the general line (YELLOW).
(1) PALMA DI MONTECHIARO - CAMPOBELLO - MAZZARINO - CALTERGIRONE - GRAMMICHELE and to the East to contact the British in the vicinity of RAGUSA.
(2) To include (BLUE) high ground in vicinity of PIAZZA AMERINA - AIDONE to prevent hostile interference from the Northwest.

II. PLAN

1. CENT - DIME Assault:
a. Commander: Major General O. N. BRADLEY, II Corps.
b. Troops: 1st Division (-1 RCT)
45th Division
2 Ranger Battalions
91st Reconnaissance Squadron
Paratroops (82d Airborne)
Supporting Troops (See Troop List to be issued separately)
c. Missions:
(1) Under cover of darkness of D Day to land in the FEDERAL - SAMPIERI area (beaches 59 to 69 inclusive available) capture and secure:
(a) The airfield at HOMESPUN by daylight on D/1.
(b) The airfield north of QUEENBEE by daylight of D/2.
(c) The air landing field north of PARKHEAD by dark of D/2.
(2) Extend the beachhead to YELLOW and gain contact with the British in the vicinity of QUEENBEE.
(3) Contact with 3rd Division.
d. Maintenance: Over the beaches and through small ports.
e. Transport: Ship to shore and shore to shore (See Troop List).
f. Support:
(1) Navy: By naval gunfire on call of the Sub Task Force Commanders.
(2) Air:
(a) Protection from hostile air interference.
(b) Direct support of the ground troops, including reconnaissance and photo missions.
(c) Protection, transport and supply of airborne units.

2. JOSS Assault:
a. Commander: Major General L. K. TRUSCOTT.
b. Troops: 3rd Division
Combat Command A, 2nd Armored Division
1 Ranger Battalion
Supporting Troops (See Troop List to be issued separately)
c. Mission:
(1) Under cover of darkness on the morning of D Day to land in the FIBULA area (beaches 70 to 74 inclusive available) capture and secure the port and the airfield at FIBULA by dark on D Day.
(2) Extend the beachhead to YELLOW, protecting the left flank of the operation against interference from the Northwest.
(3) Contact with II Corps.
d. Maintenance: Over the beaches and through small port.
e. Transport: Shore to shore. (See Troop List)
f. Support:
(1) Navy: By naval gunfire on call of Sub Task Force Commanders.
(2) Air:
(a) Protection from hostile air interference.
(b) Direct support of ground troops, including reconnaissance and photo missions.

III. FORCE 343 RESERVE.

1. KOOL:
a. Commander: Maj. Gen. HUGH GAFFEY, 2d Armored Division.
b. Troops: 2d Armored Division (less CC A)
1 RCT 1st Division
Supporting Troops (See Troop List to be issued separately)
c. Mission:
(1) Sail with assault convoy and be prepared to land in support of any of the planned assaults.

2. 82d Airborne Division (less paratroop elements):
a. To be prepared to support the assault on call after H-Hour on D Day.

3. 9TH DIVISION: To be alerted to move on call of the Commanding General 343 after D Day.

IV. GENERAL

1. Navy:
a. Provide escort for assault and follow-up convoys throughout their passage to and from HORRIFIED.
b. To clear under-water mine fields in the vicinity of the assaults.
c. To be prepared to assist the planned assaults with gunfire on call of the Sub-Task Force Commanders.
d. To assist the planned assaults by making feint landings elsewhere.
e. Protection of transport area.

2. Air:
a. To provide protection for the assault and follow-up convoys in their movement across the MEDITERRANEAN.
b. To occupy, repair, protect and operate captured airfields as quickly as possible.
c. To be prepared to support further action of the ground troops on call from the captured airfields.
d. To carry out further bombardment, reconnaissance and photo missions as directed by the Task Force Commander.
e. To attack enemy troops moving on roads.
f. To be prepared to bomb enemy artillery beyond the range of the artillery of the ground troops.
g. To insure for the initial airborne operations a minimum of two-thirds of the transport aircraft available, and sufficient gliders to move or to carry the glider RCT of the 82d Airborne Division.
h. To transport, protect and supply the airborne troops.
i. To provide AWS service.
j. Protection of shipping off beaches or in ports.

3. Maintenance:
a. Initially over the beaches and through small ports, and
b. Through the port of LADBROKE by the British, commencing on D Day.

V. COMMAND SET-UP.

Force 343.
Monrovia - Force 343
Destroyer - CG Force 343

d-2

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Ancon - CENT (II Corps, 45th Div)
Chase - DIME (1st Div)
Biscayne - JOSS (3d Div)
For NCT Hqs - 8 LCI's

PATTON
Commanding

GAY
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
MADDOX
G-3

DISTRIBUTION: (Eliminated)

EXHIBIT III

PLAN FOR ORGANIZATION CONCENTRATION
AND MOVEMENT OF XII AIR SUPPORT
COMMAND UNITS IN OPERATION
HUSKY

7 June, 1943

I - GENERAL

1. An estimate of the situation will be published at a later date for the information of all subordinate units. Current intelligence summaries will be issued at periodic intervals prior to, and during the operation. Pertinent extracts of the detailed operational plans of other forces involved in the operation will be furnished units concerned.

2. Allied Air Forces are now engaged in operations designed to reduce Axis Air strength in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy as a preliminary to a joint operation in which Southeastern Sicily is to be assaulted on D day by Ground forces and paratroops supported by Naval and Air Forces. During the period prior to D day Pantellaria will be converted to our use as an air base. Other preparatory operations include those conducted with the Navy to gain the upper hand over Axis submarines in the Mediterranean, to destroy any Axis Naval Forces which may threaten the movement to Sicily and to protect shipping and major ports in North Africa.

II - OUTLINE OF ASSAULT PLANS

3. Seaborne Forces

Force 141 will assault Southeastern Sicily through eight groups of beaches at H hour "D" day to seize airdromes and ports in the area and to establish itself along the general line Catania, Licata, prepared for further operations. The assaults are as follows:

ACID NORTH & ACID SOUTH	At Avola by Force 545, (British) to capture Syracuse and AGUSTA.
BARK NORTH, BARK MIDDLE & BARK WEST	By Force 545, on either side of Cape Passero, to capture the airfield at Pachino and to support the forces landed at AVOLA.

CENT, near Cape Scorina by Force 343 (U.S.) to capture Comiso airfield and to advance to the high ground Pallazzolo BUCCHERI-VIZZINI.
DIME, At GELA, by Force 343, to capture airfields at Ponte Olivo and Biscari.
JOSS, At LICATA, by force 343, to capture the port and nearby landing ground.

4. Airborne Forces.

a. A paratroop attack, the details of which are not available, will be dropped in the zone of Force 545, in conjunction with the Acid & Dark assaults.

b. In Force 343 sector, paratroops will be dropped south of Niscimi during the period 2330 D-1 to 0300 D, to assist CENT Force in establishing itself on shore.

5. Naval Forces.

The Eastern Naval Task Force and Western Naval Task Force, are charged with the escort to and landing of Force 545 and 343 respectively and with the subsequent support of these forces until they are firmly established on shore.

6. Air Forces.

The primary role of the Allied Air Forces will be to neutralize the enemy air forces and to provide maximum security for shipping and beaches against air attack. Until this aim is attained or until conditions permit the relaxation of such security measures, the scale of air effort available for direct support will be strictly limited.

7. Operational policy, Tactical Air Force in the preliminary phase, Tactical Bomber Force will undertake escorted light bomber attacks by day and by night when moon assists against selected objectives on Western Area of Sicily and medium bomber attacks against objective on Eastern Area. Escort will be provided from Mainland for light bombers and from Malta, for Medium Bombers. Fighter units in Malta will be employed in Air Fighting using every artifice to secure combat with the enemy air forces. On D-1 day, heavy convoy commitment will be imposed on fighters in Malta. During the initial assault, the main requirements from Malta and Pantellaria are protection of congested beaches and shipping lying off by day and night. Night fighter operations will include intruder activity against main enemy airdromes on Sicily. During this phase, fighters are fully committed and support bombing possible only in exceptional circumstances.

On movement of Air Forces from Malta to Sicily, heavy protective committment for beaches reduced and fighter bombers will become available for support bombing. At this stage, escorted light and medium bomber effort by day for prearranged attacks will be practicable and by night, light and medium bomber effort against selected objectives. The above system will continue in effect until such a time as it is practicable to establish a second fighter control in Sicily.

8. Fighter Control Principles.

a. Assault Phase: All fighters are to be under control of AOC Malta, including operating from Pantellaria. U.S.S. Monrovia will provide forward direction with VHF/RT in the Dime and Joss areas, and the U.S.S. Ancon in the Cent area. Subordinate to U.S.S. Monrovia and providing visual direction over Dime and Joss beaches are U.S.S. Chase and Biscayne respectively. Night Fighters will operate under GCI Control Malta and also under GCI Control of LST's.

b. AOC Malta will continue to control all fighters until Hq's 211 Group is established ashore. Forward control in 343 area will be provided by Ponte Olivo information Center and by Cent Sector operating directly under AOC Malta. Joss Sector will operate under Ponte Olivo until adequate communications are established.

c. On approximately D/3 day nucleus ARQ Desert Air Force and Hq. 211 Group will commence to operate in the PACHINO area and will control RAF squadrons on PACHINO, COMISO and BISCARI airfields. At this stage ARQ DAF will be integral with Hq. 211 Group and will use its communications, until the air warning, GCI and communications systems can be centralized in 211 Group, subordinate to 211 Group will continue to operate in Comiso and Syracuse areas. A forward control will operate in advance of 211 Group. Forward and subordinate sector controls will be linked to 211 Group by HF R/T and W/T until land lines are established. On D/3 information center of Hq. 12th Air Support Command will be ashore and operating. This formation will provide fighter control both forward in support of land operations and for the defense of airfields and beaches. AOC Desert Air Force will control the 31st Group in the Ponto Olivo area through this agency.

d. After the capture of the Catania area, three U.S. Fighter Groups will be operating in Sicily from LICATA, PONTE OLIVO, BISCARI and COMISO airfields under control as specified in sub par. c above until such time as it is practicable to establish a second fighter control in Sicily when XII ASC will form separate entity with direction of effort and coordination undertaken by TAF.

III - MISSION

9. a.--To provide general support for the operation against Southeastern Sicily in conjunction with other Air Forces, by gaining and maintaining air mastery over the battle area and in particular over beaches, naval escorts, and during the initial assault.

b. To furnish Tactical Air Reconnaissance for Force 343, and to watch particularly for the movement of enemy reserves into the battle area from the North and West.

c. To be prepared to operate in close support of either Forces 343 or 545 when the situation permits the diversion of the Air effort from its main objective of denying the air to the enemy, or in the event a major emergency arises during the early stages of the operation.

IV - ORGANIZATION

10. Control of Units.

a. XII ASC units, located on the mainland, will be under the operational control of AOCTAF, who will exercise control through rear Hq. XII ASC.

b. XII ASC units located on Pantellaria, will be under operational control, AOC Malta, under direction AOCTAF.

c. XII ASC units located in Sicily will be under operational control AOC DAF through advance Hq. XII ASC.

d. The 111th Observation Sq. is excepted from the above. This unit will be available for direct call C.O. XII ASC for reconnaissance in support of Force 343, ground.

e. XII ASC will form separate entity with direction of effort and coordination by AOC, TAF when the formation of two separate commands in the Sicilian area is practicable.

f. Movements by D, D/4, and D/8 convoys will be coordinated with division commanders concerned. Succeeding movements will be coordinated with Force 343.

g. The movement of combat echelons into Sicily will be coordinated with AOC, DAF.

11. Channels for Requests for Air Assistance.

When the demands for air assistance exceed the capacity of units under the operational control of the C.O. XII ASC, requests will be initiated and forwarded to Headquartere as follows:

a. Requests for protective air cover during the assault phase are to be made to Air Officer Commanding, Malta.

b. When air forces are established in Sicily and during the assault phase, requests for air support are to be made to the Air Officer Commanding, Desert Air Force.

c. After the assault stage, requests for heavy bomber attack by day (by Strategic Air Force) and for night reconnaissance or bombing by Strategic Air Force or Tactical Bomber Force respectively are to be made direct to Tactical Air Force Hq. repeated to Air Officer Commanding, Desert Air Force, and Air Officer Commanding Malta. Coordination of this effort will be undertaken by Tactical Air Force Hq's.

d. Requests for PRU reconnaissance will be forwarded direct to Tactical Air Force Hq., repeated to Air Officer Commanding Desert Air Force and Air Officer Commanding, Malta.

12. Headquarters Organization.

Hq. & Hq. Sq. reinforced by elements of the 3d Wing will be organized into an advance, and a rear echelon.

a. The advance echelon will consist of 28 Officers and 40 Enlisted Men. The functions of this headquarters will be:
(1) To control Operations of the 111th Observation Sq.
(2) To be prepared to take over other units specifically released to operational control of the CO XII ASC.
(3) To maintain liaison with Force 343 and to initiate or filter requests for air assistance in accordance with developments of the situation.
(4) To supervise operations of the forward fighter control unit in Force 343 area.
(5) To control and supervise the installation of XII ASC units on shore.
(6) Collect and evaluate operational and intelligent data and forward pertinent information to lateral and higher Air Headquarters.
(7) Arrange for movement of Air Echelons from Tunisia in coordination with AOC, Force 545.
(8) Establish a standby Headquarters to take over the above function in event Force 343 Command ship is destroyed or delayed enroute to the area.

b. The Rear Echelon will:
(1) Control operations of XII ASC units operating in Tunisia under direct orders AOCTAF.
(2) Administer these units and coordinate their movement to ports of embarkation.
(3) Dispatch air echelons to Sicily as directed by C.O. XII ASC.

13. Provisional Fighter Control Group.

a. This unit will include the following organizations:

Det. 3rd Air Defense Wing.
82nd Fighter Control Squadron.
Provisional Aircraft Warning Bn.

b. Functions will include the establishment and operation of:
(1) RDF facilities and ground observation station.
(2) Air - ground communication facilities.
(3) Advance Fighter Control.
(4) Operational control of A.A., artillery covering airdrome, and rear areas to include ports.
(5) Dispatch and control of aircraft in accordance with operational plans C.O., XII ASC or as directed by higher headquarters.

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14. Battle Order - (Combat Units).

31st Fighter Group
27th Fighter-Bomber Group
86th Fighter-Bomber Group
33rd Fighter Group
324th Fighter Group
7th Wing South African (Fighters)
79th Fighter Squadron
111th Observation Squadron

15. General Plan.

a. Disposition of Units (XII ASC).
(1) By D-10:

1 Group Spitfires - GOZO
1 Group P-40's - PANTELLARIA
Remaining Units - CAPE BON PENINSULA

(2) Units will be moved to advance airdromes in Sicily as rapidly as conditions permit in such a manner as to preserve continuity of operations in the following order of priority:

31st Fighter Group
111th Observation Squadron
33rd Fighter Group
27th Fighter-Bomber Group
86th Fighter-Bomber Group

b. Tactical Employment (XII ASC).

The following missions will be undertaken by XII ASC units in conjunction with other formations of the Tactical Air Force.
(1) During the period D-7 to D-1 Day:
(a) Units based in the Malta and Gozo will be employed to neutralize enemy air forces based in Western Sicily, and to protect shipping. Escort will be provided for day operations by the Tactical and Strategical Bomber Force.
(b) Air Force (XII ASC) elements based in Pantellaria and Tunisia will be employed to escort medium bombers of the Strategic Air Force and Tactical Air Force in attacks against objectives in Western Sicily, and to protect shipping.
(2) Period of the Assault:
The air effort will be concentrated to provide protection to shipping and beaches. Direct support for ground operations will be provided only in exceptional circumstances. Air Reconnaissance will be furnished for Force 343.
(3) Establishment of a Bridgehead from LICATA TO CATANIA.
(a) Continued air operations to neutralize enemy air forces and to protect shipping and beaches.
(b) Air Reconnaissance for Force 343.
(c) When air forces can be located in Sicily, direct support to assist the advance of land forces.
(4) Flexibility in Employment:
(a) Units equipped with A-36 and P-40 type aircraft will be prepared to operate as fighters or fighter bombers.
(b) Observation units will be retained specifically for an observation role but will be trained in fighter tactics.

c. Maintainance (1st and 2nd echelon) and operational facilities will be established in Force 343 area and combat echelons will be advanced to the area as rapidly as conditions permit. This movement will be so arranged as to maintain continuity of operation.

d. Forward control and AW facilities will be provided for aircraft operating within the zone of action of Force 343, covering ground operations, airdromes, beaches, and naval escorts. The system will be tied in with that established by D.A.F.

e. Liaison will be established with Force 343 and maintained throughout the operation. Requests for air assistance will be filtered and acted on within the capabilities of units under operational control C.G., XII ASC. Requests which cannot be met will be passed to higher formations.

VI - DETAILED MOVEMENT PLAN

16. One-half Hq & Hq Sq., and 309th Fighter Squadron (less combat echelon), will move to Algiers by D-28 for concentration, training and rehearsal with the 1st Infantry Division. These units will accompany the assault Echelon, "Dime" Force and will establish themselves on Fonte Olivo airdrome prepared to service aircraft and coordinate operations immediately on arrival of combat echelons of the Group. Detailed arrangements for movement will be coordinated with Hq., 1st Infantry Division.

a. The combat echelons of 307th, 308th, and 309th Squadrons and 1/2 Hq & Hq Squadron will be moved to GOZO by air prepared to undertake intensive operations under AOC Malta prior to D-7. On D-2, on call, these units will be moved to Sicily by Air where they will operate under control AOCWD, through Advance Hq., XII ASC.

b. The service elements of the Air Echelons of the 307th Squadron, the 308th Squadron will be moved by air transport to Fonte Olivo on call Advance Hq., XII ASC. Transports to be furnished by the Service Command.

c. The 308th and 309th Fighter Squadrons, (less air Echelons), will be held in the Cape Bon area, in readiness for movement to Tunis after D-8 on orders C.G., XII ASC.

17. 33rd Fighter Group Disposition.

a. The 58th Squadron, less combat echelon, will be concentrated in the vicinity of Tunis by D-4 day, prepared for embarkation with elements of the "Dime" Force on D-4 day. Upon arrival in Sicily, this unit will establish itself on Biscari airdrome prepared to service combat echelons of the Group by D-3. Movement to be coordinated with C.G., 1st Infantry Division.

b. The Air Echelons, 59th and 60th Squadrons, the combat echelon, 58th Squadron, and Group Hq & Hq Sq., will be moved to Biscari by combat aircraft and transports to be furnished by NAASC. Movement to be made on D-8 on call Advance Hq., XII ASC, escorted by combat echelon of the Group. Units are to be prepared for operations immediately after landing at Biscari.

c. The Ground echelons of the 59th and 60th Squadrons will be prepared to move from Pantellaria to Biscari by D-10. Details concerning movement will be coordinated with Force 343 by Hq., XII ASC.

18. 27th Fighter Bomber Group.

a. The Group will be concentrated in the Cape Bon Area prepared to undertake operations as fighter or fighter bombers over Sicily by D-7.

b. One-half Group Hq & Hq Squadron and 17th Fighter-Bomber Squadron (less combat echelon) will be moved to point of embarkation "Dime" Assault Force, Tunis by D-4 day, prepared for shore to shore movement to Sicily. These units will leave on the D-4 convoy and will establish themselves by D-8 on Comiso Airdrome, prepared to service aircraft and to coordinate operations immediately on arrival of the combat echelons of the Group. Detailed arrangements will be coordinated with C.G., 1st Infantry Division.

c. The combat echelon, 17th Fighter-Bomber Squadron, the Air Echelons of the 16th and 91st Fighter-Bomber Squadrons, and 1/2 Group Hq & Hq Sq., will move by air to Comiso on or about D-8 on orders C.G. XII ASC, Adv. Hq. Air Transports will be furnished by NAASC. Units will be prepared for immediate operations on landing at Comiso. Escort for transports to be provided by combat echelons.

d. The ground echelons of the 16th and 91st Fighter-Bomber Squadrons will be moved to Tunis on D-12 prepared for embarkation with elements of the "Dime" Assault Force. Details relating to the movement from Tunis to Sicily to be coordinated with Hq., Force 343, Hq., XII ASC.

19. 86th Fighter-Bomber Group.

a. The Group will be concentrated in the Cape Bon area prepared to undertake operations as fighter or as fighter-bombers by D-7.

b. One-half Gp., Hq & Hq Sq., and the 309th Fighter-Bomber Squadron (less combat echelon) will be moved to point of embarkation "Dime" Assault Force Tunis by D-4, prepared for shore to shore movement to Sicily. These units will leave on the D-4 convoy and will establish themselves by D-8 on Comiso Airdrome prepared to service aircraft and to coordinate operations immediately on arrival of the combat echelons of the Group. Detailed arrangements will be coordinated with C.G., 1st Infantry Division.

c. The combat echelon 309th Fighter-Bomber Squadron and the air echelons of the 310th and 311th Fighter-Bomber Squadrons will be moved to Sicily on D-8 on orders C.G., Advance Echelon XII ASC. Air transports will be furnished by NAASC. Units will be prepared for operations immediately on landing. Escorts for transports will be provided by combat echelons.

d. The ground echelons of the 310th and 311th Fighter-Bomber Squadrons will be moved to Tunis on D-12 prepared for embarkation with elements of the "Dime" Assault Force. Details of the movement from Tunis to Sicily to be coordinated with Hq, Force 343, by C.G., XII ASC.

20. 111th Observation Squadron.

a. The Squadron will be concentrated in the Cape Bon area by D day prepared for operations in Force 343 area.

b. One-half ground echelon will move to assembly area in the vicinity of Tunis on D-8. The unit will move to Sicily on D-4 with elements of the 1st Infantry Division (Dime Force). Details of the movement to be coordinated with Hq, 1st Infantry Division. Upon arrival in Sicily, the unit will establish itself on Fonte Olivo airdrome prepared to service aircraft and to coordinate operations of the combat echelon by D-5.

c. The air echelon will move to Fonte Olivo airdrome on D-2 on orders C.C., Advance Hq., XII ASC. Transports to be furnished by NAASC. Unit to be prepared for operations immediately after landing. Escort for transports to be provided by combat echelon.

d. The remainder of the squadron will be assembled in the vicinity of Tunis on orders C.G., XII ASC prepared for embarkation with elements of the "Dime" Force. Details to be coordinated with Hq, Force 343.

e. Special fighter escort will not be available in the early stages of the assault due to the air situation, but advantages will be taken of the incidental protection offered by scheduled fighter and bomber missions. Initially reconnaissance will be concentrated to provide early information relative to the movement, disposition, and strength of reserves. Operations will be controlled through forward fighter control facilities in the GELA area.

21. Hq & Hq Sq., XII A.S.C.

a. The advance echelon will accompany Hq, Force 343, and subordinate Headquarters in Command Ships for command and liaison purposes.

COMMAND SHIP	OFFICERS AND MEN	ASSEMBLE	DATE
Force 343 (Monrovia)	10 Officers 20 Enlisted Men	Algiers	D-10
II Corps and 45th Inf Div (Anson)	8 Officers 10 Enlisted Men	Oran	D-20
1st Inf Div (Chase)	4 Officers 5 Enlisted Men	Algiers	D-20
3rd Inf Div (Biscayne)	4 Officers 5 Enlisted Men	Bizerte	D-15
1st Armored Div (Ormsaba)	2 Officers	Oran	D-20

b. Command ship parties (less 2 liaison officers for each headquarters), will assemble at GELA at headquarters, XII ASC on arrival in Sicily.

c. The Rear Echelon will move to GELA on orders C.O., XII ASC after combat units have cleared Tunisia.

22. Fighter Control Group (Provisional).

a. Assault Echelons.

(1) Provision will be made for the operation of fighter control facilities on board command ships as follows:

COMMAND SHIP	PERSONNEL	TYPE OF CONTROL	ASSEMBLE	DATE
(Monrovia)	6 Officers 25 Enl. Men	Main Ftr. Control and Visual Direction	Algiers	D-25
(Anson)	6 Officers 25 Enl. Men	Standby Ftr. Control and Visual Direction	Oran	D-25
(Chase)	3 Officers 8 Enl. Men	Visual Direction	Oran	D-25
(Biscayne)	3 Officers 8 Enl. Men	Visual Direction	Bizerte	D-25

(2) An advance party of 20 Officers and 221 Enlisted Men (includes, British GCI team of 3 Officers and 31 Enlisted Men and 6 ground Observer teams totaling one Officer and 42 Enlisted Men) will be organized to establish forward fighter control facilities on shore in the GELA area. This party will be assembled at Algiers with the 1st Division by D-20 for training and rehearsal. It will accompany the assault convoy 1st Division, and establish RDF, VHF, and operations room facilities on shore to take over main control in the area from the Monrovia. The system will be integrated with JOC69 facilities and will be tied in laterally with 211 Group as rapidly as possible.
(3) Personnel on Force 343, 1st Division, and 45th Division Command Ships will assemble at GELA as soon as fighter control facilities are established on shore, to augment the organization outlined in 21 a(2) above.
(4) An advance party of 5 Officers and 61 Enlisted Men (includes 1 COL (British) attached, with 1 Officer and 31 Enlisted Men) will be organized to establish RDF facilities and local fighter direction in the LICATA area. This party will assemble in the Bizerte area by D-25 for rehearsal and training with the 3rd Division. It will accompany Assault Convoy 3rd Division.
(5) Personnel on the Command Ship, 3rd Division, will assemble at LICATA to augment the organization outlined in 21 a (4) above.

b. All follow up echelons will be moved to Sicily through the Dime area with elements of the 1st Division. Units will be assembled in Tunis at least 8 days prior to scheduled date of departure.

(1) A first follow up echelon of 20 Officers and 233 Enlisted Men (includes attached 1 GCI team (British) 1 Officer and 31 Enlisted Men, 1 COL (British) 1 Officer and 31 Enlisted Men, 6 ground Observer teams (British) 1 Officer and 42 Enlisted Men will be organized to augment fighter control facilities in the area. This unit will be assembled at Tunis by D-4 prepared for movement with elements of the 1st Division on D-4.
(2) A second follow up echelon of 9 Officers and 116 Enlisted Men (includes 8 Officers and 72 Enlisted Men) will be assembled at Tunis by D day prepared for movement with elements of the 1st Division on D-0.
(3) Remaining elements to be in readiness after D-16 prepared for movement on 48 hours notice to Tunis.

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3rd Communications Squadron.

a. (1) ASP's will be provided as follows:

CENT Assault:	1.	For II Corps Hq.
	2.	For 45th Div. Hq.
DIME Assault:	2.	For Hq. 343
	2.	For 1st Div.
JOSS Assault:	2.	For 3rd Div.
KOOL Force by Air	2.	For 1st Armored Div.
	1.	For 82nd Airborne Div.
	Reserve 1 with 9th Division	

(2) Each ASP will include 1 Officer, and 5 Men. They will be concentrated initially in the Algiers area for training and re-equiping and will be moved to join designated headquarters at the earliest practicable date. These units will accompany division Corps and TF Hq., on command ships. The ASP set-up for the 82nd Airborne Division will be dropped by parachute with appropriate headquarters.

(3) For details, see Signal Plan.

b. Advanced Landing Ground Parties.

(1) 4 Parties, 1 Officer and 13 men each, will be organized. They will be concentrated inthe Algiers area for re-equiping and training and moved to Divisional areas by D-25.

(2) Parties will accompany convoys and establish HF and VHF communications on airfields as indicated:

UNIT	ASSAULT FORCE	DATE CONVOY	COMMUNICATIONS ESTABLISHED AT
1 Party	3rd Division	D	Licata
1 Party	1st Division	D	Ponte Olivo
1 Party	1st Division	D+4	Biscari
1 Party	1st Division	D+4	Comiso

c. Remaining elements of the squadron will be in readiness after D+8 prepared for movement to Sicily from Tunis on 48 hours notice.

24. 927th Signal Bn. ASC.

a. Cryptographic and message center personnel will be provided on Command Ships as follows:

SHIP	O	MEN	ASSEMBLES	DATE
Monrovia	2	7	Algiers	D-25
Ancon	2	7	Oran	D-25
Biscayne	0	2	Bizerte	D-25
Chase	0	2	Oran	D-25
Orizaba	0	2	Oran	D-25

Personnel will be assembled at GELA when C.P., XII ASC opens on shore.

b. An advance detachment of 8 Officers and 136 Enlisted Men will be organized to provide communications for Hq, XII ASC, to include the construction of lines for Intelligence and Operational purposes. This detachment will be concentrated with the 1st Division on D-25 for training and rehearsal. It will move to Sicily with the Assault Echelon, 1st Div., on D day and will report to Hq. XII ASC GELA upon arrival on shore.

c. A follow up detachment of 3 officers and 96 Enlisted Men from Light Construction Company will be moved to Point of Embarkation 1st Division, Tunis, on D+1. Detachment moves with D+4 convoy 1st Division and reports to Hq. XII ASC at GELA on arrival on shore.

d. Remaining elements will continue to operate Signal facilities for Rear Hq. XII ASC, moving with the latter unit to Sicily on orders C.O., XII ASC.

25. The 3rd Air Defense Wing will provide necessary detachments for organizing the Provisional Fighter Control Group and Advance Hq. XII ASC. Remaining elements will be held in Tunisia, for reorganization as a Fighter Wing, to be moved to Sicily on call C.O., XII ASC.

VII - MISCELLANEOUS

26. Anti-Aircraft Artillery.

Operational control will be undertaken by C.O., XII ASC when satisfactory communications are established.

27. Barrage Balloons.

The number and type to be available in the Cent convoy from the U.S. are not known. Provision has been made for British equipment and personnel but these will be replaced if possible with U.S. units. Local A.A. defense commanders will control barrage balloons.

28. Restrictions, A.A. Fire. (To be issued later in separate instructions).

29. Air-Sea Rescue.

Air-Sea Rescue arrangements are being made by Mediterranean Air Command for the Theater of Operations and comprehensive instructions will be issued by this formation. This information will be passed to aircraft crews when it becomes available to this headquarters.

30. Defense of Airfields.

Before aircraft are called into Sicily, assurance will be had that airfields are adequately protected by A.A. Artillery. Minimum requirements for each airdrome are estimated at:

8 - 90 mm
16 - 40 mm
16 - 50 Cal.

31. Airfield Construction.

Reconnaissance for additional airfields will be initiated early inthe operations. Every effort will be made to construct additional fields to expedite the entry of units into Sicily and to effect greater dispersion of units.

32. Licata Airfield.

A minimum of one squadron of fighters will be moved to Licata prior to the time the port is opened for use by Force 343.

VIII - ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ENEMY INFORMATION

33. Preparatory Period.

a. Are there any indications that preparations are being made to concentrate Axis air forces to meet our attack?

b. What additional beach defenses are being established in Sicily?

c. What effect is our bombing having on his fighter strength and dispositions? Are bombers being withdrawn as a consequence of this bombing? If so to what locations?

d. What are his current air defense potentialities?

e. Are there any weaknesses in the enemy's logistical and communications systems which can be effected by air action?

34. Period of the Assault.

a. What is the current strength disposition and location of Axis Air Forces in position to intervine in the battle area?

b. Where is the enemy's A.A. Artillery located?

c. How is the enemy employing his Air Forces? In mass attacks or piecemeal? Against which objectives are their Air Forces being concentrated?

d. How is the enemy disposing his local and general reserves of ground forces?

e. What effect is our attack having on his Air defense organization?

f. What organized defenses including Artillery are holding up our ground forces?

g. What is the enemy's reaction to our paratroop attack?

h. Are there any indications of weak points in the enemy's logistical and communications systems?

35. Establishment of a Bridgehead from Licata to Catania.

a. What are the current reactions and future capabilities of Axis Air Forces?

b. Against which objectives is the enemy concentrating his Air Forces?

c. What is the current disposition and capabilities of the Axis Air Forces?

d. How are his reserves being employed?

e. What weakness has been developed in his AW defense system?

f. Where is his A.A. Artillery located?

g. Are there any signs of a withdrawal or full retreat?

h. Are there any indications of weak points in the enemy's logistical and communications systems?

/s/ L. P. Hickey

L. P. HICKEY,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

d-5

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AMENDMENT NO. 1 BIGOT SECRET
to
PLAN FOR ORGANIZATION CONCENTRATION
AND MOVEMENT OF XII AIR SUPPORT
COMMAND UNITS IN OPERATION
HUSKY

18 June, 1943.

Add Paragraph 25½:

25½. a. The following units based in the Cape Bone Area operating under control of the Rear Echelon Hq. XII ASC until that formation moves to Sicily when they will pass to direct control of Hq N.A.T.A.F. These units will be prepared to operate over the area of Force 343, refuelling if necessary, at Pantelleria.

324th Fighter Group
7th Wing, South African Air Force (Fighter)

b. The 99th Fighter Squadron, attached to the 33rd Fighter Group initially, will not under present plans move to Sicily, but will continue operations from Pantelleria under control of Commanding Officer, Pantelleria.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ A. R. Lederer,

A. R. LEDERER,
Captain, Air Corps,
Acting Adjutant.

EXHIBIT IV
WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE
OPERATION PLAN NO. 2-43
SHORT TITLE "HON/W 2"

File
A4-3/W 31

Serial: 00218

WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE
U.S.S. MONROVIA, Flagship,

ALGIERS, ALGERIA
May 26, 1943 (1030)

SECRET
BIGOT - HUSKY

OPERATION PLAN
No. 2-43

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) 80. CONTROL Force
1 80.1 Force Flagship
MONROVIA (FF), McLANAHAN.

9 80.2 Escort Group
Desron Seven less Desdiv 14 and MAYO, Eight (9 DD).

17 80.3 Screening Group
ORDRONAUX,
MTBron Fifteen (17 PT).

10 80.4 Demonstration Group
10 - APDs,
PT 213.

3 80.5 Minelaying Group
KEOKUK, SALEM, WEEHAWKEN,
40 Escorts (as assigned).

3 80.6 Reserve Group
ORIZABA, CHATEAU THIERRY,
6 LST,
7 LST,
11 LCI(L),
16 16 LCI(L), British.
43

(b) 81 DIME Attack Force, Rear Admiral Hall, U.S.N.
8 Transdiv Three (8 APA-AKA)
4 H.M.S. PRINCE CHARLES (LSI(S)),
2 H.M.S. PRINCESS CHARLOTTE (LSI(S)),
9 SAVANNAH, BOISE (2 CL),
2 Desron Seventeen (9 DD),
6 STEADY, SUSTAIN (2 AM),
4 YMS 62, 69, 207, 208, 226, 227, (6 YMS),
6 PC 621, 624, 625, 627, (4 PC),
4 SC 676, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, (6 SC),
6 HOPI (towing pontoon causeways), REDWING,
2 16 LST (including 2 carrying pontoons),
16 19 LCI(L),
5 U.S. Army forces (as assigned).
76

40
43
76
96
265
320
11
531

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(c) 85. CENT Attack Force, Rear Admiral Kirk, U.S.N.
AMOCN (F),
Transdivs One, Five, Seven (18 APA-AKA),
PHILADELPHIA (1 CL),
H.M.S. ABERCROMBIE,
Desron Fifteen, Sixteen less McLANAHAN, ONDRONAUX (16 DD),
COLE, BERNADOU, DALLAS (3 DMD),
Mindiv Seventeen less STEADY, SYSTAIN (4 AM),
YMS 16, 18, 34, 36, 37, 43, 55, 58, 63, 64, 82, 83, (12 YMS),
PC 542, 551, 556, 557, 558, 591, (6 PC),
SC 1029, 1030, 1043, 1044, (4 SC).
NARRAGANSETT, NAUSET (Each towing pontoon causeways),
14 LST (Including 10 loaded for 45th Div; 3 carrying pontoons),
8 LCT-5,
6 LCI(L),
U.S. Army Forces (as assigned).

(d) 86. JOSS Attack Force, Rear Admiral Conolly, U.S.N.
BISCAYNE (F),
H.M.S. PRINCE LEOPOLD (LSI(S)),
H.M.S. PRINCESS ASTRID (LSI(S)),
Crudiv Thirteen (BROOKLYN, BIRMINGHAM) (2 CL),
Desron Thirteen (9 DD),
SEEN, SENTINEL (2 AM),
YMS 3, 13, 15, 20, 21, 78, (6 YMS),
PC 543, 545, 546, 550, 559, 562, 626, (7 PC),
SC 497, 498, 503, 506, 508, 522, 526, 530, 532, 533, 534, 535, 638, 639, 649, 651, 655, 695, 696, 697, 770, 771, 977, 978, 979, (26 SC),
MORENO (towing pontoon causeways), INTENT, RESOLUTE,
40 LST (Including 5 carrying pontoon; others carrying 6 LCVP and fitted as hospital carriers),
85 LCT-5,
54 LCI(L),
12 LCT-3 or 4, British,
9 LCG(L), British
8 LCG(L), British,
U.S. Army forces (as assigned).

(e) 87. Train, Captain , U.S.N.
DELTA,
VULCAN,
MOUNT BAKER,
TARAZED,
WINOOSKI, NATTAPONI, CHICOPEE, SALAMONIE, CHEMUNG, NIOBRARA,
CHAMBERLAIN.

1. Information. (1) Current information on hostile forces and on characteristics of the Theater of Operations is listed in Information Annex, Annex A. Additional information, as available, will be separately distributed.
(2) The Western Task Force is part of a combined Allied force which has as its mission the capture of SICILY as a base for future operations.
(3) The Western Task Force is being employed in the waters to the westward of the southeastern part of the island. Operations by British forces on the same echelon are taking place simultaneously in waters to the eastward of the southeastern portion of the island.
(4) The area of the Western Task Force is bounded:
(a) On the North, by the parallel of thirty-eight degrees North.
(b) On the West, by the meridian of twelve degrees East.
(c) On the Southwest, by a line drawn one one zero degrees from POINT SPADILLO (PANTELLARIA).
(d) On the Southeast, by a line drawn two two five degrees from RELIGIONE POINT (SICILY).
(5) Enemy ports which will come under the control of UNITED STATES forces are PORTO EMPEDOCLE, MARSALA, TRAPANI, and PALERMO. Other ports on the southern coast may be occupied during the early phases of the operation in order to maintain our military forces. Maintenance of our military forces will be undertaken also through the port of SYRACUSE as soon as that port is captured and made available to our shipping. Upon the opening of ports to the shipping of the Eastern Task Force, additional British landing craft may be allocated to the Western Task Force to assist in the maintenance over the beaches of UNITED STATES military forces.
(6) British submarines will act as navigation beacons in each area selected for American attacks (see Submarine Plan, Annex H).
(7) Fighter coverage of the Western Task Force will be provided: by North African Coastal Command during movements along the north coast of Africa and during passage through the TUNISIAN war channel; by the MALTA command during the northern approach on D minus one day. Until the capture of SICILIAN air fields: cover over the CENT Attack Force and DIME Attack Force will be provided by MALTA; cover over the JOSS Attack Force by PANTELLARIA. When SICILIAN air fields are captured and placed in operation, (probably D plus three), day and night fighter cover will be provided over landing beaches, ships lying off-shore, and convoy movements. (See Air Plan, Annex F).
(8) Friendly aircraft participating in the operation will be marked with existing National markings, except that the UNITED STATES white star will be enclosed in a yellow circle. Thus all Allied aircraft will have the general similarity of a circle, i.e., the British and French roundel and the UNITED STATES circle enclosing the star. (See Air Plan, Annex F).
(9) Force "H", a strong British force, will cover the Allied assaults from enemy surface vessel approach from the IONIAN SEA. If the Italian Fleet sorties from western ports of ITALY, Force "Z", a strong British force, will operate southward of SARDINIA in positions favorable covering the Allied assaults from enemy surface vessel approach from the TYRRHENIAN SEA.
(10) On D minus two, a Covering Group, consisting of UNITED STATES cruisers and destroyers, will cover the eastward movement of Allied convoys, operating in accordance with Covering Group Directive, Annex O.
(11) From D minus two onwards a British screening force comprising two MTB flotillas and one MGB flotilla will operate to screen the western flank of the Western Task Force. The operating area of this screen will be west of the meridian thirteen degrees East, and north of a line connecting Latitude thirty-seven degrees North, Longitude thirteen degrees East, with Latitude thirty-eight degrees North, Longitude eleven degrees East. At zero eight hundred on D day this screen will come under the command of Naval Commander, Western Task Force.
(12) Controlled mine fields are reported to exist off all southern beaches, except possibly beach number eighty-eight. Beach data given in Information Annex, Annex A.
(13) During moonlight on D minus one, own paratroops will be dropped from transport planes into zones behind the enemy lines in order to capture enemy airfields and divert enemy forces from the beach defenses prior to the assault from seaward.
(14) When military operations are undertaken for the reduction of the island, a Support Force, comprising light cruisers and destroyers, will be assigned to support the reduction operations by naval bombardment.
Assumptions. (1) That the initial landing will take place during darkness.
(2) That strong submarine, E-boat, and air attacks are to be expected.
(3) That mines may be encountered.
(4) That no harbors will be available and that initial landings must be over beaches.
(5) That weather conditions will permit landing through the surf on designated beaches.
(6) That false beaches will not preclude the landing ships and craft from landing on the true beaches.
(7) That own paratroops will divert enemy forces from the beach defenses prior to the landings made from seaward.
(8) That the maintenance and build-up of the military forces can be continued over beaches until adequate ports become available and are rendered usable to meet logistic requirements.

2. This force will firmly establish Western Task Force in positions ashore on the island of SICILY suitable to its capture of the south-eastern portion of the island in order to assist in seizing and holding that island as a base for future operations.

3. (a) CONTROL Force, Force Flagship operate as directed by Naval Commander Western Task Force.
Escort Group escort convoys in accordance with Convoy Plan, Annex I. Protect convoys against submarine, surface, and air attack. Upon arrival in attack area, render gunfire support as directed.
Screening Group screen JOSS Attack Force against hostile surface forces approaching from bases in WEST SICILY. Frustrate enemy E-boat raids. Operate in accordance with Screening Group Directive, Annex K.
Demonstration Group conduct deceptive operations in accordance with Demonstration Group Directive, Annex L.
Minelaying Group lay mines in accordance with Minelaying Group Directive, Annex M.
Reserve Group LCT's sail with TJS-1 enroute to DIME area, LST's sail with TJU-1 enroute to DIME area, and LCI(L)'s sail with TJF-1 enroute to DIME area; ORIZABA and CHATEAU THIERRY sail with CENT Attack Force joining DIME Attack Force in accordance with Departure and Rendezvous Plan, Annex G; subsequent movements as directed by Naval Commander Western Task Force.
(b) DIME Attack Force establish assigned Army Forces ashore near GELA by simultaneous attacks on selected beaches at H hour on D day in accordance with plan of attack developed by Commanding General concerned. Capture and secure the airfield at PONTE OLIVO, extend the beachhead to the East and Northeast to include the line RAGUSA-CHIARAMONTE-CALTAGIRONE and gain contact with the British forces on the East. Support military operations by naval gunfire in accordance with Fire Support Plan, Annex B. Silence batteries and destory searchlights which threaten transports, beaches, and landing craft. Take advantage of opportunity to move transports inshore during darkness, and in daylight when shore-batteries have been silenced. Upon joining in accordance with Departure and Rendezvous Plan, Annex G, sail ORIZABA and CHATEAU THIERRY of Reserve Group to DIME area. Expedite unloading transports; utilise fully twelve LCT's ex-JOSS Attack Force.
(c) CENT Attack Force establish assigned Army Forces ashore near SCOGLITTI by simultaneous attacks on selected beaches at H hour on D day in accordance with plan of attack developed by Commanding General concerned. Capture and secure the airfields at COMISO and BISCARI, extend the beachhead to the East and Northeast to include the line RAGUSA-CHIARAMONTE-CALTAGIRONE, and gain contact with the British forces on the East. Support military operations by naval gunfire in accordance with Fire Support Plan, Annex B. Provide own air spot. Silence batteries and destory searchlights which threaten transports, beaches, and landing craft. Take advantage of opportunity to move transports inshore during darkness, and in daylight when shore batteries have been silenced. Sail ORIZABA and CHATEAU THIERRY of Reserve Group, releasing in accordance with Departure and Rendezvous Plan, Annex G. Expedite unloading transports; utilize fully fourteen LCT's ex-JOSS Attack Force.
(d) JOSS Attack Force establish assigned Army Forces ashore near LICATA by simultaneous attacks on selected beaches at H hour on D day in accordance with plan of attack developed by Commanding General concerned. Capture and secure the port and airfield at LICATA; protect the left flank of the operation against interference from the northwest. Support military operations by naval gunfire in accordance with Fire Support Plan, Annex B. Silence batteries and destroy searchlights which threaten landing craft and beaches. Sail craft of Reserve Group as follows; LCT's in TJS-1, LST's in TJW-1, and LCI(L)'s in TJF-1. Prior to execution of JOSS Approach Plan, release Reserve Group. Exploit port facilities to maximum to ensure troop maintenance. Be prepared to unload four coastal freighters upon arrival D plus four day. When unloaded from assault flight release twelve LCT-5 to DIME Attack Force and fourteen LCT-5 to CENT Attack Force.
(e) Train render logistic services to all Task Forces as required. Base on ORAN, ALGIERS, BIZERTA, or as directed.
(x) (1) This Operation Plan will be placed in effect by dispatch or sealed orders.
(2) D day and H hour will be signalled.
(3) The assault is to be pressed home with relentless vigor regardless of loss or difficulty.
(4) Take every available measure to ensure,
(a) earliest warning of submarine attack, and
(b) destruction of hostile submarines.
(5) Destroy enemy forces encountered.
(6) Take all practicable precautions against mines.
(7) Take appropriate steps to ensure safety of submarines stationed as beacons. Escort submarines in accordance with Submarine Plan, Annex H.
(8) Employ smoke to fullest extent for defense against enemy action and to screen own operations.
(9) Take special precautions to ensure early recognition of friendly aircraft.
(10) Take special precautions to avoid compromise of infra-red receivers.
(11) Extend timing of boat waves to avoid congestion on beaches.
(12) Site pontoon bridges expeditiously.
(13) Ensure effective boat salvage operations.
(14) Clear landing ships and craft promptly in order to ensure prompt follow up. Provide adequate escorts. Route shipping in accordance with Convoy Plan, Annex I.
(15) Maintain radio silence and visual silence except as modified by Communication Plan, Annex C.
(16) The following documents, in the possession of Commanders of Attack Forces, are in effect:
(a) MEDITERRANEAN (W) Combined Navy/Air Orders.
(b) MEDITERRANEAN (W) Naval Air Defence Orders.
(c) MEDITERRANEAN (W) Secret General Orders.
(17) Landing ships and craft base on BIZERTA-TUNIS; other ships base on ORAN - ALGIERS.

4. Evacuation of wounded in accordance with Medical Plan, Annex D.
Logistic support in accordance with Logistic Plan, Annex E.

5. Use Communication Plan, Annex C. Use zone BAKER time.
Rendezvous: A. CASABLANCA
B. GIBRALTAR
C. ORAN
D. ARZEW
E. ALGIERS
F. BOUGIE
G. PHILIPPEVILLE
H. BONE
I. BIZERTA
J. CAPE FARINA
K. TUNIS
L. CAPE BON
M. SOUSSE
N. TRIPOLI
O. LINOSA
P. LAMPEDUSA
Q. PANTELLARIA
R. MALTA
S. SYRACUSE
T. RELIGIONE POINT
U. CAPE SCALAMBRI
V. SCOGLITTI
W. GELA
X. LICATA
Y. Latitude 36° 53'N. Longitude 13° 50'E.
Z. Latitude 36° 07'N. Longitude 13° 30'E.

The Short Title of this Plan is "HON/W2".
Naval Commander Western Task Force in MONROVIA with DIME Attack Force.

(S) H. K. HEWITT,
H. K. HEWITT,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Naval Commander Western Task Force.

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ANNEXES (To be issued separately)
A. Information Annex.
B. Fire Support Plan.
C. Communication Plan.
D. Medical Plan.
E. Logistic Plan.
F. Air Plan.
G. Departure and Rendezvous Plan.
H. Submarine Plan.
I. Convoy Plan.
J. Approach Plan.
K. Screening Group Directive.
L. Demonstration Group Directive.
M. Minelaying Group Directive.
N. Hospital Ship Directive.
O. Covering Group Directive.
P. Intelligence Annex.

EXHIBIT V

FIELD ORDER NO. 1 FORCE 343

Field Order)
Number....1)

Hq Force 343,
APO #758, US Army,
20 June 1943

MAPS: Road Map, SICILY, 1:500,000 (Sketch)

1. a. See Annex No. II Intelligence.

b. (1) FORCE 343, consisting of FORCE 343 (Left) and BRITISH 12th ARMY (Right), supported by combined US and British Air and Naval Forces, assaults the southeastern portion of SICILY to capture it as a base for further operation.

(2) BRITISH 12th ARMY (1st Canadian Div on the left (West)O, assault's within its zone of action at H Hour on D Day. (See Operations Map)

2. FORCE 343 assaults west of the line POZZALO - RAGUSA - CHIARAMONTE GULFI - VIZZINI, all exclusive, at H Hour D Day to seize and hold the airfields just north of COMISO, at PONTE OLIVO, the air landing fields at BISCARI and northwest of LICATA; to seize and operate the small port at LICATA; and to be prepared for further operations.

D Day: To be announced.
H Hour: To be announced.
Troops: See Annex No. III, Troop List

3. See Annex No. I. (Operations Map)

a. SHARK FORCE (CENT and DIME FORCES)

Commanders: SHARK: Lt Gen O. N. BRADLEY
CENT : Maj Gen T. C. MIDDLETON
DIME : Maj Gen TERRY DE LA M. ALLEN

Mission:

(1) Land H Hour D Day in the SAMPIERI - GELA area, capture and secure:

(a) The airfield at PONTE OLIVO.
(b) The airfield north of COMISO.
(c) The air landing field north of Biscari.

(2) Contact with JOSS FORCE.

(3) Extend beachhead to YELLOW and gain contact with the BRITISH 12th ARMY, initially vicinity RAGUSA.

b. JOSS FORCE

Commander: Maj Gen L. K. Truscott

Mission:

(1) Land H Hour D Day in the LICATA area, capture and secure the port and the airfield at LICATA.
(2) Extend the beachhead to YELLOW, protecting the left flank of the operation against interference from the Northwest.
(3) Contact with SHARK FORCE.

c. PARACHUTE TASK FORCE:

Commander: Col J. M. GAVIN

Troops: 505th Parachute R.C.T.
3rd Bn, 504th Parachute Infantry Regt.

Mission:

(1) Land maximum parachute elements that can be lifted in available troop carrier aircraft night of D-1, D Day in drop zones on high ground east of PONTE OLIVO.
(2) Assist DIME FORCE in landing, and the capture of airfield vicinity PONTE OLIVO.
(3) Attached to SHARK FORCE upon establishing contact with DIME FORCE after H Hour.

d. RESERVES:

(1) KOOL FORCE (Floating Reserve).

Commander: Maj Gen H. J. GAFFEY

Mission:

(a) Sail with Assault Convoy, prepared to land in support of any of the Assault Forces.

(2) 82ND AIRBORNE DIV (-Dets) W/2nd Bn 509 Para Regt atchd.

Commander: Maj M. B. RIDGEWAY

Mission:

(a) 82nd Airborne Div (-Dets) concentrate rapidly by successive air lifts in SICILY, by D ∮ 7, in either or both the DIME or JOSS areas, as directed.
(b) 2nd Bn, 509th Para Inf, remain in NORTH AFRICA, in FORCE 343 reserve, available for drop missions as directed.

(3) 9TH INF DIV.

Commander: Maj Gen M. S. EDDY

Mission:

(a) One RCT (w/84th Cml Wpns Bn atchd) and the entire Div Arty will be assembled prepared to move to SICILY on call anytime after D Day.
(b) Remainder of Div (less 1 RCT and Div Arty) will be prepared to move on call to SICILY at any time after D ∮ 8.

e. FORCE TROOPS (See Annex No. III, Troop List).

(1) Units other than those allotted to Sub-Task Forces will be prepared to move from NORTH AFRICA to SICILY in subsequent convoys as shipping becomes available, according to priorities announced by this Headquarters.

f. WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE.

(1) Naval gun fire support. (See Annex No. IV).

g. AIR (See Annex No. V).

(1) XII Air Support Command.

(a) Furnish organized Air Support Control and Air Support Parties and coordinate requests for air support.
(b) Provide air reconnaissance on request.

h. (1) All commanders will insure that troops have sufficient information of the operation prior to H Hour D Day to enable them to execute their tasks intelligently and effectively.

(2) The provisions of this paragraph will be made known to all ranks:

(a) Leading waves will reach beaches at H Hour.

(b) Leading waves will push in rapidly and aggressively, cleaning beaches promptly.

(c) Avoid direct attack. Pin the enemy by frontal fire and attack from rear.

(d) Attack both by day and night to the limit of human endurance and then continue to attack. Rapid, violent and continual attack will win.

(e) Military or civilian units or individuals offering resistance will be destroyed.

(f) Military and civilian authorities displaying conciliatory attitude will be treated accordingly.

(g) Local Civilian Authorities in captured localities will be urged to continue their administrative and judicial functions.

(h) Houses of worship, cemeteries, and private homes will not be disturbed or entered unless they are used as defensive works.

(i) Women will be treated with the utmost respect. Soldiers guilty of assault on women or looting will be shot.

(j) Men will go ashore in the initial beach assault carrying minimum equipment needed for the immediate task at hand.

(3) All commanders, down to and including companies, will make known prior to H Hour, D Day the names of the second and third in command of their unit or organization.

4. See ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 1 w/Annexes.

5. a. See Annex No. X. Signal Annex.

b. Command Posts: Force 343, (1) Initially aboard MONROVIA.
(2) Ashore, vicinity GELA, at a time to be announced.

JOSS, aboard BISCAYNE
SHARK, aboard ANCON
DIME, aboard CHASE
CENT, aboard ANCON
KOOL, aboard ORIZABA
82nd Airborne Div, (1) Adv CP - aboard MONROVIA.
(2) CP - KAIROUAN, TUNISIA.

Annexes

I - Operations Map
II - Intelligence Summary #1
III - Troop List
IV - Naval Gun Fire Support
V - Air Support
VI - Field Artillery
VII - Antiaircraft
VIII - Coast Defense
IX - Engineer Operations
X - Signal Annex
XI - Chemical Warfare

PATTON
Comdg

/s/ Maddox
MADDOX
G-3

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
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ANNEX NO. 1 TO F.O. NO. 1


PALERMO
MESSINA
MARSALA
CATANIA
S CATALDO
CALTANISSETTA
CANICATTI
AGRIGENTO
PIAZZA ARMERINA
"YELLOW LINE"
MAZZARINO
CAMPOBELLO
CALTAGIRONE
AUGUSTA
VIZZINI
SALIMI
LICATA
PONTE OLIVO
GELA
SIRACUSA
BISCARI
CHIARAMONTE
VITTORIA
COMISO
RAGUSA
NOTO
PACHINO
PORTO PALO
PACHINO
PACHINO
PACHIN

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Annex No. II to FO No. 1

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

Maps: OPS Map (Annex I) to FO #1.

Headquarters Force 343
A.P.O. 758, U. S. Army
20 June 1943

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. See G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation #4 (to be issued by Y-day) as supplemented by Air Intelligence Estimate, Hq XII ASC, 14 June 1943 issued as G-2 General Information Bulletin No. 18, 18 June 1943, Hq. 343.

b. See Battle Order of Sicily (to be issued by Y-day), this Headquarters.

c. See collation map of defenses correct to 19 June 1943, this Headquarters.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. NAVY.

(1) Status of alertness of enemy navy? Submarine, PT boats, Seibel ferries activities?

(2) Details of location, calibers, etc., enemy land and shore batteries? Firing efficiency?

(3) Underwater defenses, mines, wiring, etc. How are mines controlled?

b. GROUND FORCES.

(1) Identifications, troops weapons, calibers? Nationality and units? General status of equipment? Status of local maintenance reserves?

(2) Sabotage, demolition, mines, booby-traps, wire? Location of mine fields and road blocks? Condition of utilities - (railway, electrical, telephone and telegraph, water)? Water pollution? Condition of wells, springs and streams?

(3) Location of troop reserves? Location of reinforcements? (Prisoners of war and civilian reports).

(4) Military attitude (type and quality of resistance)? Civilian attitude? Gas masks being worn by civilians or military?

(5) Location and type of armored trains? Tanks encountered, type, German or Italian?

(6) Air activity? (Type, time, number, direction of flight, and results achieved)?

(7) Status airfields and airfield supplies and equipment? Results of our bombings prior to and during operation?

(8) Terrain and road information for map correction?

c. METEOROLOGICAL

(1) Forecasts as to visibility, humidity, high and low pressure areas, wind directions and velocity. Temperatures.

(2) Effects of forecasts on streams, employment of chemical smoke and actual smoke due to burning, and visual observation?

c. AIR AND AIRBORNE.

(1) Nature and type of enemy air activity?

(2) See 2b. (1); 2b.(6); 2 b. (7).

(3) Location of unmapped terrain features (lakes, rivers, defiles).

(4) Troop movements on roads, direction, type and volume? Emphasis on movements to East and South. (Road congestion, military and civilian, by location). Location of armored trains and tank units?

(5) Intensity and type of antiaircraft fire?

(6) Enemy water movements (time, number and direction emphasis on activity in Straits of Messina).

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND PHOTOGRAPHIC MISSIONS.

a. Visual air observation and spot photo sorties by XII Air Support Command through Air Support Party channels. One mission (two sorties) reserved for JOSS, two missions (four sorties) reserved for SHARK daily until noon, unless this Headquarters otherwise advised, as if and when available.

b. Air Reconnaissance photographic sorties by PRU detachment, NAPRW, under direct control of AC of S, G-2 Force 343. Requests direct to AC of S, G-2 Force 343 through channels, (not through Air Support Parties). See G-2 General Information Bulletin #22, 20 June 1943, Hq 343.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

During initial phase of operations prisoners and captured documents will be examined and disposed of by Sub-Task Force Headquarters. (See Annex #1 to Intelligence Plan, 22 April 1943, Hq Task Force 343). Important information will be transmitted at once. See letter, this Headquarters, same subject.

5. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND MOSAICS.

Maps will be issued as provided in Annex No. 4 to G-2 Intelligence Plan, this Headquarters, 27 May 1943. See also amendment 21 June 1943, Hq 343, to Annex #4 of G-2 Intelligence Plan.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. C.I.C. See G-2 General Information Bulletin #21, 19 June 43, Hq 343.

b. Photo Reconnaissance and Interpretation Plan. See G-2 General Information bulletin #14, 14 June 43, Hq 343.

c. "J" Service. See letter 1 June 43, Hq 343, same subject.

d. P.W.I. See Intelligence Plan referred to in 4 above.

e. Interpreters. None will be provided from Hq 343. See paragraph IV, G-2 General Information Bulletin #11, 12 June 43, Hq 343.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

a. A summary G-2 report will be submitted by Sub-Task Forces daily covering the preceeding 24 hour period to 2400B and will reach this Headquarters by 0800B the day following day reported upon, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

b. Important information pertaining to enemy action against our forces will be transmitted by the most expeditious means to this Headquarters in brief form as spot returns.

c. Yellow Smoke Grenades will be used by attacking units to designate "Friendly troops are here."

PATTON, Commanding.

GAY
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Kooh
KOCH,
Annex. G-2

COPY #1
TROOP LIST
Annex #3

To F. O. #1

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343

:::::::::::::::::::
:S E C R E T :
:Auth:CO, IAC :
:Initials: JW :
:Date: 19 June 43:
:::::::::::::::::::

TROOPS ALLOTTED TO SHARK FORCE (II CORPS)
CENT FORCE (45th Inf Div Rein)
DIME Force (1st Inf Div Rein)

Hq & Hq Co II Corps
1st Inf Div (-18th RCT)
HQ 1st Inf Div
HQ Co 1st Inf Div
1st Recon Trp
1st Engr Bn (-Co B)
Hq & Hq Btry 1st Div Arty
5th FA Bn
7th FA Bn
33d FA Bn
16th Inf Regt
26th Inf Regt
1st Med Bn (-Co B)
1st Ord Co
1st QM Co
1st Signal Co
MP Plat 1st Inf Div
45th Inf Div
HQ 45th Inf Div
HQ Co 45th Inf Div
45th Recn Tp
20th Engr Bn
Hq & Hq Btry 45th Div Arty
158th FA Bn
160th FA Bn
171st FA Bn
189th FA Bn
157th Inf Regt
179th Inf Regt
180th Inf Regt
120th Medical Bn
745th Ord Co (Lt Maint)
45th QM Co
45th Sig Co
MP Plat 45th Inf Div
1st Ranger Bn
4th Ranger Bn

PARACHUTE TASK FORCE
505th RCT 82d Airborne Div, w/3d Bn 504th Prcht Inf Regt Atchd
505th Prcht Inf Regt
3d Bn 504th Prcht Inf Regt
456th Prcht FA Bn
Co B 307th A/B Engr Bn
Det 82d A/B Sig Co
Det 307th A/B Med Co
Air Support Party
PNI Personnel

COAST ARTILLERY
103rd Barrage Balloon Btry VLA (Sep)
104th Barrage Balloon Btry VLA (Sep)
103rd AAA AW Bn
105th AAA AW Bn (SP)
Btrys A & B 107th AAA AW Bn
Hq & Hq Btry 106th AAA Gp
Hq & Hq Btry 107th AAA Gp
215th AAA Gun Bn
400th AAA AW Bn
401st AAA Gun Bn (SM)
411st AAA AW Bn (SP)
451st AAA AW Bn
690th AAA MG Btry (Sep)
691st AAA MG Btry (Sep)
692nd AAA MG Btry (Sep)
693d AAA MG Btry (Sep)
694th AAA MG Btry (Sep)
695th AAA MG Btry (Sep)
696th AAA MG Btry (Sep)
697th AAA MG Btry (Sep)

- 1 -

CHEMICAL WARFARE
2d Cml Mtz Bn (Sep)
21st Cml Co (-1 Plat)
Det 63d Cml Co
83d Cml Mtzd Bn (Sep)
12th Chem Co Maint (-Det)

CAVALRY
91st Recon Sq

ARMORED FORCE UNITS
753d Tank Bn (M)
70th Tank Bn (L)
2 Medium Tank Platoons

FIELD ARTILLERY
13th FA Brig (-1 Bn 36th FA Regt & 1 Btry (-Flash Unit) 1st Obsn Bn)

ENGINEER
19th Engr Regt (C)
39th Engr Regt (C)
40th Engr Regt (C) w/1 Bn 133d Engr Regt (C) attached
62d Engr Co (Topo)
Co B 401st Engr Bn (WS)
Co C, 401st Engr Bn (WS)
1 Well Drilling Sect, Hq & Serv Co, 401st Engr Bn (WS)
2d Plat 437th Engr Co (Dp Trk)
1 Plat 462d Engr Co (Dep) (-Dets)
531st Engr Shore Regt

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2 Plats Co B 601st Engr Bn (Cam)
809th Engr Bn (Avn)
811th Engr Bn (Avn)
2602d Engr Co (Pipe Line)
Dets 2657th Engr Map Depot

MILITARY POLICE
202d MP Co
342d MP Escrt Gd Co
504th MP Bn (-Co A & B)
---- Prisoner of War Proc Det

MEDICAL
1 Sec Adv Plat, 2d Med Sup Dep
Det 2d Aux Surg Grp (7 Teams)
Det 3d Aux Surg Grp (7 Teams)
11th Field Hospital
15th Evac Hospital
5th Med Bn
1st Plat, Co A, 36th Amb Bn
1 Col Co and 1 Cl Plat 51st Med Bn
93d Evac Hosp
261st Med Bn (-1 Co)
Vet Det 8580 JJ

ORDNANCE
9th Ord Co (MM)
Hq & Hq Det 63d Ord Bn (Amm)
Hq & Hq Det 43d Ord Bn (M&S)
79th Ord Co (Dep)
69th Ord Co (Amm)
83d Ord Co (HM)(Tk)
3d Plat, 235th Ord Co (Bomb Disp)
261st Ord Co (MM)(AA)
262d Ord Co (MM)(AA)
* 330th Ord Co (MTS)
608th Ord Co (AM)
3406th Ord Co (MM)(Q)
3407th Ord Co (MM)(Q)

QUARTERMASTER
109th QM Co (GR)
2nd Bn 47th QM Regt Trk (-Co E and F)
86th QM Rhd Co
2 Dets 184th QM Co (Dep Sup)
Co A 205th QM Bn (Gas Supply)
Co C 269th QM Bn (Serv)
523d QM Co (Car)(Prov)
2636th QM Trk Bn
2637th QM Trk Bn (-1 Co)
528th QM Serv Bn
Co C & D 382d QM Port Bn
384th QM Port Bn
Discharge personnel loaded in U.S.

SIGNAL
53d Sig Bn w/cipher Det 141
71th Sig Co (Spec)
Det 72d Sig Co
Radio Team 12th Army
Unit #1 163d Sig Photo Co
2 Rad Sec & 1 Tel Sec 177th Sig Co (Rep)
2 Bn Teams & 1 Regt Team 286th Sig Co
2 S & I Sec, 206th Sig Co

NAVAL
Naval Shore Bn #3
Naval Shore Bn #4 (-1 Co)
Naval Personnel (Naval Fire Control Parties, etc.)

MISCELLANEOUS
CIC Personnel
Broadcasting Det
Civil Affairs Personnel
Public Relations Personnel
Prisoner of War Interrogation Personnel
Censorship Personnel
30th Finance Disb Det
25th MEU

TROOPS ALLOTTED TO JOSS FORCE
(3d Inf Div Reinf)

3d Inf Div
Hq 3rd Inf Div
Hq Co 3rd Inf Div
3rd Recn Trp
10th Engr Bn
Hq & Hq Btry 3rd Inf Div Arty
9th FA Bn
10th FA Bn
39th FA Bn
41st FA Bn
7th Inf Regt
15th Inf Regt
30th Inf Regt
3rd Medical Bn
703rd Ord Co (Lt Maint)
3rd QM Co
3rd Sig Co
MP Plat 3rd Inf Div
3d Ranger Bn
4th Tabor (Goums)

ARMORED FORCE UNITS
CCA 2d Armored Div.
Hq CCA
66th Armd Regt
41st Armd Inf (-1st Bn)
14th Armd FA Bn
Co A 17th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 48th Armd Med Bn
Co A Supply Bn
Co C Maint Bn
Det 142d Armd Sig
Co B 82d Armd Recon

COAST ARTILLERY
688th AAA MG Btry (Sep)
689th AAA MG Btry (Sep)
214th AAA Gun Bn
106th AAA AW Bn (SP)
443d AAA AW Bn (SP)
436th AAA AW Bn
Hq & Hq Btry 105th AAA Gp
102d Barrage Balloon Btry VLA (Sep)
62d AAA Regt

FIELD ARTILLERY
1st Bn 36th FA Regt
1 Btry (-Flash Unit) 1st FA Obsv Bn
77th FA Regt (155 How)
5th Armd Artillery Group
Hq & Hq Btry
58th Armd FA Bn
62nd Armd FA Bn
65th Armd FA Bn

CHEMICAL
3d Cml Mtr Bn (Sep)
1st Plat 21st Cml Co (Decon)
Det 12th Cml Co

ENGINEER
20th Engr Regt (C)
815th Engr Bn (Avn)
1 Plat Co B 601st Engr Bn (Cam)
36th Engr Regt
2d Bn 540th Engr Regt
Det 462d Engr Co (Dep)
Det 2658th Engr Map Dep Det
Co A 401st Engr Bn (WS)(-1500 gal Tanker Sec)
Survey Plat 66th Engr Co (Topo)
Det 727th Rwy Opn Bn

QUARTERMASTER
382nd Port Bn (-Co C & D)
361st QM Bn (Trk)
93d QM Co (Rhd)
Co A 269th QM Serv Bn
184th QM Co (Dep Sup)(-2 Dets)
Co C 205th QM Bn (Gas Sup)
48th QM Graves Reg Co (-1 Plat)
Co E & F 47th QM Trk Regt

SIGNAL
2 Radio Secs & 1 Tel Sec, 177th Sig Rep Co
2d Gen Assignment Group, 196th Sig Photo Co
71st Sig Co (Spec)
1 S & I Sec 206th Sig Co (Dep)

MEDICAL
1 Col Co & 1 Cl Plat 51st Med Bn
1 Plat Co A 36th Amb Bn
Det 3d Aux Surg Gp (9 Teams)
10th Field Hosp
56th Med Bn
11th Evac Hosp
128th Evac Hosp
1 Sec Adv Plat 4th Med Sup Dep
Vet Det 8580 GG
20th Malarial Control Unit

ORDNANCE
542th Ord Co (Amm)
Det 3497th Ord Co (MM)(Q)
Hq & Hq Det 42nd Ord Bn (M&S)
1st Plat 235th Ord Co (Bomb Disp)
78th Ord Co (Dep)
93d Ord Co (MM)(AA)
34 Ord Co (MM)
3408th Ord Co (MM)(Q)
350th Ord Co (MTS)(Q)(-½ Co)
99lst Ord Co (HM)(Tk)

MILITARY POLICE
377th MP Escrt Gd Co
Co A 504th MP Bn
261st Prisoner of War Processing Platoon

NAVY
Naval Personnel (Naval Fire Control Personnel, etc.)
Naval Shore Bn #3

MISCELLANEOUS
Prisoner Of War Interrogation Personnel
Civil Affairs Personnel
C. I. C. Personnel
Public Relations Personnel
Censorship Personnel
32d Fin Disp Sec
7th M. H. U.

TROOPS ALLOTTED TO KOOL FORCE
(2d Armored Div, Reinf)

2d Armd Div (-CCA) & (-2 Plats Med Tanks)
Hq 2d Armd Div
Hq Co 2d Armd Div
Serv Co 2d Armd Div
67th Armd Regt (-2 Med Tank Plats)
82nd Armd Recn Bn (-Co B)
17th Armd Engr Bn (-Co A)
78th Armd FA Bn
92nd Armd FA Bn
1st Bn 41st Armd Inf Regt
Hq & Hq Co 2d Armd Div Trains
48th Armd Medical Bn (-Co B)
Maintenance Bn (-Co C)
Supply Bn (-Co C)
142nd Armd Sig Co (-Det)
18th R.C.T. (1st Inf Div)
18th Inf
32d FA Bn
Co B 1st Engr Bn
Co B 1st Med Bn

ENGINEER
Det Hq & Serv Co 401st Engr Bn (WS)
540th Engr Regt (-2d Bn)
Det 2658th Map Dep Det
Det 462d Engr Co (Dep)
1 Plat Co B 601st Engr Bn (Cam)

COAST ARTILLERY
107th AAA AW Bn (-Btrys A & B)
433d AAA AW Bn

MEDICAL
Det 3d Aux Surg Gp (3 Teams)
Co A 261st Med Bn
51st Med Bn (-2 Col Co & 2 Cl Plat)
1 Plat Co A 36th Amb Bn

MISCELLANEOUS
Prisoner Of War Interrogation Personnel
Civil Affairs Personnel

QUARTERMASTER
Co D 2657th QM Bn (Trk)
1 Sec Co B 205th QM Bn (Gas Supply)
1st Plat 100th QM Co (Rhd)
396th QM Port Bn

NAVAL
1 Co Naval Shore Bn #4

SIGNAL
1 Bn Team 286th Sig Co

ORDNANCE
603d Ord Co (Amm)
3497th Ord Co (-1 Det)

MILITARY POLICE
Co B 504th MP Bn

FORCE TROOPS
Units not included in SHARK, KOOL, or JOSS, Sub Task Forces.

FORCE TROOPS
Hq & Hq Co, Force 343
9th Infantry Division
82nd Airborne Div (-505th RCT)(-3rd Bn 504th Prcht Regt)
Hq 82nd Airborne Div

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Hq Co 82nd Airborne Div
80th Airborne AA Bn
307th Airborne Engr Bn (-Co B)
Hq & Hq Btry 82nd Airborne Div arty
319th Glider FA Bn
320th Glider FA Bn
376th Prcht FA Bn
504th Prcht Inf (-3d Bn)
325th Glider Inf Regt
307th Airborne Medical Co (-Det)
782nd Airborne Ord Maint Co
307th Airborne QM Co
82nd Airborne Sig Co (-Det)
MP Plat 82nd Airborne Division
2nd Bn 509th Prcht Regt (Atchd 82nd Airborne Div)

ARMORED FORCE UNITS
Prov Tank Co
Hq & Hq Det 2nd Tank Group
191st Tank Bn (M)
757th Tank Bn (L)
760th Tank Bn (M)
756th Tank Bn (L)

CHEMICAL
82nd Cml Co (Impreg)
63rd Cml Co (Dep)(-Det)
69th Cml Co (SS)
78th Cml Co (SG)
84th Cml Mtn Bn (Sep)

COAST ARTILLERY
Hq & Hq Btry CA Bn 155 Gun SM
_____ CA Btry HD (4 Seo)
_____ CA Btry 155 SM
_____ CA Btry 155 SM
Hq & Hq Btry 1st AAA Op
Hq & Hq Btry 44th AAA Op
Hq & Hq Btry 34th AAA Op
Hq & Hq Btry 8th AAA Op
67th AAA Regt (-3d Bn)
68th AAA Regt
167th AAA Gun Bn (SM)
213th AAA Regt (-2d Bn)
216th AAA Gun Bn
351st AAA SL Bn
353rd AAA SL Bn
354th AAA SL Bn
355th AAA SL Bn
360th AAA SL Bn
403rd AAA Gun Bn
406th AAA Gun Bn (SM)
410th AAA Gun Bn (SM)
431st AAA AW Bn
432d AAA AW Bn
434th AAA AW Bn
437th AAA AW Bn
533d AAA AW Bn
Hq & Hq Btry, 2626th AAA Brig

FIELD ARTILLERY
Hq & Hq Btry, 18th FA Brig
FA Obsn Bn
65th Armd FA Op
Hq & Hq Btry
59th Armd FA Bn
69th Armd FA Bn
93rd Armd FA Bn

ENGINEERS
Hq & Hq Co, 1st Engr Spec Brig
Det #6, Engr Plat FF
Det #8, Engr Plat FF
66th Engr Co (Topo)(-Survey Plat)
Co A, 85th Engr Bn (Hy Pont)
175th Engr Regt (GS)
343d Engr Regt (GS)
376th Engr Bn (Sep)
387th Engr Bn (Sep)
401st Engr Bn (WS) (-Cos A, B, C, & Dets H & S Co)
402d Engr Bn (WS)
Wood Hull Plat, 410th Base Shop Bn
427th Engr Co (Dp Truck)
437th Engr Co (Dp Truck (-2 Plats)
462nd Engr Co (Dep) (-2 Plats)
469th Engr Co (Maint)
Co B, 601st Engr Bn (Cam) (-4 Plats)
1090th Engr Co (Spec Util)
2657th Engr Det (Map Dep) (-2 Dets)

ENGINEERS (Cont'd)
2658th Engr Det (Map Dep) (-2 Dets)
Hq & Hq Co 1051st Port Rep & Const Op

MEDICAL
_____ Vet Det
_____ Medical Lab
_____ Medical Sup Dep
_____ Ambulance Co
2nd Med Lab Army
3d Aux Surg Gp (-19 Teams)
8th Evac Hosp (750 Bed)
16th Evac Hosp (750 Bed)
Co A, 366th Amb Bn (-3 Plats)
59th Evac Hosp (750 Bed)
77th Evac Hosp (750 Bed)
91st Evac Hosp with Malarial Unit
Gen Hosp (1000 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (250 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (250 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (250 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (250 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
_____ Sta Hosp (500 Bed)

MILITARY POLICE
204th MP Co
Hq & Hq Det 2629th MP Bn

ORDNANCE
_____ Ord Co (Dep)
Hq & Hq Det, 5th Ord Bn (MM)
5th Ord Co (MM)
_____ Ord Bn Amm (6 Cos)(On call)
28th Ord Co (MM)
29th Ord Co (MM)
31st Ord Co (HM)(FA)
Hq & Hq Det, 45th Ord Bn
Hq & Hq Det, 62nd Ord Bn (Amm)
53rd Ord Co (Amm)
Hq & Hq Det, 67th Ord Bn (MM)(Q)
86th Ord Co (HM)(Tk)
86th Ord Co (HM)(Tk) w/atch Rec Unit
82nd Ord Co (HM)(FA)
87th Ord Co (HM)(Tk)
89th Ord Co (HM)(FA)
101st Ord Co (MM)
109th Ord Co (MM)
161st Ord Plat)
Hq & Hq Det, 197th Ord Bn (HM)(Q)
201st Ord Co (Dep)(-½)
235th Ord Co (Bomb Disp)(-1st & 3d Plats)
½ 339th Ord Co (MTS)
529th Ord Co (HM)(Tk)
604th Ord Co (Amm)
609th Ord Co (Amm)
878th Ord Co (HM)(Q)
905th Ord Co (HM)(Q)
907th Ord Co (HM)(Q)
3405th Ord Co (MM)(Q)(-½ Co)

QUARTERMASTER
_____ QM Co (Ster)
1st Bn, 27th QM Regt (Trk) (-Co C)
10th Port Hq Co (-Det)
Co A, 23d QM Regt (Tk Trk)
62nd QM Bn (Ldry)
67th Ord Co (Refrig)
94th QM Bn (Bkry) (-2 Cos)
100th QM Co (Rhd) (-1 Plat)
138th QM Co (Trk)
144th QM Co (Trk)
205th QM Bn (GS) (-Co A, C, D, & 1 Sec Co B) & (-Hq & Hq Det)
232nd QM Co (Salv Col)
242nd QM Bn (Serv)
246th QM Bn (Serv)
246th QM Co (Dep Sup)
249th QM Bn (Serv) (-Co A & C)
Co C, 301st QM Bn (Ster)
Co D, 301st QM Bn (Ster)
2631st QM Co (Dep)
2638th QM Bn (Trk)
2639th QM Bn (Trk)
6616th QM Car Co (Prov)

SIGNAL
1st Armd Sig Bn (-Det)
_____ Signal Co (Dep)
51st Sig Bn
72d Sig Co (-Det)
128th Sig Co (RI) with Det 849th Sig Intel Serv
Unit #3 163d Sig Photo Co
206th Sig Co (Dep) (-Det)
229th Sig Opn Co
286th Sig Co (Amph) (-Det)
811th Sig Port Serv Co (-Det)
Pigeon Plat, Co C, 829th Sig Serv Bn
2659th Sig Port Serv Co

TANK DESTROYER UNITS
Hq & Hq Co, 1st TD Gp
601st TD Bn
645th TD Bn
776th TD Bn
813th TD Bn
894th TD Bn
899th TD Bn

TRANSPORTATION
_____ Op Reg Sta (-Det)
703d Rwy Grand Div
713th Rwy Opn Bn
727th Rwy Opn Bn (-Det)
753d Rwy Shop Bn

MISCELLANEOUS
20th MRU
Translation Detachments
Interpreter Personnel
Censorship Personnel
Civil Affairs Personnel
Public Relations Personnel
Psychological Warfare Personnel
CIC Personnel
Base Post Office
25th Finance Disb Det
26th Finance Disb Det
APO #758

UNITS TO LAND AT SIRACUSA D / 10
Det 10th Port Hq
Det GP Reg Sta
1st Bn, 46th QM Regt (Trk)
309th QM Co (Rhd)
Hq & Hq Det & Co D, 205th QM Bn (Gas Supply)
255th QM Bn (Serv)
334th QM Co (Dep Sup)
58th Ord Co (Amm)
339th Ord Co (MTS)(Q)(-½ Co)
½ 3405th Ord Co (MM)(Q)
½ 201st Ord Co (Dep)
1 Plat 462 Engr Co (Dep)
Det 811th Sig Serv Port Co
Det 63d Cml Depot Co

UNITS OF XII AIR SUPPORT COMMAND
Hq XII Air Support Command
31st Fighter Group
33d Fighter Group
27th Bomb Group
86th Bomb Group
111th Observation Squadron
34 Communications Squadron
82d Fighter Control Squadron
927th Signal Bn ASC
Prov. A. W. Signal Bn
Det Hq 3d Air Service Area Command
Hq 41st Service Group
Hq 332d Service Group
26th Serv Squadron
57th Service Squadron
306th Service Squadron
321st Service Squadron
1110th QM Co Service Group
1127th QM Co Service Group
1971st QM Co (Truck)
1974th QM Co (Truck)
1983d QM Co (Truck)
1976th QM Co (Truck)
1032d Ordnance Co (AB)
1051st Ordnance Co (AB)
1640th Ordnance Co (MM)(Q)
1636th Ordnance Co (MM)(Q)
1658th Ordnance Co (MM)(Q)

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1583d Ordnance Co (MM)(Q)
1016th Sig Co Service Group
1059th Sig Co Service Group
1062d Sig Co Service Group
1067th Sig Co Service Group
439th Sig Construction Bn
904th AB Security Bn
Cryptographic Detachment
Det 12th Weather Squadron

COPY
UNITS OF ROYAL AIR FORCE
1 Air Formation Sig Det
2 ALG Sig Sec (Advance Landing Ground)
3 Beach Dets
2 Dets 981st B lloon Sq
2 Dets 985th B lloon Sq
1 C.C.L.
1 Field Force Hq Sig Sec
1 Ftr WO Hq Sig Sec
3 GCI (Ground Controlled Interception)
4 LWS (Light Warning Set)
1 Med Rec Sta
3201st Serv Commando
3202nd Serv Commando
3203rd Serv Commando
2 Tech Int. Parties

WINGALO (Air Liaison Officer)
12 WO Dets (Wireless Unit)
Det 982d Balloon Sq
Air Support Party

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox

H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

S-254

SECRET
Auth: CG, I A C
Initials: GRH
Date: 27 June 43

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINF
APO 758

27 June 1943

SUBJECT: Amendment #1, to Annex #3 to FO #1.
Force 343, dated 19 June 1943.

TO : Commanding General, Force 141.

1. The following changes should be made on all copies Annex #3, FO #1, Force 343:

a. Under "Troops alloted to Shark Force (II Corps)".
(1) Coast Artillery:
(a) Delete: 451st AAA AW Bn
(b) Delete: 104th Barrage Balloon Btry VLA (Sep)
(c) Add: Det, 102d Barrage Balloon Btry VLA (Sep)
(2) Signal:
Add: Det 128th Sig Co (RI)
(3) Quartermaster:
(a) 2636th QM Truck Bn, change to read:
52nd QM Bn (Trk)
(b) 2637th QM Truck Bn, change to read:
53rd QM Bn (Trk)

b. Under "Troops alloted to Joss Force."
(1) Signal:
Add: Det 128th Sig Co (RI)
(2) Ordnance:
Add: 53rd Ord Co (Amm)
(3) Coast Artillery:
(a) Delete: 102 Barrage Balloon Btry VLA (Sep)
(b) Add: 104 Barrage Balloon Btry VLA (Sep)

c. Under "Troops alloted to Kool Force."
Add: 451st AAA Bn (AW)

d. Under "Force Troops."
(1) Quartermaster:
(a) 2638th QM Bn (Trk), change to read:
54th QM Bn (Trk)
(b) 2639th QM Bn (Trk), change to read:
55th QM Bn (Trk)

(2) Signal:
After 128th Sig Co (RI) w/Det 849th Sig Intel Serv, add (-2 Dets)
(3) Ordnance:
Delete: 53rd Ord Co (Amm)
(4) Medical:
(a) 26th Gen Hosp (1000 Bed) change to read:
Gen Hosp (1000 Bed)
(b) 32nd Sta Hosp (500 Bed) change to read:
Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
(c) 35th Sta Hosp (500 Bed) change to read:
Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
(d) 43rd Sta Hosp (250 Bed) change to read:
Sta Hosp (250 Bed)
(e) 53rd Sta Hosp (250 Bed) change to read
Sta Hosp (250 Bed)
(f) 55th Sta Hosp (250 Bed) change to read:
Sta Hosp (250 Bed)
(g) 58th Sta Hosp (250 Bed) change to read:
Sta Hosp (250 Bed)
(h) 73rd Sta Hosp (500 Bed) change to read:
Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
(i) 78th Sta Hosp (500 Bed) change to read
Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
(k) 79th Sta Hosp (500 Bed) change to read:
Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
(l) 80th Sta Hosp (500 Bed) change to read:
Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
(m) 81st Sta Hosp (500 Bed) change to read:
Sta Hosp (500 Bed)
(n) 105th Sta Hosp (500 Bed) change to read:
Sta Hosp (500 Bed)

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ H. G. Maddox
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

S-266

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINFORCED
APO 758

SECRET
Auth: CG IAC REINF
Initial: HGM
Date: 28 June 1943

28 June 1943

Subject: Amendment #2 to Annex #3 to Field Order #1, Force 343, 19 June 1943.

To : Commanding General, Force 141.

The following change should be made to Amendment #1, to Annex #3 to FO #1, Force 343, dated 27 June 1943, reference number S-254.

Delete paragraph 1d (4).

By Command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
COLONEL, GSC.
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
H. G. MADDOX,
COLONEL, GSC.
AC of S, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: Same as for FO #1

SECRET - BIGOT
Auth: CG Force 343
Initials: HGM
Date 2 July 43

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343

COPY NO 1

2 July 1943
JPS/oar

SUBJECT: Amendment #3, to Annex #3, to FO #1, Force 343, 19 June 1943.

TO : Commanding General, Force 141.

1. The following changes should be made to Annex #3 to FO #1, Force 343, dated 19 June 1943:
a. Under Troops allotted to Shark Force (II Corps):
(1) Change 20th Engr Bn to read: "120th Engr Bn."
(2) Change 745th Ord Co (1t Maint) to read, "700th Ord Co (LM)."
(3) Quartermaster:
(a) After 53d QM Bn (Trk) add "(-1 Co)."
(b) After 384th QM Port Bn add "with Det 484th QM Port Bn."
(4) Signal: Add "1 Gen Asgmt Unit, 196th Sig Photo Co."
b. Under Troops allotted to Joss Force:
(1) Signal: Add "Co A, 51st Sig Bn."
c. Under Troops allotted to Kool Force:
(1) Quartermaster: Change Co D, 2637 QM Bn (Trk) to read, "Co D, 534 QM Bn (Trk)."
d. Under Force Troops:
(1) Signal:
(a) After 51st Sig Bn add "(-Co A)."
(B) Add "2 Radio Sec, 1 Tel Sec, 177 Sig Co (Repair)."

For the Commanding General:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ H. G. Maddox
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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Auth of CG, F343
Initials CW
11 June 1943

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o Hq I Armored Corps, Reinf
APO #758

EOS/egf

AS

ANNEX NO. IV
TO F.O. 1.

NAVAL GUN FIRE SUPPORT PLAN

1. MISSION:

a. To provide prearranged fire support as scheduled by sub-task force commanders.

d-12

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b. To provide call fires, to be fired upon call by assault battalion or regimental commanders through shore fire control parties, or Army Sub-Task Commanders through Naval Sub-Task Force Commanders.

c. To provide fire on targets of opportunity as requested by Assault Battalion Commanders or Regimental Commanders through shore fire control parties or as requested by Army Sub-Task Force Commanders as a result of information furnished by air reconnaissance.

d. To provide deep supporting fires as requested by Army Sub-task force Commanders.

e. To provide counter-battery fire as follows:

(1) Prior to landing, as necessary to protect own forces (See par 4 a).

(2) After landing, as coordinated between Army and Navy Sub-task Force Commanders to protect our own forces.

4. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

In accordance with requests of sub-task Force Commanders submitted to Naval Sub-Task Force Commanders.

5. DURATION OF FIRE SUPPORT:

a. Fire support ships will be withdrawn as necessary when required by the Fleet Commander for action against enemy forces. If any units are withdrawn, shore fire control parties and Army Sub-task Force Commanders will be notified.

b. Except as noted in a, Naval gun fire support will continue until the Commanding General, Force 343 informs the Fleet Commander that Naval gun fire support is no longer required.

c. Sub-task Force Commanders will inform the Commanding General, Force 343 immediately when Naval supporting fires are no longer required by their forces.

6. LIMITATIONS UPON NAVAL SUPPORT FIRES:

a. There will be no Naval gunfire employed against shore targets until enemy action indicates to Sub-task Force Commanders that the presence of the invading force has been discovered. At times designated by Sub-task Force Commanders, deceptive fires and special demonstrations may be undertaken. Schedules and objectives for deceptive fires will be submitted without delay to the Commanding General, Force 343 for approval. Deceptive fires will be delivered only against remunerative targets.

b. Scheduled fires in the vicinity of the objective beaches will not be executed prior to the assault except when in the judgment of Sub-task Force Commanders, the assaults on the objective beaches have been discovered by the enemy and no further secrecy can be gained by withholding fire.

c. After troops have landed, Naval gun fire will be employed as specified in paragraph 1.

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

COPY #1 HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
ANNEX NO. V APO #758
TO F. O. NO. 1 20 June 1943

AIR SUPPORT PLAN

Primary Mission

1. The main tasks of the Allied air forces in order of priority will be as follows:

a. To render the enemy air forces unable to offer serious interference with our shipping, projected landings and subsequent operations.

b. To impede the enemy's power of movement in the area of operations on land and to hamper reinforcements moving by sea, air and land.

c. To give the maximum support possible to Allied land forces both in the assault and during subsequent phases of the operations.

Plan

2. The Air plan provides for the above tasks to be carried out as follows:

a. By destroying the enemy air forces both on the ground and in the air.

b. By attacking focal points of enemy land, sea and air communications.

c. By providing maximum direct support of land forces consistent with the success of a and b.

Policy

3. Accordingly, the following general policy has been decided:

a. There will be no bombing of purely tactical targets before the assault, other than the diversions planned to assist the operations of parachute troops.

b. The task of destroying the enemy air forces (Para. 2 a) has priority over all other tasks.

Coordination

4. Hq XII Air Support Command will be located with Hq Force 343 and will furnish air support parties to all Corps and Divisions.

Method Before 'D' Day

5. Force 343 will submit for consideration of Northwest African Tactical Air Force, through Hq XII Air Support Command:

a. Lists of bombing targets which can be considered with the other strategical targets selected by the Air Forces.

b. Details through the same channels of diversionary bombing targets required to cover airborne operations.

c. Demands for smoke to be laid by aircraft, if required.

Period Subsequent to D Day

6. Direct Air Support after D Day will be requested through Hq XII Air Support Command.

Artificial Landmarks

7. a. All Corps, Division, and Regimental Headquarters Companies will have a trained "Team" prepared to put out landmarks in their areas by day or night when ordered through Air Support Command channels. Such landmarks will be in such a position that they may be easily maintained without enemy opposition. The landmark will be a letter of the alphabet as ordered, by day at least 50 yards long, by night 100 yards long, the width of the strips forming the landmark being at least 3 yards. Day landmarks can be improvised from tin cans (opened out and blackened if necessary), blankets or ground panel strips. Night landmarks will consist of lighted tins of gasoline and sand, burlap or waste soaked in oil, small flares, or electric bulbs spaced 25 yards apart. Arrangements must be made for illuminating a night landmark thorughout the whole period of darkness if necessary.

b. The Air Support Command will be responsible for determining the time of illumination of night landmarks.

c. It is the responsibility of "The Artificial landmark Team" to reconnoiter the site and report accurately the map reference of the landmark. The landmark may be moved from time to time provided all concerned are given sufficient warning.

Impromptu Landmarks

8. a. For close targets, an impromptu landmark will be put out whenever possible, consisting of colored smoke or flares preferably in conjunction with a well defined natural landmark or a "V" strip (Signal Operation Instructions, Item 2h-1). (Yellow smoke or flares will NOT be used for this purpose). Its position will be included in the target request, as close as possible to the target area but in such position that it can be maintained without enemy opposition. The actual color of smoke or flare to be used will be ordered through Air Support Command Channels from time to time. The smoke or flares should be lit two minutes before the estimated time of attack of the aircraft (received over Air Support Command channels).

Form of Target Requests

9. a. Requests for targets will include description of target and map reference, time attack is required (if necessary), Bombline and any special instructions, which would include the map reference of any impromptu landmark put out as an aid to air attack.

b. The target map reference will always be sent in clear; other details will be encoded if considered essential and time permits.

c. The reply to a target demand giving details of air effort and time of attack will always be encoded.

d. Targets within artillery range, by specific prearrangement with units concerned, may be marked by smoke.

Bombline

10. a. The bombline is defined as the predicted line of forward troops during the next two hours.

b. Air Support Command must be kept constantly informed as to location of Bombline.

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox ccg
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

SECRET-BIGOT

Copy No. 1

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o Hq I Armored Corps, Reinf
APO #758

SECRET BIGOT by Auth of CG, F343
Initials_____
19 June 1943

AS
ANNEX NO. VI
TO F.O. 1.

JJBM/wrg

FIELD ARTILLERY ANNEX

MAPS: GSGS 4164: 1/100,000: GSGS 4228: 1/25,000: Photo Map: ITALY: 1/25,000.

1. MISSION.

a. To provide maximum fire support for elements of Force 343 in HUSKY operation.

b. To counterbattery enemy artillery opposing Force 343.

2. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT:

a. Divisional artillery. To remain initially in organic divisional assignment.

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b. Corps artillery:
(1) Attached JOSS:
5th Armd FA Gp
77th FA
1st Bn 36th FA
Btry B 1st Obsn Bn (less 1 Flash Unit).

(2) Attached SHARK:
13th FA Brig (less 1st Bn 36th FA and Btry B 1st Obsn Bn (-))
Btry G (Prov), 36th FA (155mm Gun).

3. COUNTERBATTERY:

a. Sub-task force commanders will be responsible for all counterbattery in their respective zones.

b. Counterbattery sub-section of artillery section, Hq IAC (R) is available to JOSS for counterbattery use, from D-20.

4. PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE:

a. Force 343 and SHARK will each establish, at Force 343 Photographic Interpretation Center, an Artillery Photo Liaison Section which will locate artillery targets on pertinent prints from all photographic sorties and forward description and location of targets direct to Counterbattery Subsections of JOSS and SHARK.

b. Artillery requests for air photo missions will be submitted to the Artillery Photo Liaison Sections through the respective Counterbattery Subsections of JOSS and SHARK.

5. AIR OBSERVATION:

Requests for artillery observation or surveillance missions to be flown by the 111th Obsn Sq will be submitted to G-2, Force 343, through Artillery Officer, Force 343.

6. COLORED SMOKE SHELL:

a. No yellow smoke shell will be fired by artillery units in this operation.

b. Other colors will be used:

(1) Primarily: For fire control purposes and to assist in the accurate massing of fires.

(2) Secondarily:

(a) By specific prearrangement with supporting air units for each target to mark targets for air attack.

(b) By mutual arrangement with supported unit commanders for simple signalling purposes such as to indicate the completion of an artillery concentration, to mark terrain objectives, and to designate sector boundaries.

(3) In emergency, as normal smoke.

(c) Use of white smoke remains unrestricted.

7. CONSERVATION OF AMMUNITION:

Only remunerative targets will be taken under fire.

By Command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox

H. G. MADDOX,
COLONEL, G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-3.

HOBART R. GAY,
COLONEL, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

SECRET-BIGOT

MRT/wrg
HQ FORCE 343
APO #758
22 June 1943

ANNEX NO. VII

TO F.O. 1

ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE

Maps: MAPOG, 1:500,000; Road Map SICILY, 1:500,000, GSGS 4230 ITALY, 1:250,000; GSGS 4164 ITALY, 1:100,000; GSGS 4229 ITALY, 1:50,000.

1. a. British and American aircraft will be operating from Malta and North Africa beginning D Day and from captured airdromes in SICILY by D + 4.

b. The XII Air Support Command will operate AWS and Fighter Controllers initially on the HQ ships of Force 343 and each sub-task force. Controllers will move ashore on D + 1 or D + 2. Senior Controller will be in GELA.

2. Mission: Assist in AA Defense of elements of Force 343 while afloat; Provide AA Defense for landings of Force 343; Provide AA Defense of beaches, ports, airports, and other vital areas.

3. a. Responsibility:

(1) Sub-Task Force Commanders: Until relieved of area responsibility by HQ Force 343, AA defense in areas coming under their control, including: Coordination between Air Forces, AAA, CWS, and Navy on Air Defense matters; coordination of AWS and AAAIS through the AAA Gp Hq and Air Support Controller with each sub-task force.

(2) CG, 34th AAA Brig:

(a) Preparation and loading of attached units of D + 12 follow-up.

(b) On arrival SICILY, charged with the AA defense of all ports, airports, beaches and Force installations under US control in SICILY.

(3) CG, 2626th AAA Brig:

(a) Training, local employment, preparation and loading as scheduled, of attached units.

(b) On arrival SICILY, responsible for the AAA defense of airports, ports, beaches and Force installations in assigned area.

(4) AA commanders in all areas will coordinate AAA defenses with Civil Passive Air Defense in their area.

b. Organization for combat:

ATTACHED SHARK

102 & 103 Bar Bln Btries VLA (Sep)
2 Bln Det RAF, 385 Sqdn
2 Bln Det RAF, 601 Sqdn

CENT
107th AAA Gp Hq
441st AAA AW Bn (SP)
450th AAA AW Bn
451st AAA AW Bn
401st AAA Gun Bn (SM)
694, 695, 696, 697 AAA MG Btries (Sep)(AB)

DRUM
100th AAA Gp Hq
105th AAA AW Bn (SP)
107th AAA AW Bn (Btries A & B only)
103rd AAA AW Bn
215th AAA Gun Bn
690, 691, 692, 693 AA MG Btries (Sep)(AB)

ATTACHED JOSS

105th AAA Gp Hq
443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)
100th AAA AW Ba (SP)
436th AAA AW Bn
214th AAA Gun Bn
62nd AAA Regt
688 and 687 AAA MG Btries (Sep)(AB)
104 Bar Bln Btry VLA (Sep)
1 Bln Det RAF, from 602 Squadron.

ATTACHED KOOL

107th AAA AW Bn (less Btries A & B)
453rd AAA AW Bn

Force 343 Troops.

ATTACHED 34 AAA Brigade

1st AAA Gp Hq
431st AAA AW Bn
432nd AAA AW Bn
406th AAA Gun Bn (SM)

ATTACHED 2626th AAA Brigade

67th AAA Regt (-3d Bn)
68th AAA Regt
213th AAA Regt
4th AAA Gp Hq
65th AAA Gp Hq
167th AAA Gun Bn (SM)
216th AAA Gun Bn
403rd AAA Gun Bn
410th AAA Gun Bn (SM)
351st AAA SL Bn
353rd AAA SL Bn
354th AAA SL Bn
355th AAA SL Bn
360th AAA SL Bn
437th AAA AW Bn
434th AAA AW Bn
533rd AAA AW Bn

c. Conduct of Antiaircraft Fires.

(1) Units not in communication with an Air Force Controller will fire only at aircraft indentified as hostile or committing a hostile act.

(2) Controllers will order fire withheld or limited to 6,000 feet when friendly planes are operating in the area by passing the command "FORTU" followed by the area, as "CENT" or "JOSS". This will be cancelled as soon as friendly aircraft leaves the area by the command "NEGATIVE FORTU _____."

d. Barrage balloons.

Supply elements (transports, ports, beaches and dumps) will have priority in assignment of barrage balloons.

4. Smoke will be used in AA defense in coordination with local Controller, local Chemical Officer, and the Navy.

5. a. Recognition Signals. Aircraft recognition signals will be obtained by AAA Defense Commanders from local Air Defense Controllers or Air Defense Commanders.

b. Air Warning Broadcasts.

(1) AWS information will be broadcast by US Navy, for Force 343 area only, on 2010 KC. Complete AWS information will be broadcast from MALTA on 3755 KC using MAPOG and standard air warning code.

c. Radio and Radar Channels.

(1) All SCR-268 sets assigned to AAA units will operate within a frequency band of 202Mc to 209Mc.

(2) All GCI will operate on a frequency of 209Mc.

(3) Care will be exercised that power allotted on any radio frequency is not exceeded.

6. Secondary AAA roles:

a. AAA Commanders charged with AA defense of ports and beaches will be responsible for:

(1) Coordination of defensive fires with AA defenses of any naval vessels in the commanders area of responsibility.

(2) Siting of some AA weapons in vicinity of beaches and ports for defence against surface craft.

b. Where indicated by the situation AAA commanders will site AA weapons for use in dual role defense against enemy mechanized vehicles.

c. 90mm gun units will prepare plans for possible employment in Field Artillery role.

By Command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
COLONEL, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox acg
H. G. MADDOX,
COLONEL, G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-3

Copy #1

SECRET-BIGOT

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o Hq I Armored Corps, Reinf
APO #758

SECRET BIGOT by
Auth CG, Force 343
Initials
Date 15 June 1943

MRT/kdm

AS

15 June 1943

ANNEX NO. VIII
TO F.O. 1.

COAST DEFENSE PLAN

1. Basis of Planning. a. This Coast Defense Plan is based on the following intelligence estimations contained in Planning Instruction No. 10, Hq Force 141;

(1) That no threat exists of large scale attack on HORRIFIED by the enemy fleet or any major portion thereof.

(2) That small scale attacks by small craft and submarine are the only form of coastal threat expected.

b. It is presumed some CD weapons will be captured intact and operative.

2. General Plan.

a. In view of the limited lift available, and small probability of profitable targets, a minimum of Coast Defense troops and materiel is being made available for one port only.

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b. Some AAA weapons employed in beach and port defense will be sited to provide defense against enemy Naval vessels.

c. Captured enemy Sea Coast materiel will be exploited.

3. Detailed Plan.

a. Means Available.

(1) Seacoast Artillery.

(a) 1 Hq & Hq Btry ___ CA Bn, 155mm Gun (SM).

(b) 2 CA Btries, 155mm Gun (SM).

(c) 1 CA Btry, Harbor Defense, with plotting room equipment, less guns.

(2) AA Artillery. All AAA set up in defense of beaches, ports and other objectives on the coast will site necessary weapons for dual role, Antiaircraft and Coastal Defense.

(3) Enemy Materiel. Enemy Seacoast Defense weapons in critical areas, which can be made serviceable, will be manned by CA personnel and utilized in Coast Defense (See par 4).

b. Plan of Employment.

(1) All Seacoast units will be attached to 2626 AAA Brigade on arrival in North Africa and maintained on an alert status prepared to embark on six hours notice after D day.

(2) Seacoast units on arrival in HORRIFIED will be assigned to defense of LICATA unless, by the time of their arrival, a larger port has fallen into our hands in which case all, or the major portion, will be placed in defense of the main port.

(3) Upon arrival Seacoast Defense Units to be attached to the AAA Headquarters in the area to which assigned.

(4) Seacoast Defense Sector responsibility will be prescribed by Hq Force 343.

c. Coordination with Navy. All Coast Defense Units will immediately establish contact and liaison with any U.S. or British Naval Units arriving in their Seacoast Defense Sector and will closely coordinate defense plans with the senior Naval Unit Commander.

4. Exploitation of Captured Enemy Seacoast Materiel.

a. Immediately major enemy coast defense installations in or near a port are captured by elements of Sub-Task Forces, the Sub-Task Force Commander will cause a survey to be made of materiel captured, reporting direct to Artillery Officer, IAC (R), the following:

(1) Serviceable Cannon (3" and greater):

(a) Number (by type and caliber).

(b) Number (by type and caliber) complete w/sighting equipment.

(c) Number (by type and caliber) still operational by centralized fire control systems.

(2) Ammunition (3" and greater):

(a) Number of projectiles (by type and caliber).

(b) Number of fuses (by type).

(c) Number of propelling charges (by type and caliber).

b. Responsibility.

Artillery Officer, IAC (R), will be responsible for exploitation and employment of captured enemy seacoast materiel.

5. Liaison.

CO ____ CA Bn, 155mm gun (SM) will send one officer, capable of completing reconnaissance and planning for coordination of Seacoast Defense Artillery in the battalion area of defense responsibility, to report to the Artillery Officer, IAC (R), to remain thereafter with Hq IAC (R), until the arrival of the Hq ____ CA Bn, 155mm gun (SM) in HORRIFIED.

6. Added Role for 155mm Guns (SM).

a. The Hq Btry and 2 Gun Btries, 155mm Gun (SM), may be required to function in a Field Artillery role, as Corps or Army Artillery, under Force 343.

b. Plans for such employment will be prepared by CO, _____ CA Bn, 155mm Gun (SM).

c. Additional transportation required for such employment will be provided by authority Hq Force 343 if CD Unit is so employed.

By command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
COLONEL, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ H.G. Maddox,
H.G. MADDOX,
COLONEL, G.S.C.,
A C of S, G-3

Copy No. 1

Hq Force 343
APO 758, U.S. Army
18 June 1943

Annex II to F.O. #1
Maps: As in F.O. #1

ENGINEER ANNEX

1. a. Enemy: Intelligence-Annex II to F.O. #1.

b. Friendly: Initial assignment of non-divisional engineer troops as follows:

Shark - Cent
Det, 2657 Map Dep
Det, 462 Engr Co (Dep)
40th Engr Regt (C) plus 1 Bn, 133d Engr Regt (C)
1 Plat, 437th Engr Co (DT)
1 Plat, Co "B", 601st Engr Bn (Cam)
"B" Co, 401st Engr Bn (WS)(Less Det)
19th Engr Regt (C)
811th Engr Bn (Avn)

Dime
Det, 2657th Map Dep
Det, 462d Engr Co (Dep)
531st Engr Regt (Shore)
1 Plat, 437th Engr Co (DT)
1 Plat, Co "B", 601st Engr Bn (Cam)
"C" Co, 401st Engr Bn (WS)(Plus Det)
39th Engr Regt (C)
809th Engr Bn, (Avn)
62d Engr Co (Top)
2602d Engr Co (Pipeline)

Joss
Det, 2658th Map Dep
Det, 462d Engr Co (Dep)
36th Engr Regt (C) plus 2d Bn, 540th Engr Regt (C)
1 Plat, Co "B", 601st Engr Bn (Cam)
"A" Co, 401st Engr Bn (WS)(Less Det)
20th Engr Regt (C)
815th Engr Bn Avn
Survey Plat, 66th Engr Co(Topo)

Kool
Det, 2658th Map Dep
Det, 462d Engr Co (Dep)
540th Engr Regt (C) - 2d Bn
1 Plat, Co "B", 601st Engr Bn Cam
Det, 401st Engr Bn (WS)

Force Troops - Priority of arrival
437th Engr Co (DT)(less 2 Plats)
462d Engr Co (Dep)(less 1 Plat)
343d Engr Regt (GS)(One company to be replaced by the contact plat 469th Engr Co (Maint) and the 66th Engr Co (Topo)(Less survey Plat). Company replaced to come on a later convoy).
Det, 6th Engr Plat (FF)
Remainder 2657th And 2658th Map Dep Det
Co "B", 601st Engr Bn (Cam)(Less 4 Plats)
Det, 8th Engr Plat (FF)
175th Engr Regt (GS)
469th Engr Co (Maint)(Less contact platoon)
427th Engr Co (DT)
401st Engr Bn (WS)(Less 3 Co)
Hq & Hq Co, 1051st Port Construction and Rpr Grp
1090th Engr Co (Sp Utilities)
402d Engr Bn (WS)
387th Engr Bn (Sep)
376th Engr Bn (Sep)
Co "A", 85th Engr Bn (Pvy Pontoon)
One Company 343d Engr Regt (GS)

2. Missions: Sub-task forces are responsible for all engineer missions until Force 343 assumes control. At that time engineer functions in rear of the line of dumps established by the 1st Special Brigade, except map and water supply, will become the responsibility of the Commanding Officer of that brigade. The Engineer, Force 343, will retain his normal function forward of the line of dumps established by the 1st Special Brigade.

3. In addition to normal engineer functions common to all sub-task forces, specific missions assigned are as follows:

a. Shark

(1) As soon as captured to repair the runways at Comiso and Ponte Oliva airfields or to initiate construction of substitute runways to be available not later than D plus 8.

(2) As soon as captured to repair the landing strip at Biscari landing field or to construct a substitute runway.

(3) To repair the jetty at Gela.

(4) To initiate the construction of pipeline and tanks for bulk fuel storage.

b. Joss

(1) To initiate repair of the Port of Licata.

(2) As soon as captured, to repair landing strip at Licata.

c. Kool

(1) To initiate reconstruction of Porto Empedocle if committed in that sector.

(2) To assist in special missions of sub-task force in sectors in which committed.

d. 1st Engineer Special Brigade.

(1) When supply activities are taken over by the Commanding General, Force 343, to assume responsibility for the execution of all supply plans within the theatre of operations emanating from Force 343, including the operation of ports.

4. Engineer service and supply functions, including water and map supply - see Administrative Order #1 and Engineer Annex thereto.

5. Engineer OPs (afloat)

a. Shark - USS Ancon

b. Cent - USS Ancon

c. Dime - USS Chase

d. Joss - USS Biscayne

e. Kool - USS Orizaba

f. 1st Special Brigade - USS Monrovia

g. Force 343 - USS Monrovia.

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
COLONEL, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox

H. G. MADDOX,
COLONEL, G.S.C.,
A C of S, G-3.

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CG, Force 343
Initials
Date 21 June '43

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o I Armored Corps, Reinf.
A. P. O. # 758

SECTION I

SITUATION

1. General Situation.

a. This Signal Communication Plan covers the provision of signal communications for Force 343, a force moving by sea to occupy the south-eastern coast of Sicily. The area which this force plans to occupy consists of that territory within the limits of the Salza River on the west, the Irminio River on the east and north along the line of town, Riesi, Mazzarino, Caltagirone, and Vizzini. This operation is coordinated with a British Force, Force 545, which will occupy the eastern coast of Sicily.

b. Three simultaneous pre-dawn landings are to be carried out between the towns of Licata and C. Scaramia for the purpose of establishing a broad beachhead, and allowing subsequent operations over this beachhead. The initial objective is to capture the port of Licata and all the airports in the area.

2. Special Situation.

a. Enemy Signal Countermeasures.

(1) It is expected that the enemy will resort to radio "jamming" tactids from time to time when the opportunity presents itself. Plans will be made as to the proper course of action in the event.

(2) It is expected that the enemy will attempt to inject false messages into their traffic to cause "peaks" in an effort to confuse our radio intelligence.

(3) It is known fact that the enemy is extremely capable as to intercept activity.

(4) It is recognized that the enemy has capable cryptanalysts and will make every effort to obtain solutions to our codes and ciphers.

(5) There are no details known as to the strength and organization of enemy signal intelligence units.

b. Installations in theater which may be available.

(1) Radio (see Appendix "A" attached)

(2) Wire (see Appendix "B" attached)

c. Local Power Supply in Towns.

(See Appendix "C" attached)

d. Existing Commercial Facilities.

(1) Initially, each task force commander will have complete control of all telecommunication facilities in areas occupied by his troops. This control will be exercised through his chief signal officer, who will coordinate the exploitation of these facilities and their allotment to the various services.

(2) As a general rule, naval and air telecommunication installations will be made available for naval and air services if so required, since the equipment will usually be of special design.

(3) All existing telecommunication services will be closed down immediately and the installations are secured. Personnel will be evacuated and a guard mounted. Care will be taken to secure and preserve all records. Services will not be resumed except under orders of the commander.

(4) Installations secured will be operated by signal personnel of the Allied Forces. Friendly alien personnel may be employed provided their integrity can be established, but they will not be employed without adequate supervision.

(5) Broadcast transmitters will be taken over as military stations and will, if required, be used initially for communication purposes. They also may be required in the early stages of the operation for broadcasting of announcements by the military commander. As soon as these stations can be released from purely military use, they will go to control of personnel

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ANNEX NO. 10 TO FIELD ORDER NO.1, - HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343 - SIGNAL COMMUNICATION PLAN:

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ANNEX # 10

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APPENDICES

of P.W.B. including technical personnel, which will accompany each task force. The technical personnel will be available to operate broadcast stations in the initial period when the transmitters may be required for purely military communications.

(6) No telegraph services will be operated in Sicily except those wholly controlled by the Allied Forces. No civilian will have access to any telegraph facilities, except through AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories, late Civil Affairs).

(7) All civil telephone services will be discontinued as such. Local telephone services will be re-opened for military purposes requirements, certain public services or individual civilians may be allowed access to local telephone services. Among these will be included such civilian agencies or persons, for example hospitals and doctors, as may be nominated by AMGOT. Such agencies or persons will have no direct access to long distance telephone services, but may be permitted by AMGOT to make calls when necessary from military offices.

e. Information on Procedures.

(1) Combined Radio Telegraph (W/T) Procedure, short title, CCRPI, will be used by all army ground forces, U. S. and British, taking part in the operation HUSKY for:-

(a) Combined use; that is, when working to other services of the other nation.

(b) Joint use; that is, when working to other services of the same nation.

(2) "Combined Operating Signals", short title, CCRP2, will be used whenever CCRPI is used.

(3) It will be the object of all signal planning to insure that personnel of the same service and the same nation operate both ends of a channel whenever possible, thus reducing the use of CCRPI and CCRP2 to combined or joint usage in cases where no previous arrangements have been possible.

(4) Consequent on the adoption of this procedure within the forces employed in HUSKY the following procedures will no longer be used by army ground forces.

(a) Basic (British-U.S.) Signal procedure.

(b) British Inter-Service Procedure.

(c) U. S. Joint Army-Navy Procedure, for use as a joint procedure.

f. Naval Plan for Communication between Ships.

An outline Naval Communications Plan will be published and will be listed as Appendix "K" to this Annex.

g. Joint Codes and Ciphers

(1) To provide essential flexibility in handling cryptographed traffic, U. S., as well as British cipher teams, will be provided at all task force (Army) and Corps Headquarters throughout. These teams will be adequately equipped to handle messages in the appropriate U. S. and British systems prescribed for the operation. In addition, U. S. units down to and including divisions will hold the British Interservice Cipher for communication with the British Army, Navy, or the Royal Air Force. Royal Air Force Group Headquarters will hold U. S. Army SIGABA and Strip systems.

(2) All units within Force 343 down to and including divisions will hold the Joint Army-Navy SIGABA (Navy ECM) and Strip systems. Converter, M-209, keys for use in the Joint Army-Navy traffic will be held in Army units down to battalions and in the Navy down to minor war vessels. All the above cipher keys will be furnished by Force 141 and distributed by Force 343.

(3) For detailed methods of usage see Signal Instruction Number 9, and SOI Item 2e-1.

h. Information on the Aircraft Warning System.

(See Air Plan, Appendix "I" attached.)

i. Air Plan.

(1) The signal plan for the XII Air Support Command has been drawn up to cover the communication and radar coverage during the assault and initial establishment of forces in Sicily. The XIII A.S.C. aircraft operating from airfields at Licata and Ponte Olivo and subsequently as Biscara and Comiso will be controlled through the facilities of the information center.

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(2) Light warning and G. C. I. units are to be landed with the assault to provide early warning of the approach of enemy aircraft and control of night fighters. Long range warning equipment will be brought into operation as soon as possible. D/F and homing facilities will be provided at all airfields.

(3) Plans as drawn up do not cover the entire reduction of Sicily; however, as positions are secured, the communication and Radar system will be expanded to the fullest extent. This work will be done by the communication, air warning and construction units of the XII A. S. C.

(4) Proper coordination as to codes, panel codes, visual signals, photographical maps and such will be made with the ground force and incorporated in the SOI of all arms.

(5) Coordination with the R. A. F. as to frequencies and Call signs have been made through N.A.A.F. and N.A.T.A.F.

(6) Air Support Parties from the 3d A.S. Comm. Sqdn. are being assigned to the respective Infantry Divisions, Task Force and Corps Headquarters taking part in the operation.

(7) Advance landing Ground Parties will go ashore at Gela and Licata to establish radio communications with XII A. S. C. Headquarters and act as advance aircraft control agencies as soon as airfields are captured.

(8) Coordination with Naval units as necessary for such items as are required in the SOI will be made and included prior to issue.

(9) All personnel will be given verbal instructions as required prior to the landing operations.

3. Command Posts

a. A. F. H. Q.

Main - Algiers
C.P. - Malta

b. Hq. Force 141

Tactical - Malta (Returning to Tunis Area)
Main and Rear - Tunis Area (Probably La Marsa)

c. Hq. Force 343

C.P. - (1) Hq Ship "Monrovia"
(2) Sicily later.

Rear - (1) Bizerte
(2) Sicily later

d. II Corps

C.P. - (1) Hq Ship "Ancon"
(2) Sicily later

e. Hq CENT Force

C.P. - (1) Hq. Ship "Ancon"
(2) Sicily later

f. Hq DIME Force

C.P. (1) Hq Ship "Samuel Chase"
(2) Sicily later

g. Hq JOSS Force

C. P. (1) Hq Ship "Biscayne".
(2) Sicily later

h. Hq KOOL Force

C.P. (1) Army Transport "Orizaba"
(2) Sicily later

i. NATAF

C.P. - Tunis Area

4. Enumeration of Signal Corps Troops

a. Taking Part in the Assault.

Detach. 1st Armored Signal Bn.
Detach. 51st Signal Bn.
Det. 206th Signal Depot Co.
Det. 163rd Signal Photo Co.
Det. 286th Signal Co. Spec.
Det. 177th Signal Repair Co.
Det. ___Broadcasting Co.
71st Signal Co. Spec.
Detach. 72d Signal Co. Spec.
7hth Signal Co. Spec.
45th Signal Co.
1st Signal Co.
3d Signal Co.
82d Airborne Signal Co.
142d Armd Signal Co.

b. Following on D plus 4

53d Signal Bn.
1st Armd Signal Bn (less detachments)
206th Signal Depot Co. (less detachments)
286th Signal Co. Spec. (less detachments)
Detach_____Prov. Port Service Co.

c. Following on later Convoy.

51st Signal Bn. (less detachments)
9th Signal Company
129th Signal Opn Co.
128th Sig. R. I. Co.
___Prov. Sig. Port Service Co. (less detachments)
Pigeon Plat., Co. E, 829th Sig Service Bn
206th Signal Depot Co. (less detachments)
Detach. 849th Sig. Int. Service Co.
72d Signal Co. Spec. (less detachments)
____Signal Depot Co.
No. 52 Wireless Intelligence Section (Br)

SECTION II

MISSION AND GENERAL PLAN

5. The Mission

The Signal Mission is to provide communications.

a. As prescribed by Force 141.
b. To major units composing Force 343
c. To the Navy ashore.
d. To the various headquarters of the 12th GASC
e. To subordinate units directly attached to Force 343

6. General Plan

To provide a Signal Service with the following capabilities:

a. Operating headquarters communications, afloat and ashore; to handle all administrative, personnel, communication, training, photographic, pigeon, supply and signal intelligence activities.

b. Operating message centers to serve Force 343 headquarters and the major units of this Force, and subordinate units attached directly to Force 343.

c. Operating a messenger service between Force 343, major units of the Force, Air Headquarters, subordinate units attached directly to the Force, base radio station, main beach command posts and harbor authorities.

d. Installing, operating, and maintaining radio communications to provide:

(1) Communication between Forde 343 afloat and ashore, and the major units within the force.
(2) Communication between Force 343 and Force 141.
(3) Communication between II Corps and 30th Corps (Br)
(4) Communication between forward assault elements ashore, and navy afloat.
(5) Communication between forward elements ashore and air.
(6) Communication for air support by shore and aircraft.
(7) Channels for ship fire control by control parties ashore.
(8) Communication between air and anti-aircraft systems.
(9) Such radio nets within units and subordinate units as required to facilitate their control.

e. Installing, operating and maintaining wire communications.

(1) Initially

From Force Headquarters to the headquarters of the JOSS Force, II Corps, and such other units of Force 343 as may be located in the vicinity.

(2) Later

(a) Establish later communication between Force 343 and 12th Army (Br) in accordance with instructions from Force 141.

(b) Start the repair and operation of the commercial wire facilities within the area occupied by Force 343. These facilities are to be used for military purposes only, until released for civilian use by the Commanding General, Force 343.

(3) Finally

(a) Coordinate the use of all facilities in the area under control of Force 343 to provide the necessary wire communication for the Army, Air Corps, and the Navy.

(b) Construct and operate the Force 343 portion of the wire plan as established in "Outline Plan - Line Communications - Operation HUSKY, dated 17 April 1943, Headquarters 141.

f. Operating a Signal Intelligence Service to provide for:

(1) The interception of enemy radio communications.
(2) Radio goniometric location of enemy radio transmitting stations.
(3) Forwarding to G-2 all intelligence derived from above sources.

g. Establishing, operating, and maintaining a signal depot.

A signal corps depot will be established, operated, and maintained in the vicinity of Licata for the receipt, storage, and issue of signal corps equipment, material and supplies. A sub depot will be similarly established at Siracusa to handle U. S. signal supplies entering that port.

h. Operating a signal corps repair service for radio, wire and other communication equipment for the entire command, with the following exceptions:

(1) In general, all units will be responsible for the first and second echelon repairs to all communication equipment issued to them.

(2) Responsibility for the repair of communication equipment issued to them rests with the Air Corps.

i. Photographic coverage of force activities.

(1) Special photographic units have been organized to cover all phases of action in Force 343. The personnel of these photographic units will carry special identification. Commanding officers will allow photographers complete freedom of movement, and render them all possible assistance in the performance of their assigned tasks. Photographic censorship will be exercised by the War Department and not by unit censorship; however, the shipment of photographic films and prints from a zone of operation will be cleared through Headquarters Force 343.

(2) For details see Appendix "D" attached.

j. Establishing and maintaining pigeon communication is set out in Appendix "E" attached.

SECTION III

OPERATIONS

7. Sub-Forces under Force 343.

a. II Corps

(1) Signal Corps Troops.

(a) During voyage, headquarters in Ancon.

1. Signal Officer, Lt. Col. Grant A. Williams
2. In D plus 4 follow-up.

	Pers.	Veh.
53rd Signal Bn.	932	249
Det.206th Sig Co (Depot)	25	2
Total	957	251

b. CENT Force.

(1) Signal Corps Troops.

(a) During voyage, Headquarters in Ancon.

1. Signal Officer, Lt. Col. Hort, 45th Division.
2. Units in assault

45th Signal Co.	226	56
Det. 163rd Sig Photo Co	7	1
Broadcasting Det	3	--
74th Sig Co(Spec)	202	25
Total	438	82

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3. In D plus 4		
Det. 206th Sig Co (Dep)	25	2

c. DIME Force

(1) Signal Corps Troops

(a) During voyage, Headquarters in Samuel Chase.

1. Signal Officer, Lt. Col. George Pickett, 1st Div.
2. Units in assault.

1st Signal Company	226	56
Det 163rd Sig Photo Co	7	1
Det 177th Sig Repair Co	21	6
Det 286th Sig Co (Spec)	118	3
Broadcasting Det	3	--
Total	375	66

d. JOSS Force

(1) Signal Corps Troops.

(a) During voyage, Headquarters in Biscayne.

1. Signal Officer, Lt. Col. Brooke, 3rd Division.
2. Units in assault.

	Per.	Veh.
3rd Signal Co.	226	56
Det 177th Sig Rep Co	21	6
Det 163d Sig Photo Co	7	1
71st Sig Co. (Spec)	195	15
Broadcasting Det.	3	0
Total	452	78

3. D plus 4 follow-up

Det 206th Sig Co.(Dep)	25	2

e. KOOL Force (Floating Reserve)

(1) Signal Corps Troops

(a) During Voyage, Headquarters in ORIZABA.

1. Signal Officer, Major Carmon Clay, 2d Armd Div
2. Units in the assault.

142d Sig Armd Co	256	51
Det 286th Sig Co	49	-
Total	305	51

8. The SOP For the Signal Services.

a. The Signal Services within the DIME, JOSS. and KOOL forces are to install, operate and maintain communications in accordance with the Signal Annex Plan of Communication to the FAITC Invasion Doctrine, and such communications afloat and ashore within each force as are hereinafter specified or prescribed in SOP.

b. The Signal Services within the CENT force are to install, operate, and maintain communications in accordance with the Joint U.S. Air-Amphibious Communications Instructions and such communications afloat and ashore within the force as are hereinafter specified or prescribed in SOP.

9. Air Communications

An outline of the Air Communication plan for all forces is set out in Appendix I, attached.

10. Detailed Signal Plan.

a. Message Centers to be operated on a continuous basis:

(1) In each headquarters ship from the day of embarkation until all elements of each force is landed. The message center to be jointly operated. For detail of military personnel, see Appendix "F" attached.

(2) At Force 343 Headquarters, Command Posts of major units, and Regimental Combat Team Headquarters of assault regiments from the time of establishment on shore.

(3) At principal Shore Party Command Posts from the time of establishment on shore, until ordered to close by Force 343.

b. Scheduled Messengers.

As soon as the roads have been cleared, scheduled messenger service will be established between all major units, and the messengers will leave these major units three times daily.

c. Special Messenger.

A special messenger will be held in readiness at all times from the time of establishment of the Headquarters of Force 343 ashore. It will be used sparingly so as to enable the maximum number of troops to be engaged on tactical missions. Every effort should be made to use the scheduled messenger service. Only in case of emergency or a strictly urgent message will the special messenger be used.

d. Radio Communication.

(1) Radio silence.

(a) No radio set will be allowed to switch on during the voyage. Communications officers will be personally responsible that this order is carried out, and will take steps to bring to the notice of all radio operators that infringement of this order may jeopardize the safety of the entire convoy.

(b) Radio silence may be broken when leading troops are ashore, or when the element of surprise is lost, or in an extreme emergency during the ship to shore movement on the authority of the Commanding General, Force 343.

(2) Batteries.

(a) Every radio set operated from dry batteries will land with new batteries installed and three new sets of batteries as spare. These spare sets of batteries will be carried in a watertight container. No time expired batteries will be used.

(b) Storage batteries will be fully charged prior to embarkation.

(3) Waterproofing.

(a) Radio sets will be stored aboard ship in the driest and coolest possible place. Communications officers will give this matter their personal attention.

(b) Every portable radio set, combat loaded, will be enclosed in a watertight container. Special canvas bags are issued for this purpose. These bags will not be removed until radio sets are landed, except in the case of those radios which may be required to operate during the ship-to-shore approach movement, and for the purpose of inserting new batteries prior to embarkation into landing craft. These waterproof bags will be collected and turned in to division signal companies at the conclusion or the assault phase, and held pending orders this headquarters.

(4) Call Signs

(a) Individual call signs will be assigned to Force 343 troops. They will be changed daily as directed.

(b) Blocks of call signs will be assigned in accordance with the Army Code Sign System (See item to S.O.I. for the assignment of Call Signs.)

(5) Frequency Allocation

See S.O.I. item 3b-2.

(6) Detailed Description of Radio Channels

See Appendix "G" attached.

(7) Radio Procedure

(a) "Combined Radio Telegraph (W/T) Procedure", short title, C.C.B.P.I. will be used by all army ground forces, U.S. and British, taking part in the operation "Husky" for

1. Combined use; that is when working to other service of the other nation.
2. Joint use; that is when working to other services of the same nation.

(b) Combined Operating Signals, short title C.C.B.P.2 ("Q" Signals) will be used in all units

(c) Link Sign will not be used in cases (a) 1. and (a) 2. as mentioned above.

(d) Link sign procedure combined with C.C.B.P.1 (AFHQ Signal Instruction #48) will be used by all units within the allied ground forces. It will not be used on fixed wireless stations.

(e) For Force 343 higher net procedure see "Radio Schedules for "HUSKY" in appendix "G" to the Signal Annex.

e. Wire Communication

For detailed wire plan see Appendix "J" attached.

f. Visual Communication

(1) (a) During the voyage intercommunication between ships will be by visual methods and will be the responsibility of the Navy. Naval Signal Officers will provide such visual operators as are required to ensure sufficient visual facilities between ships.

(b) During the assault phases visual communications, including pyrotechnics, used between the beaches and seaward will be by prearranged signals the coordination of which will be the responsibility of Division Commanders. Coordination will include all adjacent units in order that there can be no misunderstanding of signals.

(2) Panels

(a) The only panel displays authorized are illustrated in Signal Operation Instructions, item 2h-1. Normally these displays will be by prearrangement or will be requested by radio.

(b) If it should become necessary for a low flying friendly airplane to ask for "Ground Panel Display", in order to know where to drop a message or supplies, the plane will signal by throttling the motor twice or by releasing a green verey light. Any panel display made will be removed and concealed immediately after the plane has acknowledged by "rocking" or has passed on beyond the area concerned.

(3) Pyrotechnics

(a) Pyrotechnics signal within a division will be prescribed and coordinated by the division commander:

(b) Signals are of little value except for a specific operation when the approximate time and location from which the signal is to be released are known. Usually such signals can be used but once as both the signal and the resulting action of our troops will be observed by the enemy who may send up the same or a conflicting signal in order to confuse our troops and nullify the meaning of the original signal.

(c) In all cases the intended use of pyrotechnic signal will be made known to all friendly troops to whom the signal may be visable.

(4) Krypton

(a) The use of Krypton Lights, where available, will be coordinated by the Division Commanders.

(b) If used between air and ground Krypton signals will be coordinated with and made known to all friendly air and ground units operating in the area of visibility.

(5) Smoke

(a) The air-to-ground request for friendly troops to show yellow smoke will be a White Verey light from aircraft. (not to be confused with the Krypton light.)

(b) Ground-to-air recognition will be yellow smoke grenades or flares. Yellow flares or smoke will not be used for any other purpose.

g. Authenticator System

Authentication will follow the procedure set down in S.O.I. item 2d using the keys therein. Corps and Divisions will make up their own keys following the general system used by Headquarters Force 343.

h. Codes and Ciphers

Designation and distribution of codes and ciphers use between services and between higher headquarters will be found in S.O.I. item 2c.

i. Radio Intelligence

(1) Radio intercept and direction finding missions will be carried out by detachments of the 128th Radio Intelligence Company with Force Shark, Force Joss, and Force 343. These detachments will work under the direction of the Signal Intelligence Service who will maintain close liason with the G-2's of their respective organizations.

(3) Information gathered by radio intercept and position finding will be submitted to G-2.

j. Counter Signal Intelligence Measures.

(1) Wire

(a) Field and open wire lines and cables will be patrolled completely and frequently to guard against tapping. Captured commercial wire lines will be completely isolated from outside connections before being put into use. It is quite possible to send false messages over wire lines.

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(2) Radio

Enemy intercept and direction finder operations can be counteracted by:

(a) Limiting transmitting power to the minimum required.
(b) Reducing transmission time to minimum and breaking necessary long transmissions into short irregular intervals.
(c) Locating transmitters away from command posts and other important installations.
(d) Using prescribed radio procedure exactly and without variations.
(e) Adherence to rules of cryptographic security.
(f) Constant monitoring of nets and strict enforcement of radio discipline.

(3) Radio Ruses

Fake messages and fake stations must be guarded against by authentication procedure on all messages and marking of those not authenticated.

(4) Jamming

(a) Enemy interference on our radio channels is avoided by:
1. Rapid shift to alternate frequencies while continuing to transmit, if possible, on original frequency.
2. Use of tone modulation where possible, or of C.W. instead of voice.
2. Training of operators to copy through interference

(5) Intelligence information to other services will be transmitted through established radio channels.

k. British Officers on Liaison Duty with Force 343 "J" Service.

The following British Officers will be on duty with Force 343 assisting in the supervision of the "J" service:

Capt. F.W.A.Allen	R.A.C.
Lt. G.F.Cox	Royal Artillery
Lt. T.B.Wilcox	Royal Artillery
Lt. J. Burness	R.A.C.

1. Naval Fire Control Parties

a. Fire control parties will be attached to each assault battalion. Each party will consist of one naval officer, radio operators and two SCR 284 Radio sets.

2. Fire support ship-shore has been assigned as follows:

DIME FORCE		CENT FORCE		JOSS FORCE	
CL	USS SAVANNAH	CL	USS PHILADELPHIA	CL	USS BROOKLYN
CL	USS BOISE	19	DESTROYERS	CL	USS BIRMINGHAM
9	DESTROYERS	HMS	ABERCROMBIE	9	DESTROYERS
				9	L.C.G.
				8	L.C.F.

1. For Naval Fire Support frequencies see SOI.
General fire support frequency is 5640 Kcs.

m. Air Support Parties

Air support parties will be furnished by the 12th Ground Air Support Command as follows:

Force 343	- 2	45th Inf Div	- 2
II Corps	- 1	2nd Armd Div	- 2
1st Inf Div	- 2	82nd Airborne Div	- 1
3rd Inf Div	- 1		

n. Military Personnel for Hq. Ships.

See Appendix "F" attached.

o. Communication Isolation Plan

(1) Radio broadcast and communication stations will be located on operation maps in the hands of all units down to include battalion Commanders.

(2) Radio communication will be interrupted as soon as possible and with least possible damage to the equipment. Attack will be directed to power and antenna installations rather than transmitter equipment.

(3) Wire communications will be disrupted as outlined in appendix "F" attached.

SECTION IV

ADMINISTRATION

11. General-See the G-4 Administrative Order, that accompanies the Field Order, for general directives and service plans indicated therein for details

12. Motor Vehicles

a. All Signal Corps units are being equipped according to T/BA or appropriate T/E.

b. In addition, each Headquarters, Force 343, Shark, Dime, Cent, Kool, and Joss is being equipped with two DUKWS with SCR 299 installations. These will revert to the control of Force 343 when organic SCR-299 sets are received.

13. Supplies

a. Class III. Gasoline and lubricants.

The Quartermaster is providing gasoline and lubricants aboard each assault and follow-up convoy to maintain the participating units. This material will be provided all Sub-Task forces. Signal detachments and units will obtain these materials from the units with which they are operating. No white gasoline will be provided. An equivalent may be obtained by filtering leaded gasoline through 18 inches of steel wool or several thicknesses of cloth.

b. Class IV

(1) Cryptographic

All regular cryptographic systems and/or devices for communications between higher headquarters (Division and higher headquarters) will be supplied by A.F.H.Q., Distribution will be made by Force 343.

(2) Photographic

See Appendix "D" for list of special photographic equipment additional to that provided in T/BA for the detachments of the 163rd Signal Photo Company.

(3) Wire

A plan for fixed wire installations and systems for this operation is in the course of preparation. Equipment for fixed wire installations will be laid down in North Africa and be ready for shipment to destination on call after D-Day as the situation develops.

14. Shipment of Supplies

Initial and 7-day maintenance equipment will be carried along with the troops. Each 1st and 2nd Follow-up convoy will carry seven days maintenance for the troops already at the destination. 15-day reserve maintenance will be ready on call in the event port facilities will not permit the direct discharge of materials in Sicily from UGS-11 Convoy.

Further maintenance supplies will be shipped from the New York Port of Embarkation direct to Sicily. A thirty day reserve and a ten day working level will be maintained in the depots.

15. Signal Depot

a. Location: To be determined later.
b. Troops: 206th Signal Depot Company.
c. Signal Property Officer: Captain John M. Tallman, Commanding Officer, 206th Signal Depot Company.
d. Mission: To establish, maintain, and operate a Signal Depot at the destination for the receipt, storage and issue of Signal Corps equipment, materials, and supplies.
e. Stockages:

(1) Initial - 7 days maintenance carried by units plus 7 days maintenance on first follow-up plus 7 days on second follow-up to be maintained in beach dumps by Storage and Issue Section of the Signal Depot Company.

(2) Levels - 30 days reserve plus ten days working margin to be maintained by necessary requisitions.

16. Marking of Supplies.

a. Unit equipment and supplies will be marked with their overseas shipment number.

b. Maintenance supplies for over-beach discharge will be marked with:

(1) Port to be shipped from
(2) Signal
(3) Class of Supply (i.e. Class II or Class IV)
(4) KKK
(5) Number of phased requisitions.
(6) Initial of Sub-Task Force Code name.

Example: CAVI-SIG-II-KKK-1-J
(1) (2)(3) (4)(5)(6)

c. Subsequent supplies coming from United States will be marked with:

(1) Port to be shipped to.
(2) Has no significance to the force.
(3) Branch of service requisitioning
(4) Class of Supply
(5) Signifies BIGOT-HUSKY
(6) Has no significance.

d. (1) Signal supply will be marked with the usual orange band around the sides and ends of the boxes.
(2) Packing slips or stenciled markings on outside of boxes will designate contents. These will not be removed by other than Signal Depot Personnel.

SECTION V

COMMAND

17. SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS

a. Initial sets of SOI's will be prepared by Commanding Generals of Forces, Shark, Joss, Kool, Dime, and Cent by 1st June, 1943.

b. Two copies of all SOI's will be furnished to the Signal Officer, Force 343.

c. Except for the following the form of all items of SOI is left to the discretion of the Commanding Generals of the Sub-Task Forces.

(1) Codes and ciphers including keys will be in accordance with the materials furnished (See current Index to SOI)

(2) Radio call signs and frequencies

(a) Tactical Radio Net Operations, see Appendix "C" attached, and SOI.

(b) The cable address of Force 343 will be announced later.

18. a. The II Corps Signal Officer will be designated as the Signal Officer Shark Force.
b. The Divisional Signal Officer of the 1st Infantry Division will be designated as Signal Officer of the Dime Force.
c. The Divisional Signal Officer of the 45th Infantry Division will be designated as Signal Officer of the Cent Force.
d. The Divisional Signal Officer of the 3rd Infantry Division will be designated as the Signal Officer of the Joss Force.
e. The Divisional Signal Officer of the 2nd Armored Division will be designated as the Signal Officer of the Kool Force.

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/S H. G. MADDOX

H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S, G-3.

SECRET - BIGOT

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o I Armored Corps, Rein.
A. P. O. # 758

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, Force 343
Initials
Date 18 June 43

APPENDIX "A" 18 June 1943

List of Existing Fixed Radio Stations

Place	Call Sign	Freq. KCs	Power KWs	Position and Details
Corleone	-	-	-	Italian Military equipment. No fixed station located, but a part of the 41s Coy Teleradio which is here presumably has mobile W/T equipment.
Palermo	11PA	M.F. 365	3	Broadcasting equipment at: 38° 06' 31" N 13° 19' 42" E

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APPENDIX "A", cont'd

Place	Call Sign	Freq. KCs	Power KWs	Position and Details
Palermo	IAI	H.F.3113.5	-	Postal System 38° 06' 31" N 13° 22' 00" E Near Pote Agata
Palermo	-	H.F.7980	-	I.A.F. 38° 06' 03" N 13° 19' 01" E ½ mile south of BOCCA DI FALCO airfield at CAMASTRA, in S.E. angle of road from PALERMO meeting a road running South from CAMASTRA. PALERMO/BOCCA DI FALCO W/T Stn Link to Catania, Siracusa, Pantelleria.
Palermo	-	M.F.333	-	D/F on airfield; to south of perimeter.
Palermo	-	H.F. 5230 5700 4348	-	I.A.F. Air H.Q. Sicily. Unlocated
Palermo	-	-	-	Question as to nature - may be the station above. 38° 06' 07" N 13° 20' 33" E In S.W. outskirts of Palermo in the BK (either CASERNO CUBA or CASERNE EUCLIDE TURBA) which are on the N. side of the road PALERMO - PIANO DEL GRECI.
Palermo	-	M.F.171.4	-	Italian Military to MESSINA, Siracusa, Trapani. Unlocated.
Palermo	-	-	-	May be the station above 38° 07' 10" N 13° 21' 23" E In CASERNO RUGGERO, on PIAZZA S
Palermo	-	-	-	S. FRANCESCO DE PAOLA; S.E. of LOLLI Railway Station.
Palermo	-	-	-	May be the station two above. 38° 06' 40" N 13° 21' 38" E
Palermo	-	-	-	In Prefecture, on COUS VITTORIO EMANUELE, adjoining on E. side CASERNO CALATAFIMI
Palermo	-	-	-	Naval. Unconfirmed on MONTE PELLERGRINI (N. of Palermo)
Palermo	-	-	-	38° 12' 00" N 13° 15' 30" (approx) E PUNTA MALESE, NW of PALERMO, SW of CAP GALLO. In Center of point where road makes a sharp bend around point. No details.
Trapani	ICP	M.F./H.F. 153.6 3805 5438 8615 439 500 120	5	Naval/Coastal 37° 59' 03" N 12° 32' 47" E 1000 yds NW PACHECO and 2½ miles SE TRAPANI, in angle formed by CANAL DE BAJUTA to North and the railway to MARSALA to the South
Trapani	-	H.F. 3000-6000	-	G.A.F. 38° 00' 56" N 12° 35' 29" E Band to TAORMINA, ELMAS, PANTELLERIA, Most German occupied SICILIAN airfields, ROME and Air Ground traffic TRAPANI/MILO airfield at BORGO ANNUNZIATO, 300 yds due N of NW corner of perimeter, just N of main road to CALATAFIMI which skirts airfield. Adjoins Barracks.
Trapani				Known equipment: 1 Fu.Ge.III; 1 Fu.Ge. A 1 70 W Transmitter (?)
Trapani	-	M.F./H.F.	-	G.A.F. D/F probably as above.
Trapani	-	M.F.171.4 250	-	Italian Military unlocated to Palermo, Siracusa, Messina.
Trapani	-	- -	-	May be the same as above: 38° 00' 58" N 12° 33' E At W end of the town, past end of houses on N side of peninsula leading to TORRE LIGNY and VILLONEUVO NASI
Trapani	-	-	-	Coast Artillery (?) 38° 03' 20" N 12° 34' E NNE of town, circa 2100 metres NNW of ERICE and CIRCA 1050 metres SE of POINT PILOLUNGO. In general area of M. GIULIANO. Adjoins a semaphore stn, and fire control post 500 metrs to the E is a gun position or battery.
Marsala	-	5700	-	I.A.F. 37° 52' 00" N 12° 29' 00" E MARSALA STAGNONE Seaplane base N of MARSALA. On coast due W of CONSO village, facing SALTERNS Safety Service and air/ground tf.
Marsala	-	333 (?)	-	D/F. Unlocated. Italian and GAF
Marsala	-	-	-	37° 48' N 12° 28' E Area S of SALINA LAZZARA and E of SALINA POLLARI. GAF Beacon.
Marsala	-	-	-	Italian Military. Unlocated. Unconfirmed.
Marsala	-	-	-	37° 47' 35" N 12° 26' 25" E In angle formed by RR running S into MARSALA and NE houses of MARSALA.
Castel Vetrano	-	M.F. H.F. 6400-7200 5700 400	-	G.A.F. I.A.F. to TRIPOLI and PANTELLERIA Safety Service and air/ground W/T R/T. Unlocated. Probably near airfield.
Sciacca	-	H.F.3000-6000	-	Band to TAORMINA, German occupied Sicilian and Sardinian airfields. Unlocated. Probably near an air field.
Sciacca	-	-	-	DEALMETER. Set up mid-November 1942. D.W. links PANTELLERIA and TUNIS, or to TUNIS via PANTELLERIA. Unlocated.
Porto Empedocle	-	H.F.3000-7000	-	GAF to TAORMINA, and all Med naval and Air ...s. Day - Naval link to ROME. Night - AUGUSTA, BIZERTE, TUNIS. Unlocated.
Licata	-	-	-	Circa 37° 5' 50" N 13° 56' 35" E On a hill overlooking the port between CASTLE S ANGELO (to N or NW) and cemetery (to S or SE). No other details.
Gela	-	-	-	HDF. Possible long range FREYA 37° 04' 08" N 14° 12' 20" E
Gela	-	4000 3000-5000	-	I.A.F. Main control of R/T. Air/Ground
Gela				G.A.F. band to CATANIA, PECHINO, GERBINI, BISCARI, SAN PIETRO, REGGIO, Unlocated. Probably near an airfield.
Vittori	-	M.F.476 500 418 5025	1	To shipping. Coastal Met. Broadcasts: 36° 56' 49" N 14° 31' 24" E On W outskirts of Vittoria on S side of main road to RIGLIORI
Vittori	-	-	-	Beacon 36° 56' N 14° 30' E No other details
Comiso	-	3000-6000	-	GAF band to TAORMINA, German occupied airfields and operational groups in Central Med Area. M.F. Air/Ground tfc. IAF Air/Ground (W/T) 36° 58' 45" N 14° 35' 39" E 2½ miles NNW COMISO and about 3/4 mile SW airfield on E side or road COMISO to airfield, just S.E. of junction of this road with VITTORIA-airfield road BEAM approach-Aligned on COMISO airfield N.E. - SW Runway, with Visual Lorenz.
Biscari San Pietro	-	H.F.3000-5000	-	GAF. Band to CATANIA, GERBINI, GILA, PACHINO, REGGIO, M.F. air/ground. Unlocated. Probably near landing ground.
Cap Passero	-	H.F./M.F.	/ -	GAF D/F. Unlocated.

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A C of S, G-3

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o I Armored Corps, Rein.
A. F. O. # 758

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, Force 343
Initials ____
Date 18 June 43

APPENDIX "B"

"Enemy Wire Communications"

1. General

a. Telephone long distance lines and all telegraph lines are owned and operated by the government.

b. The local telephone systems are owned and operated by the Societa Esercizi Telefonica (S.E.T.), and independent company with a high degree of government control.

c. There are often two exchanges in one town, one for long distance and one for local calls. In some towns the long distance exchanges are in the main Post Office Building.

d. Special units of the militia have been training in guarding the telephone and telegraph systems. It can be assumed that these guards are also trained in the destruction of the equipment so that extensive damage can be anticipated.

e. The enemy is known to make special efforts to mine and booby-trap communication equipment, so extra precautions must be taken to prevent casualties to personnel from these agencies.

2. Telephone exchanges

a. Automatic

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The cities listed below have automatic exchanges, using equipment of the rotory type. The equipment was probably provided by Ericsson Company of Stockholm:

City	Location of Exchange	No. of Lines
Agrigento	P.T.T. Piazza Vittorio Emanuele	500
Caltanissetta	P.T.T. Via Francesco Grispi	1000
Catania	Palazzo P.T.T. Via Etnea (S.E. corner of Giardino Bellini)	7000
Marsala	Probably in Via Garibaldi	500
Messina	Palazzo P.T.T. Piazzo Cavour	4000
Palermo	Palazzo P.T.T. Via Roma	9000
Siracusa	Palazzo P.T.T. (North Corner of Ortica)	1000
Trapani	Palazzo P.T.T. Piazza Cavor	1000

b. The cities listed below have common battery exchanges:

City	No. of Lines.
Modica	200
Enna	100
Giarre	100
Piazza Armerina	100
Ragusa	100
Sciacca	100

c. Other cities and towns have common battery magneto type exchanges, but not data is avilable as to size or type of equipment. In many of the smaller localities, Ericsson (Swedish) type multiple relay exchanges have been installed. It is believed that up to 1940, 180 installations of this type were supplied to the S.E.T. and that those supplied for use in villages were of 10 lines capacity, and were installed in the homes of the local Priest.

d. Trunk Exchanges

The location of the following trunk exchanges are known:

City	Location
Palermo	Via Polacchi 127
Messina	Via Delle Rovere
Catania	Palazzo P.T.T. Via Roma

3. Submarine Cables - Submarine cables exist between the points listed below:

a. Punta Mazzone

(1) Cable Hut or Landing Point

Map Ref. Sheet 254 IV N.E. 435649, at or close to lighthouse known as Torre Bianca. It is possible that a cellor of the tower is used as a Cable Hut.

(2) Cables

Four (4) cables to Bagnara (Calabria). These cables carry the main telegraph circuits to the mainland. It is known that in 1940 an S.T. & C. channel carrier system was used between Messina and Naples, and it is possible that it was carried over the Streights of Messina by these cables.

One (1) cable to Fiumicino (Roma). This cable probably carried the Italcable Co. high speed telegraph circuit Messina - Roma.

b. Punta Mazzone

Cable Hut or Landing Point

Map Ref. Sheet 254 IV N.E. 438649, approximately 350 yards east of Torre Bianca.

One (1) Telegraph Cable to C. Chieme (Calabria)

One (1) Telephone Cable to C. Chieme (Calabria)

There is a possibility that a carrier system is used on the above cables.

NOTE: In 1940 the circuits carried on the above cables were extended to Messina by O.H. lines. There is a possibility that these lines are now replaced by U.G. cable.

c. Milli Marina

Landing Point

Map Ref. Sheet 254 III, C7474

Three (3) telephone cables to Rggio Calabria

One (1) Cable, 3 quads for 2 wire circuits
One (1) Cable, 3 quads for 2 wire circuits
One (1) Cable, 3 quads plus one screened pair for two wire circuits and radio.

The above cables are unloaded (7 x 0.5 mm conductors) and carry the through circuits from Sicily to the mainland on 2 wire basis. A carrier system (type not known) is used on these cables. The cables are lead straight into the basement of the repeater station and terminated on a pane. in the repeater apparatus room.

d. Siracusa - Punta Asparano

Cable Hut

Map Ref. Sheet 277-I-NW 126230

One (1) Cable to Benghazi
One (1) Cable to Tripoli

NOTE: It is reported that the Tripoli cable is cut approximately 1830 ohms (say 230 miles) from Tripoli and the sea earth is broken.

e. Siracusa - Cappucini Bay

Cable Hut or Landing Point

Map Ref. Sheet 274 II SW 154320 (approx)

One (1) Cable (Coastal) to Augusta, Catania, Messina

f. Pozzalo

Cable Hut

Map Ref. Sheet 276 II SE 765929

Two (2) Cables to Malta

The Cable Hut is at the east end of a sand beach which extends 750 yards east of the town to a low cliff. It lies 50 yards back from the sea in a low sandy bank. The cable lands just west of rocks lying at the base of the low cliff.

g. Porto Empedocle

Cable Hut

Map Ref. Sheet 271-IV-NW 577545 (approx)

One (1) Cable telephone to Pantelleria - Limosa - Lampedusa - Tripoli

It is not certain if this cable is in operation or not. It is reported that the first section was manufactured, but not laid, in 1940. It is probable that it has been laid as far as Lampedusa. The repeater station associated with this cable was to have been 750 yards from the cable hut.

h. Mazara

Cable Hut or Landing Point

Map Ref. Sheet 275-IV-NE. Probable locations - 752958, 764953, 767948.

One (1) Cable to Pantelleria.

This cable is reported cut by the French in 1940. It is most probable that the cable is working.

i. Marsala

Cable Hut or Landing Point.

Map Ref. Sheet 256 II 613127 (approx). Probably at base of Cape Lilibeo

One (1) Cable to Isola Marettimo

j. Tramontana Point

Cable Hut or Landing Point

Map Ref. Sheet 257 IV 645244 (approx)

One (1) Cable to Favignana Island (Circuits extended to Levanzo Island)

k. Mondello Bay (N. of Palermo)

Cable Hut or Landing Point.

Map Ref. Sheet 249 - 412566 (approx)

The landing point is most probably close NE of Mondello Moles, where, facing E there is a parallel aided cut in the rocks 60 feet long and 10 feet wide.

One (1) Cable to Punta Anzio (Roma)
One (1) Cable to Cagliara (probably operated by Italcable Company)
Two (2) Cables to Napoli
One (1) Cable to Ustica (Isole)

l. Milazzo

Cable Hut or Landing Point

Map Ref. Sheet 254 - 083587 (approx)

Two (2) Cables to Isola Lipari

4. Underground Cable

a. One underground, government owned cable is known to exist. The cable is buried at a depth of 60 - 70 cm (2 - 2½ feet). Loading coils are placed in manholes at distances of 1800 - 1900 meters. These manholes have round covers, the only round covers reported in use in Sicily. The cable carries a number of telephone circuits, telegraph circuits, one radio circuit, and several special army and navy circuits. Known infomation is tabulated below:

Messina (*) - Mili Marina (R)	8 km	24 quads
Mili Marina (R) - Catania (R)	89 km	49 quads
Catania (R) - Catania (E)	2.3 km	69 quads
Catania (E) - Raddusa (R)	59.7 km	39 quads
Raddusa (R) - Caltanissetta (R)	68 km	39 quads
Caltanissetta (R) - Caltavutro (R)	80 km	39 quads
Caltavutro (R) - Palermo (R)	65 km	39 quads

(R) Indicates Repeater Station
(E) Indicates exchange
(*) Cable terminal equipment only - not a repeater station.

b. Full technical details of the cables and repeater equipment is available. See Appendix "A", MI8/2573/7 and 8.

5. Aerial Cable

There are no known aerial cables.

6. Overhead Wire

a. Overhead wire is the standard method of construction. Wooden poles with metal crossarms are used throughout. Exact routes of overhead wire lines are not known, but probably follow main roads.

b. In general, telephone and telegraph lines are built on separate pole lines.

c. Distribution within cities is by means of open wire with supporting structures attached to buildings.

7. Railroad Lines

a. Railroad dispatch and control lines are of standard pole line construction along railroad right of way. Some dispatch circuits are telephone, but most of them are telegraph.

b. Railway dispatch lines are used for military control of armored trains and railway guns when these weapons are used.

8. Carrier Equipment

No information is available regarding carrier equipment.

9. Power Supply

a. Power is supplied to domestic consumers at 150 volts, 50 cycles. Factories and large consumers receive power at 260 volts, 50 cycles.

b. There is no infomation regarding carrier voice channels over power transmission lines.

OFFICIAL: By command Of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

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HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o I Armored Corps, Rein.
A. P. O. # 758

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, Force 343
Initials
Date 19 June 43

APPENDIX "C"

"Summary of Local Power Supply in Towns"

1. Hydro-Electric Resources.

a. The hydro-electric resources of Sicily, like those of other Italian Islands, have not hitherto been developed to anything like the extent of those on the mainland of Italy, although there exists plans to provide for considerable increases in capacity during the next few years.

b. Analysis of the output of hydro-electric plants in the Italian Islands as a whole show that they are subject to wide seasonal variations. Seasonal percentages of the annual output have been as follows:

December - February	50%
March - May	40%
June - August	3%
September - November	7%

In Sicily there is an additional obstacle to a highly developed hydro-electric system, in that many of the island's rivers are neither powerful nor accessible enough for building work to be other than a long and costly undertaking. Both in 1937 and 1938 the six important hydro-electric plants produced 70 - 75 million KWH, or about 35 percent of the island's total power production.

2. In order to regulate the supply of electric power throughout the year, a considerable output from the mal-stations is required from June until November, (inclusive). Of the six principle thermal generating stations in Sicily, several are relatively small capacity, but they are important for peak-load operations and for the local power supplies. The output from thermal stations was between 115 and 140 million KWH in 1937 - 1938; this gives a plant factor of about 3000 hours per year. Before Italy's entrance into the war in 1940, the coal for Sicily's thermal plants was imported from Great Britain, Germany, or Poland. Now it presumably comes exclusively from Sardinia.

3. Power Stations:

a. Hydro-Electric

Alto Belice	11,000 KW
S. Carlo	7,000 KW
Francavilla (Alcantara)	5,600 KW
Cassibile	5,360 KW
Kaggi (Alcantara II)	4,800 KW
Poggio Diana	4,000 KW

b. Thermal Stations

Catania	25,450 KW
Palermo	13,800 KW
Porto Empedocle	10,000 KW
Trapani	1,180 KW
Messina	750 KW
Siracusa	300 KW

4. Characteristics of Power Supply

a. For industrial use power is supplied as follows:

260 volts
50 cycles
3 phase

b. For domestic use power is supplied as follows:

150 volts
50 cycles
3 phase

5. Sub-Stations:

Mazzarra S. Andria
Archiand Bauso
Messina
Roccalumera
Viagrande
Capo Molini
Catania
Carlentini
Sartino
Siracusa
Vizzini
Bucchere
Ragusa
Salemi
Porto Empedocle
Caltanissetta

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S, G-3

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o I Armored Corps, Rein.
A. P. O. # 758

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, Force 343
Intials
Date 22 June 43

APPENDIX "D"

"Photographic Plan"

1. a. Four photographic units will accompany Force 343.

b. Each unit consists of one officer cameraman, and six enlisted cameramen. Each expert with still and motion picture cameras. The units will be so organized for the assault, that the men will be equipped with the following:

Two men will carry 35mm motion picture cameras, with black and white films.

One man will carry a 16mm motion picture, magazine loading, camera with color films.

Three men will carry 4 x 5 Speed Graphic cameras with 4 x 5 film packs, and a 35mm camera of the Leica type.

c. In the initial assault, each unit will be broken up into three two man teams consisting of one still cameraman and one motion picture cameraman. Wherever possible, these teams will be deployed so that they will accompany a Divisional Combat Team. Each of these teams should be loaded on separate ships wherever possible.

d. Two ¼ ton 4 x 4 vehicles will be used by two of these landing teams in the initial assault.

e. One enlisted cameraman will remain with a vehicle which will have on it the extra film and initial laboratory equipment. This vehicle will arrive as soon after "D" Day as arrangements can be made for it.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S, G-3

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o I Armored Corps, Rein
A. P. O. # 758

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, Force 343
Initials
Date 19 June 43

APPENDIX "E"

"Pigeon Communication"

1. a. A detachment (two officers and twenty enlisted men) from the Pigeon Platoon, Company "E", 829th Signal Service Battalion, will arrive by D plus 8, and will be attached to Force 343 Headquarters. This detachment will be employed as required as soon as the birds are settled.

b. The Pigeon Platoon, Company "E", 829th Signal Service Battalion less above detachment, will arrive by D plus 20, and will be attached to Force 343 Headquarters. The Pigeon Platoon will be employed in accordance with the situation.

c. Pigeon communication will be used as the tactical situation dictates. All message will be encoded. Except in emergency, pigeons will not be confined away from their home lofts more than three (3) days. When rapid communications is essential, pigeons will not be used if other means are available.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343

23 MAY 1943

APPENDIX "F" TO SIGNAL ANNEX

Radio Channels, Equipment, and Personnel of Headquarters Ships.

For the Commanding General:

HOBART R. GAY
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

HALLEY G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy No.
Force 343:	
CG	1 - 2
C/S	3
Sig	4 -10
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II Corps: CG	14 - 16
1st Div	17 - 18
2nd Armd Div	19 - 20
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9th Div	25
82d AB Div	26 - 27
Sig O - 141	28- 29
Sig O - AFHQ	30
Navy - 343	31 - 40
Sig O -343 (Spare)	41 - 50

d-22


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
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Effective "D" Day

FORCE 343 - RADIO SETS @ MONROVIA

Force 343
17 June 1943
Sheet No.____

Type Set		Net	No Net	Freq Kcs.	Call Signs D	D-1	D-2	D-3	Remarks
1 - TCS	Army	343 Reporting	A3	2310	GCT	JNA	MFX	CAR	
1 - TCE/RAO	Army	343 Command	A1	2530	GCT	JNA	MFX	CAR	
1 - TCE/RAO	Army	343 - 82d Airbourne	A6	3510	GCT	JNA	MFX	CAR	
1 - TCE/RAO	"	Link to 141	F1	(a) 2040 (b) 4910	HMY	SHV	BGD	BOP	(a) 2000-0600Z (b) 0600-2000Z
1 - BC/343	"	Monitor 345 "J"	-	3285	-	-	-	-	
1 - SCR 608	"	Commanders FM Net	-	27.9 mc	GCT	JNA	MFX	CAR	
1 - TCE/RAO	Air	Air Support Net		3650					See 12th GASC S.O.I.
1 - TCE/RAO	"	Commanders Net Rear		3450					See 12th GASC S.O.I.
1 - TCE/RAO	"	Commanders Net Rear (Malta)		5450					See 12th GASC S.O.I.
2 - BC-639/40	"	UHF to Planes		-					" " " "
2 - BC-639/40	"	" " "		-					" " " "
1 - RAK	Navy	Malta Broadcast		150					See Naval Orders
1 - RAK/RAL	"	Malta Senior Offs. Bdcst		53.9					" " "
1 - TCE/RAS	"	Radar Reporting		2610					" " "
1 - ET8C10/RAK	"	Admirals Wave		385					" " "
1 - TBS	"	UHF Voice Maneuvering		65.75 mc					" " "
1 - TAJ/RAZ	"	Force Fox & Emergency Warn.		369					" " "
1 - ET8C10A/RAL	"	Link to Higher Hq		3475					" " "
1 - TBL/RAL	"	Task Fleet Cmdrs Voice		-					" " "
1 - TBK/RAH	"	Ship Shore Wave		4205					" " "
1 - RAC (?)	"	Weather Receiver		-					" " "
1 - RAG (?)	"	" "		-					" " "
1 - TBL/RAL (?)	"	Rear Link to Wntg. Hqs.		3270					" " "



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SECRET - BIGOT
Effective "D" Day
JOSS - Radio Sets - BISCAYNE

Hq. Force 343
17 June 1943
Sheet No.____

Type of Set	For	Net	Net No.	Frequency	Call Signs D	D /1	D /2	D /3	Remarks
1 TCS	Army	343-82d Airborne Net	-	3510	EFM	LHG	IFZ	NGA	Listens Except Emergency
1 SCR-284	Army	Shore Regt Command							
1 SCR-193	Army	JOSS Command Net							
1 SCR-193	Army	343 Command Net	A1	2530	EFM	LHG	IFZ	NGA	
1 SCR-193	Army	343 Reporting Net	A3	2310	XMJ	YRZ	JAE	PCP	
1 SCR-608	Army	Commander's Voice Net	FM	Ch 279	EFM	LHG	IFZ	NGA	Channel 279 Afloat
1 BC-603/BC-683A	Army	"J" Reporting Receiver	-	-					" 10 Ashore
1 BC-342	Army	"J" Reporting Receiver	-	-					As Directed
1 S-20R	Army	"J" Reporting Receiver	-	-					" "
1 SI-2E	Army	"J" Reporting Receiver	-	-					" "
1 HD-3A	Army	"J" Reporting Receiver	-	-					" "
1 SCR-193	Air	Air Support Net		3650					See 12th GASC S.O.I.
1 BC-342	Air								" " " "
2 BC-639/640	Air	VHF to Aircraft							" " " "
1 RAK	Navy	Malta Broadcast (Br)		150					See Naval Orders
1 RAK/RAL	Navy	Malta Senior Off B'cast		53.2					" " "
1 TCE/RAS	Navy	Radar Reporting Wave (Br)		2610					" " "
1 TBL/RAL	Navy	Admiral's Wave (Br)		385					" " "
1 TBS	Navy	UHF Maneuvering Wave	65.74 m c						" " "
1 TAJ/RAK	Navy	Force FCX & Emer. Warning		369					" " "
1 TBL/RAL	Navy	Task Fleet Commanders Net							" " "
1 TCS	Navy	Task Force Voice							" " "
1 TCS	Navy	Task Force Commanders Net							" " "
1 TCS	Navy	Ship to Shore Admin. Net							" " "

Note: Army code signs shown are links to 343 from Joss.

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Hq Force 343

II CORPS & CENT - RADIO SETS - ANCON

Actual Types	Desired Types Navy	Air Corps	Army	Source	Installed by	Remarks
1-TCS			1-SCR-284	Navy	Navy	
1-TCS (?)			1-SCR-284	Navy	Navy	
1-TDE/RAO			1-SCR-193	Navy	Navy	
1-TDE/RAO			1-SCR-193	Navy	Navy	
1-TDE/RAO (?)			1-SCR-193	Navy	Navy	
1-BC-603A			1-BC-603A	Army	Navy	
1-TBL/RAO			1-SCR-193	Navy	Navy	
1-BC-683A			1-BC-683A	Army	Navy	
1-SCR-299			1-SCR-193	Navy	Navy	
4-BC-342			4-BC-342	Navy	Navy	Consists of 1-BC-610(E), 1-BC-312, 1-BC-342
1-TBL/RAC		1-SCR-193		Navy	Navy	
1-TBL/RAO		1-SCR-193		Navy	Navy	
1-TBL/RAO		1-SCR-193		Navy	Navy	
1-BC-639/640		1-BC-639/640		Navy	Navy	
1-BC-639/640		1-BC-639/640		Air Corps	Navy Assisted by Air Corps	
1-BC-639/640		1-BC-639/640		Air Corps	Navy assisted by Air Corps	
1-TAQ	1-TAQ			Navy	Navy	
1-TBL	1-TBL			Navy	Navy	
1-TBK	1-TBL			Navy	Navy	21 May 1943
3-TDE	1-TCE			Navy	Navy	
1-TAJ	1-TAJ			Navy	Navy	Concurred in:
1-TCS	1-TCS			Navy	Navy	Army /s/ Elton F. Hammond, Col., Sig Corps
1-TBS	1-TBS			Navy	Navy	
3-RBL	3-RAZ			Navy	Navy	Navy /s/ E. A. Evans, Capt., U.S.N.
8-RAD	8-RAS			Navy	Navy	Air Corps /s/ D. Williams, Lt. Col., A.C.
1-TBL	1-TCP			Navy	Navy	
1-TBY	1-TBY			Navy	Navy	Unit Net
3-TCS	1-TCS			Navy	Navy	Boat Control Net
1-(?)	1-(?)			Navy	Navy	
1-(?)	1-(?)			Navy	Navy	

SECRET - BIGOT

Sheet No 7

TENTATIVE

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Hq Force 343

DIME - RADIO SETS - SAMUEL CHASE

Actual Types	Desired Types Navy	Air Corps	Army	Source	Installed by	Remarks
1-TCH (T and R)			1-SCR-284	Navy	Navy	
1-TBL and 1-RAL			1-SCR-193	Navy	Navy	TBL is 200W; 175-600 kc and RAL is .3 to 23
1-SCR-284			1-SCR-284	Army	Navy assisted by Army	2.8 - 18.0 mcs mc.
2-TCS			2-SCR-193	Navy	Navy	TCS is 25W; 1.5 to 12 mc.
1-BC-603A			1-BC-603A	Army	Navy assisted by Army	
1-BC-683A			1-BC-683A	Army	" " "	
3-BC-342(-)			3-BC-342(-)	Army	" " "	
1-RBO			1-BC-342(-)	Navy	Navy	
1-TBL		1-SCR-193		Navy	Navy	
1-AR-8505		1-BC-342(-)		Navy	Navy	
2-BC-639/640		2-SCR-522		Navy	Navy	
1-TBL	1-TBL			Navy	Navy	
1-TDA	1-TAJ			Navy	Navy	
1-TCP	1-TCP			Navy	Navy	
1-TBY	1-TBY			Navy	Navy	
2-TCS	2-TCS			Navy	Navy	
1-TCH	1-TCS			Navy	Navy	
1-TBS	1-TBS			Navy	Navy	21 May 1943
2-TCE	2-TCE			Navy	Navy	Concurred in:
3-RAZ	3-RAZ			Navy	Navy	Army /s/ Elton F. Hammond, Col., Sig Corps
1-RAL	1-RAS			Navy	Navy	Navy /s/ D. S. Evans, Capt., U.S.N.
1-(?)*	1-(?)			Navy	Navy	Air Corps /s/ D. Williams, Lt. Col., AC
3-RAS	3-RAS			Navy	Navy	

* M (S) Net

Sheet No 4

SECRET-BIGOT

TENTATIVE

SECRET - BIGOT

SIGNAL PERSONNEL FOR HEADQUARTERS SHIPS

Hq Force 343
21 May 1943

	Officers	ARMY Radio Operators	Code Clerks	Message Center Clerks	Radio Repairmen	Total	Navy Air Corps	Navy (above normal complement)	Aggregate	Remarks
343 C. P. Monrovia	3	12	6	4	1	3 23	4 32	25 60	32 115	See No 171 FORTUNE 2 May 43 Army Personnel Permanently assigned to ex. missed boat. See 12046 May Comphiblant. Being sent from US (Col Lensner) 20 May 1943
343 Advance DESTROYER	1	5	4			1 9		1 5	2 14	1st Armd Sig Bn
CENT & II CORPS COMMAND - ANCON	4	20	10	9	1	4 40	4 32	16 40	24 112	See 171 FORTUNE (same as 343 CP) (or II Corps)
DIME SAMUEL CHASE	3	12	6	4	1	3 23	3 8	12 25	18 56	See AFSO 9916 - 6 May 43 (see ANCON or II Corps)
JOSS BISCAYNE	3	12	6	4	1	3 23	3 8	16 30	22 61	Same as for DIME (or 3d Division)
KOCL ARMY TRANSPORT (To be designated)	2	8	4	3		2 15	1 3	9 20	12 38	
TOTALS	16	69	36	24	4	16 133	15 83	79 180	110 396	

Concurrence by:
Army /s/ Elton F. Hammond, Col, Sig Corps
Navy /s/ D.A.Evans, Capt., U.S.N.
Air Corps /s/ D. Williams, Lt.Col., A.C.

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Hq Force 343

343 ADVANCE - RADIO SETS - DESTROYER

Actual Types	Desired Types: Navy	Air Corps	Army	Source	Installed By	Remarks
1-TBL and 1-RAL			1-SCR-193	Navy	Navy	TBL is 200W; 175-600 Kc, 2 to 18 mc.
1-RAL			1-BC-342( )	Navy	Navy	RAL is .3 to 23mc.
		NONE				
1-RBB/RBC	1-RAS			Navy	Navy	
1-RBA	1-RAZ			Navy	Navy	
1-RAK	1-RAZ			Navy	Navy	
1-TBK	1-TBL			Navy	Navy	
1-TBS	1-TBS			Navy	Navy	
1-TAJ	1-TAJ			Navy	Navy	

EIGHT (8) RCT HQ SHIPS - RADIO SETS (Each)

Actual Types	Desired Types: Navy	Air Corps	Army	Source	Installed	Remarks
3-TCS			3-SCR-284	Navy	Navy	TCS is 25W; 1.5 to 12 mc.
		NONE				
5-TCS	5-TCS			Navy	Navy	
1-TUE	1-TUE			Navy	Navy	
2-RBL	2-RAZ			Navy	Navy	
1-RAO	1-RAS			Navy	Navy	

Concurred in: 21 May 1943

Army /s/ Elton F. Hammond, Col., Sig C.

Navy /s/ D. S. Evans, Capt., U.S.N.

Air Corps /s/ D. Williams, Lt. Col., A.C.

SECRET- BIGOT

Sheet No 10

TENTATIVE

SECRET - BIGOT

Hq Force 343

KOOL - RADIO SETS - ARMY TRANSPORT

Actual Types	Desired Types: Navy	Air Corps	Army	Source	Installed by	Remarks
1-TCS			1-SCR-193	Navy	Navy	
1-TUE/RAL			1-SCR-193	Navy	Navy	
1-RAL			1-BC-342	Navy	Navy	
1-RAL		1-BC-342		Navy	Navy	Note SCR 522's if required to be installed NNAAF
1-TBS	1-TBS			Navy	Navy	
1-RAK	1-RAK			Navy	Navy	
1-TUE/RALS	1-TUE/ RAL			Navy	Navy	
1-RAK	1-RAK			Navy	Navy	
1-RAL	1-RAL			Navy	Navy	
1-TCS	1-TCS			Navy	Navy	
1-TAJ/RAK	1-TAJ/ RAK			Navy	Navy	

21 May 1943

Concurred in:

Army /s/ Elton F. Hammond, Col., Sig. C.

Navy /s/ D. A. Evans, Capt., U.S.N.

Air Corps D. Williams, Lt. Col. A.C.

SECRET - BIGOT

Sheet No 9

SECRET - BIGOT

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, Force 343
Initials
Date 10 June 43

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o I Armored Corps, Rein.
A. P. O. # 758

APPENDIX "G" (Signal Annex for HUSKI) 10 June 1943.

Radio Plan for the Assault

1. Radio communication for the 45th Division assault landing (ship - shore) will be in accordance with Joint U. S. Air Amphibious Communication Instructions, dated 10 March 1943.

2. Radio communication for the JOSS and DIME Forces will be in accordance with doctrines developed by the Invasion Training Center, Fifth Army. (See attached diagrams, 1, 2, & 3).

a. Prior to 'H' Hour radio silence is in effect.

b. At 'H' plus 10, each Company Commander lands with an SCR-536 (or SCR-511) radio station in the Infantry Battalion Command Net.

c. At 'H' plus 10, the Advance Navy Beach Signals Team lands and establishes an SCR-609 radio station in the Traffic Control Net.

d. At 'H' plus 15, a communications team lands in the third wave and establishes an SCR-284 radio station in the Navaly Gunfire Control Net.

e. At 'H' plus 15, the Shore Company Communication Team lands in the 3d wave and establishes an SCR-609 radio station with one channel operating in the RCT Command Net and the other channel operating in the Shore Battalion Command Net.

f. At 'H' plus 15, the Infantry Battalion Headquarters Communication Team lands in the 3d wave, and establishes the following radio stations:

(1) An SCR-610 with one channel operating in the RCT Command Net; the other channel operating with attached units. These channels are in operation while afloat also.
(2) An SCR-284 operating in the RCT Command Net.
(3) An SCR-536 (or SCR-511) operating as control in the Infantry Battalion Command Net.

g. At 'H' plus 90, the RCT communications lands in the 8th wave and establishes the following radio stations:

(1) An SCR-608 in 1/4 ton amphibious truck with one channel operating as control in the RCT Command Net; one operating with Division Headquarters afloat; one channel operating each Infantry Battalion Channel, one channel operating with Shore Battalion Headquarters.
(2) An SCR-284 radio operating as control in the RCT Command Net.
(3) An SCR-284 operating in the Division Comsand Net.

h. At 'H' plus 90, the Shore Battalion Communications Team lands in the 8th wave and establishes the following radio stations:

(1) An SCR-609 radio station with one channel as control in the Shore Battalion Command Net; the other operating with RCT Headquarters.
(2) An SCR-284 operating in the RCT Command Net.
(3) An SCR-284 operating in the Shore Regimental Command Net.

i. At 'H' plus 90, the Navy Beach Signal Team lands in the 8th wave and establishes an SCR-284 radio station in the ship to shore Administrative Net.

j. At 'H' plus 120, the Air Support Party lands in the 12th Wave and establishes an SCR-299 in the Air Support Net.

k. Diagram 3 shows the Division Ashore.

3. Communications of higher echelons afloat are shown in Appendix F to Signal Annex.

a. Diagram 4 shows the initial 343 radio communications ashore (Army).

b. Diagram 5 shows final 343 radio communications ashore (Army).

4. Listening Watch - All ships radio sets operating on Army or Joint Shore Party teams will open a listening watch at D minus 30 minutes.

5. Radio Silence will not be broken before the leading elements of the assault are ashore or extreme emergencies when authorized by the Senior Naval Officer of the command.

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6. Responsibility of Commanders - It is essential that radios be landed to conform to "Radio Schedules", attached, and Item 3b-1, S.O.I., Force 343.

7. Radio will be replaced by wire as soon as possible during the operation. No unnecessary traffic or readability reports will be transmitted.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S, G-3


HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION "S"

SECRET

ASSAULT BATTALION L.T. ASHORE

DIAGRAM 1




ASSAULT BATTALION L.T. ASHORE.
FORCE 343

LEGEND
ARMY CHANNELS
AIR CORPS CHANNELS
NAVAL CHANNELS

DATE: 7 JUNE 43

SECRET

DIAGRAM 2




LEGEND
ARMY CHANNELS
AIR CORPS CHANNELS
NAVAL CHANNELS

RCT HQ LANDED
FORCE 343
SECRET
DATE-7 JUNE 43

SECRET

DIAGRAM 3



NOTE
NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
AS IN DIAGRAM NO. 2

DIV. HQ. LANDED
FORCE 343

LEGEND
ARMY CHANNELS

DATE : 7 JUNE '43


d-26


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SECRET - BIGOT
RADIO SCHEDULES FOR "HUSKY"
(Effective "D" Day)

Hq Force 343
9 June 1943
Sheet No.

Ser. No.	Schedule	Call Signs	NCS	Frequency	Times	Procedure	Priority	Set	Remarks
F1	141 IAC Hq - 343 Hq	Code Signs	141	(A)2040 (B)4910	2000 - 0600Z 0600 - 2000Z	Link Link	2	SCR-299 141	Afloat and ashore
F7	141 Main Hq - Rear Ech 343	Code Signs	141	2490	All	Link	-	141	Established by 141
F8	141 Main Hq - 343 Hq (Ashore)	Code Signs	141	(A)3080 (B)5060	2000 - 0600Z 0600 - 2000Z	Link	5	SCR-299 141	Ashore Only
F10	141 Main Hq-343 Hq (Ashore)	Code Signs	141	(A)3240 (B)5730	1900- 0700Z 0700 - 1900Z	Link	8	SCR-299 141	Ashore Only
F12	141 Main Hq - 343 Hq and 545 Hq	Code Signs	141	(A)2970 (B)4080	2100 - 0400Z 0400 - 2100Z	Link	11	SCR-299 141	Ashore Only
F13	343 - 545	Code Signs	343	(A)2870 (B)5140	2000 - 0600Z 0600 - 2000Z	Link	4	SCR-299 1 Armd Sig Bn	Ashore Only (MONROVIA MAY LISTEN)
F14	343 - 545	Code Signs	343	(A)2690 (B)4860	2000 - 0600Z 0600 - 2000Z	Link	10	SCR-193 1 Armd Sig Bn	Ashore Only
A1	343 Command Net	Code Signs	343	(A)2530 (B)2760 (C)7530	All Alternate Alternate	Link	1	SCR-299 1 Armd Sig Bn	Afloat and ashore. Freq (A) will be used whenever possible. (B) & (C) are alternates
A2	343 Administrative Net	Code Signs	343	(A)2240 (B)5310	2000 - 0600Z 0600 - 2000Z	Link	9	SCR-299 1 Armd Sig B	Rear station keeps listening watch until silence is broken by Forward Sch
A3	343 Reporting Net	Code Signs	343	2310	All	Link	6	"	Normal traffic rearward. May be used for any emergency use.
A4	343 Troops Net	Code Signs	343	1730	All	Link	12	"	Opens on order 343 Sig O
A5	343 Liaison Net	Code Signs	343	3870	All	Link	7	"	Opens on order 343 Sig O
A6	343 - 82d AB Div Net	Code Signs	343	3510	All	Link	3	"	Afloat and ashore
86	343 - NATOUSA			(A)4030 (B)7410			-	"	Opens on order NATOUSA
	343 Counter Battery Net	Code Signs		7040	All	Link	-	"	See note for net 2a above

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HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o I Armored Corps, Rein.
A. P. O. # 758

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, Force 343
Initials ____
Date 19 June 43

APPENDIX "J"

"Detail Wire Plan"

1. General

a. All equipment being carried by the forces will be in the best possible operating condition. All dry cells will be new and additional dry cells will be packed with the equipment.

b. Waterproofing - All switchboards, telephones, telegraph sets, reel units, batteries and tool kits will be waterproofed in accordance with existing instructions.

c. Full use will be made of telegraph to provide additional channels.

2. Communications in North Africa

a. The 51st Signal Battalion, in the initial phase, will provide wire communications in North Africa for both the Force 343 Command Post and the Rear Echelon. If necessary, additional personnel and equipment can be supplied initially by the 229th Signal Operations Company.

b. Long lines communications and communications in the embarkation area will be provided by Allied Force Headquarters.

3. Tactical Communications in HORRIFIED

a. Sub-Task Forces.

(1) Corps and Sub-Task Force Commanders are responsible for all tactical wire communications in their own areas. This includes responsibility for all wire communications required for Shore Landing Parties and Shore Beach Parties. They are also responsible for the proper use and conservation of existing wire facilities in their areas until such responsibility is taken over by Force 343.

(2) One Construction Company, less one Construction Section, of the 51st Signal Battalion will be attached to the JOSS Force prior to embarkation to supplement their organic signal troops.

(3) One Construction Section of the 51st Signal Battalion will be attached to the KOOL Force prior to embarkation to supplement their organic signal troops.

b. Force 343

(1) Force 343 will be responsible for wire communications to and between Sub-Task Forces.

(2) The following signal troops will be available to Force 343:

1st Armd Sig Bn (14 O and 229 EM on D Day)(Balance D/4)
229th Sig Operation Company (D/8 to D/20)
51st Signal Battalion (less 1 Constr Co)(D/30)
2659th Sig Port Serv Co (Provisional) (D/30)

(3) The 1st Armored Signal Battalion will establish communication to Sub-Task Forces as soon as possible after getting ashore. Initial communications will be over field wire which will be replaced with a better type of construction as soon as the material becomes available. Initially, two talking circuits and one telegraph circuit will be provided to Sub-Task Forces.

(4) The 229th Signal Operations Company will take over any fixed communication installations which may have been started by the 1st Armored Signal Battalion to free the 1st Armored Signal Battalion to advance as the tactical situation changes.

(5) Communication to Twelfth Army will be established as soon as the situation permits.

(6) In accordance with instructions from Force 141, at least one circuit will be built from Comiso to Ragusa for use by the RAF.

(7) Full use will be made of existing facilities in the area. Later as these circuits are no longer needed for tactical use, they will be used in the fixed wire system.

4. Fixed Wire Communications in HORRIFIED

a. Fixed wire communications will be established in accordance with wire plan published by Force 141.

b. Initially this plan will be as shown in Diagram "A". Later it is anticipated that additional fixed communications will be installed as shown in Diagram "B". These plans, however, are subject to change.

c. The greatest possible use will be made of existing poles and wire in establishing the fixed communication system in order to conserve line materials.

d. Material for use in establishing fixed wire communications will be under control of the Signal Officer, Force 343, and except in emergency, will not be issued for tactical purposes.

e. Construction and operation of the fixed wire communications system will be done by the 51st Signal Battalion and the 229th Signal Operations Company. Additional construction will be available from time to time from the 1st Armored Signal Battalion.

f. The 2659th Signal Port Service Company (Provisional) will operate the various port installations that are established on a permanent basis.

5. Interruption of the Commercial Wire System

a. Known details of enemy wire installations are shown in Appendix "B", Annex No. 3, Operations Plans.

b. Advance units will be instructed to cut wire lines leading into enemy territory. This includes telephone, telegraph, and railroad dispatch lines. The near end of the enemy portion of such lines will be short-circuited and grounded.

c. Enemy central offices will be secured intact if possible. All troops will be instructed to remove all enemy personnel from the central offices and establish a guard over such installations. Power supply should be interrupted to central offices to insure that the enemy does not use the equipment. The minimum amount of damage should be done to the central office equipment so that it can be readily restored for our use. Particular care should be taken to secure all records since this will greatly facilitate the re-establishment of communication. Signal Officers of the various units will make plans for taking over central offices as soon as possible after they are captured.

d. Every precaution will be taken to prevent losses to Signal Corps personnel from mines and booby traps while working on any type of enemy communication facilities.

6. Control of existing facilities.

a. Initially Sub-Task Force Commanders will exercise control over all existing commercial facilities in their areas. This control will later be exercised by Commander, Force 343, in order to co-ordinate the use of these facilities. Ultimately, Force 141 will take over supervision of all commercial communication facilities.

b. All existing communications will be closed down as soon as the installations are captured. Personnel will be removed from communication installations and guards posted.

c. Operation of all communication facilities captured will be by signal personnel of the Allied Forces.

d. Civilian personnel will not be allowed to use telephone or telegraph services. Local services may be re-opened for military use in accordance with instructions from Signal Officer, Force 343.

7. Wire Supply

a. Normal supply channels will be used throughout the operation.

b. Units will be issued wire supplies on the basis of T/BA allotments insofar as these supplies are available.

c. Certain supplies are being received for the special projects involved in the fixed wire communications plan outlined in Par. 4. These supplies will be under control of the Signal Officer, Force 343, and will be issued only for the use intended. This equipment consist of following items:


Permanent line construction materials.
Rapid pole line material.
Spiral four cable.
Carrier telephone equipment.
Repeaters.
Switchboards.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
H. B. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.



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


DIAGRAM B

SECRET - BIGOT

S E C R E T
By Authority of
CG, Force 343
Initials
Date 16 June 43

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o I Armored Corps, Rein.
A. P. O. # 758

16 June 1943.

APPENDIX "N"

Air Courier Dispatch Service

1. An air courier dispatch service was inaugurated by the Signal Section, I Armored Corps, Reinforced, on 8 June 1943. The primary object of this service is to furnish rapid dispatch service to all units of this Corps and to higher headquarters located in North Africa.

2. The following personnel is assigned to this service:

a - Officer in Charge, Air Courier Service - Lt. Col., Signal Corps. Part time only.
b - Officer Couriers - From Adjutant General Section on special duty with Signal Section.
c - Officers in Charge of Message Centers located at Telergma Air Field and Biserte.

3. The following is daily schedule of courier service:

a. Mostaganem to Casablanca and return:

Mostaganem	Lv.	0600B	Ar.	2000B
Casablanca	Ar.	1230B	Lv.	1400B

b. Mostaganem to Biserte:

Mostaganem	Lv.	0600B	Ar.	2000B
Maison Blanche	Ar.	1045B	Lv.	1600B
Maison Blanche	Lv.	1130B	Ar.	1130B
Telergma	Ar.	1530B	Lv.	1200B
Telergma	Lv.	1515B	Ar.	0945B
Tunis	Ar.	1800B	Lv.	0700B
Tunis	Lv.	1815B	Ar.	0645B
Biserte	Ar.	2000B	Lv.	0500B

d-29

A. Use is made of the Air Corps, Air Courier planes and the Air Transport Service planes for the air portion of the route.

Use is made of motor messengers from the various sub-message centers to the unit concerned.

5. a. Upon movement of the Corps Command Post to the Biserte area, the courier service will be continued from that point on a slightly revised time schedule.

b. Upon movement of the Corps Command Post from Biserte for the "HUSKY" Operation, an additional daily air courier service will be inaugurated from the Corps Command Post to the Biserte area.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S, G-3

S E C R E T
By Authority of
CG, Force 343
initials
Date 19 June 43

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
c/o I Armored Corps, Rein.
A. P. O. # 758

19 June 1943.

APPENDIX "O"

Radio Command Channels of Communication.

1. Explanation:

The attached charts illustrate the possible radio command channels in the case that any one or any combination of headquarters' ships are sunk or damaged to the extent that all of the radios fail to operate.

2. Use:


These alternate channels will be used only in case of an emergency.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S, G-3





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
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
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




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
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


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ANNEX NO. XI

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Hq Force 343
19 June 1943

1. Mission. The mission of Chemical troops is to:

a. Support the attack with 4.2" chemical mortar HE and White Phosphorus Fire as directed by Sub-Task Force commanders.
b. Furnish smoke protection for beach and harbor installations.

2. Organization for Combat.

a. Troops attached to Sub-task Forces.
(1) JOSS
(a) 3rd Chemical Mtzd Bn (Sep)
(b) 1st Platoon, 21st Chemical Co (Decon) as Smoke Troops.

(2) II Corps
(a) 83rd Chemical Mtzd Bn (Sep)
(b) 2nd Chemical Mtzd Bn (Sep)
(c) 21st Chemical Co (Decon) less 1st Platoon as Smoke Troops.

b. Force 343 Troops
(1) 84th Chemical Mtzd Bn (Sep)
(2) 69th Chemical Co. (Smoke Generator)
(3) 78th Chemical Co. (Smoke Generator)

3. Tactical Mission for Subordinate Units.

a. The 84th Chemical Mtzd Bn (Sep) is attached to the 9th Infantry Division, and in any assignment missions, will support with HE and WP Fire from 4.2" Cml. mortars.
b. 69th Chemical Co (Smoke Generator) and the 78th Chemical Co (Smoke Generator) will, under the direction of the AADC (Anti-Aircraft Defense Commander) furnish smoke protecion for the harbor of BIZERTE. They will be prepared to move to HORRIFIED and furnish harbor smoke protection on call from Force 343, in the following order:
(1) 69th Smoke Generator Co.
(2) 78th Smoke Generator Co.


4. Use of Chemical Agents.

a. No toxic chemical munitions will be employed by this Force, except on order of the Commanding General.
b. Any use of toxic chemicals agents by the enemy will be immediate reported to Headquarters Force 343 by the quickest possible means.

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ H. G. Maddox acg
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.



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SECRET
Auth: CG, Force 343:
Inits:
Date: 12 June 1943

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

Hq. Force 343,
A.P.O. #758, U.S.ARMY,
15 June 1943, 1030B

Ref: Q-630

ADM O 1 To Accompany FO 1.

Maps: Same as FO 1.

1. REFERENCES.
   a. Admin. Plans, Hq. Force 343, 31 May 1943, for CENT, DIME, JOSS and KOOL; Amendment No. 1, 12 June 1943.
   b. No. Q-378, Hq. I Armd Corps Reinf., 3 June 1943, Sub: "Outline Plan for Beach Group Operation".
   c. Adm. O. No. 1, XII Air Support Command (Rear), 5 June 1943.

2. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.
   a. Sub-task Force Commanders:
      (1) Sub-task Force Commanders will be responsible for their own supply from ships and other landing craft, over the beaches, or through the ports to include the operation of all beach heads and ports except the port of LADBROKE, until this duty is taken over by Force 343.
      (2) Sub-task Force WOLF will be supplied by air-drop or through DIME beaches.
   b. Commanding Officer, 1st Engineer Special Brigade:
      (1) When supply activities are taken over by the commanding General, Force 343, the Commander 1st Engineer Special Brigade will assume command of the beach groups and of all non-divisional and non-corps service units thereto attached and such other service units as are necessary and may be attached by the Commanding General, Force 343; and will be responsible for the execution of all supply plans within the theater of operations and emanating from Force 343, including the operation of ports, if any.
      (2) Commander, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, will control operations of U.S. service and depot personnel at the prot of LADBROKE until this responsibility is taken over by Force 343.
   c. Force 343.
      Force 343 will be responsible for coordinating with SOS, NATOUSA, in the assembling of supplies to various points of embarkation and their transportation to the theater of operations.

3. PROCUREMENT OF SUPPLIES.
   Supplies will be obtained from SOS, NATOUSA, and forwarded on an automatic basis or on special request by Sub-task Force Commanders and the Task Force Commander.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE CHANNELS FOR SUPPLY.
   a. From Sub-task Force Commanders and Force 343 troops direct to Force 343.
   b. Initially, SHARK will have no administrative functions other than those pertaining to its own Corps troops, except in emergency.

5. MAINTENANCE AND RESERVES.
   a. Maintenance: (Except CWS Class II, which is held in North Africa.)
      (1) To include D + 8:
         (a) JOSS, CENT, and KOOL ---- Twenty-one (21) days.
         (b) DIME ---- ---- ---- Twenty-eight (28) days.

      The above includes 45,000 Type "C" rations for Prisoners of War to be equally distributed among JOSS, DIME and CENT and shipped on the first follow-up, D + 4.

      (2) To include D + 4:
         (a) JOSS and CENT -- Seven (7) days additional.
   b. Reserves:
      (1) The general policy for the build up of reserve supplies, except CWS Class II, in HORRIFIED will be on the basis of at least one (1) to three (3).
      (2) Additional reserves will be built up by SOS, NATOUSA, in North Africa, on the ground at AGOUTI by D day.

6. SUPPLY.
   a. Ground and Air: For details see References, Paragraphs 1a and 1g; also, Quartermaster Supplies, Annex No. 1; Medical, Annex No. 2; Ordnance Plan, Annex No. 3; and Engineer Plan, Annex No. 4.
   b. Water: Supply of one (1) gallon per man per day, D to D + 5, in five-gallons cans over beaches and from LST tanks. Local sources to be utilized thereafter. Strict water discipline must be observed at all times. For details, see Annex No. 4. (Engineer Plan).

7. EVACUATION.
   a. Casualties: See Annex No. 2. (Medcial).
   b. Burial: See Graves Registration Directive - Annex No. 5.
   c. Salvage: Collected by Sub-task Forces and report submitted to Hq. Force 343.
   d. Captured Material: Collected by Sub-task Forces and report submitted to Hq. Force 343, as directed in paragraph 11g(2).
   e. Prisoners of War: By organizations to Sub-task Force collecting point. For details see Military Police Plan, Annex No. 6.

8. TRAFFIC.
   a. Ship traffic control: By the Navy.
   b. Land:
      (1) Circulation restrictions and control: As directed by Sub-task Force Commanders within their respective areas.
      (2) Construction and Maintenance of Routes:
         (a) By Sub-task Force Commanders within their respective areas until Task Force 343 assumes control.
         (b) When Task Force 343 assumes control, by 1st Engineer Special Brigade from shore to line of supply points (beach dumps) and by Engineer, Force 343, from supply points (beach dumps) to sub-task force rear boundaries when latter moves forward of line of supply points (beach dumps).

9. SERVICE SUPPORTING TROOPS.
   As allocated to Sub-task Force Commanders in Troop List No. 4, Hq. Force 343, 10 June 1943.

10. PERSONNEL.
   a. Stragglers: By organization to collecting points.
   b. Surplus Baggage: As directed by Sub-task Force Commanders.
   c. Mail: Normal delivery to all units for the initial operation, except Assault. Details to be announced.
   d. Replacements: See Memorandum # 56, Hq. I Armd Corps Reinf., 6 June 1943, Subject, "Personnel Replacement Requisitions".
   e. G-1 Reports: See Personnel Memorandum # 2, Hq. I Armd Corps Reinf., 6 June, 1943, Subject, "G-1 Reports". Additional instructions will be issued later.

11. MISCELLANEOUS.
   a. Location of G-4 Section, Force 343:
      (1) Afloat: After D day -- MONROVIA.
      (2) Ashore: AGOUTI.
   b. Property Accountability: As prescribed in War Department Circular # 405, dated December 15, 1942.
   c. Procurement Policies and Procedure: See Annex No. 7.

   d. Military Police Plan: See Annex No. 6.
   e. Reports:
      (1) G-4 Periodic Report: To be submitted by Sub-task Forces and separate units to Hq. Force 343 weekly, as of 2400 Friday. First report to be submitted for period ending 16 July 1943. Report Form attached - Annex No. 8.
      (2) Daily Report on Losses and Capture of Material and Supplies: To be submitted, in duplicate, by Sub-task Forces and separate units to Hq. Force 343, daily as of 1800, by the most expeditious means, commencing D day. Report should show quantity and type of major items of equipment and supplies in tons, grouped by supply branches, as follows:
         (a) Actual losses due to enemy action.
         (b) Reported losses due to enemy action.
         (c) Actual losses due to other causes.
         (d) Reported losses due to other causes.
         (e) Actual captured enemy materiel.
         (f) Reported captured enemy materiel.
      (3) The following reports will be submitted to Ordnance Officer, Hq. I Armd Corps Reinf., A.P.O. # 758, U.S.ARMY, by Sub-task Forces and separate units of Force 343.
         (a) Special report as of 5 July 1943 listing weapons and vehicles by type and model for each organization.
         (b) Bi-monthly reports as of the 15th and last day of each month of all major items of Ordnance equipment including vehicles, classified as Authorized, On Hand, Serviceable for Combat, Unserviceable Awaiting Repairs, Unserviceable due to Shortages of Major Items and Unserviceable due to Shortages of Minor Items.
         (c) Commencing on D day, Ammunition Expenditure Reports will be submitted daily as of 1800 to arrive at Hq. Force 343 by 0800 the following day.

PATTON,
Cmdg.

OFFICIAL:

(S) MULLER,
MULLER, G-4.

SPECIAL G-4 DISTRIBUTION.

List of Annexes:
No. 1 -- Quartermaster Supplies.
No. 2 -- Medical.
No. 3 -- Ordnance Plan.
No. 4 -- Engineer Plan.
No. 5 -- Graves Registration Directive.
No. 6 -- Military Police Plan.
No. 7 -- Procurement Policies and Procedure.
No. 8 -- Report Form - G-4 Periodic Report.
No. 9 -- Chemical Warfare Service.

d-33

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
Office of the Quartermaster
APO #758

14 June 1943

QM ANNEX TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 1

QUARTERMASTER SUPPLIES

CLASS I

1. ASSAULT PHASE: (To arrive D Day).

   a. Reserve Rations: Automatic to ships for full capacity of personnel. (NOT to be consumed on voyage.)

      (1) Issue to organizations, except KOOL and 82nd Airborne Division, at Port of Embarkation, prior to embarkation, and to be stored in space assigned to organization.

         Type "C" -- 3 days
         Type "K" -- 4 days

         (a) Hospital supplement, consisting of soup, fruit, fruit juice, vegetable juice, milk, coffee and sugar, based on Medical expectancy of wounded, for seven (7) days. (Hospital supplement to be specially packed, 25 supplemental rations to the box).

      (2) Issue to individuals at Port of Embarkation, prior to embarkation: (For consumption during voyage and individual reserve upon debarkation.)

         (a) JOSS
            Type "C" -- 1 day
            Type "D" -- 1 day
            Type "K" -- 1 day

         (b) CENT - DIME
            Type "D" -- 1 day
            Type "K" -- 2 days

            NOTE: One bottle, 24 tablets, Halazone, one bottle salt tablets, toilet paper, sunburn ointment, as specified, issued to each individual prior to embarkation.

         (c) KOOL
            See Incl. #1.

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343

SECRET - BIGOT
Auth: CG Force 343:
Initials:
Date: 2 July 43

2 July 1943
JFS/ear

SUBJECT: Amendment #3, to Annex #3, to FO #1, Force 343, 19 June 1943.

TO : Commanding General, Forces 141.

1. The following changes should be made to Annex #3 to FO #1, Force 343, dated 19 June 1943:
   a. Under Troops allotted to Shark Force (II Corps):
      (1) Change 20th Engr Bn to read, "120th Engr Bn".
      (2) Change 745th Ord Co (Lt Maint) to read, "700th Ord Co (LM)".
      (3) Quartermaster:
         (a) After 534 QM Bn (Trk) add "(-1 Co)".
         (b) After 384th QM Port Bn add "with Det 484th QM Port Bn".
      (4) Signal: Add "1 Gen Asgmt Unit, 196th Sig Photo Co".
   b. Under Troops allotted to Joss Force:
      (1) Signal: Add "Co A, 51st Sig Bn".
   c. Under Troops allotted to Kool Force:
      (1) Quartermaster: Change Co D, 2637 QM Bn (Trk) to read, "Co D, 534 QM Bn (Trk)".
   d. Under Force Troops:
      (1) Signal:
         (a) After 51st Sig Bn add "(-Co A)".
         (b) Add "2 Radio Sec, 1 Tel Sec, 177 Sig Co (Repair)".

For the Commanding General:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL: /s/ H. G. MADDOX,
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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(3) To be laid down at AGOUTI, prior to D day, to be turned over to 82nd Airborne Division on call:

Type "D" -- 1 (per individual)
Type "K" -- 2 (per individual)
type "M" -- 40,000

(4) To be laid down at KAIROUN, prior to D day, Type "C" rations for three (3) days and Type "K" rations for four (4) days, for one (1) RCT.

NOTE: One bottle, 24 tablets, Halazone, one bottle salt tablets, toilet paper, sunburn ointment, as specified, issued to each individual prior to embarkation.

FIRST FOLLOW-UP PHASE: (To arrive D plus 4)

a. Reserve Rations: Automatic to ships for capacity of personnel in first follow-up. (Not to be consumed during voyage)

(1) Issue to organizations in first follow-up, prior to embarkation and to be stored in space assigned to organization.

Type "C" -- 2 days
Type "K" -- 2 days
Type "B(5-in-1)" -- 3 days

(2) Issue to individuals at Port of Embarkation, prior to embarkation: (For consumption during voyage and individual reserve upon landing).

Same as 1, a, (2), (a) and (b) above.

(3) In ships or craft to accompany first follow-up seven (7) days same type as (1) above for troops in assault phase.

(4) In DIME first follow-up ships or craft, seven (7) days same type as (1) above for airborne troops.

(5) Halazone tablets, salt tablets and seven (7) days Hospital ration supplement for (1), (3) and (4) above to accompany shipment.

(6) Tobacco components for assault, first follow-up and airborne (except protions of CENT and DIME mounted in U.S.), seven (7) days, to accompany shipments.

(7) For Prisoners of War: 45,000 Type "C" rations equally divided among JOSS, CENT, and DIME shipments.

3. SECOND FOLLOW-UP PHASE: (To arrive D plus 8).

a. Reserve Rations: Automatic to ships for full capacity of personnel in second follow-up (Not to be consumed during voyage).

(1) Issued to organizations in second follow-up, prior to embarkation and stored in space assigned to organization:

Type "C" -- 2 days
Type "B(5-in-1)" -- 5 days

(2) Issued to individuals at Port of Embarkation, prior to embarkation: (For consumption during voyage and individual reserve upon landing).

Same as 1, a, (2), (a) and (b) above.

(3) In ships or craft to accompany JOSS and CENT second follow-up, seven (7) days same type as (1) above for all troops in assault and first follow-up of JOSS and CENT.

(4) In ships or craft to accompany DIME second follow-up, fourteen (14) days as follows for troops in DIME assault and first follow-up:

Type "C" -- 4 days
Type "B(5-in-1)" -- 10 days

(5) Hospital ration supplement, tobacco component, Halazone and salt tablets on all rations shipped.

4. THIRD FOLLOW-UP PHASE: (To arrive by D plus 14).

a. Reserve Rations: Automatic to ships for capacity of personnel of third follow-up, plus personnel of assault and first two follow-ups:

(1) JOSS and CENT: DIME - None
Type "C" -- 2 days
Type "B(5-in-1)" -- 5 days

b. Type "B" ration to be made available as soon as possible. As early as possible thirty (30) days reserve of Type "B" plus ten (10) days reserve of emergency rations to be built up.

(1) Thirty (30) days supply, Type "C" biscuits and Graham crackers (50-50 ratio) to be substituted for bread. "B" rations, beginning D plus 30 will include bread ingredients and increased allowance (10%) flour, baking powder, shortening and sugar.

c. Items to supplement Type "B" rations for hospital patients to be furnished on an automatic basis by SOS, NATOUSA or PEMBARK, based on 10% (ten percent) of the number of rations furnished to this theater. Special hospital mess to be discontinued D plus 30.

5. Tobacco, candy, toilet articles -- gratuitous issue: Under the provisions of WD Cir. 245, 25 July 1942, each ration, (except Type "B") will include the following items which will be issued to troops, as indicated below, per rations:

Blade, safety razor	ea.	.275	Cigarettes	ea.	20.00
Razor, safety	ea.	.010	Tobacco, cigarette	oz.	.05
Shave cream, brushless	oz.	.140	Tobacco, pipe	oz.	.08
Brush, tooth	ea.	.015	Tobacco, chewing	oz.	.02
Powder, tooth	oz.	.035	Papers, cigarette	bk.	2.50
Soap, toilet	oz.	.140	Matches, safety	bk.	2.00
Candy, hard	oz.	1.000	Gum, chewing	stk.	1.00

6. PACKING AND MARKING: Packages will be prepared for one man loads, not to exceed seventy (70) pounds, at Depot, and marked for Sub-Task force concerned by code name. Shipment to be made to Port of Embarkation on call of Sub-Task Force Commander. Reserve rations to be broken down and issued to organizations will be marked "FOR ISSUE".

7. SPECIAL for LADBROKE: (To be shipped by D plus 10).

Type "C" -- 2 days
Type "B(5-in-1)" -- 5 days

CLASS II and IV

1. GENERAL.

a. Thirty (30) days combat maintenance of certain articles, which include individual clothing and equipment, organizational clothing and equipment, expendable supplies, pest control materials (issued to individuals), assault packs, pack transport equipment and protective covers, individual, will be prepared by SOS, NATOUSA or PEMBARK and will be available upon call of C.G., Force 343.

b. An additional thirty (30) days to sixty (60) days maintenance will be laid down by the Quartermaster, SOS, NATOUSA or PEMBARK to be on call by the C.G., Force 343 when these supplies may be handled. A thirty (30) day level plus a ten (10) day working margin will be maintained at the main port of entry for all units of the force.

c. Packages will be one man loads, not over seventy (70) pounds, water proofed and strapped for rough handling over beaches.

d. Markings: Packages will be marked with contents, quantity, number designating Sub-Task Force (when practicable), and corners will be painted Green.

e. Beach or Unit Reserve: Each unit will carry its own combat maintenance. The assault will be equipped with assault packs and shoe packs for five percent (5%) of its strength. First and second follow-ups will be equipped with assault packs and shoe packs for three percent (3%) of their strength. One (1) 2 oz. bottle of insect repellant and one (1) 2 oz. can insect powder to be issued to each individual JOSS force and to each individual CENT - DIME force mounted in Africa, prior to embarkation. Subsequent follow-ups will carry maintenance for themselves and all preceding groups. Assault packs for 45th Division and accompanying troops mounted in U.S. will be top-loaded in Africa in amount called for by 45th Division, (but not to exceed three percent (3%) of total strength of its assault troops).

NOTE: For 82nd Airborne Division, thirty (30) days special clothing and equipment items to be laid down at AGOUTI prior to D day, along with insect powder, insect repellant, and sunburn ointment.

CLASS III SUPPLIES (P.O.L.)

1. GENERAL: All vehicle fuel tanks will be filled and organic gasoline cans, 5-gallon, will be filled prior to embarkation. Each vehicle will carry oil and greases as specified. Each wheeled vehicle will carry (5) five quarts of oil. Vehicle grease guns will be filled prior to embarkation. Supply of reserve gasoline to be carried on ships will be automatic for ground vehicles only.

2. GASOLINE:

a. Assault: Seven (7) days supply of V-80 for all motor vehicles will be carried as accompanying vehicles or on same convoy. Basis: Six (6) U.S. gallons per wheeled vehicle. Thirty (30) U.S. gallons per half-track and sixty (60) U.S. gallons per track vehicle. (This is based on fifty (50) miles operation per day, plus additional gasoline for Navy ground work. All gasoline will be in five (5) gallon cans.

b. First Follow-Up: Same, plus seven (7) days supply all Class III for assault group.

c. Second Follow-Up (D plus 8): Fourteen (14) days for DIME plus fourteen (14) days for vehicles in assault and first follow-up; JOSS and CENT seven (7) days for vehicles in assault and first follow-up.

d. Third Follow-Up (D plus 14): JOSS and CENT, seven (7) days for vehicles in assault and first and second follow-ups.

e. Gasoline to be available first fifteen (15) days in five (5) gallon cans. Subsequently, and until bulk storage is available, five (5) gallon cans and fifty-five (55) gallon drums. (Bulk storage expected to be available by D plus 16.)

3. DIESEL FUEL OIL:

a. Diesel fuel oil, conforming to Specification 2-102B will be supplied on an automatic basis for use by Engineers. Fuel to be shipped in five (5) gallon cans, initially, later in fifty-five (55) gallon drums. To be shipped in the assault: Fifteen-thousand (15,000) gallons. To be shipped D plus 4: Nineteen thousand two hundred (19,200) gallons. To be shipped D plus 8: Twenty-six thousand eight hundred (26,800) gallons.

4. LUBRICANTS AND GREASES:

a. Allowances: Engine oils, 5.5 gallons per 100 gallons of gasoline consumption. Gear oils, one (1) gallon per 100 gallons gasoline. Chassis greases 1.6 pounds per 100 gallons of gasoline.

b. Oil will be shipped in five (5) gallon cans, greases in twenty-five (25) pound pails. Cans to be plainly marked showing contents.

c. Levels will be brought up to and maintained at a thirty (30) day reserve plus a ten (10) day working margin for all units of the force by D plus 40.

5. SPECIAL FOR LADBROKE (To be shipped by D plus 10): Seven (7) days gasoline, lubricants and greases.

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Incl. #1

KOOL

For portion of force mounted:

1. Reserve Rations: Automatic to ships for full capacity of personnel. NOT to be consumed on voyage.

a. Issue to organizations at Port of Embarkation and prior to embarkation, and to be stored in space assigned to organization:

Type "K" -- 5 days
Type "C" -- 5 days
Type "B(5-in-1)" -- 9 days

(1) Hospital supplement, consisting of soup, fruit, juices, milk, coffee and sugar based on expectancy of wounded for 21 days.

(2) Gratuitous issue of toilet, tobacco and candy components.

b. Issue to individuals at Port of Embarkation, prior to embarkation:

Type "K" -- 2 days
Type "D" -- 1 day

NOTE: Halazone tablets, salt tablets, toilet paper, sunburn ointment, 2 ounce bottle insect repellant and 2 ounce can insect powder, as specified, issued to each individual prior to embarkation.

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For portion of force not mounted:

1. Reserve Rations: Available at Port of Embarkation on D day for entire personnel, ready to be loaded upon call. NOT to be consumed.

   a. Type "K" -- 7 days
      Type "D" -- 1 day
      Type "C" -- 7 days
      Type "B(5-in-1)" -- 9 days

      (1) Hospital supplement, based on expectancy of wounded for 21 days.

      (2) Gratuitous issue, toilet, tobacco and candy components.

      (3) For individual issue prior to embarkation: Halazone tablets, salt tablets, toilet paper, sunburn ointment, and insect repellants.

CLASS II and IV

Assault packs for five percent of strength mounted and three percent of strength unmounted to be available at Port of Embarkation prior to D day, plus 21 days maintenance of critical items for full KOOL strength, from which supplies will be extracted for personnel mounted.

CLASS III

Twenty-one days balanced stock of gasoline, lubricating oil, grease, and Diesel oil to be available at Port of Embarkation prior to D day for all vehicles, KOOL force, from which will be extracted 21 days supply to be loaded for number of vehicles mounted.

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ASSAULT PACK

(Quartermaster Class II, plus certain Ordnance, Medical, and Chemical Warfare Items)

Contents Packed Bottom
To Top In Order Named:

1. Haversack, w/pack carrier attached, containing complete mess kit, bath towel, 1 "K" rations, salt tablets, Halazone tablets and insect repellant.

2. Gas Mask, w/protective cover and ointment inside carrier.

3. *Belt, web, pistol, w/following attached: canteen w/cup and cover, dsmtd., pouch, 1st aid, including packet; pocket, mag., web with two (2) loaded clips; holster, w/pistol, incl. loaded clip of 6 rounds.

4. Jacket, field.

5. Helmet, steel, M-1, w/liner, adjustable headband and headnet, sandfly.

6. Suit, working HBT, 1 or 2 piece, and 1 pair sox, in pockets.

7. Undershirt, summer.

8. Drawers, shorts.

9. Blanket, wool O.D.

Above to be packed in special waterproof paper container and enclosed in water repellant barrack bag.

Weight: Not to exceed 50 pounds. Cubage: 2.524 cubic feet.

Clothing items to be sorted large, medium, and small sizes and bags plainly marked with large block letters "L", "M", and "S".

*Approximately half of bags will contain Sub-Machine Gun, pouch, magazine, sub-machine gun, w/two loaded magazines of 30 rounds each, instead of pistol, holster, pouch and 45 caliber ammunition.

NOTE: Assault packs available for top-loading when 45th Division reached North Africa, do not contain Ordnance items.

Incl. #2 to QM ANNEX.

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SHOES ASSAULT PACKED

Shoes, in full assortment of sizes, will be packed seperately in packages of twelve (12), wrapped in waterproof paper and boxed for handling over the beaches.
WEIGHT: Fifty-five (55) pounds. One (1) shoe pack will be provided for each twelve (12) assault packs shipped on assault and follow-ups.

Incl. #3 to QM ANNEX.

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINF.
A. P. O. #758

14 June 1943.

ANNEX NO... 2)
TO :
ADM. O. NO. 1)

MEDICAL

1. TROOPS AND MEDICAL SUPPORT

   a. CENT - DIME Force - CG II Corps.
      (1) CENT Force - CG 45 Div -
         (a) Troops -
            1. 45 Div.
            2. 4th Ranger Bn.
            3. Supporting troops.
            4. Total lift to D + 8 - 24.992.

         (b) Medical support allotted.
            1. Beach group - 54th Med Bn.
            2. Assault support group
               a. 1 Plat 11 Field Hospital (100 bed)
               b. Det 3d Aux Surg Group (7 teams)

      (2) DIME Force - CG 1st Div.
         (a) Troops -
            1. 1st Div (- 1 RCT)
            2. 70th Tank Bn (L)
            3. 1st Ranger Bn.
            4. Supporting troops.
            5. Total lift to D + 8 35.181.

         (b) Medical support allotted.
            1. Beach group - 261 Med Bn (- 1 Co).
            2. Assault support group
               a. 11th Field Hospital (- 1 Plat) (250 bed)
               b. 1 Coll Co and 1 Clear Plat, 51st Med Bn.
               c. 1 Plat, Co A, 36 Amb Bn.
               d. Det, 3d Aux Surg Group (7 teams)
            3. First Follow-up, D + 4
               a. 15th Evac Hosp (400 bed)
               b. 93rd Evac Hosp (400 bed)
               c. 1 Sect, Adv Sup Plat, 2nd Med Sup Depot
               d. Vet Det. 8580JJ (B)

   b. JOSS Force - CG 3d Div.
      (a) Troops -
         1. 3d Division
         2. CG "A" 2d Armd Div.
         3. 3d Ranger Bn.
         4. Supporting troops
         5. Total lift to D + 8 - 44.180.

      (b) Medical Support allotted.
         1. Beach group - 56 Med Bn.
         2. Assault Support Group.
            a. 1 Coll Co and 1 Clear Plat, 51st Med Bn.
            b. 10th Field Hosp (380 bed)
            c. Det, 3d Aux Surg Group (12 teams).
            d. 1 Plat, Co A, 36 Amb Bn.
         3. First follow-up, D + 4.
            a. 11th Evac Hosp (400 bed)
            b. 128th Evac Hosp (400 bed)
            c. 1 Sect. Adv Sup Plat, 4th Med Sup Depot
            d. 20th Malaria Control Unit.
            e. Vet Det. 8580GG (A).

   c. KOOL Force - CG 2d Armd Div.
      (a) Troops -
         1. 2d Armd Div (- CC "A").
         2. _____RCT 1st Div.
         3. Supporting troops.
         4. Total Lift - 7.975.

      (b) Medical Support allotted.
         1. Beach group - 1 Co, 261st Med Bn.
         2. Assault support group.
            a. 51st Med Bn (- 2 Coll Cos and 2 Clear Plats).
            b. 1 Plat, Co A, 36 Amb Bn.

2. EVACUATION (FM 8-25, "Medical Service in Joint Oversea Operation", will govern).

   a. Navy Responsibility - General Policy

      The Navy is responsible for the medical care of all sick and wounded of all services, including Prisoners of War:-

      (a) While in transit from ports of embarkation to Theatre of Operation.
      (b) While being transported in landing craft of all types to high water mark on land and beaches, except in those LST's to which Army Medical Corps personnel have been assigned.
      (c) While in Evacuation stations of the medical sections of Naval Beach parties.
      (d) While returning patients on any Naval Craft, except in LST's as mentioned above.
      (e) While in transports for further evacuation to hospitals on friendly shores.

   b. Army Responsibility - General Policy

      Combat Zone - Task Force 343.

      (a) Assault Phases-Early

         1. Attached unit medical detachments and elements of Divisional Medical Battalions.
         2. Later - Divisional Medical Battalion.
         3. Field Hospitals with attached Surgical Teams to care for the non-transportables.

         4. Beach Medical Bn. to collect and care for casualties in the beach area and those evacuated to their Clearing Stations by the Divisional Medical Bn. To evacuate casualties to Naval Craft and Ships through Naval Medical Officer on Beach Master's Staff. To initiate and maintain Medical Records. The Senior Medical Officer in each beach group will be designated Surgeon.

      (b) Later Phases

         1. Normal responsibilities of established medical installations after beach head enlarges.
         2. Responsibility for hospitalization of returned casualties in North Africa, NATOUSA, and U.S., SOS.

   c. Evacuation of Casualties - General Policy

      (1) Casualties occurring in landing craft will be retained aboard, if their condition permits, for the return trip to their ship or shore.
      (2) No casualties will be evacuated until after assault troops have landed.
      (3) Non-transportables will be evacuated, only if Hospital Ships, Hospital Carriers, AFA's, and XAFA's, are available.
      (4) Initially HORRIFIED will be regarded as an Evacuation Zone, with the Evacuation Hospital as the largest medical unit. Normal Army method of evacuation will be in effect, except that initially the Divisional Medical Bn. will evacuate their Clearing Stations rearward to the Beach Medical Bn. General/Station Hospitals will be landed as soon as possible after a port has been opened. The build up of hospital beds will not exceed 3% of the Force (taken at its maximum strength), the remainder of the beds required being available in North African bases. With the reduction of the garrison following the subjection of HORRIFIED, this will approximate to the 6% normally required.

   d. Evacuation Arrangements
      (1) Evacuation arrangements have been made as follows:
         (a) Phase 1.
            1. Casualties will be evacuated initially to AFA's and XAFA's while these ships are standing off the beaches. These casualties will be discharged at FASCIST.
            2. Hospital ships and carriers will arrive off the beaches when the AFA's and XAFA's depart, or sooner if it appears that a need exists. Hospital ships and carriers will be operated as a shuttle service, between the assault area and the ports of AGOUTI and LAINDON. If the casualties should become congested in the AGOUTI-LAINDON area, ships and carriers may be diverted to EFFENDI by H.Q. Force 141 upon request by NATOUSA.
            3. If it is found that AFA's and XAFA's, hospital ships or carriers are inadequate for the casualties to be evacuated, LST's will be used to transport slightly wounded to NORTH AFRICA. Medical personnel and supplies to accompany the casualties have been provided.
            4. The Beach Master will designate the landing craft he chooses for carrying casualties on the return trip to ships, and LST's (if needed) on the return trip to NORTH AFRICA.

         (b) Phase 2
            1. From the time hospital ships can use ports until adequate hospital accommodation has been established, evacuation will be in accordance with the following general principle:

               All cases having a hospital expectancy in excess of seven (7) days will be evacuated to AGOUTI, LAINDON, EFFENDI or FASCIST, upon the recommendation of NATOUSA.

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e. Casualty Estimates and Sick Rates

(1) To arrive at a basis on which to plan the medical arrangements, it will be assumed that the total casualty rates, including killed, missing and sick, may be of the following order:- (Estimates based on those given in Force 141 Maintenance Project)
(a) During the first seven days of the operation the total number of casualties may be 15% of the formations/units carrying out the assault and 5% of the remainder landed.
(b) During the second seven days 7½% of the total number of men ashore.
(c) Thereafter, 4% of the total number of men ashore.

(2) The above percentages may be sub-divided as follows:-
(a) Of the total casualties 25% can be assumed to be killed or missing.
(b) Of the remainder, 5% can be assumed to remain in HORRIFIED.
(c) After deducting the above, the remainder is the number to be evacuated from HORRIFIED, and is likely to consist of walking or lying cases in equal proportion.

(3) The above rates include assesment for sickness at the rate of 3 per 1,000 men per day. This assessment has been made on the assumption that the recommendations of the medical services regarding measures directed towards the control of Malaria, Dysentery, and other diseases have been implemented, and that preparatory training and the provision of the necessary special equipment have been carried out.

f. Means Available and Plan for Evacuation and Hospitalization

(1) Land
(a) Means expected to be available by D + 4 in addition to the organic medical units of three infantry divisions, one armored division, and supporting troops will be:

1.	Four (4) evacuation hosps. (400 bed)	11th-15th-93rd-128th
2.	Two (2) field hospitals (380 bed)	10th and 11th
3.	Four (4) medical battalions	51st-54th-56th-261st
4.	3rd Aux Surgical group (26 teams)	
5.	Three (3) Platoons, ambulance company (A/36)	
6.	Two (2) sections, adv sup platoon, med sup depot 4th and 2nd	
7.	Two (2) Veterinary Detachments (Food inspection)	
8.	Malaria control	20th

(b) Special features:
1. Maintenance over the beaches require evacuation to holding hospitals on or near the beaches for transfer to hospital ships and carriers.
2. Early occupation of the captured air fields by fighter aircraft requires hospitalization available nearby to serve these units. Hospitals so located will be used as holding hospitals for air evacuation when this service is established.

(c) Reserve Medical Units
The following medical units will remain in N.A. after D + 4 to be called forward when shipping space is available:

8th Evacuation Hospital (750 bed)
16th " " "
59th " " "
77th " " "
91st " " (400 bed)
2nd Medical Laboratory
Co A, 36th Amb Bn (- 3 Plats)

(2) Water
(a) Area Evacuation Officer (AEO).
Each area (CENT, DIME, and JOSS) will have a Naval medical officer assigned as AEO who will control the distribution of casualties within the ships in his area.
1. CENT AEO - In the Leonard Wood
2. DIME AEO - In the Samuel Chase
3. JOSS AEO - In the Biscayne
(b) Force Evacuation Officer (FEO) (U.S. Navy) in the Monrovia. This officer will control the water evacuation of entire force.
(c) Transfer of casualties from beach to craft and from craft to ships is a responsibility of the Navy.
(d) Initial allotment. The following hospital ships and carriers will be allotted to Force 343 initially and will be employed under the direct control of Naval Commander, Western Task Force.

Ships		Draught	Capacity Litter	Sitting	Total	Speed
ACADIA	(U.S.)	25'	380	426	806	18
SEMINOLE	(U.S.)	25'	284	184	468	14½
AMARAPOORA	(BR.)	25'	270	136	406	11
OXFORDSHIRE	(BR.)	22½'	250	120	370	14
TAIREA	(BR.)	25'	261	222	483	16
Carriers						
ST ANDREW	(BR.)	14'	167	223	390	13½
DINARD	(BR.)	13½'	130	230	360	18
LEINSTER	(BR.)	14½'	130	230	360	?
PERAK	(BR.)	?	?	?	150	?

(e) Employment. These ships and carriers will be called forward to the beaches by Naval Commander, Western Task Force when the situation will permit.
Hospital ships and carriers will not move in convoy with other ships. The FEO in communication with each Navy Beach Medical Section through the respective AEO's will coordinate the distribution of hospital ships and carriers to the various beaches as required.
(f) Loading. This is a responsibility of the Navy. Water ambulances or small craft will be used to transport casualties from the beaches to the hospital ships (and carriers).
(g) North African Ports for reception of casualties.
1. LAUNDON and AGOUTI are designated as the regular ports to receive casualties from hospital ships and carriers.
2. Alternate ports. In the event that the hospitals in the LAUNDON-AGOUTI area become congested, upon the request of NATOUSA through HQ FORCE 141 hospital ships and carriers may be diverted to EFFENDI to utilize the hospital beds in that area.
3. APA's and XAPA's, after departure from the beaches, will move in convoy to FASCIST where the following types of casualties will be discharged:
a. Personnel of Force 343 (Army) and U.S. Naval Forces who have a hospital expectancy of less than 90 days.
b. All personnel whose condition does not justify the long sea voyage, regardless of hospital expectancy.
(h) Patient Capacity of Craft:
1. APA's and XAPA's have an average patient capacity of:
Stretcher 139, Ambulatory 337
2. APA's and XAPA's for CENT will have a patient capacity of:
Stretcher 1,907, Ambulatory 4,381 - TOTAL 6,288
3. APA's and XAPA's for DIME will have a patient capacity of:
Stretcher 695, Ambulatory 1,685 - TOTAL 2,380
4. APA's and XAPA's for JOSS - None
5. Each LST will have a patient capacity of:
Stretcher 300, Ambulatory 165 - TOTAL 465
(i) MBS NATOUSA must be prepared to accept up to 5000 casualties from APA's and XAPA's at about D + 5.

(3) Air. Beginning about D + 14 it is expected that air transport service into the island will begin. Returning aircraft will be utilized to the fullest extent, consistent with the welfare of the patients, to evacuate casualties. Evacuation of casualties has second priority on these planes, (first priority to air crews returning to N.A. to return again with operational aircraft to replace fighter aircraft losses).
(a) Medical arrangements on HORRIFIED are the responsibility of Surgeon Force 343 as follows:
1. Holding Hospitals located near the air field or fields to which supplies are to be transported.
2. Ambulance available to transport casualties to planes promptly.
3. Litter squads available to the Advance Air Evacuation Officer, to load the planes.
4. As each patient is prepared to leave the hospitals on HORRIFIED for air evacuation, a slip of paper will be placed in the jacket of his Field Medical Record. This may be prepared on any paper and will show the patient's name, ASN, rank, organization, diagnosis and classification as listed in sub para (c) 2. below. This is to enable the Adv Air Evac Officer to prepare a nominal list of the patients on each plane rapidly.
(b) Medical arrangements in N.A. are the responsibility of Surgeon, ESS, NATOUSA.
1. Reception stations near the airdromes at Meteur which will be used to land U.S. casualties.
2. Ambulance service on the airdrome at the time planes arrive.
3. Litter squads to unload the planes.
(c) Operation. This evacuation service will be operated by the U.S. Troop Carrier Command utilising the available air evacuation squadron or squadrons.
1. an Adv Air Evac Officer will be stationed on each field in HORRIFIED to coordinate the air service with Force 343.
a. He will contact TAF HQ on HORRIFIED to determine number of planes available and time of arrival.
b. He will notify Surgeon Force 343 or his representative the time, place and number of patients he can evacuate. This information will be transmitted as soon as available, if possible during the preceding day.
c. He will supervise the loading of the planes on the field.
d. He will prepare a list for each plane showing: Number of plane, names of medical crew members, and for each patient the name, ASN, rank, organization, diagnosis, and classification as in sub para 2. below.
2. Classification of casualties for air evacuation.
Priority I-Require expert nursing enroute (mostly litter cases)
Priority II-Require minor nursing enroute (mostly ambulatory)
Priority III-Require no attention enroute (ambulatory)
3. Attendants enroute.
a. Available air evacuation crews from the Air Evacuation Squadron will be utilized to the limits of its personnel to staff planes transporting Priority I cases. Priority II cases may be used to fill available lift.
b. A pool of trained medical technicians (EM) will be maintained by U.S. Troop Carrier Command to operate in the air evacuation squadron but will only be utilized to accompany Priority II cases.
c. Priority III cases require no attendants and may be transported to N.A. in any returning planes.
4. Report. Advance Air Evacuation Officer will report through TAF channels to HQ Force 141 for transmission to Surgeon ESS, NATOUSA the number of patients being evacuated, airdrome on which they will be landed and predicted time of arrival.
(d) Ferrying Personnel to HORRIFIED. It is the responsibility of CG, Troop Carrier Command, NAAF, to reserve sufficient space on transport planes being flown to HORRIFIED to transport the medical air evacuation personnel to the landing fields on the island from which casualties will be evacuated.
(e) Supplies. To prevent the wasteful procedure of equipping all C - 47 airplanes with complete stock of exchange items of medical equipment, the following will be followed:
1. Force 343 will maintain a dump of exchange items on the landing field in HORRIFIED sufficient to make proper exchange with ambulances delivering patients to the evacuation planes.
2. The Medical Officer on the landing field in N.A. will make the property exchange with ambulances which evacuate the planes. As this property accumulates he will transfer it to Surgeon, ESS, NATOUSA.
3. The stock of exchange property in Force 343 will be maintained by shipment to HORRIFIED in returning hospital ships. The responsibility of loading this property on returning hospital ships rests with Surgeon ESS, NATOUSA and for unloading it in HORRIFIED and transporting it to advance landing fields rests with Surgeon, Force 343.

(4) After the military forces are firmly established ashore and ports are available to Force 343, evacuation on island will assume the normal mode of operation.
(a) Casualties with prolonged hospital expectancy will be evacuated to N.A.
1. Hospital ships and carriers will operate under control of Force 141. They will be dispatched to the island upon request of Surgeon Force 343 and will deliver casualties to N.A. ports designated by Surgeon, NATOUSA. This policy will be governed by available hospital ships and carriers, demands of Force 343 and Twelfth Army, and availability of ports.
2. Air evacuation will continue as outlined above.
(b) Evacuation policy will be decided from time to time and will depend upon available vacant beds in Force 343 hospitals and NATOUSA hospitals.
(c) Emphasis will be placed on sitting holding hospitals in the vicinity of air fields and ports to facilitate air and water evacuation.

(d) SOS units available in N.A. on call from Surgeon, Force 343.
1 General Hospital (1000 bed)
8 Station Hospitals (500 bed)
4 Station Hospitals (250 bed)
1 Convalescent Hospital
1 Medical Supply Depot (contingent upon arrival of this unit in the theatre)
1 Malaria Control Unit
1 Veterinary Detachment (Food Inspection)

3. SUPPLY

a. Attached medical troops will land with unit equipment, augmented by Special Supplies, such as Blood Plasma, Morphine Syrettes, extra Dressings, etc.
b. Seven (7) day maintenance of medical supplies, augmented by Blood Plasma, Special Drugs, and Biologicals, essential for this operation, combat loaded, will be unloaded at Beaches "X", "Y", and "Z", on D-day, when the situation permits.
c. Medical Supply Dumps will be established at Beaches "X", "Y", and "Z", for each Combat Group, immediately subsequent to the landing of Assault Troops. These supply points or dumps will be dispersed on beaches in protected places as directed by the Beach Group Surgeon.
d. Property exchange will be accomplished at each point in chain of Evacuation. Initially, the Beach Surgeon will be responsible for the Medical Dumps on the beaches and the issuing of supplies at these Dumps. Moving of supplies forward from the Beach Dumps will be the responsibility of the Divisional Medical Supply.
e. The Reserve Force will carry 21-day maintenance for its own Force.
f. The first Follow-Up will carry a seven (7) day maintenance for the Assault Group in addition to its own seven (7) day maintenance.
g. The second Follow-Up will carry a seven (7) day maintenance for the Assault, a seven (7) day maintenance for the first Follow-Up, in addition to its own seven (7) day maintenance; except DIME Force which will carry fourteen (14) days instead of seven (7) day maintenance.
h. Each subsequent Follow-Up brings in seven (7) days maintenance plus seven (7) days for troops previously landed, in lots capable of being unloaded over beaches, sufficient for five (5) follow-up convoys.
i. Special items for troops enroute, such as Sunburn Cream and Seasick CAPSULES to be drawn and issued prior to embarkation. Benzedrine will be available to Unit Surgeons upon request.

SECRET

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1. Thirty (30) days combat maintenance of certain articles, expendable supplies and pest control materials, have been prepared by SOS, NATOUSA or PEMBARK and will be available upon call of CG, Force 343.

2. An additional thirty (30) days to sixty (60) days maintenance will be laid down by the Surgeon, SOS, NATOUSA or PEMBARK, to be on call of the CG, Force 343. To be built up in HORRIFIED as follows:-

(1) For troops of sub-task forces served by beach heads ten (10) days by D + 32.
(2) For all troops -- Twenty (20) days in HORRIFIED by D + 90.

3. Requisitions. Surgeon, Force 343 will requisition through Force 141 on ERS, NATOUSA for supplies required.
(1) Shipment. Surgeon, ERS, NATOUSA is responsible for preparing supplies for shipment and delivery to ports.
(2) Priority of shipment to HORRIFIED will be determined by Force 343 within the allotment of water and air transport tonnage allotted by Force 141.
(3) Hospital ships and carriers are authorized to transport medical supplies and personnel. This method will be exploited to the fullest as a means of rapidly replenishing stocks on HORRIFIED and relieving the general shipping situation. This method will habitually be used to return to HORRIFIED exchange items of equipment brought to N.A. by air evacuation service.
(4) Emergency requisitions will be placed in the same manner as other supplies. Force 343 will give these items a priority in their daily request for air transportation to HORRIFIED.
(5) Surgeon, ERS, NATOUSA will maintain a small section in the dump to be established in the vicinity of KAIROUAN. This dump will contain a balanced stock of items which may be required in an emergency for shipment by air to "HORRIFIED".

4. PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT RECORDS AND REPORTS DURING THE INITIAL PHASE

a. The attention of all concerned is directed to pertinent Army Regulations, Field Manuals, War Department Circulars, APHQ Circulars, and Circular Letters from the Office of the Surgeon General, as they apply to the preparation and forwarding of medical reports and records of units of this Task Force in its prescribed Theatre of Operations.

b. General
All reports will be classified as "SECRET" and will designate only the APO number as the location.

c. Sick and Wounded Records
(1) Unit Dispensaries and Aid Stations
(a) In combat, aid stations and collecting stations of divisional or brigade units engaged with the enemy will partially accomplish the Emergency Medical Tag (WD MD Form 52b) to show only the name, grade, army serial number, date, hour, diagnosis and treatment given. Space will be economized to permit subsequent entries.
(b) Form 52b thus partially prepared, will be signed by the person responsible, indicating his grade.
(c) At clearing stations and other Medical Department establishments in rear of clearing stations, Form 52b will be accomplished completely.
(2) For the Transfer of Patients
To Clearing Station or Hospital. The original of the Emergency Medical Tag will accompany the patient to the Clearing Station or Hospital. Hand imprinting machines should be used whenever possible to transmit the information contained on the patients identification tag to the Emergency Medical Tag (MD Form 52b). The notation, "Clearing Station" or "Hospital" will be shown in the space for disposition. If the patient is returned to duty from the Clearing Station, the Emergency Medical Tag will accompany him back to his unit dispensary when practicable to do so, where the tag will be removed, completed by the necessary notations on the reverse side under "Supplement Record", and will be forwarded with the Sick and Wounded Report for the month in which the patient returned to duty. When this procedure is impracticable, the Emergency Medical Tag may be included in the Sick and Wounded Report of the Unit which had given treatment to the patient.
(3) For Treatment Cases. The Emergency Medical Tag will be used for cases excused from duty and treated in quarters. Cases admitted to dispensary beds are considered as being on a "quarters" status. On cases returned to duty from dispensary or quarters, the Emergency Medical Tag will be completed with the notation "Duty", "Duty Improved" or "Duty Condition Unchanged" under disposition. In cases treated in quarters or dispensary, and later transferred to a clearing station or hospital, the Emergency Medical Tag will accompany the patient with the proper notation "Hospital" or "Clearing Station" together with the date of transfer.
(4) For Deaths. All deaths occurring outside Hospitals will be recorded on the Emergency Medical Tag, and attached to the body. The original EMT will be removed from the body of the dead at internment, and forwarded direct to the Graves Registration Officer, Hq Force 343, who will in turn transmit the original EMT to the Surgeon, HQ Force 343, who will forward to Surgeon General through channels.
(5) Hospitals, mobile. Mobile hospitals will prepare, on each patient admitted, the Field Medical Record (WD MD Form 52c) and (WD MD Form 52d). If Form 52c and 52d are not available, Form 52 may be used. The Field Medical Record will accompany patients transferred to other hospitals. For patients returned to duty, dying, or otherwise disposed of (absent in desertion, turned over to Military Police, etc), the records will be completed. All records on completed cases will be forwarded with the monthly report of Sick an Wounded.
(6) Channels of transmission. All sick and wounded reports will be submitted to the Task Force Surgeon through medical channels. A surgeons will check and correct reports transmitted through their offices.

d. Casualty Reports and Reports of Death.
Battle Casualty reports will be rendered under the provisions of Circular #5, Hq. I Armored Corps, Reinforced, dated 25 May 1943. Detailed instructions for the preparation of casualty and death reports other than battle casualties are also found in this Circular, and therefore further instructions in this directive are not necessary. Strict adherence to the instructions contained in this Circular #5 is imperative. All concerned will check their reports for accuracy.

e. Admission and Disposition Reports.
(1) Purpose: The purpose of the Daily Admission and Disposition Report will be to furnish commanders with information concerning the status of personnel evacuated to medical installations.
(2) When and by whom submitted: A report on IAC Form 1, or a reproduction thereof, will be furnished by each commanding officer of a medical installation down to and including medical battalions It will cover all admissions and dispositions of patients, both casualty and non-battle casualty, and will show the last name, first name, middle initial, grade, army serial number, date of admission or disposition, and short diagnosis. Diagnosis of battle casualties will be preceded by (BC) to indicate and separate those cases hospitalized as a result of enemy action. Reports will be submitted to this headquarters in duplicate through command channels and will cover the period from midnight to midnight of each day. Also under dispositions will be shown whether casualty was transferred, i.e., within the combat zone, or evacuated, i.e., from the combat zone. The evacuating craft will be identified by name or number by the Evacuation Officer.

f. Report of Hospitalization.
In order to facilitate the notification of each unit as to the number of casualties, an individual report of hospitalization will be rendered by each functioning clearing station and hospital. This report will be rendered daily as of midnight. Attached is a suggested form for individual report of hospitalization. This, or a similar form will be used by all units rendering this report.

g. Award of Purple Heart.
(1) Casualties entitled to the Purple Heart will be given this decoration in the forward Medical installations provided that they are not to be evacuated rearwards.
(2) The fact of such an award and the number of the decoration will be entered on the individual's Emergency Medical Tag or (WD MD Form 52, Report Card) to avoid duplication. Four (4) copies of orders announcing the award will be forwarded through this headquarters to The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.

h. Form 86f (Revised)
(1) The Form 86f (Revised) will be rendered daily as of midnight by all hospitals and during combat by functioning clearing stations. When any unit opens, its first report will be marked "INITIAL" and when closed the last report will be marked "FINAL".
(2) The following instructions relative to the preparation of the Form 86f will be used as a guide in the preparation of this form and will be strictly complied with by all units rendereing this report. Attached hereto is copy of 86f which will be used by all units rendering this report to this headquarters.

I Red Status: Self-explanatory.
II Number of patients:
(a) Under spaces (1) Diseases, (2) Injury, (3) Wounded, (4) Gassed, and (5) Total, will be entered all United States Army, Navy and Air Force personnel hospitalized or treated during the period covered by this report. Each of these spaces have been sub-divided into two sections: Army and Navy. Include all Air Force personnel under either the Army or Navy column as the case may be. Under space (6) will be entered all other Allied personnel hospitalized or treated during the period covered by the report, such as English, French, etc. Space (7) Enemy, self-explanatory. Space (8) Grand Total, self-explanatory.
(b) Line (a) Remaining: All patients that were remaining on preceding report will be entered on this line.
(c) Line (b) Received Direct: Patients received will be considered DIRECT ADMISSIONS if they have not previously had a War Department MD Form 52c or 52d started. If a patient is received from a division or corps clearing station and admitted to an evacuation hospital with only the War Department MD Form 52b, Emergency Medical Tag, attached, he therefore should be carried as a DIRECT ADMISSION: the same applies to division and corps clearing stations.
(d) Line (c) Received by Transfer: On this line will be entered all patients that are received and already have a Form 52c or 52d started on them.
(e) Line (d) Total: On this line will be the total of Lines (a), (b), and (c).
(f) Line (e) Duty: On this line will be entered all patients returned to duty during period covered by report.
(g) Line (f) Transferred: On this line will be entered only those patients evacuated to the communications zone; i.e., if a patient is transferred from a clearing station to an evacuation hospital or from one corps evacuation hospital to another within the combat zone, this will not be considered as evacuated but carried as Transferred and entered on Line (f) Transferred. For a patient to be evacuated he must be evacuated from the combat zone to a medical installation in the Communication Zone.
(i) Line (h) Died: On this line will be entered all patients dying during period covered by report.
(j) Line (i) Other Dispositions: On this line will be entered unusual dispositions, such as AWOL, or when a patient is returned to his organization as a quarters case; or any other unusual disposition not covered specificially on this form.
(k) Line (j) Sub-Total: On this line will be the totals of Lines (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i).
(l) Line (k) Remaining: On this line will be entered the total number of patients remaining in hospital or clearing station at the close of period covered by report.
(m) Line (l): On this line will be entered in the proper subcolumn all seriously ill patients remaining in hospital or clearing station at the close of the period covered by the report.
III Classification of Patients:
(a) Bed Patients: In this space will be entered the total number of bed patients remaining in hospital or clearing station at the close of period covered by report.
(b) Transportable: In this space will be entered all patients whose physical condition permits them to be transported, both ambulatory and litter patients.
(c) Non-transportable: In this space will be entered all patients that cannot be removed, due to the status of their physical or mental condition, from the hospital or clearing station.
(d) Ambulatory: In this space will be entered the total number of ambulatory patients remaining in hospital or clearing station at the close of period covered by report.
(e) Approximate Number of Patients to be Evacuated Following Day: In the space (1) Litter and (2) Walking will be entered the approximate number of patients to be evacuated (not transferred) the following day; i.e., if you are rendereing a report for the period 2 May 1943 - the report is rendered on 3 May 1943 and refers to the approximate number to be evacuated on the following day - 4 May 1943.
IV Communicable Diseases: (To be rendered when medical situation permits)

(a) Communicable disease cases will be entered under the appropriate column as designated by the report; i.e., Respiratory, Venereal, etc. Communicable disease cases entered under the column "Endemic Diseases" will be further explained as to the specific kind under section "VI Remarks".
(b) Line (a) Remaining: All patients that were remaining on preceding report will be entered on this line.
(c) Line (b) Admitted: All patients admitted either direct or by transfer during the period covered by the report.
(d) Line (c) Total: On this line will be entered the total of Lines (a) and (b).
(e) Line (d) Duty: All patients returned to duty during the period covered by the report.
(f) Line (e) Died: All patients who have died during the period covered by the report.
(g) Line (f) Other Dispositions: All patients transferred or evacuated, AWOL, etc., during period covered by the report.
(h) Line (g) Sub-Total: On this line will be entered the total of lines (d), (e), and (f).
(i) Line (h) Remaining: On this line will be entered the total number of communicable disease patients (within these categories) remaining in hospital or clearing stations at the close of period covered by report.
V. Hospitals Included in this report:
This section pertains to hospital units only and should give the correct designation of each hospital whose statistics are included therein.
VI. Remarks:
This section pertains to hospitals and clearing stations. Any information pertinent to the casualty situation should be included under this heading. Any communicable disease, injury or unusual circumstance reported under above headings that may require clarification should be further explained here.

i. Wounded Progress Reports.
(1) When submitted: Wounded Progress Reports will be submitted weekly on NATOUSA Form 7 by commanding officers of all hospitals. The reports will be submitted direct to this headquarters in duplicate covering the period from mid-night of Saturday to mid-night of the following Saturday, the initial report being submitted as of mid-night of the first Saturday following "D" day.

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(2) Preparation: The Preparation of the Wounded Progress Report, NATOUSA Form 7, is self-explanatory and no further discussion is necessary except that it must again be impressed upon all concerned with the preparation of this report that only personnel who have been hospitalized as Battle Casualties will be reported on this form.

j. Surgeon, Sub-Task Forces, will report daily to Surgeon Force 343 by the most expeditious means available the number of casualties being evacuated by water and air, their classification (Water - stretcher or ambulatory. Air - Priority I, II, or III), and place of landing in N.A.

5. PROFESSIONAL CARE OF CASUALTYS

a. In an effort to standardize professional care of patients by medical officers of the force, the consultants in the Chief Surgeon's Office, NATOUSA have prepared outlines for the professional guidance of all concerned. These are attached as Appendices "A", "B", "C", "D", and "E" and "F".

b. These represent the best opinion available in the light of experience gained in Tunisia and should be widely distributed.

6. SANITATION

See attached inclosure 1. - Sanitary Order.

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

(S) W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., AGD.
Adjutant General.

DRAFT FOR SANITARY ORDER

GENERAL ORDER:

NO. . . . :

1. GENERAL: The following provisions for the sanitation of this command are published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

a. Responsibility. Commanding Officers of all grades as provided in AR 40-205 and FM 21-10.

b. Medical Department. The Senior Medical Officer is responsible for the general supervision of the Medical Department of the Command in the performance of its duties. All medical officers will act in like manner as technical advisors to their respective commanding officers.

c. Hygiene. The highest standard of personal hygiene must be continuously maintained to prevent the occurrence and spread of serious diseases in this area. Physical inspections will be held twice monthly and at such other times as recommended by unit surgeons and approved by unit commanders. Frequent bathing will be required. All personnel will report to the unit medical officer immediately upon discovery of infestation with lice, ticks or fleas.

d. Water. The supply is scanty. Commanders of all grades will insure strict compliance with regulations for the conservation of water, assuring themselves that economy measures shall apply less drastically to drinking supplies. All water will be considered as non-potable, regardless of source, until pronounced potable by competent authorities. Troop units away from authorized sources will purify their water by boiling for one (1) minute or by the use of Halazone Tablets (2-4 tablets to one canteen of water depending upon turbidity) and allow to stand for thirty (30) minutes. A minimum allowance of one (1) gallon of water per man per day should be provided.

e. Food and Messes. Care will be exercised in the preparation and handling of food, especially avoiding all use of left over cooked foods for subsequent meals. Meats and other foods will receive veterinary inspection and approval before issue to troops. Local root and leafy vegetables will not be used except when thoroughly washed, scaled or peeled. No raw vegetables will be served. No food will be purchased from local sources unless authorized by the Commanding General.

During the initial landing phase, troops are cautioned not to eat out of mess kits, until facilities for washing mess-gear become available. Sand, other than that from clean beach sources, will not be used for scouring.

Police and cleanliness of messes and mess-gear will receive special emphasis to prevent disease outbreaks. In the event facilities for adequately heating of water cannot be provided, dishes having been cleaned by washing and then rinsed in hot water will be immersed for not less than 30 seconds in a chlorine solution containing at least 50 parts per million of free chlorine.

Food handlers will be examined and inspected as prescribed in AR 40-205.

f. Waste Disposal. Intestinal diseases being very common, special care is demanded, particularly during initial phases of landing on beaches.

(1) Human excreta will be disposed of by the following methods:
- (a) Catholes during the initial landing phase.
- (b) Straddle trenches properly maintained.
- (c) Flyproof, deep-pit latrines.
- (d) Urine soakage pits.
- (e) Septic tanks and other water carriage systems where present and proper maintenance is possible.

(2) Kitchen solid and liquid waste will be disposed of by the following methods:
- (a) Burial or incineration.
- (b) Soakage pits or trenches, employing grease traps, which must be covered.
- (c) Hauling away by reputable civilians with the avoidance of spillage or other sanitary nuisances.

g. Quarters. All barracks, tents or billets will be maintained in a clean and sanitary state. All buildings will be thoroughly inspected and disinfested, when necessary, before occupancy. Locations near swamps, ponds or native habitations will be avoided as much as possible when the military situation permits. All troops will sleep under sand fly nets.

h. Control of Insects and Pests:

(1) The Medical Department is responsible for making necessary surveys relating to pests and for making appropriate recommendations relating thereto.

(2) The Corps of Engineers is charged with the carrying on of work in relation to the environmental factors of insects.

(3) The Quartermaster Corps has the responsibility for operating the larger delousing units for the treatment of troops.

(4) The Chemical Warfare Service will furnish the Medical Department technical advice in regard to fumigation of buildings.

(5) The troop units will conduct pest control measures within their own areas and in areas immediately adjacent thereto.

i. Prevalent Diseases.

(1) Intestinal Diseases - The high incidence of Diarrhea, Amebic Dysentery, Bacillary Dysentery, Typhoid Fever, and Undulant Fever necessitates the greatest possible emphasis on the sanitary supervision of all foods, drink, waste disposal and all fly control measures. No unboiled milk from any source, except canned rations, is to be used. Native foods and native food-handlers will be avoided initially. Strict compliance with Cir. No. 106 NATOUSA 9 June 1943 will be enforced. Any relaxation in recommended control measures will be followed by serious epidemics and will not be tolerated by this command. All troops should be fully protected by T.A.B. inoculation.

(2) Insect-borne Diseases - Malaria, Sandfly Fever, Leishmaniasis, Relapsing Fever, Typhus Fever, Fievre Boutonneuse, Dengue and Yellow Fever introduced by air, must be especially guarded against. Whenever possible camp sites should be located on high ground and not near ruins. All troops will sleep under mosquito bars, sandfly mesh, carefully supervised and constantly maintained. Personnel on guard detail will wear gloves and headnets. Repellants and anti-mosquito spraying should be employed. Equipment for applying Paris Green and Oil must be available. Suppressive Atabrine therapy against malaria will be carried out as ordered by the Commanding General. Contact with dogs, especially those with sores, native dwellings, and natives must be forbidden. Bathing will be as frequent as possible. Avoidance and correction of lousiness is paramount to prevent Typhus and Relapsing Fever. All buildings will be thoroughly inspected and fumigated or sprayed before occupation in order to eliminate fleas and other disease bearing insects. Rat control measures will be instituted.

(3) Other Diseases.

(a) Hookworm - Personnel should be cautioned against going barefoot and handling soil in the vicinity of homes and manured fields. If suspicious symptoms arise, trench diggers should be examined after 20 days for eggs.

(b) Rabies - Because of the prevalence of Rabies, the keeping of dogs, cats, and other animal pets in organizational areas is forbidden.

(c) Schistosomiasis - Bathing or swimming in fresh water streams, lakes or marshes will be prohibited

j. Immunization. All immunizations will be accomplished in accordance with Circular No. 21, NATOUSA, dated 28 February 1943.

k. Supplies for Pest Control. The following pest control materials will be available at Engineer and Quartermaster supply warehouses. The fullest possible use of these materials must be made by all organizations to prevent Plague, Typhus, Malaria, and other diseases spread by insects and rodents:

Engineer Supplies

MATERIAL:	BASIS OF ISSUE:
Pyrethrum insecticide for roaches or fleas.	5 gal per Co.
Insecticide for crawling insects	2 oz can per pers. ea. mo.
Borax powder to prevent fly breeding	10 lbs per Co.
Barium carbonate rat poison	1 lb per Co.
Calcium cyanide for fumigation	- to be handled by trained persons, not for general issue.
Rat traps	4 per Co.
Fly swatters	4 per Co.
Fly paper, rolls	10 rolls per Co.
Flying insect repellent "Indalone"	2 oz bottle per pers. ea. month.
Sprayers Knansack, anti-mosquito	2 per Regiment.
Diesel Oil for mosquito control	1 drum with ea. sprayer (55 gal.)
Paris Green	- to be handled by trained persons.

Quartermaster Supplies

MATERIAL:	BASIS OF ISSUE:
Ethocel delousing bags, individual	2 per Co.
Methyl bromide ampules to use with above	50 per Co. (20 cc. each)

Organizations will provide themselves with proper equipment and materials to control lice, fleas, rats, flies, mosquitoes, roaches and other pests about their areas. Engineer responsibility for mosquito control and other pest and insect control is as outlined in AR 100-80.

Medical Inspectors are responsible for inspection of men and premises and for advice as to the best means for controlling any pest that is encountered. Daily inspection for lice will be made when louse-borne diseases occur in an organizations.

The use of Ethocel bags for delousing is as follows: -

The clothing and equipment of the individual soldier are placed in the bag with one 20cc capsule of methyl bromide and the mouth of the bag securely tied. The capsule is then broken from the outside of the bag using the least force necessary. The bag is set in the open air for thirty (30) minutes. It is then opened and aired ten (10) minutes before emptying. No gas mask is needed when working in open air. Men will be bathed, shaved and inspected for lice and nits as in any other method of delousing. Adult lice and eggs are destroyed by methyl bromide.

l. Venereal Prophylaxis. Venereal disease is common and widespread. Before landing troops should be provided with adequate mechanical and chemical prophylactic kits. Venereal prophylaxis will be available at each unit dispensary. Lists of prophylactic stations in nearby communities will be posted on all organization bulletin boards. Personnel on pass will be required to have on their person mechanical and chemical prophylactic kits.

m. Health Education. Troops will receive regular and frequent instruction relative to personal hygiene, dangers of unauthorized food and drink, diseases prevalent in this area, venereal diseases, and the necessity for the various special precautions.

n. Liaison with Local Civilian and Civil Affairs Health Authorities. The Force Surgeon will contact and maintain liaison with local native and Civil Affairs Health Authorities as soon as possible and make available such local health information to the Command.

2. CIVILIANS: All civilians and civilian organizations attached to this Command will comply with this order insofar as it applies to them.

TREATMENT OF SANDFLY FEVER, MALARIA, AND BACILLARY DYSENTERY

1. Sandfly Fever. This disease clinically resembles Influenza. The onset is abrupt with a congested face and injected conjunctivae. Meningismus may be present with an increase of lymphocytes in the spinal fluid. A transient rash may be noted in the first 24 hours and headache, backache and post-orbital pain are prominent symptoms. The pulse is slow in comparison with the temperature.

a. Treatment. Purely symptomatic. Aspirin grains 10, Q. 4 hours relieves the pain. Fluids should be forced.

2. Malaria Therapy. If a subject becomes infected with Malaria and breaks through suppressive therapy, the clinical course of the disease will not be changed by the fact that suppressive treatment has been given, and curative therapy should be carried out as usual.

a. Therapy. Malaria - uncomplicated. (Patients are able to retain oral medication.)

(1) Combined QAP Treatment. (Method of choice)
- (a) Quinine sulphate, 0.64 gram (10 grains) three times daily after meals for 2 or 3 days, or until pyrexia is controlled.
- (b) Atabrine, 0.1 gram (1 1/2 grains) three times daily after meals for five days. Then after 2 days without anti-malarial medication give
- (c) Plasmochin, 0.01 gram (3/20 grain) three times daily after meals for five days, except for the debilitated patient, who should receive only two doses daily. (Discontinue if toxic symptoms occur. Never give Atabrine and Plasmochin concurrently).

(2) Atabrine - Plasmochin treatment. (May be used for simple vivax infections and in other infections when no Quinine is available.)
- (a) Atabrine, as above for 7 days. Then, after 2 days without antimalarial medication, give Plasmochin, 0.01 gram three times daily for 5 days, as above.

(3) Quinine - Plasmochin treatment. (Method when no Atabrine is available.)
- (a) Quinine sulphate, as above, for 7 days during the last 5 of which accompany each dose of quinine with Plasmochin, 0.01 gram three times daily.

NOTE: Quinine sulphate tablets are more quickly effective if dissolved before taken. Ten grains of Quinine sulphate may be dissolved in one ounce of water which has been acidified by the addition of 10 minims of dilute sulphuric or hydrochloric acid, (USP) or 2 trams (30 grains) citric acid.

- (b) Malaria with coma. Quinine dihydrochloride, 0.64 gram (10 grains) in at least 200 cc. sterile normal saline given intravenously very [illegible] every 8 hours until patient can retain oral medication; then treat as uncomplicated case.
- (c) Malaria with vomiting (unable to retain oral medication)
  1. Quinine dihydrochloride, 1.0 gram (15 grains) in 10cc sterile normal saline injected carefully into the gluteal muscles of one buttock; site of injection then massaged thoroughly for 2 minutes. Care must be taken to avoid the sciatic nerve. Dose may be repeated if necessary in 8 hours in another buttock. As soon as patient can retian oral medicant treat as an uncomplicated case. (See 2 a).
  2. Atabrine dihydrochloride, 0.2 gram (3 grains) in 5 cc. sterile normal saline may be substituted for intramuscular injection if no quinine dihydrochloride is available.

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3. Acute Bacillary Dysentery. Specific therapy should always be used in the treatment of Bacillary Dysentery and Diarrhea in order to prevent many carriers from becoming established. Fluids should be forced, salt loss replaced and in severely ill, dehydrated patients plasma transfusion and the administration of saline by the intravenous route should be practiced.

a. Sulfaguanidine. Initial dose 7.0 grams by mouth. Subsequent dose 3.5 grams every four hours, day and night, until the stools number 5 or less per day. Then give 3.5 grams of Sulfaguanidine every 8 hours until convalescence is established.

b. Sulfadiazine. Initial dose 2.0 grams by mouth. Then give 1.0 grams every 8 hours until convalescence is established. If the response to therapy is not prompt, the dose of the drug may be increased.

SURGICAL MEMORANDA ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

1. General Principles of Wound Management:

a. Surgical operation performed under unfavorable conditions without facilities for proper after care is often more hazardous than prompt evacuation if the patient is transportable or can be made so.

b. Wounded evacuated by water should, particularly during early phases of combat, be so bandaged and splinted that they can swim or at least remain afloat should emergency require it.

c. Overdosage with morphia produces dangerous coma and respiratory depression that may delay the administration of an anaesthetic or render evacuation transport hazardous.

d. All wounds are left open after debridement, frosted with sulfonamide and loosely filled with vaseline gauze. There are no exceptions. (See below for specialized regional situations).

e. Only bruised and devitalized skin need be excised, and this with narrow margin. Avoid circumcision of wounds leaving circular defects by using linear extensions to gain exposure.

f. During debridement open all deep pockets and transversely divide fascial planes.

g. Do not pack wounds with gauze or sulfonamide.

h. Immobilize site of extensive injury even if fracture is not present.

i. Continue oral administration of sulfonamide.

j. Make notations on casts and on Field Tags and Records, (casts are frequently changed) particularly of what was done at operation. These notes are not merely for statistical purposes although essential as such. They are required for the subsequent care of the patient.

2. Plaster Casts.

a. Split or bivalve all casts as soon as dry. There are no exceptions.

b. Pad all casts and split padding as well as cast. Non-padded plaster is not suitable for transportation splinting.

c. Apply no circular adhesive or bandage under cast.

d. Maintain foot in neutral position with correction of tendency toward equinus, valgus or varus.

3. Compound Fractures.

a. Objects to be achieved in initial surgery are control of infection and safe, comfortable transportation. Reduction and rigid fixation of fracture can be accomplished at the Base.

b. Careful debridement as priority case. No internal fixation forward of Field or Evacuation Hospitals. Do not pack wound - loosely fill with vaseline gauze. Splint for transportation. Skeletal fixation or traction not recommended for transportation splinting.

c. Femur: Evacuate in Tobruk splint (see appendix) as early as circumstances permit to reach Base for correction of deformity. A fractured femur should reach a General Hospital in the rear within 10 days. Do not evacuate with clove hitch or boot traction-use skin adhesive.

d. Knee-joint: In debridement minimize incisions that compound joint. Remove accessible foreign bodies. Irrigate joint with saline. Close synovial membrane. Loosely fill debrided wound with vaseline gauze. Evacuate early, immobilized in plaster or preferably, Tobruk splint.

e. Leg: Carefully debride all wounds in multiple injuries, as circulation frequently impaired and gas gangrene likely. Penetrating wounds of calf may require incision for hematoma impeding circulation. Bivalve rather than split casts so inspection dressings may be possible without losing position in compounded fractures. Hold patient if circulation is questionable, otherwise evacuate as early priority.

f. Humerus: Use modified Velpeau plaster bandage to hold arm to trunk, or "U" plaster. Skin traction, skeletal fixation, high abduction spica and hanging cast unsuitable for transportation splinting.

4. Neuro-surgical:

a. Cranio-cerebral. Shave scalp three inches around wound. Remove gross superficial debris by gentle separation edges of scalp. Apply sulfonilamide; cover with sterile pad. Evacuate as priority case preferably by air.

b. Spinal Cord: Same. Suprapubic cystostomy postponed until neurosurgical and x-ray evaluation of injury.

c. Peripheral Nerve: Describe findings on record. No suture.

d. Note the following abstract from "The Treatment of Head Wounds in Forward Area" by Brigadier Hugh Cairns, Consultant Neuro-surgeon, B.A.M.C.

(1) Middle East experience suggests that when the patient with a head wound is in good condition he should be evacuated without operation if he can be delivered to a Head Center within 72 hours of injury. The decision to hold or to evacuate should be made at the earliest possible moment after the patient reaches the forward hospital. Too often 24 hours or more are lost before the decision is taken.

(2) In cases which must be operated on in the forward area because there is no possibility of evacuation, the general surgeon should perform a limited operation. He should excise obviously necrotic skin, but not do a formal excision of the scalp wound. He should remove superficial blood clot and debris (dirt, hair, necrotic brain and bone), place in the wound sulfanilamide (unless there is a hole into the ventricle, apply a firm dressing (but no plugging or packing of the brain wound) and evacuate the case to the head center as soon as possible. Arrived at the head center, such a case should, after x-ray examination, be operated on again to complete the toilet of the brain wound.

(3) A small proportion of cases will require operation in the forward area because they are rapidly developing cerebral compression, with increasing depth of unconsciousness and the other symptoms of extradural and subdural clot. In these cases the wound must be thoroughly explored and the clot evacuated.

(4) Head injuries have proved to be among the most favorable cases for prompt evacuation by air.

5. Eye:

a. No excision of eyeball because of damage - only if necessary as part of wound debridement. Penetrating wounds evacuate lying. For injuries and foreign bodies instill 1% atropin. Apply soft pad and bandage both eyes if safe for method of transport available (see Section 1, b).

6. Maxillo-facial:

a. Clear respiratory passage. Maintain sitting or face down position. Tongue traction. Do not remove fragments of fractured mandible unless certainly devitalized. Soft part closures only after dental splinting.

b. Inter-dental wiring with elastic band traction fixation. Evacuate by air to avoid sea-sickness.

7. Chest:

a. Temporarily close sucking wounds by pad of vaseline gauze held firmly by adhesive strapping. Insert small catheter 2nd interspace anteriorly to relieve pressure pneumothorax. With extensive surgical emphysema relieve pressure pneumothorax.

b. Initial definitive surgery limited to debridement and closure wound of chest wall without complete suture of superficial layers and skin. Local anaesthesia often satisfactory and avoids hazards of asphyxia. Transfuse slowly and only when essential.

c. Evacuation by air as priority case. Preliminary aspiration hemothorax without air replacement.

8. Abdomen:

a. First priority for emergency surgery. Close abdominal wall with stay sutures.

b. Exteriorize large bowel and rectum perforations or perform proximal colostomy. There are no exceptions.

c. Examine carefully for evidence of abdominal penetration all casualties with entrance wounds in buttocks or chest.

d. Perforation of intestine, particularly ileo-cecal region and multiple, is caused by hydraulic blast wave from bombs exploding in water. No external evidence of injury.

e. Always leave supra-pubic cystostomy in closure of perforation of bladder.

f. Hold abdominal cases after operation until equilibrium is established (4-5 days). This is essential, as even simple cases die as a result of early transport. Leave Levin tube in place during transport.

9. Burns:

a. Cleansing may be limited to removal of gross debris and thick coating of oil by mechanical means.

b. Apply boric ointment or vaseline gauze, cover with sterile mechanics waste and bandage firmly. Burns damaging eyes require closure by bandage.

c. For emergency transport by water do not obstruct vision or respiration by bandaging. Leave jaw free for possible vomiting.

d. Shock in burns is often delayed for 4 to 6 hours. Use this period for evacuation when possible. Otherwise extensive burns must be held until equilibrium is established. Most flash burns are partial thickness injuries with small patches of full thickness loss. Life endangering shock not common unless surface area is unusually extensive, or unless environmental temperature is immoderately high.

10. Amputations:

a. Circular type guillotine is amputation of choice. In forward surgery performed for control of hemorrhage, destruction of circulation, removal of an irreparably destroyed extremity, and as a step in the debridement of a traumatic amputation. The site is the lowest possible level of viable tissues regardless of the eventual utility of the stump.

b. Gas gangrene infection occurs in certain cases with 24 hours delay in evacuation from the field. Amputate only if more conservative surgery and full dosage (80,000 to 100,000 units of polyvalent anti-toxin) are judged inadequate.

c. Apply skin traction on the operating table and maintain during evacuation.

d. No sutures. There are no exceptions.

APPENDIX

Tobruk Transportation Plaster. Recommended for fractures of the femur, wounds involving the knee-joint and fractures of the leg near the knee.

1. Dress wound and retain dressing with stripe of adhesive plaster. No circular dressing or bandages should ever be put on under a plaster case.

2. Support patient with a pelvic rest, or bowl under sacrum. One assistant holds the foot by the heal and toes and exerts traction. The foot is kept at right angles. A second assistant supports the fracture and keeps the knee bent at 10 degrees flexion with the palms of the hands not the fingers.

3. Apply traction strapping as close up to the wound as possible. Fold distal ends of straps into cords.

4. Pad the heel and malleoli with wool. Turn back the traction straps from the region of the malleoli while winding the wool around. Pad the knee prominences similarly. There have been some cases of foot drop from pressure on the external popliteal nerve. Pad the upper part of the thigh close to the ring of the splint with a layer of wool. Pad the entire extremity with sheet wadding or stockinette.

5. Lay a strip of tin (obtainable from ration boxes, etc.) wrapped in paper over the anterior surface of the length of the limb to beyond the toes.

6. Prepare a plaster slab (6 thickness) - apply posteriorly as high as possible and distally over heel and sole of foot to project 3-4" above the toe

7. Complete plaster cast with circular bandages round the slab enclosing the whole of the leg and foot except the dorsum of the toes and mould. Do not cover over traction straps further than just above the malleoli.

8. The traction straps are now emerging from the plaster just above the malleoli. Turn them back and cut the plaster away from where they emerge, sufficiently to free the straps from the plaster. This allows the traction to be on the leg and not on the cast. Trim the plaster over the dorsum of the toes. See that the little toe is free.

9. Apply Thomas Splint preferably half-ring and fit lower part of ring against Tuber Ischii and adductor muscles. Hold up ring so as to obtain correct position and insert pads of wool anteriorly and laterally between the ring and the thigh to maintain the position. Tie traction straps to notch in splint and insert spreader and Spanish Windlass.

10. Wind plaster bandages round the side bars of the splint and round the limb to anchor the splint to the limb.

11. Support distal end of splint with splint bracket.

12. When plaster is moderately firm cut down on thin strip over whole length plaster and withdraw strip and split the plaster. Cut the underlying padding with scissors or knife. It is not necessary to cut stockinette.

13. With indelible pencil draw diagram of fracture and write simple details, date of wounding, treatment, date of application of plaster, unit, etc.

NOTE: This splint is only intended as a transportation splint for the journey to the base. There is no need to aim at accurate apposition in the Forward Area. On arrival at the Base Hospital x-ray examination should be made, position corrected if necessary and routine treatment employed.

This form of fixation will do quite well even for fractures of the upper third of the femur for transport.

NEUROPSYCHIATRIC CASUALTIES IN COMBINED OPERATIONS

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:

Because of the relatively great percentage of neuropsychiatric casualties under modern battle conditions and because of the marked disturbance and panic possibilities created by such cases, it would appear advisable to give special consideration to the handling of this problem during Combined Operations.

There are few available statistics on the rates of occurrence of neuropsychiatric casualties during such operations and those which are available are of a general nature. It is thus obvious that any calculations of this type must be based on inductive reasoning from these general figures and may be subject to wide error. In spite of this possibility of error it should be possible to formulate a moderately close approximate of expected results.

Neuropsychiatric cases comprise about 3-5% of total hospital admissions in the European and North African Theater of Operations during non-combat times. It therefore seems reasonable to suppose that, allowing for the effects of anticipatory fears and of bombing, 10% of the total non-fatal cases occurring during the Waterborne Phase of the Operation will be neuropsychiatric in origin.

During the Landing Phases only three figures are of any significance:

(a) Dieppe Raid - The neuropsychiatric casualties constituted 2% of the total battle casualties returned to England following this heavy but short duration fighting.

(b) Navrik Operation - The neuropsychiatric casualties constituted 33% of the total battle casualties returned to England following the landing, fighting under unfavorable circumstances, and withdrawal from Norway.

(c) Maknassy-El Guettar - The neuropsychiatric casualties constituted 20% of the total battle casualties occurring during this moderately heavy battle engaged in by American troops.

From these figures it seems reasonable to suppose that neuropsychiatric casualties will comprise 15-20% of the total non-fatal battle casualties developing during the first ten days of the Landing Phase.

From previous experience with this type of case it can be stated with reasonable certainty that with adequate sedation 75% of the total neuropsychiatric case will be of the walking wounded category, 20% sitting, and 5% will require litters ashore and hospital bed space on shipboard.

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TREATMENT:

The general principles of the treatment of these neuropsychiatric cases are, with modifications, the same during all phases of a Combined Operation. In essence this treatment consists of heavy and prolonged sedation which materially decreases the severity of the symptoms and thus makes much easier the handling of such cases both ashore and on shipboard. This therapy should be continued until the cases are returned to the treatment center ashore.

During the pre-embarkation phase a determined attempt should be made to eliminate all of those men who show probability of developing a psychiatric disorder during or immediately following a Combined Operation. This process is already being undertaken.

During the Embarkation Phase any man developing marked psychoneurotic manifestations should immediately be disembarked and sent to a shore medical installation to avoid later occurrence and the contamination of other troops.

During the Waterborne Phase of the Operation any man developing disabling psychiatric manifestations should be at once placed on heavy sedation and segregated from the rest of the troops. He should be kept in a drowsy state, although not necessarily in bed, and if possible returned to a Base medical installation with the ship. His treatment should be the responsibility of the senior medical officer of the ship, or his delegate, and the patient should not be allowed to land on the hostile shore.

During Phase I of the Landing Operation (FM 8-25, 23 a) psychiatric casualties should be given a heavy initial dose of sedative by the Bn. Surgeon (or Company Aid man if feasible) and evacuated as an ordinary casualty.

During Phase II of the Landing the same general principle should be followed. Since by this time moderately large numbers of such cases will have begun to collect ashore, one psychiatrist, either from hospital installations of low landing priority or on special assignment., should be sent to each major beach head or hospital ship where needed to handle these cases.

During Phase III the principle of heavy sedation should continue and as bedspace becomes available in the Semi-mobile Evacuation hospitals those cases which have a favorable short term prognosis will be retained in such units for treatment. Those cases with poor prognosis will be evacuated in the usual manner.

Treatment on the hospital ships during all phases of the operations should follow the general sedation policy mentioned above. If non-hospital ships are designated to receive minor cases the majority of the neuropsychiatric cases could be usefully sent to those ships.

EVACUATION:

During all phases of the operation up to and including the second phase of the landing operation all cases, with rare exception, which develop should be considered unfit for further general combat duties and evacuated to the Communications Zone. In general this can be accomplished by means of the returning Troop Ships designated to receive minor patients, the special exceptions to this rule being those cases who are dangerous to themselves or to others. These latter cases must be evacuated in the locked facilities of a hospital ship.

During the third phase of the Landing, or as soon as beds are available, only those cases which cannot be treated in the shore installations will need to be evacuated. These evacuable cases will comprise 40% of the total neuropsychiatric casualties or in other terms 8% of the total battle casualties.

PERSONNEL:

The only specially trained personnel needed will be one psychiatrist per Force. He should be landed during Phase II of the Landing Operation as indicated above and should be obtainable from medical installations of low landing priority or by special assignment.

SUPPLIES:

No special supplies are needed. However, it must be made certain that each Bn. Aid Station, Medical Bn., Mobile Evacuation Hospital, and Ship has an ample supply of Sodium Amytal and Phenobarbital readily at hand. In addition each Hospital Ship should have an available stock of intravenous Sodium Amytal and if possible some paraldehyde.

SUGGESTION:

It has been clearly shown that barbiturates decrease the incidence of Seasickness in doses which do not impair mental function. The routine administration of Phenobarbital Grains I to all men landing in initial phases should be seriously considered. This would be best given 2-5 hours before the landing attempt and it would not only materially decrease Seasickness but would also decrease natural but excessive nerve tension.

THE TREATMENT OF BURNS

1. Classification.

a. Depth of Burn. Principles determining local treatment are based on two depths of injury of the skin:

(1) Partial thickness skin loss (1st and 2d degree)

(2) Full thickness (3d degree)

A partial thickness burn may be converted into full thickness loss of skin by infection or by the application of strong chemical coagulants or antiseptics.

b. Surface Area of Burn. The severity of shock and consequently the measures necessary for its prevention and correction are determined more by the extent (surface area) of the burn than by its depth. The application of Berkow's formula provides a convenient estimation of the burned area in terms of percentage of the total surface area of the body.

Berkow Formula

Head		6.0%
Both arms and forearms	13.5%	
Both hands	4.5%	
Total		18.0%
Trunk: Anterior surface	20.0%	
Posterior surface	18.0%	
Total		38.0%
Both Thighs	19.0%	
Both Legs	13.6%	
Both Feet	6.3%	
Total		38.9%

In describing a burn both the depth and the surface area is recorded. For statistical purposes it is also important to record the causative agent, e.g., gasoline, flame, tracer bullet, steam, etc.

2. First Aid. A burn is treated as a fresh open wound, the basic principle being prevention of contamination. Infection is prevented by avoiding seeding the surface with bacteria from the noses and throats of those taking care of the patient, contact with blankets, careless dressing technique and exposure by non-occlusive bandaging and dressings.

Burned clothes are left undisturbed, and exposed areas covered with shell dressings or sterile gauze held in place by firm occlusive bandaging. Morphia is given to relieve pain. Flash burns in enclosed spaces such as tanks may cause pulmonary damage and anoxia. Under such circumstances the respiratory depressant affect of large doses of morphia may be dangerous.

Plasma therapy need not be instituted in the field if a Clearing Station or Hospital for definitive treatment can be reached in approximately two hours. When a longer period may elapse before a center for definitive treatment can be reached, plasma infusions should be given to extensive cases. A first dressing of boric ointment or vaseline gauze is applied without attempt at preliminary cleaning.

A booster dose of tetanus toxoid is recommended.

3. Definitive Treatment. (At a Clearing Station or Hospital where full aseptic surgical technique can be observed).

a. Treatment of Shock. Shock should be anticipated and prevented rather than combatted. To anticipate shock an estimate of the area of the burn is informative. For each 10% of the body surface involved by a blistering burn, 500 cc of plasma will be required.

When shock is already present, blood-pressure readings and pulse rate provide indications for plasma dosage. With a low blood-pressure, plasma is given rapidly--at a rate of 100 cc per minute--until 1000 or 1500 cc have been given. Plasma infusion is then continued at a slower rate. In severe cases 4000 to 8000 cc may be required during the initial 48 hour period.

The degree of hemoconcentration is also a useful guide to shock treatment. 50 cc of plasma is indicated for every point that the concentration of hemoglobin exceeds the normal of 100%. Or, 100 cc of plasma for every point that the hematocrit determination exceeds the normal of 45.

These "rules of thumb" guides to therapy based on percentage of surface area and hemoconcentration are approximations, and will be found to vary with the man's condition before injury (dehydration, fatigue), environmental temperatures, particular body regions burned, associated wounds and other variables.

b. Local Treatment. Military conditions are distinctly unfavorable for the treatment of burns by coagulants. Sealing of the surface by an eschar is comparable to primary suture of a wound. The use of tannic acid and silver nitrate, and the use of gentian violet or triple dye cannot be recommended. This also holds for the use of jellies and ointments containing these ingredients either for first aid or definitive treatment.

A possible exception may be noted. With large area, partial thickness burns of the trunk when the casualty arrives for definitive treatment within 12 hours of injury, tannic acid may be a preferable form of treatment. The eschar should be formed by the rapid method, i.e. with the addition of silver nitrate, as prolonged methods of tanning may produce liver damage.

An essential step in the ritual of the coagulant treatment of burns was an elaborate cleansing of the surface. With the use of an "open" method of treatment cleansing need be less meticulous or if circumstances demand, dispensed with altogether. When cleansing of the burn surface is carried out it is done with all of the aseptic precautions of a major operation. Every person in the operation room including the patient is masked. Cleansing is done with extreme gentleness. The use of irritant soaps, detergents and antiseptics is avoided; cotton swabs replace scrubbing brushes and only a limited part of the burn is exposed to the air at any one time. The cleansing should be so gentle that anaesthesia other than preliminary sedation with morphia or barbiturates is not required. Blebs may be left intact or aspirated.

(1) Boric ointment or vaseline. Fine mesh gauze (see 8) impregnated with boric ointment or vaseline is applied to the surface. This is covered with a bulky dressing of sterile gauze or sterile mechanic's waste. A firm bandage exerting an even pressure is then applied. In burns of the forearm or leg the bandage starts at the digits and is carried upward. Fingers are separated and the hand bandaged in the position of function in burns of the hand. Remove finger rings. Burns of the face may be similarly treated, padding behind the external ears and carefully noting injury to the eyes before bandaging. Sodium sulamyd solution or an eye ointment is recommended for the eyes, with instillation of a mydriatic if corneal injury is present. Sulfadiazine ointment as issued is not suitable for the eyes because the ointment base is irritating.

As a further protection, extremities should be splinted or may be enclosed in a plaster of Paris casing particularly during evacuation. Plaster casings are split immediately to allow for swelling. Smearing the edges of the plaster with boric ointment is said to prevent maggot infestation.

When a boric ointment or vaseline dressing is used on extensive burns, oral or intravenous sulfonamide (preferably sulfadiazine) is immediately instituted and continued.

(2) Other ointments and emulsions. The use of cod-liver oil ointment appears impractical in this theater because of limitation of supply by W.P.B. order; rapid deterioration in hot weather, and its attraction for flies.

(3) Local application of sulfonamides.

(a) Sulfadiazine ointment may replace the bland ointments particularly in minor burns when it is not necessary to institute an intensive course of chemotherapy.

(b) Sulfanilamide in crystalline form frosted on the surface of the burn is rapidly absorbed, and if applied liberally to a large area may produce serious or fatal overdosage. No more than 10 grams can be used at one application. No supplemental chemotherapy should be given by other routes. Repeated appliontion requires dressings at four day intervals. The absorption rate and concentration established at the surface of the burn is unpredictably modified by a vaseline gauze covering.

(g) Water soluble base ointments and jellies containg sulfonamides evaporates rapidly and cause the dressing to adhere to the surface.

4. Continuing General Treatment.

When shock has been adequately controlled with plasma, saline or glucose saline may be used to supplement the oral intake and maintain fluid balance. Fluids are given to establish a urinary output of 1200 cc in 24 hours. Urinary output should be measured and charted. After any initial chloride deficiency has been corrected, intravenous infusions should be glucose in water.

Severely burned patients may be expected to develop a secondary anemia after 2 to 4 days. This may require whole blood transfusions as well as iron therapy. Repeated whole blood transfusions are required in extensive full thickness burns. No more than one or two transfusions should be given from "O" (universal) type if the patient is another type. Select a donor of the same group.

High protein diet and supplemental vitamin therapy are recommended for full thickness burns.

5. Continuing Local Treatment.

Change of dressings becomes necessary when the outer layers become soaked with exudation despite reinforcement, or when the clinical course suggests infection. The general condition of the patient, comfort, appetite, and mental clarity are as reliable indices of infection as the temperature chart which may remain elevated for some days even with clean healing. When the clinical course is satisfactory, dressings need not be changed until 10 to 14 days.

Dressings are carried out with the same aseptic technique recommended for the initial treatment, preferable in the operating room.

6. Full Thickness Skin Loss.

Partial thickness burns heal kindly in two weeks unless they become heavily infected. Enthusiasts can show miraculous results with almost any new form of treatment provided its use is limited to partial thickness burns. The majority of "flash" burns encountered in military surgery are of partial thickness.

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A full thickness burn demands untiring labor by the surgical team and may be a trying ordeal for the most courageous patient. Infection of the necrotic skin is inevitable, and chemotherapy at the best can only prevent extension of the infection to normal tissues or systemic dissemination.

If it were possible to recognise full thickness skin destruction at the onset, primary excision might be desirable. Early recognition is rarely certain in the absence of actual charring. Particularly in regions where function must be conserved, the natural separation of sequestrum from viable tissues must be accepted as the best method of management.

Full thickness areas are usually recognisable as such toward the end of the second week. Dressings are then done more frequently and separation of the slough hastened by instrument dissection. Wet saline dressings are recommended. If heavy infection is present, chlorinated dressings may be helpful. Pain during dressings is best controlled by sedation (morphine addiction is not infrequent) or pentothal anaesthesia.

Skin grafting is essential in every full thickness burn over an inch in diameter and is to be done at the earliest moment possible. Split thickness grafts cut with the razor or dermatome are preferable to pinch grafts. Traction, splinting or active motion will not prevent contractures during prolonged healing. The only means of minimising scar formation is early closure of the defect by grafting.

Corrective plastic procedures are not the function of this theater.

7. Evacuation. Casualties with severe burns do not travel well until the initial febrile stage is past and areas of full thickness skin loss are covered with healthy granulations. They should be kept at the place of primary treatment if the tactical situation permits.

8. Materials. It is recommended that medical units prepare sterile tins of fine meshed gauze or four thickness folds of hospital gauze impregnated with boric ointment or vaseline for use in burn casualties. (Boric ointment may be somewhat preferable to vaseline as it tends to inhibit the growth of B. pyocyaneus, a frequent secondary contaminant, and is said to discourage flies and maggots). Thirty-six inch hospital gauze is folded lengthwise to nine inches, giving a strop nine inches wide and four layers in thickness. Rapid application is favored by enclosing the strip in sheets of cellophane or paper (preferably waxed) and cut to proper sizes for face and hands. Longer strips for larger areas may be stored with an accordion fold in sterile tins. Prepared gauze may be packed in improvised containers for field, airplane or vehicle first aid kits.

MEMORANDA ON FORWARD SURGERY

1. Surgical Echelons.

a. The welfare of the patient and the tactical necessity for rapid evacuation demand a clear understanding of the function or mission of each unit of the Army Medical Corps. This is best arrived at by dividing the treatment of a casualty into two stages - primary and definitive. Separate groups of units provide each stage of treatment. In general, the equipment of each group is designed for that purpose only.

b. Stations of the first and second echelons - Aid Stations, Collecting Stations and Clearing Stations are equipped and staffed for the primary phase of treatment. Arrest of hemorrhage, splinting of the injury, resuscitation measures needed to make the patient transportable and administration of sulfonamides are the urgent functions of these stations. In addition, the treatment of minor injuries that allow immediate return to duty is carried out without evacuation. A Clearing Station is not designed to provide definitive treatment of battle casualties.

c. During combat, especially with long distances in evacuation to the rear, Surgical Teams are attached to certain Clearing Stations. It is their function to give emergency surgical treatment to selected cases requiring operation. This treatment would not otherwise be available in this echelon. The lack of facilities for pre-operative X-ray examination and for post-operative care of adequate duration place a grave responsibility on the surgeon in the selection of cases for surgery. These same limitations exist during quiet times The length of the evacuation line to the next echelon and changing tactical conditions require frequent redefinition of the surgery undertaken in the clearing station.

d. It must be remembered that the lightly wounded soldier, or a casualty due to accident may regain full combat status within the Theater if proper surgical treatment is carried out, but the Theater may be deprived of his service by faulty surgical judgement. Because a surgical procedure appears simple it is not sufficient reason for performing it in a Clearing Station unless the man can be returned to immediate duty without evacuation to the rear.

e. Hospitals of the third echelon (Evacuation Hospitals) are designed to initiate definitive surgical treatment to battle casualties. The more delay there is before reaching this echelon and the more hands the patient passes through in reaching it, the poorer will be the final result. The evacuation line is not an assembly line in which surgeon does his bit to the patient. It is a conveyance line along the course of which the progress of the patient may be halted to save life or limb or render him transportable.

f. While Evacuation Hospitals are adequately equipped and staffed to perform rehabilitation operations, it is not the function for which they were designed. Even in quiet times these patients are evacuated to the fourth echelon for operation unless the Commanding Officer assumes full responsibility based on a knowledge of the existing tactical situation as well as the surgical aspects of the individual case.

2. Surgical Procedures.

a. Dressings: Ideally, the primary phase of treatment is completed in the first unit reached that is equipped to provide it. The dressing is then left undisturbed until the patient reaches an Evacuation Hospital for operation. There are certain safeguards and adjustments that must take place enroute, but these do not include inspection of the wound by removal of the dressing unless definite indications are present. A compound fracture is halted at the Clearing Station for more adequate immobilization or resuscitation, but this need not involve redressing the wound unless there is reason to arrest continuing hemorrhage. A wound is not redressed solely for the purpose of reapplying local sulfonamide. Oral administration is sufficient safeguard.

b. The same principles apply after operation has been completed and the patient is being evacuated to the rear.

c. Uninformed hands do unnecessary dressings. The best safeguard for the patient is an adequate and legible record that accompanies him. A receiving officer is then in a position to refer to the record instead of looking at the wound. Many wounds after debridement and arrival at the base can be closed by secondary suture. Infection arising from contamination at the time dressings are changed makes this impossible.

d. Wound Management: Common mistakes in war surgery are: (1) Suture of wounds. (2) Tight Plugging by Packs. Hemorrhage is controlled by a stitch ligature if from a large vessel. Otherwise, by a temporary pack, elevation and firm pressure. If a pack is left in a wound make a note that it should be removed at the first opportunity. Vaseline gauze is laid loosely in a wound, not packed in. (3) Failure to Immobilize Site of Injury. Large wounds are immobilized even though fracture has not occurred. (4) Overexcision of skin. Circular defects are slow to heal. Very little skin need be excised, and in some instances none at all. (5) Failure to Open Deep Spaces during definitive treatment by freely incising fascial planes.

e. Head Wounds: Gently separate the edges of the scalp wound, remove superficial dirt and blood clot, and cover with gauze. Holding the gauze in place, shave the scalp for three inches away from the wound. Remove the gauze, frost the wound with sulfanilamide (not sulfathiazole) and apply dry gauze sponge held in place by suture to the wound edges or stripe of adhesive and bandage. Write on the S.W.T. - Dressing not to be removed before operation. Note the time of the wound and the duration of any period of unconsciousness or mental confusion if these facts can be obtained. Commence or continue sulfadiazine by mouth. Evacuate as priority case to nearest Hospital equipped and staffed for neuro-surgical procedures. A transport time of 48 to 72 hours is not an indication for an attempt to carry out surgery forward of an Evacuation Hospital.

f. Eye Injuries: It is never necessary to excise an eyeball in the Forward area because it is damaged. There is no danger of sympathetic opthalmia for two weeks. Any man suspected of having a penetrating wound of the eye is to be evacuated lying in order to prevent escape of vitreous. For injuries and foreign bodies in the eye instill 1% atropin and apply an anaesthetic ointment such a butyn and metaphen. Immobilise the lid with a patch or bandage. Many patients evacuated for eye injury arrive at a hospital with the pupil contracted in spasm so that examination and treatment is delayed.

g. Unless wounds and lacerations of the eye-lids are sutured with special plastic procedures, function is disturbed.

h. Ear: Do not put drops in the ear for blast injury. Lightly pack with cotton.

i. Chest: A sucking wound of the chest is closed tightly enough to prevent to and fro blasts of air with respiration, but not so tight that air cannot escape from the chest if a pressure pneumothorax builds up from an accompanying wound of a bronchus. Close with a pad of vaseline gauze folded to fit the wound and hold in position by adhesive plaster. One or two sutures penetrate the pad so that it is not lost into the pleural cavity.

j. Pressure pneumothorax requires prompt release by needle aspiration. If it reforms, insert a small catheter in the second interspace anteriorly.

k. Oxygen therapy may be as important as plasma. Aspiration of blood and air may make a man transportable that cannot otherwise be moved. Replacement of aspirated blood by air is rarely advisable. Internal bleeding is usually from the chest wall requiring revision of the (1) wound of exit and (2) wound of entrance; or it is from a large visceral or mediastinal vessel requiring thoracotomy.

l. Definitive surgery for thoracic wounds is postponed until X-ray examination can be carried out. It is disastrous to assume that large retained foreign bodies will not promote infection.

m. Abdomen: Perforation of abdominal viscera occurs with unusual sites of entry. Casualties with wounds of the thighs, buttocks and chest are examined with this in view. Transfer as priority case to a Clearing Station with Surgical Team attached or to an Evacuation Hospital, whichever is quicker. The large intestine must be exteriorized or drained after any injury, however trivial. If the injured part is mobile, it is respected and brought to the surface as a double barrelled colostomy. If it is fixed, the injury is repaired and a proximal colostomy performed. Any injury of the rectum, especially an extra-peritoneal one, demands a proximal colostomy. In the Middle East this principle of exteriorisation of colon injuries has been cited as perhaps the most important advance in the surgery of this war.

n. Abdominal incisions are closed with the added support of through and through stay sutures. When the large intestine has been perforated it is not advisable to suture the skin. Insert a folded strip of vaseline gauze held in place by the stay sutures tied over it.

o. Bladder: No perforating wound of the bladder is closed without establishing suprapubic drainage. Cord injuries complicated by retention of urine may be managed by an indwelling urethral catheter until the neuro-surgical implications of the case have been studied.

p. Compound Fractures: It is essential to distinguish splinting applied for a limited time as a transportation splint from apparatus or splinting designed for reduction and prolonged or rigid immobilisation. An adequate transportation splint prevents additional soft part injury and further deformity. It cannot in itself cause nerve injury, pressure sores, or jeopardise the circulation of the extremity. It provides adequate fixation for ambulance transport over rough roads, but may not secure the fragments in rigid fixation or exert the traction necessary for further reduction.

q. Plaster Casts: A more liberal use of plaster of paris casting is urged. Plaster casings or slabs applied as temporary transportation splints are padded and either bivalved or completely split. Encircling bandages and cotton rolling under the cast is also split as it soon becomes inflexible with dry blood or serum. Plaster casings applied directly to the skin are rarely found advisable in forward areas. If a skin plaster is applied for a definite indication, bony prominences are paded and the cast is immediately split in its full length. No encircling bandages or adhesive strips are placed under a plaster.

(1) All plaster casts applied in forward areas should be split or bivalved as soon as sufficiently dry.

r. Skeletal Traction: There is no indication for the use of skeletal traction or skeletal fixation in conjunction with transportation splinting in the forward area.

s. Internal Fixation: The use of bone plates or screws is not recommended in stations forward of an Evacuation Hospital.

t. Humerus: Skin traction, skeletal traction and high abduction spica plasters or splinting are not only uncomfortable but dangerous transportational methods. A hanging plaster is unsuitable for transportation purposes. A simple U plaster slab running from the affected shoulder over the anterior aspect of the forearm and upward to the axilla is usually sufficient. The wrist is supported by a bandage sling. Following definitive surgery, the same type of splinting may be used for further transport, or a carefully applied spica with limited abduction (30° - 35°) may be used.

u. Femur: Traction applied by a clove hitch, ankle bracelet or through the boot is not advisable for longer than six hours. This type of traction should be changed to skin traction at the Clearing Station.

v. Attention is drawn to the Tobruk transportation splint highly recommended by the R.A.M.C. reports from the Middle East. Medical Officers should be familiar with the design and methods of application of this splint and a more frequent use is suggested.

w. If a plaster spica is used the extremity is fixed in slight abduction and care taken to see that the upper part of the cast does not impinge on the costal margin. If the other leg is not tied into the spica, and it rarely need be, the plaster casing is extended well above the costal margin with fenestration provided for the abdomen.

x. Spica casting for either the upper or lower extremity must be well applied with adequate padding to avoid discomfort and pressure sores during transportation. These complications as well as easier application have led to the development of the Tobruk splint.

y. Amputation: In military surgery an amputation is a two-stage operation - the first stage performed in the overseas theater, the final stage, if necessary, in the Zone of the Interior.

(1) The circular type Guillotine is the amputation of choice. The indications for primary amputation are control of hemorrhage, destruction of circulation, removal of irreparably destroyed extremity and as a step in the debridement of a traumatic amputation. The site of primary amputation is the lowest possible level of viable tissues regardless of the eventual utility of the stump so formed.

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(2) Delayed amputation is performed for circulatory insufficiency, infection, gas gangrene in which more conservative measures have been inadequate, or in the judgement of the surgeon will be inadequate, and uncontrollable in secondary hemorrhage. The site of secondary amputation is determined by the judgement of the surgeon with respect to preservation of maximum bone length.

(3) Sulfanilamide is dusted on the end of the stump and vaseline gauze dressing applied. Skin traction is applied on the operating table and continued until the stump is healed. All lower leg amputations are splinted with a posterior slab to prevent flexion deformity of the knee. The splint extends below the level of the stump. Transport in ¥ ring Thomas splint with support of the stump and continued skin traction.

(4) Adhesive plaster traction is recommended in the forward areas where a bulky dressing may be desirable. Stockinette applied with skin glue may be substituted at the base. Adhesive plaster traction strips must extend to the edge of the incised skin and be anchored by two circular strips. They should not extend upward beyond the base of the limb.

(5) Secondary closure of amputation stumps is not recommended.

a. Peripheral Vascular Insufficiency: Following wounds that jeopardize the blood supply of an extremity transport beyond an Evacuation Hospital is delayed until the collateral circulation has been demonstrated adequate or until amputation has been performed. Immobilization for transport, or the additional trauma and shock incident to transport may be a determining factor in producing gangrene.

(1) Principles guiding treatment of a limb with defective circulation are as follows: (1) Immediate restoration of blood volume with plasma supplemented by whole blood transfusion to establish normal oxygen carrying capacity of the blood. (2) Prevention of loss of body heat by dry woolen covering for body and limbs. (3) Do not ligate a major artery in continuity. Divide vessel between ligatures. (4) Ligate and divide the companion vein. (5) The extremity supplied by the divided vessel should not be elevated but slightly depressed. Wrap in wool or cotton. Do not directly heat.

(2) To stimulate the development of collateral circulation the following measures are recommended: (1) Heat the body (not the limb) under a cradle. (2) Novocain block of sympathetic chain repeated daily if necessary. (3) Under special circumstances, sympathectomy (4) Vasodilating drugs are of questionable efficacy. (5) Passive vascular exercises. (6) Incision of deep fascia planes if a tense hematoma is present.

(3) Arterial spasm may be encountered when a missile passes close to an artery or there is an adjacent fracture. There is no external bleeding or hematoma. The limb is cold, numb and muscle action lost. Peripheral pulses are absent. There is no pain in contract to occlusion of the artery by an embolus.

(4) Peripheral pulses return in a few days as color and warmth reappear in the limb. Treatment is directed toward warming the body, and the use of sympathetic novocain block. If the vessel is exposed during debridement direct application of procain solution may be tried.

(5) All casualties with defective circulation in an extremity, particularly of the leg should be under close observation for the development of gas gangrene.

3. Whole Blood Transfusion. During the malarial season all personnel AUS, North African Theater of Operations, will be on suppressive atebrin therapy. It is recommended that no additional anti-malarial therapy be given either to recipients or donors of blood for emergency transfusions. If the transfusion is elective, atebrin 0.2 grams is given to the donor on the night before the blood is drawn. Quinine 0.64 grams (10 grains) given six hours before the transfusion may be substituted for the atebrin "booster" dose.

a. In addition to the above, the following precautions should be observed:

(1) The donor is questioned as to whether or not he has had chills, fever or malaise.

(2) The donor's abdomen is palpated for the presence of an enlarged spleen. If the spleen can be felt, the donor is rejected.

(3) Thick and thin films of the donor's blood are examined for malarial parasites if laboratory facilities are available.

b. Wounds and surgical procedures that of necessity interrupt the atebrin suppressive regimen may lead to the appearance of clinical malaria during the surgical recovery period. Surgical officers are to be on the alert to differentiate malaria from other surgical complications. Atebrin administration is resumed at the earliest possible time in surgical patients.

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EVACUATION POLICY FOR GAS CASUALTIES

1. Any plan for evacuation of gas casualties must be highly flexible and susceptible to rapid alteration as enemy chemical tactics develop. The policy herein outlined will serve as a guide in the formulation of these various plans.

2. Vesicant contaminated casualties should not be evacuated with non-gas casualties unless they have been treated and contaminated clothing removed. Initially, separate services for first aid and personnel decontamination must be maintained. After the casualty has been decontaminated and treated, his subsequent evacuation will be via normal channels with no special precautions. This should be accomplished as far forward as possible.

3. The speed with which personnel decontamination and first aid is rendered is most important, but subsequent to this the speed of vesicant casualty evacuation need not be considered as so urgent. Early evacuation is desirable to prevent clogging of the system.

4. The personnel of the attached medical detachments of divisional medical services should be able to care for chemical casualties if they occur only in small numbers and irregularly through the command. In a concentrated chemical attack provision must be made to augment and often replace portions of the 1st and 2nd echelons of normal medical service by moving forward a supporting medical unit. This will be especially feasible in an offensive situation, and enemy vesicant chemical action will probably be essentially a defensive procedure. Sections, platoons, or detachments of corps medical installations should be made readily available and alerted for such a mission.

5. Separate evacuation hospitals are not necessary for chemical casualties but later segregation in hospitalization is desirable.

6. The following factors are especially referable to the 1st and 2nd echelons of medical service:

a. The most important sector in the care of gas casualties is the forward medical installation. The extent of evacuation and the period of hospitalization are inversely proportional to the speed and effectiveness of first aid and personal decontamination.

b. Lung irritant casualties are all evacuated as litter cases and treated as severe battle casualties.

c. Skin contamination with vesicant agent is not adequate reason for evacuation while action is still in progress. By self decontamination with protective ointment most individuals can continue fighting until the tactical situation permits their release.

d. All significant skin casualties due to lewisite or nitorgen mustard should be evacuated when the situation permits.

e. Skin vesicant casualties and eye casualties are walking cases except as local lesions prohibit.

f. Irritant smoke and lacrimator casualties are not to be evacuated.

g. Casualties with vesicant chemical and surgical wounds may be evacuated directly through normal channels, the surgical wound regulating the urgency of evacuation. First aid for the chemical injury should be co-incidental.

h. If vesicant contaminated casualties are carried in an ambulance, suitable decontamination precautions must be taken before carrying other casualties.

i. The evacuation of potential casualties of the lung irritant groups is entirely dependent upon the feasibility of their release by the line commander. This is a command decision and not a medical decision, the medical officer being responsible only for his recommendation.

IAC FORM 1 ADMISSION AND DISPOSITION REPORT OF

_____ (Medical Installation)

For period ending at 2359 hours _____ (Day) _____ (Month) _____ (Year)

SECTION I - ADMISSIONS

	FULL NAME	ASN	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	DIAGNOSIS IN BRIEF **
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44.					

** Indicate (BC) if Battle Casualty

(Signature) (Grade) (Title) (Organization)

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(Medical Installation)

SECTION II - DISPOSITIONS (Day) (Month) (Year)

	FULL NAME	ASN	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	DIAGNOSIS **	DISPOSITION *
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* Show exact disposition. Also the evacuating craft will be identified by name or number by the Evacuation Officer.
** Indicate (BC) if Battle Casualty

(Signature) (Grade) (Title) (Organization)

d-43

INDIVIDUAL REPORT OF HOSPITALIZATION

EVACUATION HOSPITAL

TO: C.O., _____ (Unit)

_____ (Last Name) (First Name) (Middle Initial) (Rank) (ASN)

was received at this hospital _____ (Date).

Battle Casualty: Yes No (Delete One) TYPE: LW SW (Delete One)

Disposition: Held Evacuated (Delete One)

Cut on perforated line.

INDIVIDUAL REPORT OF HOSPITALIZATION

EVACUATION HOSPITAL

TO: C.O., _____ (Unit)

_____ (Last Name) (First Name) (Middle Initial) (Rank) (ASN)

was received at this hospital _____ (Date).

Battle Casualty: Yes No (Delete One) TYPE: LW SW (Delete One)

Disposition: Held Evacuated (Delete One)

WD Form 86f
(Revised)

UNIT _____ From _____ To _____ Hr. Day ____ Month ____ Year ____

I BED STATUS:

	Total	Occupied	Vacant	Emergency
Number of Beds:				

II NUMBER OF PATIENTS:

		U.S. ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE*										
		(1) Disease		(2) Injury		(3) Wounded		(4) Gassed		(5) Total		(6) Allies	(7) Enemy	(8) Grand Total
		Army	Navy	Army	Navy	Army	Navy	Army	Navy	Army	Navy			
a	Remaining													
b	Direct Admission													
c	Adm. by transfer from other Hosps.													
d	Total													
e	Duty													
f	Transferred													
g	Evacuated													
h	Died													
i	Other Disps.													
j	Sub-total													
k	Remaining													
l	Seriously Ill													

* Include Air Force Under Army or Navy according to branch.

III CLASSIFICATION OF PATIENTS:

a	Bed Patients		
b	Transportable		
c	Non-transportable		
d	Ambulatory		
e	Approximate No. of patients to be evacuated following day:		
		Litter	
		Walking	

IV COMMUNICABLE DISEASES:

		Respiratory	Dysenteries	Diarrhoea	Malaria	Endemic Dis.**	Venereal
a	Remaining						
b	Admitted						
c	Total						
d	Duty						
e	Died						
f	Other Disp						
g	Sub-Total						
h	Remaining						

** State Specific kinds of Endemic Diseases under remarks:

V HOSPITALS INCLUDED IN THIS REPORT:

VI REMARKS:

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
Office of the Ordnance Officer

THN/am
15 June 1943.

ANNEX NO: 3

TO ACCOMPANY ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NUMBER 1, HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343

1. Ammunition

Units of Fire as used in all administrative plans referred to is that published in Incl. No. 2, letter AG 471 (2-13-43) AB-S-D-M, dated Feb. 16, 1943, copy of which is attached.

It is the responsibility of all units to obtain their organic loads of ammunition and have it in their keeping at all times. Ammunition shown under Column B, "Beach or Shore Reserve", is in addition to organic ammunition. The latter will be supplied from stock piles placed at Ports of Embarkation by SOS.

2. Waterproofing

Waterproofing to be accomplished by each individual unit as directed by CG, Sub-Task Forces. Ordnance troops have been made available to each Sub-Task Force for maintenance and supply. Such Units may be used at the discretion of the Sub-Task Commander in connection with waterproofing. Supplies for waterproofing will be drawn from Base Sections as outlined in letter, this HQ, dated June 7, 1943, subj: Waterproofing Material.

3. General Supplies and T/BA

It is the responsibility of Sub-Task Forces Commanders to submit requisitions for all shortages in T/BA and organic supplies for their units to the nearest base section. In case of failure of Base Sections to meet these requirements, prompt report should be made to this Headquarters as to the actual shortages. This Headquarters only enters the picture if supply is unavailable or when special priorities are established. Priorities for equipment covering all units of I Armored Corps, Reinforced, have been established with SOS. Each "Administrative Plan" shows clearly the respective responsibilities of Sub-Task Force Commanders and CO, Force 343.

4. Maintenance

Suggested method of packing "over the beach" maintenance kits and tool kits has been published and distributed to all Ordnance Units (Memorandum, Ordnance Office, Hq. I Armored Corps, dated 2 May 1943). These instructions are to be considered as advisory and may be modified as deemed advisable by Sub-Task Force Commanders. Plans should be made to move organic spare parts into the target as rapidly as shipping and other transportation permit. It is not anticipated that it will be possible for Force 343 to place bulk supplies at the target prior to D + 30. Special requirements will be met if possible upon request to Force 343, African Headquarters.

A generous proportion of Ordnance maintenance and supply troops has been given each Sub-Task Force. It is anticipated that these troops should provide adequate maintenance and supply until such time as service troops under direct control of Force 343 can be placed at the target. After Force 343 assumes supply responsibility at the target, readjustment of assignments of Ordnance units will be made. At all times, Force 343 will follow the principle of pushing supplies and maintenance forward.

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Demands of forward units will be assumed to be correct and will be met if physically and tactically possible. Units should be governed accordingly in making requests on I Armored Corps as overordering may result in overburdening the available transportation.

/s/ T. H. NIXON,
T. H. NIXON,
Colonel, Ordnance Dept.,
Ordnance Officer.

Incl:
Incl #2, ltr. AG 471
(2-13-43) OB-S-D-M,
Feb. 16, 1943.

UNIT OF FIRE

For use as a guide by Theater Commanders

WEAPON		ROUNDS PER WEAPON
Ordnance Items		
Carbine Cal..30		60
Automatic Rifle Cal..30		710
Rifle US Cal..30		150
MG Cal..30 1919 A4 (Ground)		2000
MG Cal..30 1917 A1 (Ground)		2000
Pistol Auto. Cal..45		10
Sub. MG Cal..45		200
MG Cal..50 HB Ground		500
MG Cal..50 HC AA		1200
20mm AA Gun MK 2 & 4 (Navy Oerlikon)		540
Very Pistol		10
Pyrotechnic Pistol		10
37mm Tank Gun		100
Ground Signal Projector		10
37mm AT Gun		100
37mm AA Gun		300
40mm AA Gun		300
60mm Mortar		100
81mm Mortar		100
75mm How. Field		300
75mm How. SP		300
75mm AT Gun		50
75mm Tank Gun		100
75mm Field Gun		300
3" Anti Tank Gun		75
3" AA Gun		150
3" Tank Gun		100
90mm AA Gun		125
105mm AA Gun		145
105mm How. Field & SP		200
155mm Howitzer		150
155mm Gun		100
4.5" Field Gun		175
4.7" AA Gun		90
240mm Howitzer		60
Launcher, Rocket, AT		6
Launcher, Grenade, AT		6
Grenade, hand, frag.	(per rifle Co.)	50
Grenade, hand, offensive III	(per rifle Co.)	50
Shotgun		25

Note 1: The above units apply to weapons on vehicles of the Armored Force as well as all weapons of the Ground Forces.
Note 2: For percentage by types, see Day of Supply tables.
Chemical Warfare Service Items; See Annex

ENGINEER ANNEX TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER #1 (ENGINEER PLAN)

A. WATER

Water to be provided on the basis of one gallon per man per day. A sufficient supply on this basis for five days' operation to be brought in in five gallon cans or by the Navy in bulk.

Sources of water are available to sub-task forces as follows:

Force	5-gal Cans	Bulk-LSTs	Local (g.p.d.)
CENT	24,000	30,000(3)	497,000 Vittovia aqueduct 1,000,000 Springs-S Croce Camerina
DIME	13,000	50,000(5	367,000 - Gela aqueduct 250,000 - Gela river wells
JOSS	17,500	90,000(9)	450,000 - Licata aqueduct Selso River
KOOL	7,500	30,000(3)	-------

*A spring of 79 gpm has been reported at Berdia but not confirmed.

A limited number of 2,000 gal. distillation units are also available.

Five-gallon cans to the above total have been ordered to the ports of embarkation where they will be filled by the S.O.S. base section.

The decision as to how many 5-gallon cans will be taken and whether any distillation units will be included rests with each sub-task force commander.

Organic engineers will perform their normal functions including the necessary development of water sources.

The 401st Engineer Water Supply Bn. will develop water supplies in the rear areas, including decontamination of sources and boring wells. It will furnish water in 750-gallon tankers to division and corps water points and to beach groups as required.

The 402d Engineer water Supply Bn. will be on call in North Africa to supplement the work of the 401st if necessary.

B. MAPS

1. Initial issues.

a. Sub-Task Forces - coverage of their area of initial operations, to be delivered packaged for the following lower units:

(1) Each Infantry Regiment.
(2) Division Artillery.
(3) All other divisional troops and Divisional Headquarters.
(4) Each Regiment not part of a division.
(5) All other Sub-Task Force troops.

b. Airborne Units - coverage of the areas of Joss and Shark.

c. The 9th Division - coverage of the area of immediate operations of Joss and Shark.

d. Headquarters II Corps and Headquarters I Armored Corps - complete coverage.

e. Navy - sheets requested by them.

2. Reserves.

a. Sub-Task Forces - a limited reserve to be carried by the sub-task force engineer to provide for unforseen contingencies in the following quantities per division:

1/100,000 - - - 100 copies
1/250,000 - - - 200 copies

b. Beach Reserve - a beach reserve carried by the Map Depot Detachment attached to each sub-task force. This consists of:

(1) 20% of the initial issue in 1a above.
(2) 200 copies of 1/100,000, 1/50,000 and 1/25,000 sheets covering the area of anticipated subsequent operations of each sub-task force.

3. Stocks.

a. Coverage of the balance of the island in all scales to be stocked half in the main depot on the island and half in North Africa.

4. Issue.

a. On D - 14 - The Engineer, Force 343, will deliver initial issues and reserves to the Sub-task Forces on D - 14.

A Map Depot Detachment will be attached to each Sub-Task Force on D minus 14. This detachment will consist of:

Dime and Joss - 1 Officer, 4 E.M.
Cent and Kool - 4 E.M.

b. D - 7 to D - Between D minus 7 and D day a map depot will be established at Bizerte to hold reserve stocks and serve reserve troops not included in sub-task forces. Prior to D minus 7 the depot will be at Constantine.

c. D day to D plus 4 - On D day the map depot detachments will form emergency depots stocked with the beach reserve at the beaches on which they land.

d. D plus 4 to D plus 8 - Between D plus 4 and D plus 8, depots will be consolidated to form two depots in two towns within the beach head. One Depot will serve Cent and Dime, one will serve Joss and Kool. These depots will be reinforced as soon as possible by reserve stock held in Africa and will be moved as the situation requires.

e. Maps will be delivered in rolls of fifty, each roll being coded. Each sub-task force engineer has been furnished with:

(1) A code list.
(2) Breakdown units and begmarking.
(3) Quantities of sheets in unit bags.
(4) Assortment of sheets for each distribution with indices.

C. CONSTRUCTION

1. Policy - Only the works essential for military needs.

2. Docks - Immediate repair and expansion and maintenance to provide maximum unloading facilities.

3. Communications - In conformance with policy. No extensive repairs.

4. Utilities - In conformance with policy to include necessary sanitation.

5. Shelter - Depots - Wood frame, tarpaulin covered warehouses only for supplies liable to damage by exposure.

Hospitals - Tent floors only.

Troop Housing - Latrines, kitchens and bath facilities only if situation becomes stabilized to permit.

Other - None initially.

6. Labor - Hired and paid for direct by using unit and not through any labor agency.

7. Real Estate - Initially by direct requisition in accordance with Annex of A.F.H.Q. When Task Force 343 assumes control, by requisition through the Engineer, Task Force 343.

8. Funds - Division - Engineer share of $100,000 to be allotted each division.

Corps - Engineer share of $50,000 to be allotted II Corps.

/s/ GARRISON H. DAVIDSON,
GARRISON H. DAVIDSON,
Colonel, C. E.,
Engineer.

HEADQUARTERS, FORCE 343
Office of the Quartermaster

GRAVES REGISTRATION DIRECTIVE

1. RESPONSIBILITY:

a. Each company, battalion, regiment, and division, as well as hospitals, depots, and other separate organizations will appoint an officer to perform the duties of Graves Registration Service Officer. Graves Registration Service officers, within divisions and higher units, are responsible to the unit Quartermaster who in turn is responsible to the Graves Registration functions. The Sub Task Force Graves Registration Officer will be responsible for the planning, operation, and coordination of all burial functions within his unit. He will make appropriate recommendations to Sub Task Force G-4 concerning burial and to facilitate this will maintain liaison with G-2 and the Sub Task Force Surgeon and be familiar with the Surgeon's recommendations to G-4 concerning evacuation. Graves Registration Service Officers of separate units and establishments are responsible directly to Force 343.

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2. OPERATION:

a. In the event a Graves Registration Platoon is attached to a division or Sub Task Force, the platoon commander will work with the Division GRS Officer under the supervision of the unit Quartermaster, but he will not be designated Division Graves Registration Officer. The platoon commander will assign section of his platoon to elements of the division and coordinate and supervise their work. If any unit of the division becomes isolated or operates at such distance that it cannot be served by the Graves Registration platoon, the division GRS officer will call upon the unit GRS Officer (appointed as in Par. 1 Above) to perform burial and Graves Registration functions for the organization concerned with troops detailed by the organization commander.

b. If Graves Registration personnel are not attached to a division or Sub Task Force, a provisional organization will be established under the supervision of the officer appointed as per Par. 1 above. A recommended organization is listed below but this may be altered in any way desired by division or Sub Task Force GRS Officer to fit circumstances encountered.

Graves Registration Personnel and Equipment:

(1) Office of the Division GRS Officer:
- (a) One Graves Registration Officer
- (b) Two NCO's (Draftsmen for layout, plot, and map of cemetery)
- (c) One Pvt. - Clerk
- (d) One Pvt. - Driver
- (e) Two Pvts. - Basic
- (f) One ¼-T Truck
- (g) Office and Drafting Equipment, GRS Forms.

(2) Elements of Division:
Three registration sections, (one section per combat team) each consisting of:

- (a) 1 NCO (Section Chief)
- (b) 1 Pvt. (Clerk)
- (c) 4 Pvts. (Laborers)
- (d) 1 NCO (Attached Medical)
- (e) One 3/4 ton Weapons Carrier
- (f) Litter, rubber gloves, absorbentcotton, disinfectant, blankets, shelter halves, lashing straps, rope, compass, map of area, notebook, pencil, twine, knife, inkpad, heavy shears, or tin snips.

c. Attached Medical Personnel
- (1) As outlined above
- (2) Equipment
  - (a) EMC tags (WD MD Form 52B)
  - (b) Ink pad, notebook, and pencil

d. Service Unit Personnel -
(1) NCO's and men to be detailed by division or separate unit commander upon call by Graves Registration Officer. Number and disposition of service troops determined by type of action involved, number of casualties, and terrain fought over.
- (2) Equipment -
  - (a) One shovel per man
  - (b) One pick per two men
  - (c) Additional details and equipment from Engineers if rock encountered.

e. Duties - Graves Registration Personnel -
- (1) Accomplishing and forwarding burial reports and records.
- (2) Proper identification of body
- (3) Collection of personnel effects.
- (4) Marking of Grave
- (5) Cemetery Maps

NOTE: GRAVES REGISTRATION PERSONNEL ARE NOT TO BE USED FOR GRAVE DIGGING.

f. Duties - Attached Medical Personnel -
- (1) Identification of portions of body dismembered.
- (2) Fingerprints in event identity is open to doubt.
- (3) Preparation of tooth charts, notation of anatomical characteristics, inspection of body for identifying media when identity is open to doubt.
- (4) Preparation and disposition of WD MD Form 52B.
- (5) First aid in emergency.

g. Duties - Service Unit Personnel -
- (1) Collection of bodies to avoid isolated burials.
- (2) Digging of Grave.
- (3) Assists in search for unfound dead.

h. Transportation -
(1) Transportation will be furnished by Division Quartermaster if that of the provisional graves registration units is insufficient to meet requirements. Transport to be by routes not used by troops if possible.

3. BURIALS:

a. United States Personnel -

(1) In cemeteries, bodies will be buried in graves dug in accordance with the cemetery plan to a depth of approximately 5 feet. In hasty battlefield burials, the location and depth will be such as to prevent the elements from exposing the body. Only one body will be placed in a grave. Military honors will be rendered and Chaplains of appropriate faith will officiate when possible for all burials. The latter will be dispensed with only when the lives of the burial parties are in danger.

(2) Burial of general prisoners, deserters, or dishonorably discharged men will be made in separate plots in United States Cemeteries.

b. Allied Dead -

(1) Burial will be made in separate plots in United States Cemeteries. Coordination with the Graves Registration Service of the force concerned with respect to burial reports and disposition of personal effects will be by Graves Registration Service Officer, Force 343. An additional copy of burial report will be forwarded thru normal channels.

c. Enemy Dead -

(1) Enemy dead will be reported as in the case of American dead. Separate reports will be rendered on members of the enemy forces, which will be clearly marked as such.

(2) Enemy dead are entitled to the same burial as members of American or Allied forces, but will be buried in separate sections of the cemetery. Graves will be marked, registered, and reported through channels to Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

(3) Marker on enemy grave is to be marked "ED".

(4) The following procedure governs the disposition of Enemy Identification tags:

(a) One-half of the tag remains on the body and is buried with it.

(b) The information on the other half is copied in English in pencil on the marker, or the information is placed in a bottle and placed in the earth near the head of the grave.

(c) The duplicate or other half of the tag is forwarded to Prisoner of War Information Bureau thru channels.

e. REBURIALS:

a. Combat conditions will necessitate some hasty burials made in the absence of Graves Registration personnel. However, hasty burials do not relieve burial parties from the responsibility of following prescribed regulations as to the manner and place of burial, marking of graves, forwarding the prescribed reports, and the proper handling of personal effects, nor do hasty burials made by other personnel relieve Graves Registration personnel from the responsibility of verifying identity of graves, eliminating isolated graves, searching of battlefields for unburied dead, marking of unmarked graves, and the correcting of all errors made by other personnel in the performance of burial activities. Reburials made to eliminate isolated graves will be reported as for original burials but burial forms will be marked Reburial.

5. CEMETERIES:

a. Officers in charge of burials should be familiar with the location of all authorized military cemeteries within the area of the respective commands, and should see that none but authorized cemeteries are used except in unusual circumstances. A DIVISION CEMETERY WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN ALL CASES.

b. When it is necessary to lay out new temporary cemeteries, the standard plan furnished by the Quartermaster General (copy attached) will be strictly followed both as to plotting and to the numbering of graves, except when division is actually required by the terrein conditions, in which case a report of the modifications and reason therefor will be forwarded thru military channels to the Graves Registration Service Officer of the Force 343.

c. Graves are to be layed out as per Quartermaster plan in accordance with an accurate survey. To save confusion during times of heavy action, graves in at least one section may be layed out ahead of time and countersunk to a depth of three or four inches.

d. Graves will be aligned both laterally and longitudinally.

e. Cemetery will be inclosed at the earliest opportunity with a fence of sound material and construction.

f. Once a cemetery has been established and burials therein begun, neither the plan nor the number of the graves will be changed except by authority of the Graves Registration Service Officer of the Force 343.

g. Local labor may be used whenever available for grave digging, reburials, fencing, and landscaping. Such labor must be supervised by GRS personnel.

6. GRAVE MARKING:

a. At time of burial each grave must be marked in such a way as to insure identification. Combat conditions will necessitate the use of such materials as are at hand, such as, driftwood, lumber from the ration boxes, crating material, and etc. When no better marker is available the information from the identification tag will be copied on a piece of paper and placed in a bottle, spent shell or other receptacle that can be tightly sealed and placed so as to mark, and identify the grave. In this event such marking will be indicated on report of burial. These are to be replaced as soon as possible with a more permanent marker. The identification tag will be forwarded with the report of burial, and not left at the grave, if it cannot be inserted in the container.

b. When markers are available, crosses may be used to mark the graves of those of Christian faith and the Star of David to mark the graves of those of Jewish faith. In the event Hebrew markers are not available, the cross piece of the cross will be removed prior to placement.

c. If markers are not available, name pegs may be used. These pegs are V-shaped wooden pegs or boards 1" in thickness, 9" wide at the top, and 36" in length as measured from the center of top to tapering point at bottom of peg.

d. Each Graves Registration Section will serve as a base for supplies, for all graves registration personnel in the area which it serves. Supplies will include burial report forms, temporary grave markers, and personal effects bags.

7. IDENTIFICATION TAGS:

a. The emergency medical tag attached to the body will be removed at the time of burial either by a Medical Department representative or by a responsible member of the burial party, and will be forwarded in either case direct to the Chief Surgeon who will transmit the tag to the Surgeon General.

b. One of the two identification tags worn as prescribed in Army Regulations will be left upon the body to be interned with the body. The duplicate tag will be removed at the time of BURIAL and securely attached to the grave marker about 2" from the top.

c. When tags are found entirely detached from bodies, effort will be made to ascertain to whom they belong, and if same can be identified as coming from a body, then they will be treated in the same way as those found upon the body. If they cannot be identified as belonging to a body in the vicinity where found, inquiry will if practicable, be made of the organization of which the owner was a member to ascertain if they were lost or thrown away, with a view to restoration to the owner, and to enable action by his commanding officer. If they cannot be identified as belonging to either a deceased or living person, they will be forwarded to the office of the Chief Graves Registration Service, with full report as to the locality and circumstances attending their discovery. Where tags found on a body are illegible, effort will be made to identify the body by other means, and properly mark the grave for future identification. The illegible tags and full information including the identification of the wearer, if established, will then be forwarded the Chief, Graves Registration Service.

d. If only one of the two identification tags is found with the body, it will be interred with the remains. When identification tags are missing an exact copy of the report of interment to be submitted will be completely accomplished, will be sealed within a container, and buried with the body. Notation as to type of container and to the fact that report was buried with remains will be made on report of interment.

8. UNIDENTIFIED DEAD:

a. Prior to the burial of unidentified dead every effort will be made to secure the fingerprints of both hands. Burial parties should be equipped with stamp pads. Fingerprints should be placed on EACH copy of the burial report. On each report will be entered a brief description of such features as may contribute to identification. Features reported will include apparent weight, height, color of hair, description of scars. The report will include a brief description of the enemy action involved, location in which the body was found, estimated date of death, and any other data which might give a clue to identity. A dental chart will be made in cases where fingerprints are impossible.

9. PERSONAL EFFECTS:

a. Personal effects of deceased personnel will be disposed of as follows:

(1) Those effects found upon the body will be listed on G.R.S. Form No. 1 and will be promptly bundled and turned over the Graves Registration Service for forwarding to the nearest Base Section for disposition. Each package should contain full data pertaining to the owner's identity, and also a list of items contained therein.

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(2) Other personal effects of the deceased will be collected, inventoried, and listed on Form No. 54 by organization commander. Any article which might cause embarrassment to relatives of the deceased will be removed. The effects will be prepared for shipment and storage and conspicuously marked with the name, rank, serial number, organization, type and date of casualty, and forwarded to the G.R.S. Officer, Force 343 for disposition. A copy of WD AGO Form No. 54 will be inclosed in the package.

(3) Money found in the effects of the deceased will be turned over to the Finance Officer by the organization commander or other officer handling the effects and receipt obtained in duplicate. One copy of the receipt will accompany service record when forwarded thru channels.

b. Personal effects of individuals reported "Missing in Action", "Captured", or "Interned", will be disposed of as follows:

(1) As soon as the status of the owner becomes "Missing in Action", his belongings will be placed in the custody of the supply officer and an accurate inventory made.

(2) At the time replacement is requested, normally after thirty (30) days absence, the effects will be forwarded to the G.R.S. Officer, Force 343 with an inventory and statement of circumstances inclosed or attached.

(3) Such effects received by G.R.S. Officer, Force 343 will be held ninety (90) days, available for return in case the owner rejoins his unit. If not claimed in ninety (90) days they will be forwarded thru the appropriate port of embarkation to the Effects Quartermaster, Kansas City Quartermaster Depot, Kansas City, Missouri, with an inventory or statement of circumstances inclosed or attached.

c. Government Property:

(1) Clothing and other Government property issued to deceased personnel, other than those items necessary for burial, will be collected and turned in to the unit, or other supply officer, with individual mess equipment.

d. Effects of Enemy Dead:

(1) Effects of enemy dead will be recorded and dispatched under the same arrangement as our own troops except that final routing (along with inventory and statement of circumstances) will be to Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Officer of the Provost Marshal General, Theater of Operations.

e. Effects of personnel who have been evacuated by reason of sickness or wounds or who are patients in hospitals will be disposed of as follows:

(1) Personnel being sent to hospitals will take with them only such personal effects as will be required for reasonable needs and small luxuries. This should include one musette bag or haversack, toilet articles, one complete set of outer clothing, including a raincoat (or overcoat when indicated), one pair of shoes, extra underwear, socks, and handkerchiefs. Hospitals have no place to store and secure the personal effects of individuals.

(2) The gas mask and helmet will normally be the only items of equipment to accompany hospital patients. Mess gear, arms, and ammunition, blankets and other items of equipment will not be sent with or to a patient. Commanding Officers of hospitals will collect arms and ammunition from U.S. patients at the time of entry and turn this material over to the nearest Ordnance Depot or Maintenance Company. Other items of equipment collected from patients will be turned over to the nearest salvage collecting point.

(3) Unit supply officers will collect and inventory the effects of personnel who have been evacuated or are patients in hospitals. Items indicated in (1) above should be sent to the patient if possible. Unless it is known definitely that the soldier will not return, personal effects will be held in the unit for at least thirty (30) days and then transmitted with inventory setting forth the circumstances under which they are being forwarded.

(4) When effects are received by the Base Quartermaster they will be held until such time as they are applied for by the owner or the owner has been located by the Base Quartermaster.

f. Deserters:

(1) Public property will be turned in to the unit supply officer and the enlisted man will be credited on the Clothing and Equipment Record. Personal effects will be listed and forwarded to the Base Quartermaster serving the area where they will be retained for one (1) year unless he is returned to military control within that period. In the event he is returned to military control, the effects will be delivered to him. At the expiration of one (1) year if the deserter has not returned to military control, the Base Quartermaster will dispose of the personal effects as prescribed by AR 615-300.

g. Disposition of effects when location of owner is unknown:

(1) Effects of individuals not included in the above categories, who cannot be located will be inventoried and sent to the Base Quartermaster serving the area. A statement setting forth the circumstances under which the effects are being forwarded will be transmitted with the effects.

10. MAPS:

a. Cemetery Maps will be forwarded to the GRS Officer, Force 343, shortly after burials are begun in a cemetery. Location of isolated battlefield graves will be accurately reported on the report of burial by means of map references or by reference to permanent landmarks, such as: bodies of water, railways, wooded areas, cross roads, etc. These sketches must be accurate and complete.

11. RECORDS AND REPORTS:

a. Record of Burial (QMC Form No. 1 GRS) will be filled out as completely as possible and forwarded to the Graves Registration Officer, Force 343, in quadruplicate through the division or separate unit personnel section where the report can be checked against casualty reports. An additional copy of the burial report for all burials of other than U.S. Army personnel will be forwarded thru channels for notification of the Force concerned. In all cases the burial report will be signed by the officer or person in charge of burial and verified by the GRS Officer of the administrative headquarters who checks burial reports against casualty records.

b. Graves Registration Platoons or similar provisional units will submit to GRS Officer, Force 343, Weekly Report of Burials Recorded, QMC Form No. 2-GRS, in quadruplicate. (to be submitted directly)


c. At the time a cemetery is closed a complete map and final report will be submitted to GRS Officer, Force 343.

Typical Layout for GRS Temporary Cemetery

NOTES

1. Graves to be a minimum of 5 feet in depth.
2. All interments to be made with head in same direction.
3. Markers to be placed at head of grave.
4. Graves to be numbered consecutively, starting with No. 1 at left (standing at foot of grave and facing head) and following row to end, then continuing with first grave at left of second row.
5. Where terrain or other reasons necessitate excavation of trench for burial purposes, the remains will be interred therein in the same manner and distance apart as per this plan, (see Sketch "A"). In such cases extreme care must be taken to insure marker being placed at grave to which it pertains.
6. In light or sand soil, where excavation will not stand, it is sometimes necessary to dig trenches to a depth of 4 feet and then make excavations 1 foot deeper. (see Sketch "B").
7. Care should be taken so that graves are in line with one another, both laterally and longitudinally.
8. The meridan (Directional Arrow) indicating North should be shown on all plans and sketches.
9. Separate layout plans should be prepared for each cemetery and/or burial plot.

TYPICAL GRAVE LAYOUT FOR GRS TEMPORARY CEMETERY



A.M.G. Form 1 - GRS
SOS NATOUSA
June 1, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF BURIAL
AR 30-1815 & TM 10-630

SAMPLE

14 February 1948
Date Report Filled Out

Myers	Russell	E.	38061433	White
(Last Name)	(First Name)	(Middle Initial)	(Serial No.)	(Race)
Private	Company "H" 392 Inf. Regt.			U.S.A.
(Rank)	(Organization)		(Branch)	(Country)
Manila, P.I.	13 February 1948	K - Bullet Wound - Chest		Catholic
(Place of Death)	(Date of Death)	(Cause of Death)		(Religion : P, C, H, etc)

MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION

Identification Tags found on body : Yes (X); No ( ).
If no identification tags, other means used to identify body (Identification card, letters, etc).

Complete fingerprint chart of both hands on reverse side if body cannot be identified.
Complete tooth-chart on reverse side and list anatomical characteristics and other data if fingerprints cannot be taken.

If unidentified, give circumstances:
List of Personal Effects found on Body and disposition of Same : 1 Bill fold; 1 Wrist watch; 3 Pictures; 1 Fountain pen - Rearever. Forwarded to Quartermaster, Phillipine Base Section.

Mrs. R.E. Myers — 309 N. Washington St. Chugwater, Wyo.
(Name of Emergency Addressee) (Address of Emergency Addressee)

Data furnished by Officer reporting burial.
(Signature (or Name) of Person furnishing above data when other than the C[illegible] of Burial)

1930 Hours, 14 February 1948 — U.S.A. Military Cemetery, Manila, P.I.
(Time and Date of Burial) (Location, Name, & No. of Cemetery)

IF BURIAL OTHER THAN IN ESTABLISHED CEMETERY FURNISH SKETCH AND MAP REFERENCE REVERSE SIDE THIS FORM

3	2	103	Wooden Name Peg	Catholic
(Plot No.)	(Row No.)	(Grave No.)	(Kind Grave Marker)	(Type of Religious Ceremony)

Identification Tag buried with body (1); Identification Tag attached to marker (1).
If Identification Tags not present, what other identification data were buried with the body and in what kind of container?

Bodies buried on either side (See paragraph 4 on reverse side this form.)
Right side : Brown, John (NMI) Sgt. 14906382 Co. "D" 95th Arm'd Inf. 104
(Name) (Rank) (ASN) (Organization) (Grave No.)

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Left side : Kraisel, Norton E. T/Sgt. 33126874 Hq. & Hq. Det. 130 Ord. Bn 102
(Name) (Rank) (ASN) (Organization) (Grave No.)

PAUL J. CLARKSON, 392 Inf. Regt. JOSEPH T. SPAULDING, Captain Chaplain
Signature of Officer Reporting Burial (Verified by unit G.R.S. Officer)

Sub Task Force Rowboat.

Last St.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILLING OUT BURIAL REPORT : Make out QMC Form 1 - GRS in quadruplicate for U. S. dead, one additional copy for allied and enemy dead. Sign all copies. Submit report to nearest member of Graves Registration Service. Graves Registration Service will forward the original and two copies through at least one higher administrative headquarters to be checked against Casualty Reports and allied papers and all copies verified by the Graves Registration Officer of that headquarters to Base Section Graves Registration Service Officer.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR BURIAL

1 PREPARATION OF BODY: Have body examined by member of Medical Department whenever possible (to attach E.M.T. Form 52b.) Remove all personal property; remove one identification tag, leave other on body in protected position (in case of enemy dead, leave ½ tag on body, forward ½, with personal effects). If no tag present, make notation of identifying data on form, protect in sealed bottle, canteen, spent shell, or best available container, and bury with remains. If unidentified, take fingerprints of both hands; if this is not possible fill out tooth-chart and note height, weight, color of eyes and hair, tattoo marks, birthmarks, etc., and other data as serial no. of weapon, laundry marks, where body found, etc. Wrap body in shelter half, mattress cover, or blanket when available.

2. BURIAL : Dig grave to a depth of five feet (hasty battlefield burials, to sufficient depth to prevent elements from exposing the body). *Place only one body in a grave.* Dig graves side by side, row behind row.


3. MARKING OF GRAVE : Fasten identification tag to temporary name peg and place at head of grave. For enemy dead, write data on peg. When pegs are not available, copy data on a piece of paper, place in bottle, spent shell, or other receptacle, seal tightly and place so as to mark and identify grave. If identification tag cannot be fastened to peg or placed in container, do not leave at grave but forward with report of burial. If only one tag is found on body, it should be buried with body. The information thereon should be written on marker or placed in container at head of grave. Do not use weapons or helmets to mark graves.

4. LOCATION OF GRAVE : Report burials in established cemeteries by plot, row, and grave number (or show on cemetery map). For all other burials prepare sketch in space provided below; and give location by means of map references, or by reference to prominent permanent landmarks. Information must be specific, accurate, complete. Stand at foot of grave facing head to determine bodies buried to the left and right.

5. PERSONAL EFFECTS : List only personal effects taken from body on the Burial Report form. Place these with information as to identity of owner, organization, emergency addressee, in personal effects bag, or wrap in handkerchief, towel, or other available material, and turn over to Graves Registration Service Personnel with report of burial. Government property is not to be included in personal effects but is to be turned in to Salvage Collecting Point.

SKETCH AND MAP REFERENCE :

TOOTH-CHART



Characteristics :

Other Data :

QMC FORM No. 2 - GRS
HEADQUARTERS GRAVES REGISTRATION SERVICE, Q. M. C.

EXAMPLE

WEEKLY REPORT OF BURIALS RECORDED
(To be submitted to Quartermaster General)
(Par. 53a (1) TM-630)

No. 43 Date 15 June 1946 19

U.S. Army Personnel

NAME	SOLDIERS NO.	RANK	ORGANIZATION	DATE OF BURIAL	CEMETERY
DOE, JOHN C.	33417788	Pvt.	1324th Inf.	6 12 46	U.S.A. Military Cemetery, Tokyo Japan.
SMITH, JAMES T.	44669922	T/5	"	6 13 46	"
JONES, RONALD J.	32104567	T/Sgt.	"	6 14 46	"
			WILLIAM D. CAMPBELL 2nd Lt., Q.M.C. G.R.S. Officer 928th MOT.		

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(2) Organic Military Police.

* Hq & Hq Det, 2629 MP Bn	3	16	8
20th MP Co IAOR	5	192	26
202nd MP Co, II Corps	5	192	26
45th Div MP Plat	3	77	24
1st Div MP Plat	3	77	24
3rd Div MP Plat	3	77	24
9th Div MP Plat	3	77	24
2nd Armd Div MP Plat	4	45	20
82nd Airborne Div MP Plat	2	36	8
* Does not include Med Det of	2	6	0
-- P.W. Processing Detachment	1	45	0
-- P.W. Processing Detachment	1	45	0
* Does not include Med Det	3	15	4

c. Situation.

In this operation there will be special situations arising in addition to the normal duties and functions covered in B, 1 above for which special measures must be planned.

(1) The landing will be made on a definitely hostile shore. After forcing back of hostile troops, a certain amount of fifth column activity is to be expected requiring constant surveillance and guard.

(2) Sniping will undoubtedly be prevalent, especially in towns where there is an opportunity for cover and hiding. Snipers must be ferreted out and either killed or captured.

(3) The civilian population cannot be expected to be friendly. Therefore, rigid control and regulation of their movement will be required.

(4) During the assault phases at least, no reliance can be placed upon the use of any existing civil law enforcement groups. Even should one or more organizations as a whole be found cooperative a certain period of time will be necessary for reorganization before it can be allowed to function. Even then close supervision and coordination by the Provost Marshals and Civil Affairs Officers will be required.

(5) In the territory covered by the initial operations there are about twenty towns and villages, six of which have a population varying from 20,000 to 40,000. They are:

HAREM	31,028
QUEENREX	21,914
FIGULA	30,641
FEDERAL	31,918
DOGMATIC	40,180
BRUTE	34,769

These towns will present special problems as related to the above situations.

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Auth: CG IAC REINF
Initial:
Date: 15 June 1943

15 June 1943

MILITARY POLICE PLAN

1. MISSION.

The mission of this TASK FORCE will involve a "Theatre of Operation" and a landing over an extended and hostile beach line. Since there are no suitable harbors capable of being used for supplying the Sub-Task Forces, it will be necessary to supply these forces over beach heads for considerable time. The following plan is set up as a guide to Sub- Task Force Provost Marshals in the preparation of their plans of operation.

2. MILITARY POLICE.

a. Military Police duties in the area of each Sub-Task Force will include:

(1) Traffic control at the beach heads and along the lines of communication thereto.

(2) Guarding and disposition of Military Prisoner of War and Civilian internees.

(3) Maintenance of Law and Order in towns and areas occupied by our troops.

(4) Coordination with Civil Affairs personnel in these areas.

(5) Cooperation with the Counter Intelligence Corps in the apprehension of individuals and facilitation of searches and seizures.

(6) Control of movements of individuals including evacuation of civilian population.

(7) The protection of vital installations, including deposits and records of financial governmental institutions.

b. Personnel.

(1) Assigned units.

	Officers	EM	Veh
* 504th Military Police Battalion.			
HQ & HQ Co	10	69	16
Co "A"	5	192	26
Co "B"	5	192	26
Co "C"	5	192	26
342 MP Escort Guard Co	3	134	4
379 MP Escort Guard Co	3	134	4

d. Distribution.

The organic Military Police of the Sub-Task Forces will be required by those forces to handle the normal military police functions and duties within these forces such as, tactical traffic control, operation of straggler lines and straggler collecting points, handling of Prisoners of War at Division collecting points and C.P. operation. They cannot therefore, be considered as Force troops. This leaves the 504th Military Police Bn, the 342nd and 379th Prisoner of War Escort Guard Companies, and two Prisoner of War Processing Detachments available for assignment to assist Sub-Task Force Commanders in their mission. They have been allotted initially as follows:

(1) Co "C", 504th Military Police Bn is assigned to the "CENT" Assault.

(2) The 504th Military Police Bn (less companies "A", "B", and "C") the 342nd Military Police Escort Guard Co, and one Prisoner of War Processing Detachment is assigned to the "DIME" Assault.

(3) Co "A", 504th Military Police Bn, the 379th Prisoner of War Escort Guard Co, and one Prisoner of War Processing Detachment is assigned to "JOBS" Assault.

(4) Co "B", 504th Military Police Bn, is assigned to "KOOL" Force (Reserve).

These units will be required for beach control, traffic control in the beach areas, at dumps, along the lines of communication, and as Prisoner of War Guards, Prisoner tagging and preparation of nominal rosters. With the taking and occupation of towns in each Sub-Task Force area the problems previously discussed will present themselves. At the present time there are no reserve Military Police units available to meet any situations arising therefrom. It will be necessary for the Sub-Task Force Provost Marshals to meet them with combat troops or to substitute combat troops in some of their other installations to relieve sufficient Military Police for these special duties. Should additional Military Police Units be made available later to Force 343, they will be held as Force 343 reserve to make available to Sub-Task Force Commanders on request for use as aid to the Civil Affairs officers and as security police in captured towns and areas.

3. PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES.

Until such time as there is a Force 343 enclosure established on HORRIFIED evacuation of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees will be accomplished by the NAVY direct from Sub-Task Force beaches to enclosures at ACCUTI and LAUNDON in NORTH AFRICA. Prior to movement for evacuation, Sub-Task Force commanders will be responsible for having them properly tagged and that a nominal roster has been prepared in quadruplicate. The Navy escort commander will receipt for the prisoners and Internees received by him at the beach by signature on one copy which will be retained by the Sub-Task Force. One copy will accompany the Prisoners or Internees and the remaining two copies will be forwarded direct to Commanding General, Force 343.

Until a Prisoner of War enclosure is established on HORRIFIED by Force 343, daily radio reports will be made by each Sub-Task Force Commander to Commanding General, Force 343, giving only total number of prisoners evacuated during day. As soon as conditions permit the Provost Marshal, Force 343, will establish a Prisoner of War and an Internee enclosure on HORRIFIED in the vicinity of FEDERAL with a capacity of approximately 15,000. Sub-Task Force commanders will be notified of the time and date of opening and its exact location. Upon receipt of this notice all Prisoners of War and Internees will be evacuated to the Force 343 enclosure by Sub-Task Forces together with all four copies of the nominal roster. The enclosure commander will receipt by signature for the prisoners or Internees on the file copy and return it to the escort commander for return to the apprehending unit. He will keep one copy for his file and forward the remaining two copies to Commanding General, Force 343. The Provost Marshall Force 343 will assume control of Prisoners of War and Internees at the Force enclosure.

He will be responsible for feeding prior to their transfer to NORTH AFRICA. Evacuation will be as rapid as rostering and available shipping space will permit. It is contemplated that Prisoners and Internees will not be held for more than a maximum of three to five days for turn around of ships. Civilian Internees will be kept separately from Prisoners of War. The Commanding Officer of the Force 342 enclosure will segregate and hold, upon request from G-2 prisoners or Internees desired for special interrogation. The estimated daily rate of flow of Prisoners based on G-2 estimates is:

	D to D/5	D/5 to D/15	After D/15
Maximum	2500	8000	8000
Minimum	1000	1000	830
Total estimated to D/30		30,000	

Medical. Emergency medical treatment for Prisoners of War and Internees at Sub-Task Force Collecting Points will be arranged for by Sub-Task Surgeons. The Surgeon, Force 343 will provide a Medical Detachment at Force 343 enclosure by D/10 or upon the opening of the enclosure.

Quartermaster. The above mentioned supplies and equipment have been requisitioned.

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Engineers. Request has been submitted to Corps of Engineers for material, location and construction of force enclosure to accomodate 15,000 prisoners and Internees on HORRIFIED, to be ready by D/10.

Civil Affairs. The Provost Marshal will coordinate closely with the Public Safety Division of the Civil Affairs Section Force 343. Initially and until such time as existing civil police have been reorganized the Provost Marshal 343 and Provost Marshals of Sub-Task Forces will be responsible for the control of Military and Civilian personnel, the maintenance of law and Order, the control of traffic, registration and circulation of civilians, and recommendations for the protection of vital installations. In so far as available, Military Police personnel permits, the Provost Marshal Force 343 and Provost Marshals of Sub-Task Forces will furnish detachments of Military Police for assistance of the Public Safety Officers of the Civil Affairs Section. These detachments will assist the Public Safety Officers in the enforcement of the laws and regulations of the Military government and in the reorganization and supervision of any existing civilian police forces.

By Command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
COLONEL, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL: /s/W. G. CALDWELL
W. G. CALDWELL,
1T COL, AGD,
Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
APO #758

SECRET
Auth: CG IAC REINF
Initial:
Date: 22 June 1943

Ref. No. Q-792

22 June 1943

AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO ANNEX 6, ADM. O, NO. 1.

MILITARY POLICE PLAN

1. Classified Document above subject this headquarters, dated 15 June 1943, is hereby amended and amplified as follows:

2. The first paragraph of Section III is rescinded and the following is substituted therefor: Until such time as there is a Force 343 Enclosure established on HORRIFIED, evacuation of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees will be accomplished by Sub-Task Forces to Enclosures in NORTH AFRICA. Escorts will be found from personnel already on HORRIFIED as determined by Sub-Task Force commanders. Prior to movement for evacuation, Sub-Task Force commanders will be responsible for having Prisoners of War and Internees properly tagged and a nominal roster prepared in quadruplicate. The Commanding Officer at the Enclosure in NORTH AFRICA to which the prisoners are evacuated will receipt for them on one copy which will be retained by the Sub-Task Force. One copy will accompany the prisoners and the remaining two copies will be forwarded direct to Commanding General Force 343.

3. Persons suspected of threatening security will be arrested by combat troops or CIC personnel. After preliminary interrogation such persons will be released or turned over to Prisoner of War details for evacuation. Prisoner of War escort personnel will accept for evacuation such civilian prisoners, both male and female, as may be turned over to them by CIC Detachments or combat troops. Civilian prisoners will be segregated from military Prisoners of War and will be evacuated to Division and Corps Prisoner of War cages (Civilian Wing) to the rear. Such prisoners should not be evacuated from HORRIFIED without prior consent of the security staff.

4. Prisoners of War, whether civilian or military, will not normally be evacuated in ships carrying Allied, lying wounded, and will not be evacuated on combat loaders. The number of prisoners embarked on any ship will be governed by the sanitary facilities aboard.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:
/s/ W.G. CALDWELL,
W.G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., AGD,
Adjutant General.

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC.
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
APO #758, U. S. ARMY

11 June 1943

PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
FORCE 342

1. The following instructions will govern all procurement of supplies and services for Force 343, and is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

a. Procurement under this order will not be effected on the African Continent.

2. References:
a. FM 27-10 Rules of Land Warfare.
b. FM 27-5 Military Government.
c. FM 100-10 Field Service Regulations.
d. W.D. Circular #21, dated 15 January 1943.

3. Policy:
a. To immediately secure supplies and services necessary to accomplish the tactical mission.
b. To insure prompt payment for certain supplies and services as hereinafter described.
c. To insure prompt consideration of those items for which immediate payment is not made.
d. To provide for a uniform method of operation throughout Force 141, 343 and 12th Army.
e. To establish a central control for purposes of coordination with other Allied Forces within the Theater.
(1) The Fiscal Division, G-4 Section, Force 343, consisting of forward and base echelons, is charged with the responsibility for control and coordination of all matters pertaining to this directive.
(2) An Assistant Fiscal Officer, G-4 Section, Force 343, will be attached to each Sub-Task Force, G-4 Section, to assist in the administration and accomplishment of procedures set forth herein.

4. Money Contributions:
a. Money contributions will not be levied nor collected except upon direct command of the Commanding General, Force 343.

5. Purchases:
a. It is the responsibility of the Commanding Generals of Sub-Task Forces and the Special Staff Officers, Force 343, charged with procurement functions, to secure the appointment of sufficient officers under their command to insure compliance with this order. Such officers to be appointed in orders as both Purchasing & Contracting Officers and Class B Agent Officers.

(1) Price lists will be furnished Purchasing Officers by Fiscal Officer, Force 343, and such prices will be strictly adhered to except in the case of immediate emergency.
(a) Price lists will be augmented and revised consistent with the situation.
b. Public Property:
(1) No property of the Enemy State will be purchased or paid for. (Par. 6 b).
(2) Where the ownership of property is unknown, or doubt exists as to whether the property is public or private, it shall be treated as public property until ownership is definitely settled EXCEPT all such doubtful ownership property will be reported in accordance with Par. 6 b (3).
(3) Property of municipalities and that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and sciences, even when Enemy State property shall be treated as private property.
c. Private Property:
(1) In general, all supplies, land and buildings owned by individuals and services needed by the United States will normally be obtained by agreement between the appropriate officers of the Army of the United States and the owners or persons whose services are desired.
(2) Exceptions to Par. 5 c (1) supra wherein requisitioning will be used rather than purchasing are as follows:
(a) All motor vehicles.
(b) All procurement involving large stocks or payments and continuing payments.
(c) In the event failure to reach an agreement occurs between appropriate officers of the Army of the United States and the vendor(s).
(3) The use of privately owned immovable property including billets will be acquired without agreement as to compensation, for convenience the requisition form will be used. (Par. 6 c).
d. Purchasing Procedure and Payments:
(1) Class B Agent Officers, who will also be designated as Purchasing & Contracting Officers, will act as procuring, receiving, and paying officers and all procurement will be so accomplished EXCEPT as limited in Par. 5 c and 6.

(2) Pertinent Army Regulations will apply in this instance with particular reference to AR 35-320 and AR 35-6300 with the following exceptions:
(a) The certificate required by Par. 5, AR 35-6300 will be modified to read:

"I certify that the supplies and/or services were purchased and received by me and that payment therefor was made by me as Agent Officer in cash this ____day of ____19__, from funds entrusted to me by, _____, Finance Officer. Procurement Authority No.__ _____, the available balance of which is sufficient to cover the cost thereof".

_____
(Name and Grade)
Agent Officer,
Purchasing & Contracting Officer.

(3) Payment for purchases will be made in cash immediately.

6. Requisitions:
a. Requisitions for supplies and/or services will be made only upon the authority of the Commanding General, Force 343, and the Commanding Generals of Sub-Task Forces.
(1) Requisition forms and instructions for their use will be furnished by Fiscal Officer, G-4 Section, Force 343.
(2) Where possible, requisitioned supplies and services will be obtained by requisitioning on local Civil Officials, thru District Commanders, by Supply Services of Force 343 and the Sub-Task Forces, rather than by the smaller units.
(3) Complete records of requisitioned items will be maintained by all requisitioning agencies.
(4) Information appearing on all copies of requisitions will be compiled by Fiscal Officer, Force 343, and reports promptly made to interested Staff Sections.
b. Public Property:
(1) In general, Enemy State owned real property shall be utilized in accordance with FM 27-5 and FM 27-10, but the occupation and/or use of such property will be reported by means of requisition forms as described thereon.
(2) With reference to property of municipalities, etc., See Par. 5 (b) (3).
(3) Procurement of all property wherein a question as to public or private ownership exists will be accomplished in accordance with Par. 6 b (1).
(4) Movable property of the Enemy State needed for military operations will be appropriated by the Army of the United States without further reference to this order.
c. Private Property:
(1) Requisitioning of private property will be made only under circumstances established in Par. 5 c (2).
d. Requisitioning Procedure and Payments:
(1) Appropriate Staff Sections, Force 343, and Commanding Generals of Sub-Task Forces will be furnished sufficient booklets of requisitioning forms for compliance with this order.
(a) Booklets will contain twenty-five (25) requisitions, each requisition to be in triplicate.
(b) Complete information concerning the filling out and distribution of requisitions will be printed on the back thereof for the guidance of the requisitioning officer.
(c) All requisitions will be serially numbered and strict accounting will be required for each requisition.
(2) Original copies of all accomplished requisitions will be forwarded immediately to Fiscal Officer, Force 343.
(3) Any and all payments for requisitioned supplies or services will be made by Fiscal Officer, Force 343, only.

7. Accounting:
a. All recipients of W.D. Form 23, War Department Procurement Authority for the purpose of procurement under this order will make report to the Fiscal Officer, Force 343, of monthly obligations only. Reports will be submitted on a calendar monthly basis and will be forwarded to reach the Fiscal Officer not later than the 10th of the month following the month being reported upon. No particular form is prescribed for this report.
b. Requisitioning officers to whom serially numbered requisition blanks are issued will retain a copy of each requisition issued, and may at any time be required, by competent authority, to account for all requisition blanks issued them by either producing their copy of an accomplished requisition or the blank forms with which they are charged.
(1) The loss or misappropriation of requisition blanks will be reported immediately to Fiscal Officer, Force 343, in order that such blanks may be promptly invalidated.

8. Hire of Civilian Labor:
a. All civilian labor will be hired and paid by the using Arm or Service.
b. Labor will be hired by direct negotiation and not thru any labor agency, labor organization or labor service.
c. Contracting for construction, etc., will be accomplished in the usual manner, provided, such contracting is not in violation of Par. 8 b supra, and it has been determined that the Enemy State is not a party to the contract, either directly or indirectly.
d. Prevailing wage rates will be paid but in no case will the maximum rates of pay, as published in the price list, be exceeded without prior approval of the Fiscal Officer, Force 343.
e. Revised and detailed pay rate schedules will be issued at the earliest practicable date.
f. Pay periods will not be longer than on a calender week basis, Sunday thru Saturday, except to provide for emergent conditions.
g. Payrolls will be promptly paid by Class B Agent Officers.

By command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Col. G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ W. G. CALDWELL
W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col. A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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SUPPLEMENT #3

17 June 1943.

PROCUREMENT INFORMATION AND PRICE CONTROL LIST

1. Reference: Annex #7, Adm. Order #1, Field Order #1.

2. The following is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

a. Augmented and revised price lists will be published periodically as additional information becomes available.

3. Commodity Prices and Supplies.

a. Supplies of olive oil, wine and citrus fruits appear to be plentiful. Wheat supplies are adequate but distribution irregular with local shortages. There is a definite shortage of meat and fish. Sugar is very scarce and butter unobtainable. All Class III supplies are very scarce.

b. At the present, there are many discrepancies between various reports about commodity prices. This may be due to the fact that the rationing system is on a municipal basis and there may be local surpluses of commodities.

c. The following controlled prices are reported for the vicinity of BIOOT (ENNY Operation.

Commodity	Unit	Price in Lire
Bread	Kg	1.30 to 2.30
Meat	"	11
Pasta	"	1.70 to 2.30
Olive Oil	Litre	7.50 to 10
Soap	Kg	4 to 5
Flour	"	2.50
Oranges	"	1.20 to 3
Pears	"	1.60 to 2
Wine	Litre	2.50 to 3.50
Cheese	Kg	20 to 24

4. Black Market.

a. There appears to be a black market everywhere for rationed commodities which includes almost all foodstuffs and clothing, though it seems that the system is not uniform and some municipalities do not ration a few commodities. Black market prices vary enormously from district to district and from commodity to commodity. There is also a barter trade in foodstuffs between producers in certain agricultural districts.

(1) Representative black market prices are as follows:

Commodity	Unit	Price in Lire
Bread	Kg	20
Pasta	"	4 to 10
Flour	"	5
Olive Oil	Litre	20 to 25
Meat	Kg	50

5. Wage Rates.

a. The daily wage rates of common labor varies slightly between districts but the general average is 70 lire per day.

By command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ W. G. CALDWELL
W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343
APO #758, US Army

SECRET
Date 24/6/43
Auth: CG, FACR Ini:___

Ref. No. G-751

24 June 1943

SUPPLEMENT #2

PROCUREMENT INFORMATION AND PRICE CONTROL LIST

I. INSTRUCTIONS ON REQUISITIONING.

1. Reference: Annex No. 7, Adm. Order #1, Field Order No. 1.

a. The third copies of all requisition forms are amended to read as follows:

"Authority: Annex No. 7 to Adm Order No. 1 to Field Order No. 1"

II. PRICE CONTROL LIST. (Change #1)

1. Prices indicated herein are official prices and are representative as of this date. Care will be exercised not to exceed maximum official prices insofar as the tactical situation permits:

COMMODITY	UNIT	PRICE
Bread	Kg	3.0 Lire
Pasta	"	4.0 "
Meat	"	16 to 20.0 "
Olive Oil	"	25.0 "
Sugar	"	10.0 "
Cheese	"	25 to 30.0 "
Potatoes	"	1.6 "
Flour (Whole wheat)	"	3.0 "
Rice	"	3.5 "
Chicken	"	18 to 20.0 "
Vegetables	"	2 to 3.0 "
Ham	"	20 to 25.0 "
Rabbits	"	12 to 15.0 "
Eggs	ea	1.0 "
Milk	Litre	5.0 "

III. WAGE RATE CONTROL.

1. Par. 5, Supplement No. 1 is amended as follows:

a. This wage schedule has been prepared from the latest available intelligence and is published for the information and guidance of all concerned. Under the circumstances, this schedule cannot fit all areas, but will serve as a rough guide as to representative wages to be paid initially in Horrified.

Common Labor	55 lire per 8 hour day
Heavy Labor	65 " " " " "
Skilled building workers	75 " " " " "
Transport workers	80 " " " " "
Skilled factory workers	80 " " " " "
Unskilled factory workers	50" " " " "
Supervisory workers	20% more than the workers

b. While the above schedule can only be used as a rough guide, employing Arms and Services will endeavour to ascertain existing local wage rates by checking workers' employment cards. These cards contain the record of the worker's previous employment.
All workers are supplied with these cards as part of the Enemy State employment system. They are similar in appearance to U.S. Army Officers' Pay Data Cards (W.D.A.G.O. Form 77).

c. Wage rates in existing services, e.g., railroad personnel, public utility concerns, etc., will be continued unchanged until further notice. In such concerns, even when they are taken over by the Army, the operating personnel will continue to be paid by the existing local organization, if possible, e.g., by municipalities in the case of municipally owned utilities. In the event such practice is impossible, the Fiscal Division, G-4 Section, Force 343, will be notified immediately.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ W. G. CALDWELL,
W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
A.P.O. #758, US Army

1 August 1943.

SUPPLEMENT #3 (To Annex #7, to Adm. O. #1, Hq. Seventh Army).

PROCUREMENT INFORMATION AND PRICE CONTROL LIST

1. Effective immediately the following rates of pay will be used for the hiring of civilian labor by all components of the Seventh United States Army.

a. No exceptions will be permitted without prior approval of the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army.

2. A labor pool has been established for Palermo, Sicily, and surrounding territory and, except under emergent conditions, all civilian labor hired by the Seventh Army in this district will be secured through the labor pool.

a. Labor of all classifications will be secured by informing the Labor Advisor, Civilian Supply Branch, AMGOT of such labor requirements.

(1) The above agency can be contacted by phoning 16990 or by making personal call at #22 Via Phillipo Parlatore, Palermo, Sicily.

(2) 24 hour service will be maintained by this agency.

(3) Any transportation required will be furnished by using Arm or Service.

(4) All timekeeping and payrolls will be the responsibility of the using Arm or Service.

(5) The above agency will be informed of labor requirements at least 24 hours prior to the time the labor will be required.

b. All civilian labor now employed by the Seventh Army who are not registered with the above agency will be required to register not later than 5 August 1943.

(1) All non-registered civilian labor that may be employed by reason of emergent conditions subsequent to this date, will be required to register within 48 hours after employment.

3. The following rates apply to a day of 8 actual working hours exclusive of meal time or time required to travel to and from the job.

4. A normal work week will be considered to be 48 actual working hours, 6 days of 8 hours each.

5. Overtime will be paid for all time over 8 hours worked in one day, at the rate of one and one half times the regular rate.

6. All civilian labor will be hired at the minimum rates, for a probationary period of one work week.

a. After working one week the rate of pay for the civilian employee may be revised within the maximum limit, at the discretion of the employing Arm or Service.

7. Arms or Services hiring and paying civilian employees will make no deductions from the civilians pay for unemployment or sickness benefits or similar reasons.

a. Such payments for the benefit of the worker will be made by the worker as, and when he is able to, at his own discretion.

8. Contractors working for components of the Seventh Army will be bound by the labor laws of the areas in which they operate and are not exempt by reason of being employed on military projects.

a. Such contractors will be required to make customary payroll deductions for the workman's unemployment and sickness and similar benefits but will not make any deductions in behalf of any labor organization, or society or for any commission to any organization, society, or individual, or for any similar reason.

9. Wage rates in existing services e.g., railroad, public utility, etc., will be continued unchanged until further notice. In such instances, even when taken over by the Army, the civilian personnel of the organization should not be placed on the Army payroll.

10. RATES OF PAY CIVILIAN LABOR:

CLERICAL	LIRE Min. per day	LIRE Max. per day
Clerks, male	70	110
" , female	60	90
Interpreters, (Oral)	70	110
" , (Translating)	90	110
Storekeepers	70	110
Typists, male	70	110
" , female	60	90
CLASSIFIED LABOR		
Apprentices to all trades	30	70
Armature Winder	75	120
Blacksmiths	70	110
Battery Workers	70	100
Boiler Makers	75	110
Bookbinders	75	100
" , Assistants	70	90
Bricklayers	75	100
Carpenters	70	100
Caulkers	70	90
Coppersmiths	75	120
Compositors	70	100
" , Assistants	70	90
Chainmen	70	90
Concrete workers	70	90
Coopers	70	100
Engineer, Locomotive	75	110
" , Steam, Stationary	70	100
Electrical Wiremen	75	120
Electricians	75	120
Farriers	70	100
Firemen, Oil Fuel	70	90
Fitters, Electrical	70	100
Foundrymen	70	100
Glaziers	70	100
Hammerman	70	90
Linotype operators	80	120
Lithographers	80	120
" , Assistants	70	90
Masons	70	110
Machinists, Engineering	70	100
" , Tool Room	75	110
" , Woodworking	70	100
Mechanics, Instrument Repairer	90	120
" , Sewing Machine	90	90
" , Typewriter	70	100
" , " , Assistants	70	80
" , Wireless	90	120
Operators, Crane	70	100
" , Winch	70	90
Moulders	80	120
Painters, Polishers and Signwriters	70	100
Pattern Makers	75	110
Platers	70	100
Plumbers	75	100
Plasterers	70	100
Printers	80	120
Riggers	70	100
Rivet Heaters	70	90

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Riveters	70	100
" , Holder-up	70	90
Saddlers	70	100
Sawyers	70	100
Sheet Metal Workers	80	120
Shipwrights	75	110
Stokers & Firemen	70	90
Smelterers	70	100
Tortenders	70	90
Tinsmiths	70	100
Toolmaker	70	100
Quarrymen - Stonecutters	70	90
Vulcanisers	70	100
Welders	80	120
MISCELLANEOUS		
Bakers	70	90
Watchmen	53.3	80
Stevedores	70	70
" , Head	85	85

UNSKILLED LABOR	LIRE Min. per day	LIRE Max. per day
Unskilled laborers	—	50
Strawboss	—	60
Foreman	—	70
Boys, up to and including the age of 17 yrs	—	30
Unskilled women	—	40

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HOBART R. GAY,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
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plus 20 copies to Civil Affairs, Seventh Army.
" 20 " " Fiscal Sec., G-4 Seventh Army

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

From _____ (Date and Hour)
To _____ (Date and Hour)
Reporting Unit _____
Location of Unit _____
Date and Hour _____

NUMBER _____

Maps - References _____

1. LOCATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE TROOPS AND INSTALLATIONS.

2. STATUS OF SUPPLY.

a. Class I.
Ration Strength _____. Type: B C D K Compo.

b. Class II. List Principal Shortages by Supply Service.

c. Class III.

	On Hand	Days of Supply @ 100 Miles Per Day
Fuel (gallons)		
Gasoline V-100		
Gasoline V-80		
Diesel Fuel		
Kerosene		
White Gasoline		
Oil (gallons)		
SAE___		
SAE___		
SAE___		
SAE___		
SAE___		

Grease (pounds)

Type___		
Type___		
Type___		
Type___		

d. Class IV. List Principal Shortages and Major Stockages on Hand.

e. Class V. List Principal Shortages.

3. STATUS OF TRANSPORTATION

	Combat Auth.	Combat On Hand	Administrative Auth.	Administrative On Hand
Operative Vehicles				
Deadlined Vehicles				
TOTAL ON HAND				

4. STATUS OF EVACUATION.

	Disease	Injury	Battle	Aggregate
Remaining from last report				
Admissions				
Returned to Duty				
Remaining				

5. CONDITION OF ROADS AND STATUS OF CIRCULATION.

6. SALVAGE AND CAPTURED MATERIAL.

Type	Amount	Disposition

7. ACTIVITIES AND REMARKS.

Signature _____
Rank _____

ANNEX NO. 9 CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE Hqrs Force 343
To 15 June 1943
ADM. O. NO. 1

1. Class II CWS Supplies.

No Maintenance for Class II Supplies other than items peculiar to Chemical Motorized Battalions and Flame Throwers will be provided for shipment to HORRIFIED. Maintenance stocks of other Class II Supplies will be set up for Force 343 and held in North Africa subject to call forward as the tactical situation dictates.

2. Class V CWS Supplies.

Basic load for white and colored smoke, incendiary and frangible grenades as set forth in Basic Load plan (copy attached). Maintenance for grenades as listed on Basic Load plan set up for assault, first and second follow-ups in accordance with Administrative Plan, Hqrs. Force 343, dated 31 May 1943. Maintenance for hydrogen, nitrogen and NaPalm for portable Flame Throwers set up on the basis of 3 UF for each Flame Thrower in the assault, first and second follow-ups.

Reserves of 4.2" Mortar ammunition set up in accordance with Administrative Plan, Hqrs. Force 343, 31 May 1943 (2 1/3 units of fire for assault, 1 1/6 for each follow-up, in the ratio of 50% HE and 50% WP).

It is the responsibility of all units to obtain their basic load of Class V CWS Supplies. Maintenance of Class II Weapons and Class V Supplies to accompany assaults, first and second follow-ups are being laid down at Fort of Embarkation by SOS.

3. Smoke Munitions for Area Screening.

Smoke Pots, HC M1 and Smoke Floats, HC M4, set up for JOSS, KOOL, CENT and DIME sub-task Forces in following quantities:

ITEM	Assault	D/A	D/8
* Pot, Smoke, HC M1	8300	8300	8300
** Float, Smoke, HC M4	4200	4200	4200

* 8300 for KOOL Assault, 8300 KOOL follow-up.
** 4200 for KOOL Assault, 4200 KOOL follow-up.

4. Training Gas Masks.

All Assault troops will carry the Training Gas Mask. Service or Diaphragm Masks of individuals furnished the Training Gas Mask will be turned in to be boxed and shipped forward with other T/BA equipment for reissue as soon as the tactical situation permits.

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Auth: CG, IAC
Initials:
Date: 31 May 1943

BASIC LOAD - CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE - CLASS V

GRENADES, for Destruction and Screening Purposes	WHITE PHOSPHORUS, M15 or Substitute HC Smoke, M-8	Incendiary THERMITE M-14	Frangible, AT-M1 (or latest type)
Each fuel consuming combat vehicle including tanks, halftracks, scout cars, armored cars, carriages, Motor S.P., and prime movers except mtcls, truck ¼ ton in Recn units, and TD vehs.	4	4	-
Each gun, 37mm, 40mm, or 57mm	-	2	-
Each gun or howitzer, 75mm, 3", 90mm, 105mm (or prime mover)	-	6	-
Each gun or howitzer, 155mm or larger	-	8	-
Each mortar	-	1	-
Each truck, ¼ ton in Recn unit	3	2	-
Each mtcl. in Recn unit	-	1	-
Each vehicle or mount in TD unit	12	4	-
Each rifle Co.	20	10	10
Engrs. Assigned to Amphib. operations			
Hq. & Serv. Co	10	5	-
Bn. Hq. Co.	10	5	-
Shore Co.	20	10	10

GRENADES, Signalling for Air-Ground Recognition. (only two (2) colors loaded at one time)	Smoke (Violet) M16	Smoke (Yellow) M16	Smoke (any future colors) M16
Each tank	3	3	3
Each halftrack	3	3	3
Each scout car	3	3	3
Each vehicle, except mtcl. and those listed above.	1	1	1
*Each Bn Hq Inf.	10	10	10
*Each Co Hq Inf.	5	5	5
*Each Regt Hq Inf.	10	10	10

*In addition to vehicular authorization.


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
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
Staff Section Reports

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The command group of the Seventh Army, with the exception of the Commanding General, consisted of the Deputy Commanding General, the Chief of Staff, the Tactical Deputy Chief of Staff, the Administrative Deputy Chief of Staff, a Secretary of the General Staff Section, and the personal staffs of the general officers of the group.

Its purpose was to provide an immediate agency through which the Commanding General could most efficiently and properly discharge his responsibility of command.

The duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff followed the necessary and well defined practices previously established. It was the process by which the mass of tactical and administrative detail was collected, coordinated and dispatched, which requires some additional comment in this report.

The mechanical phases of this process were largely accomplished through the Secretary of the General Staff Section, commonly referred to as "Chief of Staff Section". It was gradually formed during the planning phase of the operation in order to carry out certain duties designated by the Commanding General of Force 343. Without precedent as regards many of its ultimate over-all functions, those responsible for the establishment of the section had to proceed slowly by trial and error to crystallize its duties and responsibilities by the time the operational phase commenced.

Based upon his experience in the Tunisian campaign, the Commanding General insisted that there be at all times connected with the forward echelon, sufficient officer and enlisted personnel to perform the following duties:

1. Maintain a record of, and coordinate, all orders and instructions emanating from the various staff sections, together with orders and instructions received. A record of the action taken in each case was likewise to be recorded.

2. Make available for ready reference by the command group complete up-to-date reports on:

   a. Casualties.
   b. Replacements.
   c. Prisoners of War.
   d. Materiel losses.
   e. Captured materiel.

3. Coordinate, through the Chief of Staff, all requests for: a. air support; b. Corps (Army) artillery support, and later, Naval fire support and record the time, action taken, time support was received, and results.

4. Accomplish the administration of the command group, and distribute information to the interested sections.

At the outset of the planning phase, the Adjutant General of the I Armored Corps, Reinforced, had set up a special classified section, the sole duties of which were to receive, distribute, record, and transmit all of the classified material relating to the Sicilian operation. It was anticipated that the highly specialized duties of this classified section would make its personnel completely familiar with the plans, records and administrative responsibilities within the Corps with regard to the operation, and thus permit them, without further briefing, to be incorporated in the Chief of Staff Section at the outset of the operation proper.

Moreover, it had become apparent by the time Corps Headquarters moved to Mostaganem, Algeria, on 26 April, that because of the numerous complexities and difficulties elsewhere mentioned, in the preparation for the operation, an administrative assistant to the Chief of Staff was highly desirable. Consequently, on 12 May, the Corps Adjutant General was relieved from such assignment and made Administrative Deputy Chief of Staff. Thereafter, all of the administrative matters pertaining to the Corps, including those involved in the Sicilian operation, were routed through the Chief of Staff Section to the Administrative Deputy Chief of Staff, for action.

At the same time, the section took over from the special classified section of the Adjutant General the receipt, approval, and transmittal of all outgoing classified messages relating to the operation, and kept the complete records thereof. The section also established and maintained a complete planning and operational file for ready reference by the command group, as well as special operational files for the Commanding General, Deputy Commanding General, Chief of Staff, and Tactical Deputy Chief of Staff.

At the conclusion of the planning phase, the Chief of Staff Section, in addition to the Chief of Staff and the Tactical and Administrative Deputy Chiefs of Staff, consisted of three commissioned officers in the Secretary of the General Staff Section, and three staff sergeants who functioned as stenographers and file clerks.

Thus, the section, although a little short of personnel for the additional clerical work involved, was able during the planning phase of the operation to render considerable and constant assistance to the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the discharge of their duties. The orders, instructions, and other activities of all sections of the general and special staffs of the Corps were coordinated and expedited through the Section to the Chief of Staff and Commanding General with very little delay.

In preparation for the operation proper, with the extremely limited space and transportation facilities available, certain carefully selected files relating to the Sicilian operation were taken to the headquarters ship, and the Chief of Staff Section was increased by the addition of one officer and four enlisted men who had previously worked in the special classified section under the Corps Adjutant General. The section was now complete for the operation, and consisted of the Chief of Staff, two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, four officers and seven enlisted men who were also familiar with the planning, tactical and supply phases involved in the operation.

With the opening of headquarters aboard the U.S.S. "Monrovia", the section functioned on a twenty-four hour duty basis, with at least one officer and two enlisted men on duty at all times. The section's functions in assisting the Chief of Staff during the initial operational phase until the Army headquarters was established at Gela, Sicily, on 12 July, consisted principally of receiving, recording, distributing, coordinating, and preparing for radio transmittal all communications to and from the command group and staff sections in the forward echelon. The record of the planning phase of the operation was also made available for frequent reference by the command group and officers of the Army staff.

Meantime, during the planning phase, Corps unit staff sections, including divisions, had been specially instructed in administrative matters involving the collection and preparation of information to be provided the Chief of Staff Section. Schools were conducted for units from whom such information was desired.

In anticipation of the receipt of such information, files were opened and prepared to record:

1. Orders and instructions given and received during the operational phase.

2. All air support requests, the action thereon, the result, and the time period therefor.

3. Materiel gains and losses.

4. Casualty, replacement, Prisoner of War, and enemy personnel loss files.

One statistical clerk was assigned to keep a cumulative daily report on such information.

Casualty, replacement, and Prisoner of War reports had a necessary lag, as did the reports of materiel losses, such lag averaging about three days. These reports depended largely upon the time required by the lower echelons to assemble the information. In order to obviate this lag, G-2 commenced the publication of a daily estimate of casualties, Prisoners of War, materiel losses, enemy casualties, and captured equipment, from its available sources of information. G-1 and G-4 soon adopted this practice with regard to the information for which they were responsible. The estimates of G-1 and G-4 were revised daily to conform with the actual figures as they arrived and, on the whole, the estimates proved extremely accurate. They were of considerable assistance in providing the command group with vital information.

As the Advance C.P. moved East from Palermo, the section established a daily officer courier service by Cub plane to Main Headquarters to insure the delivery of important communications. This was maintained until the close of the campaign.

During the entire operation, checks and follow-ups were constantly made on delivery and dispatch of important messages to other headquarters, and the section continued to receive and distribute all incoming radio messages and other material at the Advance C.P.

At the conclusion of the Sicilian operation, the section was charged with performing the following duties:

1. Coordinating all orders and instructions relating to the operation issued from the various sections of the Advance C.P.

2. The receipt, coordination, recording and distribution of radio messages to interested staff sections, designating by whom action should be taken.

3. Maintaining as an official record, the file of all incoming and outgoing radio messages.

4. Receiving and consolidating all reports relating to:

   a. Casualties.
   b. Replacements.
   c. Prisoners of War.
   d. Enemy casualties.
   e. Materiel losses.
   f. Captured equipment and enemy materiel losses.

5. Handling the receipt and distribution of miscellaneous material to the interested sections in the Advance C.P., and accomplishing the administration for the command group.

6. Operating an officer courier service.

7. Maintaining, insofar as possible, records of artillery and naval fire support requests and air support requests.

8. Handling stenographic work originating in the section and the command group.

9. Following up the dispatch and delivery of orders and instructions issued by the command group to lower echelons.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The clearance of all tactical and certain administrative orders and instructions through the Chief of Staff Section were handled expeditiously and produced the following additional benefits:

   a. Inconsistent orders and instructions were obviated before transmittal.

   b. Outgoing messages were reclassified through a central agency to insure their proper priority in transmittal.

   c. Enabled the Chief of Staff Section to provide a central agency for the follow-up and check on the delivery or transmittal of important documents and messages and to furnish a special messenger service where the circumstances required it.

   d. Enabled the Chief of Staff Section to maintain a complete record of the operation available for the proper coordination necessary to its direction.

2. For future operations, where it appears probable that Army Headquarters will operate an Advance C.P., supervision of Main Headquarters and its coordination with the Advance C.P. must be effected through an over all executive head in command of Main Headquarters.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In future operations, a Chief of Staff Section similar to the one described in this report should be established, prepared to operate indefinitely on a twenty-four hour duty basis.

2. Prior to the operation, an operating procedure in connection with requests for Naval fire support and Air support should be carefully worked out with the Naval and Air operations staffs, which should also provide for such additional information as may be required by the command group.

3. A general officer, thoroughly familiar with all phases of the operation, should be placed in command of the Main Headquarters (when separated from the Advance C.P.) whose sole duties should be the coordination and control of Main Headquarters and the various general and special staff sections thereof, and the coordination of the Main Headquarters with the Advance C.P.

Paul D. Harkins
PAUL D. HARKINS,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Dep. Chief of Staff (Tactical).

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REPORT OF THE A.C. OF S. G-1 (PERSONNEL)

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I GENERAL

On receipt of outline plan for HUSKY Operation, the first problems confronting G-1 were the selecting and assembling of officers for the various headquarters Staff Sections and building up to T/O strength of all units assigned to the command.

There were assigned to headquarters at this time 85 officers, organized under T/O 100-1. Recommendation was made to higher headquarters for organizing under 100-1, with certain modifications, providing for a total of 178 officers. This was approved and the necessary officers to bring headquarters up to this new strength were assembled, in many cases by name, and in others by qualification, from practically every source within the theater, including higher headquarters, Base Sections, Replacement Depots and subordinate units.

The replacement procedure at this time provided for requisitions to be submitted through Headquarters I Armored Corps and Fifth Army to NATOUSA, where they were approved and sent to Replacement Depots for filling.

Concurrent with the assembling of personnel, special units necessary for the particular operation being planned, were activated under approved T/O's and personnel provided for them.

Outline plans for the operation were prepared, covering all phases of G-1 responsibility. Plans included securing and distributing replacements; the receiving and disposing of Prisoners of War; coordination with Civil Affairs officer and AMGOT; Military Police plans; the preparation of directives on administrative procedures covering G-1 reports, promotions, decorations and awards, Prisoner of War reports and Graves Registration; the securing and distribution of an adequate initial supply of medals, and many other diverse phases.

II STATION LIST & STRENGTH OF COMMAND

UNIT	LOCATION 20 AUGUST	STRENGTH 10 JULY	STRENGTH 20 AUGUST
Hq. Seventh Army	Palermo	507	507
Hq. Co. Seventh Army	Palermo	601	586
1st Avn Tk Co	Sicily	71	-
Btry "B", 1st Fl Obsn	Cesaro	156	156
1st Tank Des. Grp.	*Sebdou	139	120
1st Ranger Bn	Castelvetrano	-	521
1st Armd Dis Bn	Nicosia, Palermo	1031	1022
2nd Tank Grp	*Sebdou	89	83
3rd Sup Subg Grp	*Sougi	-	28
3rd Ord Co (MM)	San Stefano	-	158
3rd Ranger Bn	Patti	-	546
4th Ca Grp HQ & A	Palermo	83	91
4th Med Sup Dep	*Biserte	42	38
4th Ranger Bn	Caltanissetta	-	485
5th Ord Bn	Licata	38	34
5th Ord Co (MM)	Licata	-	162
Engr F.P. Det. 5A	Palermo	27	27
Engr F.P. Det. 8B	Palermo	26	-
7th Ca AA Grp HQ	Palermo	83	-
8th Evac Hosp	*Algiers	599	-
10th Port of Emb. TC	Palermo	559	524
11th Postal Reg Sect	Palermo	-	16
11th Evac Hosp	San Agata	370	-
12th Cml Bn Co Det	Palermo	166	109
14th Evac Hosp	*Mt. Sarbe	604	-
20th Engr Regt	Cefalu	1442	1298
20th Malaria Ctrl	Palermo	-	11
21st Cml Bn	Palermo	59	194
21st QM Rept Trk	Licata	230	230
24th Fin Disb Sect	Palermo	20	20
26th Fin Disb Sect	Palermo	24	25
1st Bn, 27th QM Rept Trk	Cefalu	390	382
34th Ord Co MM	*Port Lyautey	169	169
36th Ord Co MM	Sperlinga	207	166
51st Cml Regt AA	Palermo	101	-
54th Med Amb	Palermo	-	64
62nd Ord Bn MM	Palermo	330	51
65th Ord Bn MM	*Rabat	42	-
68th QM Rept Trk	Palermo	694	518
81st Med Bn	Palermo	442	217
91st Sig Bn	Palermo	496	1002
92nd Cml Co	*Alcoea	-	215
93rd QM Bn Trk	Palermo	-	521
95th QM Bn Trk	Palermo	529	513
98th Med Bn (-Co A&C)	Cefalu	-	435
58th Ord Co AM	Palermo	175	175
59th Evac Hosp	Palermo	753	400
62nd Armd FA Bn	Cesaro	742	715
Hq & Hq Det and Co "A", 62nd QM Ldry	Palermo	373	320
Co "B", 62nd QM Ldry Bn	*Oran	299	295
Co "C", 62nd QM Ldry Bn	*Oudjda	292	292
Co "D", 62nd QM Ldry Bn	*Ouled Rahmouin	293	293
62nd Ord Bn AM	Licata	53	-
Hq 1st Bn, 213th CA Regt	*Tebessa	99	-
Btry "K", 213th CA Regt	*Tunis	206	-
216th CA Bn AA M	Licata	822	-
229th Sig Co Opn	Licata	306	284
232nd QM Co	Palermo	226	213
235th Ord Co BD	Palermo	105	128
242nd QM Bn Serv	Licata	903	988
246th QM Bn Serv	Palermo	996	808
249th QM Bn Serv	Palermo	254	251
255th QM Bn Serv	Palermo	976	911
261st Ord Co MM	Licata	165	-
301st QM Bn Ster	*Biserte	317	312
305th QM Co Rhd	Palermo	107	105
330th Ord Co MT Q	*Corronia	106	101
334th QM Co DS	Palermo	151	137
339th Ord Co MTS	*Biserte	212	213
342nd M.P. Escort Gd Co	*Algiers	142	142
343rd Engr Regt GS	Palermo	1212	1179
351st CA Bn AA SL	*Algiers	552	-
353rd CA Bn AA SL	*Ferryville	-	738
354th CA Bn AA SL	*Biserte	738	742
355th CA Bn AA	*Ferryville	-	723
360th CA Bn AA SL	*Algiers	552	-
376th Engr Bn Sep	*Mateur	1111	1111
379th M.P. Escort Gd Co	Licata	137	137
382nd Port Bn TC	San Stefano	-	217
382nd Port Bn TC	Termini	-	201
387th Port Bn TC	Palermo	-	441
387th Engr Bn	*Valmy	179	-
396th Port Bn TC	Palermo	-	174
401st Engr Bn WS	Licata	134	134
401st Engr Bn WS	Palermo	474	179
401st Engr Bn WS	Caltanisetta	98	105
402nd Engr Bn WS	*St. Barbe	344	-
403rd CA Bn AA Sep	Palermo	902	912
410th CA Bn AA	Licata	747	-
410th Engr Co Dep	Palermo	31	749
427th Engr Co DT	Palermo	120	137
431st CA Bn AA Sep	Licata	711	-
434th CA Bn AA SW	*Souk El Mehmis	704	-
437th CA Bn AA Sep	*Souk El Mehmis	581	-
437th Engr Dep Co	Trapani	47	118
462nd Engr Co Dep	Palermo	47	-
462nd Engr Co Dep	Palermo	40	-
469th Engr Co MTC	Palermo	175	224
504th M. P. Bn	Palermo	195	271
528th QM Bn Serv	Catania	-	911
533rd CA Bn AA	*Perrysville	-	802
540th Engr Regt	Palermo	-	1392
548th A.P.U.	Palermo	-	12
549th A.P.U.	Palermo	-	13
550th A.P.U.	Palermo	-	12
601st T/D Bn	*Cap Blanc	851	-
601st Engr Cam Bn	Licata	99	31
601st Engr Cam Bn	Palermo	-	169
604th Ord Co AM	Palermo	-	178
609th Engr Bn Amm	Palermo	133	-
645th Tank Des Bn	*Porto Ferina	980	-
Hq & Hq Det & Med Det, 63rd Ord Bn	Petralia	47	54
63rd Cml Co Dep	Palermo	70	101
66th Engr Topo Co	Cesaro	32	32
66th Engr Topo Co	*Tunis	91	89
Hq & Btry H, 67th CA Regt	*Grombolia	240	-
Btry A.B.& C., 67th CA Regt	*Hammarnet	770	-
Btry D, 67th CA Regt	*Soliman	170	-
Btry E.F.& G., 67th CA Regt	*Soliman	530	-
67th Ord Bn	*Finale	420	30
67th QM Ref M Co	*Constantine	134	-
69th Cml Co	Palermo	129	118
77th Evac Hosp	Palermo	110	-
78th Cml Co SG	Palermo	116	115
78th Ord Co	Palermo	130	118
85th Engr Hv Pont	*Port Cheliff	205	-
86th Ord Co HM	*Oran	218	-
87th Ord Co HM Trk	*Mateur	217	-
89th Ord Co F	*Biserte	-	220
91st Evac Hosp	Palermo	297	297
93rd Ord Co MM AA	Licata	161	149
94th QM Bn Bkry	Palermo	141	141
95th QM Bn Bkry	Palermo	-	39
100th QM Co Bhd	Palermo	93	113
101st Ord Co MM	*St. Leu	140	-
106th CA AAA	Nicosia	248	-
107th CA Grp	Licata	6611	-
128th Sig Co RI	San Stefano	368	245
128th Evac Hosp	Cefalu	329	321
138th QM Co Trk	Palermo	122	137
144th QM Co Trk	Palermo	134	132
161st Ord Plat	*Biserte	29	29
163rd Sig Photo Co	*Algiers	5	14
167th CA Bn AA	Palermo	738	-
175th Engr Regt	Licata	1236	-
177th Sig Rep Co	*Biserte	-	34
177th Sig Rep Co	Palermo	-	33
191st Tank Bn M	*Biserte	837	-
196th Sig Photo Co	*Biserte	-	-
196th Sig Photo Co	San Agata	-	-
197th Ord Bn HM Q	*Mostaganem	499	110
201st Ord Co Dep	Licata	186	186
204th M. P. Co	Palermo	185	261
205th QM Bn GS	Palermo	316	133
206th Sig Co Dep	Palermo & Gela	138	137
Btry "H", 213th CA Regt	*Bongie	70	-
Btry "A" & "B", 213th CA Regt	*Beja	308	-
Hq 3rd Bn, 213th CA Regt	El Harouin	304	-
Btry "I", 213th CA Regt	*Ferryville	211	-
Btry "D", "E" & "F", 213th CA Regt	*Mateur	585	-
Hq & Hq Btry & Med Det, 213th CA Regt	*Menzel Heur	165	-
Btry "C", 213th CA Regt	*Soliman	179	-

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UNIT	LOCATION 20 AUGUST	STRENGTH 10 JULY	STRENGTH 20 AUGUST
689th CA Btry AAA	Licata	-	76
703rd Ry Co Ry Div	*Sidi Mabrouk	111	-
713th Ry Opn Bn	Licata	708	849
727th Ry Opn Bn	Palermo	854	872
753rd Ry Shop Det	*Cran	517	-
756th Tank Bn L	*Perryville	688	-
757th Tank Bn L	*Sebdou	709	-
758th A.F.U.	Palermo	-	9
760th Tank Bn L	*Fort Lyautey	800	-
776th T/D Bn	*Sebdou	1006	948
813th T/D Bn	*Cape Blanc	845	-
814th Sig Co Port	Palermo	653	117
815th Engr Bn AM	*Bizerte	208	-
849th Sig Int Serv	*Algiers	73	-
878th Ord Co HM	*Algiers	282	-
894th T/D Bn	*Sebdou	986	865
899th T/D Bn	*Sebdou	936	964
905th Ord Co HM	*Constantine	251	-
991st Ord Co	Palermo	111	75
1651st Engr Port Const Co	Termini	247	240
1090th Engr Util Co	Palermo	-	186
2626th CA Brig AA	Palermo	6195	-
2629th M. P. Bn	Palermo	22	22
2641st P/W Proc Det	Licata	40	39
3405th Ord Co MM	Palermo	188	185
3407th Ord Co MM Q	Defalu	-	143
3408th Ord Co MM &	Sperlinga	-	207
4510th Y SL Rep Co	Palermo	-	5
6623rd Reg Co (Prov)TC	Palermo	-	230
6625th Base Area Group	Palermo	489	494
6648th Casual Bn	Defalu	-	2
Vet Det "B"	Palermo	-	20
SUB TOTAL		68203	41558
Attached: Army Troops.			
3rd Cml Bn Mtz	Cesaro	1000	-
7th M.R.U. Mobile	Palermo	28	32
20th M.R.U. Mobile	Palermo	60	60
83rd Cml Bn Mtz	Trapani	996	1014
84th Cml Bn Mtz	Nicosia	988	972
84th Engr Bn Cam	Trapani	86	-
2657th Engr Map Dep	Palermo	26	26
2657th Engr Map Dep	Gela	13	13
2658th Engr Map Dep	Palermo	12	12
Other attached personnel	-	1229	1229
SUB TOTAL		4438	3361
CORPS:			
II Corps.			
Hq & Hq Co II Corps	V. Campo Felice	411	496
25th M.P.W.	V. Campo Felice	42	47
30th Fin Disb Sect	V. Campo Felice	20	20
523rd QM Car Co	V. Campo Felice	67	151
202nd M. P. Co	4 mi W. Campo Felice	239	242
62nd Engr Co Topo	Nicosia	125	95
53rd Sig Bn	4 mi W. Campo Felice	924	901
SUB TOTAL		1928	1952
Attached: II Corps.			
13th FA Brig	Messina	-	-
Hq & Hq Btry	Messina	110	132
1st Obsn Bn	Messina	175	313
36th FA Regt	Messina	652	1464
17th FA Regt	Messina	1238	1306
178th FA Regt	Messina	1295	545
Hq & Hq Btry, 106th CA Grp (AA)	-	80	-
103rd CA Bn	-	741	-
19th Engr Regt (C) (-2 Bns)	Agrigento	383	1333
39th Engr Regt (C)	*S. Aque Dolci	1368	1355
Co C, 40lst Engr Bn	*Cedra	134	101
11th Field Hosp	M. Cesaro	175	352
Coll Co plus Clr Plat, 51st Med Bn	M. Troina	126	117
54th Med Bn	Sperlinga	512	489
1st Plat, 36th Amb Bn	-	27	-
Det, 2nd Aux Surg Grp (7 teams)	M. Cesaro	38	42
Det, 3rd Aux Surg Grp (7 teams)	M. Cesaro	38	69

UNIT	LOCATION 20 AUGUST	STRENGTH 10 JULY	STRENGTH 20 AUGUST
Co C, 249th QM Bn Serv	-	227	-
10th Field Hosp	-	-	245
Det, 51st Med Bn	-	-	118
15th Evac Hosp	-	-	315
262nd Ord Co	-	-	156
83rd Ord Co	-	-	214
79th Ord Co	-	-	175
1st Bn, 17th FA Regt	-	-	620
Det, 36th FA Regt	-	-	569
443rd FA Bn	-	-	918
58th Armd FA Bn	-	-	725
3rd Plat, 46th QM Co	-	-	122
Other attached personnel	-	144	452
SUB TOTAL		7463	12251
DIVISIONS:			
1st Infantry Division.			
Div Hq	Licata	163	187
Div Hq Co	Licata	230	227
M. P. Plat	Licata	138	137
1st Sig Co	Licata	320	291
1st Recn Trn	Licata	216	190
1st Ord LM Co	Licata	164	161
1st QM Co	Licata	256	255
1st Engr Bn.	Licata	795	657
1st Med Bn	Licata	505	465
16th. Inf Regt	Licata	3538	2734
18th Inf Regt	Licata	-	3261
26th Inf Regt	Licata	3384	2556
Div Arty	Licata	242	241
5th FA Bn	Licata	711	659
7th FA Bn	Licata	576	596
32nd FA Bn	Licata	-	569
33rd FA Bn	Licata	599	506
Casuals from Hosp, (unassigned)	Licata	43	46
SUB TOTAL		11880	13728
Attached: 1st Inf. Div.			
Det, 2657th Engr Co	-	5	-
Det, 12th Cml Co	-	80	-
62nd Engr Co Topo	-	123	-
Plat, 21st Cml Co	-	60	-
Broadcasting Det	-	3	-
Pub Rel Pers	-	7	-
Censorship Det	-	1	-
Civil Affairs	-	4	-
P.W.I. Teams	-	24	-
1st Ranger Bn	-	470	-
531st Engr Shore Regt	-	2069	-
70th Tank Bn	Mistretta	649	627
91st Recn Sqd	Mistretta	757	874
3406th Ord Co	Campo Felice	234	191
79th Ord Co	Campo Felice	93	179
83rd Ord Co	-	217	-
93rd Evac Hosp	San Stefano	331	-
690th CA Btry	-	81	-
691st CA Btry	-	69	-
692nd CA Btry	-	59	-
693rd CA Btry	-	79	-
2nd Bn, 47th QM Regt	-	308	-
261st Med Bn	-	322	-
286th Sig Co	-	118	-
105th CA Bn	-	866	782
Det, 1st Obsn Bn	-	162	-
69th Ord Co	-	186	-
86th QM Co	-	112	-
2nd Med Sup Dep	-	45	-
Vet Det T (8580JJ)	-	5	-
43rd Ord Bn	-	33	-
235th Ord Co	-	34	-
Det. 18/4th QM Bn	-	38	-
3844th Port Bn	-	882	-
809th Engr Bn	-	470	-
Air Corps (RAF&AAF)	-	11	-
Btry E, 36th FA Bn	-	1381	-
C.I.C. Det.	-	144	-
67th Armd Regt, Det	-	19	-
177th Sig Co	-	122	-
601st Engr Bn, Co A	-	21	30
205th QM Bn GS	-	15	-
Det, 462nd Engr Co	-	27	-
		21	-

UNIT	LOCATION 20 AUGUST	STRENGTH 10 JULY	STRENGTH 20 AUGUST
Det, 3407th Ord Co	-	108	-
Det, 2657th QM Bn	-	510	-
2602nd Engr Co	-	198	-
Co C, 249th QM Bn	-	227	-
437th Engr Co, Plat	-	41	-
262nd Ord Co	-	159	-
504th M. P. Det.	-	197	-
Det, 109th CA Bn	-	373	-
Det, 36th Amb Bn	-	27	-
Det, 204th Sig Co	-	24	-
Det, 163rd Sig Photo Co	-	8	8
Det, 46th QM Co GR	-	58	-
15th Evac Hosp	-	294	-
Det, Aux Surg Grp	-	40	-
Det, 63rd Ord Bn	-	51	-
Det, 382nd Port Bn	-	400	-
Det, 72nd Sig Co	-	49	-
P. W. Proc Det	-	46	-
Det, 62nd Armd FA Bn	-	-	27
Other attchd personnel	-	-	310
SUB TOTAL		13573	3031
2nd Armored Division.			
Div Hq & Hq Co	Giardinello & N. Africa	174	339
Div Serv Co	Giardinello & N. Africa	294	378
Trn Hq Co	Giardinello & N. Africa	124	120
67th Armd Regt	Giardinello & N. Africa	2133	1286
78th FA Bn	Giardinello & N. Africa	798	628
92nd FA Bn	Giardinello & N. Africa	462	291
82nd Recn Bn	Giardinello & N. Africa	865	365
17th Engr Bn	Giardinello & N. Africa	265	1323
48th Med Bn	Giardinello & N. Africa	116	272
142nd Sig Co	Giardinello & N. Africa	283	256
Supply Bn	Giardinello & N. Africa	603	186
Maint Bn	Giardinello & N. Africa	-	961
66th Armd Regt	Giardinello & N. Africa	-	2421
41st Inf Regt	Giardinello & N. Africa	-	2685
SUB TOTAL		6477	11815
Attached: 2nd Armd. Div.			
107th CA Bn	-	143	-
51st Med Bn	Palermo	161	163
32nd FA Bn, Det	-	30	-
451st CA Bn	-	816	-
18th Inf Regt	-	400	-
Det, 36th Amb Bn	-	27	-
Det, 669th Engrs	-	4	-
603rd Ord Co	-	138	-
Det, 100th QM Co	-	34	-
Det, 462nd Engr	-	11	-
SUB TOTAL		1447	163
3rd Infantry Division			
Div Hq & Hq Co	Trapani	389	401
3rd Sig Co	Trapani	328	325
3rd Recn Troop	Nr Rometta Marea	198	187
7th Inf Regt	Nr Paceco	3561	3442
15th Inf Regt	Nr Napola	3471	3400
30th Inf Regt	Nr Paceco	3506	3455
Div Arty	Nr Trapani	171	168
9th FA Bn	Nr Trapani	663	641
10th FA Bn	Nr Trapani	639	616
39th FA Bn	Nr Trapani	639	596
41st FA Bn	Nr Trapani	625	614
3rd Med Bn	Nr Barbera	499	492
3rd QM Co	*Nr Rosina	218	235
10th Engr Bn	*Nr Lago Grande	766	758
703rd Ord Co	*Nr Rosina	163	154
SUB TOTAL		15786	15486
Attached: 3rd Inf. Div.			
Combat Command "A"	-	6351	-
2nd Bn, 540th Engr	-	430	-
Co A, 40lst Engr	-	119	-
36th Engr Regt	Licata	1854	2065
71st Sig Co	-	189	-
688th CA, Det	-	76	-
Det, 689th CA MP Btry	-	69	-
382nd Port Bn	-	428	-

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UNIT	LOCATION 20 AUGUST	STRENGTH 10 JULY	STRENGTH 20 AUGUST
Co "C", 361st QM	-	443	-
3497th Ord Bn	-	137	-
5th Armd Arty Grp:			
Hq Det	E. Floresta	70	62
58th Armd FA	E. Floresta	714	725
62nd Armd FA	E. Floresta	722	686
65th Armd FA	E. Floresta	729	735
62nd CA Regt	-	2231	-
436th CA Bn	Nr Falcone	861	918
443rd CA Bn	-	931	-
214th CA Bn	-	829	-
77th FA Regt	Cefalu	1394	1261
1st Bn, 36th FA	-	629	569
Co C, 205th [illegible]	-	124	-
184th QM Co	-	123	-
93rd QM Co	-	109	-
48th QM Co	Nr Caronia	108	122
Co "E", 47th QM	-	123	-
Co "F", 47th QM	-	[illegible]	-
10th Field Hosp	-	246	-
56th Med Bn	-	456	-
Det, 12th Chem	-	166	-
2nd Plat, 21st Chem	-	59	-
S & I Sect, 206th Sig	-	24	-
2nd Chem Bn	Brolo	-	916
Co "A", 51st Sig Bn	-	242	-
379th M.P. Escort Gd Co	-	137	-
42nd Ord & Med	-	50	-
99ist Ord Co	-	222	-
3rd Ord Co	-	125	-
Btry B, 1st FA Obsn	-	156	-
Vet Det 8580	-	5	-
729th Ry Opn Bn	-	827	-
64th Ord	-	174	-
SUB TOTAL		23003	8059
9th Infantry Division.			
Hq & Hq Co	Cefalu	464	520
9th Med Co	Cefalu	481	302
9th QM Co	Cefalu	220	335
9th Sig Co	Cefalu	330	329
9th Rcn Trp	Cefalu	214	206
Div Arty	Cefalu	164	162
15th Engr Bn	Cefalu	714	673
26th FA Bn	Cefalu	602	590
34th FA Bn	Cefalu	607	600
39th Inf Regt	Cefalu	3095	2776
47th Inf Regt	Cefalu	3205	2934
60th Inf Regt	Cefalu	3131	2855
84th FA Bn	Cefalu	596	597
709th Ord Co	Cefalu	148	150
60th FA Bn	Cefalu	594	570
SUB TOTAL		14565	13599
45th Infantry Division.			
Hq & Hq Co	Termini	521	637
45th Cav Rcn Trp	Termini	201	197
157th Inf Regt	Termini	3496	3337
179th Inf Regt	Termini	3492	3382
180th Inf Regt	Termini	3496	3330
Div Arty	Termini	150	165
158th FA Bn	Termini	631	613
160th FA Bn	Termini	635	628
171st FA Bn	Termini	631	598
189th FA Bn	Termini	633	615
120th Engr Bn	Termini	763	747
120th Med Bn	Termini	505	486
45th Sig Co	Termini	322	317
45th QM Co	Termini	213	216
700th Ord Co LM	Termini	155	170
SUB TOTAL		15359	15436
Attached: 45th Inf. Div.			
441st CA Bn	Termini	841	833
753rd Tank Bn	-	768	-
2nd Chem Bn	-	1010	916
SUB TOTAL		2619	1749
82nd Airborne Division.			
Hq & Hq Co	-	344	-
82nd A/B Sig	-	130	-

UNIT	LOCATION 20 AUGUST	STRENGTH 10 JULY	STRENGTH 20 AUGUST
307th A/B Med Co	-	298	-
407th A/B QM Co	-	174	-
782nd A/B Ord Maint Co	-	92	-
307th A/B Engr Bn	-	495	-
504th Para Inf	-	2321	-
376th Para FA Bn	-	598	-
505th Para Inf	-	2281	-
456th Para FA Bn	-	615	-
325th Glider Inf	-	2257	-
319th Glider FA Bn	-	426	-
80th CA AA Bn A/B	-	609	-
320th Glider FA Bn	-	440	-
Hq Btry, Div Arty	-	129	-
509th Para Inf Regt	-	789	-
SUB TOTAL		12018	-
1st Engineer Special Brigade.			
Hq & Hq Co	Licata	67	71
Hq Co	Licata	201	229
261st Med Bn	Licata	90	426
286th Sig Co	Licata	136	125
361st QM Bn	Licata	327	303
Det, 3497th Ord Co MM Q	Porto Empedocle	40	-
SUB TOTAL		861	1154
Attached: 1st Engr. Spec. Brig.			
175th Engrs.	Licata	-	1289
Det, 72nd Sig Co	-	49	-
40th Engr Regt	-	2246	-
36th Engr Regt	-	2139	-
2nd Naval Beach Bn	-	438	-
71st Sig Co	-	187	-
Det, 452nd Engr Co	-	11	-
18ith QM Co., Det	-	120	-
2602nd Engr Co(Pipeline)	-	179	-
540th Engr Regt	-	1273	-
SUB TOTAL		6642	1289
34th Coast Artillery Brigade.			
Hq	-	-	102
62nd CA Regt	Palermo	-	1748
103rd Bar Bln Btry	Palermo	-	194
68th CA Regt	Palermo	-	2178
167th CA Bn (AA)	Palermo	-	738
401st CA Bn (AA)	Licata	-	816
406th CA Bn (AA)	Porto Empedocle	-	751
400th CA Bn (AA)	Licata	-	739
104th Bar Bln Btry	Licata	-	263
689th CA Btry (AB)	Gela	-	72
691st CA Btry (AB)	Gela	-	61
693rd CA Btry (AB)	Licata	-	76
105th CA Grp (AA)	Termini	-	83
214th CA Bn (AA)	Termini	-	620
436th CA Bn (AA)	Termini	-	712
SUB TOTAL		-	9153
2626th Coast Artillery Brigade (AA)			
Hq & Hq Btry	Licata	-	101
107th CA Grp (AA)	Licata	-	80
215th CA Bn (AA)	Gela	-	798
216th CA Bn (AA)	Gela	-	829
433rd CA Bn (AA)	Forte Olivo	-	378
690th CA MG Btry	Forte Olivo	-	69
692nd CA MG Btry	Gela	-	87
696th CA MG Btry	Gela	-	81
697th CA MG Btry	Gela	-	82
261st Ord Co	Licata	-	162
1st AAA Grp	Licata	-	83
401st CA Bn (AA)	Licata	-	811
106th Grp	Licata	-	759
406th CA Bn (AA)	Porto Empedocle	-	751
698th CA Bn (AA)	Gela	-	60
693rd CA MG Btry	Licata	-	74
104th Bln Bar Btry	Licata area	-	264
400th CA Bn (AA)	Porto Empedocle, Gela, Licata	-	735
SUB TOTAL		-	6204
GRAND TOTAL		207062	159990

NOTE: Where strength figures are shown on only one of the two dates, 10 July or 20 August, the units status had changed and either accounted for under a division or brigade, or added after 10 July or dropped before 20 August.
* - Not in Sicily

III ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS

- Headquarters Installations -

All properties occupied within cities and towns occupied by Seventh Army Headquarters during the campaign were requisitioned through, and approved by G-1; this applied also to bivouacking within the cities and towns occupied.

Seventh Army Headquarters was moved from the headquarters ship and established in GELA on 11 July 1943. It was divided into a Forward Echelon, established in a fortified park area just outside the town, and a Main Headquarters Echelon which was established in the Ecola Communal. Forward Echelon consisted of the Commanding General, the Deputy Commanding General, The Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Aides, Secretaries, G-2, G-3 and a detachment of the Adjutant General Section.

G-1 Billeting Officer reconnoitered and made detailed assignments of the space in these headquarters installations and also provided office space and billets for the XII Air Support Command, Headquarters Seventh Army, Provisional Car Company, and other units which it was necessary to establish in town. Officers' billets were provided by requisitioning several apartments and two hotels.

On 21-22 July the headquarters was moved in two echelons from GELA to AGRIGENTO into facilities previously reconnoitered by Billeting Officer G-1; the Forward Echelon was established in Fascist headquarters, and the Main Headquarters Echelon was established in a German Marine Barracks. The Hotel Des Temples was requisitioned for billets for field officers, and an officers' mess was established therein. Company grade officers of headquarters were billeted in a portion of the Marine Barracks.

On 23 July 1943 headquarters was moved from AGRIGENTO to PALERMO in two echelons, and into previously reconnoitered facilities. The Forward Echelon was established in the Palazzo Reale and the Main Headquarters in the Palazzo Del Poste E Telegrafi. The Hotels Excelsior, Grand, and Sole, and an apartment building at 39 Via Liberta were requisitioned for the billeting of headquarters and transient officers.

The problems of assigning billets and bivouacs to Allied Military as well as civilian agencies within the PALERMO area proved to be of some magnitude. A Billeting Section was established under Billeting Officer, G-1, Seventh Army, consisting of 4 officers and 3 enlisted men. Over 200 buildings and properties were requisitioned by Seventh Army in PALERMO for various command groups including Naval, Air, and Ground Forces, as well as for the Base Area Group, and the many tactical and service units necessarily located within the city for defense and for operation of the port and other facilities. All of these properties were formally requisitioned through G-1 and checked by the Engineer Section. Inventories of all moveable property were taken and, where necessary, civilians were evacuated, coordination being effected with Civil Affairs Officer, AMGOT.

- Prisoner of War Inclosures -

Prisoner of War Inclosures established in SICILY included:

Operated by Seventh Army -

GELA Inclosure:
Opened 15 July, closed 28 July.
Capacity - 8,000 prisoners.
Operated by 342nd Military Police Escort Guard Co., and Prisoner of War Processing Detachment.
2360 Prisoners of War handled thru Inclosure.

LICATA Inclosure:
Taken over by Seventh Army from 3rd Division, 18 July.
Operating capacity - 8,000 prisoners.
Operated by 179th Escort Guard Company and 261st Prisoner of War Processing Detachment.
29,050 Prisoners of War handled thru Inclosure.

PORTO EMPEDOCLE Inclosure:
Opened 19 July, closed 14 August.
Capacity - 20,000 Prisoners of War.
Operated by Detachment 379th Military Police Escort Guard Company and Detachment of 261st Prisoner of War Processing Detachment, relieved by 342nd Escort Guard Company and Prisoner of War Processing Detachment, 28 July.
33,130 Prisoners of War handled thru Inclosure.

CEFALU, TUSA, NICOSIA Inclosures operated by Army personnel as transfer Inclosures only. Prisoners of War received held only long enough for transportation by rail or motor, to PALERMO or LICATA. CEFALU Inclosure closed 9 August. TUSA and NICOSIA opened 9 August. 342nd Military Police Escort Guard Company and Processing Detachment moved to TUSA 22 August.

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Operated by other units assisted by Seventh Army personnel -

PALERMO Inclosure.
Opened by 3rd Division, taken over by 2nd Armored Division about 1 August.
Assisted by Processing Personnel Seventh Army, and Military Police Escort Guard platoons loaned Seventh Army by NATOUSA.
Capacity - 10,000 Prisoners of War.
41,750 Prisoners of War handled.
Now operating.

PRIZZI Inclosure.
Opened by the 3rd Infantry Division, taken over by 2nd Armored Division about 1 August.
Processing Personnel from Seventh Army assisted in processing.
Prisoners of War evacuated through PORTO EMPEDOCLE and PALERMO Inclosures.
Capacity - 20,000 Prisoners of War.
Approximately 20,000 Prisoners of War evacuated to this Inclosure by 3rd Division, 2nd Armored Division and 82nd Airborne Division.

SCIACCA Inclosure.
Opened and operated by 82nd Airborne Division.
Capacity - 4,000.
Closed 12 August.
Processing Detachment and a Processing Platoon processed and evacuated to PORTO EMPEDOCLE Inclosure 7,261 Prisoners of War.

TRAPANI Inclosure.
Opened about 22 July and closed about 12 August.
Operated by 82nd Airborne Division assisted by Processing detail from Army troops.
7,000 Prisoners of War evacuated thru PALERMO Inclosure.

ENNA Inclosure.
Opened about 20 July.
Operated only as transfer Inclosure to LICATA

- Straggler & Casual Installations -

Initial plans for handling casuals and stragglers provided for the early establishment of Replacement Battalions at suitable locations, three such battalions having been requested of NATOUSA. These battalions, besides their normal function for handling replacements, would perform the function of receiving, housing, caring for and re-equipping casuals from hospitals and returning them to their units.

The battalions were never approved and, until August 5th, when authority was received to provisionally organize the 6648 Casual Battalion with personnel drawn from units assigned to Seventh Army, the Provost Marshal was forced to depend on Army and Unit ration trucks, supplemented at times by special truck convoys and special trains when available.

The Provost Marshal provided military police personnel at Class I Supply dumps, both Army and Divisional, and also at straggler collecting points, whose sole responsibility it was to see that casuals, including those returned from hospitals, were provided water, food and necessary shelter and transportation to their units, usually via ration trucks or rail.

Due to the complex supply system necessitated by the supplying through ports on both sides of the Island - and over great distances; and due to the shortage of transportation caused by these complexities, the system of return was not entirely satisfactory. As soon as authority was received to organize the 6648 Casual Battalion, it was established and seperated into two echelons, one at PALERMO, the other at CEFALU, and later a third at LICATA, and all incoming replacements, as well as casuals returning from hospitals, were handled by it under the close supervision of G-1. This worked very satisfactorily, however, it was still necessary to depend largely on retion trucks and supply trains for transportation, and the Provost Marshal still was required to keep military police personnel at each retion dump to control the return of casuals and to see that they were fed and cared for between arrival and departure of transportation.

It is believed that the original plan of establishing Replacement Casual Battalions on the Island, as soon as the tactical situation would permit, would have greatly improved this important function. The size of the problem can be understood when the figures are considered. Replacements brought in to the Island and distributed to the units over this period totaled 7,226; the casuals returned from hospitals, both on the Island and from North Africa totaled 7,414.

Army Straggler lines and Collecting Points were established successively as follows:

Initially, on 12 July, the City square at GELA, with sub-posts on the highways leading into town. By 14 July, Straggler lines were extended on all roads out of GELA approximately 5 miles. July 21 Straggler lines were established along Army rear boundery Route 115, from GELA to AGRIGENTO. July 26 Army Straggler line established along roads in the vicinity of PALERMO. The main Straggler Collecting Point was set up near the post office in PALERMO and later moved to the Class I Supply Dump at PALERMO. The second Army Straggler lines were established on Highway 120 from TERMINI IMPRESE to CALAVATURA, thence along highway southeast to road junction Route 121, extended along Route 121 to Army boundary.

Collecting Points were established at TERMINI IMPRESE, CALAVATURA and ST. CATARINA.

August 12 the Army Straggler line was moved to Route 117, extending from SAN STEFANO to ENNA. Collecting Points were established at TUSA, NICOSIA, and ENNA.

IV CASUALTIES & RETURNS

Due to the rapidly moving tactical situation and accompanying communication difficulties, regular daily G-1 Reports were often received too late to be of current value in reflecting casualties.

In addition to the regular G-1 reports, the Commanding General was provided twice daily - at 6:00 A.M. and 4:00 P.M. - with up to the minute, carefully checked reports, covering for our own forces — Killed - Wounded - Missing in Action and Replacements; and for enemy forces — Prisoners of War - Estimated Killed and Wounded. Data for these reports was secured in code by every available means, including phone, air courier and radio. Final figures from casualty reports and G-1 reports proved that these estimated daily reports were remarkably accurate. Some pertinent data extracted from the afternoon edition of these reports is tabulated herewith:

TIME & DATE	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	TOTAL
1600, 10 July	58	205	787	1050
1600, 11 July	175	615	2581	3371
1600, 12 July	204	800	2787	3791
1600, 13 July	262	910	2823	3995
1600, 14 July	359	1325	2918	4602
1600, 15 July	375	1650	1937	3962
1600, 16 July	393	2000	2111	4504
1600, 17 July	436	2237	1725	4398
1600, 18 July	561	2470	1728	4759
1600, 19 July	603	2549	1487	4639
1600, 20 July	619	2583	1507	4709
1600, 21 July	624	2585	1511	4720
1600, 22 July	630	2590	1501	4721
1600, 23 July	651	2565	1475	4691
1600, 24 July	659	2540	1465	4664
1600, 25 July	672	2535	1435	4642
1600, 26 July	676	2539	1435	4650
1600, 27 July	685	2545	1440	4670
1600, 28 July	690	2610	1400	4700
1600, 29 July	700	2675	1425	4800
1600, 30 July	704	2696	1420	4820
1600, 31 July	705	2695	1400	4800
1600, 1 August	728	2815	1430	4973
1600, 2 August	735	2925	1425	5085
1600, 3 August	750	3045	1400	5195
1600, 4 August	765	3125	1400	5290
1600, 5 August	820	3250	1400	5470
1600, 6 August	860	3440	1500	5800
1600, 7 August	900	3600	1450	5950
1600, 8 August	960	3640	1450	6050
1600, 9 August	980	3750	1450	6180
1600, 10 August	1025	3900	1450	6375
1600, 11 August	1050	4000	1500	6550
1600, 12 August	1135	4250	1000	6385
1600, 13 August	1150	4450	1000	6600
1600, 14 August	1260	4660	1050	6970
1600, 15 August	1300	4850	850	7000
1600, 16 August	1365	5025	850	7240
1600, 17 August	1415	5000	800	7215
1600, 18 August	1425	5125	775	7325
1600, 19 August	1425	5200	775	7400
1600, 20 August	1425	5200	791	7416

BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES BY WEEK *

OFFICERS

	Week Ending: July 17	24	31	Aug 7	14	21	Total
KILLED	42	9	10	32	21	7	121
SICK, GASSED, WOUNDED (1) EVACUATED	95	36	26	120	67	25	369
(2) NOT EVACUATED	2	34	46	85	62	58	287
CAPTURED	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
MISSING	73	4	1	4	2	0	84
TOTAL	215	83	83	241	152	90	864

WARRANT OFFICERS

	Week Ending: July 17	24	31	Aug 7	14	21	Total
KILLED	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
SICK, GASSED, WOUNDED (1) EVACUATED	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
(2) NOT EVACUATED	0	1	4	5	7	3	20
CAPTURED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MISSING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	2	6	3	7	3	23

ENLISTED MEN

	Week Ending: July 17	24	31	Aug 7	14	21	Total
KILLED	442	72	139	459	362	53	1,527
SICK, GASSED, WOUNDED (1) EVACUATED	1,821	995	1,156	2,527	1,794	984	9,277
(2) NOT EVACUATED	874	544	1,067	2,113	1,514	1,192	7,304
CAPTURED	4	0	6	0	2	1	7
MISSING	1,716	196	101	355	227	9	2,614
TOTAL	4,857	1,807	2,463	5,454	3,909	2,239	20,729

* As reported by organizations on weekly G-1 Reports

RETURNS TO ORGANIZATIONS BY WEEK *

OFFICERS

	Week Ending: July 17	24	31	Aug 7	14	21	Total
SICK, GASSED, WOUNDED (1) EVACUATED	1	0	5	4	42	20	72
(2) NOT EVACUATED	1	18	17	60	55	69	220
CAPTURED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MISSING	0	8	1	14	0	0	23
TOTAL	2	26	23	78	97	89	315

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PERCENT CASUALTIES BY ARM OR SERVICE
(From MRU Data)

ARM OR SERVICE	TOTAL CASUALTIES	TOTALS OF BRANCH OR SERVICE IN ACTIVE ZONE	PERCENT CASUALTIES
Infantry	5,690	54,363	10.5%
Cavalry	124	2,780	4.4
Field Artillery	494	21,009	2.3
C.W.S.	85	3,647	2.3
Corps of Engineers	302	16,511	1.81
Medical Department	162	9,022	1.7
Transportation Corps	40	4,229	.9
Corps of M.P.	22	2,574	.84
Chaplains	1	113	.8
Dental Corps	1	134	.8
Coast Artillery	154	26,200	.6
Ordnance	411	6,608	.63
Signal Corps	39	5,879	.68
Medical Corps	7	864	.55
Quartermaster	27	11,112	.24

CASUALTIES EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TROOPS IN ACTIVE ZONE, FOR EACH TYPE CASUALTY

	NUMBER OF CASUALTIES	TROOPS ACTIVE ZONE	PERCENT
MIA	971	166,212	.58%
KILLED	1,240	166,212	.74
DEAD	109	166,212	.062
SW	1,863	166,212	1.12
LW	2,915	166,212	1.75
CAPTURED	36	166,212	.022
TOTALS	7,134	166,212	4.23%

CASUALTIES EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CASUALTIES, FOR EACH TYPE CASUALTY

	TYPE CASUALTY	TOTAL CASUALTIES	PERCENT
MIA	971	7,134	13.6%
KILLED	1,240	7,134	17.2
DEAD	109	7,134	1.4
SW	1,863	7,134	26.1
LW	2,915	7,134	40.7
CAPTURED	36	7,134	.50

Note: Above figures are based on M.R.U. figures as of 31 August 1943

MIA - Missing in Action.
K - Killed.
D - Died of Wounds.
SW - Seriously wounded.
LW - Slightly wounded.
C - Captured.

V GRAVES REGISTRATION

Outline plans called for the landing with the assault echelons of the various Task Forces, of eight Graves Registration Platoons, earmarked for Force 343. In addition to Graves Registration troops, it was contemplated that additional Graves Registration and burial details would be furnished from Division Quartermaster battalions or other service troops, this extra personnel to be assigned and trained in each Task Force before the assault. Complete, detailed instructions for Graves Registration personnel was prepared and distributed to all units 31 May 1943. Actually only six platoons were made available and in one case a Task Force did not land its Graves Registration Platoon with the assault. However, graves registration was completed without mishap and according to plans.

Identification was difficult in many cases because of lost identification tags and dismembered bodies. This difficulty was largely obviated and Graves Registration was immeasurably facilitated by requiring the identity of every officer and enlisted man to be marked inside of each legging.

- Cemeteries -

Data on all important cemeteries established by Seventh Army units is outlined below.

During the early stages of the Sicilian campaign the Third Infantry Division established a cemetery at LICATA, SICILY, 1,000 yards northeast of the town on Highway 115. This cemetery, now known as United States Military Cemetery No. 1 was opened 11 July and closed on 1 August. It was operated by the Company Headquarters and one platoon of the 48th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company. There are buried in this location 176 American, 7 Allied and 163 enemy dead.

At a point seven miles north of BELA, the first Infantry Division started making burials on 10 July 1943 and continued doing so until 20 July 1943. On 21 July the 1st Platoon of the 45th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company started making burials, as the 4th Platoon of this unit attached to the First Infantry Division, sent bodies back to this cemetery. In this place there are buried 1,008 American, 126 Allied and 588 enemy dead. This cemetery is known as United States Military Cemetery No. 2.

The second Armored Division established a cemetery three and one-half miles west of PALERMO, on Highway 113, on 5 August 1943, which is being operated by the 2nd Platoon of the 48th Quartermaster Graves. This cemetery has a capacity of 1,000 American graves. 133 American and eight Allied soldiers are buried there.

About 12 August 1943 the temporary cemetery established at SAN STEFANO was discontinued as a burial ground and sixty bodies were moved to CORONIA. On 15 August 1943 burials were begun here and total 451 American and 408 enemy. Company Headquarters and one platoon of the 48th Quartermaster Graves operated this cemetery. This cemetery is known as United States Military Cemetery No. 3.

The above figures include Air Corps, Naval and Ground Force personnel and unidentified dead.

- Temporary Cemeteries -

Among the many temporary cemeteries established during the course of battle, the following are most important:

Third Division cemetery at AGRIGENTO, one and one-half miles southeast of the city. All bodies have been disinterred.

COMISO Airfield cemetery which contained 64 Americans who were moved to United States Military Cemetery No. 2. Sixty enemy remain in this cemetery.

CEFALU cemetery established by the 45th Division with 84 Americans and 48 enemy, now being disinterred to Military Cemetery No. 3.

TROINA cemetery, established by the Ninth Infantry Division with 56 Americans and 74 enemy, now being disinterred to Military Cemetery No. 3.

MONTEVAGO cemetery, established by 82nd Airborne Division with 11 Americans and and 7 enemy, is being disinterred to Second Armored Division cemetery.

In addition to these, the Third Division and Ninth Division established temporary cemeteries at ACQUI DOLCI and SAN STEFANO.

VI REPLACEMENTS

Replacement plan prepared by G-1 was predicated on anticipated losses during the period D to D+7, 15% of all assault units - 12,000; D+7 to D+15, 8% of total build up to date - 12,000. By D+21, 4% of total build up to date - 6,000; a Grand Total 15% overstrength to assault divisions and attached assault units at the earliest practicable date. And secondly -to operate 3 Replacement Battalions, initially on the North African side and later on the Island, and to secure a flow to these Replacement Battalions from North Africa Depots at an approximate rate of 1,500 per day; replacements to be furnished by branches and arms in the same proportion as received in North African Theater.

NATOUSA approved in principle the 15% overstrength but the personnel never became available for assignment. NATOUSA also initially approved Replacement Battalions as requested - later they proved not to be available. G-1 then requested that shipping be allocated in Shipping Priority Tables, for the flow of approximately 1,500 replacements per day, and requested that NATOUSA, upon radio requisition, organize required replacements into march groups of suitable size, each under the command of an officer, and land them on appropriate Sub-Task Force beaches where guides and, when possible, transportation from the units would meet them. This plan was approved and was followed.

Transportation for movement of replacements was not available to bring all units up to T/O strength before departure for SICILY and all outstanding requisitions were cancelled by NATOUSA on the 10th of July.

NATOUSA was requested to have all assault units mounted in United States for Force 343 arrive on D-day 15% overstrength in enlisted men and officers of company grade. This was not done.

Plans called for a pool of 6,000 replacements being available at E.B.S. by D-day. G-1 left an officer with Seventh Army Rear Echelon to facilitate the forwarding of replacements. On D-day, only a small number of replacements were in the 7th Replacement Depot, while in the 2642 Armored Replacement Battalion, approximately 1,500 replacements were available for assignment.

The first Radio requisition was submitted on D+3 by this headquarters for 1,039 enlisted men and 665 actual replacements were delivered over the beaches on D+ 8. This requisition was shipped 374 short because replacements were not available in the 7th Replacement Depot.

The shortage of replacements in the depot on D-day was attributed to the fact that transportation in North Africa was primarily being allocated for movement of units rather than filler replacements.

Subsequently, requisitions were received from units regularly by telephone, radio, and courier, forwarded by radio to NATOUSA, and the replacements received with reasonable promptness, until 14 August when last shipment was made with a large number on outstanding requisitions unfilled, due to shortage of replacements and lack of shipping facilities.

The total number of replacements shipped and delivered to units in SICILY and in Africa after D-day was 8,752.

- Miscellaneous Personnel -

Early in June, three courier officers were procured and air courier service between headquarters Force 343 and NATOUSA established.

In mid June a staff was assembled for the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, using officers selected from Corps units.

The 204th Military Police Company was reinforced by two officers and ninety enlisted men on Detached Service from low priority units.

A Provisional Engineer Utilities platoon was approved as temporary increase to Headquarters Company and organized, specialist personnel being assembled from I Armored Corps Units.

Additional administrative personnel for Task Force Kool was approved and personnel so assigned.

The 6616 Provisional Car Company was activated and personnel assigned.

VII PRISONERS OF WAR

Plans for handling Prisoners of War prepared by G-1 were based on estimated average daily rates of flow as follows:

	D to D+5	D+5 to D+15	After D+21
Maximum	2,500	8,000	8,000
Average	1,000	1,000	830 (for 1st 30 days)

Plans made Sub-Task Force Commanders responsible for the preparation of nominal rosters, the evacuating of prisoners to Naval craft, and the providing of guards to accompany them to Inclosures in North Africa, all processing being done by NATOUSA after reaching North Africa. It was further planned that Provost Marshal, Seventh Army, would establish Army Inclosures as soon as practicable and facilitate the actual evacuation. The usual Prisoner of War reports to G-1 Force 343, including copies of nominal rosters, were to be furnished by Sub-Task Force commanders. Two Military Police Battalions, two Prisoner of War Escort Guard Companies, and two Processing Detachments were requested in addition to the organic Military Police Companies and platoons.

Actually, one battalion, two Guard Companies and two Detachments were assigned. The great number of prisoners captured made it necessary for Army to assist Divisions earlier than had been planned; and the great numbers captured at the time the beaches were still under fire made the preparation of nominal rosters on initial troops practically impossible. The number of guards required became a serious factor because of depleting the strength of combat units. On 15 July, 8 officers and 200 enlisted men were brought over from low priority Force 343 units in North Africa, to serve as guards for prisoners during evacuation. An additional 200 more men were brought over for the same purpose. In addition ninety extra enlisted men were attached to 204th Military Police Company, prior to sailing and later it became necessary to add one hundred enlisted men to the 204th Military Police Battalion. On 29 July authority was granted to parole Sicilian Prisoners of War. Necessary forms were printed and parolling began August 1st. Actual prisoners captured and processed are shown in table below:

parole of Sicilians, B-6

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G-1 Reports from units showed the following Prisoners of War captured and evacuated during the period of the campaign:

WEEK ENDING	CAPTURED	EVACUATED FROM UNITS
17 July	22,153	14,386
24 July	31,389	26,179
31 July	24,683	16,907
7 August	13,158	19,383
14 August	5,860	20,098
21 August	5,696	5,696
TOTAL	102,939	102,649

Provost Marshal, Seventh Army, Report of Status of Prisoners of War at termination of the campaign follows:

P/W On Hand in Sicily:	Total	German Officers	German E.M.	Italian Officers	Italian E.M.	Other Prisoners
P/W Inclosure No. 1	9,299	0	0	66	9,233	
Labor Camps outside Palermo	3,715	0	2	1	3,712	
Military Hospitals (Staff & Patients)	1,470	0	9	145	1,239	77 (Sicilians)
Paroling Teams outside Palermo	15			5	10	
TOTAL	14,499	0	11	217	14,194	77
Evacuated:						
Palermo	14,202	4	492	925	11,893	873 (Slovene) 15 (Pole)
Enpedocle	30,335	14	1,002	1,182	28,137	
Gela W/O nominal Rolls	2,360		270	90	2,000	
Licata W/O Nominal Rolls (Estimate)	25,310	4	574	408	24,324	
	1,428				1,428	
TOTAL	73,635	22	2,338	2,605	67,782	888
Paroled:						
Sicilians	33,762				33,762	
Chaplains & Doctors	308			308		
GRAND TOTAL	122,204	22	2,349	3,130	115,738	965

Difference between total reported by units and total reported by Provost Marshal may be attributed to the fact that Sicilians turned themselves in to Army Inclosures in order to be paroled.

VIII MORALE

- Battlefield Promotions and Appointments -

On 19 June 1943, the Commanding General, NATOUSA, authorized the Commanding General, Seventh Army, to promote officers, up to and including the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, and to appoint Warrant Officers and enlisted men to the grade of Second Lieutenant who demonstrated outstanding ability to command in actual combat. This authority did not apply to Staff promotions, and it authorized promotions or appointments to fill existing Table of Organization vacancies only. Staff promotions were to be processed in the usual manner. The intent of this authority was that officers and enlisted men who showed outstanding leadership in battle could be immediately promoted or appointed to fill a Table of Organization vacancy. The usual situation for these appointments was one in which officers were lost, due to casualties or transfers and the enlisted man took command and let his platoon, and in some cases his company, to the successful accomplishment of its battle mission.

- Regular Promotions -

During the period of the operation, normal promotions were processed in the usual manner. Those Staff Officers and Administrative officers not eligible for promotion under the authority granted for battlefield appointments, but who were eligible for regular promotions, were promoted by the Commanding General, NATOUSA.

The following is a tabulation of recommendations for promotion processed by G-1 after 10 July 1943:

REGULAR PROMOTIONS	BATTLEFIELD PROMOTIONS	BATTLEFIELD APPOINTMENTS	TOTAL
1,435	141	122	1,698

- Decorations & Awards -

Based on War Department figures and a review of the records of the TORCH, DIEPPE, and TUNISIAN operations; and considering the number of troops, type of operation and estimated casualties for Operation HUSKY, requirements of all types of decorations were estimated. The medals were requisitioned to be shipped in two equal shipments, the first to arrive not later than D minus 15 and second not later than D-Day. Medals requisitioned were as follows:

Medal of Honor	16
Distinguished Service Medal	30
Distinguished Service Cross	150
Silver Star	900
Purple Heart	30,000
Distinguished Flying Cross	500
Soldiers Medal	200
Good Conduct Medal	1,000
Oak Leaf Cluster (L)	6,000
Oak Leaf Cluster (S)	1,500
American Campaign Ribbons	125,000
Battle Stars (Bronze)	125,000

The first shipment was received and distributed to units assigned to Force 343 early in June. In order to insure the 45th Infantry Division having medals with it when it landed, the Commanding General was instructed by radio, 26 May 1943, to bring the necessary medals with the Division, and a list of appropriate medals, and quantities of each needed, was supplied. These medals were actually brought over by the Division. In addition to the medals distributed to the units, a supply was retained for Headquarters Seventh Army, and each sub group of G-1 Section, Seventh Army, brought on D-Day a sufficient number of medals and ribbons for use in making any merited awards promptly. The remaining medals retained by headquarters were brought to SICILY on D plus 14.

Two Silver Stars were presented aboard the headquarters ship en route to SICILY.

Awards authorized to be made by Commanding General, Seventh Army, include the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Soldiers Medal, the Purple Heart and the Air Medal.

Complete directives to all units on procedures in the preparation and processing of recommendations for awards were published to all units on 6 June 1943 in Memorandum No. 55, Headquarters I Armored Corps, and covered orally in administrative schools attended by personnel sections of all major units. Particular stress was placed on promptness of investigating, and recommending all deserving cases for the appropriate award.

Under column "Awarded", below, are tabulated awards made after 10 July 1943 by NATOUSA, Headquarters Seventh Army, Corps, Divisions and Brigades, exclusive of Purple Heart. Under column "Recommended", are tabulated recommendations forwarded to higher headquarters but not yet acted upon:

	AWARDED	RECOMMENDED
Medal of Honor		1
Distinguished Service Medal	1	8
Distinguished Service Cross	29	
Legion of Merit	75	287
Silver Star	476	
Soldiers Medal	45	
TOTALS	626	296

At the time of writing this report recommendations are still being received daily, based on action during the Sicilian Campaign and are being processed.

- Special Services -

Plans were made for the assembling and distribution of supplies to all units on troop list. Concurrently with the planning, Special Services clubs and movies were opened and operated in MOSTAGANEM and film service arranged for. Request was made to NATOUSA for two Special Services companies for Task Force 343 but these did not arrive in the theater in time for assignment. Units which had been engaged in the Tunisian Campaign were re-equipped and re-supplied by the Special Services Officer.

The E. F. M. system was established.

Plans were completed for Special Services activities in SICILY. Requisitions were submitted for necessary supplies and equipment. Supplies and equipment were distributed to units, including books and small games for use on board ships. Special stress was placed on sufficient supplies of cigarettes, reading material, cards and small games, solely for hospital use. Arrangements were made by the Army Special Services Officer with the Stars and Stripes to have the newspaper furnished free, 60,000 per week, starting with the issue of 3 July to all troops in the combat area.

Army Special Services Officer and forward Special Services group landed on D plus 4, the remainder of the Section arriving on D plus 8 and D plus 14. Surveys and reconnaissances were initiated immediately and supplies distributed to units. Movies were supplied to units through the use of portable equipment. A theater was secured and put in operation in PALERMO. August 11, radio station A.E.F. commenced operation, and on 12 August the first Sicilian edition of the Stars and Stripes appeared.

At the conclusion of the campaign, movies and supplies were pushed to all units in the field and personal contact made with all units by the Special Service Officer; also, a recreational program was available in PALERMO, including movies, clubs and bathing beaches.

- Religious Activities -

During actual operations in the Sicilian Campaign, members of the Chaplain Corps served with their respective units, ministering to the wounded and dying and assisting in the care of the dead. They helped to direct the evacuation of the dead from the battlefield and performed appropriate religious rites in burials. In some instances Chaplains served as Graves Registration officers of their respective units. Appropriate religious ceremonies for all faiths were held as frequently as the tactical situation and the number of Chaplains available permitted. The work of the Chaplains of Seventh Army and subordinate units was a great factor in the maintenance of high morale.

- Payment of Troops -

On 31 May 1943, an Army Finance Officer was assigned to Special Staff. Based upon troop list and strength of command, immediate steps were taken to provide necessary disbursing detachments, and personnel therefor was assembled by G-1. The 6055-E Disbursing Detachment was redisignated as the 25th Finance Disbursing Section to serve Army troops.

A special finance section for 1st Engineer Special Brigade was approved, activated, and personnel furnished from units in Task Force 343.

Due to the fact that many of the troops were on shipboard at usual time of payment of June rolls, and were in action in July, the payment of some troops was delayed. However, with the arrival of the Rear Echelons of the major units, followed by the withdrawal of other units in action, troops were paid without undue delay. A large percentage of pay received by troops was sent home or put into one of the various types of saving.

- Courts Martial -

Courts martial cases handled by the Staff Judge Advocate, Seventh Army, for the period 10 July to 21 August were as follows:

Summary courts martial cases	432
Special courts martial cases	136
General courts martial cases	12
Total	580

- Postal Service -

Thirteen postal units participated in the campaign. A.P.O. #45 landed on D-Day, the remainder of the A.P.O.'s arriving in SICILY by D 15. All available mail was brought over to SICILY by the A.P.O.'s. The first follow-up from Africa of 700 sacks arrived at LICATA on 21 July and was promptly delivered to various organizations. Outgoing mail was dispatched regularly to Africa by air. Incoming mail from Africa by air averaged 1,000 pounds daily, in addition to a considerable volume coming in by water transportation. Mail service on the island was considered good, units having received mail in record time.

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- American Red Cross -

Field directors landed with combat teams to handle soldier's welfare work and to distribute supplies.

American Red Cross also had workers in each hospital to distribute cigarettes and supplies.

American Red Cross was furnished with, and operated, facilities secured and established by Special Services Officer, Seventh Army, including beach club at MONDELLO, the Massimo and E.N.I.C. theaters, clubs at 110 and 115 Via Cavour and two large shower installations in PALERMO.

IX CIVILIAN POPULATION

Original plans called for the Provost Marshal to coordinate closely with the Public Safety Division of the Civil Affairs Section, Force 343. Initially and until such time as existing civil police had been reorganized, the Provost Marshal, Force 343 was responsible for the control of Military and Civilian personnel; the maintenance of law and order; the control of traffic, registration and circulation of civilians, and recommendations for the protection of vital installations. Insofar as available, Military Police personnel permitted, the Provost Marshal, Force 343, and Provost Marshals of Sub-Task Forces furnished detachments of Military Police for assistance of the Public Safety Officers of the Civil Affairs Section. These detachments assisted the Public Safety Officers in enforcement of the laws and regulations of the Military Government and in the reorganization and supervision of any existing civilian police force.

A Civil Affairs officer was assigned to the staff of the Commanding General, Seventh Army and accompanied his headquarters on the initial landing. Civil Affairs officers also accompanied the Sub-Task Force units. As towns were occupied, Security officers of divisions continued in operation the municipal administration and essential local services, utilising existing personnel wherever possible; published proclamations and orders of the Military Governor, and with the Military Police officers enforced the law of Military Government; on behalf of local unit commanders, issued local regulations to insure security and local order; coordinated with combat units in requisitioning, procuring, and billeting in the local areas and assisted local unit commanders in other matters involving the civil population. Security officers turned these duties over to AMGOT officials within a matter of a short time.

As the action progressed and was completed, more and more of the civil functions were supervised by AMGOT and Civil Affairs Officers. Price lists of commodities and services were posted in each town. Civil police were organized and inferior courts were established. Within two days after the landing the local police force at GELA was functioning.

On 8 August, Civil Affairs Officers of Seventh Army including those assigned to Divisions, reverted to control of AMGOT, 15th Army Group.

The civilian populace was as a whole friendly and cooperative, tired of war and anxious for its completion.

X CONCLUSIONS

1. The approved plan for replacements for HUSKY left a great deal to be desired. G-1 original plan is considered sound.

2. Military Police, Prisoner of War Escort Guard and Processing personnel were inadequate. Additional personnel actually found necessary, and secured, was approximately equal to that originally recommended by G-1.

3. The twice daily estimated G-1 Reports proved accurate and an invaluable supplement. Verified reports are oftentimes received too late to be of current value.

4. Identification of personnel killed in action was greatly facilitated : units requiring the identity of every officer and enlisted man to be marked on the inside of each legging.

XI RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In order to maintain effective strength in combat units, it is considered essential to:

a. Have 15% overstrength in enlisted men and company grade officers assigned to all assault troops in time to have them assimilated, and to allow for plans to be worked out for their transportation with the rear echelons well before D-Day.

b. Assign replacement battalions to the Task Force to be operated by it, initially on the mainland and as soon as practicable on the land invaded, not only to furnish flexible replacement reserve but also to care for, re-equip and re-distribute casuals, including those returning from hospitals. In this connection, the landing of replacements in organized march groups on the appropriate Sub-Task Force beaches was not entirely satisfactory because, due to the rapid shifting of the tactical situation and the delay between the radio requisitions and actual receipt of the replacements, the units were actually being supplied, at the time of the arrival of the replacements, over beaches or through ports many miles from the ones designated in requisitions. The answer to this, of course, is to ship all replacements through central depots operated by replacement battalions, from where they would be distributed to units.

c. To have a pool of replacements available on D-Day, convenient to shipping and representing at least 25% of the anticipated losses for the first 30 days, and a definite shipping schedule for movement of replacements into the depot after D-Day to insure continued availability of replacements.

d. Again in the matter of maintaining effective strength, requisitioning on the basis of battle casualties alone will not work. There is too much lag between the time when a verified requisition can be submitted and the time when actual replacements can arrive. In addition to the procedure listed in paragraph above, troop units must be allowed to requisition in the early stages against anticipated losses.

2. For future similar tasks imposed, at least two Military Police battalions, two Prisoner of War Escort Guard Companies and two Prisoner of War Processing companies, in addition to all organic police units should be provided and landed on D-Day.

3. The identity of all officers and enlisted men of combat units be required to be marked on the inside of each legging.

4. Estimated G-1 Reports should be utilized in order to give up-to-the-minute reports.

DAVID D. ZINK,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
~~A. C. of S., G-1~~

ANNEXES

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINFORCED
A. P. O. #758

6 June 1943.

PERSONNEL MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 2:

G-1 REPORTS

1. All units assigned or attached to I Armored Corps, Reinforced, will submit G-1 Reports as follows:

a. Reports will be submitted weekly as of 2359B, Saturday. Reports to reach this headquarters by the most expeditious means available.

b. Reports will be prepared in accordance with Form 19, Field Manual 101-5, with Annexes No. 1 and 2, copies of which accompany this Memorandum.

c. All units assigned or attached to a command under Corps control will be included with the report of that command.

d. When a subordinate unit is attached to another headquarters its strength will be dropped from that of the parent unit and a remark made in Part 3 of Annex No. 1. Individual attachments will be shown in Annex No. 2.

e. When a new unit is gained by assignment or attachment to a reporting unit, its strength will be included and entered under Part 1 or Part 2 of Annex No. 1. When it is relieved from assignment or attachment, it will be listed as a loss under this annex.

f. Replacements received from Replacement Depots will be listed as replacements regardless of whether they were former members of the unit or not.

g. Weekly check against Forms 303 will be made to see that all gains and losses have been included in the G-1 Report.

h. Sick, evacuated, is personnel transferred to a Detachment of Patients and dropped from the unit roster. Sick, not evacuated, is hospitalized personnel still carried on unit roster. Day to day sick book cases are not listed.

i. No cumulative figures will be used. Only events occurring within the period covered by the report will be included.

j. Annex No. 2 will contain all information necessary to reconcile strength from Saturday to Saturday. This annex may be consolidated by each successive headquarters.

2. Absolute accuracy of reports is necessary. Every means must be used to expedite transmission of report. Reports will be classified "SECRET".

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

EDWARD FOX,
Major, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

Distribution "D"

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINFORCED
APO #758

PERSONNEL MEMORANDUM) 7 June 1943
:
NUMBER 3)

CHECK LIST ON OFFICERS PROMOTIONS

I - REGULAR PROMOTIONS.

1. The Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, has the authority to make temporary promotions of officers in the Army of the United States to include the grade of colonel. This authority is limited to promotions to fill existing position vacancies in current Tables of Allotment and Tables of Organization.

2. Recommendations for promotions will be governed by the following current directives: WD Circular #161 (1942) as amended by WD Circulars #218, 290, 417 (1942), WD Circular #15 and 27 (1943), and in accordance with the principles outlined in General Eisenhower's letter dated 15 March 1943, and Circular #101 NATOUSA, dated 31 May 1943. Circular #101 has attached, as an appendix, form letter to be used in submitted recommendations.

3. Many errors are found in the mechanical preparation of this form letter. Prior to submission the following points will be carefully checked for correctness and completeness:

a. Is the officer's serial number correct and the branch of service correctly shown?

b. Is the component, Reserve, Army United States, Regular Army, National Guard shown; not branch of service?

c. Is the date of entrance on current active duty used; not date of commission, unless both dates are the same?

d. Is the date of rank, the date of rank in present grade?

e. Is the date of order announcing promotion to present grade correct?

f. Does the total length of commissioned service include only actual active commissioned service? In the case of Reserve or National Guard officers, actual service spent on training and CCC service may be included.

g. Is the position vacancy occupied by the officer recommended clearly indicated? Use only title shown in T/O, or if amendments thereto exist, attach a certified copy, as Amendment may not be on file in each headquarters through which recommendation must pass. Do not indicate merely as Company Officer.

h. Is length of time position vacancy has been occupied correctly shown?

i. Is the manner of performance of duties entered and initialed by the recommending officer? Recommendations with efficiency ratings below excellent or superior will not be considered.

j. Has the recommending officer satisfied himself that the officer recommended fully meets the requirements set forth in the statements regarding the demonstrated fitness, and that he has achieved desired results in raising disciplinary standards?

k. Does the date on which the position vacancy is certified to exist agree with the date of the letter of recommendation?

l. Is statement on the relative rank of the officer entered where the promotion is to field grade? (Major or higher).

m. Are the statements that I will be glad to have this officer under my command in the grade to which recommended and that he is the best qualified officer present eligible and available for assignment to position vacancy included?

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n. Is a relative rank list for promotion to Colonel included? (To include name, rank, ASN, grade, and date of present rank only for those of same grade and senior in rank).

o. Does each indorsement indicate approval or disapproval and the statement on disciplinary results achieved? If promotion is to field grade indorsement must also include relative rank statement.

p. Is basic recommendation and all succeeding indorsements signed personally by appropriate commander concerned?

q. Are sufficient copies prepared to allow four (4) to reach this headquarters?

4. When recommendations for promotion are submitted on officers who have served for a relatively short period of time it is advisable to include additional information, particularly of commendable services, which indicates that promotion to the next higher grade is merited. In many instances recommendations are based solely on the existence of a position vacancy.

5. Recommendations will be submitted through command channels.

II - BATTLEFIELD PROMOTIONS.

1. The authority to make battlefield promotions and to make appointments from enlisted men and warrant officers is normally delegated to the Commanding General of a large force engaged in combat. Promotions include the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, and appointments to the grade of 2nd Lieutenant. This authority is limited to existing table of organization vacancies and recommendation must state that vacancy exists. This authorization does not include staff officers whose recommendations must be processed in the usual manner.

2. Only outstanding cases of leadership and demonstrated ability to command in actual combat will be recommended for promotion to the next higher grade or for appointment as 2nd Lieutenant in the Army United States.

3. Recommendations for battlefield promotions or appointments will be submitted in letter form through command channels in sufficient number to allow four (4) copies to reach the promoting or appointing authority.

4. The demonstrated outstanding ability to command in actual combat will be explained in detail and will clearly show that the service rendered was of such outstanding nature that the promotion or appointment is merited.

5. Battlefield Appointments:

a. For the protection of the officer and his dependents, the War Department requires that certain forms be accomplished, as follows:
(1) Report of entry on active duty; includes name and grade, serial number, assignment, place and date of entry, and authority. Under authority the Special Order assigning the officer appointed to the unit will be cited; not letter of appointment.
(2) Personnel placement questionnaire (WD Form 0850) (triplicate).
(3) Reports of physical examination (WD For 63) (triplicate).
(4) Oath of office (WD Form 0337T).
(5) Letter of acceptance. (triplicate)
(6) Copies of letter of appointment. (triplicate).
(8) F. B. I. Fingerprint card.
(9) Designation of Beneficiary (WD AGO Form 41).

b. The above information will be submitted, thru channels, as soon as practicable after appointment.

c. Battlefield promotions will be reported by the authority making the promotion.

6. In the event the Commanding General, I Armored Corps, Reinforced is granted the authority to make battlefield appointments or promotions, a form letter indicating the information required and the authority therefor will be published. A model form for use in reporting entry on active duty and letter of acceptance will also be furnished.

III - CHECK LIST FOR APPOINTMENTS IN ARMY UNITED STATES.

1. Applicants from United States forces for Officer Candidate Schools, and Aviation Cadet training, will not be returned to the United States or to the United Kingdom for training. Applicants for Officer Candidate School and other enlisted men and Warrant Officers who are sufficiently outstanding in the opinion of the commanders concerned, to warrant commissions direct from the ranks, may be so recommended to Headquarters NATOUSA, thru channels. Such recommendations must be signed by a Corps or higher commander stating that the applicant has appeared before a board of officers and has been duly recommended; that the applicant meets the mental, moral and physical qualifications for appointment and that he has exhibited outstanding qualities of leadership which warrant the appointment - Reference AR 605-10, Circular #73 NATOUSA and Sect. II, Circular #24 Fifth Army.

2. To avoid unnecessary delay in processing and returning incorrect applications the following check list is provided.

a. Is letter of application accompanied by the following supporting papers?
(1) WD AGO Form #0850 and 0850A (in triplicate).
(2) Report of Physical Examination WD AGO Form #63 (in triplicate).
(3) Three letters of recommendation (in triplicate).

b. Is applicant's AGCT score included in 1st indorsement or separate statement?

c. Qualifications for appointment:
(1) Applicant must have displayed outstanding qualities of leadership which warrant appointment.
(2) Must meet mental, moral and physical qualifications of grade to which recommended.
(3) Must have AGCT score 110 or higher.
(4) Must have four months of active military service immediately preceding recommendation for appointment.
(5) Must have personally appeared before, and been recommended by a board of officers.

d. Board of Officers:
(1) Does the board have a member of the branch of service for which applicant is requesting appointment?
(2) Are all members of the board senior in grade to that for which applicant has applied?
(3) Is one member of the board Regular Army?
(4) Are 3 copies of Special Order Appointing the board attached?

e. Board Proceedings:
(1) Do the proceedings of the board conform generally to provisions of AR 420-5?
(2) Do the board proceedings include a paragraph headed findings? Findings to include a brief word picture describing the applicant and covering the following:
(a) Physical fitness.
(b) Moral character.
(c) Professional and technical qualifications.
(1) Military service.
(2) Civilian experience.
(d) Leadership.
(e) General estimate of the applicant.
(3) Are board proceedings attached in triplicate?

f. Are waivers for all deficiencies, including physical, requested and approved or disapproved in each subsequent indorsement.

g. Does each forwarding indorsement indicate whether or not a suitable T/O vacancy exists and whether or not applicant is desired by the organization?

h. Where request for appointment, and recommendation is to a higher grade than Second Lieutenant is a statement included, in the accompanying papers, showing whether or not applicant is willing to accept appointment in a lower grade?

i. For appointment in Corps of Military Police the following additional requirements must be fulfilled by the applicant:
(1) Have excellent records.
(2) Have at least 8 years continuous service, at least four of which have been served in a warrant officer or Non-commissioned officer status.
(3) Be Regular Army.

j. A detailed check list of WD AGO Form 0850, is not included, however, it should be carefully checked for correctness. The Report of Physical Examination should be examined by the Surgeon to insure completeness.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
"D"

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINFORCED
A. P. O. #758

6 June 1943.

MEMORANDUM)
:
NUMBER 56)

PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT REQUISITIONS

In order to establish uniformity throughout this command the following Standard Operating Procedure for the preparation and disposition of replacement requisitions is presented:

I - General.

1. All units are directed to submit personnel replacement requisitions promptly upon loss of personnel.

2. All units will report immediately, by the most expeditious method (Radio, telephone, courier or letter) the receipt of replacements.

3. The persons responsible for preparation of requisitions will study carefully the instructions contained in this memorandum and will be guided accordingly.

4. Requisitions for replacements will be submitted normally through command channels on proper forms. Each headquarters through which such requisitions pass will indorse each requisition, making such comments as to priority, propriety, substitution, shipment, etc., as may be indicated.

II - Accomplishment of the Requisitioning Form.

1. All unit personnel replacement requisitions are to be prepared on the W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 211. If additional space is required, the W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 211-1 is to be used. For purposes of consolidation, the W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 212 is to be used. All units not possessing these forms are to requisition them as soon as practicable.

2. All units are to supply all information requested by the requisitioning form in so far as practicable.

3. FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations - Administration, sets forth the procedure in handling requisitions in Chapter 8, Section II, as amended by Change No. 1, 29 April 1942. WD AGO Forms 211 and 212 are illustrated and are self-explanatory. Whenever a requisition is prepared on Form 212, which does not include a comparison of T/O and M/R strengths, it will include or be accompanied by a certificate to the effect that filling of the requisition will not result in over-strength, with detailed explanation of exceptions, if any.

4. It is desired that the figures appearing on the requisitioning form be checked carefully so as to insure accuracy. Thus, the number of one type of specialist requisitioned is to be equal to the difference between the number of such specialists authorized and the number present; consolidated totals are to equal the sum of unit totals, etc. If consolidated totals do not agree with the sum of the unit totals a complete explanation will be made in the covering indorsement.

5. The information contained in requisitions is "Secret". Accordingly, all requisitions are to be classified as such, the stamp to appear on both sides of the requisitioning form, if both sides are used.

6. All unit requisitions are to be numbered successively, beginning with "1", and carrying on therefrom, regardless of the time period concerned and regardless of whether commissioned or enlisted personnel are being requisitioned for. All consolidated requisitions are to be numbered in this same manner. Thus, the number of every requisition is to be equal to the number of the preceding requisition plus one.

7. Total figures of the number of men requisitioned for are to be included in all requisitions, all totals to be plainly labeled, such as Total Enlisted Men and Total Officers. It is not necessary to combine the totals for commissioned and enlisted personnel or for Warrant Officers. If the requisition calls for personnel of different arms and services a separate total is to be included by branch, such as Total Enlisted Men, Infantry, or Total Officers, Cavalry, in addition to the final totals.

III - Specification Serial Numbers and Job Titles.

1. All units are to carefully check on the accuracy of the Specification Serial Numbers placed on the requisitioning form.

2. It should be determined that there is agreement between the Specification Serial Numbers and corresponding Job Titles.

3. In emergencies, requisitions need not specify SSN's, be prepared on designated forms nor follow normal channels. However, in every such case, a confirmatory requisition in proper form will be forwarded promptly, through normal channels accompanied by a complete statement of the circumstances involved.

IV - Transmittal of Requisitions.

1. One copy will be retained by the requisitioning unit, and the original and three (3) copies will be forwarded to Division Headquarters. Division Headquarters will consolidate all Unit Personnel Replacement Requisitions and will forward Consolidated Requisition in quadruplicate, together with three (3) copies of each Unit Personnel Replacement Requisition, retaining one (1) copy of Unit Requisition and Consolidated Requisition. Requisitions forwarded unconsolidated to this Headquarters are to arrive in quadruplicate - (See Para. 2, Section VI).

2. Corps Troops and attached units will forward Unit Personnel Replacement Requisitions to this Headquarters, in quadruplicate, where they will be consolidated and forwarded.

3. All units are urged to make liberal use of their covering indorsements in order to explain any difficulty that might be expected to arise from a lack of clarity of certain features of the requisition itself. Requisitions which include replacements for anticipated losses will list such personnel separately, in order that the requisition may be approved for personnel to bring the unit to T/O strength without requiring return to the originator for separation. If a unit indicates a shortage of Warrant Officers, but does not wish to requisition for any, as it is desired to grant warrants to enlisted men of the unit, this fact is to be explained.

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4. In accordance with instructions on the reverse side of the W.D., A. G. O. Forms No. 211 and 212, Unit and Consolidated Personnel Replacement Requisitions, replacements for attached troops are a responsibility of the headquarters to which attached. Accordingly, requisitions of units attached to other than their parent units are to be forwarded to the headquarters to which attached.

V - Tables of Organization Strength.

1. The date of the current T/O is to accompany the number of the T/O under which the unit is operating in filling out the blank entitled "T/O No." on the W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 211.

2. The blank entitled "T/O Strength" is to be filled out so that Table of Organization strength for Enlisted Men, Officers, and Warrant Officers, is listed separately, each figure to be clearly labeled.

3. The figures entered in the "W/R Strength" are likewise to be separate for Enlisted Men, Officers, and Warrant Officers.

4. The number of men necessary to bring the unit to T/O Strength is also to be listed separately for Officers, Warrant Officer, and Enlisted Men.

5. The figures that are to appear in the columns under the headings, "Number Authorized" and "Number Present", are figures applying to the corresponding Specification Serial Number only. Thus, in the case of a unit requisitioning for Light Truck Drivers, if the unit is allowed 50 men in the Transportation platoon, only 35 of whom are Light Truck Drivers, the figure that is to appear in the column headed "Number Authorized" is to be only 35.

VI - Consolidation of Unit Reports.

1. On consolidated requisition forms the unit requisitions of attached units are to be included in the consolidated requisitions of the headquarters to which attached.

2. Consolidated requisitions are to be prepared only when the consolidating headquarters possesses two or more unit requisitions to be forwarded. In instances where such headquarters possesses only one unit requisition, four copies of that requisition are to be forwarded unconsolidated, to this headquarters, with approval of the forwarding headquarters indicated on the requisiton or in the forwarding indorsement.

VII - Forwarding of Requisitions Superseding Previous Requisitions.

1. A requisition once submitted will be considered as in force until it is filled or disapproved. Inquiries as to the status of a requisition or requests to cancel a requisition will be made by normal communication methods. Requests to amend a requisition will be accompanied by a new requisition bearing the same number and clearly labeled "Corrected Copy". Personnel requested on a previous outstanding requisition and not yet received will not be listed in the tabulation showing SSN's and number required. For example, a unit requiring twenty-five men to bring it to T/O strength which has previously requisitioned for but has not yet received ten men should initiate a new requisition calling for fifteen men. Each requisition is to call for only the difference between the number of men authorized by the T/O under which the unit is operating and the number of men on hand plus those requisitioned for previously.

2. No unit is to submit a requisition superseding previous requisitons of that unit.

3. In instnaces in which men previously requisitioned for by a unit are no longer desired for any reason, immediate correspondence is to be initiated by the requisitioning unit explaining the circumstances and requesting cancelation of so much of the requisition as applies to the replacements no longer desired.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col, AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
"D"

T H I S P A G E I S U N C L A S S I F I E D

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINFORCED
A. P. O. #758

MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 55)

6 June 1943

CHECK LIST FOR DECORATIONS & AWARDS

1. GENERAL POLICY:

a. The award of decorations must be given the gravest consideration by all concerned in order that no deserving case may be overlooked, and at the same time, that the recommendations for awards does not cheapen the value of the decoration.

b. Promptness in the award of decorations, consistent with proper verification and investigation is essential.

c. Awards for individuals include decorations (AR 600-45, with C2 and 6, incl., and Section III, Cir. 342, WD, 1942, Cir. 391, WD, 1942) Service Medals (AR 600-45, 600-68, Sec. I, Cir. 44, WD, 1942 as amended by Sec. II, Cir. 123, WD, 1942, and Cir. 176, WD 1942 and Commendations (AR 600-55). Awards for units include streamers for colors, standars and distinguishing flags to denote service in war and meritorious service in action (Par. 12, AR 260-10 and Sec. III, Cir. 342, WD, 1942). Also see Cir. No. 50, NATOUSA, 5 April 1943, and Cir. No. 85, NATOUSA, 13 May 1943.

2. LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION:

a. Is the proper award recommended?
b. Is a separate letter including appropriate citation submitted for each individual recommended for award?
c. Does citation include:
(1) Full name, rank, serial number, and organization (both at time of act cited, and present)?
(2) The individual's home town and State at the time of enlistment, induction, entry into West Point, or present home town?
(3) The date, time, place and all pertinent details of action; such as terrain, enemy forces, morale, weather, etc., and in case of service decorations such as Legion of Merit, etc., complete description of service rendered, in detail?
(4) Statement as follows: (Appropriate statement must be in body of the citation, see Par. 2, model letter.

MEDAL OF HONOR - "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty against the enemy."

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS - "For extraordinary heroism in action."

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL - "For exceptionally meritorious service in a duty of great responsibility."

SILVER STAR - "For gallantry in action."

PURPLE HEART - No citation required, but is desirable when merited.

SOLDIERS MEDAL - "For extraordinary heroism, not in action."

DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS - "For extraordinary heroism and achievement while participating in aerial flight."

AIR MEDAL - "For meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flight."

GOLD LIFE SAVING MEDAL - "For extreme and heroic daring and risk of life in saving (or attempting to save) lives from drowning."

GOOD CONDUCT MEDAL - "For exemplary behavior, efficiency, and fidelity." Awarded to enlisted who complete 3 years service on or after 27 August 1940, or who complete one (1) year's service after 7 December 1941. (AR 600-68, WD Cir. #104, 1942, NATOUSA Cir. #85, 13 May 1943.

LEGION OF MERIT - "For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service." Recommendations to be submitted in proportion of 1 field officer, or higher grade, to 10 E.M. and officers of Company grade. (See Cir. #32, NATOUSA, particularly paragraphs 5 and 6, and Cir. #23, Headquarters Fifth Army). In addition to proposed citation, does recommendation contain a complete description of the service rendered in such detail that it may be determined whether the performance was of sufficient character to meet the requirements of responsibility and merit?

d. Does letter include a statement by the recommending officer that he has personal knowledge of the above facts? If not, are two certificates or affidavits attached?
e. Does letter of recommendation include statement that entire service of individual, since performing the act cited, has been honorable?
f. Does each indorsement by a higher headquarters approve citation as drafted, or include a more appropriate one?
g. Does each recommendation for Purple Heart include a certificate of Medical Officer that medical treatment was required, and a citation if appropriate? (Medical officers may furnish the Unit commander with a certified list of the personnel requiring treatment for wounds received in action.)
(1) The following interpretation of wounded in action, or wounded as result of enemy action, is quoted for your information and guidance. "The term Wounded in action, or wounded as a result of enemy action" is defined, for this purpose, as physical injury (injuries) requiring treatment by a medical officer. Included in this category are those wounds resulting from the piercing of the body by a projectile, a fragment of shell, an object set in motion by enemy weapons, or by weapons of United States or Allied Forces while engaging the enemy; the piercing of the body by any weapon in the hands of, hurled or thrown by the enemy; torn flesh or broken bones received from a moving object propelled directly, or indirectly, by United States or Allied Forces while engaging the enemy; any disabling contact with gas or flame released or propelled by the enemy or by United States or Allied Forces while engaging the enemy."
h. Are five (5) copies of letter of recommendation furnished? Number of copies may be less than five depending upon the headquarters competent to make a particular award.

3. ORDERS:

a. Have General Orders and unexpurgated letter orders been published? (See Par. 7 c., Cir. 50, NATOUSA, regarding security precautions) Note: Purple Heart award will not be published in G.O. but in a classified letter order.
b. Did General Orders contain citation, serial number of medal awarded, and individual's home town?
c. Have General Orders and unexpurgated Letter Orders announcing awards been distributed in accordance with Paragraph 2, Section I, Cir. #85, NATOUSA, dated 13 May 1943? Have copies been furnished this and other headquarters requiring distribution of orders?
d. Has individual concerned been furnished a copy of General Orders and unexpurgated letter?

4. REPORTS:

a. Have seven copies of reports of presentation of Silver Star, Purple Heart, Soldiers Medal, Good Conduct Medal, etc., awards been forwarded, thru channels, to higher headquarters? (See Par. 7f., Cir. 50, NATOUSA)?
b. Did reports give dates, times and places awards were made; names of officers making the awards, and the serial numbers of medals awarded; also full name, rank, serial number, and organization of each individual receiving awards?
c. If the Purple Heart is awarded in a Medical Installation where the individual's personnel records are not available, has the fact of the award been entered on the Eff or Report Card (WD, MD Form 52)? To avoid duplication, report of presentation will be made to the individual's Unit Commander, who will publish the letter announcing the award. (Par. 7d (3), Cir. #85 NATOUSA & Par. 7f, Cir. #50 NATOUSA).

5. GENERAL:

a. Have all deserving cases been promptly investigated and appropriate awards made, or recommended to higher headquarters for award?
b. Have awards of decorations been noted in Service Records of E.M., or on Classification cards (WD, AGO 66-1) of officers and warrant officers, and Unit Historical Records (to include serial number of medal)?
c. Does Unit have on hand a reasonable number of all decorations C.O. (or C.O.) is authorized to award? Unit Supply Officers in this theater will submit requisition for medals, etc., to CO of Base Section, thru this headquarters, for supply. (Sect. II Cir. 85, NATOUSA).

6. MODEL LETTER:

See attached.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

W. G. Caldwell
W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., AGD,
Adjutant General.

1-Incl.
Model Letter

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"D"

MODEL LETTER:

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS 67TH INFANTRY
A.P.O. #000
(Organization & Address)

6 June 1943.
(Date)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award.

TO : Commanding General, I Armored Corps, Reinf.

1. Under the provisions of paragraph 16, AR 600-45, as amended, it is recommended that 1st Lt. Joe K. Brown O-111111, Headquarters Co., 67th Infantry,
(Rank) (Name) (ASN) (Organization)
be awarded Distinguished Service Cross.

2. Citation:

JOE K. BROWN, (ASN O-111111, first lieutenant, Infantry, U. S. Army. For extraordinary heroism in action, on the 9th of November 1942, northwest of Port Lyautey, French Morocco. Lieutenant Brown, Platoon Leader, Hq. Co., 67th Infantry, together with three privates, crept up under cover of darkness to a hostile position in the face of heavy rifle and machine gun fire and at point-blank

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range of less than thirty feet, Lieutenant Brown shot two of the enemy with submachine gun fire, threw five hand grenades into the enemy position, destroying it, and allowing his unit to advance. Entered military service from Louisville, Kentucky.

3. Terrain was rolling and provided little cover. Enemy morale was high; (Nature of terrain) (Enemy morale)
weather was clear, but visibility was poor; time of the action was about 2100; (Weather) (Time)
enemy forces was estimated at a rifle platoon, several heavy machine guns and (Enemy Forces)
at least one mortar.

4. I (have personal knowledge of)(do not have personal knowledge of) the above incidents. (If latter, two certificates or affidavits required).

5. Previous decorations and awards and authority for each:_____

6. a. Rank and organization at time of act:_____
b. Rank and organization at present date:_____

7. Next of kin (posthumous only):_____ (Name & Address)

8. The entire service of the above named (*officer)(*enlisted man) has, since the rendition of the service upon which this recommendation is based, been honorable.

_____ (Signature)

Incls.

NOTE: * Strike out words not applicable.
(Forms to be reproduced locally)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINFORCED
A. P. O. #758

SECRET
By auth. of
CG, IAC, Reinf.
Initials
Date

20 June 1943

PERSONNEL MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 4:

G-1 REPORTS

1. Personnal Memorandum #2 (copy attached), this headquarters, 6 June 1943, subject: Weekly G-1 Report, will remain in effect and will be complied with by all subordinate commands operating directly under Force 343. In addition, commencing on D Day, a daily report will be submitted as of 2359B, covering the preceding twenty-four hour period.

2. Reports will be submitted by radio using the code listed below:

J - Strength.
K - Time
L - Missing in Action.
M - Captured.
NA - Sick, gassed & wounded, evacuated.
NB - Sick, gassed & wounded, not evacuated.
P - Replacements.
Q - Killed.
R - Prisoners captured.

The code letters will not be used in regular series. Start with a different letter each date and shuffle the other letters in random order. Example: L 42 Q 29 R 150 K 4 MAR J 956 M 9 NB 36 NA 14 P 33.

3. Strength includes all personnel operating under the administrative control of the reporting unit.

Time - Midnight each night being the effective time of all reports, merely the date will be given, - Example: 2359B, 4 March would appear merely as 4 MAR.

Missing in Action - All not accounted for and not known to be hospitalised, killed or captured.

Captured - Report only those known to be in hands of enemy.

Sick, gassed & wounded, evacuated - Report only individuals evacuated by Navy or transferred to Detachment of Patients.

Sick, gassed & wounded, not evacuated - Report all of this type casualty not actually evacuated by Navy or transferred to Detachment of Patients.

Killed - No individual should be reported as killed unless positive evidence exists and there can be no possible chance of error. Until such time as this evidence is available, persons thought to be killed should be reported as "Missing in Action".

Prisoners captured - Prisoners captured during the twenty-four hour period covered by the report. Extreme care will be taken to avoid duplication of reports from successive headquarters to whose control the prisoners pass.

4. The following points must be thoroughly understood:

(1) No figures will be cumulative. Once a casualty has been reported, it will not be reported on a successive day even though individual is still "Missing" or hospitalized. Figures cover occurrences since submission of last report only.

(2) If no report is received from a subordinate unit, the strength of the unit as of its last report will be used.

(3) Unless positive evidence exists that a complete unit is lost, it will be carried in the strength.

(4) As soon as courier service can be established the radio report will be replaced with a daily report indicated on mimeographed form, page 1, attached to Personnel Memorandum #2. Annexes #1 and #2 need not be included on this daily courier report.

(5) The weekly report called for by Personnel Memorandum #2 will be submitted as of 2359B each Saturday and will cover all events during the preceding seven days. For instance, total killed during the week, total missing in action during the week, etc. will show on this report. The weekly report will be a summary of the daily reports during that period but if no daily reports were received this weekly report would account for all the activities during the week.

(6) Complete instructions relative to the preparation and submission of the weekly report are contained in Personnel Memorandum #2. All units whether using the daily radio or whether using the daily single page report will submit the weekly report with both annexes.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

JOSEPH Y. RAHE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 - Incl. Pers. Memo. #2

Distrubution "D"

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINFORCED
A.P.O. #758

AG 210.2-A

25 June 1943

SUBJECT: Battle Field Promotions and Appointments.

TO : All Units, I Armored Corps, Reinforced.

1. The Commanding General, I Armored Corps, Reinforced, has the authority to promote instantly to the next higher grade, including the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, any officer who has demonstrated outstanding ability to command in actual combat. This authority also permits appointments of enlisted men to grade of Second Lieutenant for the same reason.

2. When recommendations are made under this authority, by unit commanders, the following data will be included in each recommendation:

a. Full name, current rank, or grade, and serial number.

b. Branch of service, component, and present organization.

c. Statement that suitable vacancy exists.

d. Date of present rank.

e. Statement of demonstrated outstanding ability to command in actual combat. Statement must be complete and in detail.

3. This authority does not include staff officers whose promotions must be processed in the usual manner.

4. No oath of office or letter of acceptance is necessary for promotions of officers but is required where an enlisted man is appointed. (Reference Personnel Memorandum #3, Section 2, this headquarters, 7 June 1943, for reports on enlisted men appointed.)

5. All promotions are effective the date of letter or radio announcing promotion, and pay accrues from that date.

6. A position vacancy must exist for either promotion or appointment. Position vacancies do not have to be filled at all times and should not be filled unless there is an officer available who has clearly demonstrated his fitness therefor.

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

JOSEPH Y. RAHE,
Major, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

3 Incls:
#1-Form for Recommendation.
#2-Form for Report of Entry on A.D.
#3-Letter of Acceptance

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G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

From:
To :
UNIT:
Date:

No.

1. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS:_____

		OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	NURSES	ENLISTED MEN	TOTAL
2.	STRENGTH OF COMMAND:					
3.	CASUALTIES:					
	(a) Killed:					
	(b) Sick, gassed & wounded:					
	(1) Evacuated:					
	(2) Not evacuated:					
	(c) Captured:					
	(d) Missing:					
	TOTAL:					

4. GRAVES REGISTRATION:_____

5. REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED:_____
6. PRISONERS OF WAR: Captured_____ Evacuated:_____
7. STRAGGLERS:_____
8. MORALE:_____
9. CIVILIAN POPULATION:_____

_____ (Signature)

ANNEX NO. 1
To G-1 Report
of _____(Unit)
as of 2359B

STATION LIST AND STRENGTH REPORT

UNIT	LOCATION	PREVIOUS STRENGTH	GAINS	LOSSES	DIFF.	FINAL STRENGTH
PART 1 - LIST OF UNITS ASSIGNED AND DIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY YOUR HEADQUARTERS.						
PART 2 - LIST OF UNITS ATTACHED AND DIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY YOUR HEADQUARTERS.						
PART 3 - UNITS ASSIGNED BUT ATTACHED TO ANOTHER HEADQUARTERS FOR CONTROL. (No strength figure required but remark showing date of detachment and to (whom attached will be given. Example: "569Oth Cml Bn attached 24-5-43 to MRS")						

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ANNEX NO. 2
To G-1 Report
of _____(Unit)
as of _____

GAIN & LOSS REPORT

	OFFICERS	W. O.	NURSES	E. M.	TOTAL
1. LOSSES:					
a. Casualties:					
(1) Killed:					
(2) Sick, gassed & wounded:					
(a) Evacuated:					
(b) Not evacuated:					
(3) Captured:					
(4) Missing:					
b. Other Losses:					
(1) Desertion:					
(2) Transfers:					
(3) DS or TD:					
(4) Units:*					
TOTAL					
2. GAINS:					
a. Returns from:					
(1) Evacuated					
(2) Not evacuated:					
(3) Captured:					
(4) Missing:					
(5) Desertion:					
(6) DS or TD:					
b. Replacement from Depot:					
c. Transfers:					
d. DS or TD:					
e. Units:*					
TOTAL					
Difference, Gains or Losses (+ or -)**					
3. STRENGTH OF COMMAND:					
a. Previous Strength:					
b. Present Strength:					
Difference (+ or -)**					

NOTE: 1. To accompany weekly G-1 Report covering period 0001 Sunday through 2359 Saturday.
2. * Use Annex No. 1 to show Gains & Losses of units, also recording totals above to reconcile gains and losses.
3. ** - Difference between Previous and Present strengths should equal difference between Gains & Losses.

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINFORCED
A. P. O. #758

AG 210.5-A 26 June 1943.

SUBJECT: Decorations and Awards.

TO : Commanding Generals, Corps, Divisions and separate Brigades, I Armored Corps, Reinforced.

1. Attention is invited to Memorandum #55, this headquarters, 6 June 1943, subject: Awards and Decorations.

2. It is the desire of the Commanding General, I Armored Corps, Reinforced, that everything practicable be done to assure promptness in the making of awards to all deserving individuals.

An initial supply of all medals available has been issued to all commanders authorized to make awards.

To facilitate the processing of awards, from an administrative standpoint, the Commanding General desires that at least one officer in each separate brigade, division, and higher headquarters, acquire thorough and complete specialized knowledge of:

a. The character of citations that have already been approved by the War Department for various medals and decorations.

b. The particular shades of specific requirements for the various awards.

c. Current administrative procedures.

This officer should develop facility in adequately present work pictures of actions, in citations.

3. In connection with 2 b. above, the following typical examples are cited as a guide for further study:

a. One citation for an award to an officer was returned because it clearly set forth exceptional performance by the unit commanded by the officer, instead of presenting the actions or influence of the individual officer.

b. In some cases, recommendations for the Medal of Honor fail to establish the facts that the action was actually (1) extreme gallantry in action, and (2) beyond the call of duty.

c. In one case an officer was recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in action when, although being wounded, he exposed himself to enemy fire to take the controls of a landing boat after the Navy coxswain was killed. (For this act a Silver Star would have been appropriate.) He was then seriously wounded and knocked from the controls by gunfire and again returned to the controls, while still under fire, and safely landed the craft. (The latter act justified the D.S.C. rather than the Silver Star.)

d. A warehouse containing bombs was ignited by enemy fire; a soldier rescued a comrade from the warehouse and the exploding bombs. He was recommended for the Silver Star. Should have been the Soldiers Medal since enemy action had ceased at the time of rescue.

e. For extreme and heroic daring and risk of life in saving a person from drowning in waters in this theater, while not under fire, the Soldiers Medal is considered appropriate, rather than the Gold or Silver Life Saving Medal.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

JOSEPH Y. RAHE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

Distribution "D".

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO #758

AG 210.2-A 22 August 1943

MEMORANDUM:

TO : All Corps, Divisions, Brigades and Separate Units.

1. Attention is invited to letter, AG 210.2-A, Hq. I Armored Corps, Reinforced, dated 25 June 1943, Subject: Battlefield Promotions and Appointments.

2. To be promoted or appointed under this authority the officer or enlisted man must have clearly demonstrated outstanding ability to command in actual combat. Superior performance of assigned duty or exemplary conduct at all times during combat do not, alone, qualify for battlefield promotion or appointment.

3. Numerous recommendations reach this headquarters with insufficient information to definitely indicate that the person being recommended has actually demonstrated outstanding ability to command in actual combat. Statements on demonstrated ability must be complete and in detail, citing dates, specific instances and circumstances.

4. a. Section II of Circular 127, NATOUSA, dated 3 July 1943, rescinds that portion of Circular 101 and Circular 112, NATOUSA, authorizing the promotion of 2nd Lieutenants to 1st Lieutenant without regard to T/O vacancy, providing the resulting total of 1st Lieutenants does not exceed the authorized combined total of 1st and 2nd Lieutenants.

b. Section II of Circular 127 is repeated for your information and strict compliance:

"II - Promotions of Officers in A. U. S. - Paragraph 3 f, Circular 101, this headquarters, 31 May 1943, and Paragraph 1 c, Section IV, Circular 112, this headquarters, 11 June 1943, are rescinded and the following substituted:"

"Second Lieutenants of Field Forces, who have demonstrated in combat their fitness for promotion, and are fully qualified therefore, may be promoted to grade of First Lieutenant, regardless of table of organization vacancy. However the resulting total of first lieutenants will not exceed the authorized combined total of first and second lieutenants. This policy does not effect the present policy of battle field promotions but is supplementary to it."

c. In recommending the promotion of 2nd Lieutenants to 1st Lieutenant under the provisions of Circular No. 127, NATOUSA, a statement will be included to the effect that the officer being recommended has demonstrated, in combat, his fitness for promotion.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

W. H. Caldwell
W. H. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., AGD,
Adjutant General.

_____ _____
(UNIT) (DATE)

SUBJECT: Battle Field Promotion.

TO : Commanding General, I Armored Corps, Reinf.

1. Under authority contained in letter, Headquarters I Armored Corps, Reinforced, date 25 June 1943, AG 210.2, subject: Battle Field Promotions and Appointments, the following named (officer, enlisted man) (strike out one) is recommended for battlefield (promotion, appointment) (strike out one) to the grade of _____.

a. Full name, current rank or grade, and serial number: _____.

b. Branch of service, component and present organization: _____.

c. Statement that a position vacancy exists, naming the position: _____.

d. Date of present rank: _____.

e. Statement of demonstrated outstanding ability to command in actual combat, under fire, citing date(s), instance(s) and circumstance(s): _____.

(Signed) _____
(Name Typed)
(Grade and Branch)
(Title)
_____ (Date)

SUBJECT: Letter of Acceptance of Appointment.
TO : Commanding General, NATOUSA, APO #534, (Thru Channels).
I, _____ (Name), hereby accept temporary appointment in the Army of the United States, in the grade of _____ (Grade) on _____ (Date).

_____ (Name)
_____ (Grade, Branch & Organization)

HEADQUARTERS _____
APO _____

_____ (Date)

SUBJECT: Entry on Extended Active Duty.
TO : Commanding General, NATOUSA, APO #534.

The following report of entry on active duty is submitted:

a. Name and Grade:
b. Serial Number:
c. Assignment:
d. Place of entry:
e. Date of entry:
f. Authority:

_____ (Signature)
_____ (Rank & ASN)

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REPORT OF THE A.C. OF S. G-2 (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE)

FOREWORD

The following is an attempt to paint a picture through the various steps of the build-up of G-2 activities from the initial steps of the planning stage through the final steps of the operational phase. It was expected that lessons would be learned and they were. Errors seemingly large but inconsequential in the big picture were made, noted and corrected. In final summation the report represents a picture primarily for future study of the unfamiliar so that in the future profit may be gained from experiences in the past. Conclusions drawn and recommendations made represent the combined thought of all of the members of the section and are submitted as matter of consideration for future plans.

I. INTELLIGENCE PLAN

About the first of March, a directive to prepare for the Husky operation was received. At this time, the G-2 Section was composed of five officers and ten men. Immediate steps were taken to increase this organization to meet the operational requirements of a planning staff for an amphibious invasion. The steps consisted primarily of a request, through G-1 channels, for a Photo Interpretation officer and for the necessary Counter Intelligence and Prisoner of War Interrogation personnel, to be assigned to major units to comprise the force. Furthermore, based on the experience in the Moroccan Campaign, a Translation and Document Section, composed of two officers and six men, was requested, and interpreters, based on the requirement of at least one per battalion plus an additional quota for each major headquarters, making a total of about 200, were requisitioned. In addition to the foregoing, experienced personnel were requested to fill the normal needs of the G-2 Section.

The preparation of a book, mimeographed form generally known as the "Black Book", was commenced. This Black Book was composed of pertinent data for the planned operation, including a topographic study, highways, railroads, airfields, communications, beaches, ports, port facilities, fixed defenses, and battle order of the land forces. Special studies were included of the local utilities, such as water and electricity, and other material resources which might affect the operation. The object of this book was to serve as a ready reference or synopsis of material available in more detailed form elsewhere.

OVERLAYS

In order that the commanding general, the staff, and commanding generals and their staffs of lower and higher echelons, could see quickly and clearly the enemy situation, either singly or in groups, the following procedure was used. Sheets of transparent acetate were prepared on a frame, behind which suitable lights were used to bring out details. Each sheet was an overlay which was colored and formed the basic study of different phases; for example, the basic sheet showed, to scale, a terrain study which included altitudes, rivers, etc.; a second, which could be placed on top of the first, showed the roads, railroads, and other items of interest which could be studies in relation to the terrain by super-imposing them on the same frame; a third important sheet showed the enemy battle order, which was tied in with the terrain and transportation facilities by further super-imposing this sheet on the previous two. The advantage of this procedure was that the detailed study of the terrain and other combinations versus the enemy forces presumed occupying it, and the defenses along the coast, provided a reasonably accurate method of estimation based on their dispositions of the probable enemy intentions and capabilities. As a matter of general interest there was prepared, likewise a terrain study in color, using the same scale, 1:100,000, of the North African coast for comparative study in terrain features in which a landing had been made previously by some of the troops involved in the new operation.

In connection with G-2 estimate for initial presentation to the tactical commanders and their staffs, the Intelligence Plan was prepared. It was attempted in this plan to anticipate as many questions and conditions as practicable. These were, in the main, ones which were laid down specifically by Headquarters 1st in the form of directives and various types of information, and with minor changes only the plan, as originally announced on 22 April 1943, was carried into effect. Certain special units were charged to the G-2 Section by higher authority too late to be considered in the planning stage, and, consequently, insufficient preparation could be made for their gainful employment. The Intelligence Plan briefly included the coordination of all intelligence activities and announced that the normal agencies in corps and lower echelons would be augmented by prisoner of war interrogation teams, counter intelligence corps personnel, photo intelligence personnel, signal intercept intelligence services, such as radio intercept, known as the "J" system, which is an intercept of our own front line battalions, and "Y", an intercept of enemy tactical agencies. The plan for providing interpreters and the availability of a translation and document section at Headquarters 5th, the progress concerning public relations, psychological warfare branch, and various types of censorship, were also announced.

A broad directive was given for the continuance of intelligence training with emphasis to be placed on enemy battle order organization and tactics, as well as an understanding of the British intelligence and tactical practices, particularly with reference to abbreviations, nomenclature, conventional signs and symbols, and the British grid system, with which our troops would probably not be familiar.

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I. Intelligence Plan.
II. Administration.
III. Combat Intelligence.
IV. Battle Order.
V. Photo Intelligence.
VI. Air Liaison and Observation.
VII. Maps.
VIII. Counter Intelligence.
IX. Prisoner of War Interrogation.
(Translation, Interpreters, Documents).
X. Intercept Services.
"J" Service
"Y" Service
XI. Miscellaneous.
A. Counter Intelligence Corps.
B. Prisoner of War Interrogators.
C. Psychological Warfare Branch.
D. Experimental Detachment G-3 (C.S.S.).
E. Experimental Detachment G-2 (A-2)
F. Secret Intelligence (b) SHAEF.
G. Advance Censorship Liaison Section.
H. Field Press Censor.
I. Advance Document Section.
J. Special Liaison Unit. (British)
K. Translators and Interpreters.
L. Press Censorship Liaison Office.
M. Public Relations.
(See Public Relations Report)
XII. Conclusions.
XIII. Recommendations.

INTERPRETERS

Although it was anticipated that Force Headquarters and corps would each be provided with four officers and six enlisted men interpreters, and all divisions ten officers and fifteen enlisted men each, none of these arrived in time for the operation. It was also planned that three officer interpreters would be available for censorship and psychological warfare branch; these also failed to arrive in time. Likewise, the translation section, which was to consist of an Italian and German team of one officer and three enlisted men each, failed to arrive, and prisoner of war interrogators had to be used for this purpose during the operation. The interpreters were obtained after the operation itself started by requesting eight Italian speaking soldiers, who were then attached to various headquarters sections for that purpose.

A cover plan originated from higher headquarters but was received at a date which was almost too late to be of material value. With spreading of troops, as it was necessary to do for their lift, the security involved presented a difficult problem, and such measures as were necessary had to be delegated to sub-force commanders to meet their local situations.

The plan further included the Navy air and Army air cooperation. An air observation plan was announced, with the observation squadron to serve the force from the African theater, and the plan later took concrete form in the assigning of missions to be flown if communications broke down. The plan included reconnaissance facilities from both, air observation, by means of the 111th Observation Squadron, and photographic reconnaissance, by means of a detachment from the North African Photo Reconnaissance Wing. In each case, plans were made for the use of these units with initial missions for each day after D-5 provided, anticipating communication problems as far ahead as possible.

Public Relations were planned in detail and were set up for various sub-task force headquarters with necessary equipment D-day and thenceforth. Psychological Warfare Branch activities were included to provide by D-30 ten officers and three interpreters, two drivers, and two clerks. The plan provided for and announced the method of map supply, anticipation of aerial photographs, and relief models. In addition, during the planning phase, high obliques from an altitude of approximately 200 feet were flown of the area in which the beach landings were to be made, and proved invaluable.

DISSEMINATION

During the actual operations the plan of reports followed was that any information of immediate value was to be issued as spot reports and that the G-2 Periodic Reports were to be issued on a twenty-four hour daily basis. In addition, instructions were received that intelligence summaries were to be sent classified for priority as "Operational Priority" to be closed as of 1600 hours. During the operation, this was augmented by addition of partial summaries each six hours, resulting in four scheduled reports to higher and lower headquarters during the twenty-four hour period.

The plan for interrogation of prisoners of war was to provide Army, Corps and Division headquarters each a total of four officers and eight enlisted men, consisting of two teams; one having a thorough knowledge of Italian, the other of German.

The Counter Intelligence activities were planned so that one Field Security Detachment would be assigned to Army headquarters and to Corps headquarters, consisting of two officers and eleven men each and two Port Security Detachments, consisting of two officers and eleven men be assigned to Army headquarters, and later used at designated ports. Each division was assigned a detachment of one officer and five men from the CIC. The counter sabotage plan involved only such personnel as were already available to tactical units and included instructions to prevent sabotage. Later, counter subversive control was announced and close cooperation was arranged for counter subversive control during the operational phase of occupied territory.

CENSORSHIP

Censorship was planned, to be provided by Force 141, to consist of two field press censors, three civilian mail censors, three telephone and telegraph censors, three officer interpreters and three clerks. The mail censor was to follow instructions then issued in the African theater, censorship of civilian mail in occupied territory was to become the function of Civil Affairs. The field press censor was to have as his sole responsibility the dispatches of war correspondents. Signal security plans were announced as conforming to signal operation instructions to be issued by the Signal Officer, Force 343.

As previously noted, all of these plans were laid for the invasion of Western Sicily, and, upon revision of the basic plan and announced directive that Force 343 would operate simultaneously with Force 545, in Southeast Sicily, minor changes only were made and the plan as a whole stood up. The late change caused a slight difficulty in such matters as were long range in preparation; for example, the beach models which were at that approximate time available for issue to troops were of no value, and new ones had to be prepared for the new area. On the 5th of May, 1943, an amended intelligence plan was issued for distribution to the sub-task force commanders.

As time progressed in the execution of this plan, the G-2 Section was broken up into various sub-sections which functioned in the planning phase. The future development of the Section into the operational phase followed with the functions being gradually changed to meet operational conditions. Annexes 1 and 2 show the organization of the G-2 Section.

Following are comments on those functions with their experiences.

II. ADMINISTRATION

PLANNING PHASE

This section was responsible for internal distribution of mail and messages and the circulation of intelligence and telephone traffic within the G-2 section, also publication, mimeograph material, letters and so forth, typing of outgoing G-2 radiograms and messages. Although in many instances other sub-sections repared their own copy, constant checking was necessary to secure a uniform and orderly publication policy. This section also maintained the journal and diary and other normal routine matters.

When the planning for the Husky operation began in Rabat, for security reasons, a separate filing and distribution system was maintained for these papers only.

The transition to planning administration was a gradual process. The influx of planning documents in increasing number made necessary a plan for distribution. This was based on a downward flow from higher headquarters, because little intelligence was being produced by lower units at this stage. The basic pattern was thru II Corps to its divisions, direct to the other divisions and Army troops. Limited personnel inhibited adequate distribution to Army troops, as their specialized character and the frequent changes in troop-lists called for more time and study than was available. To understand the problem it must be remembered that documents are topical, and a description of a mine should reach Army Engineer Units while a mine field pattern should also reach Army Tank Units. The inadequacy was not as serious as it might have been, as the majority of the Army troops were attached to Corps and Divisions.

Changes in the composition of the task force complicated the publication and distribution problems, as the early publications were run to meet existing demands, with no margin for expansion. A notable example was the "Black Book", a document of a hundred odd pages, of which only 35 copies were run. As a result of the increase in the force, the planning phase ended with only one copy in G-2. There were many times when the soundness of the practice of keeping all stencils, thereafter accepted, was justified.

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SUPPLY PROBLEMS

Supply was normal in aspect except for such hard-to-get things as clear acetate, which required all sorts of extraordinary efforts and even the use of discarded X-ray film from our hospitals. In the matter of equipment, continuous studies by the section of labor-saving and reproduction devices which could help out were made, and discussions with section chiefs and specialists led to the conclusion that certain business machines could be profitably employed by the section in improving the quality and speed of dissemination to the lower units. For example, a multilith was ordered to meet needs beyond the scope of the mimeograph and ditto machine. Due to supply difficulties this has not yet been obtained.

A large proportion of additional officers and men were attached for temporary duty in the late planning stage, and the task of orientation and training placed further burdens on a staff already carrying quite a load. In fact for several weeks they were of little or no value. This was not a question of experience, as among them were officers of considerable background in combat intelligence but at the army level the identity of units, their commanders, the names of the staff officers and the physical location of the offices, message channels, methods, and so on were a bewildering array that could not be assimilated at once.

The administration section had a considerable part in the work of dividing the section into three echelons, for travel respectively on the LST which left Mostaganem late in June, the headquarters ship which left Algiers the first week in July, and the rear echelon which moved to Bizerte and came over in odd lots from D plus two on. Space and passenger lists were arranged (an attempt was made to have an operating G-2 section on each boat), vehicle requirements were determined, and the equipment and supplies were apportioned and packed. During this last minute rush a large number of reference documents requiring careful checking were sent in by lower units. As it was impossible to handle them properly it became necessary to carry them along, resulting in several hundred pounds of useless freight, not to be forwarded until after processing for which there was no time, and not to be left behind as there was no provision for storage of highly classified documents.

The administration section reopened briefly in bivouac near Algiers, publishing a few mimeographed items, clearing some documents to Force 141, and accomplishing last minute distribution of data to units mounted in the harbor.

OPERATIONAL PHASE

Few of the administration section were included in the D-day mounting, and those primarily for transportation. The balance were set up in Bizerte for shipment. In Sela, the section was reassembled and at Affreville and thereafter the administration sub section split into two echelons. One was concerned with normal G-2 activities, and the other principally undertaking the administration of numerous special sections under the heading of the Miscellaneous Sub-section.

The several moves in the final phase of the operation, and an experiment with a captured truck used as an office indicated that the administration section could save about three hours on every move, and that it would operate more efficiently and with less harm to typewriters and mimeograph in a simply converted truck or trailer.

On D plus 1, an advance detail went ashore from the command ship to establish this section at [redacted].

From July 12 to the end of the operation a combined G-2 and G-3 War room was maintained. An operational map of the entire island, to the scale of 1:100,000, was mounted at each location, and the terrain model placed in a proper relative position with this map. G-2 Combat Section posted only general locations of known enemy units on this operational map.

It was found that several detailed maps were needed. A work map was maintained, on which was placed all intelligence information without regard to its credibility. This map was posted by the G-2 duty officer and was the basis for the G-2 Periodic Report issued daily.

A combined visual and photographic air reconnaissance map was maintained. All requested air reconnaissance was plotted on this map, which revealed at a glance those missions which were currently being flown. Visual reconnaissance and spot photographic coverage, as well as requests on G-2 showing profitable bomb targets, were initiated by the Combat Section based on the enemy situation.

During the latter part of the Sicilian campaign, it was found advisable to keep posted a map showing the road blocks and demolitions executed by the enemy, keeping abreast of enemy intentions portrayed thereby in his delaying action in the difficult terrain found in the northeastern portion of the Island.

A chart showing daily and aggregate total enemy prisoners of war, dead and wounded, aircraft, guns, and tanks was posted by the Combat Section duty officer in an attempt to have up-to-the-minute record of these enemy casualties. Since these figures were obtained from spot messages of subordinate units, the figures were not official.

The sources of Combat Intelligence information were normal, including the Navy, Air, and higher, lower, adjacent echelons of command, and radio intercept. Captured documents, prisoners of war, individual observation, and civilian informers proved invaluable.

ROUTING OF MESSAGES

All messages received in the Combat Intelligence Section were first examined by the officer on duty, who indicated on the message itself the action to be taken; that is, whether it should go the Battle Order, Situation Map, Work sheet, File, or be disseminated to high, lower, or adjacent units, or Staff Sections. Spot dissemination in the form of radio message or telephone was made immediately of those items requiring prompt action. Routine dissemination requiring reproduction, as prisoner of war reports, was accomplished by the Administration Sub-Section.

A G-2 Journal was kept, which included the disposition of action taken on each individual message. Intelligence Summaries (ISUM) for the preceding 24-hour period were prepared at 1600B daily, as directed by higher headquarters. Copies of such ISUMS were sent all subordinate units. To supplement these regular ISUMS, it was made general policy to send additional spot reports every six hours.

III. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

Prior to D day all efforts were directed toward the collection and evaluation of all intelligence information concerning SICILY, and distribution of this information in digest form to all component units.

Overlays in color, on transparent acetate, showing terrain, roads, railroads, and disposition of enemy troops, were prepared for use of the Planning Staff and for presenting estimates of the enemy situation in briefing the various commanders.

Relief models of landing beaches for each specific sub-task force were ordered and delivered to the units concerned. One terrain model of the entire island to the scale of 1:100,000, was made during the planning phase, and this model was moved with the Combat Section. It was found invaluable for an overall study of planned operations, and permitted visualization of enemy capabilities from a terrain standpoint.

During the planning and operational phase, G-2 plans and publications issued consisted of the following:

a. Intelligence Plan.
b. Intelligence Annex to Field Order No. 1.
c. G-2 Estimates Nos. 1,2,3,4,5, & 6 (Annex No. 3)
d. G-2 General Information Bulletins (Annex No. 4).
e. Outline of Intelligence Information - "Black Book"
(Table of Contents only)(Annex No. 5).

On approximately D minus 10 the supplies, equipment, and personnel were divided into three parts, two of which were loaded on separate headquarters ships moving with the assault force. One unit moved on to BIZERTE and was scheduled for shipment on the D plus 8 convoy.

Initially, it was planned to operate this section in the Combined Air, Navy, Army Operations Room, aboard the headquarters ship. Limited space, however, made this impracticable. Since Navy and Air were chiefly concerned with operations during this transition period, the Combat Section was not physically present in the Combined Operations Room prior to D day.

OPERATIONS IN SICILY

Until rejoined ashore on D plus 2, the section operated with insufficient personnel due to the limited number of G-2 personnel which could be transported with the assault force. Operations were on a 24-hour a day basis, and the division of responsibilities during this period were:

2 officers on duty, situation map, (including maps kept up to date outside for general information), and reports.

2 typists on journal and stenographic work.

1 staff sergeant on battle order map and file system.

1 draftsman

Formal G-2 Periodic Reports were prepared daily. Initially these reports were closed as of 2400B; however, it was found that less confusion occurred in operation of the Work Sheet by changing this time to coincide with the ISUM report as of 1600 B (Annex No. 6).

IV. BATTLE ORDER

One non-commissioned officer, who was both a linguist and a trained PW interrogator, was charged with maintaining records of enemy battle order during the planning phase. He was assisted when necessary by personnel of the PW Interrogation Team assigned to Headquarters I Armored Corps, Reinforced.

Battle order information was supplied by higher headquarters. Complete data on enemy forces was republished as received, posted on a battle order map and entered in a card index file for ready reference.

Upon establishment of the headquarters ashore at Sela, two officers and an additional enlisted man - the latter also a trained PW and battle order clerk - were assigned to the section. In later stages one officer and two men comprised the section.

Activities as they developed resulted in division of responsibility whereby summaries and general supervision were charged to the officer. Posting of the battle order map and specialties reference Italian battle order devolved upon The non-commissioned officer, and matters pertaining to German battle order and records were the main effort of the other enlisted man. The two officers were used early ashore as battle order assumed major proportions early in the campaign and running estimates were necessary.

The section recorded all identified enemy units down to battalions (to companies and batteries in the case of armored forces, artillery or engineers). New information was entered promptly on the unit's individual card. The new position was posted on the map and any necessary comments were communicated to the A. C. of S., G-2 or to the Duty Officer.

Information of enemy units located was disseminated as part of the "Identifications" section of the daily G-2 Periodic Report, published separately as a complete enemy battle order, or issued as special reports to G-2 on enemy units to be expected in sectors of projected operations.

An overall picture of enemy strength was maintained in the form of a chart showing estimated number of enemy infantry battalions, number of tanks, and number of guns remaining and combat efficiency.

V. PHOTO INTELLIGENCE

On April 1, 1943 one officer constituted the Photo Intelligence Section. As the functions of the section increased and developed, personnel were added. During May two officer interpreters, one enlisted clerk and one enlisted draughtsman were attached to the section from Hq. I Armored Corps.

In June, the section was augmented by a detachment from the Northwest African Photo Reconnaissance Wing, composed of thirteen officer photo interpreters, two enlisted draughtsmen, one typist, one clerk, three cooks, three truckdrivers and one motorcyclist; equipped by the same unit with two 3-ton trucks (offices), one 1½ ton truck (office), one 3/4 ton truck and one motorcycle.

Shortly after their arrival at Hq. Seventh Army, six interpreters were detached, one to each of the Divisions and one to II Corps. Prior to D day, two artillery officers and two artillery enlisted men were also attached for counter-battery purposes. One officer and one enlisted man were from the artillery section, Hq. Seventh Army. The other officer and enlisted man were from Artillery Section, Hq. II Corps.

On D-1, a part of the 15th Photo Squadron composed of a flight section, photo section, and administrative section were in direct support. The flight section was composed of ten aircraft, fifteen pilot officers, and fifteen mechanics. The photo section was composed of one officer and twenty-four technicians, and the administrative section which included cooks, guards, etc., was composed of one officer and sixteen enlisted men. Thus, the section from the beginning of the planning phase when it was composed of one officer and no enlisted men was built up to a section of thirty-five officers and seventy enlisted men.

After D day, an Engineer officer was added to make detailed reports of demolitions and other matters of Engineer interest.

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The activities of this section fall into five categories: Photo Reconnaissance, Photo Processing, Photo Interpretation, Collation Maps, and Beach Evaluation.

PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE

During the planning phase all requests for photo reconnaissance flights were made to Fifteenth Army Group and sorties were flown by units of the Northwest African Photo Reconnaissance Wing. These followed a broad overall plan of coverage which was outlined and furnished that headquarters early in the planning phase. (Annex No. 7). Plans for the first six day's missions (D to D plus 5) were prepared on 3 June 17, 1943 in event of poor communication. (Bulletin No. 22, Annex No. 11). These proved invaluable.

Special requests for Photo Reconnaissance by Divisions and Corps were made through channels to Hq. Seventh Army, who coordinated the requests and made special demands on the Air Liaison Officer, Fifteenth Army Group. As this officer was stationed at Malta, requests from both Seventh Army and Eighth Army were thus cleared.

For the operational phase the 12th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron was placed in support of the Seventh Army. The squadron comprised ten F-5 aircraft, (P-38), each equipped with one 6" camera and two 24" cameras. One aircraft had two 36" cameras.

From D to D plus 10 (20 July) the squadron was based at the Ariana airfield, Tunisia. After 20 July, an average of 5 aircraft daily were flown to Ponte Olivo airport, Gela, Sicily, where the pilots were briefed for the days missions. Upon completion of a mission, the planes landed at this same airfield, the film was removed, and the pilots were interrogated. The planes were then flown back to Ariana to escape the dangers of nightly enemy aerial bombardment.

After satisfactory communications were established between Hq. Seventh Army and units (D plus 8), all requests for photo reconnaissance missions were made to AC of S, G-2. One officer of the section was stationed at the airfield from which the squadron operated. All requests for missions made by units of Seventh Army were cleared through this officer. Requests for missions were made by radio, air courier, and telephone.

Night photo reconnaissance missions failed early in the operation due principally to enemy searchlights setting off the cameras, which used up the film before the target was reached. A solution to overcome this shortcoming was not found by the end of the operation.

A total of 140 missions were flown during the operational phase.

Statistics on the missions flown during the operation are as follows:

Total number of missions	140
Total mission failures (Missing target, weather, mechanical)	5
Total successful missions	135
Percentage of sorties successful	96.5%
Percentage of sorties failure	3.5%
Average flying time per sortie	1½ hours
Average number of missions daily	3.7
Plane Losses	0
Pre D-day missions	130
Number of 36" sorties after D-day	4

PHOTO PROCESSING

During the planning phase all sorties were flown from Malta and North Africa, were developed and printed at the respective airports and one set of prints dispatched to Hq. Seventh Army by Air Courier. There was a lag of approximately 48 hours from the completion of the printing to the delivery of the prints to Hq. Seventh Army.

If reprints were desired requests were made through channels, viz: Division to Corps to Hq. Seventh Army to HQ, Fifteenth Army Group to N.A.P.R.W. Delivery of prints was made in reverse order. The time gap from the origin of request to delivery of prints varied from 3 to 10 days.

From 3 to 10 sets of each sortie were printed and distributed to lower units during the planning phase. The number of sets requested depended upon the importance of the coverage and the repetition of the coverage.

Mosaics at scale of 1/25,000 of the entire original Seventh Army area were prepared and 35 sets distributed to lower units. This area included 1260 1/4 map sheets 271, 272, 273, 275, and 276.

An estimated total of 199,000 photographic prints and 1,400 mosaics were distributed to lower units.

The photo section of the 14th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron began developing and printing photographs on D day with the flight at Ariana airfield, Tunisia. This continued to D plus 10, and during this period only one set of prints was printed, there being no means of transporting prints to Sicily. The average time for developing and printing a 250-print sortie was 9 hours.

From D plus 10 to the end of the operation the photo section was based near the Ponte Olivo airport, Gela, Sicily. Either 2 or 3 sets of prints were printed with distribution of one each to interpretation detachment at the airport, to the division interested and to II Corps. Each sortie averaged 235 prints.

Distribution was made to Corps the same day that missions were flown providing air transportation was available, otherwise it was on the morning following the previous day's missions. Prints were subsequently distributed to divisions by Corps. This system was so slow, in most cases, that Divisions received prints covering an area after they had passed it.

EFFICIENCY IMPROVED

The efficiency of the photo section increased to such an extent during the operational phase that 3 sets of prints were finished in 3 hours, as against one set in 3 hours at the beginning of the operational phase. If a request was made by Corps two sets were printed. If request was made by a Division, 3 sets were printed with both the Division and Corps receiving a set of prints. Upon completion of the two or three sets of prints, the negative was dispatched by air courier to N.A.P.R.W. located at La Marsa, Tunisia.

Requests by units for selected prints were made through channels to Hq. Seventh Army. Hq. Seventh Army radioed for prints to N.A.P.R.W. Delivery was made by air courier daily to Ponte Olivo from where the prints were distributed to Corps via air courier when available. Many times prints were delayed as much as 48 hours due to lack of transportation. Corps in turn distributed to Divisions by their regular courier. This means of distribution resulted in a further delay.

88,100 prints were made during the operational phase by the Photo section. In addition to the prints made by the Photo Section of 12th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, N.A.P.R.W. printed about 155,000 photos for this Army.

Photo mosaics of the entire area through which the Seventh Army moved were printed and 75 sets were distributed to units prior to their advance into the area.

PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Prior to 1 June, all photo interpretation was carried out by Hq. Fifteenth Army Group. Reports of defenses, etc., were forwarded to Hq. Seventh Army.

On 1 June, a detachment from N.A.P.R.W. consisting of thirteen officer photo interpreters, two plotters, and two clerks were attached to Hq. Seventh Army. Six of these interpreters were placed on detached service, one with each Corps and Division. The remainder formed the Hq. Seventh Army Photo Interpretation Detachment.

Sorties were interpreted daily as received and interpretation reports were issued beginning 3 June. These reports described in detail all defenses, including enemy batteries, dumps, minefields, anti-tank ditches, barracks, etc. A total of 18 reports was issued between 3 June and D-day.

Special airfield reports were issued on the airports in the Seventh Army Area. Detailed descriptions were made of the airports including the defenses, type of aircraft, length of runway, bomb craters, etc.

A description of pre D-day and D-day targets for aerial bombing and Naval bombardment was also made by the section.

Daily interpretation reports were issued on the entire day's coverage. While located in Africa (D to D plus 10) reports were submitted by Artillery radio to the units in Sicily via 299 radio provided for this purpose.

After D plus 10 the unit was located with the photo section, adjacent to the Ponte Olivo, Gela Airport.

Photos were interpreted as soon as they were printed and significant changes found were phoned or sent by courier to Army and Corps. On 1 August, a 299 radio was attached to the section for rapid dissemination of information. This radio operated on the Artillery net. After the completion of the interpretation of the day's sorties a mimeographed report was prepared. This was usually completed by midnight and reports were sent the following morning via air courier to the Army and Corps, who forwarded reports to their respective organizations by the fastest available means. A total of 46 interpretation reports was issued. (Annex No. 8 for sample). The same difficulties existed in the distribution of reports as are outlined in the Photo Processing section of this report.

An Engineer officer was attached to the unit to report on enemy demolitions. Daily reports were issued.

Counter-battery officers from Hq. Seventh Army and II Corps were attached for the purpose of fixing coordinates of enemy gun positions. The coordinates of counter-battery targets were reported by radio to Hq. Seventh Army and II Corps.

COLLATION MAPS

Prior to D day all collation maps were printed by facilities available to Fifteenth Army Group.

The first edition was printed on 19 May in limited quantity (200 copies), and overprinted information was furnished by Hq. Fifteenth Army Group. This edition was for planning use only.

The second edition was printed on 20 June, the Photo Interpretation section of Hq. Seventh Army furnishing the overlays for the maps of Seventh Army area. Collated maps of the area adjacent to the Seventh Army area was furnished by Hq. Fifteenth Army Group. U. S. military symbols were used. 1,900 copies were printed of each map.

On D-10 the 66th Topographical Company located at Ariana airfield was made available for the purpose of printing collated maps. Base maps of the entire western portion of the island were prepared and overlays were kept up to date for immediate printing.

On D day, the Topographical Company started printing the collation maps of the Seventh Army area. Maps were printed and distributed from 11 July until 20 July.

After the movement of the Photo Interpretation Detachment to Sicily the facilities of the 62nd Topographical Company of II Corps were made available for the printing of the maps. Base maps were prepared of the new areas assigned to Seventh Army and collated maps were printed of the entire coastal area from TERMINI to CALASIBI, two days prior to the advance of a unit into a new area. This system was retarded at times due to the great distance between the Topographical Company and the Interpretation Detachment. Too much time was wasted traveling between the two organizations concerned. Two editions of some maps were issued, usually when the advance was difficult and retarded.

Field Manual distribution was made of all maps. 500 copies of each were made.

Copy of collation map and overlay showing maps printed are attached as Annexes 9 and 10.

BEACH EVALUATION

Preliminary Beach Evaluations were issued by Hq. Seventh Army as G-2 Information Bulletin No. 4 with 3 supplements.

The final beach evaluation issued to units of this command was a combination of Hq. Fifteenth Army Group, ZEMAMAN, and Hq. Seventh Army interpretations, and was issued as G-2 General Information Bulletin No. 23. (Annex No. 4)

Beach evaluations were prepared by Seventh Army of the beaches which were used for the 3 landings behind the enemy lines, during the closing phases of the campaign. Annotated photo strips, collages, collation maps, and a written description were furnished the units concerned in the operation 48 hours prior to the operation. (Annex No. 11).

VI. AIR LIAISON AND OBSERVATION

During the planning phase arrangements were made for an observation squadron to be in direct support of Force 343. The 111th Observation Squadron later designated the 111th Reconnaissance Squadron was assigned to the XII air support Command. Inasmuch as the personnel were mostly fighter pilots, the squadron requested and were furnished ground officers (one from the armored division, and one each from infantry and artillery) to assist in training the pilots in what to look for on their missions. These air liaison officers stayed with the squadron throughout the operations.

This squadron had twenty-five P-51 type aircraft. Two of these were equipped with cameras, each having one 70 mm vertical camera and one 70 oblique camera. Each mission was flown by two aircraft. The scale of photography taken with these cameras was usually too small to be efficient tactical interpretation, but inasmuch as the photographs were supplementary to the visual observation and usually were for target missions, the observation proved extremely successful. If the pilots saw targets of any value, the plane without cameras served as a lookout while the other plane photographed the target.

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Missions were requested by H.Q. Seventh Army through XII Air Support Command. Corps and divisions submitted requests through their respective air support parties to the XII Air Support Command. The average time for submitting a request was two hours. Information derived was submitted to units as soon as available.

The use of the air support channel resulted in some confusion. Many requests were made by lower units to the squadron for photo missions which should have been directed to the Photo Reconnaissance Squadron.

MISSION PREPARATION

As with photographic reconnaissance, in addition for failure or lack of communications, this unit, which was based in North Africa until suitable airfields were available in Sicily, was assigned to advanced missions for the first five days after the landing. These covered all the indicated requirements, and were submitted through the XII Air Support Command. An understanding was also established with XII Air Support Command that if communications were unsatisfactory (as they later were during the assault phase) the results of the observation were to be acted upon without reference to the Seventh Army. This worked exceedingly well, and lack of information was compensated for by the knowledge that both turret guns could be taken under fire as standard procedure. (For further figures on fighter missions appear in [illegible] Information Bulletin No. [illegible] No. 4).

A total of 270 reconnaissance missions each consisting of two sorties were flown during the operational phase. Of the total, 90 or 35% were visual and 180, or 67% were visual only. A total of 10 or 4% of the missions were failures. The [illegible] were [illegible], an average of 1½ per photo sortie.

THE LIAISON OFFICER

Tactical reconnaissance required high performance, fighter type aircraft. The pilot must be a trained observer and thoroughly familiar with employment of tank and friendly infantry, armor, artillery, and air forces. It [illegible] in this training a ground school briefly covering the direction of Army, formations and tactics of infantry, tanks, armor, artillery, [illegible] shore, types of invasion craft and landing beach, [illegible] operations, tactical employment of artillery, artillery adjustment of fire, identification of ground vehicles, [illegible] required by units in march, bivouac and deployed formations, and the capabilities of German anti-aircraft artillery was conducted by three liaison officers referred to above. All instruction was of conference type supplemented with diagrams and pictures to depict target formations and troop movements.

Tours were made of nearby harbors where navy personnel cooperated in explaining various types of landing craft and vessels. Later pilots were sent out to observe these craft at various altitudes.

Advantage was taken of actual amphibious training of ground troops. Pilots observed these actual landing and ground maneuvers and took photographs. Results were checked with known dispositions of troops which had not been disclosed to the observers prior to their return.

On D minus 2 the section was briefed for Sicilian operation and studied the part the squadron was to play. Orders stated that the squadron would be prepared to fly 29 missions of 2 aircraft each between dawn and dusk of "D" day. First missions were reconnaissance of the three main landing beaches with instructions to report progress of landing and resistance being met. Other missions were briefed for reconnaissance of road nets to determine movement of enemy reserves.

All results were good. Pilots as a result of their training knew and recognized the types of ships and landing craft observed. At this time the squadron was operating from Korba on the Cape Bon Peninsula (Tunisia) and the only communication with Army Headquarters was by radio thru XII Air Support Command (Rear). Unfortunately the communications were not good and it was impossible to disseminate the information obtained. However, such information was very vital for dive-bomber targets.

On D plus 4, the air echelon of the squadron moved to Ponte Olivo (Sicily) airdrome and direct communications were established between XII Air Support Command and the squadron. The squadron later moved to Gela west where it continued to operate throughout the campaign, flying an average of 20 sorties per day.

FLASH REPORTS

II Corps established radio communications with the squadron for "flash" reports on the results of the missions. Otherwise, all reports of missions were required to be reported thru XII Air Support Command, who in turn gave the information to Seventh Army. Late in the campaign, radio communication with front line divisions was established. This contact was direct from plane to ground and listeners could get flash reports of pilot while the plane was still in air.

When distances permitted air liaison officers made visits to Army or Corps headquarters to keep the squadron posted as to ground action. When Army and Corps headquarters became so distant from the operating field, trips had to be abandoned. II Corps then established its liaison by air courier, via cub plane, and in addition direct radio channels were set up to Seventh Army as well as II Corps through the 3d Air Defense Wing, located at the same airfield. II Corps then began sending an officer daily by cub plane to visit the squadron and 3rd Air Defence Wing also had radio communications with II Corps.

VII. MAPS

With the announcement of the operation HUSKY early in March, immediate steps were taken to ascertain what maps of Sicily were available. At this time it was found that a map to the scale 1/100,000 in one color, and decidedly not satisfactory, was the only thing available in this scale. Similarly, a black and white map, scale 1/250,000, was available and it was found that black and white maps to the scale 1/50,000 and 1/25,000 were available of portions of the Island but neither scale covered the island completely.

ROAD MAP

No road maps similar to the type published by the oil companies in the United States could be found.

In the operation Torch, the road map of Morocco, provided on a per vehicle basis, proved to be of inestimable value. Therefore, it seemed obvious that a road map must be prepared for similar use in Sicily. It was decided to take the I.S.T.S. road map, which was on the scale 1/250,000, reduce it to 1/500,000, and print it in four colors showing roads, railroads, towns, etc., in an effort to hastily improvise.

This road map was not very satisfactory because it did not show third-class roads and names of small localities. A more suitable map was made in the United States to the scale 1/200,000, and would have been very satisfactory for our purposes, but, since our channel of command was through Force 141, British Headquarters, there was no way for us to ascertain what was available in the United States for our purposes.

COLORED MAPS

In order to rectify the larger scale maps, such as 1/100,000, 1/50,000 and 1/25,000, second editions were prepared and published in five colors. This map was a five color multigraph map with red roads, brown contours, blue water, green woods, and coordinates, grid lines, towns, etc., shown in black. These proved to be quite satisfactory.

At a conference with G-2, Engineer and Artillery, it was decided to make the 1/50,000 scale available as the basic map for field manual distribution. The 1/100,000 scale map was made available for higher headquarters, planning purposes, and the 1/25,000 scale available for the use of the Artillery, augmented by the 1/25,000 photo maps of areas not available in the 1/25,000 scale map. Besides these, the 1/250,000 scale map in color, showing contours, was provided for general utility purposes.

The Engineer Section was responsible for and handled the production and distribution of all maps and these phases are discussed in the Engineer report.

During the operational phase it was found that map stocks in large quantities were not available in forward areas.

Collated maps were prepared by the Engineer from drawings from overlays provided by the Photo Interpretation Section of G-2. Further details on this subject will be found in the Photo Intelligence Section report.

VIII. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

At the start of the planning phase, one of the officers of the G-2 Section was placed in charge of security for the planning at Headquarters I Armored Corps, then at Rabat, French Morocco, the main responsibilities being reflected in intensification of operation of the security for the War Room, and CE system throughout the Corps. Liaison was carried on with local CIC agents and later with CI Section, MBS, Oran; and with Office Naval Intelligence at Arzew.

The Counter Intelligence Plan was also immediately drafted for inclusion in the intelligence plan. Upon advice of the move of Headquarters to Montagnon an advance officer proceeded there and supervised arrangements for the security of the Headquarters and final planning room for Force 343 (I Armored Corps, Reinforced). And there, as previously, physical security of the buildings in which planning took place, was accomplished in cooperation with the Force Provost Marshal.

The plan for distribution of CIC personnel originally was based on the then tactical plan of taking the western portion of the island of Sicily. As this portion included two major ports, two port type CIC detachments, composed of two officers and eleven men each, were requested. One field security type of the same number of officers and men for the Army and the Corps Headquarters were also requested, and one officer and five men were requested for each Division.

SECURITY PLANS

A security memorandum was published following a directive from higher Headquarters which resulted in the classification of XO and TO officers and Pigot clerks of all members of the planning staff of this and lower Headquarters. (See Annex # 12). A Counter Intelligence plan for operation HUSKY was drawn up, high lights of which were to secure, plot and disseminate CI missions to be accomplished by the Army, Corps and Division Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments. The section prepared lists of railway facilities, tunnels, communications, power and light stations, water facilities, military establishment, and certain important civil establishments which were indicated on town plans. These town plans were then sent to interested CIC detachments with directives that such facilities be either captured and protected or destroyed depending upon their nature. Unfortunately, the securing and protection of important installations was sometimes hampered due to a lack of transportation, lack of linguists and lack of available guards to fulfill security recommendations.

Countersigns to include Dyl were issued for all Army Troops - thereafter delegated to lower echelons of command. As that caused some confusion, unforeseen by augmentations of unrelated troops in the same area, these were later changed to one set for all Seventh Army troops. Of interest is that to insure complete distribution of countersigns, a safe margin was found to be seven days in advance.

Higher headquarters had established a CIC training school of approximately three weeks duration for CIC personnel later to be assigned to the units of Seventh Army. Upon completion of this course sections reported to Rear Commands and a portion of one of the Port Sections was placed with the 1st Engineers Special Brigade to learn first-hand the most likely problems of security in "over the beach supply".

CIC personnel attached to all echelons of Seventh Army totaled 13 officers and 68 special agents and agents. One Field Section and Port Sections "A" and "B", each consisting of two officers and 11 men, were attached to Headquarters Seventh Army. The Field Section was attached to Headquarters II Corps. These members were sufficient for tactical operations but due to speed of the operation, and lacking follow-up were not sufficient to insure prompt, complete counter intelligence coverage of towns captured or by-passed during the operation.

Charged as it was with the preparation of the cover plan and countersigns, the personnel of the section was changed to 2 officers and one clerk and later to 3 officers and 2 clerks. The cover plan was prepared by higher headquarters and required assembling and reporting all rumors, in order that those authorities might determine what success their propaganda was having. Other matters such as sealing of troops were, because of distances and subdivisions employed in organizing of task forces, delegated to the sub-task force commanders.

ENEMY AGENTS

Operationally, the CIC sections of divisions landed with assault troops on D-Day according to the CIC Plan and without loss. Others landed with their proper headquarters during the operations. They located and arrested leading military and civil Fascists of which 222 were interned; generally, these were Segretario Politico, Segretario Federale or vic segretario; Members of G.V.N.A.; Members of Squadra di Azione; Commandante of G.I.I.; Commissario di Publica Sicurezz; Inspectors of P.N.F.; Commandante M.V.S.N.; or, Agents of Centro Contra Spanaggio.

It is estimated that the number of Political Prisoners interned as dangerous or potentially dangerous to security during the active phases of operation was over 500, of which probably one-third remain detained. Wherever practicable, AMGOT officials were contacted before taking action. Former party members vital to the operation of the civil government, key installations and police were continued in their positions where adequate replacements could not be found.

It must be borne in mind that the military mission was to obtain unconditional surrender of Sicily. The detachments were, hence, interested in political as well as military resistance, and with that in mind made arrests according to their best judgment. The decision was theirs, during the tactical phase, and so performed though occasional mistakes were made.

CIC searched enemy CPs and military and civil headquarters resulting in large numbers of maps, overlays of minefields, gun positions, supplies, etc., which proved of great value to tactical units. Volumes of documents, orders, data, military codes, handbooks, etc., were forwarded to AFHQ through the Documents Section. Counter Intelligence material of immediate interest was forwarded to 15th Army Group.

Overlays were found of nearly all minefields in Sicily; a copy of Battle Order of enemy units operation in Sicily; at the former headquarters of the Centre Contra Spanaggio, papers giving considerable information including names

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and addresses of Colonel de Leo's organization, and a list of potential enemy agents. This information was immediately dispatched to interested agencies.

GERMAN RADAR UNITS

Complete codes of German Radar Units, of wireless transmitter units, and of code "K" with seals unbroken which carried radio code information for use until September 1943 were found and dispatched. Other documents included data on the Prison system of Italian PW group, including the informant system, location of Italian PW camps, rules, regulations, etc. A detailed Battle Order information of enemy in Balkans and Greece was also taken. Thirteen wireless transmitters (eight intact) and four Radar units were located and turned over to or reported to the Army Signal Section for disposition. Over 200 sacks of enemy mail and 18 sacks of postage stamps and volumes of telegrams were turned over to ACLS.

The Port Sections installed and operated port security and "over the beach supply" security measures. One handled security for the ports of Licata, Porto Empedocle and Palermo, and the other in Port of Gela and "over the beach supply" from a point south of Vittoria to east of Licata. To insure port security pass systems were installed and interestingly, to date, no sabotage has been noted.

IX. PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION

INTERROGATION SYSTEM

During the operations FWI personnel attached to Hq Seventh Army consisted of 1 officer, 3 enlisted men (German); 2 officers and 5 enlisted men (Italian). This detachment was employed during the initial operations in Gela for spot interrogation of prisoners assembled at the Gela cage. Prisoners of war were questioned hastily and briefly for immediate tactical intelligence such as battle order, troop dispositions, minefields, etc. The prisoners during this early phase were principally from a battalion sector. Hence, initial information obtained was limited to that of a tactical nature only.

As combat elements progressed, prisoners evacuated through Gela became more diverse and Army interrogators initiated more detailed and thorough interrogation. They conducted special interrogations of enemy high ranking officials and selected prisoners were referred to G-2, Seventh Army at Gela and later at Agrigento and Palermo. A directive was issued by this headquarters that all enemy admirals, general officers, colonels, and separate unit commanders be sent to Army cage for interrogation. Information sought covered all phases of intelligence, including broad strategic questions: Battle order, troop movements, plans, armored forces, artillery, reserves, missions, effects of bombings, etc. Italian generals, escaped German and Italian prisoners, enemy aviation personnel (in conjunction with special air interrogators with and through the XII Air Support Command) and enemy technical experts were interrogated in detail. Particular reference is made to the interrogation of an Italian general from whom a complete battle order and personalities of two Italian Divisions was obtained.

In February, 1943, the I Armored Corps laid plans for a school for the training of Prisoner of War Interrogators. For six weeks extensive planning, interviewing of prospective students of all I Armored Corps troops, and administrative preparations continued. The school was ready for operation; instructors had prepared a curriculum, and housing and messing facilities were arranged for. The course failed to materialize but was compensated for by the Corps and unit commanders gaining a personally authenticated file of all linguists in their command. This was to stand in good stead later, particularly with reference to linguists.

Two FWI teams were allotted to each division and to each higher headquarters. Personnel assigned to AFHQ were attached directly to divisions. Assigned I Armored Corps personnel were retained at its headquarters or sent on detached service to subordinate units.

PARATROOP-JUMPER INTERROGATORS

During the planning period changing operational requirements necessitated shuffling of personnel and presented interesting but complex problems. The 82nd Airborne Division, for example, made an urgent request for volunteer parachute-jumper interrogators. Canvassing of units produced two. Excess personnel was detached from the division planned for force reserve and attached to the 2nd Armored Division combat teams, who were scheduled to perate early in the campaign.

Vehicles and trailers were requisitioned for the intergral transportation that Interrogation Teams require. In addition a small reserve was arranged for to replace shortages, losses or damges which later proved its worth.

Operational procedure was drafted and included in the G-2 Intelligence Plan. Its basis was coordination with the Intelligence Situatin or Combat Sections. The planned system was reciprocal whereby essential elements would be furnished Interrogation Teams by Intelligence Combat sections and FWI findings given to Intelligence Combat sections through daily reports and weekly summary reports.

One hundred-forty prisoners were interrogated by Army interrogators during the operation. Irregular cases arose regarding prisoners of war and Sicilians. Army interrogators handled and affected the settlement of problems involved. Reference is made to the case of Italian lieutenant colonel and party of 5 enlisted men (carrying large sums of money) captured at sea by Navy and confined to civil jail in Palermo. Also the case of a civilian anti-Fascist who was released from prison and delivered a list of Fascist names numbering 200.

PRISONERS PAROLED

At the request of the Army Provost Marshal, interrogators assisted in expediting the paroling of approximately 5,000 Sicilians following a directive issued regarding such paroles. Work was done at cages at Palermo, at Prizzi, and later from local prefectures at Corleone, Misacuire, and others.

The distribution of personnel of FWI teams in the divisions was supervised by Seventh Army when required by the tactical situation or by casualties among interrogators.

Additional activities of FWI personnel as interpreters, translators and miscellaneous document activity, are covered elsewhere in this report.

Extracts from lower echelon reports:

2d Armored Division - Armored Division FWI personnel worked best when distributed into bi-lingual teams as follows: 4 interrogators each with Reconnaissance Battalion, CCA, CCB, and Division Headquarters. Enemy documents picked up by soldiers, and sent back, and gone through by interrogators have uncovered some highly important items such as new locations of enemy units, location of enemy minefields, defenses and installations, signal operating instructions, and lists of paroles and countersigns.

45th Division - FWI personnel was distributed approximately evenly between RCT's Hq and Division Headquarters. Each group was bi-lingual and had an officer in charge. Principal objectives in interrogation were identification strength, equipment, and location.

1st Division - Interrogators were distributed throughout Division Headquarters and RCT headquarters. In addition, 4 enlisted men, FWI, were with the Clearing Company of the Medical Battalion. Interrogation personnel acted as part of the staffs of the units to which they were attached. Officers participated in staff conferences and their opinions were given weight in any consideration of enemy capabilities.

The major advantage of interrogation at combat team headquarters is the time element; information received one or two hours after capture is still "fresh".

II Corps - The FWI personnel with II Corps was used partly to reinforce division interrogation teams, and partly in the Corps battle order section. There was no Corps cage and, therefore, no interrogation at Corps. Prisoners were evacuated directly from Division cage to Army cages.

The translation section scheduled to arrive from the United States with the 45th Division did not arrive. To meet this deficiency a Translating Section consisting of 1 enlisted man (translator) and 1 officer (translator), and 1 typist was improvised by Hq Seventh Army from its own FWI personnel.

Translations were made for the Commanding General, AMGOT, and all staff sections. (Number of typewritten pages of translations approximately 200).

The requested number of interpreters for Seventh Army was not received. To further alleviate conditions the Army Italian FWI team was used extensively on interpreting missions. Such missions included: Interpreting for the Army Commander, Hq. Commandant, Billeting Officers, CIC, visitors from higher headquarters, and the Army Engineer, Artillery and Provost Marshal Sections.

X. INTERCEPT SERVICES

"Y" SERVICES REPORT

It was contemplated that an intercept of enemy radio traffic would be made available to the Seventh Army. Actually the campaign progressed so fast that these services were not established until the last two or three days when useful information was obtained. Further details concerning the original plan and the final outcome will be found in the report on the Signal Section.

"J" SERVICES REPORT

To regulate the introduction of "J" Service into the United States Army and to train personnel in its functions, orders from Allied Force Headquarters attached two British officers to Headquarters I Armored Corps late in May. The officers attached had wide experience with the British First Army and thus were well qualified to introduce it. Briefly, the service was to provide a speedy and accurate source of information to G-2 and G-3 staffs at Army, Corps, and Division headquarters by intercepting radio traffic of friendly forward nets. As a secondary purpose, it was to monitor those nets with a view to checking on breaches of radio security.

The activity was assigned as a G-2 function. The technical requirements, qualifications, capabilities, and limitations are covered in greater detail in the Signal Officer's report.

Inasmuch as this was to be an educational as well as an operational project, the staffs of sections concerned were oriented as to the advantages and limitations of the service. The officers arrived at MOSTAGANEM on 1 June and immediately set up their establishments. Contacts were made with the various headquarters, and plans were laid for technical arrangements to provide the necessary intercept on board headquarters ships. In the main, operating personnel was to be furnished by the Radio Intelligence Platoon of the infantry divisions.

It was stipulated that "J" Service was under control of the G-2 of the headquarters being served. In that way, the officers in charge could be briefed as to anticipated activity, and could be oriented for the traffic anticipated. Inasmuch as this traffic was to produce the messages of our lower combat echelons, it would, likewise, serve as an enemy intelligence agency.

USEFUL IN ASSAULT

During the landing operations, this service served as a valuable link and some success was achieved by direct intercept with a FM set on the bridge of the Army command ship, which augmented the situation reports of the actual landings of the assault waves.

When the Command Post moved from GELA to AGRIGENTO, communication was poor and not very prolific. Due to the speed with which units were progressing they passed beyond the range of the intercept sets and, in addition, telephonic communication was used. A set dispatched with the 2nd Armored Division arrived too late in the PALERMO area to be useful but it was then shifted to the 1st Division, where a total of 60 messages was received in one day. This material included intercepts from the British 78th Division and 1st Canadian Division on the right flank of the Seventh Army and proved a valuable source of information.

A valuable contribution was made as a source of early information, wherein there were reported such important items as the capture or fall of ENNA, TROINA, BRONTE, MALETTO, RANDAZZO, CASTIGLIONE, and others. It contributed early lateral information reference minefields, blown bridges, and disposition of enemy forces. It proved to be a considerable source of operational information not received otherwise from the division and brought to light grave breaches of radio security in lower units.

XI. MISCELLANEOUS

Although during the planning phase, the miscellaneous subsection was to tie in such activities as Prisoner of War Interrogators, Translators and Interpreters, immediately upon entry into the operations this section grew by leaps and bounds. As a result of the division of the command post into an "advanced CP" and "Main CP", the miscellaneous subsection functioned at the Main CP and, as it finally developed, supervised and coordinated activities of the following:

A. Counter Intelligence Corps.

B. Prisoner of War Interrogators.

C. Psychological Warfare Branch.

D. Experimental Detachment G-3 (O.S.S.).

E. Experimental Detachment G-3 (X-2)

F. Secret Intelligence (b) (BRITISH)

G. Advance Censorship Liaison Section.

H. Field Press Censor.

I. Advance Document Section.

J. Special Liaison Unit. (British)

K. Translators and Interpreters.

L. Press Censorship Liaison Office.

M. Public Relations. (See Public Relation's Report).

To digress briefly, a tactical commander is primarily interested in tactical results. His investments must pay prompt dividends. Many detachments sent by higher headquarters made their appearance with vague missions, some

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entirely strategic, and without advance notice. Had their purpose in the picture been more clearly defined, briefing and employment in the operation might have been more intelligently performed and no immediate results would have been sought. So some, later to prove themselves of inestimable value, joined during the operational phase under handicap. Some, instead of joining at a late date should have accompanied the assault. All should have been coordinated at this Headquarters in the planning phase. This subsection report emphasizes the importance of these activities.

This section also served as liaison between the G-2 section operating at the advanced CP and other agencies such as AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory) and the Public Relations section. As stated before, the purpose of this Section was to coordinate these various miscellaneous units, the members of which were in many cases unfamiliar with American Army command procedure, and lacked administrative self-sufficiency, so that it was necessary to have a central head for the purpose of seeing that rations, transportation, billets, pay, etc. were obtained.

Another important purpose of the Section was to insure that these various activities and agencies were properly coordinated and controlled with a minimum of overlap. Daily activity reports from these units were rendered to the chief of the Subsection for consolidation and recommendations were made to the A.C. of S., G-2.

Several of these units arrived unannounced without any warning from higher headquarters, and without authentic written orders.

A. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS.
(See Part VIII Preceding)

B. PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATORS.
(See Part IX Preceding)

C. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

Early in the planning phase advice was received that Psychological Warfare personnel would be provided for the operation by higher headquarters. Beyond this, very little was known about its activities other than what was contained in a general directive. No specific contacts were made, and as far as the Seventh Army was concerned, PWB entered the operation as an intangible activity of doubtful and questionable value. Results, however, were convincing of the important part this activity plays.

The PWB team consisting of a detachment of seven landed in Sicily on D+4 and reported to Headquarters. It was intended for direct tactical action, principally through propaganda leaflets. Two further echelons arrived subsequently, to deal with the civil population during the periods of consolidation and occupation.

Propaganda leaflets were the principal PWB weapon against enemy morale (Attached Annex #13 - Sample leaflets in Italian and German). The dropping of strategic leaflets began in the middle of May, dissemination being made by tactical bombing force. In one week, July 10-31, it is reported 15,000,000 leaflets were dropped. Seven million leaflets were dropped in sectors specified by Psychological Warfare forward teams in twenty-three bombing missions from North Africa.

After the landing, further leaflets were edited in Sicily, based on information obtained from interrogations, captured documents and mail. These proved valuable and enabled PWB to determine the relative effectiveness of various forms of leaflets. New leaflets continued to be printed and distributed from Africa. Interestingly, some 500,000 copies were printed in Sicily, distributed by Cub planes, and in some cases shot into enemy lines by twenty-five pounder guns at the specific request and suggestion of tactical units. In several instances these leaflets contained the names of enemy commanders obtained through prisoner of war interrogations, which are believed to have proved especially effective psychologically in softening enemy morale. In other cases, the surrender of Sicilian towns was probably hastened by the dropping of leaflets on immediate military objectives urging them to fly white flags to prevent further destruction. As an indication of the effectiveness of these leaflets in inducing enemy troops to surrender, approximately 80% of Italian prisoners of war interrogated were in the possession of, or thoroughly familiar with, Psychological Warfare Branch leaflets.

RADIO PROPAGANDA

Other activities during the operation, although of less tactical significance, consisted of propaganda radio programs, first from North Africa, and later from the Palermo broadcasting station. This station was seized by Psychological Warfare Branch personnel immediately on the surrender of the city and started operating on 5th of August.

Moving picture films were seized throughout Sicily and carefully censored. Movie theaters were reopened in Palermo and began showing American and British films of propaganda value on August 14th. A daily newspaper "Sicilia Liberata" started publication August 4th with a news column in English utilizing staffs and plants of two existing newspapers. PWB photographers took pictures of American troops being welcomed as liberators by the local populace, and other pictures showing return to normal conditions, for use in propaganda.

Subversive efforts were made through rumor spreading, the most effective being of clashes between Germans and Italians. Contacts were established throughout Sicily with underground anti-Fascist organizations and much valuable intelligence information was obtained from these sources.

On August 18th, the detachment commander, with an important group of his personnel, were ordered back to North Africa and subsequently the detachment commander was replaced several times. This led to some confusion through lack of continuity of command, and reduced the effectiveness of the section which was then rapidly expanding its activities.

D. EXPERIMENTAL DETACHMENT G-3 (O.S.S.)

The first detachment composed of three officers and nine enlisted men landed at Licata on July 15th and immediately reported to this Headquarters. The detachment commander was informed of the desirability of obtaining intelligence information from the Palermo area, and consequently, two attempts to infiltrate missions through the lines were made; military movement was so rapid that both of these missions were unable to infiltrate.

After the capture of Palermo, two three-man teams were attached to a front line division and succeeded in infiltrating behind enemy lines on several occasions, furnishing information of tactical value. An important mission consisting of the detachment commander, four enlisted men and two civilians was organized for the purpose of penetrating enemy lines in the direction of Messina. The mission was ambushed by German troops and several of its members were captured and wounded. All but the detachment commander eventually succeeded in returning through enemy lines and brought with them information of tactical value to our front line troops.

Several agents were landed, with the cooperation of the Navy, on the Italian mainland and at the request of the Navy, members accompanied the U. S. Naval expedition which captured the LiPari Islands, and proved useful in negotiating with the enemy authorities occupying the Islands. Close cooperation was affected with C.I.C. and AMGOT, and assistance was rendered in locating enemy agents, dangerous Fascist officials and important documents.

E. EXPERIMENTAL DETACHMENT G-3 (X-2)

As this detachment, which consisted originally of two officers, operated directly under higher headquarters, it is not further included in this report.

F. SECRET INTELLIGENCE (b) BRITISH

This unit, consisting of a party of five, also operated under higher headquarters and with experimental detachment G-3 (X-2), maintained close contact with C.I.C. and supplied valuable information.

G. ADVANCE CENSORSHIP LIAISON SECTION

The section consisting of two officers and one enlisted man and equipped with one 1/4 ton 4x4 landed at Gela July 15th and with the mission of seizing all enemy mail found in Post Offices, military Headquarters, and places of concealment.

No advance indication of its attachment had been received but it too soon proved its worth. By energetically following close behind tactical units, it succeeded in seizing over 110 tons of mail, several millions lire in currency and important documents. The mail was examined for material of immediate tactical value and after sorting, was sacked and shipped by air to the organizations Examination Center in Tunis. Currency and stamps found were turned over to AMGOT. Among important documents discovered, was a complete list of all Italian A.P.O.'s with their locations in Russia, Germany, Italy, Sicily and the Balkans. Also found were maps showing the complete signal installations of all islands belonging to or occupied by Italians. All documents of immediate tactical value were turned over to A. C. of S., G-2, for disposition.

H. FIELD PRESS CENSOR

The field Press Censor was in contact with Public Relations Officer in ample time to prepare plans for his activities which were stipulated to be the censoring of all press material prepared by correspondents, the giving of censorship guidances to war correspondents in the field in order to reduce subsequent censorship, and the sending back to higher headquarters as the operation proceeded of information and suggestions affecting censorship guidance.

The Field Press Censor censored about 900 words per day of radio copy sent to Algiers during the first two weeks. Thereafter, when radio congestion prevented press radios, he remained with correspondents in the field using II Corps Headquarters as a base. There, he attended daily briefing of correspondents by A.C. of S., G-2, II Corps, and advised them of any changes in censorship regulations. He also accompanied correspondents on trips to other headquarters and to the front giving on-the-spot guidance.

I. ADVANCE DOCUMENT SECTION.

Again during the planning phase no indication was received of the existence or proposed activity of this important organization.

This section, which consisted of one officer and one enlisted man, seized, examined, packed and shipped through channels to the Document Section, G-2, A.F.H.Q. a great volume of captured enemy documents. Data of immediate tactical importance was turned over to G-2, Seventh Army, including details of the previously unidentified German Panther Tank and of German and Italian Battle Order. Arriving without organic transportation, an Italian truck was requisitioned to handle its large volume of business. The ground floor with loading ramp of the Post Office building at Palermo was used to advantage. Again, as with allied activities, additional personnel and assistance was given by the G-2 section during peak-load periods. Upon the withdrawal of its detachment commander during the operation, the G-2 section cooperated to the completion of its mission.

J. SPECIAL LIAISON UNIT (British)

As with several other detachments this unit worked directly under supervision of higher headquarters.

K. TRANSLATORS AND INTERPRETERS.

Following emphasis laid on lack of language personnel during the invasion of French Morocco, this Headquarters requested early in the planning stage that adequate Italian speaking personnel be supplied for the Sicilian operation. In April it was announced to this Headquarters that the following interpreters and translators would be available thru A.F.H.Q. and the War Department:

a. Interpreters:

Army Headquarters	4 officers, 6 enlisted men
Corps Headquarters	4 officers, 6 enlisted men
Each Division	10 officers, 15 enlisted men

b. Translators:

Army Headquarters

Italian - 1 officer, 3 enlisted men

German - 1 officer, 3 enlisted men

None of the above personnel arrived, and had to be provided for from available personnel. As shown elsewhere in this report, Italian speaking enlisted men, mostly of mediocre language ability, were drawn from lower units to act as interpreters for various staff sections, and F.W.I. personnel was utilized for interpretation and translation. Similar emergency measures were taken by all units of Seventh Army.

This failure proved a handicap to every phase of the operation, not only in administrative contacts with civilian population, but in combat operations when combat units were restricted in obtaining much essential information concerning roads, terrain features, enemy locations, water supply, etc. from local inhabitants.

L. PRESS CENSORSHIP LIAISON OFFICE.

The unit consisted of one Italian speaking officer from Censorship Branch (INC) A.F.H.Q., who reported to this Headquarters August 12th. He censored local newspapers and photographs for inclusion in press, publications of local origin, and Italian and United States radio scripts, also "Stars and Stripes, Sicily", organization publications, P.W.B. photos, etc., and successfully carried out its mission.

MISCELLANEOUS SECTION VALUABLE

The Miscellaneous Sub-section, born in combat, proved of real value in facilitating the operation of units attached to it. All of the units supplied information of great value, and cooperated in every way, not only with G-2 and other headquarters sections, but with each other.

The effectiveness of most of these units would have been greatly increased if this Headquarters had been advised during the planning stage that they would be made available and what their functions were to be. Their arrival in the theater after D-day, in the full course of the operation, with no prior opportunity for the Army and lower headquarters staff to learn what each unit could furnish or how they were to operate, inevitably led at the outset to confusion, misunderstanding and waste of valuable time and effort. Had these been coordinated in this Headquarters in the planning phase, the time lag necessary for familiarization would have been eliminated.

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XII. CONCLUSIONS

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1. General.

a. The most effective device developed during the planning phase was the pictorial method of displaying terrain, communications, enemy dispositions and fortifications on overlay sheets of clear acetate, which enabled the staff to be kept informed of the enemy situation and assist in the preparation of the tactical plan more quickly than ever before. It proved a most desirable method of briefing both higher and lower general staffs as required.

b. Another important innovation was the attachment of a photo interpretation section to the G-2 section. This, for the first time, provided facilities immediately available to G-2 to keep abreast of enemy installations and to provide a means, under G-2 control, for the rapid dissemination of information so gained, and proved most successful, particularly in the planning phase.

c. The measures to provide security taken with the inception of the operation HUSKY and carried on relentlessly through the campaign, were most successful as tactical surprise was attained at the time of the assault.

d. The greatest weakness turned out to be inadequate preparations for the sudden shift from the planning to the operational phase of the campaign. This shift requires a complete change in the activities of the personnel of the G-2 section and considerable training and experience is required to make it function smoothly. Personnel added late are of little value.

e. Another weakness was lack of appreciation of the importance of enemy Battle order, which requires long and comprehensive study by competent personnel. It is an uninteresting evolution and hypothetical peacetime training and presents a most difficult problem. In operations it becomes instantly important. By piecing its results with combat intelligence gained, particularly in landings on hostile shores, enemy capabilities become immediately apparent.

2. Administrative Section.

a. An administrative section is required to tie in the numerous G-2 activities so that uniformity and coordination is attained.

b. Additional office appliances are required such as a machine capable of reproducing fine line sketches, maps, etc., and a machine to produce battle order information, beach data, and other intelligence matters or else Engineer equipment must be available.

c. Inadequate transportation particularly handicapped the personnel of this section in rapidly moving situations. Field offices should be improvised in motor vehicles or trailers were frequent moves of the CP are anticipated. In the assault phase due to shortage of available space, the administrative section was left behind for future follow-up. It was difficult enough for the combat section to switch from the planning phase to operational phase without having the added burden of disposition, dissemination and administrative details which it had under this procedure.

d. G-2 was particularly vulnerable to certain administrative problems outside of the normal province of the section, such as the appearance of numerous groups dispatched for special missions with no orders at all, or inadequate orders which were obviously assigned to G-2 for supervision and coordination. In some cases section chiefs of headquarters, out of normal command channels, issued orders to this type personnel without it passing through the normal channels. Obviously, advance notice should be received by G-2 of the intended attachment of personnel so that plans can be made for their proper use and administrative details, such as loading, messing, etc., can be arranged for.

3. Combat Intelligence.

a. Estimates based on careful studies of terrain, communications, enemy dispositions, using terrain models, proved accurate. Beach information and enemy fortification information proved adequate.

b. War gaming the enemy based on his disposition, terrain, and communications proved of inestimable value in arriving at correct conclusions.

c. During the planning phase 3 officers assigned to combat intelligence proved adequate, but as soon as operations go on a 24-hour basis five officers are required. The two officers to augment this section cannot be plunged into operations. They must be kept in contact with the situation and kept thoroughly familiar with operating procedure.

d. Enemy battle order proved its worth in this operation. It was only by means of statistics available from this source that the tactical staff could determine enemy losses, reinforcements, and even dispositions in many cases.

e. It was found that one officer and two enlisted men is the minimum for the organization to operate efficiently.

f. The "Y" and "J" message service proved invaluable as well as the information obtained through the Prisoner of War Interrogation Teams.

4. Photo Intelligence.

a. In the early stages the most important information required by the tactical staff was beach information and enemy fortifications and dispositions along the coast. The development of a section devoted to the acquisition and interpretation of photographs of the area involved, provided a most successful solution to the problem. In this manner not only were most useful beaches selected, but the type of sand and exits, with under-water barbed wire leading up to the beaches, and shore defenses could be accurately determined. This is a practical realization of how far photographic interpretation has gone.

b. From the American Army point of view, there were two great weaknesses. To be self-sustaining, we lacked sufficient American photo interpretation personnel. This deficiency was made up by drawing on the British who furnished adequate and proficient personnel. The other weakness was the lack of communication whereby units needing prints could receive them in the shortest possible time.

c. This campaign demonstrated that photos must be flown over a period of time for comparison. In the latter phase when capabilities indicated an enemy organized defensive position in depth, although sorties gave negative results, by comparison over a period of two weeks, no changes were noted. This was proven to be correct, but no chances can be taken. Some logical positions of defense (based on terrain studies) were flown twice daily - for comparison. This procedure must always be emphasized as there is a tendency to consider such action uneconomical, but the balance of cost versus saving of American soldiers' lives gives the answer.

d. The three elements (airplanes, photo laboratory and interpretation section) making up this section were initially scattered over too wide an area. For example, the planes were flown from Malta and La Marsa, Tunisia, a point over 1,000 miles away from the interpretation section, causing too much of a delay at a time when every hour counted. Later, during the operational phase, this situation was partially corrected but then there was no quick communication with the divisions in action. For example, by approximately 22 July the three elements were together at the Ponte Olivo airfield. The planes were flown, the pictures developed and interpreted at this point. But, since no courier planes were available to dispatch the results obtained, this improvement was wasted.

e. The beach high obliques were most important and gave those concerned a visualization of the terrain which they were to meet.

5. Air Tactical Reconnaissance and Air Liaison.

a. The assignment of ground force officers to the Tactical Reconnaissance (Air) Squadron proved most effective in briefing and interrogating pilots as well as helping staff officers in their appreciation of the advantages and limitations of this service during the operation.

b. Visual reconnaissance in modern aircraft cannot detect details such as gun installations, small caliber, except when the guns are firing, dispersed front line troops, pinpoint targets considering that the pilot must observe, fly his ship, and manipulate his map all at once. The lack of understanding of ground officers as to the capabilities and limitations of tactical reconnaissance aircraft and strategic photo reconnaissance aircraft led to a waste of the tactical reconnaissance squadron as far as tactical observation was concerned. A system of drop messages or special communication must be arranged from the airfield from which these planes fly to the divisions in the line.

c. Another weakness was the lack of the ability to get the information obtained to the units concerned promptly.

6. Maps - Relief Models.

a. In general, available maps were adequate, the 1:50,000 scale, 4-color, edition of Sicily being most effective.

b. The collation map of beach defenses was of inestimable value.

c. The photo maps, scale 1:25,000, were used very little and apparently not worth while.

d. The road map as issued, although sound from the viewpoint of putting a map of one sheet into the hands of drivers, was not adequate because of the lack of sufficient details.

e. Town plans are most effective. Characteristic of this area, main roads lose their identities in villages, usually narrowing to secondary or 3d class roads.

f. Beach relief models and other terrain models again proved their effectiveness.

7. Counter Intelligence and Security.

a. Four basic considerations influenced the operations of CIC activities; (1) lack of transportation, (2) lack of linguistical ability, (3) insufficiency of personnel, and (4) insufficiency of civil government personnel to follow through. Of these, the latter two were mainly caused by the speed of the operation.

b. Security was definitely menaced by the distribution of small handbooks on Sicily to the troops and they were of no apparent value in this case. A final one day should have been established and distribution to the troops effected under careful supervision at that time.

c. The method of processing maps was an extremely dangerous practice and although not anticipated, recurrence would probably result in the compromise of the operation. Field security was seriously jeopardized and several violations were caused by the delay of documents which had been scheduled to arrive and did not appear.

d. Countersigns and paroles, if used, must be kept under Army control, published at least seven days in advance and disseminated by lower headquarters with decreasing time intervals. Thus, the company should be issued theirs within 24 hours of use to prevent compromises difficult to correct. Great care must be taken to insure separate units serving a large headquarters (Army and Corps troops) receiving them on regular distribution.

8. Prisoner of War Interrogation.

a. All prisoners must be tabulated by their organizations for battle order purposes upon entering cages, and this information must be forwarded forthwith in consideration of enemy capabilities portrayed thereby. In a number of cases, destroyed units up to the size of battalions were considered effective long after destruction.

b. A definite psychological reaction was noted in grouping German Prisoners of War without regard to their political beliefs.

9. Intercept Services.

a. The "Y" service (monitoring enemy tactical radio) and the "J" service (monitoring our own forward tactical radio) proved extremely valuable.

b. The innovation of the "J" service proved a stumbling block in taking full advantage of it, due to staffs not being fully familiar with this type of service. For further information, see Signal Corps report.

10. Miscellaneous Activities.

a. The procedure of lumping the various attached units serving G-2 in one way or another into a miscellaneous subsection, proved most valuable, providing the necessary coordination. There were too many individuals belonging to independent agencies, each responsible to different and uncoordinated heads and lacking, apparently, definite or planned missions. This resulted in uncoordinated duplication of similar missions. Insufficient information was available during the planning phase concerning many diversified but allied intelligence activities to permit greatest efficiency during the operation.

b. The Psychological Warfare Branch proved to be of inestimable value. Missions given on the ground proved most successful.

c. Failure of arrival of interpreters and translators, as such, tapped other activities, precluding the full benefit to be gained from them as contemplated. Although the original request was made early in March, a translation and document section for the Army headquarters fell by the wayside for the same reason and definitely handicapped the G-2 Section.

XIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Administrative.

a. That Army Headquarters be authorized in tables, a multilith unit, including operating personnel, and that a HSHB-C-MAPH (a device which projects vertical plans from a horizontal plane, as tracing contours on a map to get reliefs of the terrain) be included in the T/BA.

b. That experiment be conducted to provide built-up vans or trucks as mobile field offices.

c. That, if for no other purpose than security, the necessity for competent orders be stressed.

2. Combat Intelligence.

a. That it be recognized that a minimum of 4 officers in this section is necessary from a physical standpoint - operating continuously on a 24-hour basis. By three 8-hour shifts with overlap, the same officer would go on endlessley - say from midnight to 8 a.m. He would under those conditions never receive an uninterrupted night's rest, and more so might on another shift be required to get his rest in the heat of the day.

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b. That an enemy battle order be emphasized and stressed in peace time training.

3. Photo Intelligence.

a. That training of qualified photo intelligence personnel be stressed, and that such personnel have qualifications of (1) a desire or special aptitude for the work, (2) basic military training of the Scope of their studies, (3) that they have had combat experience to know the type of objects of interest. As a side light it is recommended that combat officers incapacitated for actual field work be selected, other qualifications considered.

b. That photo interpretation detachment become an integral part of all headquarters down to include Divisions.

c. That a Photo Intelligence officer (an officer familiar with the problems of P.I.) be incorporated in each G-2 section, not as an additional member, but one of the regular personnel, if necessary, qualified in this specially important activity.

d. That when the components are physically separated (i.e. the P.I., the photo reconnaissance aircraft and processing, and the units to be served) either a radio link be established, or preferably, air courier be instituted.

e. That all effort be directed to get photos to the using units (generally the division) by passing momentarily higher headquarters, which, though interested, will be served by copies later to be received.

4. Air tactical Reconnaissance.

a. Steps must be taken to educate ground officers in the capabilities and limitations of tactical reconnaissance aircraft and the technical differences between that type of service and the photo reconnaissance units.

b. A system of drop messages or special communication must be arranged from the airfield from which these planes fly to the divisions in the line.

5. Maps.

a. That wherever practicable, and based on air photo interpretation or suite guides, line drawing of town plans be made up, in booklet form, arranged alphabetically, of towns through which main roads change direction, and that these booklets be distributed, with the road map on a basis to include one per vehicle.

b. That road map must include 3d class roads, streams, railroad crossings, towns located at crossroads, and other information for drivers, M.P.'s and guides.

6. Counter Intelligence and Securitr.

a. In that tactical CIC personnel is inadequate, a follow up, to take up territorial, political and economic activities pending arrival of civil government agencies should be provided early in an operattion. If trained personnel is not available, CIC should be augmented by preselected personnel who can be given specific missions with complete understanding of what is desired.

b. To avoid compromise of the cover plan, cover maps should be of the same scale as those used in the actual plan.

7. Prisoner of War Interrogation.

a. G-1 channels should develop a method of enrollment of Prisoners of War to include their organizations.

b. German Prisoners of War should be further separated according to their political (Nazi or non-Nazi) beliefs or affiliations. If no other way, the younger should be separated from the older groups.

8. Intercept Services.

a. A decision of security versus utility must be reached early. As it happened in this campaign once security was established the arrival of the "Y" service was set too far back to be of material assistance in this operation.

9. Miscellaneous.

a. That Psychological Warfare Branch activity and all other special intelligence agencies combined be represented on the planning and operational staff, each by an individual who would be directly responsible to G-2 for the proper placing of personnel and the coordination of its activity.

b. That (as in the case of interpreters and translators) where special attachments cannot be supplied by higher Headquarters, if such qualified personnel is located in tactical units, such units be authorised under proper T/O's to form their own, permitting the use of the allotted grades and ratings to prevent attached personnel from being deprived the ratings they would normally enjoy.


OSCAR W. KOCH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

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ANNEX I

ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL CHART
G-2 SECTION I ARMORED CORPS REINFORCED
PLANNING PHASE



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
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ANNEX 2

ORGANIZATIONAL & FUNCTIONAL CHART
G-2 SECTION 7TH ARMY
AUG 17, 1943
OPERATIONS PHASE



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ANNEX 3 G-2 ESTIMATES

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION #1

20 April 1943

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Assumption.

This estimate is based on the continued defense of Tunis and Bizerte by the German and Italian forces now operating in Tunisia. To date, no indications of organised withdrawal from the North African theater have been observed. It is also assumed that operations against Sicily will not begin prior to 60 days after the Tunisian campaign is terminated.

b. Over-all Strength and Neighboring Troops.

The Italian forces in Southern Italy and the Mediterranean Islands consist of a group of armies composed of the Seventh Army (Southern Italy), the Sixth Army (Sicily), the XIII Corps (Sardinia), and the VII Corps (Corsica), under the command of the Prince of Piedmont.

Known German forces in this theater are those listed below under "Tunisia". It is estimated that approximately 24,000 German Air Force ground personnel are, at the present time, manning the airfields and their defenses in Sicily. The presence of other German troops in Southern Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, or Corsica are unknown at this time. It is estimated that approximately 5,000 German troops intransit from the mainland to Tunisia may be expected to be in Sicily when the North African campaign is over.

(1) TUNISIA

Axis forces in Tunisia, as of 14 April 1943, were estimated to be about 160,000, consisting of 110,000 Germans and 50,000 Italians. More recent defeats have inflicted heavy losses on Axis forces.

Italy has insignificant remnants of 2 infantry divisions in Tunisia; and 1 complete infantry division. They are organized as follows:

XXX Corps - 1st (Superga) Division (complete)
10th Pistoia Inf. Division (incomplete)
Young Fascist Division (incomplete)

Rommel's Afrika Panzer Army in Tunisia is now combined with von Arnim's 5th Army, under the latter's command.

The following German divisional units are now in Tunisia:

10th Panzer Division (incomplete)
15th Panzer Division (incomplete)
21st Panzer Division (incomplete)
Goering Airborne Division (incomplete)
Manteufel Infantry Division
90th Light Infantry Division (incomplete)
334th Infantry Division
164th Light Infantry Division (incomplete)
999th Africa Division (elements)

The tank strength estimated total is 100 tanks, as of April 14. What percentage of these are Italian and what are German is not known at this time, but the complete destruction of the single Italian Armored Division indicates that the Italian tank strength is now practically zero.

(2) SOUTHERN ITALY

The 21st (Sardinian Grenadiers) Division has returned from YUGOSLAVIA to its home station, ROME. It is possibly intended to replace the 4th (Livorno) Division. Identifications of the latter have been reported in SICILY. Although the "Sardinian Grenadiers" Division is reputedly composed of picked personnel, it did not particularly distinguish itself in the Greek war nor, more recently, against the Yugoslav guerillas. In view, however, of its battle experience, it must be rated as one of the more seasoned of Italy's divisions. Depot elements have been sent with other miscellaneous units to CORSICA.

Recent identifications suggest the possible presence in the BARI area of remnants of the 52d (Torino) Division. It is believed that this formation was largely destroyed in RUSSIA, but a nucleous of it may still exist; composed of survivors from the Eastern front, and depot units from the home country.

10th (Mantova) Autotrasportabile (literally "motor-transportable") Division has moved from PIEDMONT to the COSENZA - NICASTROL area in CALABRIA. Little is known of this unit, which was formed a year ago. It has not yet seen active service. The term "autotrasportabile" merely implies an infantry division organized in such a way as to enable it to be transported when allotted motor transport from Corps or Army pool. It does not indicate permanent motorization. In view of the moderate fighting value of more experienced Italian divisions, it is unlikely to be of high quality.

There are no other first line divisions in Southern ITALY. 152 (Piceno) Division is responsible for coast defense in the LECCE area. This is described as a Territorial Defense Division. Its training is believed to be inadequate, and it may be considered to be very little different from the three Coastal Divisions which are located respectively in the SALERNO-CATANZARO - REGGIO CALABRIA area. Coastal Divisions are static units to which are allotted vulnerable stretches of coastline. In addition, there are considerable numbers of Independent Coastal Battalions and Coastal Regiments, similarly responsible for local coastal defense.

The garrison of Southern ITALY is, therefore, composed of:

Three Italian Infantry Divisions (one of which may have moved):

(1) 21st (Sardinian Grenadiers) Division
1st Infantry Regiment
2nd Infantry Regiment
13th Artillery Regiment
4th Blackshirt Legion

(2) 4th (Livorno) Division
33rd Infantry Regiment
34th Infantry Regiment
26th Artillery Regiment

(3) 10th (Mantova) Division
113th Infantry Regiment
114th Infantry Regiment
11th Artillery Regiment

Survivors of one further Infantry Division:

52nd (Torino) Division
81st Infantry Regiment
82nd Infantry Regiment
52nd Artillery Regiment

Four Coast Defense Divisions: one of which is the 152nd (Piceno) Division, consisting of the 235th Infantry Regiment, 236th Infantry Regiment (detached from Division), 336th Infantry Regiment, and 152nd Artillery Regiment.

Though strong numerically - possibly 300,000 - 350,000 men - the garrison of Southern ITALY can barely be considered adequate for defense purposes; even the first-line divisions are probably not of the highest quality, and the remaining units consist mainly of low category and depot troops. Large forces are necessary to guard the long and vulnerable coastline, in close proximity to which run the main north-south road and rail communications, despite the fact that in many areas the defense is naturally helped by the very difficult and mountainous terrain.

Disposition of units in Southern ITALY at the present time allows for no central mobile reserves. The main line of resistance is expected to be the coast itself, followed by a secondary position stretching from the sea to inland rugged terrain, obstructing the natural passageway northward along either the east or west coasts.

(3) SARDINIA

The 44th (Cremona) Division has recently been transferred to CORSICA, leaving only two mobile and two coastal divisions on the island. There is no evidence, at the present time, that the garrison of SARDINIA has been reinforced with additional troops; however, it is not improbable that the former strength of the island may be maintained. Although the garrison is at present surprisingly small (90,000), the defense is facilitated by the general difficulties of the terrain and by the virtual neutralization of the greater part of the eastern half of the island, owing to its lack of communications with the main centers.

The mobile divisions are the 30th (Sabauda) Division, consisting of the 45th Infantry Regiment, the 46th Infantry Regiment, the 10th Artillery Regiment, 176th Blackshirt Legion; the 31st (Calabria) Division, consisting of the 59th Infantry Regiment, the 60th Infantry Regiment, the 40th Artillery Regiment, and the 177th Blackshirt Legion.

(4) CORSICA

The garrison of CORSICA is now made up of the 44th (Cremona) Division, consisting of the 21st Infantry Regiment, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 7th Artillery Regiment, and the 90th Blackshirt Legion; and the 20th (Friuli) Division from the Italian mainland, consisting of the 87th Infantry Regiment, the 88th Infantry Regiment, the 35th Artillery Regiment, and the 88th Blackshirt Legion; plus miscellaneous depot units. Italian morale is low, and the occupying troops are reported to walk in fear of the inhabitants. These feelings are understandable in view of the taste of Corsicans for the vendetta and the aversion they have always shown to Italian propaganda regarding their Italian origin.

The garrison is apparently split up into small groups occupying the main towns and centers of communication. There are few mobile reserves. Apart from the erection of road blocks, the Italians have done little to improve the defenses of the island or to supplement the dismantled guns taken over from the French. The total garrison now amounts to some 40,000 men.

(5) SICILY

The total Italian garrison is estimated at 153,000, which is made up as follows:

(a) Army Ground Troops.

Three divisions and corps and army troops, totaling 78,000 men. These divisions are distributed in three main concentrations, in the Western, Central and Southeastern parts of the island. There are apparently few first-line troops in the MESSINA area (northeast part of the island). Included in the corps and army troops are two battalions of French 11-ton R 35 tanks, and one battalion of light Italian L 6 tanks; each battalion is equipped with about 50 tanks. None of the mobile divisions has actually been in combat, and all have done a protracted period of garrison service in the island.

Recent evidence suggests that elements of the principal components of the 4th (Livorno) Division located in the ROME area have now reached SICILY.

The following identifications have been received:

8 Co. 33 Inf. Regt. (CALTANISSETTA), 20 Feb.
7 Co. 34 Inf. Regt. (FAVARA)
4 Tp. 28 Arty Regt. (In SICILY)
152 Autoreparto (CALTANISSETTA)
11 C.C.N.R. (MESSINA)

A battery of self-propelled artillery has been identified with this Artillery Regiment. All batteries of the Artillery Regiment are reported to be mechanized.

(b) Coast Defense Organization.

About 75,000 men, organized in 84 Static Infantry Battalions and various artillery and machine gun units, whose duties consist of beach defense, guarding of vulnerable points, and dealing with the initial shock of invasion. Though their standard of equipment and training have recently been improved, they are still inferior in both respects to the Army Ground Troops.

Known fixed defenses (see special overlay attached to sub-force Hq. copies only) indicate that very formidable defenses are installed around the ports and airfields. Emplacements and machine gun positions have been constructed at vulnerable points on the coast. Information at the present time indicates a lack of depth to the coastal defenses; however, it may be expected that improvement of these beach defenses and coast watching will be increased as a result of our occupation of North Africa. Detail studies (now in progress of aerial photographs may reveal secondary defensive lines back from the coast. Supplementary overlays showing installations located will be furnished sub-task forces as they become known. The probability of obstacles, defended road blocks, mines, and observation points must be considered part of the enemy's defensive plan. There have been no reports of beach mines or of under-water obstacles.

(c) Reinforcement Prior to Allied Assaults.

For the past several years, there has been no increase in the number of first-line divisions in SICILY, but it is estimated that at present three or four Italian divisions could be made available to reinforce the garrison. It is, however, improbable that such a large force would actually be employed because of the difficulty of maneuvering in broken country with poor communications; in addition, it is expected that Germany will assist with such units as might have been evacuated from TUNISIA.

The probable scale of reinforcement prior to "D" Day is, therefore, estimated at:

(i) Two Italian Divisions, with up to 50 tanks.
(ii) Additional German elements, including MARSCH battalions and some armor, possibly making the equivalent of one division, with about 50 tanks.
(iii) The provision of further equipment and transport for the present garrison, aimed in particular at raising the standard of the coastal units to that of the field forces.

At the close of the Tunisian campaign, considering the probable effect of naval and air action, the Axis may succeed in withdrawing up to 20,000 personnel with personal equipment but without many vehicles or tanks. In this event, SICILY may be strengthened by the equivalent of one German division, not fully mobile. Closer than this, it is impossible to estimate.

The total estimated garrison on "D" Day is, therefore:

Five Italian Divisions.

Two German divisions, of which one will have been evacuated from TUNISIA and may not be fully equipped or armed.

The equivalent of six coastal divisions (84 battalions), which may or may not be mobile.

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2. DISPOSITIONS AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enemy Air Capabilities.

As of July 1943, based on assumptions that Russia is active and has gained, since April 1943, modest successes in addition to those achieved prior to that date, and that losses are normal in the interim, it is estimated that the Axis Air Order of Battle for the Central Mediterranean (to include Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily, and close by islands, as viewed from sustained fighting value), are as follows:

	German	Italian	Total	Maximum Combined Effort For a Few Days Per 24-hour Period In Sorties
LRB(Long Range Bombers)	250	90	340	125 - 150
HR(Bomber Rcn.)	40	—	40	Intensive, & if inadequate, use other types to augment.
DB(Dive Bombers)	80	—	80	80 - 100
GA(Fighter Bombers)	50	—	50	85
SEF (Single Engine Fighters)	190	225	415	250
TEF(Twin Engine Fighters)	80	—	80	40 - 50
Army Coop.	10	25	35	(Not accounting for successful paratroop operations in Sicily or by Russia.)
Coastal	—	60	60	
	700	400	1100	

Serviceability estimated at 50 - 60%.

Primary targets will probably be Allied convoys and ports, with subsidiary effort against Allied airdromes.

b. Enemy Naval Capabilities.

It is estimated that based on past performances, it is unlikely that any substantial reduction of the Italian Navy can be achieved except by air and submarine action. It is considered possible, but improbable, that land reinforcements may, from time to time, be attempted, moving at night through Palermo and Catania.

c. Enemy Ground Capabilities.

(1) General

a. Assumptions.

Enemy air reconnaissance of the North African coastline will reveal our preparations for movement. Continued bombing from the air will, undoubtedly, alert the entire forces for an expected attack. Surprise can only be achieved through the time and location of our attacks. But it must be presumed that hostile troops are alert, and that all beach installations are manned.

b. Concentration of Forces.

(1) Coastal Divisions.

These are generally disposed around the island for coastal defense. The divisions are not mobile. It is therefore believed that they are incapable of rapid concentration to carry out a mobile reserve force mission. However, it is reported that the artillery units of these divisions may be motorized.

(2) Mobile Reserves.

These are divided into three forces, disposed as follows:

(a) Western Support Units.

28th (Aosta) Division, in the area CASTELVETRANO - SALEMI - S. NINFA. Role: Mobile reserve against an enemy landing in the western section of the island.

(b) Southeastern and Eastern Support Units.

54th (Napoli) Division in the area MODICA - CALTAGIRONE - VIZZINI. Role: Mobile reserve against a landing in the southeast section of the island.

(c) Central Support Units.

26th (Assieta) Division in the area CALTANISSETTA - PAVARA - CANICATTI. Role: Probably as a mobile force against a landing on the south coast. Note: The identification of components of the 4th Livorno in this area indicates that this division may be centrally located to carry out the mission of additional support in any direction.

(2) South Coast Landing.

a. Assumptions.

It is assumed that Army and Corps troops in the vicinity of (1) the landing field north of SCIACCA, (2) at the airfield at CASTELVETRANO, (3) on the high ground at S. MARGHERITA, support installations in those areas, and that it is possible, though not probable, that the howitzers located at POGGIOREALE may be part of an Army or Corps mobile reserve.

Likewise, it is assumed that the coastal defense units in the vicinity of CASTELVETRANO may or may not be reserve for beach defenses or defenses entirely for the protection of the airfield at CASTELVETRANO.

The coastal defenses in the vicinity of SALEMI are regarded as area defenses rather than as supporting troops, and that the reserve of the area are the forces of the 28th Division, generally in the area SALEMI - S. NINFA - PARTANNA.

It is assumed that the disposition of troops are as known to be at this time and that there is no shift between "D" Day landings in the southeast and the "ENSA" landing on D+2.

It is assumed further that the Army and Corps troops known to be in the vicinity of MARSALA are defensive for the seaplane alighting area in the port but that troops of the 28th Division may be available to reinforce troops on beach defense to the southeast. This force then becomes a possible reinforcement for Beach 88.

It is assumed that the corps troops to the east of the beach zone - namely, in the vicinity of AGRIGENTO - PAVARA - ARAGONA - PORTO EMPEDOCLE, are basically installed for the protection of the port proper and probably to act as a reserve for coastal protection either to the east or to the west. The latter is discounted slightly because of lack of motor transportation, unless unknown pools are available.

With the location of the 26th Division, which is a mountain division, in the high ground in the vicinity of CALTANISSETTA, it is believed that the reaction to the D-Day landing will cause this force to move east, if any movement in a supporting nature is contemplated. Inasmuch as most of the units of this division are disposed to the west of the location of the Division Command Post, some reinforcement, to the west, particularly of artillery, may be expected. This division is uniquely equipped, mostly with howitzers and mortars, and as such would probably reinforce installations in the high ground to the west of their location rather than as initial beach and beach-head defenses.

The known locations of the coastal defense units in the general area bounded on the east by SCIACCA and on the west by MAZZARO DEL VALLO, both inclusive, based on terrain and road network, indicate the established defenses of the beaches proper.

It is presumed that other defensive positions have been prepared but are not occupied and will, if necessary, be occupied by troops from the reserve. It is not known if any of these positions are immediately on the coast.

The estimated enemy forces opposing "ENSA" are as follows:

	H HOUR	H + 8 HOURS Reinforcements	H + 16 HOURS
AT BEACH			
Coastal Troops	2300 (a)		
Coastal M. G.	240		
Coastal Arty.	8		
Mortars	none*		
SCIACCA			
Troops		1700 (b)	
Arty.		none*	
M. G.		96	
Mortars		18 45 mm	
SALEMI			
Troops		880 (c)	
M. G.		48	
Arty.		none*	
Mortars		18 45 mm	
S. NINFA			
Troops		300 (d)	
M. G.		8 Hvy.	
		25 Lt.	
Arty.		none*	
Mortars		6-10	
PARTANNA			
Troops		800	
M. G.		none*	
Arty.		12 ? Cal.	
Mortars	(e)	none*	
Tanks (47 mm)	50	50 (f)	

	H HOUR	H + 8 HOURS Reinforcements	H - 16 HOURS
MARSALA			
Troops		880 (g)	(880) (g)
M. G.		39 Lt.	(39 Lt.)
		9 Hvy.	(9 Hvy.)
		none*	none
		18 45 mm	18 45 mm

Totals	H HOUR	H + 8 HOURS Reinforcements	H + 16
Troops	2300	4500	6860
M. G.	240	225	465
Arty.	8+	12	20+
Mortars	none*	60-64	60-64
Tanks	50	(50)	50

NOTES:

* indicates that none have been identified in the area considered.

(a) In the vicinity of SCIACCA, troops of the 26th Mountain Division, consisting of 1200 men, 39 light machine guns, 9 heavy machine guns, 18 45 mm mortars, and 7 trucks, are known to exist. As indicated before, the artillery of this division is believed to be in the process of being motorized, but the presence of this unit indicates such missions, probably along the inaccessible places on the coastline. Aerial photographs indicate existance of such terrain features both east and west of SCIACCA. These troops may or may not be considered as reinforcing the beach defense.

(b) For central reserve, H48 hours by marching, for Beach 88; proportionately longer for others. No motor transportation known to be available.

(c) These are known to be motorized and are able to reach any of the assigned beaches in that period of time via the general route initially to the east and south.

(d) Reinforcement from this group would, in all probability, consist of automatic weapons and mortars, other personnel remaining in the general area of the high ground, on which it is now situated, for secondary or depth defenses.

(e) About 50 tanks, equipped with 47 mm guns are reported in the vicinity of MAZZARO, which, based, on the road network, may act as a mobile reserve to oppose any action against the beaches in the area under consideration.

(f) Not cumulative but can reach Beach 87 and eastwards by this time.

(g) The organic motor transportation with this element is probably administrative only, but by utilization of the motor transport of Army and Corps troops, in emergency this entire force could be moved to Beach 88 by H48 hours, and to Beach 87 by H+16 hours.

CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE ENSA FORCE

(1) To defend on the beach proper.

(2) To hold the beach lightly withdrawing to defend along the general line of high ground through CALTABELOTTA - M. GRANT - MONTEVAGO - PARTANNA - SALEMI.

(3) After being driven from the beaches to effect the minimum delay with the high ground in capability (2) to be the final defensive position.

Capability (1) is indicated for adoption because of the nature of the terrain immediately to the north; the location of strategic objectives such as airfields, and landing fields, the loss of important ports, fixed installations, and a governing roadnet.

Capability (3) will follow subsequently with utmost use being made in the employment of road blocks and other forms of such defenses, rather than an organized defensive position.

Organizational procedure can be anticipated in Capabilities (1) and (3). It may be anticipated that the enemy's plans provide for development from (1) to (3) with procedure organized to the status of S.O.P.

(3) North Coast Landing.

(a) Assumptions.

It is assumed that Army and Corps troops in the vicinity of TRAPANI support installations and beach defenses on the western coast of landing expected on the shores of the GOLFO DI CASTELLAMARE.

It is assumed that Army and Corps troops in the vicinity of PALERMO support installations and beach defenses in that area; with a secondary role as a mobile reserve to counter-attack against any landings effected immediately east or west of PALERMO.

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It is assumed that the western support units in the area CASTELVETRANO - SALEMI - S. NINFA are available for counter-attacking against landings on either the north or south coast in the general area west of the line TERMINI - AGRIGENTO.

However, it is assumed that the "ENSA" landing will cause employment of some of the troops of the 28th Division in a counter-attacking role. It is reasonable to presume that by D+5, the enemy's reaction to our landings on D and D-2 will be a general movement to the south and southwest. In that case, few, if any, troops of the western support units will be available for use against "FISH-GROG-HOOK".

It is assumed that troops on the west and north coasts have been alerted but that no movement has occurred by D+5 in expectation of further landings. Hence, troops located at PALERMO will be intact in operations against "HOOK"; and reserves from TRAPANI will not be moved until after the "FISH-GROG-HOOK" assault has been launched.

It is also assumed that the "ENSA" landing has been successful and on schedule according to plan.

The estimated enemy forces opposing "FISH" and "GROG" are as follows:

	H (Alerted)	H+8 Reinforcements
At Beach		
Coastal Troops	2170	
" M. G.	78	
" Arty.	24	
Mortars 45 mm	9	
ALCAMO		
Troops		950
M. G.		16
Arty.		12
Mortars		none*
PARTINICO		
Troops		950
M. G.		96
Arty.		unknown
Mortars		none*

TOTALS			TOTALS
Troops	2170	4020	6190
M. G.	78	190	268
Arty.	24	364	604
Mortars	9	9	18

* Indicates none have been identified in the area considered.

The reserve from TRAPANI should be at or near CALATAFIMI by H+16, composed of all or part of the following:

	TRAPANI	TOTAL H+16
Troops	10,500	16,690
Recruits	1,500	1,500
M. G.	500	768
Arty.	16	52
Mortars 45mm	36	54

The estimated enemy forces opposing "HOOK" are as follows:

	H	H+8
At Beach		
Troops	2100	
M. G.	144	
Arty.	unknown	
Mortars 45mm	18	
PALERMO		
Troops		7850
Recruits		9000
M. G.		340
Arty.		70+
Mortars		none*
MONREALE		
Troops		1200
M. G.		48
Arty.		none*
Mortars 45mm		18

TOTALS	H	H+8 Reinforcements	TOTAL H+8
Troops	2100	11,150	13,250
Recruits	none*	9,000	9,000
M. G.	144	532	676
Arty.	unknown	70+	70+
Mortars	18	36	54

* Indicates none have been identified in the area considered.

CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE "FISH" FORCE.

(1) Defend at the landing beaches.

(2) Hold the beaches lightly to afford time for occupation of defensive positions on high ground inland.

(3) Utilize defensive positions in (2) as successive delaying positions in a withdrawal to the heights on the general line west of CASTELLAMMARE - CALATAFIMI to provide time for maneuver of the TRAPANI forces to counter-attacking positions.

Capability (1) must be presumed as indicated against the landing on Beach 1, where a determined defense must be expected.

Capability (2), in combination with Capability (3), is indicated against landings on Beach 2 and 3 because of the small number of troops reported in this area as beach defenses. It must be presumed that some of the western support units will be available to oppose this landing at or before arrival at the main road leading west from ALCAMO. In addition, a strong counter-attack must be expected from the west (troops from TRAPANI).

CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE "GROG" FORCE.

(1) Defense at the beaches.

(2) Utilize beach defense as initial delaying positions in withdrawals to the high ground on the line PARTINICO - CARINI, where a determined defense must be expected, allowing counter-attack from the south on the exposed flank delivered by troops from the western support units.

It is presumed that a combination of capabilities (1) and (2) is likely. Forces available for immediate beach defense are considered inadequate for a prolonged defense. Hence, the enemy will probably be forced to retire to the high ground in the vicinity of PARTINICO, where, it must be assumed, he will interpose himself between "GROG" and the objective. Some reinforcement must be expected from the PALERMO area.

CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE "HOOK" FORCE.

(1) Defend at landing beaches.

(2) Defend the beaches lightly; succeeded by withdrawals to the mountains west, south and east, of PALERMO.

In view of the importance of the port and air installations in this area, capability (2) is considered unlikely.

It must be presumed that a desperate defense of the beaches, as in capability (1) will be met, in view of the importance attached to the locality and the large number of troops available for its defense.

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION #2

5 May 1943

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Assumption.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

b. Over-all Strength and Neighboring Troops.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

(1) TUNISIA.

Axis forces in Tunisia, as of 24 April 1943, were estimated to be about 155,000, consisting of 110,000 Germans and 45,000 Italians. The 110,000 Germans are estimated to be made up of 83,000 combatant troops, 14,000 anti-aircraft personnel, and 13,000 service troops. The 45,000 Italians are estimated to consist of 27,000 combat troops, 5,000 anti-aircraft and coast defense personnel, and 13,000 service troops.

Italy has two very reduced Infantry Divisions in Tunisia; and remnants of three others. They are organized as follows:

1st (Superga) Division (much reduced).
Bersaglieri D'Africa (Young Fascists) Division (much reduced)
80th (Spezia) Division (Remnants).
16th (Pistoia) Division (Remnants).
131st (Centauro) Division (Remnants).
XX and XXI Corps Artillery (Remnants).

The following German divisional units, comprising the 5th Panzer Army under Col. General Jurgen Von Arnim, are in Tunisia:

10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer Divisions (reduced strength).
Hermann Goering Division (much below strength).
334th Infantry Division (much below strength).
90th Light Infantry Division (much below strength).
164th Light Infantry Division (much below strength).
Manteuffel Division (a small provisional formation).
999th Africa Division (four battalions).
19th Anti-Aircraft Division.
20th Anti-Aircraft Division.

It is estimated that the enemy still disposes of some 115 German and 35 Italian tanks, as of April 24. The serviceability of the Italian tanks may be estimated at about 30%, while the serviceability of the German tanks may now be as high as 60%.

(2) SOUTHERN ITALY.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

Revise paragraph 4 with the following:

152nd (Piceno) Division which is responsible for coast defenses in the LECCE area, had been described as a territorial defense division but may now be considered a first line unit.

In paragraph 5 the following changes should be made:

(2) 4th (Livorno) Division
33rd Infantry Regiment (minus 1st and 3d Bns.)
34th Infantry Regiment (minus 1st and 3d Bns.)
28th Artillery Regiment (minus 1st, 3d, 4th & 5th Bns)

(4) 152nd (Piceno) Division
235th Infantry Regiment
236th Infantry Regiment (in SARDINIA)
136th Infantry Regiment
152nd Artillery Regiment

Three Coast Defense Divisions.

(3) SARDINIA.

The 236th Regiment of the 152nd (Piceno) Mobile Division has been located in SARDINIA in addition to the two mobile divisions and two coastal divisions previously reported, increasing the total number of troops to approximately 65,000. This increase gives sufficient evidence, at the present time, that the garrison has been reinforced with additional troops making it probable that the former garrison of the Island may be maintained.

(4) CORSICA.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

(5) SICILY.

The total Italian garrison is now estimated at 165,000 which is made up as follows: See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943, with the following revisions:

(a) Army Ground Troops.

3 1/2 divisions and corps and army troops, totaling 90,000 men. Recent evidence has revealed that the following units of the 4th (Livorno) Division located in the Rome area have now reached SICILY:

1st and 3d Bns. of the 33d Infantry Regiment
1st and 3d Bns. of the 34th Infantry Regiment
1st, 3d, 4th and 5th Bns. of the 26th Artillery Regiment

Indications have been given that whatever mobile troops were located in the Northeastern part of the Island have now been moved west toward the North Central section.

(c) Reinforcement Prior to Allied Assaults.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943. The only change which has occurred is the late arrival of the 4th Division.

The total estimated garrison on "D" Day is, therefore:

Six Italian Divisions.

Two German Divisions, of which one will have been evacuated from TUNISIA and may not be fully equipped or armed.

The equivalent of five Coastal Divisions (24 battalions) which may or may not be mobile.

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3. DISPOSITIONS AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enemy Air Capabilities.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

b. Enemy Naval Capabilities.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

c. Enemy Ground Capabilities.

(1) General.

See estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

(2) Against Force 343.

a. Assumptions.

(1) That this operation takes place simultaneously with the operation of 505.

(2) That enemy troops are in position as indicated in battle order as of 25 April 1943.

(3) That no augmentations take place in the area.

(4) That the entire Italian 4th Division is in the area LICATA (8434) - CALTANISSETTA (8577) - FAVARA.

(5) That all Infantry troops are alerted.

b. Enemy Dispositions.

(1) Troops of coastal divisions at the following locations are estimated as purely defensive occupying previously prepared positions for beach defense at the water's edge: ISPICA (8189), POZZALLO (7592), MAGUSA (8515), GELA (2230), BUTERA (8174), LICATA, AGRIGENTO (6257), PORTO EMPEDOCLE (9585), REALMONTE (9557), MILERA (9378), SCIACCA (6179). Those at ISPICA and SCIACCA do not immediately affect the 343 operation. The others in the order from east to west, MAGUSA to BUTERA, are capable of opposing the landing against beaches 64 - 68, and those from BUTERA to include REALMONTE are capable of opposing the landings on beaches 70 - 73. This will place an immediate strength of coastal units against DIME and GENT of 6650, and against ENSA PRIME of 6090. The nature of the troops of the 54th Division in the area COMISO (8516) (Infantry), MAGUSA (Mortar, Anti-Tank and Anti-Aircraft), MODICA (Infantry and Portee Artillery), indicates probable available motor transport for a portion of the command. The motorized elements are capable of opposing the landing against Beaches 65 to 68 by H+5, and dismounted elements thereof, are capable of making themselves felt by D+1. The units of the 54th Division, in the area BUCCHERI (8736)(Infantry), GRAMMICHELE (8747)(Infantry), CALTAGIRONE (8469)(Artillery), are located on commanding terrain on the principal ridge line, extending southeast-northwest, and are, in all probability, there to occupy an organized defensive position. The remainder of that division at NISCEMI (8439)(Infantry) is, in all probability, a force to assist in the defense of the airport in that vicinity. The COMISO (8516) force indicated above occupies commanding terrain overlooking the airport to the north and, although capable of supporting the troops on beach defense, is probably a defensive organization for that airport. The force at CALTAGIRONE (8469)(Artillery 75 mm howitzers) may be used as a mobile fire reserve to support the defensive positions along the ridgeline. The small force (Headquarters) at PALAZZOLO ACREIDE (8803) is considered an administrative unit for purposes under consideration.

The Army and Corps troops reported in the vicinity of MAGUSA are, by their nature, indicated to be armed with coast defense weapons and, being mobile, are capable of supporting the defenses from previously prepared positions anywhere against the DIME - GENT assault by H+5, unless occupying an alert position at H-Hour elsewhere. The Army and Corps troops in the vicinity of the airfield north of COMISO are considered local defense, in addition to an estimated 2000 German air ground troops at that field. Additional Army and Corps troops at GALILEO are also estimated as airfield defense. The Army and Corps troops at VITTORIA (8471?) are estimated to have the same mission as the similar unit of large caliber guns at MAGUSA. The same applies to Army and Corps troops at S. CROCE CAMERINA (8603). The disposition of the four guns, 149/35, at S. CROCE CAMERINA, and the lack of others of this type in the southeast, indicates that the MAGUSA detachment is separately located for commitment to the south or east, and the VITTORIA detachment to the west and northwest. Army and Corps troops on the ridge from VIZZINI (8674) (east) to S. MICHELE (8854) (west), consisting principally of heavy caliber guns, indicate a Corps and Army reserve to be committed in any direction for an initial coastal defense or long range defense of the predominating terrain feature (the northwest - southeast ridge). It should be noticed that there are at least 36 guns of 149/35, 12 guns of 105/28 and 60 guns of 100/17 in this general area. Although the eastern assault will, no doubt, attract some of these weapons, it must be estimated that at least 50% will be available to support the defense against DIME and HOOK assaults by H+12, unless occupying an alert position elsewhere.

(2) Against Beaches 70 - 73, troops of the 26th (Mountain) Division, in the vicinity of CALTANISSETTA (Infantry), S. CATALDO (9976) (Infantry and Artillery), SERRADIFALCO (8897)(Artillery), CANICATTI (8476?) (Infantry), FAVARA (Infantry), ARAGONA (8668)(Artillery), PUNTALLERTO (8605?) (Infantry), AGRIGENTO (Artillery), occupies commanding terrain on a general ridge line extending from northeast to southwest. Some significance must be attached to the fact that all of these units, in addition to being on commanding terrain, are on a principal roadnet, and thus must be considered as being able to support a defense to include CANICATTI to the south, and those to the west thereof can immediately support a beach defense from PORTO EMPEDOCLE by H+ hours and assist in the defense of LICATA, D-6 by H+8 and D+1 by D+1. It is presumed that this division is a support division, and significance must be attached to the fact that previous reports indicate that artillery units are motorized and consist chiefly of mortars and howitzers. Other units of this division are not considered as an immediate factor in the defense against this operation.

Army and Corps Troops: Again in this area - CALTANISSETTA - CAMPOBELLO (0935) - AGRIGENTO - PORTO EMPEDOCLE - are found a large number of large caliber guns, with the larger calibers (150 mm) in the first two places and 90 mm in the latter two. As these large caliber guns are situated on a principal highway, it is estimated they are thus a mobile reserve for either seacoast defense or long-range fire. Troops at AGRIGENTO and PORTO EMPEDOCLE are considered seacoast defense installations and can become a support to the defense against any action in the vicinity of LICATA by H+12 hours. Significance must be attached to the concentration of artillery of various types and calibers, some being probably dual purpose, at CALTANISSETTA, which are available as a mobile fire support unit against the LICATA and GELA (H2230) beaches by D+1.

Approximately 50% of the Italian 4th Infantry Division has been identified in the general area CALTANISSETTA - LICATA - FAVARA. This division, consisting at full strength of a proximately 14,000 men, may be entering this area as a reserve division to take over some of the installations of the 26th Mountain Division, and as such becomes a serious threat against the beaches of LICATA at H-Hour and can seriously interfere with any movement contemplated along the coastal road to the northwest by the ENSA PRIME force.

From the locations of the troops in the area of operations of Force 343, it can be remarked that strong elements are located on the commanding ground to the east, to the north, and to the northwest of the assault landings. The result will be an attempt to contain the landings within this natural semi-circle, and will provide the defenders with strong defensive position on the high ground.

CAPABILITIES AGAINST FORCE 343.

In order to determine the capabilities against each of the attacking forces, that is ENSA PRIME and DIME - GENT, it is necessary to consider the enemy capabilities as a whole because of the restricted area in which Force 343 will operate: a crescent-shaped coastal plain approximately 15 to 20 miles deep bounded by predominating ridge lines and faced by approximately 45 miles of shore-line (from Beach 65 to 73, inclusive). With this in mind the following are considered enemy capabilities against Force 343:

(1) To defend at the waters edge.

(2) To defend on the ridge-lines running perpendicular to the coast, especially on the eastern side, to canalize any advance inland.

(3) To defend along the ridge-line: MAGUSA - VIZZINI - CALTAGIRONE - MAZZARINO - RAVANUSA - CAMPOBELLO.

(4) To defend at the waters edge and counter-attack to the east from a general line from LICATA - RAVANUSA.

Capability No. 4 is selected for adoption because the port and four airfields are of the utmost strategic importance and can only be defended satisfactorily at the waters edge.

The counter-attack from the northwest is logical because of the concentration of the mobile Army and Corps troops in the vicinity of CALTANISSETTA.

The terrain lends itself to counter-attack from the northwest and the rivers would not form a serious obstacle at this time of the year because they are reported dry.

Recapitulation of enemy strengths opposing various landings:

ENSA PRIME

ARAGONA		H+8
Troops		600
M/G		4
Arty	75/13	8
M/T		60

PORTO EMPEDOCLE	H to H+8	H+8 to D+1
Troops	850	500
M/G	6	6
Arty	12	12
M/T	46	48

MONTAPERTA	D+1
Troops	880
M/G	48
Mortars	21
M/T	11

FAVARA	H+8	D+1
Troops	575	575
M/G	24	24
Arty 47/32	3	-
Mortars	12	9
M/T	33	-

AGRIGENTO	H to H+8	H+8 to D+1
Troops	1100	1000
Recruits	-	3300
M/G	6	12
Arty 100/22	12	-
90/53	-	20
75/13	-	4
Mortars	-	-
M/T	?	96

PALMA DI MONTECHIARO	H
Troops	800
M/G	48
Arty 47/32	?
M/T	?

SERRADIFALCO	H+8
Troops	430
M/G	6
Arty 100/17	12
M/T	50

S. CATALDO	H+8	D+1
Troops	1730	1730
M/G	51	51
Arty 47/32	6	-
Mortars	21	21
M/T	94	-

CALTANISSETTA	H+8
Troops	5600
M/G	58
Arty 149/35	4
100/17	12
47/32	24
A.A.	16
Mortars	39
M/T	206

LICATA	H	H+8
Troops	5500	11000
M/G	198	300
Arty	50+	75
Mortars	44	135
M/T	130	325

(Assumed that 45% of Division is available at H-Hour).

CAMPOBELLO	H+8
Troops	200
M/G	2
Arty 149/35	4
M/T	16

CANICATTI	H+8	D+1
Troops	1080	1080
M/G	54	54
Arty 47/32	?	?
Mortars	9	9
M/T	64	

TOTALS AT :	H	H+8	D+1	TOTALS
Troops	6300	26850	9065	42215
M/G	246	573	195	1014
Arty 149/35	-	24	-	24
105/28	-	36	20	56
75/13	-	20	4	24
47/32	-	36	-	36
A.A. & Mixed	304	115	12	157
Mortars	44	237	60	341
M/T	130	1114	155	1399

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DIME - CENT	H	H+8	D+1	Defense
CALTAGIRONE				
Troops		1540		
M/G		8		
Arty 149/35		4		
75/13		12		
M/T		87		
[illegible]MICHELE				
Troops		1650		
M/G		54		
Arty 149/35		12		
47/32		3		
Mortars		21		
M/T		81		
VIZZINI				
Troops		500		
M/G		12		
Arty 47/32		40		
COMISO AIRPORT & COMISO				
Troops				1320
M/G				92
Arty 149/35				3
47/32				24
Mortars				32
M/T				112
VITTORIA				
Troops		1000		
M/G		50		
Arty 149/35		4		
47/32		7		
M/T		164		
MODICA				
Troops		1500		
M/G		36	36	
Arty 100/17		12	-	
75/13		12		
Mortars		-	18	
M/T		98	-	
SCOGLITTI				
Troops	800			
M/G	48			
Arty 47/32	7			
GELA				
Troops	3645			
M/G	134			
Arty	284			
S. CROCE CAMERINA				
Troops	1300			
M/G	52			
Arty	84			
M/T	53			
GELA AIRDROME & NISCEMI				
Troops				1320
M/G				68
Arty 47/32				3
Mortars				32
M/T				49
BUCCARI				
Troops				880
M/G				48
Arty 47/32				3
Mortars				21
M/T				11
RAGUSA				(To East)
Troops		400	3700	200
M/G		2	-	2
Arty 149/35		-	-	4
47/32		8	-	-
A.A.		8	-	-
Mortars		-	18	-
M/T		47	-	16

DIME - CENT (Continued)	H	H+8	D+1	Defense
S. MICHELE				
Troops		750		
M/G		6		
Arty 105/28		12		
M/T		90		

TOTALS AT:	H	H+8	D+1	Def.	TOTAL
Troops	5745	7340	5220	(3520)	18305
M/G	254	156	36	(208)	446
Arty 149/35	-	20	-	-	20
105/28	-	24	-	-	24
75/13	-	24	-	-	24
47/32	-	114	-	(9)	114
AA & Mxd	56	20	-	(24)	76
Mortars	-	21	36	(85)	57
M/T	53	459	-	(172)	512

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G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION #3

9 June 1943

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Assumption.

The evacuation of enemy personnel from TUNISIA was confined entirely to air material and personnel. The completion of the North African campaign now alerts the entire Southern Coast of Europe and the intermediate islands in the Mediterranean for a probable invasion by the Allies.

b. Over-all Strength and Neighboring Troops.

The Italian forces in Southern ITALY and the Mediterranean Islands consist of a group of armies composed of the Seventh Army (Southern ITALY), the Sixth Army (SICILY), the XIII Corps (SARDINIA), and the VII Corps, (CORSICA). See Intelligence Information Bulletin No. 7, this headquarters, June 1943, for Battle Order.

Approximately 24,000 German Air Force ground personnel are, at the present time, manning the 30 airfields and their defenses in SICILY. It is not known, but it is probable that this personnel is confining its efforts to the more important fields, three of which are included in the zone of action of Task Force 343. The presence of other German troops in Southern ITALY, SICILY, SARDINIA, or CORSICA is not definitely known. The Germans have broadcast that they are reinforcing the Italian garrison of SARDINIA with German troops. It is estimated that approximately 5,000 German troops originally intransit from the mainland to TUNISIA must have been left in SICILY when the North Africa campaign ended.

(1) SOUTHERN ITALY.

The 21st (Sardinian Grenadiers) Division has returned from YUGOSLAVIA to its home station, ROME. It has possibly replaced the 4th (Livorno) Division, which is now in SICILY. Although the "Sardinian Grenadiers" Division is reputedly composed of picked personnel, it did not particularly distinguish itself in the Greek war, nor, more recently, against the Yugoslav guerrillas. In view, however, of its battle experience, it must be rated as one of the more seasoned of Italy's divisions. Depot elements have been sent with other miscellaneous units to CORSICA.

Recent identifications suggest the possible presence in the BARI area of remnants of the 52d (Torino) Division. It is believed that this unit was largely destroyed in RUSSIA, but a nucleous of it may still exist; composed of survivors from the Eastern front and depot units from the division may be reorganizing.

10th (Mantova) Autotransportable (literally "motor-transportable") Division has moved from PIEDMONT to the CONSENZA - NICASTRO area in CALABRIA. Little is known of this unit, which was formed a year ago. It has not yet seen active service. The term "Autotrasportable" merely implies an infantry division organized in such a way as to enable it to be transported when alloted motor transport from Corps or Army pool. It does not indicate permanent motorization. In view of the moderate fighting value of more experienced Italian divisions, it is unlikely to be of high quality.

The 152 (Piceno) Division is responsible for coast defense in the LECCE area. It has been previously described as a Territorial Defense Division but now may be considered a first-line unit. There are three Coastal Divisions located respectively in the SALERNO - CATANZARO - REGGIO CALABRIA area. Coastal Divisions are static units to which are alloted vulnerable stretches of coastline. In addition, there are a considerable number of divisions responsible for local coast defense.

It is reported that the 12 (Sassari) Division has moved from YUGOSLAVIA to the vicinity of ROME. The 47 (Bari) Division is now believed to have moved from the area of BRINDISI to SARDINIA.

The garrison of Southern ITALY is, therefore, composed of:

Four Italian Infantry Divisions:

(1) 21st (Sardinian Grenadiers) Division
1st Infantry Regiment
2nd Infantry Regiment
13th Artillery Regiment
4th Blackshirt Legion

(2) 10th (Mantova) Division
113th Infantry Regiment
114th Infantry Regiment
11th Artillery Regiment

(3) 152d(Piceno)Division
235th Infantry Regiment
236th Infantry Regiment
336th Infantry Regiment
152d Artillery Regiment

(4) 47th (Bari) Division
139th Infantry Regiment
140th Infantry Regiment
47th Artillery Regiment

Survivors of one further infantry division:

52d(Torino) Division
81st Infantry Regiment
82nd Infantry Regiment
52nd Artillery Regiment

Three Coast Defense Divisions.

Though strong numerically - possibly 300,000 - 350,000 men - the garrison of Southern ITALY can barely be considered adequate for defense purposes; even the first-line divisions are probably not of the highest quality, and the remaining units consist mainly of low-category and depot troops. Large forces are necessary to guard the long and vulnerable coastline, in close proximity to which run the main north-south road and rail communications, despite the fact that in many areas the defense is naturally helped by the very difficult and mountainous terrain.

Disposition of units in Southern ITALY at the present time allows for no central mobile reserves. The main line of resistance is expected to be the coast itself, followed by a secondary position stretching from the sea to inland rugged terrain, obstructing the natural passageway northward along either the east or west coast.

(2) SARDINIA.

Three mobile divisions are believed located in SARDINIA, the 30th (Sabuda) Division, consisting of the 45th Infantry Regiment, the 46th Infantry Regiment, the 156th Artillery Regiment, 176th Blackshirt Legion; the 31st (Calabria) Division, consisting of the 59th Infantry Regiment, the 60th Infantry Regiment, the 40th Artillery Regiment, 170th Blackshirt Legion; and the 47th (Bari) Division is believed to have moved from the Brindisi in ITALY to SARDINIA.

The 236th Infantry Regiment from the 152d (Piceno) Division is also located in SARDINIA, as well as two coastal divisions, in addition to the mobile divisions listed above, increasing the total number of troops to approximately 65,000. This increase gives sufficient evidence that probably the former garrison of the island may be maintained. Although the garrison of 65,000 may be considered small, the defense of the island is facilitated by the general ruggedness of the terrain and by the virtual neutralization of the greater part of the eastern half of the island owing to its lack of communications with the main centers.

(3) CORSICA.

The garrison of CORSICA is now made up of the 44th (Cremona) Division, consisting of the 21st Infantry Regiment, 22d Infantry Regiment, 7th Artillery Regiment, and the 90th Blackshirt Legion; and the 20th (Friuli) Division from the Italian mainland, consisting of the 87th Infantry Regiment, the 88th Infantry Regiment, the 35th Artillery Regiment, and the 88th Blackshirt Legion; plus miscellaneous depot units. Italian morale is low, and the occupying troops are reported to walk in fear of the inhabitants. These feelings are understandable in view of the taste of Corsicans for the vendetta and the aversion they have always shown to Italian propaganda regarding their Italian origin.

The 226 Coastal Division has been identified in CORSICA (AJACCIO) area; formerly in the LEGHORN area.

The garrison is apparently split up into small groups occupying the main towns and centers of communication. There are few mobile reserves. Apart from the erection of road blocks, the Italians have done little to improve the defense of the island or to supplement the dismantled guns taken over from the French. The total garrison now amounts to some 46,000 men.

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(a) SICILY.

SICILY and the adjacent islands form the Sixth Army Command. The Sicilian garrison itself consists of two Army Corps - XII and XVI. XII Corps is composed of 28 (Aosta) Infantry Division, and 202, 207, and 208 Coastal Divisions. XVI Corps is composed of 26 (Assietta) and 54 (Napoli) Infantry Divisions, and 206 and 213 Coastal Divisions. The garrison has recently been increased by the addition of 4 (Livorno) Infantry Division. This division may be under direct Army command, although its present disposition suggests that it may be part of XVI Corps. The 4 (Livorno) Division has taken over from the 54th (Napoli) Division at CALTAGIRONE. Location of the 54th Division unknown. In addition to Army and Corps troops, there are thus four field divisions and five coastal divisions.

Recent information states that the 26 (Assietta) Division, which, in previous Orders of Battle, has been shown at CALTANISSETTA, is now known to have moved to Western SICILY, probably the SCIACCA area.

Whether these movements have reconstituted the composition of the two Corps as above shown is unknown.

The total Italian garrison is now estimated at 208,500, which is made up as follows:

(a) Army ground troops.		57,000
Artillery(29 Bns,mainly medium,identified)	15,400	
A.A. Artillery (some 26 Bns identified)	11,200	
Two Bns French R-35 (11-ton) tanks	900	
One Bn Italian L-3 (3 1/2 ton) tankettes	350	
Two M. G. Bns.	900	
Four Anti-Tank Bns.	2,000	
Two C.W. Cos., and Misc. C.W. Troops	750	
Independent Infantry Units.	6,000	
Engineers	9,500	
Services	10,000	
Field Divisions.		58,500
4 (Livorno) Division	13,000	
28 (Aosta) Division	16,000	
26 (Assietta) Division	15,500	
54 (Napoli) Division	14,000	
Coastal Divisions.		61,300
202 Division	14,000	
206 Division	12,100	
207 Division	11,500	
208 Division	10,700	
213 Division	13,000	
Miscellaneous.		31,700
Unplaced Coastal Bns.	16,000	
Unplaced M.G. and Mortar Units	1,300	
Unplaced A.A. and C.D. Units (about 35 Bns)	14,400	
TOTAL -		208,500

The above estimates are based on the assumption that generally units are up to strength.

There is, in addition to the forces identified in the island, a considerable potential reserve of man-power. The recent call-up of an additional class in ITALY means that troops should be in training at all depots. The depot of 29 (Piedmonte) Division (serving in GREECE) at MESSINA may well be full, and replacements are almost certainly at the depots of the garrison divisions, 26 ASSIETTA and 28 AOSTA.

The presence of numbers of Carabinieri (semi-military police), coastguards, and Blackshirts, means that the military could be relieved of certain tasks, especially on the lines of communication, such as traffic control, organization of civilian evacuation, etc. Alternatively, such personnel would provide a nucleus for local defense forces.

From the foregoing, it is seen that there are four divisions, plus Corps and Army troops, on the island. The recent reports indicate that the Central Group may be eliminated by the 26th Division moving into the SCIACCA area and the 4th Livorno Division from this Central group taking over the area of the 54 Napoli Division in the southeastern sector of the island. It may be expected that the 54th is possibly moving toward the CATANIA area.

Based on this assumption, a redistribution of the field units in SICILY toward strengthening the coastal defenses along the Southern coast from SCIACCA around to CATANIA on the east coast has been effected.

There are very few first-line troops in the MESSINA area (northeast part of the island). This area is the most easily reinforced from the mainland. None of the mobile divisions has actually been in combat, and all have done a protracted period of garrison service in the island.

(b) Composition and role of various types of defense units.

(1) Field Divisions.

(i) 26 Assietta, 28 (Aosta), and 54 (Napoli) Divisions are organized as normal infantry divisions, namely two infantry regiments, one Blackshirt Legion, of two battalions, 47 mm Anti-Tank Gun Company, 81 mm Mortar Battalion, one Field Artillery Regiment, auxiliaries, and services. The normal composition is:

12,500 men
290 L.M.G.
86 M.M.G.
126 2" Mortars
36 3" Mortars
24 47 mm. Anti-Tank Guns
8 20 mm. A.A. Guns
360 M.T. vehicles
2,000 Animals
36 Artillery Pieces

Transport is mainly pack. The following are the more significant variations from the normal which have been noted:

26 (Assietta) Division has a Field Artillery Regiment of five instead of three battalions (batteries), and possibly two Mortar Battalions.

28 (Aosta) Division has a Field Artillery Regiment of four instead of three battalions, and one of its Infantry Regiments (No. 5) has one extra battalion for mobile defense.

54 (Napoli) Division has a Field Artillery Regiment of four instead of three battalions, and also has a divisional M.G. Company.

(ii) 4 (Livorno) Division is known as an "assault and landing division", its organization being designed for combined operations. The main differences between this and the normal infantry divisional organization is the decentralization of all regimental heavy support weapons (anti-tank guns and 3" mortars) to battalions, and the decentralization of all battalion light support weapons (heavy M.G.'s and 2" mortars) to companies. This has been accompanied by an increase in the number of mortars and anti-tank guns. The infantry platoon also consists of three sections, each armed with one L.M.G., instead of two sections, each armed with two L.M.G.'s. In addition, the division should have certain special auxiliary units, such as assault engineers, rock-climbers, and also a battalion of 75mm guns on 13-ton chassis, attached to the field artillery Regiment. This special type of division has no Blackshirt Legion, and its normal composition is:

13,000 men
170 L.M.G.
92 M.M.G.
54 2" mortars
63 3" mortars
48 47-mm anti-tank guns
36 field guns
12 75-mm S.P. guns
8 20-mm A.A. guns
450 M.T. vehicles
2,000 Animals

(iii) The role of the field division is (1) to support the beach defenses as a secondary defense, and (2) to repel invasion by counterattack. At the present time, they are somewhat scattered but not to such an extent that concentration could not easily be accomplished, and such concentrations may be expected within a few hours of an alert. The additional mobility of these field divisions, and the fact that they are situated where they would be immediately engaged in the event of invasion, are strong indications that their actual mission is counterattack, once the location of the most serious breach of beach defenses has been determined.

Too sharp a distinction between the coastal and field formations and their respective functions should not be made. At the present time, there are indications that elements of field divisions may be brought directly into the coastal zones (the 26 (Assietta) Division), and, similarly, the mobility of at least some of the coastal divisions makes it possible that the field units can be reinforced by coastal units drawn from less threatened areas.

(2) Coastal Division.

It is assumed that Coastal Divisions control all coastal defense and artillery units within their areas. These units are coastal battalions (normally grouped as coastal regiments), M.G. and mortar units, and coast defense artillery units.

There are, however, special defense areas in addition to coastal division sectors. Such areas are normally around the defended ports and naval bases. In these, the coastal regiments appear to be under command of the Army Corps, whereas the coastal artillery units are believed to be under naval control.

There are also independent coastal regiments outside both the coastal divisional sectors and the special defense areas.

It is reasonable to suppose that certain Mobile Groups - see paragraph (3), following, may also be subordinated to the Coastal Divisions.

The average strength of the Coastal Divisions is 12,000 men. The role of the Coastal Division is the immediate defense of the coastline and resistance to the first stages of invasion. For this purpose, they are composed of coast defense units and territorial defense units, largely, but not necessarily, static, equipped with some arms and light support weapons. The recent improvement in equipment and increased mobility of the coastal battalion may render them more capable of tactical movement. The main functions of the coastal units, in the event of their being unable to actually prevent landings, are to hold up an invading force after the initial landing until the mobile groups are ready to counter-attack.

(3) Mobile Groups.

Seven 'mobile groups' have been identified. They do not form an entirely independent element in the composition of the garrison, as they are formed from units detached from larger organizations. The composition of the 'mobile group' many vary and may contain a combination of any of the following: Infantry Company, Motorized M.G. Company, Anti-tank Company, Artillery Battery, 20-mm. A.A. M.G. Company, Light Tank Company.

(4) Anti-Parachutist Groups.

About sixty 'anti-parachutist groups' have been identified. They are composed of some 40 men, similar to a home guard unit, equipped with suitable weapons.

(5) Tank Battalions.

At present, three tank battalions have been identified. Two of these are equipped with French 11-ton R-35 tanks, and the third with Italian 3-ton L-3 tankettes. The former is a low-powered and unreliable vehicle, and the latter cannot be considered more than a tracked M.G. carrier. Normally, each battalion should have some 50 tanks.

(c) Reinforcement Prior to Allied Assaults.

Maintenance of increased forces in SICILY should not create a serious problem in view of the short lines of communication with the mainland and the probability of considerable accumulation of all essential supplies in the island. Evidently,there is no limit to the reinforcements that can be made available from the mainland by the Italian Army due to the fact that the Italians are not committed in RUSSIA or on any other front at the present time. Therefore, additional reinforcements are entirely limited by logistics based on the terrain, communication, transportation, and port facilities in SICILY. A total of 8 or 9 field divisions on the island appears to be reasonable in view of these limitations. Seven Italian divisions might be disposed in areas (based on movement of the 4th and 26th Divisions) as follows:

54th - CATANIA
4th - CALTAGIRONE
? - CANICATTI
26th - SCIACCA
28th - MARSALA - TRAPANI
? - PALERMO
? - MESSINA

Two German divisions might be disposed, one in Army reserve, in the general CALTANISSETTA - ENNA area; the other broken into special battle groups to be disposed in support of principal ports and airfields. Additional forces are likely to include a proportion of armor, one or two German tank battalions, and possibly one Italian. There are at least four medium tank battalions in Metropolitan ITALY. Reinforcements of existing mobility forces in SICILY must be expected. No definite information of such reinforcements is known at the present time.

The total estimated garrison on D Day is, therefore:

a. Six or seven Italian divisions.
b. Two German divisions.
c. The equivalent of six coastal divisions (84 battalions), which may or may not be mobile.

2. DISPOSITIONS AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enemy Air Situation (by A-2, XII ASC).

(1) Type of Enemy Planes Likely to be Within Effective Range. (In order of their importance).

	Est. Quantity Total	Serviceable
(a) Long range German JU 88 bombers	290	190
(b) Single engine German Me. 109 fighters	200	130
(c) Italian single engine fighters (Macchi 200, 202, 205 and RE 2001)	300	130
(d) German two engine Me. 110 fighters	100	66
(e) German single engine FW 190 fighter-bombers	55	36
Unimportant:		
(f) Italian S. 79, S. 84 torpedo bombers	50	22
(g) German JU 88 and He III bomber-recce.	35	22
(h) Italian bomber-recce. S. 79, S.84, Cz 1007	80	36
(i) Italian coastal Cz. 501 and Cz. 506	80	36
(j) German JU 87 dive bombers	20	14

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	Est. Total	Quantity Serviceable
(k) German Me. 109 Army Co-op.	10	6
(l) Italian Army Co-op. CA 311, 312 & 313	25	12
Totals -	1245	700
Totals assuming Italian planes half as effective as Germans - -	977	582

The last total as above can again be broken down into (a) Strictly combat types, and (b) "Others", listed in the above table as unimportant:

	Total	Serviceable
(a) Combat types	800	490
(b) Others	177	92
	977	582

(2) Tactics likely to be used by above types:

(a) German JU 88 Bombers are the best the Axis has but still are none too good, and easy to shoot down. They may be expected to bomb from medium or low altitudes, and are used either by night or day, although there is a shortage of trained crews for night bombing. All the Axis air bases south of ROME, and in SARDINIA, are within effective bomber range.

(b) Single Engine Me. 109's are easily the best Axis airplane at high, medium, or low altitudes (although latest models of the FW 190 may show high performance). They will be used for fighting, light bombing, or ground strafing, at high speed, and will operate at first from all Sicilian airfields, later withdrawing to the north and west.

(c) The Italian Fighter Planes are obsolete in part, and their latest are not as good as the German fighters. They will be held largely for the defense of airfields and harbors, rather than offensive missions, and serviceability rate will be low.

(d) The German 2-Engine Me. 110 has many combat uses, such as light bombing, ground attack, and heavy bomber protection, but it is semi-obsolete and should be replaced fairly soon with the more recent Me. 210.

(e) The German FW 190 Fighter-Bombers will be dangerous and effective on combat missions, although it is estimated that there will be only about 50 in this theater.

(f) Italian S 79 and S 84 Torpedo Bombers used to be a serious threat, but they are very vulnerable, semi-obsolete, and crew morale has deteriorated from heavy losses.

(g) (h) (i) Both German and Italian Reconnaissance Planes will, of course, avoid combat missions, and contact with fighter or anti-aircraft units, either by staying largely out over the sea, or at very high altitudes when on photo missions over our forces. All Italian coastal seaplanes will be slow, vulnerable, and of little use.

(j) The German JU 87 or "Stuka" Dive Bomber has served its usefulness, lost its terror, and will probably not be seen in future operations.

(k) (l) Italian Army Co-op planes are also obsolete and will probably not be seen. Only 10 German Co-op planes are reported in the theater and are, therefore, not important.

(3) Latest Estimate of Air Strength, this theater. This has largely been covered in paragraph (1), above, although various intangibles are involved which may neutralize each other. For instance, instensive bombing of enemy fields in the nex few weeks should destroy a considerable number of planes, both in the air and on the ground, which will have to be replaced. On the other hand, Germany may be able to spare a certain proportion of her planes now located in France, on the Russian Front, or in the Balkans, to strengthen this theater's air defenses. From a replacement point of view, she is considered to be better off on planes than on experienced crews.

Final estimates, therefore, should run about 270 serviceable German fighters, including their equivalent in semi-obsolete Italian fighters, and about 230 serviceable German bombers, all stationed within a circle of about 325 miles, or effective bombing range.

(4) Probable Routes of Approach - Enemy Aircraft. At least until our fighter aircraft can be established on the ISLAND, the enemy airforce will have every important strategic advantage, in the location of its operating bases. All fields on the island (including REGGIO CALABRIA, on the toe of ITALY) are within 120 miles, or good fighter range, from the southern beaches. Their bomber fields in Southern SARDINIA, around ROME, NAPLES, FOGGIA, etc., are grouped roughly in a semi-circle 300 to 325 miles away, which is good bombing distance, out of range of our fighters. JU 88's, now in SICILY, are likely to be withdrawn to Italian and Sardinian fields, and replaced by additional fighters from ITALY.

The approach angle of combat planes to a target bares no relationship with the location of their home bases. In the forthcoming operation, the original approaches will come mostly overland to obtain the protection from ADF interception afforded by the high hills and ridges. The direction of actual attack, however, is likely to be along the beaches or shoreline, with the sun at their back, if possible.

b. Enemy Naval Capabilities.

It is estimated that, based on past performances, it is unlike. that any substantial reduction of the Italian Navy can be achieved excepn air and submarine action.

c. Enemy Ground Capabilities.

(1) General.

(a) Assumptions.

Enemy air reconnaissance of the North African coastline will reveal our preparations for movement. It must be assumed that the enemy will have knowledge of the place of the attack, unless NDF interference is arranged to make that agency impotent, and air cover prevents organized hostile air reconnaissance while our troops are in the transport or rendezvous areas, by H minus 6 hours.

CAPABILITIES AGAINST FORCE 343:

The following is factual data reference actually known dispositions of divisions:

The 5th Division has moved out of its previously known location; present location unknown.

The 4th Division has moved into the area formerly occupied by the 5th Division.

The 26th Division has moved into the SCIACCA area.

The 28th Division remains unchanged.

Army and Corps troops remain unchanged.

Based on the obscure situation, the lack of a new Battle Order, and the thought that doubtelessly other divisions will be identified in areas vacated, no definite capabilities can be attempted. The capabilities previously presented are completely changed, but it is still considered that the enemy is capable of the following:

(1) To defend at the water's edge.

(2) To defend on ridge-lines running perpendicular to the coast, especially on the eastern side, to canalize any advance inland.

(3) To defend along the ridge-line: RAGUSA - VIZZINI - CALTAGIRONE - MAZZARINO - RAVANUSA - CASTORELLO.

Capabilities 1 and 3 are considered most likely of adoption because of the known position of the 4th Division and the known locations of Army and Corps troops. Capability 1 is favored, because of known locations of coast defense installations and the vital airdromes and ports they are designed to defend.

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G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION #4.

18 July 1943

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

a. With exception of scattered and now unidentified units presumably remaining for local counter attack and to bolster Italian troops, it is indicated that German elements involved in the defense of Sicily have drawn to the east and northeast.

b. Recent movements from the northwest indicate that the following major Italian elements have moved toward the southeast toward our western flank:

26th ASSIETTA Division from the SCIACCA area.
28th AOSTA Division from the TRAPANI - PALERMO area.

Some elements of both of these have been identified on our western flank.

c. As this operation opened it was believed that there were three elements comparable to regimental combat teams, a total of which comprising the Division Sicily, later renamed the 15th Panzer Division. It was further believed that one of these combat teams was in the CATANIA area, one in the GELA area, and the third in the TRAPANI - MARSALA area. Although unconfirmed, of these three it is believed that two are now in the east and northeastern part of the island and the third, originally in the GELA area, remains in the general area ENNA - S. CATERINA.

d. Identifications of new minor elements (Harsh Battalions) previously unreported on the island, indicate reinforcements are probably being pushed across the STRAITS of MESSINA in small increments as rapidly as possible.

e. Enemy activity opposing the advance of the Seventh Army has been light with the exception of that opposing the central portion of the zone of advance.

f. Movements in general have been to the north and east and no movements have been noted in the western part of the island in the past few days.

g. The terrain in the directed zone of action is extremely rugged, the main ridge line running generally east and west. The highest portion is in the area PIZOANTENNA (002) with an elevation of about 6000 feet. The ridge has numerous passes but limited number of first-class roads. The coastal plain on the northern part of the island is narrower than those of the southern part now occupied.

h. Numerous streams enter the northern waters, these are presumably dry at this time of the year. Notably these are from east to west, the F. DI POLLINA (C13), F. GRANDE IMERA, and, F. TORTO (both B82). Influencing the terrain also in the projected operation are the northern reaches of the SALSO, which extend within a few miles of Pzo ANTANA (002) and the V. di FICARELLA (G37), which enter the Mediterranean between SCIACCA and AGRIGENTO, and the BELICA (G09), which enters the Mediterranean to the west of SCIACCA.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Enemy Capabilities Against the 15th Army Group as a whole.

(1) To withdraw major enemy forces to the general area CATANIA - REGALBUTO (H59) - NICOSIA (C30) - S. STEFANO, and detaching armored elements as a delaying force for local counter attack.

(2) To withdraw to the general line CATANIA - PATERNO (H78) - REGALBUTO (H59) - ENNA (H28) - MUSCARELI (G78) - BIVONA (G59) - CATTOLICA (Gh7).

(3) Same as (2) and counter attack in the CATANIA Plain area with major German elements.

(4) Same as (2) and counter attack against our west flank with major Italian elements reinforcing them with German armored elements.

(5) Same as (3) and (4) either independently or simultaneously.

Capabilities (1) and (2) are favored at this time.

b. Enemy Capabilities Against the Seventh Army.

(1) To defend along the general line ENNA (H28) - MUSCARELI (G78) - BIVONA - CATTOLICA (Gh7).

(2) Same as (1) and counter attack against the west (left flank) with major Italian elements reinforced by German armor.

(3) To delay in successive positions along our general front to the north and west with local counter attacks to relieve the pressure during withdrawal.

Capability (1) is favored. Italian reaction has been purely defensive. Wht aggressive action has been taken against this Army has been by German elements, which it is believed, with exception of portions remaining in the ENNA - SAN CATERINA area, have been withdrawn along our front. A final defensive position will very likely be taken in the difficult terrain leading to the MESSINA peninsula, in an effort to either launch vigorous counter attack from that general direction at a later date or to permit withdrawal of German units to the Italian mainland. Sacrifice of the Italian troops in thewest to fulfill that mission is indicated.

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. In general does the enemy have an organized defensive system anywhere within the coastal area which had initially been defended by the coastal divisions?

b. Is he capable of important resistance and if so is he actually offering It?

c. Is the movement to the east continuing? Will Italian divisions also move to the north and east?

d. Are there any German units of any size left in the zone of advance of this Army?

e. What is the strength of the units remaining in this Army's zone of advance?

f. What are the available resources reference ammunition, fuel and food?

g. Are airports in the zone of advance in use or serviceable?

h. Does resistance and reinforcement in the east beyond the Army boundary indicate a defensive or offensive attitude?

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G-2 ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION #5

23 July 1943

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

a. German.

(1) Forces.

The German units known to be on the island of SICILY include the Herman Goering Division, the 15th Panzer Division, elements of the 29th Motorized Division, the 3d and 4th Parachute Regiments, and a few miscellaneous units. Recent movements and present dispositions indicate that the Herman Goering Division and the Parachute Regiment will be contained by the Eighth Army in the CATANIA area. Of the remainder, including possible reinforcements equivalent to one motorized division, it is believed that some 25,000 German troops are capable of being employed against our operations; including 16 infantry battalions (10,000 men), 21 artillery batteries (84 guns), 2 A.A. battalions (60 guns, 20mm and 37-mm), 3 tank battalions (150 tanks). Approximate deductions from the above T/O figures for organizational shortages and battle losses leave a net estimate of German strength as follows:

16 Infantry Battalions	10,500 men	
21 Artillery Batteries	60 guns	
2 A.A. Battalions	60 guns	(20,37)
3 Tank Battalions	65 tanks	

(2) Movements.

During the past week, the Germans have completed the consolidation of their forces in the eastern part of the island. Whereas the component elements of the original German divisions were initially widely scattered, they have now been regrouped, with the Herman Goering Division engaged with the Eighth Army in the CATANIA area, and the 15th Panzer Division on its west flank, where it furnished most of the opposition in the ENNA area prior to it withdrawal to the north and east. It is now believed to be organizing defensive position to the northwest of Mt. ETNA.

b. Italian.

(1) Forces.

The sudden fall of PALERMO and the seaward drive of the II Corps introduces some speculation as to the number and identity of the Italian units capable of opposing our operation. However, it is estimated that the Italian force may consist of remnants of the 4th Livorno, the 26th Aosta, the 28th Aosta, and the 206th Coastal Divisions, with a total not to exceed 25,000; including 21 infantry battalions (10,500 men), 49 artillery battalions (196 guns), 5 anti-tank battalions (128 guns), 2 tank battalions (11 tanks). With appropriate allowances for known battle losses, potential Italian strength may be tabulated as follows:

21 Infantry Battalions	13,000 men	
49 Artillery Batteries	96 guns	
5 AT Battalions	75 guns	
2 Tank Battalions	60 tanks	

(2) Movements.

Italian movements of the past week, aside from those with a surrender objective, have tended toward consolidation in the north and west of the island, apparently aimed at the defense of PALERMO. Of the units thus involved, it is believed that elements of the 4th, 26th, 28th, and the 206th Coastal will attempt to escape to the east after the fall of PALERMO and assist in the defense of MESSINA. Reports do not yet indicate to what extent this escape has been accomplished.

c. A recapitulation of total prospective opposition shows:

37 Infantry Battalions	27,500 men
70 Artillery Batteries	156 guns
4 A.A. Battalions	60 guns(20,37)
5 AT Battalions	75 guns
5 Tank Battalions	145 tanks

d. Terrain.

(1) Topography.

The terrain in the indicated zone of advance is more difficult than any yet encountered. From MISTRETTA (D25), the elevation rises sharply, reaching a height of 6,020 feet at M. SORI (C86). From MISTRETTA, east for a distance of 60 miles, the elevation of the ridge line averages more than 5,000 feet. Between this ridge and the coast, the littoral has an average width of less than 10 miles. This coastal area, in turn, is cut by numerous streams, forming a series of transverse cross corridors between the ridge and the sea along the entire coast.

(2) Roads.

East-west communication is limited to the coastal road, Highway 113, and Highway 120, which runs south of the main ridgeline. Lateral communication is provided at approximately 15-mile intervals by Highways 120, 117, and 116, in turn supplemented by the secondary roads through CASTEL-BUONO (D02) and the north-south road through S. FRATELLO (C53).

(3) Streams.

The streams in the area are short coastal rivers draining the northern slope of the main ridge, and believed to be mostly dry at this season. While constituting considerable obstacles to tanks, they cannot be considered water barriers.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) To withdraw east of the general line S. STEFANO (C33) - NICOSIA (G30).

(2) To defend on general line CEFALU (G03) - GANCI (G11) - NICOSIA (G30) - AGIRA (H49).

(3) To delay in successive positions from line in Capability (2), pivoting on AGIRA, with final position along line in Capability (1).

(4) To counterattack with the 15th Panzer Division and/or the 29th Motorized Division in the vicinity of LEONFORTE (H39) in the general direction CAGLIANO (G40) - CALASCIBETTA (H28).

b. Capability No. (3) is favored, implemented by Capability No. (4). Recent movements to the northwest indicate that the general line S. FRATELLO (C53) - TROINA (C50) - CENTURIPE (H69) - CATANIA (H57) might become a final defensive line with organized positions. Stubborn resistance to the Eighth Army advance in the south portion tends to confirm this. Sufficient time has elapsed to permit organization of the ground in the Northern sector. The surprise of the landing prevented organized inland defense, and it may be anticipated that none now will exist until that line is reached. The counterattack capability is discounted because of the lack of sustaining support and its vulnerability to encirclement by the 1st Division and the Canadian Division.

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. What Italian units have escaped to the east and what is their status as to strength, equipment, and morale?

b. Where is the main defensive position; what is its organization, strength and equipment; and what is the location and strength of delaying or covering forces?

c. What additional German or Italian troops have already been brought into SICILY from the Continent, and will the importation of reinforcements continue?

d. Will German or Italian units now in SICILY attempt an evacuation to the Mainland?

e. Will the enemy assume the offensive; if so, when, where, and in what strength?

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G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION #6

1 August 1943

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

a. See G-2 Periodic Report Number 23, dated 1 August.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Enemy Capabilities (Long Range)

(1) To defend east or west of the general line S. FRATELLO (C53) - CESARO (C63) - BRONTE (C71) - NIANGAVILLA (H79) - PATERNO (H78) - CATANIA.

(2) a. To defend along the general line NASO (C84) - RANDAZZO (C82); and

b. MOUNT ETNA - ACIREALE (J90)

(3) Defend along the general line NASO (C84) - RACCUJA (C84) - FRANCAVILLA (C92) - TAORMINA (D11).

(4) Defend along the general line FITNARI (C94) - FRANCAVILLA (C92)-TAORMINA (D11).

(5) Commence an evacuation in the vicinity of PATTI (C84) - MILAZZO (D55) upon completion of the defense in Capability (2).

(6) Evacuation from the beaches east of MILAZZO (D55) and MESSINA upon completion of the defense in Capability (4).

(7) Start the evacuation along the Eastern Coast from ACIREALE (J90) to MESSINA upon crumbling of defenses along that coast.

b. The above capabilities are the anticipated capabilities in the order in which they will be undertaken, and, hence, none is favored. The defensive attitude has been demonstrated throughout in the latter stages of this operation, accompanied by rear guard actions, some stubborn in nature but none so far reported, by counter-attack. The enemy has held and withdrawn, and there have been no indications of relieving the pressure to accompany the withdrawals by aggressive action. Instead, a shell has been left, and withdrawal has taken place prior to actual close contact.

c. It must be assumed that a final stand will be made. Constant surveillance is being kept of the roads, and constant photo reconnaissance is being made to determine where the organized defense will take place. To date, none has been located. For this there may be two reasons: (1) that, in fact, no defensive position has been organized, and (2) that an organized position has been developed and carefully camouflaged. The latter should be accepted, because mobile reinforcements have been sent in in sufficient size to effect a mobile north flank. No reports have been received from the British Eighth Army areas as to photographic interpretations indicating an organized defensive position.

d. Should a beach head be established for the evacuation of the island, the terrain favors the general line NASO (C84) - RANDAZZO (C82) - MOUNT ETNA, and along the coast north to FILDMEPRENO (D11). Again, however, there are no indications of a general defensive line being organized along that line. To the east, one other line, listed in Capability (4), is the last connecting road between the two main coastal roads.

e. Some shipments have been observed from the air along both coasts and, no doubt, carry equipment, personnel, and supplies. A logical place for supply points to serve forces operating both north and east of MOUNT ETNA, would be FRANCAVILLA (C92), based on road network, and hence the defense should be west of that point.

f. No doubt, the operation to the north of MOUNT ETNA will affect the operation east of MOUNT ETNA, and vice versa, so that as one attack progresses, the other may be expected to progress to maintain lateral communications and avoid defeat in detail.

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Where and when are demolitions being executed by the enemy.

b. Are organized defensive positions being prepared. If so, where and to what degree?

c. Are German or Italian units now on SICILY attempting to evacuate to the Mainland. If so, where, how and in what strength.

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ANNEX 4

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETINS

INDEX

(Only non-administrative extracts are included).

Number	Date	Subject Matter
Bulletin No. 1	10 May 1943	Symbols, Road Maps, Relief Models.
Bulletin No. 2	17 May 1943	Miscellaneous Items pertaining, chiefly, to Security Measures.
Bulletin No. 3	22 May 1943	Plans for Attachment of Prisoner of War, Counter Intelligence Corps, Translation, Public Relations & Psychological Warfare to Units.
Bulletin No. 5	3 June 1943	Estimate of the Strength of Enemy Forces at four Italian Airfields.
Bulletin No. 7	9 June 1943	Order of Battle - Italian Army.
Bulletin No. 9	12 June 1943	Psychological Warfare Branch Activities.
Bulletin No. 11	12 June 1943	Miscellaneous Items including Cover Plan, Interpreters, etc.
Bulletin No. 12	12 June 1943	Notes on Enemy Forces - Italian Units.
Bulletin No. 14	14 June 1943	Photo Reconnaissance Plan on and after D-Day.

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Bulletin No. 16	16 June 1943	Italian Coast Watching and Procedure.
Bulletin No. 17	17 June 1943	The Messina Ferry.
Bulletin No. 18	18 June 1943	Excerpts from Air Intelligence Estimates.
Bulletin No. 21	19 June 1943	Counter Intelligence Corps Plan.
Bulletin No. 22	20 June 1943	Observation and Photographic Reconnaissance Missions.
Bulletin No. 23	20 June 1943	Final Beach Evaluation.
Bulletin No. 28	1 August 1943	Translation of Italian Bulletin - Enemy Situation, Central-Western Mediterranean.
Bulletin No. 29	3 August 1943	Order of Battle - Sicily.
Bulletin No. 31	11 August 1943	Captured Enemy Document governing Officer's Prisoner of War Camps.
Bulletin No. 33	11 August 1943	Captured Field Order of Herman Goering Division.

10 May 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #1

1. Symbols.

It has been agreed that all military conventional symbols on data to be published, from now on, will be the United States Army standard map symbols; this is to include the overprinted maps.

2. The general map supply and distribution program is as follows:

a. Maps to the scale of 1/50,000 will be made available to all units in the zone of action of Task Force 343.

b. Uncontrolled mosaics to the scale of 1/25,000 will be made of the following area:

The lower half of sheets 267 and 268,
The southwest quarter of 269,
All of sheets 271 and 272,
The western half of 273,
All of sheet 275
The western half of sheet 276

c. 1/25,000 scale maps of the entire zone of action of Task Force 343 will be made available for the use of the artillery. In certain areas, where no 1/25,000 scale map is available, 1/50,000 scale will be blown up to 1/25,000. These maps will be made available on basis of two per battery, six per battalion headquarters or higher, and one for the Artillery officer.

d. Enlarged 6" wide angle photographs will be made available for artillery study of the areas not now mapped to the scale of 1/25,000.

e. Additional planning maps to the scale of 1/250,000 and 1/100,000 are available upon request.

3. Road Maps

A road map, to the scale of 1/500,000, is being prepared and will be available at approximately D-14 for distribution on a per vehicle basis.

4. Sardinia and Corsica maps will be distributed without request on the basis of approximately 5 - 10% of normal map requirements. These maps must be posted with the proper battle order. The battle order of Sardinia and Corsica islands are shown below:

SARDINIA:

XIII Army Corps	Cagliari
30th (Sabauda) Inf. Div.	"
31st (Calabria) Inf. Div.	Sassari
236th Inf. Regt.	Location unknown
204th Coastal Division	Porto Torres
205th Coastal Division	Cagliari Area (?)

CORSICA:

VII Army Corps	Location Unknown
44th (Cremona) Div.	" "
20th (Friuli) Div.	" "

5. Change name of ENSA ro ENSA PRIME to JOSS.

6. Relief Models.

One set to MSASE around May 20th; three sets to arrive in this theater approximately June 10. Models are as follows: Beaches 64 and 65; beach 66; beaches 67 and 68; beaches 69, 70, 71, 72 and 73.

17 May 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #2

1. Tables for the hours of moonlight, daylight and twilight have been requested.

2. Consideration is being given to the need for destroying RFD (Radio Direction Finder) installations.

3. Excerpts quoted from Security Instructions No. 1 (6 May 1943) Force 545 not necessarily Force 343 doctrine but of interest to all are shown below.

a. Rumors.

That individuals must not speculate in public as to their destination. The possibility always exists that they may be right.

b. Personal Documents.

During every exercise all diaries and letters will be removed from troops before going into action, in order to accustom them to this drill.

c. Lectures.

Lectures must be given instructing troops as to their action if captured. This should include an explanation of International Law covering conduct towards prisoners.

d. Briefing.

Officers and the troops themselves will be briefed on board ship in the case of ship to shore expeditions. In the case of shore to shore expeditions briefing will be at the latest moment the Corps Commander considers practical, in the assembly area. This should not be more than four days before the anticipated date of sailing.

e. Assembly Area.

The Assembly Area will be sealed off to prevent both entry and exit as far as operational requirements permit. It should be a wired camp or perimeter, sited preferably remote from a civilian center. A supervised Compound for visitors, and the collection, delivery, etc. of stores should be created.

f. Casualties.

Arrangements must be made to insure that personnel going sick after briefing and before departure are kept segregated and are warned against discussing the expedition.

g. Civilians.

Arrangements must be made to prevent civilians approaching the Assembly Area. No civilians will be permitted to enter the Assembly Area, the boundaries of which must be defined.

h. Movements.

Movements to the Assembly area will be arranged if possible so that long convoys of troops do not all pass the same point, or if this is unavoidable, that they do so by night, or under cover of an "Exercise" plan.

i. Bills, Contracts, etc.

There will be no final settlement of accounts until the day after departure. Rear parties will deal with outstanding matters."

4. Photographic Interpreters. Two photographic interpreters are being set up per division. Four to six for Hq. Force 343. Request is being made for Corps Headquarters.

22 May 1943.

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #3

1. Troop Lists.

Provisions are being made for the following G-2 personnel and vehicles for the assault echelon:

Unit	Officers	Men	Vehicles
PRISONER OF WAR DET.:			
I Armored Corps	4	8	1 - 3/4-ton 4x4,
			2 - 1/4-ton with trailers.
Also II Corps, 1st Inf. Div., 2d Armd Div., 3d Inf. Div., 9th Inf. Div., 45th Inf. Div., 82d Airborne Div. - A complete unit for each same as for I Armored Corps.			
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DET.:			
I Armored Corps	4	22	8 - 1/4-ton 4x4 with trailers, 2 - 3/4-ton 4x4s.
II Corps	2	11	4 - 1/4-ton 4x4s with trailers, 1 - 3/4-ton 4x4, with trailer.
1st Inf. Division	1	5	3 - 1/4-ton 4x4s - 2 trailers.
2nd Armd Div., 3d Inf. Div., 9th Inf. Div., 45th Inf. Div., 82d AB Div. - Same as 1st Infantry Division.			
TRANSLATION DETACHMENT:			
I Armored Corps	2	6	1 - 3/4-ton Weapons Carrier.
PUBLIC RELATIONS:			
I Armored Corps	7	5	2 - 1/4-ton 4x4; 2 motorcycles
CENT	3	1	1 - 1/4-ton 4x4
DIME	3	1	1 - 1/4-ton 4x4
JOSS	3	1	1 - 1/4-ton 4x4
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE			
I Armored Corps	4	3	1 - 3/4-ton 4x4 - 500 lbs. leaflets,
			1 - 1/4-ton 4x4

3 June 1943.

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #5

STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES

1. The attached estimate of strength of the ground forces at the airfields quoted covers both the German and Italian Army and Air Forces which would be employed on ground defense of these airfields.

2. It is not possible to estimate the proportion of German to Italian personnel but trained Italian personnel would represent a small proportion of the whole.

31 May 1943.

The following information has been received from Force 141:

Appn/615/43/M.I.3.b. MOST SECRET

APP "A"

Estimated STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES employed at certain Airdromes in Sicily

A. General

(1) As the four airdromes in question are in the concentrations areas of first line divisions it is likely that considerable outside assistance will be available for their defense in addition to the A.A. and static defense troops already employed.

(2) Mobile Defense Groups ("Nuclei Celeri") improvised to suit local requirements, but consisting generally of 600-800 men (lorryborne) well equipped with A/Tk guns, H and L.M.Gs and some A.F.Vs (probably L.3 tanks or armored cars) will be stationed where they can best be employed as Reserve Striking Forces in the event of enemy air or sea-borne landings in their proximity. An Order of Battle for these groups is given on page 32 of Sicily Order of Battle dated 18th April 1943.

(3) German Air Force personnel are known to man some of the A.A. defenses. In estimating the strength of A.A personnel no difference has been made between Italian and German batteries.

(4) The estimates for A.A guns etc, are based largely on C.I.U. Report XI.36 of 13th April 1943 after allowance has been made for a certain number of emplacements being empty or dummy. This report should be of considerable assistance in showing the extent of wiring, position of pill boxes etc. in the perimeter of the airdromes under consideration.

(5) It should be remembered that in many cases the A.A batteries are sited for ground as well as A.A defense, and will therefore be of some value in a dual purpose role.

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(6) Anti-Parachutist Groups (Nuclei Antiparacadutisti) - small units of 25-50 men, specially trained in anti-parachutist warfare and working under command of the Coastal Battalions may be expected in the vicinity of airdromes. A list of these units with their location will be found in the Sicily Order of Battle of 18th April 1943.

B. SOUTHERN SICILY

The two airdromes under consideration are in the area covered by 54 and possibly by 4 Inf. Div. BISCARI airdrome is probably within the boundary of 207 Coastal Div. and the defenses of COMISO are probably in 206 Coastal Div. area.

(1) BISCARI AIRDROME

	Hy. A.A.	Lt. A.A.	M.G.	A/Tk	Mortars	L.M.Gs	Personnel
A.A. Defenses	12	48	8	-	-	-	1,600
Mobile Forces (Probably includes 250 Cav. and 16 Lt. tks.)	-	-	12	8	6	24	900
Static Defense Tps. (C.Bns.Militia and elements 54 Div.)	-	-	18	4	9	60	1,500
Services etc. (Carabinieri, Medical, MT Supply)	-	-	-	-	-	-	300
TOTAL:	12	48	38	12	15	84	4,300

(2) COMISO AIRDROME

	Hy. A.A.	Lt. A.A.	M.G.	A/Tk	Mortars	L.M.Gs	Personnel
A.A. Defenses	20	24	6	-	-	-	1,500
Mobile Forces	?						
Static Defense Tps. (exclusive 1st line elements)	-	-	24	8	9	80	2,300
Services etc. (Carabinieri, Medical, MT Supply)	-	-	-	-	-	-	500
TOTAL:	20	24	30	8	9	80	4,300

C. EASTERN SICILY

GERBINE, its 8-9 satellite landing grounds, and the airdrome at CATANIA come within the area of 54 Inf Div and 213 Coastal Div. At SCORDIA is a Battalion of R.35 (11 ton) French Tanks,* Copy of which have probably been allocated to the local Mobile Groups. The large number of MT units in the CATANIA area suggests that a considerable part of the defense troops may be lorry-borne. These mobile forces in the CATANIA area will be available as reinforcements or reserves to the static airdrome defense troops.

(1) CATANIA AIRDROME

	Hy. A.A.	Lt. A.A.	M.G.	A/Tk	Mortars	L.M.Gs	Personnel
A.A. Defenses (some of these may be for the defense of the town)	42	34	12	-	-	-	3,500
Mobile Defense (probably includes 16 L-3 tks, Mot. M.G. Coy, etc.)	4 x 75 mm guns		12	16	9	24	900
Static Defense Tps.	-	-	24	8	9	40	2,000
Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	300
TOTAL:	42 (+ 4 x 75 mm guns)	34	48	24	18	64	6,700

* Described in FM 30-42 - p. 50-51.

(2) GERBINI AIRDROME (excl. satellites)
(Some of the defense troops may be employed at CATANIA)

	Hy. A.A.	Lt. A.A.	M.G.	A/Tk.	Mortars	L.M.Gs	Personnel
A.A. Defenses	24	48	-	-	-	-	2,000
Mobile Defense (probably includes tkn. Mot. M.G. Coy etc)	-	-	12	8	9	24	800
Static Defense Tps	? 12 guns (Div Arty)		24	8	9	40	2,500
Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	300
TOTAL: (+ 12 Fd guns)	24	48	36	16	18	64	5,600

9 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #7

BRIEF ORDER OF BATTLE: ITALIAN ARMY
(Information dated 29 May 1943)

A. SUMMARY OF DIVISIONS

51 Infantry (c. 12,500 men each)
2 Mobile (c. 8,000 men each), numbered 1, 2 Mob.
1 Motorized (c. 8,000 men), numbered 10
1 Parachute (c. 6,000 men), numbered 184
3 Alpine (c. 13,000 men each), numbered 1, 5, 6 Alpine

Total - 58 Divisions

Note: No allowance is made for the 10 divisions routed in Russia, of which considerable elements remain. Most of these have returned to Italy where an attempt will probably be made to re-form them.

B. HIGHER COMMAND

War Minister and C. in C. (delegated from the King)	Signor Benito MUSSOLINI
Under-Secretary of State for War	H.E. Antonio SORICE
Chief of G.S. of the Armed Forces	Army/Gen. Vittorio AMBROSIO
Deputy C. of G.S. of the Armed Forces	Div./Gen. Francesco ROSSI
Chief of the Army Staff	General MARIO ROATTA
Deputy Chief of Army Staff	Div./Gen. Antonio GANDIN

C. ARMY GROUP

	Commander	Composition
Group of Armies of Central and Southern Italy and the Islands	Army/Gen. H.R.H. Duke of Piedmont	5, 6, 7 Armies

D. ARMIES

Composition of armies is largely conjectural.

Army	Commander	H.Q.	Composition	Area
First Italo-German	Destroyed in TUNISIA.			
Second	See G.H.Q. Slovenia	Dalmtia		
Fourth	Army/Gen. Mario Vercellini	Menton	I, XV, XXII Corps	East of MARSEILLES-GENOA
Fifth	?Army/Gen. Mario CARACCIOLO	Florence	?XVII Corps VII, XIII Corps	Area Tuscany, Emilia, Central Italy Sardinia, Corsica
Sixth	?	Enna	XII, XVI Corps	Sicily
Seventh	Army/Gen designate HRH Duke of Bergamo	Salerno	IX, XXXI Corps	Southern Italy
Eight	Army/Gen Italo GARIBOLDI	?Poltava	Remnants of II, XXXV Alpine Corps	Russia
Eleventh	See G.H.Q. Greece			
GHQ Albania (Note 1)	Corps/Gen Lorenzo DAMAZZO	Tirana	IV, XXV Corps	Albania
GHQ Montenegro (Note 1)	Army/Gen Alexandro PIRZIO-BIROLI	? Cetinje	VI, XIV Corps	Montenegro
GHQ Greece (Eleventh Army)	Army/Gen Carlo GELOSO	Athens	III, VIII XXVI Corps	Greece
GHQ Slovenia Dalmatia (Second Army)	Corps/Gen Mario ROBOTTI	Susak	V, XI, XVIII Corps	Yugoslavia north of Dubrovnik
GHQ Aegean	Admiral Inigo	Rhodes	50, 6 Divs	Dodecanese and Aegean Islands

Note 1: Formerly part of Ninth Army which covered Albania and Montenegro.
Note 2: It is not known what Army controls XIX and XXIII Corps.
Note 3: 46 and 51 Divs, Crete, are under German command.

E. CORPS

Corps organization, particularly outside Italy, is very fluid and divisions are frequently transferred from one corps to another.

Corps	Commander	Headquarters	Composition
I	Corps/Gen Federico ROMERO	Sospel, near Grasse, France	58 Inf Div. 2 Mob Div 223, 224 C. Div.
II	Corps/Gen Giovanni ZANGHIERI	Russia	Remnants of 3 and 5 Inf Divs 52 Lorry-borne Div.
III	Corps/Gen ? ROSSI	Thebes, Greece	11, 24 & 36 Inf Divs.
IV	Corps/Gen Carlo SPATOCCO or Div/Gen Pietro MAGGIANI	Durazzo, Albania	38, 41 & 53 Inf Divs.
V	Corps/Gen Alessandro GLORIA	Susak, Slovenia	13 & 57 Inf Divs. 1 Mob Div.
VI	? Corps/Gen Paride NSORI	Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia	18, 32, 155 Inf Divs.
VII	Corps/Gen Giacomo CARBONI	Corte, Corsica	20 & 44 Inf Divs. 226 Coastal Div.
VIII or	Corps/Gen Giuseppe PAPUNDI Corps/Gen Mario MARGHINOTTI	Xylocastron, Peloponnese	29 & 59 Inf Divs.
IX	Corps/Gen Luigi DE BIASE	Bari	47 & 152 Inf Divs.
X	Destroyed in Egypt		
XI	Corps/Gen Gastone GAMBARA	Ljubljana Slovenia	14, 22, 153 Inf Divs.
XII	Corps/Gen Mario ARISO may have succeed Gen. Angelo ROSSI	Corleone, Sicily	28 Inf Div. 202, 203 207 Coastal Divs.
XIII	Corps/Gen Antonio BASSO	Cagliari, Sardinia	30, 31 Inf Divs, 204 205 Coastal Divs 236 Inf Regt.
XIV	Div/Gen Luigi MENTASTI	Centinje, Montenegro	19, 23 Inf Divs
XV	Corps/Gen Emilo BANCALE	Genoa	103, 105 Motorized Divs.
XVI	Corps/Gen Carlo ROSSI	Piazza Armerina Sicily	26, 54 Inf Divs. 206, 208, 213 Coastal Divs.
XVII	Corps/Gen Alberto BARBIERI	Rome	21 Inf Div. ? 10 Mot. Div. 12 Inf Div. 220 Coastal Div.

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XVIII	Corps/Gen Quirino ARISELLINI	Split, Yugoslavia	15, 154 Inf Divs. 1 Alpine Div.
XIX	?	Bolzano	No first-line divs identified in this area.
XX	Destroyed in Tunisia		
XXI	Destroyed in Tunisia		
XXII	?	Toulon area; HQ ? Hyeres or Draguignan	7, 48 Inf Divs.
XXIII	? Div/Gen Carlo or Alberto PENNERO	Trieste	157, 159 Inf Divs.
XXV	Corps/Gen Giovanni VECCHI	Valona	49 Inf Div.
XXVI	?Corps/Gen Gabriele NASCI	Yannina	33, 37, 56 Inf Divs.
XXX	Destroyed in Africa		
XXXI	?	Catanzaro	104 Motorized Div. 211, 212 Coastal Div.
XXXV	? Corps/Gen Francesco ZINGALES	Russia or returned to Italy	Remnants of 2, 156 Inf Divs. 9 Motorized Div. 3 Mob Div.
Alpine Corps	?	?Air-en-Provence	? 5 Alp Div. 6 Alp Div, 20 Alp Raggruppamento.

Notes: 4 Inf Div is probably controlled by 6th Army
158 Inf Div. Cara Garrison, composed of second-line troops may be controlled by G.H.Q., Slovenia-Dalmatia.
184 Nembo Parachute Div is under the direct control of 5th Army at Florence
50, 6 Inf Divs are controlled directly by G.H.Q. Aegean.
46, 51 Inf Divs, Crete, are under German Command.

F. DIVISIONS.

Note: Depots of divisions serving elsewhere are given in brackets after the actual location. Destroyed divisions are included since they are liable to be revived.

Division	Location
1. "Superga" Regiments: 91 Inf 92 Inf 5 Arty	Destroyed in Africa (Turin)
2. "Sforzesca" (Div/Gen Carlo PELLEGRINI) Regiments: 53 Inf 54 Inf 17 Mot Arty	Russia (Novara) Remnants only
3. "Ravenna" (Div/Gen Francesco DUPONT, acting) Regiments: 37 Inf 38 Inf 121 Mot Arty	Russia (Alessandria) Remnants only
4. "Livorno" Regiments: 33 Inf 34 Inf 28 Arty	Caltanisetta - Agrigento area, Sicily
5. "Cosseria" (?Div/Gen Vincenzo ROBERTIELLO) Regiments: 89 Inf 90 Inf 108 Arty	Russia (Imperia) (Remnants being re-formed)
6. "Cuneo" (Div/Gen Mario SOLDARELLI) Regiments: 7 Inf 8 Inf 27 Arty Blackshirts: 24 Legion (detached)	H.Q. Vathy, Samos (Milan) Cyclades, H.Q. Syra Samos, H.Q. Karlovassi Samos, H.Q. Karlovassi Dodecanese, Rhodes
7. "Lupi di Toscana" (Div/Gen Gustavo REISOLI MATTHIEU) Regiments: 77 Inf 78 Inf 30 Arty	H.Q. Ollioules, Toulon (Brescia) Sanary Bandol - La Ciotat
9. "Pasubio" (Brig/Gen Roberto CLXI, acting) Regiments: 79 Inf 80 Inf 8 Arty	Russia (Verona) Remnants only Elements France, Corsica
10. "Piave" (Div/Gen Ugo TABELLINI acting) (Motorized) Regiments: 57 Inf 58 Inf 20 Arty	Littoria area, Rome Frivorno Littoria Mentone elements Sezze, Littoria
11. "Brennero" Regiments: 231 Inf 232 Inf 9 Arty Blackshirts: 35 Legion	Athens (Bressanone) Laurium Larissa area Athens
12. "Sassari" (Div/Gen Furio MONTICELLI or Div/Gen Raffaele PELLEGRA Regiments: 151 Inf 152 Inf 34 Arty Blackshirts: 73 Legion	? Rome area (Trieste)
13. "Re" (Cond ?) (Inf Comd: Brig/Gen Giovanni DE BONIS Regiments: 1 Inf 2 Inf 23 Arty Blackshirts: 75 Bn 76 Bn	Gospic, Yugoslavia (Udine)
14. "Isonzo" (Div/Gen Alessandro MACCARIO)	Novo Mesto, Slovenia (Gorizia)
15. ""Bergamo" (Div/Gen Alessandro PIAZZONI) Regiments: 25 Inf 26 Inf 4 Arty Blackshirts: 89 Legion	Sinj. Yugoslavia (Pola) Sinj
16. "Pistoia" Regiments: 35 Inf 36 Inf 3 Arty	Destroyed in Tunisia (Bologna)
17. "Pavia"	Destroyed in Egypt (Ravenna)
18. "Messina" (Div/Gen Carlo TUCCI) Regiments: 93 Inf 94 Inf 2 Arty Blackshirts: 102 Bn	Metkovic, Yugoslavia (Ancona) Metkovic
19. "Venezia" (Brig/Gen Silvio BONINI) Regiments: 83 Inf 383 Inf 84 Inf 19 Arty Blackshirts:	Podgorica, Montenegro (Florence)
20. "Friuli" Regiments: 87 Inf 88 Inf 35 Arty Blackshirts: 88 Legion	Northern Corsica: H.Q.- Belgodere. (Leghorn) Corsara - Belgodere St. Florent - oletta ? Oletta
21. "Granatieri di Sardegna" (?Brig/Gen Vittoria RUGGERO) Regiments: 1 Sardinian Gren. 2 Sardinian Gren. 13 Arty Regt. Blackshirts: ? 4 Legion	Rome (Rome)
22. "Cacciatori delle Alpi" (Brig/Gen Giovanni Angelo PIVANO Regiments: 51 Inf 52 Inf 1 Arty Blackshirts: 105 Legion	Ljubljana area, Slovenia (Perugia)
23. "Ferrara" (Div/Gen Carlo CERIANA MAYNERI) Regiments: 47 Inf 48 Inf 14 Arty Blackshirts: 82 Bn.	Gacko, Montenegro (Bari)
24. "Pinerolo" (? Div/Gen Guglielmo SCALISE) Regiments: 13 Inf 313 Inf 14 Inf 18 Arty Blackshirts: 130 Bn.	Larissa area, Greece (Chieti) Lamia Pharfalla-Volos Kastoria
25. "Bologna"	(Naples) Destroyed in Egypt
26. "Assietta" (Brig/Gen Erberto PAPINI acting) (Inf Comd: Brig/Gen Mario VSCE) Regiments: 29 Inf 30 Inf 25 Arty Blackshirts: 17 Legion	Sicily. ? Caltanisetta or moved to Partanna area. (Asti)
27. "Brescia"	(Catanzaro) Destroyed in Egypt.
28. "Aosta" (?) Regiments: 5 Inf 6 Inf 22 Arty Blackshirts: 171 Legion	Trapani, Sicily (Palermo) ? ? Partinico
29. "Piemonte" (Brig/Gen Adolfo NALDI) Regiments: 3 Inf 303 Inf 4 Inf 24 Arty Blackshirts: 166 Legion	Patras, Greece (Messina) Pyrgos Aktaion Patras
30. "Sabauda" (? Div/Gen SCANGATTA) Regiments: 45 Inf 46 Inf 16 Arty Blackshirts: 176 Legion	Cagliari, Sardinia Iglesias Villacidro Iglesias S. Elena
31. "Calabria" Regiments: 59 Inf 60 Inf 40 Arty Blackshirts: 177 Legion	Sassari, Sardinia Floaghe, Sardinia Alghero
32. "Marche" (Div/Gen Riccardo PENTIMALLI) Regiments: 55 Inf 56 Inf 32 Arty Blackshirts: 40 Bn	Trebinje, Yugoslavia (Venice) Trebinje Trebinje
33. "Acqui" (Brig/Gen Ernesto CHIMINELLO, acting) Regiments: 17 Inf 317 Inf 18 Inf 33 Arty Blackshirts: ? 27 Legion	Corfu, Greece (Merano) Cephalonia Islands Zante Corfu Corfu
36. "Forli" (? Div/Gen Giunio RUGGIERO) Regiments: 43 Inf 44 Inf 36 Arty Blackshirts: ?	Athens area (Saluzzo) Nea Ionia - Phaleron ? Athens area
37. "Modena" (Div/Gen Italo CARACCIOLO, acting) Regiments: 41 Inf. 341 Inf 42 Inf 29 Arty Blackshirts: 36 Bn	Preveza, Greece (Savona) Jannina and Metsovo Crete Preveza Preveza
38. "Puglie" (Div/Gen Alberto D'APONTE) Regiments: 71 Inf 72 Inf 15 Arty Blackshirts: 115 Bn	Prizren, Albania (Conegliano) Prizen - Rukes Pristina ?
41. "Firenze" (Div/Gen Arnaldo AZZI) Regiments: 127 Inf 128 Inf 41 Arty Blackshirts: ? 92 Legion	Debar, Albania (Florence) Kicevje Tirana
44. "Cremona" (Inf. Comd: Brig/Gen Arnaldo BONELLI) Regiments: 21 Inf 22 Inf 7 Arty Blackshirts: 90 Legion	Southern Corsica, H.Q. Cauro, (Pisa) Ajaccio-Sartene Calcatoggio
47. "Bari" (? Div/Gen Giuseppe CORTESE) Regiments: 139 Inf 140 Inf 47 Arty Blackshirts: 152 Legion	? Sardinia (Bari)
48. "Taro" (Div/Gen Gino PEDRAZZOLI) Regiments: 207 Inf 208 Inf 48 Arty Blackshirts: 164 Legion	H.Q. Hyeres, France (Catanzaro) Hyeres La Crau ?
49. "Parma" (Div/Gen Ezio VENNI) Regiments: 49 Inf 50 Inf 49 Arty Blackshirts: 109 Bn	Argyrocastro, Albania (Macerata) Valona Delvine ? Struga

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50. "Regina" (Brig/Gen Michele SCAMONA) — Rhodes
(Equivalent of two divisions)
Regiments: 9 Inf
309 Inf, 331 "Brenner" Inf. — Rhodes
10 Inf
50 Arty
51. "Siena" (Div/Gen Angelico CARTA) — Neapolis, Crete (Naples)
Regiments: 31 Inf — Katokhorio
32 Inf — Hagios Nikolaos
51 Arty — Neapolis
Blackshirts: ? 141 Legion
52. "Torino" (Div/Gen Roberto LERICI) — Russia (Civitavecchia)
Regiments: 81 Inf — Remnants only
82 Inf
52 Arty
53. "Arezzo" — Koritsa, Albania
Regiments: 225 Inf — (Macerata)
226 Inf — Elbasan
53 Arty — Gribec
Blackshirts: 80 Legion
54. "Napoli" (?) — Koritsa
Regiments: 75 Inf — Caltagirone, Sicily
76 Inf — (Caltanissetta)
54 Arty — Palazzolo Acreide
Blackshirts: 173 Legion — Caltagirone
56. "Casale" (? Div/Gen Mario MAGGIANI) — Modica
Regiments: 11 Inf — Agrinion, Greece (Forli)
311 Inf (detached) — Amphissa
12 Inf — Slovenia
56 Arty — Mesolongion
Blackshirts: ? 23 Legion — Agrinion
57. "Lombardia" (Div/Gen Pietro SCIPIONE) — ? Dalnice, Croatia (Pola)
Regiments: 73 Inf
74 Inf
57 Arty
Blackshirts: 137 Legion
58. "Legnano" (Inf Comd: Brig/Gen Vincenzo DAFINO) — Draguignan-Frejus area France
Regiments: 67 Inf — Cannes
68 Inf — Frejus - S. Raphael
58 Arty — Cnnes - Nice
Blackshirts: ? 26 Legion
59. "Cagliari" (Brig/Gen Paolo ANGIOY) — Tripolis, Greece (Vercelli)
(Inf Comp: Brig/Gen alberto TRIONE)
Regiments: 63 Inf — Gytheion
363 Inf — Nauplion
64 Inf — Kalamata
59 Arty — Tripolis
Blackshirts: 28 Bn — Gytheion
29 Bn — (Destroyed in Tunisia)
80. "Spezia" — (Pisa)
(Air-borne)
Regiments: 125 Inf
126 Inf
80 Arty
101. "Trieste" — Destroyed in Africa
Regiments: 65 Inf — (Piacenza)
66 Inf (?)
21 Mob Arty
102. "Trento" — Destroyed in Egypt
(Trento)
103. "Piacenza" — Genoa (Trento)
Regiments: 111 Inf — Genova
112 Inf — Vado Ligure-Savona
37 Arty
104. "Mantova" — Cosenza (Verona)
Regiments: 113 Inf — Cosenza
114 Inf — Nicastro
11 Arty
105. "Rovigo" (Brig/Gen Erminio ROVIDA) — Ventimiglia - Albenga
Regiments: 227 Inf — (Padua)
228 Inf
117 Arty (Motorized)
131. "Centauro" — Destroyed in Tunisia
(Armored) — (Siena)
Regiments: 31 Tank
131 Arty
5 Bersaglieri
132. "Ariete" — Destroyed in Egypt
(Armored) — (Verona)
133. "Littorio" — Destroyed in Egypt
(Armored) — (Parma)
134. "Freccia" — See 2 Mob. Div.
(Armored)

136. "Giovani Fascisti" — Destroyed in Tunisia
Regiments: Giovanni Fascisti Inf
136 Arty
151. "Perugia" — Montenegro (Perugia)
Regiments: 129 Inf — Sibenik
130 Inf
151 Arty
Blackshirts: 29 Bn
152. "Piceno" (Territorial Defence) — Lecce area
Regiments: 235 Inf — Bari-Brindisi
236 Inf (Detached from Div.) — Sarinia. ? Sassari
152 Arty — Bari
153. "Marcerata" (Div/Gen Edoardo QUARRA SITO) — Kocevje (Forli)
(Inf Comd: Brig/Gen Antonio CESARETTI)
Regiments: 121 Inf — Kocevje
122 Inf — Ribnica
153 Arty
154. "Murge" (Div/Gen Paride NEGRI but may be G.C.T., VI Corps) — Mostar, Yugoslavia (Cuneo)
Regiments: 259 Inf. — Mostar
260 Inf — Mostar
154 Arty
155. "Emilia" (Inf Comd: Brig/Gen Livio NEGRO) — Kotor, Montenegro (Ancona)
Regiments: 119 Inf
120 Inf
155 Arty
156. "Vicenza" (Brig/Gen Etelvaldo PASCOLINI, acting) — Russia, (Brescia)
Regiments: 227 Inf) — Remnants only
228 Inf)
156 Arty)
157. "Novara" (Div/Gen Vicenzo PACLINI) — Trieste (Trieste)
Regiments: 153 Inf — Trieste
154 Inf — Pola
157 Arty
158. "Zara" (? Gen Carlo VIALE) — Zara
Regiments: 291 Inf) Second-line — Zara
292 Inf) garrison — Zara
158 Arty) troops — Zara
159. "Veneto" (Div/Gen Luigi KRALL) — Udine - Gorizia (Novara)
Regiments: 255 Inf — Udine
256 Inf — Cividale
159 Arty
184. "Nembo (? Div/Gen Francesco RONCO) — Pistoai (Viterbo)
(Parachute)
184 Para Inf — Tarquinia
185 Para Inf — Pisa - Pistoia
184 Arty — Prato
185. "Folgore" — Destroyed in Egypt
(Parachute) — (Tarquinia)
1. "Eugenio di Savoia" (Div/Gen Cesare LOMAGLIO) — ? Karlovac, Yugoslavia
(Mobile) — (Udine)
Regiments: 12 Lt Cav
14 Lt Cav
Mob Arty (Detached from division)
11 Bersaglieri
2. "Emanuele Filiberto Testa di Ferro" — Draguignan - Fayence,
(Mobile) — France (Ferrara)
Regiments: 1 Cav
2 Cav
134 Mot Arty Regt — Nice - Cagnes
1 Bersaglieri
3. "Principe Amedeo Duca d'Aosta" — Russia (Verona)
(Div/Gen Mario MARAZZANI)
(Mobile)
Regiments: 3 Cav)
5 Cav) — Remnants only
120 Mot Arty)
3 Bersaglieri)
6 Bersaglieri)
1. "Taurinense" (Div/Gen RENZSBURI or Brig/Gen Lorenzo VIVALDA) — Mostar area Yugoslavia (Turin)
(Alpine)
Regiments: 3 Alp Inf
4 Alp Inf
1 Alp Inf
2. "Tridentina"
(Alpine)
Regiments: 5 Alp Inf) — Recently destroyed
6 Alp Inf)
2 Alp Arty)
3. "Guilia" (Div/Gen Umberto RICAGNO) — Russia (Udine)
(Alpine)
Regiments: 8 Alp Inf)
9 Alp Inf) — Recently destroyed
3 Alp Inf) — (Being reformed)
4. "Cuneense" — Russia (Cuneo)
(Alpine)
Regiments: 1 Alp Inf)
2 Alp Inf) — Recently destroyed
4 Alp Arty)
5. "Pusteria" (Div/Gen Giovanni ESPOSITO) — Grenoble, France
(Brunico)
(Alpine)
Regiments: 7 Alp Inf — Gap - Digne
11 Alp Inf — Grenoble
5 Alp Arty — ? Valence
6. "Alpi Graie" (Div/Gen Mario GIROTTI) — Aosta area
(Alpine)
Regiments: 1 Alp Group — Alessandria
2 Alp Group (detached) — Epirus, Greece
4 Alp Group — Susa
6 Alp Arty — Chambery-Aosta

Addendum:

46. "Lecce" Division — Crete
Regiments: 265 Inf — Sitea
? 341 Inf — Crete
? Arty

There are the following non-divisional regiments and equivalent units:-

Ordinary Infantry

202 Inf. Regt. — Vibo Valentia, Calabria
236 "Piceno" Inf. Regt. (from 152 Div.) — Sardinia
331 Brenner — Rhodes

Bersaglieri (mobile infantry)

2 Bersaglieri Regiment — Euboea (Rome)
4 Bersaglieri Regiment — Mostar, Yugoslavia (Turin)
10 Mobile Raggruppamento — Corsica
18 Bersaglieri Regiment Armored Cars — Siena

Grenadiers

3 "Granatieri di Sardegna" Regiment — Ajaccio area, Corsica
Special Raggruppamento "Granatieri di Sardegna"

Alpini

20 Alpini Raggruppamento (ski troops) — H.Q. Chambery

Tanks

1 Tank Regiment) — Vercelli
3 Tank Regiment) — Bologna
4 Tank Regiment) Mainly training and — Rome
32 Tank Regiment) depot troops. — Verona
33 Tank Regiment) — Parma

Cavalry

4 Cavalry Regiment — Northern Yugoslavia (Rome)
6 Cavalry Regiment — Athens area (Naples)
7 Cavalry Regiment — Thessaly, Greece, att 24 Div (Divitavecchia)
9 Cavalry Regiment — Scutari (Ferrara)
10 Cavalry Regiment — Southern France (Bologna)
13 Cavalry Regiment — Voghera
19 Cavalry Regiment — Tirana, Albania (Parma)
30 Cavalry Regiment — Palermo
Sardinian Cavalry — Cagliari

Supporting Arms

Heavy Artillery, field anti-aircraft artillery, and specialized engineer regiments (railway, bridging, and mining) are decentralized throughout the army and are only administrative units.

Coastal Divisions

201 Coastal Div. (Brig/Gen. Constantino SALVI) — ?
202 Coastal Div. (Gen. Mario Badino-Rossi — Trapani, Sicily
203 Coastal Div. — Palermo
204 Coastal Div. — Sassari, Sardinia
205 Coastal Div. — Cagliari, Sardinia
206 Coastal Div. (Gen. Achille d'HAVET) — Pachino, Sicily
207 Coastal Div. — Agrigento, Sicily
208 Coastal Div. — Messina
210 Coastal Div. — ?
211 Coastal Div. — Cittanova, Reggio, Calabria

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212 Coastal Div. (Brig/Gen Ugo MEDORI)	Catanzaro, Calabria
213 Coastal Div. (Brig/Gen Angiolo TOSI)	Catania
221 Coastal Div.	?
222 Coastal Div.	Salerno
223 Coastal Div.	Nice
224 Coastal Div.	Cannes
226 Coastal Div.	? Alate, near Ajaccio, Corsica

NOTES: Coastal divisions, which cannot be regarded as first-line units, are mainly responsible for the immediate defence of coastal regions. They are organized into regiments and battalions and are provided with a certain amount of medium artillery as well as M.G. battalions drafted from the old Frontier Guard organization. There are at present some 450 Coastal and Territorial Battalions composed of second-line troops with a low scale of equipment.

Militia

In theory all infantry divisions have a Blackshirt Legion of two battalions included in their organization; there are also a number of independent battalions. Recently many battalions have been detached from their divisions and grouped into separate formations, called "Raggruppamenti" or groups. The following have been identified:-

30 Blackshirt Raggruppamento	Sardinia (contains at least 5 battalions).
3rd January Blackshirt Raggruppamento 23rd March Blackshirt Raggruppamento "Valle Scrivia" Blackshirt Group "Montebello" Blackshirt Group	Recently destroyed in Russia. (Remnants only)

Note:

A substantial number of troops will be found at all depots. These will have some fighting value, though equipment will be inadequate.

It must be borne in mind that this order of battle is only a summary of more important units and should not be regarded as by any means a complete statement of the forces available in any area.

12 June 1943.

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #9

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES (PWB)

I. TASKS

The following tasks will be performed by the P.W.B. Combat Teams:

1. Tactical propaganda against enemy troops.
2. Local propaganda amongst the civilian population.
3. Radio propaganda.
4. Collection of propaganda intelligence.

II. METHOD

The above tasks will be accomplished by the following methods:

1. Tactical propaganda against enemy troops.

(a) Leaflets. If the local military situation permits, previously prepared leaflets of general application, but addressed to enemy troops may be distributed by means of:

(i) Patrols.

(ii) Converted 25-Pdr. base ejection smoke shells. Combat Teams will take with them 100 "mushrooms", i.e. modification of smoke shell, together with 50,000 special leaflets.

If necessary tactical leaflets can be produced locally at a later stage for distribution to enemy troops by either of these means.

(b) Loudspeakers. If available, portable loudspeakers of the Naval Fortovox type will be taken and used for front-line enemy propaganda if circumstances require and permit.

2. Local Propaganda amongst the civilian population.

(a) Posters. A supply of suitable posters will be taken by the Combat Teams for displaying in occupied localities.

(b) Leaflets and Circulars. A supply of leaflets and circulars will be taken by the Combat Teams for hand distribution amongst the civilians in occupied areas.

(c) Printing Press. Any printing press available will be taken over and used for the local production of leaflets, posters, etc., as required.

(d) Newspapers. If it is decided to continue publication of an existing newspaper, or even to launch a fresh one, the Teams will undertake this task.

NOTE : Above will be done in close liaison with AMGOT.

3. Radio Propaganda.

In the event of a local radio station being discovered intact, it will be taken over and worked in cooperation with the C.S.O.* Radio will be used for:

*Chief Signal Officer.

(a) Broadcasting announcements by C-in-C, Force Commander or Military Governor.

(b) Propaganda to civilians in HORRIFIED and the mainland.

At a later stage, as practicable, mobile radio transmission units will be landed and operated as required.

4. Intelligence.

Information will be collected regarding the morale of enemy troops and civilians for the purpose of immediate tactical and local propaganda from base. Good communications from Force Headquarters to base via Force 141 will be essential.

The principal heading for the types of information required are as follows:

(a) Attitude of military and civilians to Allied landings.

(b) Information on the political situation, both local and on the mainland.

(c) Reactions of military and civilians to our propaganda as guide to future psychological warfare.

III. LOADING SCHEDULE

Psychological personnel and vehicles will report to the CP of Task Force 343 in the vicinity of AGOUTI on D Day, on D+10 and D+30, in accordance with the following schedule, where they will stand by to be ordered in the theater of operations by this Headquarters.

FORCE 343	D - DAY	
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE	3 Officers 1 Enlisted Man	1 Car 500 lbs. leaflets 1 Typewriter 1 Desk - Small Field 2 Chairs - Folding
	D + 10	
HQ FORCE 343		
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE	4 Officers 2 Enlisted Men	2 Jeeps
	D + 30	
HQ FORCE 343		
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE	13 Officers 7 Enlisted Men	3 Jeeps 2 trucks 1/2 ton (radio) 1 truck 1 1/2 ton (loudspeaker) 1 M/C

12 June 1943.

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #11

I. COVER PLAN.

1. The Cover Plan embraces only such activities as are to deceive the enemy and does not involve any of our security in reference to the handling of our troops to prevent leakages, which would normally be picked up through our Counter Subversive system.

2. The Cover Plan for the 82d Airborne Division has been prepared. In outline, the plan is that after concentration in a certain area, parties will be sent to another area and preparations made for the move of the 82d Division to another staging area prior to the actual assault on the cover destination.

3. The use of dummy parachute landings is proposed and under consideration.

II. BEACH STUDIES.

Two hundred copies of 1/12,500 beach studies are being made, 25 going to Navy; 25 to go to Headquarters 343; 150 to the force concerned. These copies will be ready about 14 June.

III. PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION TEAMS.

Prisoner of War Interrogation teams are being ordered directly to their divisions. They will have 1/4-ton 4x4's but lack trailers.

IV. INTERPRETERS.

It has been requested that interpreters be placed on the convoy that is bringing the 45th Division. However, in the event they do not arrive, it is recommended that all Divisional G-2's, through the proper staff section, canvass their own personnel for Spanish, German, Greek, and Italian linguists, with a view to using the latter when the need arises.

V. ROAD MAPS.

Road maps will be available subject to Force 343 Engineer Distribution Plan, at the warehouse in Constantine, after June 16. This is a 1/500,000 scale road map in four colors, to be placed in every vehicle.

VI. RELIEF MODELS.

Additional relief models will be dispatched as they arrive in LAUGHTER, directly to sub-units concerned.

VII. "TARGET" BOOKLETS.

A booklet entitled "Target" will be distributed to units on the following basis; 4000 to JOSS; 4000 to SHARK; 1000 to WILDCAT; 750 to WOLF; 250 to Hq. 343.

VIII. COLLATION MAPS.

One hundred proof sheets of the final collation maps of the beach areas will be ready approximately 14 June. They are to be regarded correct as of 7 June. This headquarters will make distribution to lower echelons immediately thereafter.

IX. PUBLIC RELATIONS.

Public Relations personnel will be distributed to units as early as possible. It is considered good cover to have them dispatched to units early, as ordinarily they arrive just before a new venture is to take place. This personnel will not be classified until necessary for the actual operation but will be considered a part of the organization reference restrictions, etc.

X. CENSORSHIP.

1. One field press censor will be with Hq. 343. The purpose of this censor is to pass on all publicity material after consultation with G-2, 343, and then forward it to Force 141. No press information is allowed to pass by radio below Hq. 343 at any time until the instructions are received from Hq. 141.

2. The remaining post office, telephone, and telegraph censors will be brought over as soon as requested by Hq. 343 and will be held in readiness at the AGOUTI Headquarters of 343.

XI. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

1. Personnel and equipment for Psychological Warfare is being provided by Hq. 141. This personnel will report to Hq. 343, at AGOUTI, on approximately D Day, where they will be held in readiness until called for by Hq. 343.

2. Advance copies of Psychological Warfare leaflets will be made available to all major headquarters as soon as printed.

XII. SECURITY PASSES.

1. Two types of security passes will be issued to Corps and Division Headquarters. The white security passes are for issue to United States and British civilian organizations, such as the Red Cross. A brown security pass will also be issued for emergency use only to special individuals for counter intelligence purposes.

2. The above two types of passes are not to be confused with the passes issued by the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT), which will probably be red in color and are for the purpose of identifying civilians in their normal civilian pursuits.

3. Embossed stamps will be issued for use with the white and brown security passes.

4. Sets of three date stamps, designed to enable local pass systems to be established for employees working in docks, service installations, etc., will be issued. They are for stamping daily the actual person (e.g., wrist) of the employees on their entry to the docks or installations, etc.

XIII. CAPTURE OF ENEMY AGENTS.

1. If an enemy agent is captured in HORRIFIED, the nearest CIC officer will be notified at once.

2. This is particularly important in the case of an agent equipped with some means of communication with the enemy, such as a radio transmitter or secret ink. Such an agent must be held in custody and forwarded to Hq. 343, through channels, as quickly as possible.

3. The fact that an enemy agent has been captured must be treated with the greatest secrecy, and knowledge thereof must be strictly limited to those that require such knowledge in order that the case may be properly handled.

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12 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 12

1. NOTES ON ENEMY FORCE (ITALIAN).

a. Personalities.

GENERAL ROATTA. The Germans have published the appointment of General Roatta as Chief of the Italian General Staff in place of General Ezio Rosi. The latter succeeded General Ambrosio less than six months ago. The new Chief of Staff relinquishes the command of the Italian 6th Army (Sicily). He was Chief of Staff to the Italian forces in Spain during the Civil War but was relieved of his post as a result of the disaster of Guadalajara. In 1939 he was for a short while Military Attache in Berlin, subsequently becoming Deputy Chief of Staff to General Graziani whom he succeeded as Chief of Staff in March 1941 retaining the position until January 1942. This is therefore his second tenure of the office. He is not considered to be of outstanding military ability but is a pronounced racist and, although never proved to have pro-German learnings, nevertheless has had considerable contacts with German military circles.

ROATTA is described as capable, unscrupulous and unpleasant. He is believed to be disliked by the Germans which may explain why he has been removed from Sicily.

2. HISTORIES OF FIELD DIVISIONS IN SICILY.
(Excerpts from Intelligence Summary No. 1, dated 25 May 43)

4 'LIVORNO' Div.- Home station CUNEO. In August 1940 commanded by General GIODA (later CG X Corps, LIBYA) was stationed in the MONVISO area of N. ITALY and formed part of Italian 1st Army. Does not seem to have played any role of importance during the FRANCO-ITALIAN campaign. November 1941 moved to HOME area, probably under control of XXX Corps (lost in TUNISIA) together with 1 'SUPERGA' and 20 'FRIULI' Divisions. During September 1942 units underwent special training course at LEGHORN, but it is not known how far the T/O of the division was reorganized to justify its new titul of 'ASSAULT LANDING' like 'SUPERGA'. January 1943 was reported to be enroute to TUNISIA via SICILY. The bulk of the division (probably under direct control of 6 Army) has remained in SICILY, with HQ in the CALTANISSETTA area. Though untested in battle, troops of this division are probably of a higher quality than those of the other units on the island.

26 'ASSIETTA' Div.- Home station ASTI. Was in MONGINEVRO-BOUSSON area of the FRENCH frontier in August 1940 and formed part of the IV Corps of ITALIAN 4th Army. When IV Corps moved to ALBANIA in 1941 transferred to control of I Corps and remained in ASTI area. General GIRLANDO became CG at this time. In November 1941 moved to SICILY to replace 29 'PIEMONTE' which had been transferred to GREECE. Div Infantry proved their toughness by marching from N. ITALY to SICILY, taking a month to complete the journey. Probably of fair fighting value a year ago but the standard of the division may have deteriorated after months of comparative inactivity and garrison duties.

28 'AOSTA' Div.- Home station PALERMO. Has remained near its peace-time station under the control of XII Corps since the outbreak of war. Cannot be rated highly as a fighting division and has had no battle experience.

54 'NAPOLI' Div.- Home station CALTANISSETTA. Included in the peace-time station under the control of XII Corps since the outbreak of war. Cannot be rated highly as a fighting division and has had no battle experience.

3. NUCLEI CELERI (MOBILE UNITS)

According to a P/W report the "Nuclei Celeri", of which six have been identified in SICILY, are motorized and have the same armament as infantry. They would be used as "holding" forces in the event of an invasion, and in the case of an attack by parachutiests on an aerodrome would be rushed to its defence.

The No. 1 Nucleo Celere identified at BACELONA appears to consist of:

Special R/35 Tank Co.
A/Tk Co.
M.G. Co.
Inf. Co.
Arty. Co.

4. ITALIAN COASTAL DIVISIONS.
(Excerpts from Intelligence Summary No. 3 and 4 dated, 3 June 43 and 7 June 43, respectively)

a. HISTORY

Territorial battalions were founded two years ago. The defenses of the mainland were then supplemented with two main Army units of the Fascist milita. Personnel came from depots and consisted of men with little training and scanty equipment. The anti-parachutist units of 25 to 50 men are off shoots of territorial battalions. There are now some four to five hundred anti-parachutist units.

In 1941, coastal defenses were included in the responsibility of the territorial battalions. In March 42, over four hundred battalions were identified. They were then formed into regiments and divisions. In the beginning regimental and divisional headquarters were purely administrative; later a nucleous staff was capable of handling the battalions. The development of coastal divisions proceeded more rapidly in SICILY than elsewhere. In 1943 there were 450 coastal battalions with better armor as before. Men are mainly armed with rifles and hand grenades and they now have machine gun corps and artillery, and support of medium artillery from the Corps pool.

Lately the following improvements have been made:

Younger classes of recruits, signal personnel, increase in support weapons (47-32 8T guns, heavy machine guns and mortars), strength increased from 400 to 600 men. While in general the divisions are static and have no field artillery, in SICILY mobile groups have recently been created. They form a mobile reserve for certain divisions.

Coastal divisions have been identified also in France, the Balkans, Russia, North Africa and the Agean Island. The constituents were taken from the less vunerable part of ITALY.

b. ORGANIZATION.

The term "coastal" describes the role of a unit and not its organization. There is only an outline which can be made of coastal division organization.

a. Originally, coastal battalions were like armed home defense battalions made up of troops unfit for front line service. Their T/O was elastic.

The now prevailing standard organization in SICILY is estimated to be as follows: -

HQ Platoon consisting of Administrative section, Signals section, Observer section, Scout section, Supply section and men.
Four Companies.

Each company is organized as follows:
HQ, consisting of services personnal and employed men.
Two rifle platoons, each of three sections.
Two Machine-gun Platoons, each of three (? four) sections.

c. WEAPONS.

24 Light Machine-gun and 28 Heavy Machine-gun per battalion. That means one light machine-gun per rifle section. Four extra machine-guns are supplied in Headquarters. The strength of the battalion is probably about 600. The T/O strength is in the neighborhood of 800. The figure of 600 reported from Sicily represents the effective strength. There were recent steps to bring the SICILIAN coastal battalions up to T/O.

d. Coastal bns seem to be organized in Regiments of two to five bn with anti-tank companies and MG companies.

e. Organization of coastal divisions in SICILY:

Divisional HQ
Two to five coastal regiments
One A/Tk battalion
One or two Machine-gun Battalions
Three of four Coastal Defence batteries
One Mortar Company
Engineers, sub-allotted from field forces
Services

f. In SICILY larger units called "Nuclei Celeri" have been identified. They contain one or more infantry companies, probably motorised, a machine-gun company, an anti-tank company, a company of light tanks and some artillery. It seems that there is one per each coastal division, and that their role is to defend the airdromes.

g. 300 Coastal Bns are in ITALY, SICILY, SARDINIA, CORSICA AND ITALIAN OCCUPIED FRANCE, approximately amounting to 18,000 men if headquarters personnel, supporting arms, services, etc., are included, the figure comes up to 250,000.

h. Morale is described as low. In the last frew months units may have been brought up to strength by reinforcements of younger and more vigorous men. It is also believed that the coastal units are receiving additional weapons in recent months. It is, therefore, presumed that morale is rising and efficiency increasing since last year but these units are still inferior to most other Italian units.

14 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #14

PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE PLAN ON AND AFTER D DAY
INTERPRETATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS

1. On D Day, a Photo Interpretation Unit composed of five officers and six enlisted men, a photographic laboratory, the 66th Topographic Company, and an Artillery Officer for selecting counter-battery targets, will be located in the vicinity of the airdrome where the flights of photographic reconnaissance aircraft are based (in the vicinity of Tunis).

2. By D Day, each division in the task force will have at its C.P., attached to the G-2 Section, a competent photographic interpreter.

3. It is planned to cover the period D to approximately D+4 with three routine photographic sorties; in general, one at daylight, one during the day, and one in the late afternoon. Special photo missions will be flown in the next flight after receipt.

4. An interpretation report should, under favorable circumstances, reach the headquarters of the unit making the request within six hours of initiating the request.

5. In addition to the foregoing, an Observation Squadron will be available for pin-point observation photography and visual reconnaissance. These flights will be flown upon receipt, subject to priority as determined by XII Air Support Command.

6. Requests for photographic sorties will be handled through channels as follows:

a. JOSS to 3d3 (afloat) to Rear C.P. (ashore) to 3d Photo Group.
b. CENT or DIME to SHARK to 3d3 (afloat) to Rear C.P. (ashore) to 3d Photo Group.
c. There is no objection on the part of G-2, 3d3, for direct communication from JOSS, SHARK, CENT or DIME to Rear C.P. (ashore) direct, if it is technically possible to do so.
d. Copies of prints will be forwarded by water, if possible, after the radio report has been dispatched.

7. The foregoing is the plan for D to D+4. From D+4 to D+8, some photo aircraft will be landed at C.P., 3d3. Some interpreters will be brought over for duty at 3d3; one piece of equipment, capable of two prints only, will be available at C.P., 3d3. Two-way courier service, twice daily, will be instituted, and quantity reproduction of selected prints or sorties will be established at that time. Reproduction is definitely limited. All available stocks in the British Isles are now being diverted to this effort. It has been indicated that the United States is supplying the Pacific and other Allies, and none is available from the United States. If 20 copies of any sortie are required, 6000 prints are necessary. The capacity of the land-based multi-printer is 600 prints per hour.

8. All unit interpreters must be kept informed in reference to particular targets to look for in advance of the attack and must be kept informed as to location of friendly front line units to avoid delays occasioned by generalities.

9. It is understood that requested missions will be only tactical and that should strategic missions be required for any reason, these missions will clear through 14d. No air boundaries are contemplated.

16 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 16.

I. ITALIAN COAST WATCHING PROCEDURE.

The following captured Italian documents deals with coast watching in LIBYA but is of interest as furnishing a possible indication of Italian practice:

VI (AOSTA) Group of MG Squadron (I Squadron)

Subject: Guard Posts.

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1. Total number of guards watching the coast is 36, six for each post.

2. Location of posts: No. 1 - Homs road 22 km; No. 2 - Homs road 25 km; (Tower of OSTUNI); No. 3 - Homs road 29 km; No. 4 - Homs road 32 km; No. 5 - Homs road 38 km; No. 6 - Homs road 41 km.

3. Distance between sentries and guard posts: No. 1 - about 80 metres; No. 2 - sentries are in the post itself; No. 3 - about 7 metres; No. 4 - about 10 metres; No. 5 - about 20 metres; No. 6 - about 30 metres.

4. Communications - Runner: One Verey pistol for signalling at each post.

5. Arms available at each post: Machine gun and three rifles. Machine gun is in position near sentry.

6. Ammunition consists of 1100 rounds for each MG and six clips for each rifle. MG ammunition belts are kept in the proper boxes which are kept near the MG. Emergency equipment is in covers, and clips for rifles in pouches.

7. Instructions have been given to post commanders to keep in close touch with the sentries, and explain to them their responsibility for the security of the post and in particular, to train their men in the better handling of the weapons on issue to them.

8. Orders have been given to guards that no fires of any description will be lighted except in exceptional circumstances for signalling at night; that in the event of fires breaking out they will be extinguished with sand, water or any other means available.

9. Any orders that may be received from Group Headquarters are at once passed on and explained to post commanders and sentries.

10. Tasks - Inspect the stretch of coast from the 21 km to 42 km mark and all approaches from the sea in the area. Report immediately any possible landing in the area, and in the meantime engage the enemy. Landing will be signalled from the post which gives the alarm by two red rockets - danger signal - two green rockets will be sent up for danger past. Signals will be repeated at intervals until the O.P. in the tower of OSTUNI acknowledges them by sending up the same signals. In the event of the Verey pistols not working, fires will be lighted. From every O.P. periodical inspections will be made in the immediate neighborhood of the coastal area. Sentries will challenge anyone who approaches. The Post Commander will be summoned and will proceed to check identity by demanding the pass-word.

Further, should any post sight possible enemy aircraft, squadron headquarters will be notified by quickest possible means (including emergency equipment). Squadron headquarters will at once pass the information to Group Headquarters in accordance with the latter's instructions.

II. ITALIANS IN THE ATTACK.

The following captured document illustrates a frequent Italian weakness failure to organize a defensive position after a successful advance.

TO ALL OFFICERS

It often happens that an attacking unit, if it attains the objective without having to fight, or barely having to fight, not only passes beyond the objective, but sometimes stops at the objective, considering its action completed. Not only does this break the rules of discipline, but neglects the most elementary precautions of defense and safety, seeing that the men put themselves in full view and break ranks to gape around, and spread out. The consequences that may derive from such inconceivable conduct are evident and comprehensible. It occurs at the very most critical and difficult phase of the action, when enemy reaction is to be expected more or less immediately, either in the form of gun fire or counter-attack.

The regulations in such a case are clear and explicit, and therefore I do not deem it necessary to quote their contents since they constitute the basis of technical professional training, I wish, however, to make quite clear certain tactical exigencies which should be kept in mind and practiced.

(1) During the execution of the attack:
- (a) Cover your exposed flank with the MG platoon.
- (b) Keep flanking units in view and coordinate your fire with theirs.
- (c) See that units don't get mixed up.
- (d) Overcome the tendency to close up.

(2) During rest periods:
- (a) Keep the unit under control.
- (b) Dispose units in the best positions for observation and fire.

(3) When the objective is obtained:
- (a) Proceed immediately and speedily beyond the objective and organize a defensive position (use your sappers).
- (b) Maintain the greatest cohesion, keeping under cover from fire and view.
- (c) Get your weapons into position.
- (d) Re-form the reserves.
- (e) Watch the flanks.

The above reveals implicitly the vital task of the section in infantry fighting, and therefore the application of the above is the specific job of the N.C.O.

Company and platoon commanders will insist, will insist; will insist (sic) in the above, not forgetting, of course, that the training of the individual soldier facilitates the carrying out of these elementary rules, which, if they do nothing else, avoid useless sacrifices.

17 June 1943.

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #17

I THE MESSINA FERRY

Compiled from Force 141 Intelligence Summaries Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (30 May - 7 June 1943)

The MESSINA straits are the Sicilian life line across which the bulk of reinforcements of men and material will flow, supplemented by shipping to the Eastern ports of CATANIA, SYRACUSE and AUGUSTA. Traffic to PALERMO and TRAPANI will not be great unless the ports enjoy a long spell of immunity from attack.

Photo reconnaissance reveals that of the five train ferries available on 29 May, only one appeared to be serviceable. One was sunk at one of the MESSINA piers, a second was burnt out and still alongside at MESSINA, two more were under repair at TARANTO, while the fifth is apparently still active, and on 1 June was seen in transit between SAN GIOVANNI and MESSINA.

The breakdown of the ferry service is apparently being felt and causing some rail congestion at both sides of the Straits, as the following number of mixed rolling stock (excluding passenger cars) were seen on 29 May:-

MESSINA	440
GIOVANNI	350
REGGIO	357
	1147

Railway activity at MESSINA was apparently stopped for several days (29 - 30 - 31 May) as a result of air raids, while on 29 May a main coast line railway bridge at REGGIO was seen to have been destroyed.

Photo reconnaissance shows that as a result of air attacks on 21 and 24 May on SAN GIOVANNI, both rail ferry termini at this port were put out of action. A building which believed to contain the mechanism for the ferry termini was completely destroyed.

However, damage to train ferries and ports can be at least partially made up by the use of lighters, which can ply from beach to beach across the Strait. Photo reconnaissance on 1 June showed 8 Siebel Ferries to have arrived at MESSINA while on 3 June 12 Siebels and 5 F-boats were observed along the coast between REGGIO and SAN GIOVANNI. The small amount of shipping seen in the Sicilian ports in recent weeks serves to support the view that the main supply is still across the Straits.

II. ITALIAN COASTAL DEFENSE (Extracted from instructions from C.D. units, from Force 141 Intelligence Summary No. 4)

Sentries are authorized to give the signal of alert only in cases of extreme danger. In other cases the signal of alert will be given by the Commander of the Post. Should the sentry sight a formation of enemy ships approaching the coast, he must immediately call the Sergeant of the guard, who, after having ascertained the actual danger, will immediately give the alert, with green and red rockets. This signal is to be repeated every three minutes. The platoon leader is to be immediately informed and will send the information immediately to the Company Commander by every available means of communication.

When the sentry sees the alert signal fired by other shore patrol posts, he is to inform the Post Commander. The Commander after having ascertained that the alarm signal has been repeated, will answer by firing one green and one red rocket.

18 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 18.

The following excerpts from Air Intelligence Estimate prepared by A-2 of XII Air Support Command 14 June, are reproduced as additional information, covering Part 2, (a) Enemy Air Situation of G-2 Estimate No. 3, Force 343, dated 9 June.

1. Location Different Types of Enemy Planes.

a. To estimate the effective combat strength of the German and Italian Air Forces on D day of the forthcoming operation, it is not sufficient to state merely how many planes of what type are likely to be located on the airfields of Sicily, Southern Italy, and Sardinia, respectively. A certain number of single-engine fighters, for instance, must be held in Southern Italy at the airdromes around Naples and other important cities for defense of those cities along, where they will be well beyond their normal range for attack on our landing forces. Other fighter planes similarly must be held out of range in Sardinia for the same reason, and can not be brought over to Sicily.

b. Long Range JU 88 Bombers, torpedo bombers, and long range ME 110 and 210 fighters, on the other hand, will be more effective against our forces if they are based out of Sicily on the many large and well dispersed airfields around Naples, Rome, Foggia, Taranto, etc., where they will be less subject to attack and destruction on the ground by our bombing and intruder planes. These bomber bases, combined with those in Southern Sardinia, are strategically well located from an Axis point of view as they all lie within an arc of 280 to 350 miles from the Biscari-Comiso area in Sicily, which is excellent bombing range. Therefore, the number of JU 88's or long range two engine fighters now located in Sicily itself, is of no importance.

c. The single-engine Axis fighters in Sicily, and at Reggio on the toe of Italy, on the other hand, will be an effective striking force within their normal range of the southern beaches, whereas those that must be held in Sardinia, or around Naples, and other parts of Central Italy out of striking range should not be considered as directly affecting operations of XII ASC and Force 343. However, in view of the mobility of fighter squadrons, it is of little importance on what particular Sicilian field such planes are now, or are likely to be, located on D day. Also the airfield at Reggio on the toe of Italy is within 110 miles of the beaches, and should be considered as a part of Sicily from an air point of view.

2. Estimated Changes Now to D Day.

a. It is impossible to estimate accurately how many Axis planes will be destroyed on the gound and in the air by our bombers and fighters between now and D day, but every effort will be made to atempt their fighters to come up and engage in combat.

b. It is impossible also to estimate accurately the general conditions that will exist on the German-Russian front by D day, which will determine how many planes the Axis can bring down from the theatre to the Mediterranean. Every effort will be made, however, to hold many German fighters in France and Germany by means of a steadily increasing concentration of American and British bombing attacks from our bases in England.

c. It is well established, however, that the German Air Force has had a very hard winter, particularly in the Western Desert and in Tunisia, that her overall air strength has been declining, and that she has been scraping the bottom of the barrel of her reserves, with particular difficulty in providing enough trained crews for replacement. It is doubtful, therefore, that she can bring in many air reinforcements from her Western Front, and it is also known that her air strength in such areas as the Balkans has already been reduced to a bare minimum. In that area of Greece, Crete, and the Dodecanese Islands, for instance, latest reports show a total of only 160 aircraft of all types with a serviceability ratio of under 50%. Adequate servicing has been a growing difficulty in all theatres.

d. To be conservative, it is best to estimate that more Axis aircraft will be brought in from the Russian and other fronts, than will be destroyed by our air forces between now and D day. Germany also will try to spring some surprises. For instance, she may have upwards of 50 torpedo bombers with trained crews operating in the past out of Norway against Russian-bound convoys, which she might decide to bring down to Grossetto, Italy, or Sardinian bases for operation against an invasion fleet. Obviously, the Axis is well aware of the great concentration of shipping and invasion barges in North African ports.

3. Reconciliation of "Estimates" with Latest Photo Cover.

a. The following table of D day "Estimates" will show some discrepancies from the reports of the present location of Axis aircraft based on the latest photo cover. Axis fighter strength on the island has been building up from approximately 370 on May 13th, to 450 on May 21st, and 483 on May 31st, plus 27 in Reggio, or a total of 510. Further

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build-up before D day to 555 fighters and fighter-bombers would seem to be a fair estimate. Incidentally, distribution on the latest photographic interpretations showed 115 fighters on the three southern Sicilian fields, 179 in the Catania-Gerbini area in the East, and 239 on the Western Sicilian airfields, plus 27 on the toe of Italy at Reggio. All such fighter distribution however, can change over night.

b. Photo reports how that JU 88's have been moving out of Sicily, reducing the total to 73, which is entirely logical in order to place their bomber strength at the effective range and better protection afforded by Southern Sardinia, and the Rome-Naples-Foggia-Taranto area. The reports also show only 21 long range ME 110 and 210 fighter and fighter-bombers still in Sicily. It is estimated below that there will be about 100 of these planes within effective range (280-360 miles) of our landings by D day.

c. Photo reports show 80 miscellaneous and 42 unidentified planes in Sicily, which is not inconsistent with the following estimate of 300 less-important and non-combat types within the whole effective area. Most of the reconnaissance, coastal seaplanes, and miscellaneous types would normally operate back away from the zones of threatened invasion.

4. Estimate of Enemy Air Strength on D Day. (The following table includes only those planes expected to be within their effective operating range of our landing forces. It is arranged by types in the order of estimated importance):

		ESTIMATED QUANTITY	
		Total	Serviceable
a.	Long Range German JU 88 Bombers	* 290	190
b.	Single Engine German ME 109 fighters	200	130
c.	Single Engine Italian fighters (Macchi 200, 202, 205, and RE 2001)	300	130
d.	German two engine ME 110 and 210 fighters	100	66
e.	Single Engine German FW 190 fighter-bombers	55	36
f.	Italian S.M. 79, and S.M. 84 torpedo-bombers	50	22
g.	German JU 88 and HE 111 bomber-recce	35	22
h.	Italian bomber-recce S.M. 79, S.M. 84 CZ. 1007	80	36
i.	Italian coastal Cs 501 and Cs 506	80	36
j.	German JU 87 dive bombers	20	14
k.	German ME 109 Army Co-op	10	6
l.	Italian Army Co-op Cs 311, 312, and 313	25	12
	TOTALS	1245	700

. * Includes perhaps 30-50 torpedo-bombers

5. Reduction of Italian Planes to German Equivalents.

a. The above totals do not show a true picture, as they add German planes and Italian planes together, whereas it may safely be stated that all German types are superior to their counterpart in the Italian Air Force, and that many of the Italian types are obsolescent. Opinions will vary as to relative effectiveness, but for the purpose of this "estimate", an overall ration of 50% might not be far off; at least, it would be much closer to the facts than any figures which gave equal weight to Italian and German planes alike. This would reduce the above overall total of 1,245 planes to 977, of which 582 might be considered serviceable at any one time.

b. Even these totals, however, should be further broken down to separate the effective combat types from the non-combat and miscellaneous, as follows:

	TOTAL	SERVICEABLE
(1) Bombers, fighters, and fighter-bombers	800	490
(2) Recce, coastal, and miscellaneous	177	92

19 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #21

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS PLAN, OPERATION HUSKY

1. PLAN.

a. Division CIC sections will land with assault troops on D-Day and accomplish CI missions assigned by the C.O.'s of their respective divisions, based on a directive from this headquarters and supplemented by specific missions assigned by this headquarters.

b. Corps CIC sections will be coordinated with Division sections at the discretion and direction of the C.O. of the Corps and will relieve Division sections of static responsibility, thus freeing them for movement with their divisions.

c. Port Sections "A" and "B", Force 343, will land on D-Day with assault troops of LION at FIBULA and with assault troops of TIGER at FEDERAL.

These Port Sections will:

(1) Assume responsibility for Port Security. NOTE: This will include close cooperation with the 1st Engineer Special Brigade and will cover security of "over the beach" supply which is their responsibility.
(2) Relieve LION, TIGER or SHARK sections of Port Security responsibility.
(3) Make and maintain close liaison with ONI or Navy personnel present, and AMGOT representatives.

d. Field Section, Force 343, will land on D-Day at FIBULA, reinforce the Port Section if necessary, assume responsibility for C.I. coverage in FIBULA, and support movement to west or north as required.

e. Port Security Special Detail (3 men) will land on D-Day at discretion and direction of C.O. and will assist in Port Security missions at LADBROKE.

f. Port Security sections will be maintained on an extremely flexible basis in order to cover all ports which may be taken subsequent to D-Day. These sections remain under the direct supervision of Force 343.

2. OPERATION

a. Information, papers, charges, etc., secured by CIC sections, will reach Headquarters Force 343 through regular G-2 channels. Information of tactical or strategic importance will clear through the unit G-2 and will be dispatched to Headquarters Force 343.

b. The Port sections landing at FIBULA and FEDERAL will assume responsibility for Port Security at the earliest possible moment. Subsequent to organization of the port for security, each section will be organized into two separate sections. One of these will be alerted for immediate movement (if required) at any time after D plus 3.

c. On D plus (dependent on progress), when attack on JARROCKS is imminent, one-half of Port Section "A", at FIBULA, will move west and assume responsibility for Port Security upon occupation of JARROCKS. This will relieve CI Section, LION, for movement. Additional personnel from Field Section - Force 343, will move west and support LION section in attack on FLOODLE, which should develop at about the same time. Personnel from Port Section "B", at FEDERAL, will move to FIBULA as replacement. NOTE: This is based on assumption that FIBULA develops into more important supply road than FEDERAL. If over the beach supply becomes of paramount importance, the two port sections will coordinate their efforts in collaboration with the security requirements of 1st Engineer Special Brigade, which is responsible for supply and which will form the foundation for the Base Section which will follow.

d. The same Port Section procedure, of placing additional personnel in support of attacks on ports, will be followed on D plus (dependent on progress) when attack develops (west of JARROCKS) on INVINCIBLE. This same procedure will be followed at a much later D plus date, when attacks develop on north coast at NORMFIED on ports in front of DIME and CENT forces.

3. GENERAL.

a Countersigns and Paroles.

A countersign and parole, with alternate, will be issued by this headquarters for use from 1800B, D-1, to 1800, D+1. Thereafter, the use of countersigns and paroles will be as directed by sub-task commanders.

20 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #22

OBSERVATION AND PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

I. GENERAL.

The two organizations that will be available for aerial reconnaissance are, first, the 3d North African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing, which uses planes similar to our P-38s, and the other, for visual observation, is the 111th Observation Squadron, using type T-51 planes. As described below, the communication and command channels are different.

II. 111th OBSERVATION SQUADRON.

1. Administrative Details.

a. Nine missions, composed of 18 sorties per day, will be available.

b. Planes will be based on Cape Bon. This will also be the location of the Rear CP of the XII Air Support Command. The 111th Observation Squadron will be under the direct command of the XII A.S.C. and all missions will be flown on their order. Sometime after D+2, and possibly before D+5, the squadron will be based on HORNFIED.

c. One mission (two sorties) reserved for JOSS, two missions (four sorties) reserved for SHARK, daily until noon, unless advised otherwise by this Headquarters if and when available.

2. Requests for Missions.

a. The normal procedure will be for units to place their requests with their Air Support Party, which will, in turn, radio XII A.S.C. at CP of Task Force 343. The priorities of missions will be determined by representatives of G-2, G-3, Force 343, and XII A.S.C.

b. Urgent missions may be flown on three hours' notice.

3. Procedure of Obtaining results.

a. Direct radio to CP 343, giving sketchy reply from plane while in the air.

b. Radio from landing field on Cape Bon to CP, 343, after initial interrogation of the pilot.

c. Radio from the landing field to CP, 343, after interrogation and initial interpretation of the photograph, if taken, by photo interpreters at the landing field.

d. Photographs, if taken, will also be flown to Photo Interpretation Section, Hq. 343, located at La Marsa, where they will be interpreted, and a further final report, if anything new is discovered, will proceed through normal channels from the Rear CP, 343, to Forward CP, 343.

4. Pre-Planned Missions.

a. See overlay for missions requested by Hq. 343 to XII A.S.C. at Corps and Division Headquarters.

b. See memorandum, this Hq., dated 19 June 1943, on air observation to Commanding General, XII Air Support Comd, showing the actual missions requested.

c. All units, in asking their requests, will make certain that the mission they require is not included amongst the daily missions shown in letter, this Hq., 19 June 1943.

d. Night observation missions as shown in letter 19 June referred to above.

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III. PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS.

1. Administrative Procedure.

The North African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing will fly four missions per day from La Marsa airfield. Hq. Task Force 343 Photographic Interpretation Unit and the Photo Laboratory will be established at this field. Photographs will be developed, interpreted, and the information radioed to the Forward CP as fast as received. It is estimated that an average of six hours will be required for the whole process.

2. Pre-Planned Missions.

a. See overlay dated 20 June for routine missions at CPs of Corps and Divisions.

b. See Annex to G-2 Bulletin #22, this Hq., 17 June 1943, listing sorties that will be flown automatically.

IV. NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHIC MISSIONS.

Any shift of troops disclosed in the late afternoon photographic missions will be followed by night photography.

V. MAPS

1. The map to be used for identifying targets throughout the task force will be the 1/100,000 map of HORRIFIED. Missions requested will be further identified by the use of the British Grid system.

17 June 1943

ANNEX TO G-2 BULLETIN #22.

VI. PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE UNIT - ROUTINE MISSIONS.

a. D Day.
(1) Flown after 1400B. Three sorties commencing at 5000 yards inland from AGRIGENTO - ARAGONA to general line POZZALLO - RAGUSA - VIZZINI, all exclusive.

b. D/1.
(1) Flown in morning. Three sorties commencing at 5000 yards inland from AGRIGENTO - ARAGONA to general line POZZALLO - RAGUSA - VIZZINI, all exclusive.
(2) The fourth sortie D/1 to be flown after 1400B, parallel to coast to overlap inland morning sortie further north.

c. D/2. Early Mission.
(1) Two parallel; northern one to embrace and include highway VIZZINI - CALTAGIRONE - PIAZZA ARMERINA - CALTANISSETTA - AGRIGENTO - PORTO EMPEDOCLE.
(2) The third sortie from LICATA on the coastal road to CASTELVETRANO.

d. D/3.
(1) Same as first flight, D/2, along general route VIZZINI - CALTANISSETTA - AGRIGENTO.
(2) Main highway CALTANISSETTA, road junction LERCARAFREDDI, then south on secondary road to AGRIGENTO.
(3) Main highway AGRIGENTO - PALERMO.

e. D/4.
(1) one sortie CALTANISSETTA - ENNA - LEONFORTE - SPERLINGA - PEFALAIA toward TERMINI IMMERSE.
(2) Three sorties each originating at AGRIGENTO:
(i) North through LERCARAFREDDI, thence east on main highway toward CALTANISSETTA.
(ii) CALTANISSETTA - AGRIGENTO thence northwest on main road toward PALERMO.
(iii) AGRIGENTO toward CASTELVETRANO.

f. D/5 -

Same as e above (D/4).

19 June 1943

SUBJECT : Request for Observation Missions.

TO : Commanding General, XII Air Support Command.

1. Daily observation missions to locate troop movements are requested.

a. Observations on D-day are listed in order of priority below. On D/1 and each day thereafter eliminate the first two missions below and perform the balance in the same priority. See overlay. Night missions nightly beginning night of D/1, D/2, are shown on the same overlay.

(1) Request visual reconnaissance of beach from LICATA to POZZALLO supplemented by low oblique photo strip if feasable. Required: landing progress and approximate depth of penetration of our troops between points designated. Report mission not later than 1000B. This mission to be flown D-day only.

(2) Repeat No. 1 mission at 1100B. Report required not later than 1300B, D-day.

(3) Request visual reconnaissance - road CANICATTI - CAMPOBELLO - LICATA as to any enemy concentrations or troop movements south, giving size and type (foot, motorized, armored, etc). Take oblique photo strip of all enemy observed. Report by 1100B. Photos to have first priority.

(The above reconnaissance will be applicalbe to the following missions as to information and time of reporting.)

(4) Request visual reconnaissance of the PIAZZA ARMERINA - GELA road movement South.

(5) Request visual reconnaissance of the RAGUSA - COMISO - VITTORIA road, as far west as the ACATE river. Report any movement West.

(6) Request visual reconnaissance of the AGRIGENTO - PALMA DI MONTECHIARO - LICATA road. Report any movement Southeast.

(7) Request visual reconnaissance of the S. MICHELE - CALTAGIRONE - GRAMMICHELE - VIZZINI road. Report any movement East or West.

(8) Request visual reconnaissance of the CANICATTI - SERRADIFALCO - S. CATALDO - CALTANISSETTA - PIAZZA ARMERINA road, East or West.

(9) Request visual reconnaissance of the SCIACCA - RIBERA - PORTO EMPEDOCLE road, southeast.

(10) Request visual reconnaissance of the main road running Northwest from AGRIGENTO through RAFFADALI - S. STEFANO. Report any movement to the South.

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(10) Request visual reconnaissance of the main road running Northwest from AGRIGENTO through RAFFADALI - S. STEFANO. Report any movement to the South.

b. Night Observation.

(1) D Day: (night of)

(a) Road junction at H-330450
(b) Road junction at H-276376
(c) Road junction at G-940345
(d) Road junction at H-538175
(e) Road at western edge of VITTORIA - H-465182.

(2) D/1, D/2, D/3, D/4: (nightly)

(a) Road junction at eastern edge of PALMA DI MONTECHIARO - G-795438.
(b) Road junction at CAMPOBELLO - G-925508.
(c) Road Junction at CANICATTI - G-865623.
(d) Road junction at CALTANISSETTA - H-050770.
(e) Road junction at H-328645.
(f) Road junction at H-330450.
(g) Road junction at H-465485 - CALTAGIRONE.
(h) Road junction at H-670410 - VIZZINI.
(i) Road junction at H-625265 - CHIARAMONTE.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Adjutant General.

20 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #23
(Supersedes G-2 General Information Bulletin #4 and supplements 1, 2 & 3.)

Extracted from COMNAVNAW - Operation Plan No. 2-43, Annex A.

FINAL BEACH EVALUATION

1. BEACH 73 - PUNTA DI GAFFI.

Coordinates : G 85453790 - G 872360
Length : 2800 yds
Width : 5 - 20 yds

Sea approach clear. The beach lies in the shallow cove between PUNTI DI GAFFI and ROCCA SAN NICOLA; 2 miles southeastward about 200 yds east of PUNTA DI GAFFI, is a prominent tower 60' high close to the edge of a 60' cliff. ROCCA SAN NICOLA is 100' high. These points should serve as leading marks for close approach. The 3-fathom contour is 600 yds off PUNTA DI GAFFI and about 750 yds off the beach. The inshore gradient is estimated to be about 1:100.

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The narrow beach, of mixed sand and shingle, is backed by a cliff 30 - 60 ft high. Near the northwest end of the beach there is a break in the cliff at a stream mouth and near the southeast end a depression extends to the beach. About halfway between these two breaks in the cliff is SORGENTE DEL PISCIOTTO, believed to be a spring from which an aqueduct runs to LICATA. At this place there is a conspicuous building at the top of the cliff (60 ft high) and halfway down the cliff, another building. Also visible from seaward are the mouths of tunnels in the cliff in the vicinity apparently serving as caches for wells, but which could also serve as machine gun positions. Concrete blocks have been placed along the beach in the vicinity as a protection against coast erosion. Behind the entire beach, the immediate hinterland is cultivated with vineyards.

EXITS: Between the stream mouth and TORRE DI GAFFI, three foot paths wind up the cliff and lead a short distance to unpaved roads. Infantry could undoubtly work their way up the stream bed. From the break in the cliff at the southeast end of the beach, a path or undeveloped road leads inland over a highly cultivated area. With some development, this offers some possibilities for exit of vehicles. For tanks, vehicles or maintenance, this beach is considered to be very poor.

2. BEACH 72 - STA. MOLLARELLA (2)

Coordinates : G 88923420 - G 89073390.
Length : 400 yds. (entrance 350 yds. wide)
Width : 20 yds.

The distant sea approach is clear but both ends of beach are flanked by rocks. ROCCA MOLLARELLA (MUDDAFEDDA), 82' high, and connected to mainland by low sandy isthmus should be prominent land mark on approach from westward. The shore from the northern end of the beach to ROCCA SAN NICOLA (about 1 mi) is rockbound except for one small sandy cove about halfway. Estimated gradient about 1;50.

EXITS: Off the northern end of the beach, the land rises steeply to a small plateau with elevation 273' at MT. POLISCIA. Skirting this feature, on the southern side, a minor track runs from near the center of the beach over partial cultivation and consolidated sand dunes to join the old stream bed from Beach 71 and other tracks leading to the MONTECHIARO - LICATA highway about 3000 yds inland.

3. BEACH 71 - STA. MOLLARELLA (1)

Coordinates : G892338 - G 896338.
Length : 450 yds (but approach only 200 yds wide)
Width : 40 yds.

Sea approach clear but unless ROCCA MOLLARELLA (MUDDAFEDDA) can be clearly identified, near approach is hazardous because of rocky shores and underwater rocks flanking both sides of the entrance. The cove is well sheltered for daytime use.

Depths inside the cove are probably about 10 ft. with average gradient to the beach about 1:65.

The beach is of soft sand and the old stream bed which empties into the cove at the Eastern end is also soft sand which would be difficult for vehicles. The stream bed is dry in summer.

EXITS: At the extreme eastern end of the cove there is a fairly steep track which joins the undeveloped road leading over ground rising to 350 ft. and over-looking LICATA from westward. The dry stream bed is crossed by other tracks a short distance inland. The main MONTECHIARO - LICATA road is about 3000 yds inland.

4. BEACH 70-B - FALCONARA (2)

Coordinates : G 982346 - H 00403475.
Length : 2800 yds
Width : 20 - 60 yds.

Seaward approach is clear. The 3-fathom contour is about 1200 yds. offshore. There is an irregular cusped bar about 300 ft. offshore with irregular depths over it. Near the western end of the beach the gradient out to a point 650 ft is estimated as about 1:60.

The beach is of soft sand drifted into low sand dunes. It is backed by low land which increases slightly in height toward the eastern end, and by cultivation (mostly vineyards); many small paths lead across the cultivation to the main road. Three small stream beds (probably dry) open onto the beach, the largest near the eastern end. Just to eastward of the eastern end of the beach there is a steeply rising hill 115 ft high.

EXITS: By paths across beach and cultivation to Road No. 115 which is the main road between GELA and LICATA. The road roughly parallels the beach, being inland 350 yds at the western end and about 175 yds at the eastern end.

The standard gauge LICATA - GELA railroad is just inland of the highway at the ends of the beach but curves inland to pass back of slight hill backing the left-center of the beach.

5. BEACH 70-A - FALCONARA (1).

Coordinates : H 013347 - H 027345.
Length : 1600 yds
Width : 30 - 50 yds.

The 5-fathom curve is about 1500 yds offshore. Seaward approach is clear. There are charted rocks close in shore between this beach and No. 70B. The rocky patch is near the mouth of the gorge which is marked by the steeply rising hill about 115' high on its western coastal bank. About 500 yds eastward of this beach is PUNTA DEI DUE ROCCHI which consists of 2 conspicuous above-water rocks connected by sandy spit to mainland. Submerged reefs and underwater rocks with less than 10 ft cover extend about 500 yds in the area marked by PUNTA DEI DUE ROCCHI.

The bar or "false beach" is not very evident in front of this beach and gradients out to first recorded soundings run from 1;65 to 1;100.

The beach is of fairly firm sand, becoming stony toward the eastern end. A large stream in a fairly deep gorge enters onto the beach a little to east of its center. Westward from this point the beach is backed by a low steep bank and to the eastward by low sand dunes.

EXITS: Over barren land dotted with isolated small trees to main GELA - LICATA road about 250 yds inland at western end of beach to 550 yds where the road loops inland to cross the gorge and back to about 450 yds at the eastern end of the beach which is marked by a small stream bed, probably dry. The railroad is just inland of the highway and roughly parallels it. Along the stretch it is built on an embankment which is probably visible to ships close inshore.

6. BEACH 69-B - COMUNELLE.

Coordinates : H09453434 - H 10363401.
Length : 1050 yds
Width : 20 yds.

Seaward approach clear. Five-fathom curve about 1 mile offshore; 3-fathom curve about 1200 yds. There is a bar off the entire beach which is probably near the surface since waves break on it in a light wind. There are soundings of 3 ft just outside the bar at the eastern end of the beach. The bar is 150-200 yds offshore. The gradient inside the bar to the beach is estimated to be 1:80, but unless gaps are found in the bar LST's would probably ground some distance outside the bar. TORRENTO ROZZUTO, probably dry in summer, has its mouth about the center of the beach, while TORRENTE COMUNELLE, a much larger stream, which probably does not go dry, empties just to eastward of the beach. There are no distinctive landmarks of probable aid in finding the beach at night.

EXITS: The beach is sandy backed by sand dunes up to 30 ft high and partly covered with scrub. Inland of this strip of dunes, which extends 200-300 yds, is a zone of cultivated partly consolidated sand in which tracks commence leading inland to the LICATA - GELA highway about 1 2/3 miles inland.

7. BEACH 69-A - ARENA.

Coordinates : H 13703327 - H 15483251.
Length : 2100 yds
Width : 15 - 50 yds.

Seaward approach clear. Five-fathom curve about 1 mile offshore; 3-fathom curve about 800 yds at western and 450 yds at eastern end of beach. Estimated gradient about 1:100. About 500 yds east of the beach, below MT. LUNGO cliff, there are rock patches or reefs at about surface level and extending about 250 yds offshore. PIZZO DEL ARENA, a sharp pointed hill 100 ft high, is located close behind and a little to east of the center of the beach. This is the most prominent land-mark, although just to eastward of the beach is MT. LUNGO plateau, 220 ft. high.

The beach is of fine sand with sand dunes 10-15 ft high, merging into partly cultivated sandy ridges and dunes inland of the beach. A stream bed, probably dry, empties near the western end of the beach.

EXITS: No tracks or roads lead to the beach. Exits must be over the dunes partly consolidated sandy soil around either side of PIZZO DEL ARENA to the LICATA - GELA highway about 700 - 800 yds inland.

8. BEACH 69 - GELA (2)

Coordinates : H 184313 - H 192308.
Length : 1000 yds.
Width : 5 - 10 yds.

Seaward approach clear except for submerged rocks or reef patch flanking each end of the beach. On a course from southwest the beach will be the center of the low shoreline between MT. LUNGO, 220 ft high, and GELA PLATEAU. No other landmarks for night use are apparent. The 3-fathom contour is 800-900 yds offshore. The estimated inshore gradient is 1:80 to 1:100. The southeastern portion of the beach may have a bar as "false beach" about 200 yds offshore near the center of the beach, decreasing to 100 yds at the end. The beach is of firm sand. Back of the narrow sand strip is an extensive sand dune and reclaimed sandy area.

EXITS: Near the center of the beach a track goes inland to join the LICATA-GELA highway 800 yds inland. Otherwise, the only exits are across cultivated partly consolidated sand dune area.

9. BEACH 68 - GELA

Coordinates : H 21662982 - H 22502944.
Length : 1000 yds (500 yds on either side of pier)
Width : 50 - 60 yds west of pier.
80 - 100 yds east of pier.

Seaward approach is clear. Conspicuous objects are the lighthouse at the head of the pier; the cupola of the Cattedrale (in Piazza Umberto I); the campanile of Chiesa del Carmine (south of the Cattedrale) and a factory chimney in the extreme west of town. In the distance is MONTE FORMAGGIO (2100 ft) located 12½ mi. north of GELA. The pier at the center of the beach extends 980 ft perpendicularly from the water line. In summer time the sand washes up so that depths along the center of the pier are about 6 ft and at the head of the pier about 9 - 10 ft.

Out to 6 ft depth the gradient is about 1:80 to 1:100 with bars more evident to eastward toward the FIUME GELA mouth.

Sand of the beach appears to be firm.

EXITS: GELA is built on a plateau 130-150 ft high. The face of the plateau back of the beach is steep and the only promising exit for vehicles is the steep main road up to the town, which starts near the root of the pier, curves east for 120 yds, west for 120 yds, east for 180 yds, then runs directly into Piazza Umberto I. Several steep paths and tracks go up the cliffs but do not appear fit for vehicles.

10. BEACH 67 - LAGO DI BIVIERE.

Coordinates : H 245280 - H 280249
Length : 5100 yds
Width : 10 - 30 yds

Seaward approach without navigational dangers but straight coastline and lack of landmarks will make any particular portion of the beach difficult to locate. On approach from southwestward toward center of beach, hills about 2 miles inland rise to 433 ft with successively higher hills further inland. The broad valley of the FIUME GELA and FIUME MAROGLIO, though backed by hills inland should give the area immediately back of the northwest end of the beach a lower silhouette. The 5-fathom line is about 1-3/4 mi at the northwest and 1 mi offshore at the southeast end of the beach. The 3-fathom line is 1300 yds off the central portion of the beach and about 800 yds at the ends. There is a bar of "false beach" about 140-150 yds offshore. Off the mouth of FIUME GELA there is only 4 ft over the bar but this depth increases to southeastward and it is believed that from a point 1800 yds below the mouth of the river there is at least 10-11 ft over the bar. The gradient inside the bar is believed to be about 1:75.

The beach is of fine sand mixed with stones and is backed by a sandy area with many dunes, on the northwestern portion partly covered with scrub. The whole area back of the beach is sparsely developed.

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EXITS: The only track leading inland from the beach is at the extreme northwestern end. Considerable road construction will be necessary for exit of vehicles over sand dunes, partially reclaimed land and sparse cultivation. The GELA - VITTORIA highway is about 1200 yeds from the northwest end of the beach close inland of GELA - SYRACUSE railway.

11. BEACH 66-B - SAFAGLIONE.

Coordinates : H 302227 - H 342177.
Length : 6900 yds
Width : 20 - 30 yds.

APPROACHES: There are rocks close offshore off PUNTA ZAFAGLIONE, but elsewhere the seaward approaches to the beach are clear of danger. The 6-fathom contour is 1 to 3/4 mile offshore. There is a bar or "false beach" along this entire stretch of coast. For about 1 mile eastward from the mouth of FIUME ACATE the bar is double though the inner one is so near shore and the water so shallow (probably 1 fathom or under) that it is not likely to be significant except as an irregularity of the bottom . The outer bar which extends the entire length of the beach is 150-200 yds offshore. Waves break on it in rough weather but the depth over it is probably very irregular, being greatest to eastward. The gradient is gentle, averaging 1:80 to 1:115 but where gaps are found in the "false beach" the inshore gradient of the true beach is probably steeper.

This beach is of soft sand. There may be portions with a steeply sloping bank of sand about 2 ft high at the waterline. It is backed throughout its length by snad dunes 40 - 80 ft high in various stages of consolidation in a belt 900-1000 yds wide.

There are no distinctive landmarks and location of any particular portion will be difficult from sea. To the westward the mouth of the FIUME ACATE forms a break in the coastline; a little to left of center a small cluster of houses about 800 yds inland is remarkable; while the eastern portion of the beach is backed, about 1000 yds inland, by a strip of thick scrub.

EXITS: An unpaved road leads inland along the southeast bank of FIUME ACATE. Apart from this, all movement inland is across the dune area to undeveloped cart tracks leading to the main GELA - VITTORIA road about 3 mi inland. Two cart tracks roughly parallel the coast 300 yds and 500 yds inland and a somewhat better track follows the inland edge of the dune area. From this one several tracks branch inland to the main highway but very few tracks cross the dunes perpendicularly to the coast.

12. BEACH 66-A - ANCILLA.

Coordinates : H377118 - H 378511135.
Length : 500 yds
Width : 20 yds

Seaward approach clear but there are rock patches on each flank of the beach. There are no distinctive navigational landmarks. The gradient is estimated about 1:90. There is probably a low bank or ledge backing the beach. The beach is soft sand.

EXITS: Through vineyards to a minor road about 400 yds inland leading to SCOGLITTI.

13. BEACH 66 - SCOGLITTI.

Coordinates : H 38181057 - H 38201049.
Length : 75 yds.
Width : 50 yds.

The beaching facilities here consist of two small coves with rockbound entrances. The more accessible one is considered here. Seaward approach is clear. Ships anchor off the village on sand bottom, good holding ground. The 6-fathom line is charted 1/2 mi offshore and the 10-fathom line about 1 1/4 mi offshore. The village is on a 12' rise directly back of the beach.

Entrance is about 50 yds between underwater rocks. Depths in the cove are probably 8 ft and less. Gradient estimated 1:60. Air photographs show the beach filled with local boats beached there.

EXITS: The beach is fairly steep and abuts directly on to the village from which a good road leads to VITTORIA.

14. BEACH 65-D - CAMERINA.

Coordinates : H 389097 - H 391090.
Length : 700 yds
Width : 50 yds.

Seaward approaches clear of danger. PUNTA DELLA CAMERINA is a rocky danger at the southern end. The 10-fathom line is about 1½ mi offshore and the 5-fathom line about 1/2 mi. The gradient is estimated about 1:80. The beach is of soft sand, backed by extensive sand dunes.

EXITS: Appear to be suitable for infantry only. From the norther end of the beach exit would be a scramble up a 50 ft embankment and then on a lane leading into SCOGLITTI.

15. BEACH 65-C - BRANCO GRANDE.

Coordinates : H 40650495 - H 40850409.
Length : 950 yds.
Width : 10 - 20 yds.

Seaward approach clear except for rock patch separating this beach from 65 B. The 3-fathom line is about 350 yds offshore. The water inshore is shallow and there appears to be a bar, with probably not less than 6 ft over it. The estimated gradient is 1:75. Beach is of soft sand.

EXITS: The entire beach is backed by an extensive area of soft sand dunes partially consolidated along their seaward edge. Exit very poor for vehicles and would require much road construction. Exit for personnel on to the solid headlands of PUNTA BRANCO GRANDE and thence by farm paths to S. CROCE CAMERINA, about 3 mi distant.

16. BEACH 65-B - CONTRA CORRIDORE.

Coordinates : H 40950350 - H 41020315.
Length : 400 yds
Width : 10 - 20 yds.

Seaward approach clear except for rocky patch separating this beach from 65 C. The 3-fathom line is about 350 yds offshore. There appears to be a bar which probably has not less than 6 ft over it. The estimated gradient is 1:85.

The beach is of soft sand backed by an extensive area of soft dunes partially consolidated along the seaward edge.

EXITS: Exits for vehicles would require extensive road construction. Personnel could make their way up the cliffy headland of PUNTA BRACCETTO and thence by farm paths to S. CROCE CAMERINA, about 3 mi. distant.

17. BEACH 65-A - BRACETTO.

Coordinates : H 41200218 - H 41600 208.
Length : 475 yds.
Width : about 10 yds.

Seaward approach clear but there are rocky patches on each flank of the beach. The beach faces south and at the western end is a dry stream bed. Sand is probably soft. Estimated gradient about 1:85. There appears to be a bar 60-120 yds offshore.

EXITS: Over a low bank back of the beach, across 200 yds of cultivated land to a lane which leads to S. CROCE CAMERINA.

18. BEACH 65 - SCALAMERI.

Coordinates: N 44079890.
Length : 90 yds in small boat harbor protected by off-lying reef with adjoining 200 yds separated from this cove by small rocky patch.
Width : About 50 yds.

Seaward approach clear. At CAPO SCALAMERI, the coast, where it changes direction from south-east to east, is rock bound. A lighthouse and the village of PUNTA SECCA stand on the point. The 3-fathom line is about 400 yds offshore.

Estimated gradient 1:75.

EXITS: From both beaches at west end on to two lanes which lead close east of the lighthouse into the village, and to the secondary road leading to S. CROCE CAMERINA.

19. BEACH 64 - MARINA DI RAGUSA

Coordinates: N 49509845

MARINA DI RAGUSA (1000 Pop.) stands on a low cliff (about 10 ft. high). It is fronted by a rocky shore with small sandy beaches between the rocks. Many boats are beached there. Landing places on this beach are confined to two small coves in front of the village, each with an entrance about 25 yds wide and to a 200 yd stretch at N 510982; the rest of the "beach" being rock fringed. All three are exposed to southward and would be hard to locate. The 6-fathom line is 1500 yds offshore and the seaward approach is clear. Estimated gradient 1:80.

EXITS: Road exit through the village by secondary road to S. CROCE CAMERINA.

20. BEACH 63-A - IRMINIO

Coordinates: N 533973 - N 54659695
Length : 1500 yds.
Width : 10-20 yds.

The seaward approaches are clear. TORRE GIARDINELLI, a tower standing 700 yds behind the shore and 500 yds east of FIUME IRMINIO, should assist in finding the beach. The general terrain is barren and featureless, rising toward the interior. There are clumps of trees around the mouth of FIUME IRMINIO, which mark it when close enough to distinguish them.

Reconnaissance of this beach inidcated a coastwise current setting eastward .5 to .8 knot influenced by the wind. From one line of soundings near the center of the beach the gradient to 10 ft. depth was 1:40 but the average is believed to be flatter. Underwater rocks and a rocky coast commence at the eastern end of the beach.

EXITS: Beach is firm sand backed by a bank or cliff 6-10 ft. high. Exit is over this bank and inland through vineyards 1/2 mile to secondary road leading to DONNALUCATA. Vehicle exit will require considerable road construction.

21. BEACH 63 - DONNALUCATA.

Coordinates: N 565965 - N 56709635.
Length : 300 yds.
Width : 20 - 100 yds.

Approaches from southwest and south are clear of danger. The 3-fathom line is charted 300 yds. offshore and the 6-fathom line 3/4 mile. West to east of the beach is the village of DONNALUCATA (Pop. 800) on a low rock-fringed cliff. Open anchorage off the village with sand bottom.

The beach is sandy, triangular shaped, with the broad side toward the village. There is a bar off this beach but it appears to be of minor importance. The gradient is estimated to be about 1:60.

EXITS: At the extreme southeast end of the beach the main street of the village (a continuation of the SCICLI road runs west-northwestward on to the beach). Northeastward of this street a low wall separates the beach from the village.

1 August 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #28

CAPTURED G-2 ESTIMATE
1 JULY 1943

The following is a translation of an Intelligence Bulletin from the Italian Command Headquarters of Armed Forces of Sicily, Sixth Army, Intelligence Office, dated 5 P.M., July 1, 1943:

Intelligence Bulletin No. 2

I. Enemy situation in the Central-Western Mediterranean.

From the Allied situation comes the following:

1. The mass of the forces and material of the Anlo-Americans distributed in the Mediterranean, which is (60% for Aviation, 90% for troops, 96% for landing means), finds itself in the eastern basin and thus, in the sector which directly interests SICILY.

2. The major part of this is in the following zones:
(a) Oran-Algiers (33% Aviation-40% Troops-43% landing means.)
(b) Bougie-Bone (33% Aviation-40% Troops-34% landing means.)
(c) Bizerte-Tunis (33% Aviation-20% Troops-21% landing means.)

3. The landing means, the things which, due to size, give an indication of the intention and capabilities of the enemy, are concentrated in three sections of the above mentioned zones.
L.S.T's and L.S.I's.-major landing means because of capacity and effectiveness-have left for the above zones in the following percentages:
(a) Zone - Oran-Algiers--35%.
(b) Zone - Bougie-Bone--43%.
(c) Zone - Bizerte-Tunis-42%.

4. These given facts, in addition to the unanimous voices of the foreign press, the voices of belligerents and neutral countries, and information from good sources, all confirm the indication which the Anglo-Saxons are preparing to undertake.

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5. The preparation for such an invasion is now ready and complete. The recent entry into the Mediterranean of four battleships and two aircraft-carriers (plus that which is already known, i.e., 2nn. bb. and 2 p.a.) constitutes the final concentration of this preparation.

Also, that period until the end from the first to the tenth of July is especially favorable to the successful approach of enemy vessels on our coast because of the moonless nights.

IN CONCLUSION

The actual waiting period could not be prolonged because delay might hinder the succes of the action the enemy is undertaking. Because of this, we must be ready at any moment for the beginning of this action.

II. Probabilities of enemy operation.

1. SICILY and/or SARDINIA are objectives of the enemy. The major probability is an attack on SICILY.

The fact that the number of troops sent to BIZERTE-TUNIS are inferior in number to the other troops, should not be a deceiving factor in the event of a landing on this island, and therefore, it will represent the first wave moving at dawn to reach the coast of SICILY.

To confirm the efficiency of the wave, the fact is that in BIZERTE-TUNIS, there is 40% of the larger landing means.

In addition, 40% of the total of the troops in ORAN-ALGIERS zone are parachute troops, among them are three airborne divisions, which evidently could be used against SICILY in a surprise attack.

It would be a great error of illusion to believe that the enemy would undertake a secondary attack. For political and moral reasons of exceptional value, the Anglo-Americans will have to attack with all the strength they have.

2. It is understood that an attack of surprise will be undertaken, commando raids immediately followed by tanks and infantry taking advantage of the moonless nights, also air and naval support will aid the landing. It is necessary to be ready to face both possibilities.

The almost daily attacks against REGGIO and MESSINA, that is, against the communications of the aland, are part of this operation.

3. In SICILY, the entire coast could be used as a landing point. In fact, the landing attack will, without doubt, be developed on vast fronts and not only on small stretches-that were pre-selected in the decisive action, but also on vast lateral stretches and also coastal areas so that the enemy could put us into a confusion situation.

The following are the necessary precautions to be followed:

a. To keep strict guard everywhere.

b. To cut short the enemy action during the crises: that is, during the time that the parachutists are dropping and the landing barges are on beaches.

III. 1. Another point to be considered is the fact that from confidential sources, we gather that the intentions of the Anglo-Americans are to employ in their operations in the landing in SICILY the negro units, both from the English Dominion and the United States.

It is to be held in mind that the negro is very sensitive to a swift efficacious military action.

2. The enemy parachute troops in the ORAN area have very often been on jumping maneuvers during the night. It is necessary then to keep strict guard also during the night.

APPENDIX

Experiences gotten from the landings of the Americans on the Island of ATTU.

1. The Americans have successfully made landings only after violent aerial and naval bombing on the coastal defenses.

NOTE: It is very important to construct deep bomb-shelters in order to protect equipment and arms.

2. Smoke bombs have been extensively used. (The bombs are dropped from the planes. They are adjusted to parachutes and when they go off produce a dense smoke.

NOTE: All the fire will be concentrated on the smoked area and behind the area. It is also necessary to attack the enemy as soon as he makes himself visible, i.e. on the moment he comes out the white screen.

3. The landing was carried out by separate groups, corresponding to a reinforced battalion.

NOTE: We must also expect that these groups will be followed by armored units. It is to be understood that the first armored wave could not be of heavy cars: there will be a great many "Bren-carriers" (small, light armored cars) and medium cars, against which our anti-tank guns, especially our 47mm, are very efficient, as we have proved in the TUNISIAN campaign.

4. The Americans aren't very capable in bayonet attacks and are very poor night fighters.

NOTE: It is necessary, therefore, to surprise the enemy with the same means he fears. (A violent counter-attack surprising him in the dark with hand-grenades and bayonets.

ANNEX TO INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 2
Detailed Report of Enemy Situation in the Central Eastern Mediterranean Basin

I. GROUND FORCES

Gibraltar:
1 Para-troop battalion
1 unit of Commandos
25,000 men in garrison

Morocco:
1 American armored division at CASABLANCA.
1 French armored division
6 French infantry..... In temporary staging area.
2 French motorized divisions

Algeria:
6 American infantry divisions
1 English infantry division
3 French infantry divisions
1 American infantry division
1 French infantry division
3 American airborne divisions
1 English airborne division
1 American marine infantry division
1 D'Afrique Corps
3 French para-troop battalions
2 Rangers-French Units.
4 French Commando Units

Tunisia:
2 English infantry divisions
1 American infantry division
1 English armored brigade

Malta:
3 English para-troop battalions
1 English Commando Unit
30,000 men in garrison

To the above forces the following should be added. At present, the locations are not know.
5 American infantry divisions
4 English infantry divisions
2 French infantry divisions
2 English motorized divisions
1 American armored division
4 English armored divisions
1 English infantry brigade
1 English armored brigade
4-5 Regiments armored cars

In total, the units discussed in North Africa, Gibraltar, and Malta, have a force of about 780,000 men and 4,000 armored cars.

In lybia, estimated forces are valued at 50,000 men.

AIR FORCE

Gibraltar:	250 planes, majority are prusuit.
Morocco:	450 planes of various types.
Algeria), Tunisia):	1500 planes, majority are intercepters and pursuits.
Tripolitania:	900 planes, majority are intercepters and pursuits.
Circnaica:	400 planes, majority are bombers and combat.
Malta:	300 planes, majority are pursuits.

In total there is a force of 3800 planes.

III. LANDING EQUIPMENT

Gibraltar:
6 enbarkation vessels with a capacity to transport 200 men and 100 light armored cars and tanks.

The zone of ORAN:
Mostaganem, Algeria: 238 embarkation vessels, with a capacity to transport 11,000 men, 1400 tanks and half-tracks.

The zone of BUGIE:
Philippeville - Bone: 179 embarkation vessels, with a capacity to transport 18,500 men, 500 tanks and half-tracks.

The zone of BIZERTE;
Tunis: 87 embarkation vessels, with a capacity to transport 8,000 men, 1100 tanks and half-tracks.

Malta: 23 embarkation vessels, with a capacity to transport 900 men, 360 tanks and half-tracks.

Sousse: 15 embarkation vessels, with a capacity to transport 6,000 men, 190 tanks and half-tracks.

Added to the above embarkation vessels with their location not exactly know, 418 vessels, with a capacity to transport 23,000 men, 400 tanks or half-tracks.

In total, in the Central East Mediterranean basin, there are 1400 embarkation vessels, with a capacity to transport 70,000 men, 4000 armored vehicles and trucks.

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #29
BATTLE ORDER-SICILY

3 August 1943

Following is a summary of enemy dispositions in Sicily, based on latest information received. Where a unit is "not located", it has been identified but not recently enough to give an indication of its present whereabouts. When a unit is followed by a question mark, it is believed probably present but has not been identified. Changes and additions should be forwarded promptly to this headquarters. In reporting identifications, give as exact a location as possible, together with the date of which identified and any available information on remaining strength. If possible give the parent organization, if the unit designation alone leaves any doubt.

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UNIT	ESTIMATED PRESENT LOCATION	DATE LAST REPORT	REMARKS
15 Pz Gren Div	Central Sector	26/7	Formerly known as Div Sicily, and 19th Pz Div. Many recruits and convalescents from Russia.
1 Gren Regt. (Ens Regt)	Troina-Regalbuto	28/7	Part of Battle Grp. Schmalz. 1/3 under strength. Code name "Birkhun".
1 Bn	" "	1/8	Heavy casualties: CO-Capt. Thorno. Code name "Elizabeth".
2 Bn	" "	27/7	Code name "Totenkopf".
3 Bn	" "	23/7	Code name "Kinderfest".
115 Pz Gren Regt.	8 Army Front		Formerly known as 2 Gren Regt of 15 Div. CO-Col Koerner. Code name "Diplomat".
1 Bn	SE of Catenanuova	27/7	CO-Maj Kluge. Code name "Theater".
2 Bn	Catania area	27/7	Code name "Erwin".
3 Bn	Catania area	27/7	Formerly Bn "Messina" and 70 March Bn. Heavy losses. Code name "Seitgenesse".
3 Gren Regt (Fullriede Regt.)	Troina area	28/7	Rumored moving N and E. Code name "Gaukler".
1 Bn	Capizzi area	28/7	CO-Tornoff(?) Code name "Hermann".
2 Bn -	Capizzi-Troina		Code name "Ebenholz".
3 Bn	Capizzi-Troina		CO-Maj Strever. Code name "Hedwig".
215 Tank Bn	Cesaro area	28/7	1/2-2/3 strength-36 tanks, no MK VI's left. CO-Capt. Ciraga. Code name "Indianer".
116 Tank Bn	?	26/7	Existence doubtful. Reported by 1 PW as part of the 15 Div Tank Regt.
33 Arty Regt	No locations	26/7	Formerly known merely as Div Sicily Artillery.
Rcn Bn	Regalbuto area	26/7	
999 Sig Bn	No locations		Identified in Canicatti area on 17 July.
71 Nebel-werfer Regt.	Regalbuto area	24/7	150 mm and 210 mm multi-barrelled mortars. Compressed air, smoke and HE shells.
69 Marsch Bn "REGGIO"	Sferro area	31/7	Attached to 15 PG Div.
Light AA Bn	No location		Last reported at Piazza Armerina on 14 July.
382 Gren Regt			Attached to 15 Div.
1 Bn	Troina-Regalbut	30/7	
2 Bn	" "	1/8	

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UNIT	ESTIMATED PRESENT LOCATION	DATE LAST REPORT	REMARKS
29 MTZD DIV			Reconstituted after virtual destruction at Stalingrad.
15 P.G.R.	Regalbuto area	21/7	
1 Bn	East of Mistretta	27/7	
71 Regt			
2 Bn	Caronia area	28/7	
1 & 3 Bn	?		
29 Arty Regt			
2 Bn	Regalbuto area	24/7	
1,3,4 Bns	?		
Tank Bn	?		
Recn Bn	Gerbini	23/7	
Engr Bn	?	1/8	
AT Bn	?		
Sig Bn	?		
Motorcycle Bn	?		
H. GOERING PZ DIV			
	Entire div on 8th Army Front.		Reformed from H.G. units which not reach Tunisia, plus Marsch Bns.
1 PGR	Catania area		2 & 3 cos. virtually wiped out.
2 PGR	2 Bn SW of Paterno		
Tank Regt Hq	Not located		
504 Tank Bn	Catania area		Heavy losses
125 Inf Regt	?		
Engr Bn Hq	Aderno-Bronte	3/8	
Recn Bn	No located.		
MISC UNITS GERMAN			
3 Para Regt	Regalbuto area	2/8	Recently moved from Catania area.
4 Para Regt	Catania area	27/7	
1 Para Arty Regt	Not located	18/7	
Bn "Brindisi"	Not located		Reported in Grammichele on 15 July.
904 Fortress Bn	On coast near Catania	27/7	
923 Fortress Bn	NE of Catenanuova	1/8	Strength less than 200
Oria Bn	SE of Centuripe	21/7	Possibly a separate Marsch Bn attached to H.G., but may be 2 Bn of 382 Gren Regt formerly known as Neapels, now attached to 15 Div.
II ITALIAN			
4 LIVORNO DIV			Remants only-estimated to total not more than 2 full bns.
33 Inf Regt			
1 & 2 Bn	Destroyed		
3 Bn	Regalbuto area	28/7	
34 Inf Regt			
1 Bn	Destroyed		
2 Bn	Catenanuova area	31/7	"Coco Group". Has lost at least 2 platoons.
3 Bn	East of Mistretta	31/7	Never identified previous to capture of Mistretta.
28 Arty Regt			
1,2 & 3 Bns	Destroyed		
4 Bn	Regalbuto area	22/7	75/18 guns.
26 ASSIETTA DIV			Remnants reported being withdrawn into Messina bridgehead.

UNIT	ESTIMATED PRESENT LOCATION	DATE LAST REPORT	REMARKS
29 Inf Regt			
1 Bn	Destroyed		
2 Bn	Coastal area	21/7	
3 Bn	Not located	17/7	Last reported S of Ninfa 17/7.
30 Inf Regt	Destroyed.	21/7	
25 Arty Regt			
1 Bn	Coastal area	21/7	
2 & 3 Bn	Destroyed		
4 Bn	?		
17 Blackshirt Legion			
17 & 18 B.S. Bns.	Destroyed.		
26 Mortar Bn	Not located.		
28 AOSTA DIV	Reported on N Coast	27/7	Remants only, not more than 4 bns.
5 Inf Regt	Not located		
6 Inf Regt	Destroyed		
171 Blackshirt Bn	Coastal Area	29/7	
54 NAPOLI DIV			Reported totally destroyed.
MISC UNITS ITALIAN			
131 Tank Regt			
102 Bn	Not Located	21/7	R-35 tanks. 101 Bn broken up into autonomous units and since partially destroyed. At least 17 of 54 tanks of 102 Bn destroyed. Last reported at Roccapalumba on 21/7.

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #31
(Taken from Enemy Documents Captured in Sicily)

1. Extract of Regulations Governing German P/W Camp for officers.
(Translated from French)

"1. All German officers on duty are superior to any prisoner of war.....

"4. All conversation unless on business, with officers, soldiers or civilian personnel of the German Army is strictly forbidden. All infractions will be punished.....

"5. All claims are to be presented without exception in the German language during the morning roll-call by the intermediary of the PW commander of the company.....

"13. All material of the Camp (including construction material, bricks and everything in general) taken by the Prisoners of War will be reimbursed at the rate of ten times the value.....

"14. .....When men are playing with a ball, and this ball falls behind the fence of barbed wire it is necessary to act as follows: The prisoner of war, identified by a white cap, can pass the barbed wire after having warned the sentries of the number 1, and 2, posts. To make the sentries understand his intention this prisoner of war will make a signal with a white flag. The two sentries will show in return a white flag showing that they understand. The Prisoner of War can pass the barbed wire only after being convinced that the two sentries understand his intention. As soon as the ball is returned the Prisoner of War will make again a signal until the sentries show that they understand, and brought back their white flag.

"18. It is forbidden to go to bed without taking the shoes off.....

"27. It is forbidden to sing patriotic songs or songs having a national character or to make speeches on politics, etc.....

"38. Until further order the Prisoners of War have the right to write two letters and two post-cards per month....."

2. Extracts from German Daily Bulletins.

a. "C.O. German Armed Forces
PALERMO
Palermo, 22 May 1943

"No Wearing of Uniform in Rome
The German liaison officer with headquarters of the Italian armed forces reminds all military personnel of the regulation forbidding the wearing of uniforms in Rome, according to order O.K.W. No. 144/43 Secret, W.Z. (II) dated 19 April 1943. It is therefore advisable to take civilian clothes on official trips to Rome."

b. "C.O. German Armed Forces
PALERMO
Palermo, 20 June 1943

"Pass Regulations
Effective at once, members of the armed forces may leave their quarters only in groups of at least two and must carry their bayonets and firearms."

3. Translation of German Document, found 29 July 1943 in Castelo Utveggio, Palermo (undated).

"WEMC: Fighting Parachute Troops with infantry Weapons.

1. General. A surprise attack by enemy parachute troops is to be expected at any time.

Our troops must be trained to attack the parachute troops with their weapons during their actual descent. Consequently the element of surprise, and the speed of landing of the parachute troops must be taken into account.

Parachute troops either jump from heights of 3,000 feet or higher and drop to about 900 feet before opening their parachutes, or they jump from a height of about 360 - 300 feet, when the parachutes open after they have fallen about 90 feet. The speed of fall is about 15 - 18 feet/sec. While parachute troops dropping by the first method are spread over a wide area, a platoon of parachute troops dropping by the second method have a horizontal spread, while in the air, of 1200 - 2100 feet, a depth of 900 feet, and a height interval between single jumpers of about 45 - 60 feet.

2. The following principles are to be adopted in attacking parachute troops with infantry weapons.

In principle, fire will only be opened on command of the responsible leader (leader of Gruppe, Leader of Zug). The fire must be directed at the parachutists; it is useless to fire at the parachute.

The best moment for attacking parachutists is at the moment of landing, while he is helpless and without his weapons, which are usually dropped separately. At this moment all are to engage in the attack.

Ground Defense exerts a strong effect on the Morale of the Parachutist, and is for this reason of great importance.

In Detail

Rifle Attack: Parachutists will be attacked with rifles as soon as they reach the "near range" (1200 feet). With slight wind (up to 9 feet/sec) aiming point is the target center. With stronger winds the regulations for firing at moving targets apply. The sight will not be altered during fire. Ammunition pouches will be carried. A standing or kneeling (freehand) position should be adopted where possible. If under enemy fire, a lying position may be adopted. Distribution of fire is impossible. Each soldier will shoot at the nearest parachutist. With the usual adopted method of jumping, from a height of 360 - 300 feet, no more than five aimed shots can be fired."

4. Italian General Officers Captured in Sicily by Seventh Army.

a. Brigadier General Ambrosia di Laurentus, CO, 207 Coastal Div. Agrigento.
b. Rear Admiral Guiseppe Manfredi, Commander Naval Base, Trapani.
c. Major General Egisto Conti, C.G. 230 Coastal Division, Trapani.
d. Major General Corrado de Franchis, C.G. Sicilian Territorial Engineers.
e. Brigadier General Angelo Agro, C.G. Military Territorial Zone Palermo.
f. Major General Giovanni Marciani, C.G. 208 Coastal Division Palermo.
g. Brigadier General Giovanni Batista Allori, C.G. Military Zone Palermo.
h. Major General Guiseppe Molinero, C.G. Palermo Port Defenses.
i. Lt. General Francesco Traina, Deputy Judge Advocate General, Italian Army.

11 August 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN # 32

CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENT
(Unit and date of capture not known)

Captured Field Order of the Hermann Goering Division, Division Order # 31, signed: CO, Hermann Goering Div., 2 August 1943.

C-30

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Retreat to the shortened bridgehead position (position "C"). Night 2/3 August Hermann Goering Div. falls back to position "C". Strong rear guards to be left at position "B". The paratroop Reg't composed of Pz. Jr. Abt. is Division reserve. It will fall back to PIEDIMONTE - SAN ANTONIA and make contact with Battle Group "Paulus." Division position 6 Klms east of RANDAZZO and 1200 meters southwest of STAZIONE DI MOJO.

Division Artillery: One Btry of II and 2 btrys of IV will fall back to the mainland. All ammunition goes to the remainder of Division artillery. The 17-cm Btry attached to Schmaltz's Battle Group will move to REGGIO and the mainland. It will report there to the mainland Commandant (Heidrich). The other 18-cm btry remains with Battle Group "Paulus." Likewise the II Btry of the Arty Reg't will remain with Paulus.

Appendix: The enemy pursues haltingly.

Appendix: Instructions for further fighting in SICILY:

1. No road blocks or demolitions will be manned by Italians.

2. No German soldiers forced to go to the mainland will do so without their individual weapon, these weapons are "tickets" (Fahrscheine) for passage. Every soldier is to carry all the ammunition he possibly can.

3. No Italian troops will be allowed to disturb troop movements, civilians or soldiers. Every Italian and all Italian equipment is to be cleared from the streets (except those Italians who have been fighting and who will still fight).

4. Destroy all materials which cannot be carried. Burning material is forbidden on account of hostile aircraft. The best procedure is to blow the material.

5. The strictest discipline must govern. Shoot all who fail to obey.

6. All bombed areas in towns will be cleared for traffic.

7. All soldiers will take one days rations and the gov't Iron ration.

/s/ Division Commander.

ANNEX 5 G-2 OUTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

(TABLE OF CONTENTS ONLY)

SICILY BLACKBOOK
(For Western SE Section - Task Force 343)

Section 1. General Topography:
a. Rivers
b. Climate.
c. Military Aspects of the Terrain.
" 2. Water Supply.
" 3. Highways.
" 4. Railways.
" 5. Electricity.
" 6. Ports and Port Facilities.
" 7. Beaches.
" 8. Fixed Defenses.
" 9. Airfields.
" 10. Communications: Telephone, Telegraph, Radio.
" 11. Battle Order.
a. Garrison Strength.
b. Air Strength.
c. Capabilities and probable dispositions.
" 12. Disease Hazards.
" 13. Military & Civilian Personalities of Importance.
" 14. Attitude of Civil Population.
" 15. Government of Sicily.
" 16. People & Religion.
" 17. Labor Supply.
" 18. Money.
" 19. Military resources - Ammunition, Gasoline, and Oil.

ANNEX 6 G-2 PERIODIC REPORTS

From : 1002h5B July 43
To : 1024.00B July 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : U.S.S. Monrovia
Time : 1024.00B July 43

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 1.

Map - G.S.G.S. No. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally two to four miles inland from LICATA (0953h) to Army boundary vicinity of POZZALLO (N7593).

b. Defensive Organization: Considerable Teller land mines found along the beaches. Numerous pill boxes, etc., in general as shown on collation map.

c. Units in contact:

(1) In LICATA area units identified by PWs: 1 Co. 12 MG Bn, 711 Sep MG Co., 384 Coastal Bn, 390 Coastal Bn, 419 Coastal Bn, one PH. 12 Engr Regt.

(2) GELA area: 159 Bn of 134 Coastal Regt.

(3) SCOGLITTI area: 289 Bn of 134 Coastal Regt, SCOGLITTI to ACATE river, 420 Coastal Bn, 207 Coastal Division.

(4) Other areas: 206, 207 Coastal Divs., identified as normal. 11 Bn assault Engr Bn, 72 Bn of 10 Bersaglieri.

Personalities: 139 Coastal Regt: Col. Galfo.
207 Coastal Div : Comdr Gen Schreiber

d. Artillery - Location and Calibers: In LICATA area: 24 Arty, Regt. incl. 198 Bn and 486 Btry.

e. Reserves: Not located.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General summary: Reaction of enemy indicates high degree of surprise obtained. Light resistance met on beaches proper except isolated strong point G 8437.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

Weather cool, sea calm, visibility good. No estimate of the enemy losses. Several hundred prisoners reported taken.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

Situation obscure, probably delay in successive positions inland along lower reaches of ridges perpendicular to coast, strong local defenses on favorable terrain in plains areas, to await developments to determine location main effort.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 1024.00B Jul 43
To : 1124.00B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : U.S.S. Monrovia

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 2.

Map - G. S. G. S. No. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Extends from shore west of PALMA DI MONTECHIARO (9804), north of NARO (0825), and CAMPOBELLO (0925) and RIESI (H754). Enemy line before II Corps extends from 1 1/2 miles west of GELA in an arc 4 miles north of GELA and then south to BOCHIURI (H2931) northeast to TERRANA (H4131), COMISO airfield, RAGUSA. All exclusive.

b. Defensive Organization: No recognizable organized defensive system. Road blocks and prepared demolitions and mine fields up to depth approximately seven miles parallel to coast taken from captured maps.

c. Units in contact:

(1) LICATA area:

177 Bersaglieri Regt.
525 Bn - POZZO EMPEDOCLE
526 Bn - ARAGONA
527 Bn - FAVARA

223 Skoda Bn 100/22 guns
76 Bersaglieri Regt. AGRIGENTO
138 Bn.
104 AT Co.
1 Co.

(2) GELA area:

134 Coastal Regt.
429 Coastal Bn.

134 Mixed Engr Regt.

4 HG Pz. Regt. Post POLGRO 6724

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Enemy resistance stiffening with German support.

b. In LICATA area artillery fire received south of CAMPOBELLO with estimated 88 caliber north of NARO.

c. Elements of a German Panzer unit reported moving south from PALERMO with forward elements at SAN STEFANO DI QUISQUINI. Concentration of estimated twenty hostile tanks north of GELA between MAZZARINA and NISCEMI (1100) attacked and repulsed (1130).

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather cool, visibility good. Ground haze to 0900.

b. In LICATA area approximately 3,600 prisoners taken. (Complete count not available.) PW states Germans held anti-invasion exercises GELA area 4 and 5 July, forces estimated as 600 men with armored cars. Considerable AP and vehicular mines encountered in GELA.

c. In the LICATA area no organization of units larger than a battalion identified. PWs taken indicate that Italian units have been broken up into small detachments and scattered over a wide area and explains the identification of these small units in widely separated spots.

d. Confirmed information from captured documents.

739 Btry Mtz 105mm recently AGRIGENTO, LICATA, CANICATTI.
507th Flak Regt. was at SAN PIETRO.
131st Flak Regt. in SICILY.
809th Searchlight Btry last in ACIREALE.
200th Regt. last identified at COMISO.
Hq. LUFTWAFFE last identified at TAORMINA.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. General situation obscure.

b. Continue withdrawal to successive positions until main defensive positions are reached and counterattack by local reserves.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 1124.00B Jul 43
To : 1224.00B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : U.S.S. Monrovia

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 3.

Map - G. S. G. S. No. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: About 4 miles west of PALMI DI MONTECHIARO (9804). North of NARO (0825) and CANICATTI to RIESI (H085). Through the II Corps Sector extending from H1939 - H2038 - H2639 - H2737 - H3332 and H4521 - H5024 - H5426 - H5925 - H6226.

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b. Defensive Organization: Enemy resistance remains light. Still a delaying action. In LICATA area no contact with any organized system of defenses. In GELA - SCOGLITTI area main resistance north of GELA.

c. Units in contact:

(1) 3d Grenadier Regt, Div Sicily.
1094th Engr Co (believed all captured).
535th Coastal Btry, 139 Regt.
Elements of the 4th Livorno Regt and the HQ Div in GELA Sector.
54th Napoli Divisional elements.
104 Mantovia Divisional elements in BISCARI CHIARAMONTE Sector.

d. Artillery - Location and Calibers: Light Arty fires encountered by patrols about 6 miles east of AGRIGENTO at 0700 B. 88 mm and tank fire was encountered by patrol south of CANICATTI (G8859).

e. Reserves: Not located.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: In the LICATA Sector the delaying action has caused the deployment of XXX force over extended front. Enemy resistance consists of MG and rifle fire. Action on the west flank has been largely confined to patrol reconnaissance. Main resistance still in center north of GELA and vicinity of NISCEMI. Enemy aerial activity on considerably reduced scale. At 1135 B twenty hostile tanks were moving south in vicinity of CASTELTIMINI.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

Weather cool, sea calm, visibility good. 50 MK III and IV tanks attacked just north of GELA at about 1135 B, toward H 2932. 13 of which were destroyed. COMISO A/D captured by 45th Infantry Division at 111850 B.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) Attacking generally south along the NISCEMI - GELA road.

(2) Continued delaying action on all fronts with the object of falling back to the high ground in vicinity of PIAZZA ARMERINA, for center pivot.

The second capability is favored due to the probable lack of gasoline and other supply limitations.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 122400 B Jul 43
To : 132400 B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 4.

Map - G. S. G. S. No. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: PALMA DI MONTSCHIARO - NARO, 5 miles north of CANICATTI - BUTERA - NISCEMI - south of BISCARI airfield - VIZZINI.

b. Defensive Organization: On western sector north of LICATA resistance confined almost to patrol activities. Similarly, in the eastern front north of SCOGLITTI resistance decreasing. Main enemy resistance still in center in vicinity of NISCEMI.

c. Units in contact:

(1) HG Div elements in center near H 4540 probably about an armored regt and few 88 mm guns.

Elements Div Sicily
Arty 28 Regt, 4th Livorno Division
Other scattered Italian units not definitely identified

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Main enemy effort in center generally in area east and west of NISCEMI. Counter attacks were made with tanks but all were repulsed.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Large fires observed at CANICATTI and at the PONTE OLIVO Valley. Tanks destroyed on 11 July were marked with two concentric circles painted in white on left side and rear. Aerial reconnaissance reported large bivouac 1 1/2 miles west of SAMBUCO H 2903. Tanks destroyed in II Corps Sector to date 25 Mk III and IV, 5 MK VI, 22 R 35. Reports indicate that prisoners taken by II Corps now stand at 6289 of which 175 are officers and 124 are German enlisted men.

b. Identifications:

153 (?) MG Bn
101 Tank Bn (131 Tk Regt)
12 Engr Regt (Corps troops XII Corps)
12 Arty Raggruppamento (Corps troops XII Corps)
18 Coastal Brigade
134 Coastal Regt
429 Coastal Bn
I, II, III Bns PGR 2, Hoerman Goering Division
2 Bn, HG Panzer Regt
3 Co, HG Reconnaissance Bn
200 Air Signal Regt

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To delay in successive positions with the final position along the CALTANISSETTA - CALTAGIRONE ridge covering the withdrawals with armored regiments in the NISCEMI area.

(2) To counterattack with main effort on left (east) using armored (NISCEMI) elements for wide invelopment or exploitation of success.

(3) To defend along present positions and counterattack with armored (NISCEMI) regiments.

(4) To attack along the general line PALMA MONTECHIARO - NARO - CANICATTI - and combine with capability (3).

Capability (3) is favored due chiefly to the fact that the enemy is still unorganized and probably lacks supplies.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 132400 B Jul 43
To : 142400 B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 5.

Map - G. S. G. S. No. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally G 8043 - PALMA DI MONTECHIARO - CANICATTI - WEST - H 0854 - MAZZARIO - H 3448 - H 5040 - VIZZINI - RAGUSA (Excl) - POZZALLO.

b. Defensive Organization: Pocket resistance areas noted. One at H 3932 early morning. Counter attack at 1300 with 20 to 30 tanks of Mark III, IV and VI at H 5343 from the 2d Bn of the 8th Regt, HG Division. Activity in the west confined to delaying action. On the east the enemy was withdrawing to the north from route 124.

c. Units in contact: Hoerman Goering infantry vicinity H 5727. 33 Inf. Regt from 4th Livorno Division in BUTERA area. 2d Bn 75 Inf in extreme eastern flank.

d. Artillery: NESCEMI shelled at 0550 B. 28th Field Artillery at BUTERA 0330 B. Enemy fire from H 5140 noted at 1920 B.

e. Identifications:

28th Arty Regt 3d Bn at GRAMMICHELE
1 Btry 54 Arty Regt at SCORDIA
2d Btry 54 Arty Regt at ISPICA N 8199
215th Tank Bn Div Sicily at ENNA (Unconfirmed)
1st Bn 75th Inf at CANICATTI BAGNI
2d Bn 76 Inf CARLENTINI
3d Panzer Grenadier Regt CANICATTI - AGRIGENTO
75th Inf Regt Hq at PALAZZOLO
76th Inf Regt 1st Bn at RAMACCA
76th Inf Regt 3d Bn at SCORDIA
34th Inf Regt 2d Bn at GRAMMICHELE

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

Air reported during the night that all vehicles seen were moving toward the CATANIA plain. During the day the main resistance was again in the center area north of GELA. By 1430 B the Hoerman Goering units had begun to withdraw to the north from the area H 4140.

A pocket of resistance was located at H3838 at 1725 B. Enemy activity still generally delaying.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Prisoners: Estimated over 13,000 to date.

b. Air fields: BISCARI air field pitted but repairable. Damaged craft, 1 JU 88, 29 ME 109, 6 other unidentified. Air field taken at 140800 B.

c. Effect of air bombing: 24 planes PATERNO 1410 B. 11 A-36 bombed railroad at MISILMERI H 5138; 5 railway cars damaged, 2 locomotives hit, 1 exploded, time 1553 B. Concentration of vehicles at LEONFORTE (H3393) bombed at 1474. 10 vehicles attacked between ENNA H 2405 and VALLELUNGA G 8598, 1474 B.

d. Morale: Air reports illuminated victory sign during the night at H 5739.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend general line AGRIGENTO - RACALMUTO (G76) - BARRAFRANCA - CALTAGIRONE - GRAMMICHELE.

(2) To delay in successive positions to northwest.

(3) Defend general line RACAMUTO - BARRAFRANCA - GRAMMICHELE and counterattack along general line AGRIGENTO - RACALMUTO.

(4) Capability No. (1) plus counterattack to southwest from S. MICHELE (H35) - CALTAGIRONE area.

Capability (3) is favored and except for lack of movement observed in the direction from which counterattack may be expected may be executed at any time.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 142400B Jul 43
To : 152400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 6.

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally AGRIGENTO - RACALMUTO G 7767 - 4 miles south of CALTANISSETTA - PIETRAPERZIA - S. CONO H 3353 CALTAGIRONE.

b. Defensive Organization: Anti-tank ditch located at G 1578 to G 1678. Pillboxes and wire at G 1879.

c. Units in contact: Herman Goering Division in contact in our central area with Italian infantry units on Eastern and Western flanks.

d. Artillery: Fire by large caliber enemy artillery received from vicinity H 1261, with OP at H 1260. All advancing units subjected to intermittent, light artillery fire during the day.

e. Identifications: (Not previously reported). 1st Panzer Grenadier Bn Brindisi at GRAMMICHELE. 5th Co., 19th Cav. Regt. vicinity CALTAGIRONE. 11th Arty Regt in AGRIGENTO area. Div. Sicily (15th Armored), 3d Bn, 3d Regt CANICATTI area. Division Sicily, 2d Bn, 3d Regt. CANICATTI area. 169 Ragusa Blackshirt Legion - CALTAGIRONE - VIZZINI area. 6th Arty Raggruppamento, 25th Bn, and 73d Btry - CALTAGIRONE area. 32d Air Signal Regt Luftwaffe Headquarters - TAORMINA area. 4th Motorcycle Bn, 4th Div, northwest of CALTAGIRONE. 380th Coastal Bn, AGRIGENTO area. 1st Bn, 34th Inf. - RIESI area. 3d Inf Regt - northwest CALTAGIRONE. 1st Bn, 1st Panzer Gren Regt, VITTORIA area (during initial landing, 2d and 3d Corps almost wiped out). 3d Co, 102d AT Bn - RAGUSA area. 3d Co, 103 AT Bn - vicinity CALTAGIRONE. 18th Coastal Brig composed of 429th Bn, 378th Bn, 384 Bn in THALA area. 378th Bn, 18th Coastal Brig - GELA area.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: In general, the enemy continued to delay in successive positions, employing the method of local counterattacks, especially in central area, both East and West of CALTAGIRONE, using tanks as the spearhead in each case.

b. Operations of Component Units. Heavy antiaircraft of medium intensity fire was received at 1415B to 1615B from the Western part of the CATANIA plain. Light fire received West of AGRIGENTO at 1500B but none in the morning in that area. No antiaircraft fire received from CALTANISSETTA - PIAZZA ARMERINA area. Enemy bombing attack made on PONTE OLIVO airfield at 2400B, starting several fires in buildings in the town. No reported damage to the field.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Morale: Morale of German prisoners interrogated indicates it is low and is of a defeatist nature. Morale of Italian prisoners is apparently higher than that of their combat soldiers, while native populations have invariably welcomed the advance of American troops.

b. Supply and Equipment. No indications of failure of supply and equipment has been noted.

c. Terrain. Enemy bridges destroyed by enemy in rear areas, especially to the West and North of AGRIGENTO.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) Defend along general line AGRIGENTO - RACALMUTO (G7667)- PIETRAPERZIA (H1269) - PIAZZA ARMERINA - CALTAGIRONE.

(2) Same as (1) with ARMORED COUNTER ATTACK to Southwest from PIAZZA ARMERINA.

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(3) Same as (1) with counter attack along general line RAFFADALI (G5867) - ARAGONA (G6668, - RACALMUTO (G7668).

(4) To withdraw main forces to North and East, from CALTANISSETTA - PIAZZA ARMERINA area, leaving delaying force in contact with our troops and counter attacking with either or both forces indicated in capabilities #2 and #3.

Capability No. (4) is favored as counter attacks would relieve pressure now being exerted by this Army to the north in the center and permit a withdrawal either to north or east, such movement being indicated by motor movements in those directions.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 152400B Jul 43
To : 162400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 7

Map - U.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally REALMONTE (G-5247) - ARAGONA (G6668) - BEMPENSIERE (G-8175) - SERRADIFALCO (G-8973) - PIETRAPERZIA (H-1369) - PIAZZA ARMERINA (H-3365).

b. Defensive Organization: Machine gun nest just out of BARRAFRANCA, H-1824, held up advance at 1000 hours.

c. Units in contact: 207th Italian Coastal Division on left flank; 4th Livorno Division and Herman Goering Division in contact in our central area, with elements of 54th Napoli Division on our right flank.

d. Artillery: Battery of enemy artillery supported local counterattack at 1500B from the area vicinity G-9973, with their OP located at G-9568. Air action destroyed this OP at 1228B.

e. Identifications: (Not previously reported): 923 Fortress Battalion in Seventh Army sector. 6th Battalion of 76th Werfer Regiment - MAZZARINO area. 6th Battery, 557th Battalion, Division Sicily Artillery Regiment - CALTANISSETTA - ENNA area.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: In general, enemy resistance during the period was slight. Local counterattacks in central area, supported by tanks, aided the enemy's withdrawal to the north.

b. Operations of Component Units: Heavy concentration of motor transport noted at 1007300 in the area SCIACCA, RIBERA, BIVONA, CORLEONE. Sixteen tanks made strong counterattack at 1610000 south of BARRAFRANCA. At least two enemy tanks were destroyed in the attack, which was repulsed at 1200B. Anti-aircraft fire reported from Western CATANIA plain, in Square H-67, at 1516008, of medium caliber, heavy intensity. No anti-aircraft fire received from CALTANISSETTA area during the period. No anti-aircraft fire reported, although a considerable number of air missions were flown over the rear of the combat area.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Supplies and Equipment: Permanent type ammunition dump, consisting of about 25 small buildings, surrounded by blast walls, located at B-6902, and huts located at B-7110 and B-7109.

b. Statistics: Estimated total of 17,000 prisoners of war. 200,000 gallons of gasoline and over 2000 bombs, from 250 pounders to include 1000 pounders, captured to date.

c. Intelligence Information Received from Captured Documents:

(1) See attached chart of organization Division Sicily Artillery Regt.

(2) See attached chart of organization of Herman Goering Division.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) Defend along the general ridge CATTOLICA (G-4672) - CASTELTERMINI (G-6882) - CALTANISSETTA - ENNA.

(2) Same as (1), with counterattack along general line CATTOLICA - CASTELTERMINI.

(3) Withdrawal of main forces to north and east from CALTANISSETTA - S. CATERINA (H-0388) - ENNA area, leaving delaying force in contact.

Combination of (1) and (3) is favored. Lack of movement away from our northern front in past 24 hours indicates that (3) is already partially accomplished. As motor movement in Northwestern Sicily toward South and East was great, according to night aerial reconnaissance night of 15-16 July, but failed to materialize in major counterattack during period of this report, that movement probably by-passed to the east. Hence, a defensive attitude is indicated.

KOCH
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From : 162400B Jul 43
To : 172400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 8.

Map - U.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally REALMONTE (G-5256) - ARAGONA (G-6668) - BEMPENSIERE (G-8175) - 2 miles north of SERRADIFALCO (G-8973) - 1 mile north of S. CATALDO (G-9976) - south of CANTANISSETTA (H-0577) - then east to Army boundary at (H-2874).

b. Defensive organization: At end of period, indications are that enemy has organized defensive area South and southeast of CALTANISSETTA along the SALSO river with what is believed to be one regiment of P.G.R., reinforced with tanks.

c. Units in contact: On the left flank, northwest of AGRIGENTO, are now elements of the 26th Assietta Division. On our central (CALTANISSETTA) front are elements of the 4th Livorno Division and Herman Goering Division.

d. Artillery: Enemy artillery is located at G-7277, just north of MILENA at G-7675 - G-9480, area south of CALTANISSETTA and at point H-2674.

e. Identifications: (not previously reported):

Western Sector Seventh Army: 1st and 2d Bn., 30th Inf. Regt., 26th Assietta Division.
17th & 18th Blackshirt Bns, of 17th Blackshirt Legion.
161st Motorcycle Troop.
Elements of 19th Artillery Group, Armored.
4th Inf. Regt., 28th Aosta Division.

Eastern Sector Seventh Army: Barrafranca area - 1st, 2d, and 3d Cos., 1st Bn., 1st P.G.R., 15th Panzer Division.
11th Co., 1st P.G.R.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy withdrew during the night of July 16/17 from the area BARRAFRANCA to the north, and contact was not regained until 1020 hours, morning of the 17th. In the Western sector, opposition was light. The 3d Division captured AGRIGENTO night of 16/17 July.

b. Operation of Component Units: At 171020, tanks and heavy weapons were encountered in the vicinity of H-1575. Photo mission flown 161600 hours over AGRIGENTO shows no military activity on roads or town. No gun installations observed. At 171650, air reported heavy traffic TAORMINI south toward CATANIA; also on roads and area ADRANO (H-7397) - RIPOSTO (H-0604) - CATANIA, moving toward CATANIA. No movement sighted CASTELVETRANO - CHIUSA (G-3697) - SCLAFANI area. At 1720, air reports no movement on roads from CASTELTERMINI to LERCARA (B-6505) - FRIDDI to BISACQUINA (B-3501) to RIBERA (G-3678) and SCIACCA (G-1878). Air reports light general movement in area H-7680, including 4 88-mm guns at 1717400B. At 1721450, four ME 109s shot down in area 9554 by 2d Armored Division.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Supplies and Equipment: Enemy ammunition dump located at H-193653.

b. Concentrations: Air reports large bivouac area camouflaged as haystacks at H-3015.

c. Minefields: Road mining by enemy, during last 24 hours, is increasing. CALTANISSETTA road mined from 055710 northward at 171520B.

d. Intelligence Information Received from Prisoner of War: Brigadier General AUGUST LANGKEITLISS, Commanding General, 207th Coastal Division, stated his division consisted of two regiments of three battalions each, plus 10th Bersaglieri Regiment, and, according to his statement, 12 to 24 75-mm, 12 100-mm, and 12 149-mm guns. Assumed command 12 July, replacing Schreiber, who went to XII Corps. This General stated he had been charged with planning and execution of defenses of CASTELVETRANO airfield, which, due to our bombing, is now unserviceable. He was placed in command of the 26th Assietta Division 10 July before assuming command of the coastal division. He stated that great confusion exists in the High Command with changes of commanders, and, when captured, had on his person complete Battle Order of 26th Division, which he had prepared for his own information.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend along the general line CASTELTERMINI (G-6883) - MUSSOMELI (G-7886) - MARIANOPOLI (G-9387) - CATTOLICA (G-4672) - ENNA.

(2) To continue withdrawal to north from CALTANISSETTA - S. CATERINA (H-0388) - ENNA area, with local counterattacks.

(3) To bolster defense in the west by moving elements of the 26th Assietta Division from SCIACCA area.

No. (1) is favored. The attitude is defensive, and no movements into the Seventh Army theater are noted. In general, the situation appears that northeast part of the island, CATANIA - REGALBUTO (H-5795) - NICOSIA (G-3506) - S. STEFANO (G-3160) is the area to which troops have withdrawn for ultimate defense. Recent lack of German identifications tends to indicate the withdrawal of the major portion of those troops.

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From : 172400B Jul 43
To : 182400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 9

Map - U.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Situation in front of the Seventh Army on this date was of such fluid nature as to preclude the location of enemy front lines. Last contact was along general line SICLIA (G-4861) - North of S. CATERINA (H-0388) - North of ALTAFARNERA (H-3578).

b. Defensive Organization: None, except large bivouac area north of S. CATERINA in vicinity of ENNA, and heavy artillery installations are reported Southeast of ENNA, vicinity H-2684.

c. Identifications (not previously reported): None.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: During the night of July 17/18, enemy withdrew from contact along the entire line, and only light resistance was offered to general advance of all units of the Seventh Army. A convoy estimated at one thousand troops with some tanks was reported moving east from H-1587 to H-1289.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Supplies and equipment: German PW states some difficulty being experienced with supplies due to rapid collapse of the Italian Army.

b. Concentrations: Enemy concentrations noted vicinity north of COMITINI (G-6866) and northwest of VILLAROSA (H-1588). It is believed that these concentrations are bivouac areas occupied preparatory to withdrawal to the north and west.

c. Minefields: Minefields and booby traps are being encountered with greater frequency along the entire front.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend along the general line ENNA (H26) - MUSSOMELI (G78) - BIVONA (G59) - CATTOLICA (G47).

(2) Same as (1) and counterattack against the west (left flank) with major Italian elements reinforced by German armor.

(3) To delay in successive positions along our general front to the north and west, with local counterattacks to relieve the pressure during withdrawal.

Capability (1) is favored. Italian reaction has been purely defensive. What aggressive action has been taken against this Army has been by German elements, which it is believed, with exception of portions (elements of the 15th Panzer Division) remaining in the ENNA - SAN CATERINA area, have been withdrawn along our front. A final defensive position will very likely be taken in the difficult terrain leading to the MESSINA peninsula, in an effort to either launch vigorous counterattack from that general direction at a later date or to permit withdrawal of German units to the Italian mainland. Sacrifice of the Italian troops in the west to fulfill that mission is indicated.

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From : 182400B Jul 43
To : 192400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 10.

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally RIBERA (G-3678) - east to CIANCIANA (G-5560) - CASTELTERMINI (G-6882) - MARIANOPOLI (G-9288) - V. NAROSA (H-1587) - Road Junction H-1979 - Road Junction H-3175.

b. Defensive Organization: No organized resistance encountered except in the vicinity of ENNA, where remnants of one German Battalion of infantry and an artillery regiment are located between our forces and Canadian forces of the XXX Corps, general area H-2580.

c. Identifications (not previously reported): 1st, 2d, 3d Bns, 1st PGR, ENNA area.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Generally light opposition to the advance of entire Seventh Army, with mostly bridge and road demolitions and minefields, on the western half of the zone.

b. Operations of Component Units:

(1) Observation by air reports: 50-60 trucks parked at CORLEONE (B-3813) at 1045B, camouflaged. Troops marching and trucks with some towed guns on road SCIACCA - CASTELVETRANO, at 1911&0B. Head of column CASTELVETRANO. Columns of 50 to 60 tanks and trucks moving from LEONFORTE towards ENNA at 1917308. 50 MT on road three miles southwest of ALIMENA (H-1099). Head of column at H-1595, moving northwest 1908&0B. Column 10 miles long moving north; head B-9113 at 1205B. No movement sighted 190900B on roadnet area G-8686 - B-5230 - B-3250 - G-2080. At 1015B, Radar station at G-1278 strafed. Light traffic ALIA (B-7509) - LERCARA (B-6506).

(2) Small arms and mortar fire was encountered 191200B at a point about five miles north of S. CATERINA (H-0388).

(3) Contact with the enemy west of ENNA along line H-1387 - H-1390.

(4) Minefields: Mines along road RAFFADALI (G-5867) - CIANCIANA (G-5080).

(5) Antiaircraft: Light and heavy AA over area B-7509. Very intense at H-1297. At 191830B, air reconnaissance patrols report intense antiaircraft at road junction north and east of LEONFORTE. At 191600B, four AA guns south edge of Lake PIANA DEGRICI (B-3733). Inaccurate heavy AA fire at BIANCAVILLA (B-7694).

(6) Artillery: Artillery battery reported vicinity H-1487, at 1915&5B. Air reports at 191600B two batteries, each four guns, 40-mm, at G-1593 and G-1788.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Supplies and Equipment: Ammunition dump and seven enemy planes, two in good condition, reported H-2174.

b. Intelligence Information Received from Prisoners of War: PW states 17 July elements 26th Assietta Division, 3d Battalion, 30th Regiment moved out of S. CATALDO for PALERMO via CALTANISSETTA and S. CATERINA. PW from 420th Coastal Battalion, vicinity RIBERTA (G-3678), states all Germans reported west of SCIACCA.

c. Intelligence Information from Captured Documents: Captured overlay, prepared by 3d Settore Costiero di Brigata, showing probable plans for invasion, shows following three areas suitable for concentration of counterattack. Force 1: SALEMI (A-9115) - GIBELLINA; Force 2: LERCARA FRIDDI (B-6305); Force 3: GRAMMICHELE (H-5745).

d. Statistics: Estimated prisoners to date: 26,000 and about 6500 enemy killed and wounded.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend on general line CALTABELLOTTA (G-38) - BIVONA (G-59) - VALLEDOLMO (B-80) - HILL 1332 (C-20).

(2) To withdraw to the northwest to the general areas SALEMI (A-91) - GIBELLINA (B-11), and LERCARA FRIDDI (B-60), and from those areas dispose for final defense.

(3) Same as (2), accompanied by delaying action in ENNA area.

No. (3) is favored. Elements of the 15th Panzer Division (specifically 3d PGR), are identified in the ENNA area. Contact in the western portion has been lost, and advance of our forces has been delayed principally by demolitions of roads and bridges. No movement of appreciable size, other than a column moving northwest toward CASTELVETRANO from the SCIACCA area, has been noted in this period in the Seventh Army zone. Laterally, movement has been observed from CORLEONE to the east.

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From : 192400B Jul 43
To : 202400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 11

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally MENFI (G-1990) - SAMBUCA (G-2195) - BIVONA (G-5091) - S. STEFANO (G-5592) - CASTRONOVO (G-6598) - VALLELUNGA (G-8598). ALIMENA (H-1099) - LEONFORTE (H-3493).

b. Defensive Organization: No organized resistance was encountered in 7th Army zone of operations.

c. Identifications (Not previously reported): Elements of the 386th Bn of the 202d Coastal Division identified in SCIACCA area.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: No opposition was encountered by our forces with the exception of 2 R-35 tanks at Vallelunga (G-8798) and three Italian Cos in the SE vicinity of that town. Enemy artillery fired from vicinity G-7195 and the impact landed at G-7185.

b. Minefields: Reported East and West of RIBERA (G-3578) on highway 115. Removed by our troops. Minefield reported vicinity G-2178.

c. Demolitions: Air reports girder bridge on main road at G-7295 is out.

d. Anti-Aircraft: Light anti-aircraft, heavy caliber over Villabate (B50&0). Light AA Northeast of Calstelvetrano. No AA South of Corleone B-3813; intense heavy AA at Leonforte H-3&9&.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Killed and wounded to date 6,600; PW 27,000; total 3&,600. Material captured or destroyed 196 aircraft, 86 tanks all types, 139 guns, 75-mm or larger.

b. Enemy Materiel: Military and civilian store houses ordered destroyed by Italian High Command were turned over intact in Caltanissetta when town was taken.

c. Air Reports: Much activity on road running both ways between ASSORA (H-3792) and NICOSIA (C-3505); no foot troops up to NICOSIA. Gun emplacements at H-2594; 50 German fighter planes observed on airfield G-1692; no personnel observed.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To withdraw to west of bank of BELICE River and defend on general line CAP GRANITOLA (G-58) - CASTELVETRANO (F-99) - GIBELLINI (B-11) - ROCCAMENA (B-21) MARINEO (B-43) - CACAMO (B-72).

(2) To defend along general line BELICE RIVER (G-09) to (B-1005) - M. BARRACU (B-4&05) - VALLEDOLMO (B-8505) - NICOSIA (C-30).

(3) To defend on general ridge CAPE S. VITO LA CAPO (A-85) - LE ROCHE (A-92) - S. NINFA (B-01) - BISACQUINO (B-30) - CIMMINA (B-62).

(4) Delay in successive positions along line Cap #2, #1, and #3 in that general order.

No. (4) is favored.

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20 July 1943

26 ASSIETTA DIVISION
PERSONALITIES
29th REGIMENT
Col. Mario FONTANA C. O.
Capt. Ambrosio BELLIMI Adjutant
Capt. Gaitano IMBERI Medical
Chap. Agostino GAZZENA

Hq Company
Lt. Michale BELLONE C.O., Lt. Mario TAPELLO, Lt. Geno PALASEO.

1st Battalion	2nd Battalion	3d Battalion
Lt. Col., Pietro AMATO C.O.	Maj. Aalfo TORRES CO.O.	Lt. Jovanni FANTACOLONE
Lt. Mario CHIAPPONE	Lt. Pietro WOTO	Lt. Jovanni MARINO
Lt. Lucca TRAZZITTA	Lt. Pierguiseppe BANEO	Lt. Luigi NEGRETTI
Lt. GeoButta CINCITORIO	Lt. Guiseppe TESTA Med.	Hq Co. 3rd Battalion
Hq Company, 1st Battalion	Lt. Pasquale LAVANO Med.	Lt. Guido MURARI C.O.
Lt. Giovanne GAINOTTE C.O.	Hq Co. 2nd Battalion	Lt. Orente BOGGIA
Lt. Umberto BAROTO	Capt. Raffaelo FALONI C.O.	Lt. Bruno GUIDO
Lt. Romario BONUNU	Lt. Pantalione GUINTO	Lt. Jovanni BELLOMO
Lt. Visio VITALI	Lt. Domenico TACICOLI	9th Company
1st Company	Lt. Giovante F. CIRPONE	Lt. Primo CHIARO
Lt. Emmanuele TABIO C.O.	5th Company	Lt. Flacino MACRI
Lt. Guiseppi LUNARDI	Capt. Guiseppe De AMBROSIO C.O.	Lt. Eugene DeCARLO
Lt. Pietro COMO	Lt. Aefonso FALLAVICINI	Lt. Antonio MARTINEZ
Lt. Liugi CAVANNI	Lt. Guiseppe AMURO	Lt. Angelo CESARIA
2nd Company	Lt. Ciro MARUSNE	10th Company
Capt. Pietro PENUCCA C.O.	Lt. Michele GRAVINA	Capt. Antonino MIZZO C.O.
Lt. Gerolamo ACCERI	6th Company	Lt. Leonida CONTA
Lt. Carlo CAVALLA	Capt. Pietro LANDINI C.O.	Lt. Aurilio BENTI
Lt. Ezio GIRARDI	Lt. Saverio CAIROLA	Lt. Francesco CLEMENTE
Lt. Armando PITITTI	Lt. Mario D'AMEROSO	Lt. Salvatore ARTICULO
3rd Company	Lt. Comenico TRIPONE	11th Company
Lt. Ricarrdo D'UTRI C.O.	7th Company	Lt. Pezza G. RAMELLA C. O.
Lt. Eungino CATALANO	Capt. Pietro VANNI C.O.	Lt. Luigi PAZZI
Lt. Angelo LOVISETTI	Lt. Giovanni PACLLETTI	Lt. Manlio CASTRONOVO
Lt. Carlo INFANTE	Lt. Angelo STEFANE	Lt. Vincenzo LUDORICI
Lt. Dirigo AWATLICE	Lt. Mario FINI	Lt. Lino MICHELOTTI
4th Company	Lt. Domenico ZANINELLI	12th Company
Lt. Tulvio MONTICONE C.O.	8th Company	Capt. Luigi VITALE
Lt. LuigiDIANGELIS	Lt. Pasquale GRASSI C.O.	Lt. Eugeneo FUMAGALLI
Lt. Nestore DiMICHELE	Lt. Guiseppe DORINI	Lt. Guiseppe CONTE
Lt. Mourio ROSSETTI	Lt. Clemente ZAMOLA	Lt. Marino PIERSANTI
Lt. Guido GIORDANO	Lt. Mazzareuo MORO	Lt. Macedonio FOGLIA
	Lt. Guiseppe PALUIOTTO	

A/T Company (47/32)	Eng. Company
Capt. Mello TUZZA C.O.	Lt. Filio RICHETTA
Lt. Guiseppe SCIUTO	Lt. Mario GUISTI
Lt. Emilio BASSI	Lt. Bernardo PUIA
Lt. Eliseo FORCHINI	Lt. Vincinso CORTERE
Lt. Eugenio FANO	Lt. Cino SAVORELI

30th REGIMENT

Lt Col. Francesco MORETTIERI C.O.
Capt. Osvaldo FINO
Chap. San Mario SOLFRTI

Hq Company
Capt. Guiseppe MAZZETTO C.O. Lt. Pietro CANELA, Lt. Rodlfo ORZECHIA, Lt. M MONACO

1st Battalion	2nd Battalion	3d Battalion
Lt Col Alfredo TORRICINI C.O.	Lt Col Nicola COLLARILE C.O.	Lt Col Guiseppe SPINELLI
Lt. Cosinto LOCARNO (Aide)	Lt. Carlo MINAGLIA	Lt. Parida BORBONE
Lt. Alberto PAPETTI	Lt. Pienino POGGIO	Lt. Michele BLOAMPO
Lt. Fioretti MICHELE (Medical)	Lt. Arturo MANTIGA	Lt. Angelo CASASSA Med
Hq Company, 1st Battalion	Lt. Angelo MASCERO	Lt. Mario LOFFREDO Med
Lt. Guiseppe FEY C.O.	Hq Company, 2nd Battalion	Hq Company, 3d Battalion
Lt. Lautino MORI	Capt. Felice BROWSINI C.O.	Lt. Luigi SERENO C.O.
Lt. Luigio MURCATELLI	Lt. Antonio MILE	Lt. Paolo TALLIA
Lt. Guiseppe MEINERO	Lt. Mosi MARCHIONINI	Lt. Guesppe MERCHINELLI
1st Company	5th Company	9th Company
Capt. Lidonello BALDINARE C.O.	Constantino DeDANTAIS Capt	Lt. Luigi ZANON
Lt. Domenico PERICIARO	Lt. Guiseppe MALVARO	Lt. Oswaldo BASSO
Lt. Ouovanni TEPPATI	Lt. Silvano FARPRIS	Lt. Ferdinando PEPRINO
Lt. Angelo VARVELIO	Lt. Marco PORTA	Lt. Francisco GIFFOMI
Lt. Mario RASCHIERA	Lt. Antonio LOMBARTO	10th Company
Lt. Liberto BRATTONI	6th Company	Lt. Adriano TROMBETTA
2nd Company	Capt. Fridio BARTOLOTTI C.O.	Lt. Marrio COSCIA
Lt. Civanni BURATTO C.O.	Lt. Osvaldo GIARDINELLI	Lt. Filippo AUSTINI
Lt. Paris VENTURI	Lt. Matteo STRASIA	11th Company
Lt. Gerrucco BRAGAGLIA	Lt. Vittorio FENOCCHIO	Capt. Guesappe MARCONI
Lt. Vito TOTO	7th Company	Lt. Raoul GRAZIANI
Lt. Gaetano SIENA	Lt. Alfredo POGGIO C.O.	Lt. Carlo MANILLO
3rd Company	Lt. Arulino CACCIA	Lt. Carlo SIFFREOI
Capt. Guiseppe LAMMATTINA C.O.	Lt. Renato MATTIELLO	Lt. Guesappe TAVELLA
Lt. Angelo ROSSI	Lt. A. Battista ROMANO	12th Company
Lt. Luigi TIRONI	8th Company	Capt. Waldo DiRIENZP C.O.
Lt. Emilio CORENZA	Capt. Alfredo GAIDO C.O.	Lt. Carmelo PRIEPCI
Lt. Paolo ZAPPATA	Lt. Luigi MARTINO	Lt. Enzo BERPETTA
4th Company	Lt. Leonardo CLIVERO	Lt. Antonio MAURINO
Capt. Carlo PONZIO C.O.	Lt. Luciano SCALENCHE	Lt. Pietro PASSONI
Lt. Romano RIZZARI	Lt. Tullio BASSO	
Lt. Tormaso CAFFIO		
Lt. Victore FIENI		
Lt. Fransico DiSTEFANO		

A/T Company 47/32	Arty Company 47/32
Capt. Antonio POLIGNERI	Capt. Michele STASSANO C.O.
Lt. Felice ANCHOINE	Lt. Davide TROMBETTA
Lt. Arrigo CASTIGLIANI	Lt. Carlo RICCARDI
Lt. Domineco CAVASSA	Lt. Enrico Gemalti LILLY
	Lt. Franco CANDIANI

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126 Mortar Battalion

Capt. Agotino BELLACAI C.O.
Spartaco PEVIZZANI Adjutant
Guseppe MARTINI Medical

Hq Company 126 Mortar Battalion
Gorgino FORTUNATO C.O. Lt. Nicolo CHIARA

1st Company
Lt. Filiberto GARBINELLI C.O.
Lt. Fulclide ROBE
Lt. Carlo MIOCIO
Lt. Antonio DePASQUALE
2nd Company
Capt. Ettore MAUSONE C.O.
Lt. Giovanni ANTONANGELI
Lt. Castoro SARABINI
3rd Company
Lt. Safino METTA
Lt. Alfredo ECCLEINA
Lt. Mario FARISE
Lt. Clemente NEGRI
17th Battalion
Col. Giovani CERCHIARI C.O.
Lt. Ferdinando QUAORI
Antonio CASTELLANA Med.
Fanto MARIANTI
Jovanni ALBRIKORI
1st Company
Roberto GRANDI
Alfredo CAMERINO
Guesepge ROSA
Carlo SORA
2nd Company
Mardello DORMAYI C.O.
Sagio RIZZI.
Guesepge PLUCHINETTA
Cesare BONELLI
3rd Company
Nicola LAZZARI C.O.
Vito BAROCCI
Guseppe DIVFUGA
Giacinto SIPIONE

17th Blackshirt Legion
Col. Arnaldo NEGRONI C.O.
Adj Maj. Umberto TARANTINI
Lt. Bathisto PHIDA
Lt. Rigo GANNA
Lt. Luigi FLO
Platoon Legion
Gennino CAPPELLINI
Eng Company
Lt. Leonardo POMTO C.O.
Lt. Giuseppe MERLONI
Lt. Pasguale NIGRO
Lt. Entico DELFITTO
Lt. Littorio RIZZO
259 Machinegun Company
Capt. Lorenzo BERNARDINO C.O.
Lt. Aldo CASARI
Lt. Nicola FARINA
Lt. Guido CIMINIO

18th Battalion
Col. William MARELLI C.O.
Gaitano CASTORANI Adjutant
Antonio CACCIALAURA Medical
Franco SALA
1st Company
Francesco APTORI
Paolo RAUCATI
Alfredo MORETTI
Paulo FERRARI
2nd Company
Annaico AZZONI
Guesepge DRAGO
Asunego TUSATTI
Antonio PENDASILLICO
3rd Company
Arthur PAVERRI
Angel ORTUANI
Alessandro GIAMMUSO.

From : 202400B Jul 43
To : 212400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 12

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally GRANITOLA (G-8187) - CASTELVETRANO (F-9398) - S. MARGHERITA (B-1100) - PALAZZO (G-4598) - CASTRONUVO (G-6598) - VALLELUNGA (G-8598) - ALIMENA (H-1099) - AGIRA (H-4795).

b. Defensive Organization: No organized defense encountered.

c. Identifications (not previously reported): 126th Provisional Mortar Bn. 102d Bn, 131 Regt in area north of VALLELUNGA. PWs of the 29th and 30th Inf Regt and 2d Bn, 6th Inf Regt normally of the 26th Division, claim that these units are attached to the 26th Division.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Some enemy resistance was encountered on our eastern (II Corps) front, but in the other zones of the Seventh Army no organized resistance was encountered. Advance on CASTELVETRANO was slowed up by the destruction of bridges.

b. Armor: 15 enemy tanks were reported moving north out of ALEMINA (H-1099) at 0600.

c. Artillery: 2 guns east of road ALEMINA (H-1099) - LOCATI (C-0704) were observed firing on our troops.

d. Air: 2 ME-109's were flying at 2000 feet eastwards over ALEMINA at 1010 apparently on reconnaissance. The road PETRALIA (C-0811) to NICOSIA (C-3505) reported heavy traffic moving east; another report said that the traffic on that road was both ways. Comment: Shuttling may be indicated thereby.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: The estimated total of enemy prisoners is 28,900, up to 212400B Jul, and the killed and wounded amount to 6620. The total score of destroyed or captured material is: 226 airplanes, 139 77-mm (and larger) guns, 114 tanks of all types.

b. Marking of enemy vehicles: Friendly air has been instructed to attack motor vehicles marked with white circle and star if they are beyond our bombline and not yet definitely identified as ours.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend along the general line GRANITOLA (G-8187) - SALEMI (A-91) - PALAZZO (G-4598) - CASTRONOVO (G-6598) - VALLELUNGA (G-8598) - ALIMENA (H-1099).

(2) To defend along line (1) and delay in successive position in the direction of PALERMO.

(3) Same as (1) and defend the corridor between the line CASTRONOVO (G-6598) - VALLEDOLMO (B-8505) - ALIMENA (H-1099) and the north coast.

Capability number (3) is favored.

From PW identifications it is indicated that elements of the 28th Division (initially in the PALERMO - TRAPANI - MARSALA area) have reinforced the 26th Division. It is also indicated that remnants of the 54th (initially opposing and destoyred by the Eighth Army) have been moved to the west (being now with the 26th Division). This tends to confirm the belief that the Italians are massed under Italian command charged with the defense of the northwestern part of SICILY. By the execution of numberous road demolitions (including some close in to PALERMO), and ones not under pressure of our advance, a clearly defensive attitude is indicated.

It must be presumed that the capture of PALERMO will be resisted with the means at hand. However, should this be a token resistance some plan is no doubt evolved whereby the Italian troops still in the west may be moved to the northeast corner for the defense of MESSINA. All indications are that the Germans are so disposed as to organize a defensive position along the general line SAN STEFANO (C-33) - NICOSIA (C-30) - REGALBUTO (H-59) - PATERNO (H-82) - CATANIA and it may be anticipated that the corridor referred to in capability number (3) will be kept open as long as possible to evacuate troops and supplies from the west should the PALERMO forces fall.

Should PALERMO fall it is presumed that the forces in the western part of the island may capitulate if movement to the east is denied.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 212400B Jul 43
To : 222400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 13

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: With the break through to the north coast of SICILY in the western zone of Seventh Army, the enemy front line in this area would be generally MAZZARA DEL VALLO (F76) to north western edge of PALERMO. In the eastern zone the enemy line is from TERMINI IMERESE (B-7432) - PETRALIA (C-0812) - ALIMENA (H-1099) - LEONFORTE (H-3594).

b. Defensive Organization: No organized defensive encountered in the western zone while in the eastern zone of Seventh Army, advance was made against continued light enemy opposition.

c. Identifications: 28Oth Cavalry Troop, 11th Cav Regt; 102d Bn, 131st Regt in AREA ROCCOPALUMBA (B-6812) - CEFDA (B-8524), 21 July. 4 Btry, 12 Arty Bn (Corps Arty) in area ROCCOPALUMBA (B-6813) - NICOSIA (B-3505), 21 July. 17 Blackshirt Legion ALIMENA area (C-1010). 259th MG Co, (DS from 26th Div) used to reinforce 207th Coastal Division. Headquarters Sixth Army reported to be NOVARA DI SICILIA (G-9935). 3d Co, 3d Bn, Regt Fullriede, 2 kms south BOMPIETRO (C-0905), 22 July. Also,1st Bn, FGR (29th Mtn Div) reported at AGIRA (H-49), on 21 July, by Eighth Army.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Opposition to the advance of Seventh Army was light during period. Slight increase in enemy artillery fire took place between ROCCAPALUMBA (B-6812) and LEONFORTE (C-3393). The 28th Aosta Division is disposed in defensive position generally along the line CALTAVUTURO (B-9014) - PETRALIA (C-0812), thence southeast to LEONFORTE (H-3493) engaged in the defensive action.

b. Concentrations: Germans are concentrating between REGALBUTO (H-5795) - CATENANUOVA (H-6186).

c. Demolitions: Artillery fire reported falling VILLAROSA (H-1587), at 221200B July.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Estimated enemy killed and wounded to date: 6,800. PW's, 36,000. Total 42,800. Materiel captured or destroyed: 226 A/C; 140 tanks, all types; 147 guns, 75mm or larger.

b. Air Reports: 300 vehicles moving west CESARO (C-6417) at 220730B hours. 70 vehicles moving west RANDAZZO (C-8120) - NICOSIA (C-3505) road before noon.

c. Information from Prisoners of War: Germans moved ALIMENA (C-1099) to PETRALIA (C-0811), 20 July. States 30 tanks and some artillery in the column. Destroyed bridges behind them. Left Italians holding high ground south of ALIMENA. Prisoners of War from 3 PGR states 15 Panzer has 30-40 tanks.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. West of Palermo: As the fall of Palermo was reported without details of units captured or surrendered, the situation in the western part, viz: MAZARO DEL VALLO (F79) - MARSALA (F61) - TRAPANI (A63) - ALCAMO (B03) - PARTINICO (B23) is obscure. Sporadic and isolated centers of resistance may be expected in those areas.

b. East of Palermo: (In Seventh Army Area)

(1) To withdraw to the east of general line S. STEFANO (C33) - NICOSIA (C30).

(2) To defend on general line CEFALU (C03) - GANGI (C11) - NICOSIA (C30) - AGIRA (H19).

(3) To delay in successive positions at position along line in capability (2), pivoting on AGIRA and final position along line in capability (1).

Capability No. (3) is favored. By movements to the northwest noted some days ago, it became apparent that the general line S. FRATELLO (C53) - TROINA (C50) - CENTURIPE (H69) - CATANIA (H97) might become a final defensive line with organized defensive positions. Stubborn resistance to the Eighth Army advance in the south portion tends to confirm this. Sufficient time has elapsed to permit organization of the ground in the northern sector. The element of surprise of the landing prevented organized inland defense, and it may be anticipated that none now will exist until that line is reached.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 222400B Jul 43
To : 232400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 14

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: B-8030 - CALTAVUTURA (B-9013) - PETRALIA (C-0813) - H-1894 - LEONFORTE (H-3595).

b. Defensive Organization: No organized defensives encountered in the western zone of the Seventh Army while slight resistance was met in the central zone south of NICOSIA (C-3506). Highways entering PALERMO within area heavily mined and large craters at critical points. The enemy has been extensively sabotaging their fuel, ammunition dumps and equipment.

c. Identifications: Rcn Bn of the 29th Motorized Div (Gerbini M77) 23 July reported by the British. New location of previously identified units. Elements of 26 Assietta Div reported moving on highway 120 probably vicinity of PETRALIA (C01). PW states the 10th Motor Transport Regt was at CORLEONE (B3813) on or about 20 July.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Extensive demolition of road bridges, construction of AT ditches and road blocks on CALTAVUTURO - TERMINI road and PETRALIA - ALIMENIA road. Opposition to the advance of the Seventh Army was light during period. Slight increase in enemy resistance is being made southeast of TERMINI IMERESE, our troops in BOMPIETRO (C0905) received artillery fire. Italian parachutists of 111th Co, 10th Regt landed at H0737, 20 July for bridge and RR demolitions. Captured H0638 at 231500B.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Estimated enemy killed and wounded to date: 6,840. PW's 48,000. Total: 54,840. Materiel captured or destoyred: 227 A/C; 140 tanks, all types; 197 guns, 75mm or larger, exclusive of material captured PALERMO and west. Enemy ammunition dumps located at C33964. Size estimated at 200 tons (approx.). Have taken prisoner at PALERMO, General Giovanni Marciani, Commanding General of all Coastal Defenses in Western Sicily.

b. Air Reports: Intense light accurate AA east of TERMINI (C7432). Air observation north and east of PETRALIA (C0812), CASTELBUONO (C0826) indicates considerable troop movement in this area with the RJ at NICOSIA (C3408) as a key crossroad. One JU 88 shot down 25 miles NW GELA.

C-35

PW's

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4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend on general line CEFALU (C03) - GANGI (C11) - NICOSIA (C30) - AGIRA (H19).

(2) To withdraw east of the general line S. STEFANO (C33) - NICOSIA (C30).

(3) To delay in successive positions from line in Capability (1), pivoting on AGIRA, with final position along line in Capability (2).

(4) To counterattack with the 15th Panzer Division and/or the 29th Motorized Division in the vicinity of LEONFORTE (H39) in the general direction CARLIANO (CL0) - CALASCIBETTA (H28).

Capability No. (3) is favored, implemented by Capability (4). Recent movements to the northwest indicate that the general line S. FRATELLO (C53) - TROINA (C50) - CENTURIPE (H69) - CATANIA (H97) might become a final defensive line with organized positions. Stubborn resistance to the Eighth Army advance in the south portion tends to confirm this. Sufficient time has elapsed to permit organization of the ground in the Northern Sector. The surprise of the landing prevented organized inland defense, and it may be anticipated that none now will exist until that line is reached. The counterattack capability is discounted because of the lack of sustaining support and its vulnerability to encirclement by the US 1st Division and the British 30th Corps.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 232400B Jul 43
To : 242400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 15

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: B9335 - B9725 - C2043 - C3203 - NICOSIA C3506.

b. Identifications: All three Bns of 3rd PGR (German) were identified in area north of ALIMENA (C-10) - LEONFORTE (H-39).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Seven Italian parachutists landed at H-0737 on July 20, and were captured H-0438 at 231500B. Their objectives were bridge and railroad demolitions and were identified as the 111th Co., 10th Regt. (Italian).

Prisoners of War reported three Bns in area C-0807 were moving north during night 22 - 23 July.

Prisoners of War confirms reconnaissance by Germans on 22 July in area CASTELBUONO at C-0826.

b. Photo Interpretation: Photo Interpretation shows seven GO 242 gliders on beach 2½ miles west of Cape PZLORO (C-46) at 231030B.

c. Air: 50 truck convoy going east between NICOSIA (C-3605) and TROINA (C-5310) at 240645B.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Chemical Warfare: Chemical Warfare examination of German and Italian CWS documents and dumps indicate no stocks of toxic chemical agents and no indications of their proposed use.

b. Possible Sabotage: At 240400B railway cars broke loose above LICATA (0933) and rolled down grade into ammunition cars resulting in fire and damage.

c. Prisoners of War: Major General Dosero Antonio was taken prisoner by the 82d Airborne Division. Only three days ago, he had been sent to Trapani to take command. Strong anti-Fascist. Commanded Alecci Division before arrival in Sicily. Admiral Guiseppe Manfredi has also been taken prisoner by the 82d Airborne Division. He commanded the Naval Defenses of Western Sicily with Headquarters at Trapani which command he relinquised in favor of Major General Sodero Antonio.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend on general line CEFALU (C03) - GANGI (C11) - NICOSIA (C30) - AGIRA (H19).

(2) To withdraw east of the general line S. STEFANO (C33) - NICOSIA (C30).

(3) To delay in successive positions from line in Capability (1), pivoting on AGIRA, with final position along line in Capability (2).

(4) To counterattack with the 15th Panzer Division and/or the 29th Motorized Division in the vicinity of LEONFORTE (H39) in the general direction CARLIANO (CL0) - CALASCIBETTA (H28).

Capability No. (3) is favored, implemented by Capability (4). Recent movements to the northwest indicate that the general line S. FRATELLO (C53) - TROINA (C50) - CENTURIPE (H69) - CATANIA (H97) might become a final defensive line with organized positions. Stubborn resistance to the Eighth Army advance in the south portion tends to confirm this. Sufficient time has elapsed to permit organization of the ground in the Northern Sector. The surprise of the landing prevented organized inland defense, and it may be anticipated that none now will exist until that line is reached. The counterattack capability is discounted because of the lack of sustaining support and its vulnerability to encirclement by the US 1st Division and the British 30th Corps.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 242400B Jul 43
To : 252400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 16

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: C-1635 - CASTELBUONO (C-0826) - C-2410 - NICOSIA (C-3506) - AGIRA (C-4695).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy drove 26th Infantry (1st Div.) from hill 937 (C-2710) on morning of 25 July, but counterattack restored the position. In other sectors enemy resistance is light with rear guard action continuing.

b. Air: Between 0645 and 0735, vehicle columns, some as large as 30, noted on North coast road and CAPE ORLANDO - RANDAZZO - CESARO road. 60 vehicles were noted in PALTI (C-8549) area. Light inaccurate A.A. at C-4012. Very intense, light and medium A.A. at C-9350, D-1000, D-0225, C-7210. Light, mobile A.A. at C-5120. Several gun positions noted at D-1158 and C-7080. Railroad bridges at BROLO (C-7251) bombed and destroyed.

c. Naval: Fourteen unidentified vessels, four of which believed to be cruisers, reported off CAMPO FELICE (B-9032). Threat of enemy landing in rear delayed advance of 45th Division. Check on identity of ships in progress.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Prisoners of War: General Conti Egisto and Chief of Staff captured by Rangers. Maj. General Molinero Giovanni, Maj. General Marciani Guiseppe, Brig. General Aguo, Consul (Brig. General of Militia) Allori and one unidentified General captured by 3d Division.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend on general line POLLINA RIVER (C-1535) to GERACI - SICULO (C-1317) - GANGI (C-1811) - NICOSIA (C-3505) - AGIRA (H-4695).

(2) To withdraw east of the general line S. STEFANO (C-33) - NICOSIA (C-30).

(3) To delay in successive positions from line in Capability (1), pivoting on AGIRA, with final position along line in Capability (2).

Capability No. (3) is favored. Recent movements to the northwest indicate that the general line S. FRATELLO (C-53) - TROINA (C-50) - CENTURIPE (H-69) - CATANIA (H-97) might become a final defensive line with organized positions. Unconfirmed reports of reinforcements arriving along the Northern coast in this sector emphasize the probability of determined resistance by the enemy in this sector as our forces move east.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 252400B Jul 43
To : 262400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 17

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: C-1635, C-2412, LEONFORTE (H-3494), H-4892.

b. Defensive Organization: Civilian informant, considered very reliable, arriving at NICOSIA (C-3506) at 261400B, reports Germans in position east of CICERA, vicinity (C-2709) enemy caves. Approximately two companies in this area at 260500B. Supplied by trail from the main road to hill 807. West of SPERLINGA (C-3107), Germans digging in all night on hill 794 (C-3108), hill 776 (C-3202), and hill 749 (C-312063).

c. Identifications: Six PW's taken from a small boat, vicinity of C-0137, were from Flak Bn. 334, Italian. Enemy tanks and armored cars still West NICOSIA (C-3506) at 261300B hours. Probably rear guard battle group 15 Panzer Div., German.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Our 91st Rcn, at VILLAROSA (H-1587), was strafed 251400B by six planes, believed to be ME 109's. Enemy blew bridges at C-0536 and C-1327. Enemy's counterattack on hill 937 repulsed and hill reoccupied. Fourteen vessels, four of which believed to be cruisers, off CAMPO FELICE (B-9032); identification unknown, 262230B. At 260830B, reports indicated that N.E. out of NICOSIA (C-3506), 12 vehicles with field pieces were moving N. at C-365214, at 260735B. Ten vehicles towing guns, appeared to be 88-mm guns, going N.E. at C-311214, at 260750B. Indications of additional reinforcements observed by air rcn. at 261330B were 22 M/T at CATANIA, and one large ship and ten barges at 0233L. Three barges and one ferry moving N. from MESSINA (D-3757) and REGGIO (D-4446). Many barges on beach at 262000B.

b. Artillery: II Corps reports positive proof Germans have a 240-mm rocket, which may be confused with long-range heavy artillery. Artillery fire reported at C-2819.

c. Air: Report light traffic from CESARO (C-6316) to TROINA (C-5310). Heavy flak encountered at PATTI (C-8549), 261500B. Heavy traffic road between REGALBUTO (H-5795) and LEONFORTE (H-3343), 261600B July.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Total PW's to date: 58,000. Enemy dead and wounded: 7,100, and total tanks: 166.

b. Although not officially confirmed, MUSSOLINI reported resigned at 252200B, and Marshal BADOGLIO reported as successor(*).

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend on general line POLLINA River (C-1535) to GERACI - SICULO (C-1317) - GANAI (C-1811) - NICOSIA (C-3505) - AGIRA (H-4695).

(2) To withdraw east of the general line S. STEFANO (C-33) - NICOSIA (C-30).

(3) To delay in successive positions from line in Capability (1), pivoting on AGIRA, with final position along line in Capability (2).

Capability No. (3) is favored. Recent movements to the northwest indicate that the general line given in Capability (1) considered enemy outpost line of resistance. Line in Capability (2) considered main line of resistance, with area eastward to defensive line S. FRATELLO (C-53) - TROINA (C-51) - REGALBUTO (H-59) - CATANIA.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

(*) - The release of the Government controlled by MUSSOLINI to Marshal BADOGLIO has significance of undetermined character at this time. By interrogation of high-ranking Army and Navy officials, who in a number of instances refused detailed interrogation by the undersigned, showed no reluctance in voicing their disgust for MUSSOLINI personally and the Fascist Party and Government.

The Psychological Warfare Sub-Section of this Section has requested policies to be followed reference that turn of events, and pending such advice, the reactions of higher authority cannot be given.

It is historical that BADOGLIO was relieved by MUSSOLINI some time ago. Some reasons included his military popularity, which might affect MUSSOLINI'S standing within his Government. If that is considered as an indication, it may be assumed that BADOGLIO has a support of the armed forces which MUSSOLINI was losing and which may attribute to the nature of the defense of SICILY, which definitely was without spirit. Should that be the case, it may be further assumed that Italian resistance encountered henceforth may be greater, particularly after the fall of SICILY.

The local population of PALERMO reacts very favorably to the change. Newspapers and radio, the former of which is operative, and the latter, which will be operative in the matter of a few days, are being held pending polices to be announced by higher headquarters.

From : 262400B Jul 43
To : 272400B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 18

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally along C-2335, C-3415, C-3208, C-3300, C-5096, C-5086, C-8073, C-9670.

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b. Defensive Organization: Enemy MG and Inf on south slope of hill 1333 vicinity C-2306. Our patrols met small arms fire on approaching point C-2307. Also engaged with small arms fire at C-2509.

c. Identifications: No new identifications.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Entire coast patrolled by our planes to beyond STEFANO C-3135 all day yesterday. Ships previously thought to be enemy craft off Campo Felici (B-0732) are identified as friendly mine sweepers. No enemy Navy present. 1st Div sector contactin rear guard action by enemy with considerable movement North and Northeast out of NICOSIA (C-3506). Enemy resistance in vicinity. Inf OP reports enemy withdrawing this area. 30 German PW's were captured vicinity hill 987 C-2400 and were isolated and pocketed in caves. PW indicated 500 to 600 Germans SPERLINGA (C-3207 and NICOSIA C-3506 area. 10 light tanks and 2 heavy guns east of SPERLINGA C-3207. Enemy resistance on northern flank increasing. Column 30-40 vehicles including tanks and halftracks with trailers at C-9821, 20-30 were destroyed. Visual Recn of MARETTINO A33 and FAVIGNANA A52 islands reveal no activity or emplacements. 271215B very little shipping MESSINA STRAITS (D-3555). Intensive flak over town. 5 ME 210 over 1st Div area dropping delayed action bombs. No material damage, one bomb dropped by four JU 88's at C2112.

b. Artillery: Four batteries observed at C-3109, C-2711, C-3008 and C-2906.

c. Air: Four twin motored planes believed to be JU 88's dive bombed II Corps front line at 271820B. Damage not known.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Total PW's to date: 60,900. Enemy dead and wounded: 7,027 and total tanks: 169 captured or destroyed.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend West of general line MOTTO D'AFFERMO (C-33) - CASTEL DI LUCIO (C-22) NICOSIA (C-30) - AGIRA (H-49).

(2) To defend on high ground East of S. STEFANO (C-33) - MISTRETTA (C-22) - NICOSIA (C-30) - AGIRA (H-49).

(3) To delay in successive positions, first position as capability (1), second position as capability (2) working back along ridges to general line S. FRATELLO (C-35) - TROINA (C-51) - REGALBUTO (H-59) - CATANANUOVA (H-68).

Capability (1) is favored.

The identification of units of the 29th Motorized Division on the North flank now opposing our 45th Division plus activities including digging in West of NICOSIA (C-30) indicates a defensive attitude. An early study made of the terrain and indications of moving into but rarely out of the area bounded on the East by the line S. FRATELLO (C-35) - TROINA (C-51) - REGALBUTO (H-59) leads to the conclusion that an organization of defensive positions has been taking place for about ten days with rear guard action opposing our advance from the general line PALERMO (B-4546) - ENNA (H-2586). From captured documents in which it is ordered by the Italians that animals be requisitioned for the use of remnants of the 26th and 28th Divisions it may be anticipated that many and scattered small groups of resistance will be encountered in the rugged terrain in the zone of advance of the Seventh Army. From the enemy viewpoint, main lateral roads connecting S. STEFANO (C-33) - NICOSIA (C-30) - S. FRATELLO (C-35) - CESARO (C-62) and CAPO D'ORLANDO (C-65) - RANDAZZO (C-82), form principal cross corridors and so lend themselves well to organized defense.

The defensive zone may, therefore, be assumed to consist of an outpost line of resistance West of S. STEFANO (C-33) - NICOSIA (C-30) road with an organized main line of resistance East of it and close enough to it to deny that road to the Seventh Army once it is denied to the enemy. It may further be assumed that the area bounded by the road network S. STEFANO (C-33) - S. FRATELLO (C-35) - TROINA (C-51) - NICOSIA (C-30), lends itself well for organization of a defensive position in depth. Photo reconnaissance of these areas has been made and will be published as collated maps as of 2h00B 27 July. Thereafter, constant photographic missions will be flown of the zone of advance to determine the exact locations of the anticipated defenses.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From	:	280001B Jul 43
To	:	281600B Jul 43
Issuing Unit	:	Seventh Army
Place	:	In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 19

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally along line C-2534 - NICOSIA (C-3606) - AGIRA (H-4095) - CATENANUOVA (H-6186) to a point south of CATANIA at H-9670.

b. Defensive Organization: No organized defense encountered during period. Civilian informant reports road net in the S. STEFANO (C-3035) area has considerable enemy fortifications, including pillboxes and three 90-mm self-propelled guns.

c. Identifications: (1) German. 17 prisoners taken east of NICOSIA (C-3505) July 27, from 1st P.W.H., 15th Armored Division. (2) Italian. 6th Company 71st Regiment (Battalion CP at S. STEFANO (C-3035). PW taken vicinity TUSA (C-2132) states his battalion moving up from MESSINA (D-3655). 6th Regiment, 28th Division (450 Italians taken prisoner July 27) in general area C-2713.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Generally light resistance along the entire Seventh Army front, with blowing of bridges and placing of mines in front of the bridges contributing most of the delay. Reports received of German soldiers in civilian clothes sniping in rear area.

b. Artillery: Enemy 170-mm gun believed to be located at C-3837, 271637B hours. Air reports heavy gun emplacements appear to be at C-7822 at 281000B hours. Battery of 88-mm along coast road east of TUSA (C-2132) at 272h00B hours.

c. Air: Air reports heavy traffic from TROINA (C-5410) to RANDAZZO (C-8320) morning of July 28; also light traffic between S. STEFANO (C-3136) and PATTI (C-8549) at 280630B hours. Concentration of 150-200 MT in and around CESARO (C-6316) at 280630B hours. Air reconnaissance reports general movement towards the east as far as RANDAZZO (C-8320). Enemy air activity increased over forward area zone of Seventh Army. Twenty planes reported between 2300B and 2h00B July 27.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Information from Prisoners of War: PW states on July 27, 2d Battalion, 1st F.U.M. completely destoyed; also that 20 Italians had been shot that day for refusal to fight.

b. Captured Materiel: Dumps containing substantial quantities of four type large caliber rockets located at H-220615. Ordnance investigation in process and report will follow.

c. Supply Route: Indications are that enery is supplying a large proportion of the troops in Northeastern SICILY by sea to MESSINA (D-3655), then via coast roads toward CATANIA (H-9680) and S. STEFANO (C-3035).

d. Roads: Coastal road vicinity CASTEL di TUSA (C-2235) blocked by landslide believed from natural causes.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend along the general line west of S. STEFANO (C-33) - MISTRETTO (C-26) - M. MERCAVANTE (C-3807) - AGIRA (H-49).

(2) To defend high ground east of general line in capability (1).

(3) To delay in successive positions with first position general line as capability (1), the second position as capability (2) falling back over North-South cross ridges to general line S. FRATELLO (C-35) - TROINA (C-51) - REGALBUTO (H-59) - CANTENANUOVA (H-68).

Capability (3) is favored.

The interest of the 29th Wtz Division, accompanied by reports of defenses being erected and demolitions being executed manifests concern of the threat against the northern flank. The continuous bombing of motor convoys must play an important part in the retrograde movement affecting supplies. It may be deduced that the forces opposing the Seventh Army are hard pressed in their front and lack support from their rear, and that supply lines are being shortened by delaying actions to the east.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From	:	281600B Jul 43
To	:	291600B Jul 43
Issuing Unit	:	Seventh Army
Place	:	In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 20

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally along line C-2735 - West of MISTRETTA (C-26) - C-4010 - C-4500 - CATENANUOVA (H-6186) - H-8074 to a point south of CATANIA at H-9672.

b. Defensive Organization: Entrenched infantry encountered coastal area west of S. STEFANO (C-3036). Minefields located at C-326030 and four road craters at same location.

c. Identifications: (1) German. 12 Co, 15th PGR south of MISTRETTA (C-3226); 2d Bn, 71st Regt west of S. STEFANO (C-3036). (2) Italian. 171st Blackshirt Bn in coastal area west of S. STEFANO (C-3036).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Increased resistance encountered west of S. STEFANO (C-3036) as far south as MISTRETTA (C-3226). In the southern zone of the Seventh Army, patrols encountered no resistance north and northeast of NICOSIA (C-3505) during night 28/29 July. SPERLINGA (C-3107), NICOSIA (C-3505) and AGIRA (H4695) are clear of enemy troops. A general retirement east and northeast is in process. Bridge blown at C-297090 in withdrawal. Germans are reported to have pulled out rapidly from SPERLINGA (C-3107) leaving many Germans dead, considerable equipment and German graves. Three battalions of German infantry withdrew through NICOSIA (C-3505) during the night and early morning of July 28/29. Isolated groups of Germans now reported east and southeast of NICOSIA (C-3505). A typical German trick of waving a white flag in surrender and then firing on our troops in their approach has been employed north of LEONFORTE (H-3494).

b. Armor: It is reported that in withdrawing through NICOSIA (C-3505) the Germans had five tanks and three armored cars. Three or four tanks reported moving northeast on road (C-3850099) at 282015B hours.

c. Artillery: Three light batteries, one heavy battery, six rocket guns and four 88-mm guns were withdrawn through NICOSIA (C-3505) during the night July 28/29.

d. Air: Enemy air activity decreased during period. Air reconnaissance within Seventh Army zone as far east as MILAZZO (D-0959) morning of 29 July reports light traffic, no definite direction.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Information from Prisoners of War: PW states that 50% of 28th Aosta Division (Sicilians) have returned to their homes, and that he believes its strength now less than 50%.

b. Captured Material: Fourteen German rubber assault boats found in warehouse outskirts of PALERMO.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend high ground east of general line S. STEFANO (C-33) - MISTRETTO (C-26) - M. MERCAVANTE (C-3807) - AGIRA (H-49).

(2) To continue delaying tactics in the S. STEFANO (C-3135) - M. MERCAVANTE (C-3806) - TROINA (C-5209) - S. FRATELLO (C-5336) area retarding our advance by possible local counterattacks from the northeast.

(3) To initiate a general withdrawal east to a general line S. FRATELLO (C-35) - TROINA (C-51) - REGALBUTO (H-59) - CANTENANUOVA with rear guard action.

Capability (3) is favored.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From	:	291600B Jul 43
To	:	301600B Jul 43
Issuing Unit	:	Seventh Army
Place	:	In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 21

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally along line C-2734 - East of MISTRETTA (C-3225) - west of CAPIZZI (C-4216) - C-4300 - H-5396 - CATENANUOVA (H-6186) - H-8074 to a point south of CATANIA at H-9670.

b. Defensive Organization: Road blacks encountered along north-south road into S. STEFANO (C-3036), 2 km south of town. Estimated one battalion entrenched in caves along general line C-3955G2 - C-3751L3. Civilian reports that Germans are preparing defenses along line S. AGATA (C-5541) - S. FRATELLO (C-5236) - CESARO (C-6316). Bridges destroyed 1000 yds east and west of S. STEFANO (C-3036) on coast road.

c. Identifications: (1) German. PW taken on the coast confirms presence of 71st Infantry in S. STEFANO (C-3036) area.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Continued resistance encountered west of S. STEFANO (C-3036). Enemy forced to withdraw northeast from MISTRETTA (C-3226). Intense rear guard action in progress east and northeast of NICOSIA (C-3505). At 301530B, it is reported that 200 Germans are covering the town of GAGLIANA (C-4701). Islands off west coast of TRAPANI, FAVIGNANA, MARETTIMO, LEVANZA, capitulated 29 July.

C-37

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b. Artillery: Self-propelled guns reported vicinity CERAMI (C-4513). Approximately one battalion of artillery is in action against our forces in the S. STEFANO (C-3036) area, firing has been accurate and effective. Four coastal defense guns mounted on railway flat cars were inspected on the outskirts of PALERMO 29 July on siding at TOMMASO NATALE (B-3855). Civilian states they arrived 22 July. The train consists of two locomotives, four guns, 2 each, 152-A91, 1895; 1 each, 152-40A, 1899, and 1 each, 152-A99, 1903 and one carload of ammunition.

c. Photo Interpretation: Probable bivouac area in woods northwest CESARO (C-6313) with the appearance of wire near main road surrounding the woods. Light motor transports moving in and out. Air photos indicate 29th aircraft of all types, majority being fighters, on twelve southern Italian airports 21 July.

d. Air: Moderate heavy A.A. encountered over CESARO (C-6316) area July 29. 40 motor transports moving east from TROINA (C-5310) - CESARO (C-6316) at 301250B hours. Enemy plane dropped two bombs northwest COMISO airport (H-5416) at 232230B hours.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: 823 prisoners, mostly Italian, taken during occupation of NICOSIA (C-3935). Estimated total PW taken to date by Seventh Army, 79,500, by Eighth Army, 27,000; total, 106,500.

b. Captured Material: Numerous artillery pieces are being found in enemy field fortifications with ammunition dumps still intact.

c. Ordnance: Civilian reports ammunition dumps in vicinity S. AGATA (C-5541), also ammunition dump along highway between CAPO ORLANDO (C-6551) and NASO (C-6947).

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change from those given in Periodic Report No. 20 which were:

(1) To defend high ground east of general line S. STEFANO (C-33) - MISTRETTA (C-26) - M. MERCAVANTE (C-3807) - AGIRA (H-49).

(2) To continue delaying tactics in the S. STEFANO (C-33) - M. MERCAVANTE (C-3806) - TROINA (C-5209) - S. FRATELLO (C-5336) area retarding our advance by possible local counterattacks from the northeast.

(3) To initiate a general withdrawal east to a general line S. FRATELLO (C-35) - TROINA (C-51) - REGALBUTO (H-59) - CANTENANUOVA with rear guard action.

Capability (3) is favored.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 301600B Jul 43
To : 311600B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 22

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally along line east of S. STEFANO (C-33) - REITANO (C-33) - east of MISTRETTA (C-32) - CAPIZZI (C-41) - CERAMI (C-41) - east of GAGLIANO (C-40) - REGALBUTO (H-59) - west of CATENANUOVA (H-68) - H-8074 to a point south of CATANIA at H-9670.

b. Defensive Organization: No organized defense other than blown bridges, minefields, and undefended road blocks encountered along Seventh Army front. Enemy observed digging in east of CERAMI (C-4612) at 311200B hours.

c. Identifications: (1) Italian. Captured documents show four Italian A.A. battalions armed with German 88-mm guns in MESSINA area. These appear to be attached to the German A. A. organization. Organization is as follows: 88 BN (Battery unknown); 89 Bn (11406-7-8, 1501, 1506 Batteries); 90 Bn (1115, 1510, 411-12-13 Batteries); 91 Bn (11414-16-17-18-19 Batteries). In addition, 1403-4-5-9 Batteries are in the MESSINA area. 1409 A.A. Bn has been identified in MESSINA from captured mail. 549 Co., 24th Artillery Regiment identified in the MESSINA area.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy withdrew from S. STEFANO (C-33) during night July 30/31. Town of MISTRETTA (C-33) was also evacuated during night of July 30/31. No contact has been made with enemy along coast road during 31 July. The towns of CAPIZZI (C-41) and CERAMI (C-41) were taken this day. These towns were held by one Company at each place. After stubborn resistance by a German rear guard company, GAGLIANO (C-00) was taken at 311600B. Small mixed units were observed moving northeast from TROINA (C-51) during the day. The enemy continues to evacuate north and east along the entire front of the Seventh Army.

b. Artillery: Enemy artillery moving east continued to interdict our vehicles along coast road.

c. Photo Interpretation: As of 27 July, a total of 283 enemy planes, all types, were identified on twelve southern Italian airports.

d. Air: 65 motor transports moving east-on road from CESARO (C-6316) towards RANDAZZO (C-82) at 310645B hours. Large concentration of personnel observed in bivouac at C-7018 at 310700B hours. 50 motor transports observed moving west with head of column at C-4427 at 311100B hours.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Estimated enemy killed and wounded to date 6,200; aircraft destroyed or captured 235; guns, 75-mm or larger, destroyed or captured 263, and tanks, all types, 181. 200 Italian PW and 40 fully loaded motorcycles taken in the capture of MISTRETTA (C-32).

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To continue delaying action to a general line S. FRATELLO (C-53) - TROINA (C-51) - REGALBUTO (H-59) - CATANENUOVA (H-68) - CATANIA with local rear guard actions.

(2) To withdraw east to a general line NASO (C-64) - TORTORICI (C-73) - RANDAZZO (C-82) - CATANIA.

(3) To delay in successive positions, first position as shown in capability (1), second as indicated in capability (2) and final position to the eastward, now obscure.

Capability (3) is favored.

Although time has been ample for the organization of defensive positions, photo reconnaissance fails to reveal it. Tactics employed recently are definitely of the delay in successive position type, holding critical terrain as long as possible and then falling back. Just where the final position is cannot be determined. By resting flanks on Mt. Etna, shortening of the front is accomplished but lateral roads are also lost. The attitude is entirely defensive. Appearance of German units in the north indicate the importance attached to the presence of the Seventh Army. PW taken from Italian units still in action are extremely fatigued, as these units continue in action their fighting capacity decreases. As more and more Italian units are destroyed or forced to retire to the rear areas, the 29th German Motorized Division will be forced to extend its front south to join the 15th Panzer. This extension favors further rear guard action east until the enemy opposing the Seventh Army can anchor its southern flank on Mt. Etna. If the line S. FRATELLO (C-53) and CESARO (C-61) is evacuated the only remaining north-south road, NASO (C-64) - UCRIA (C-73) - RANDAZZO (C-82), must be defended.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 311600B Jul 43
To : 011600B Jul 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 23

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally along the line C3236 East of S. STEFANO (C33) - MISTRETTA (C32) - CAPIZZI (C41) - C4911 - West of REGALBUTO (H59) East of CATENANUOVA (H68) - H8074 to a point south of CATANIA H9670.

b. Defensive Organization: Extensive mining along the coast road East of S. STEFANO (C33) continued. Enemy blew bridge at C4923B6 at 310750B hours. Bridges are reported blown at C4201l6 and C4311l20. Road block reported along coast road at C5334O4.

c. Identifications: (1) German. PW states two battalions are opposing Eighth Army advance from CATENANUOVA. PW officer reports that the 3d battalion carried out unsuccessful counter-attack against 231st Brigade at 311030B hours. Additional 35 PW's from 923 Fortress Bn taken by Eighth Army. 25 PWs captured from 1st and 5th A.A. Btrys attached to HG Division. 2d Co., 29th Engr Bn east of S. STEFANO.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy continues to fight a delaying rear guard action along the coast road east of S. STEFANO (C33). Considerable motor traffic observed moving south from S. FRATELLO (C5336) during the day. Reinforcements in Artillery concentrations in the TROINA (C5310) area during the day slowed our advance toward TROINA (C5310). The CESARO (C6316) - BROWTE (C7210) - RANDAZZO (C8120) area found continuous motor movement. Bivouac area appears to be main concentration area of enemy reserves north of Mount Etna.

b. Armor: Two tanks observed at C4l2373.

c. Artillery: Batteries observed firing C5840l9l and C6340l79 believed to be 170-mm guns. Ammunition captured vicinity C3790l2 believed to be 17-mm.

d. Photo Interpretation: As of 29 July, a total of 257 enemy planes, all types, of which 154 were fighters, were identified on Southern Italy airdromes.

e. Air: German aircraft raided PALERMO (B5546) harbor and docks from 0410B to 0515B August 1st. 25 to 35 planes participated. At least four were shot down; two JU 88's by A.A. fire, and two Dornier 217's by Spitfires. A German aviator picked up the the sea six miles east of PALERMO at 0107.30B hours stated that he was a member of the crew of a JU 88; that 10 JU 88's participated in the raid leaving BARI, Southern Italy, at 0300B, arrived over target at 0400B and were shot down at 0500B. 5 ME 109's strafied S. STEFANO at 0730B August 1st.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Estimated total PW taken by Seventh Army to date: 80,000.

b. Morale: (1) Signor Steiner (a propaganda officer in the Italian Army) who arrived in SICILY from MILAN, informed PWB that Italians are now scrawling the letter "L" on walls throughout ITALY. This stands for "LIBERTA", and is an imitation of our own "V" propaganda.

(2) Interrogations reveal wide-spread reception of PWB radio programs from TUNIS, called "Voice of the United Nations". This daily feature in SICILY has been even more popular than in ITALY where sets have been few and anti-Fascists organised a word-of-mouth dissemination.

c. Prisoner of War Reports: (1) Large minefield C370380 laid July 30. (2) Minefield at C7015l0 laid July 31.

d. Civilian Reports: Germans entrenched S. AGATA (C54) to S. FRATELLO (C547). General outpost line vicinity C430369.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change from those given in Periodic Report No. 22, which were:

(1) To continue delaying action to a general line S. FRATELLO (C53) - TROINA (C51) - REGALBUTO (H59) - CATANENUOVA (H68) - CATANIA with local rear guard actions.

(2) To withdraw east to a general line NASO (C64) - TORTORICI (C73) - RANDAZZO (C82) - CATANIA.

(3) To delay in successive positions, first position as shown in capability (1), second as indicated in capability (2) and final position to the eastward, now obscure.

Capability (3) is favored.

See G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation #6 dated 1 August 1943 for long-range capabilities.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 011600B Aug 43
To : 021600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 24

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: CARONIA (C39) - C5015 - TROINA (C51) - REGALBUTO (H59) - CENTURIPE (H69) - 3 miles east of CATENANUOVA (H68) - H8074 to a point south of CATANIA at H9670.

b. Defensive Organization: Road block reported by air at C5334O4 at 010730B hours. Road north of GAGLIANA (C40) heavily mined and cratered. Minefields reported vicinity C4906.

c. Identifications: (1) German: 1 Bn, 15th PGR, 29th Mtz Division GAGLIANA (C40) area. 2d Bn, 382d PGR GAGLIANA area.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Strong resistance around TROINA (C51) continued all day 1 August and morning 2 August. At dusk August 1, the enemy counter attacked hill at C5018 by an estimated 200 men. Our forces withdrew at 2035B. August 2 our forces were again in contact and receiving small arms and mortar fire in this area. Along the coast road east of STEFANO (C33) only light contact with the enemy. Advance delayed by blown bridges, badly damaged road and heavy minefields.

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Air reports railroad bridge at C5A41 and road bridge at C5330B intact at C107CB hours. At 0715B heavy traffic observed moving south on RANDAZZO (C82) - ORLANDO (C65?) - SAN AGATA (C5A) road. At 1030B little traffic some road. Air reconnaissance of roads CESARO (C61) - RANDAZZO and ORLANDO - S. FRATELLO (C53) at C111430B observed little activity and no A.A. Also little traffic on road TROINA to CESARO at 1800B.

b. Artillery: Sporadic artillery fire in TROINA area during night 1/2 August.

c. Air: Enemy air activity increased considerably on traffic and artillery positions. Estimated 40 enemy planes over 1st Division during the day August 1. Air reconnaissance reports 50 invasion barges and one large transport off coast (DL065) at 0211008 hours.

d. Naval: Naval patrols off north coast as far east as CAPE MILAZZO (C07C4) night 31 July, 1 August. Reports no enemy waterborne activity. Lights east side CAPE ORLANDO (C65) noted.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Estimated total PW taken by Seventh Army to date 88,500; enemy dead and wounded 7,000; guns, 75-mm and larger, destroyed or captured 267, tanks, all types, destroyed or captured 101.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

For enemy capabilities see G-2 Estimate No. 6 dated 1 August 1943.

Continued blowing of bridges and laying of minefields in the north and a movement south of elements of the German 29th Motorized Division indicates a strong defense of the CESARO - BRONTE (C71) - ADRANO (H79) area. Also, the identification of the 3d Parachute Regiment east of CENTURIPE (H69) further emphasizes the importance of this area to the enemy in respect to allied intentions. Captured German documents show the final defensive position of the Herman Goering Division to be along the general line ADRANO - NICCOLOSI (H79) to ACIREALE (J09). On the north coast road, the extent and nature of demolitions is no doubt intended to retard progress only, the main effort inthe Seventh Army zone presumably being anticipated east along Highway 120.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 0211600B Aug 43
To : 0711600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit: Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 23

Map - U.S.G.S. 1264, 1:100,000, SICILY

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally along line C5Q23 - C5A18 - C5A16-C4910 - BRONTE - East of CENTURIPE (H69) - H8074 to a point south of CATANIA at H9670.

b. Defensive Organization: Extensive mining and continued blowing of bridges between CAPOMIA (C53) and S. AGATA (C5A) continued along the coast road. Single railway tracks were used in preparing demolitions for bridges.

c. Identifications: (1) German: PW from 8th Co., 71st Regiment, 29th Division taken vicinity C 4437 August 2. PW from 12 Co., 4GR Regiment taken east of S. STEFANO. (2) Italian: 26th Italian Field Artillery reported in MESSINA area. Presence of 12Tht Blackshirt Battalion in coast area vicinity S. AGATA (C5A) confirmed.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy continued delaying action east along coast road to S. AGATA (C5A). Mines and blown bridges delayed our advance but the mining was not extensive as was encountered in the S. STEFANO area. The enemy stubbornly resisted throughout the day around TROINA (C61). Elements southwest of TROINA slowly withdrew in the face of pressure. The enemy apparently built up field artillery concentrations in the general area C6120. At 0216458 heavy traffic was seen on road from TROINA to CESARO (C61), moving west and west. 30 trucks observed moving west on unimproved road between C5727 and C7221 at 0308008 hours. Generally, resistance in the north was light throughout the day. South of C5230 to include TROINA, the enemy is definitely on the defensive with hard infantry fighting throughout the area. In the Eight Army sector the Canadians have taken CENTURIPE (H69) but are making slow progress northeast against the 3rd German Parachute Regiment.

b. Armor: Tanks located at C4981L3 at 0216008 hours.

c. Artillery: Enemy heavily shelled vicinity of C4A83 to C4C4117 at 0418308 hours. Two enemy batteries were located at C5370A4; C5A172 and C4985L5. Rocket gun reported at C507C85. Some heavy artillery fell in the S. STEFANO area from battery believed located at C4937.

d. Air: Two German aircraft were shot down over 1st Division area August 2. Air reconnaissance reports bivouac area located between CESARO (C61) and RANDAZZO (C82) at C7820. One JU 88 on reconnaissance west of PALERMO.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Estimated PW taken by Seventh Army to date 90,500; aircraft destroyed, all types, 238, estimated enemy casualties dead and wounded 7,300.

b. Ordnance: German or Italian egg grenades painted blue around the top were found in the CENTURIPE area. These grenades have no delaying fuse and explode instantaneously as booby traps when knob is pulled. Warn all troops.

d. Captured documents: Document taken from Commanding Officer of 4th Bn, Hq Arty, Herman Goering Division dated 30 July was marked with three lines showing successive stages of withdrawal of the Herman Goering Division. These withdrawal lines were designated A, B and bridgehead position. The bridgehead position runs from M6A5985 to include ALESANDO (H79) and BIANCAVILLA (H79) and then generally east to J0A0904 north of ACIREALE (J09). The two intermediate lines roughly parallel this line at about five mile intervals with line A running just south of CATANIA and line B five miles north. Lines A and B pivot on a point just southeast of CENTURIPE. G-2 Estimate of Enemy strength by units to 31 July as follows:

	HQS	GUNS	TANKS
29th MTZ (G)	6	48	60 T/D
26th ASSIETTA (I)	2	24	
28th AOSTIA (I)	4	24	
15th PZR (G)	6	48	40
4th LIVORNO (I)	2	12	
54th NAPOLI (I)	1		
H. GOERING (G)	3	30	50
MISC. (G)	6	42	
	30	228	150 (100 max)
1 Coastal Division	9	36	18

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change. See G-2 Estimate No. 6, 1 August 1943.

The continued defense of the TROINA - CESARO - ADRANO - CENTURIPE area with reinforcements being moved north from CATANIA emphasizes the importance attached by the enemy to the allied threat along Highways 120 and 121. Captured documents reveal a planned withdrawal if forced north of CATANIA. Photographic reconnaissance still fails to reveal a final defensive position.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 0311600B Aug 43
To : 0411600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 26

Map - U.S.G.S. 1264, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally along the line C5A6 - west of S. FRATELLO (C53) - west of TROINA (C61) - C6300 - east of CENTURIPE (H69) - H8074 to a point south of CATANIA at H9670.

b. Defensive Organization: Railroad bridge was destroyed at C6250. Probable minefields located at RANDAZZO (C5A5) along coastal highway and railroad. Probable minefields also located vicinity southwest of ZAFFULLA (C63A).

c. Identifications: (1) Italian: PW taken vicinity south of TROINA 2 August were identified from Headquarters Co, 6th Regiment, AOSTA Division. Comment: the 6th Regiment AOSTA was reported destroyed by II Corps on 30 July; therefore, these may be stragglers. However, if the units still exist this indicates a southward movement. Other identifications of AOSTA Division remnants are on the north coast. (2) German: 1st Bn, 3d PZR Regiment, 15th Panzer Division reported in vicinity of C5L15. 2d Bn, 3d PZR vicinity C502).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Our troops moving east along coast road encountered light opposition, mortar and artillery fire. A local counterattack in vicinity of C5112 at 0320308 failed to accomplish its mission. Around the TROINA area, the enemy stubbornly resisted our advance. Generally along the Seventh Army front, rear guard action has been encountered along the coast road with some increase in the use of artillery. South of S. FRATELLO to include TROINA, enemy is retiring slowly but only after hard infantry fighting. Thirty motor transports were observed moving from S. FRATELLO (C53) north to the coast road at 0306038 hours. Approximately 30 motor transports moved south to NASO (C64) on the ORLANDO (C65) - NASO road morning of August 3. Heavy road movements were observed 0316008 both ways between PATTI (C4G) and BARCELLONA (H15).

b. Armor: Ten tanks approximately 22 feet long were seen stationary on road north of BRONTE (C71) at 0310308 hours. Comment: probably Mark VI's. At least five and probably eight tanks were observed on the BRONTE to ADRANO road between C7205 to C7300. Three Mark IV tanks used as self-propelled artillery reported in the TROINA area.

c. Artillery: Considerable artillery fire received in vicinity C4922 at 0313458 hours. A four gun enemy battery fired from position C5330J during night 2/3 August. Gun position believed east of road at C5923. Four probable anti-aircraft guns at C690L observed 0213458 hours. Two batteries, large mortar, supporting 3d PZR in vicinity of C5L910B.

d. Photo Interpretation: At 0312508 hours, photos showed a dump at C7330, bivouac and anti-aircraft guns in vicinity.

e. Air: Our air bombed road at C5823 and C5822. Road is believed temporarily blocked at both places. Air reconnaissance located a fuel or ammunition dump at C7330. Estimated 30 planes plus, raided PALERMO harbor, docks and airfield from 0206L0B to 0620458 causing little damage. One enemy aircraft destroyed by night fighters and three probably destroyed by anti-aircraft. Destroyer Schulrick severely damaged outside harbor.

f. Naval: MILAZZO harbor was empty of shipping at 0207h0B hours.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Summary of an Interrogation Report, AFHQ, 2 August 1943, is attached as an annex to this report.

b. Information from Prisoners of War: PW states that location of 15th Panzer Division Headquarters still believed to be three miles northwest of BRONTE (C71). A deserter from the 1st Bn, 115th PZR, 15th Panzer Division stated that on the 1st of August his battalion commander held an command that they were to withdraw to MESSINA and then to Sicily leaving one company as rear guard. Route of the withdrawal was to be west and north of Mt. ETNA to avoid naval bombardment on the coastal road. Comment: use of this route has been confirmed by air reports. PW of 3d PZR August 3 stated he had heard orders that officer who withdrew would be shot. PW stated that the position at TROINA is the outpost line of resistance and the main line of resistance is 20 kilometers to the East. Also, the six 75-mm A.T. guns of the 2d Regiment had been withdrawn east to the main line of resistance. Morale is low, food is bad and artillery lack ammunition. PW further stated that PZR 2 is with the German Goering Division, and that PZR 3 relieved PZR 1 at SPERLINGA (C51).

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To continue delaying action in the north with artillery support and to defend in depth from TROINA (C61) east along Highway 120.

(2) To withdraw to the general line S. FRATELLO - CESARO - ADRANO - CATANIA, deliberately in the north and from S. FRATELLO south, when forced.

(3) To withdraw to the line NASO (C64) - TORTORICI (C73) - CESARO (C61) - ADRANO (H79) - ACIREALE (D09) leaving a shell of Italian units under German control to protect the withdrawal.

Capability (2) is favored.

In the period covered by this report, it is indicated that some movement is taking place. Identification of Italian units on north coast bears some weight in the supposition that Italian units will be used for defensive, and that defensive purpose of considerable minor nature only, such as defending, road blocks, demolitions, etc, and that the German elements will offer the real resistance to the withdrawal.

Inasmuch as there has been no evidence of movement on roads in the past few days it is indicated that the withdrawal may have been taking place over night. Activity in the vicinity of the Straits of MESSINA lends credence to this and the entire action may consist largely of delaying action to cover the evacuation of, particularly, German troops.

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The rear guard action with reports of prepared demolitions sporadically, indicates that along the north coast major engagement is not to be expected, and that stubborn resistance and defenses astride route 120 is to serve to keep open the line of communication around the base of Mt. ETNA until the evacuation has been completed from that area.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

3 August 1943

MEMORANDUM TO : All Staff Sections.

SUBJECT : Summary of Interrogation Report, A.F.H.Q., 2 August 1943.

The following information was obtained by interrogation of two members of a JU 88 shot down off PALERMO, about 0445B, August 1st. The raid started from a field in southern ITALY, with the mission of attacking shipping believed to be west of PALERMO. Planes were armed with 2 500 kg. bombs and carried 10 parachute flares. The Squadron, of which these pilots were part, was to be over the objective at 0440 hrs, at which time they expected the convoy to be west of CAPE GALLO. It crossed ITALY at a height of 6900 feet, crossed a few feet above the sea until nearing PALERMO, and then climbed to 600 feet, noted a large fire in PALERMO, but continued search for their target. Finding no ships they turned northeast to bomb the ships located in the harbor area. About ten miles north of PALERMO a suitable ship was identified but an antiaircraft hit in the left engine caused the crew to bail out. It was assumed that 30 - 35 planes were involved in the operation. Members of the crew believe that Germany will win the war but their morale can only be described as fair. They were gloomy about Germanys' present position in ITALY and were notably bitter in referring to the ITALIANS, and to the resignation of MUSSOLINI, of which they had been told nothing except the fact that he had resigned.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

EDWARD FOX
Major, A.G.D.
Asst Adjutant General

From : 0416000B Aug 43
To : 0516000B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 27

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally along the line C5240 - S. FRATELLO (C53) - C5022 - C5511 - C5010 - C6300 - H7096 - PATERNO (H88) - north of MISTERBIANCO (H88) - north of CATANIA.

b. Defensive Organization: Enemy tank trap 200 yards along river bed paralleling railroad bridge vicinity C495380.

c. Identifications: (1) German: 8th Co, 71st PGR, 29th Division in S. SGATA (C54) area August 4. (2) Italian: 29th Regiment, 26th Assietta S. FRATELLO (C53) area August 4.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: The enemy continues to fight a rear guard action in the north slowing our advance by liberal use of mines and demolitions. Artillery support in this area has increased. From S. FRATELLO south to MT. PELATO (C4922) the enemy is withdrawing when forced. The line from MT. PELATO south to MT. ACUTO (C5017) is well organized and is strongly supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire. There is no report of any organization of the MT. BASCILIO (C5314) area. The major defensive effort of the enemy during the day was the defense of TROINA. The enemy positions follow a horseshoe formation from MT. DELLACROCE (C5611), then west of the town to MT. GREGERIO (C5405). On the south, this area is well defended, organized in depth, and occupied by determined enemy. In the Eighth Army sector, the Canadians have forced the enemy east of the TROINA river. The XII Corps (British) captured CATANIA and MISTERBIANCO with patrol action as far north as PATERNO (H78).

b. Artillery: S. STEFANO (C33) was shelled by reported 170-mm gun at 05 0100B hours. Enemy artillery supported in vicinity of S. AGATA by artillery mounted on railway cars moving in and out of tunnels, making counter battery fire ineffective.

c. Photo Interpretation: P.I. reports nine railroad bridges out between C5215 and C6347. Extensive minefields along beach at TERRANOVA (C5944). Nine fires observed burning between C5814J3 and C6214J9 August 3. Minefields on beach C7050 at 0403030B hours.

d. Air: At 0323000B, nine enemy planes bombed ammunition dump and road junction in vicinity of B3714.

e. Naval: Air reconnaissance at 0411000B observed much shipping activity along the coast between GANZIRRI (B4163) to the north and MESSINA to the south. The following vessels were noted: one liner - 500', one train ferry, one vessel - 220', one vessel - 150', five Siebel Ferries, one liner- 400', one vessel - 250', three vessels - 200' and seven troop landing craft.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Estimated total Prisoners of War taken by Seventh Army 91,600, enemy casualties, dead and wounded, 7,700, guns, 75-mm and larger, destoyred or captured, 276; all figures to August 5, 1943.

b. Chemical Warfare: Captured permit issued by 1st Bn, 15th PGR, 29th Motorized Division (German) authorizing the holder to travel without a gas mask because the unit had none in stock. Comment: this unit was still in France on this date, May 6, 1943.

c. Sabotage: Indications that enemy may be broadcasting false information on our radio channels August 1.

d. Information from Prisoners of War: Prisoners of War taken in the CATANIA area 2/3 August all state that the bulk of German forces have withdrawn to ACIREALE (J09) area.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To delay in successive positions, first position west of S. FRATELLO (C53) - CESARO (C62) - ADERNO (H79) - ACIREALE (J09), second position west of general line NASO (C64) - RANDAZZO (C82) - MT. ETNA - ACIREALE (J09), third position west of the general line FURNARI (C94) - FRANCOVILLA (D02) - FIUME FREDDO (D01).

(2) To withdraw to the north astride highway 113 (coast road), highway 120 TROINA (C51) - RANDAZZO road), highway 121 (REGALBUTO (H59) - ADERNO (H79) - BRONTE (C71) - RANDAZZO) and coast road 114, CATANIA to northeast.

(3) To accompany with capability (1) or (2) with evacuation to the mainland from the general MESSINA Straits area.

Capability (2) is favored augmented by (3).

In the past twenty-four hours, matters of significance have taken place, CATANIA has fallen, TROINA offers extremely stiff resistance, the north coast road impedes progress by demolitions, shipping has been noted in the MESSINA Straits of large vessels. The north ports of MILAZZO are reported empty of craft. There is considerable movement on roads between TROINA and CESARO.

From the foregoing, it is indicated that withdrawal and in all probability evacuation is taking place. Certainly the attitude is entirely defensive and the road network to the east of TROINA is vital to the withdrawal of troops finding themselves to the southwest of MT. ETNA. Delay, therefore, of our advance along highway 120 is imperative to permit the last minute withdrawal of the troops. With the fall of CATANIA the coast road to north will probably take place. The shortest and best likely for final defense is the general line listed under capability (2), second delaying position, once the area to the southwest and south of MT. ETNA is lost.

The entire operation from the enemy viewpoint, therefore, is to delay advance against time. The delay of time probably is a play being made in connection with both the political and militarh situation in the Italian mainland, developments of which are unknown.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 0516000B Aug 43
To : 0616000B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 28

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Enemy holds general line from C5340 - S. FRATELLO (C54) - east of TROINA (C61) - ADERNO - PATERNO - north of MISTERBIANCA (H88) and CATANIA.

b. Defensive Organization: Ridge at 4880 heavily mined. Coast road and railroad bridges west of S. FRATELLO all appear to be blown. Bridges to the east remain intact, air reconnaissance 5 August.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy continued to hold S. AGATA (C54) and S. FRATELLO in the north. Seventh Army advance slowed by use of mines, demolitions and booby traps. TROINA (C50) was captured at 0608208. The enemy forced out of TROINA and east along highway 120 towards CESARO (C61) by combined land and air attack. Heavy traffic was observed during the afternoon of August 5 between TROINA and CESARO. Concentration of over 200 vehicles observed in bivouac east of NOVARA (C93) at 0508308. In the Eighth Army Zone, the defensive effort of the enemy is north of the TROINA river. The battle for ADERNO continues. PATERNO (C78) was captured during the morning of August 6.

b. Artillery: During the afternoon of August 5 heavy enemy artillery concentrations on the hills west of TROINA. A reported rocket gun searched the valleys south of the road CERAMI (C41) to TROINA afternoon August 5.

c. Air: Enemy reconnaissance planes were over PALERMO harbor, some flares, at 0604308 hours.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change from last report, which was:

(1) To delay in successive positions, first position west of S. FRATELLO (C53) - CESARO (C62) - ADERNO (H79) - ACIREALE (J09), second position west of general line NASO (C64) - RANDAZZO (C82) - MT. ETNA - ACIREALE (J09), third position west of the general line FURNARI (C94) - FRANCOVILLA (D02) - FIUME FREDDO (D01).

(2) To withdraw to the north astride highway 113 (coast road), highway 120 (TROINA (C51) - RANDAZZO road), highway 121 (REGALBUTO (H59) - ADERNO (H79) - BRONTE (C71) - RANDAZZO) and coast road 114, CATANIA to northeast.

(3) To accompany with capability (1) or (2) with evacuation to the mainland from the general MESSINA Straits area.

Capability (2) is favored augmented by (3).

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 0616000B Aug 43
To : 0716000B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 29

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Enemy holds general line S. AGATA (C54) - S. FRATELLO (C53) - C5722 - east of ADERNO (H79) - BELPASSO (H88) to a point north of CATANIA at J0480.

b. Defensive Organization: Enemy defensive position around S. FRATELLO estimated strength of 700 men at 0615008. Road bridges demolished at C5613G, C5813B August 6. Road blocks located at C5L22 and C7553 August 6. Extensive wire entanglements and minefields have been encountered throughout the TROINA area. An estimated battalion strongpoint one mile east of TROINA astride highway 120 was reported at 0709008. Air reconnaissance reported minefields on beach between C9714J9 and C9795B5 at 0703455.

c. Identifications: (1) German: Interrogation of PW reveals regiments of the 15th Panzer Division have been redesignated as follows: PGR 1, now called PGR 104, PGR 2 now PGR 115, PGR 3 now PGR 112. PW reports 2d Bn, 71st PGR, 29th Motorized Division north of S. FRATELLO.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Along the coast the enemy continued his stubborn resistance supported by heavy concentrations of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. A local counterattack at 0619008 north of S. FRATELLO prevented any further advance during the day of August 6. Since that time he has engaged in stubborn rear guard action and is retiring under pressure towards CESARO (C61). Eighth Army zone, the enemy lost ADERNO (H79) - BIANCAVILLA and S. MARIA during morning of August 7. Along the east coast road the enemy has been forced to retire under heavy pressure towards ACIREALE (J09) to J0488 at 0616008.

b. Armor: Six enemy tanks were taken under fire near C6208 at 0620158.

c. Artillery: PW states two 150-mm batteries are located at C5942 August 6. Civilian engineers report gun batteries at C631098 and C5668096 on August 5. Air reports anti-aircraft fire encountered during past few days in the MESSINA Straits area to be more intense than that over the RUHR valley.

d. Photo Interpretation: Minefields on beaches vicinity C9748 August 6.

e. Naval: Air reports at 0610308 the sinking of numberous barges engaged in beach to beach shuttling across the Straits of MESSINA.

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3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Sabotage: At 0600CLB a saboteur was apprehended cutting field wire west of PALERMO. Two like offenses of this nature occured afternoon of August 6 in the PALERMO area.

b. Information from captured documents: From a map captured at TROINA in possession of officer PW on 6 August, it appears that the enemy's new defense position will be 0562l - 05718 - 05814 - 06010 - 06409 - 06501 - 06707 - 06850.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To continue to defend the general line S. FRATELLO - CESARO (062) - BRONTE (071).

(2) To defend the general line NASO (065) - RANDAZZO (082) - MT. ETNA - ACIREALE (J09).

(3) To evacuate, giving German troops priority while covering evacuation by delaying actions on either of these two lines.

Capability (3) is favored.

The determined resistance in the S. FRATELLO - TROINA area is probably the result of planned withdrawal along the west side of MT. ETNA from ADRANO through BRONTE to RANDAZZO. By such movement the defense in capability (2) is strengthened. All movement will be, no doubt, characterized by strong centers of resistance and maximum use of demolitions and mining. While this is taking place, the defense on the east of MT. ETNA will continue to be stubborn denying progress to the north until such time as the general line NASO - RANDAZZO - FIUME FREDDO can be held.

The report of shipping in the northern reaches of the Straits of MESSINA reported a few days ago as having been seen there on 4 August indicates movement into the CALABRIA Peninsula by probably a longer voyage and that transshipment of evacuees because of the political situation in Italy is probably being made in probably the central or northern ports of Italy in the vicinity of NAPLES or to the north.

The reported sinking by the RAF of many barges in the Straits of MESSINA would indicate that these are for shorter shipments and that they will be used in the evacuation, first, of such supplies as require shorter hauls or the probable later evacuation of Italian troops to the Italian mainland. The latter is doubtful at this time because of the nature of resistance being offered. It must be appreciated that the assembling of craft along the MESSINA Straits and coast is an invitation to early destruction by active Allied bombing.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From : 071600B Aug 43
To : 081600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 30

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Enemy holds general line S. MARCO (C64) - C5427 - east of CESARO (C61) - northeast of BRONTE (C71) - northeast NICOLOSI (H99) to a point south of ACIREALE at J0388.

b. Defensive organization: Air reconnaissance on August 7 report railroad bridge at FALCONE (C9545) as destroyed. Other railroad bridges reported blown at C5040 and H7398. The road from CESARO to RANDAZZO is reported heavily mined.

c. Identifications: (1) German: PW reports 1st and 2d bn, 71st PGR 29th Motorized Division in S. MARCO area. 3d Bn reported at BARCELLONA (D05) August 6. 15th PGR, 29th Motorized Division is reported 30 km east of S. AGATA on coast road to MESSINA on August 7.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: During the night of August 7/8, the enemy withdrew from S. FRATELLO and was forced out of S. AGATA towards the east at 081400B. S. MARCO (C64) was lost the morning of August 8 when American troops successfully landed during the night. Only isolated pockets of resistance remain between S. MARCO and S. AGATA. Enemy forces were driven east of CESARO at 080800B. The road from CESARO to RANDAZZO has been heavily mined. Resistance during the day has been confined to light rear guard action: In the Eighth Army zone, the enemy lost BRONTE 081020B, and began a rapid retreat towards RANDAZZO. At 081600B forward elements of the 78th DIVISION (British) had reached C8118 only 3 km southwest of RANDAZZO. NICOLOSI (H99) and BELPASSO (H88) were lost during the morning of August 8. Further to the east enemy is evacuating towards ACIREALE.

b. Armor: Thirty tanks were reported by aerial reconnaissance moving southwest in vicinity of BRONTE at 070925B. Two Mark VI and one Mark IV tanks operating east of S. AGATA retreated southwest in face of our landing force on the morning of August 8.

c. Artillery: An estimated 26 artillery pieces are in support of enemy force east of S. AGATA and S. FRATELLO.

d. Photo Interpretation: Many congested areas consisting of troops, bivouacs supply dumps and trucks located in the area TORTORICI (C73), UCRIA, FIORESTA at 0606CB.

e. Naval: USTICA Island surrendered unconditionally on August 5 to a combined naval and military landing force. Germans shd departed 11 July, destroying the wireless and telegraph station which also appeared to have been bombed. Five enemy E-boats made an unsuccessful attack on PALERMO harbor at 0600468 being driven off by destroyers. Air reconnaissance of August 6 observed a 7000 ton ship tied to west side docks MESSINA, also many small craft at 84540 and 84730.

f. Air: 16-20 FW-190s and ME-109s were encountered ten miles north of CAPE ORLANDO approaching from northeast carrying bombs. Three FW-190s were destroyed, one probably destroyed. Enemy jettisoned their bombs. Did not reach our shipping.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: PW taken in the occupation of USTICA Island included two officers, 84 soldiers, 13 sailors, all Italians, 7 machine guns and 1100 small arms were captured. 216 civilprisoners and guards were on the Island. Seventh Army: Estimated PW 93,300, dead and wounded 8,500, aircraft destroyed, all types, 245, tanks, all types, 185; all figures to August 8 inclusive.

b. Information from Prisoners of War: PW taken along the TROINA - CESARO road on August 7 reveals that all of their units are badly depleted in strength and that food and ammunition had not reached their forward elements since the 3d of August.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend the general line NASO (C65) - RANDAZZO (C82) - MT. ETNA - ACIREALE (J09).

(2) To retire to the general line PATTI (C85) - MONTALBANO (C83) - CASTAGLION (C92) - FIUME FREDDO (D01) with delaying action.

(3) To continue rear guard action to a beachhead position extending from FALCONE (C94) - NOVARO (C93) - FRANCAVILLA (C92) - FIUME FREDDO (D01).

(4) To accompany all of the above by evacuation of troops to the Italian mainland from CAPE MILAZZA and MESSINA giving German troops priority.

Capability (2) augmented by (4) is favored.

From : 081600B Aug 43
To : 091600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 31

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Enemy defends the general line C6348 - C6823 - Southwest of RANDAZZO (C82) - MT. ETNA. East of MT. ETNA enemy line runs generally north of PEDARO (H99) - north of ACIREALE (J09).

b. Defensive organization: Coast road northeast of S. MARCO (C54) mined. Highway 120 from CESARO to RANDAZZO mined and bridges blown. Indications that enemy defense line exists west of road NASO (C64) to RANDAZZO (C82). Some bridges east of RANDAZZO reported blown at 082400B. Other bridges reported blown: Two at 0629170, 0636157, 0597146, 0609143, 0617146.

c. Identifications: (1) German: Elements 1st Bn, 71st PGR, 29th Motorized Division, 29th Engineers, 29th Signal Bn captured vicinity S. MARCO (C64) August 8. (2) Italian: 439th Bn, 179th Regt, 213th Coastal Division destroyed. Elements of 75th A.A. Bn and 29th Regiment, 26th ASSIETTA Division all captured or destroyed August 8 by landing forces in the vicinity of S. MARCO and S. AGATA.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy forces in north coast sector withdrew east of ZAPPULA river and continued delaying action supported by mortar fire during the day. The road from S. FRATELLO south to CESARO has been evacuated. This route was left mined but undefended. On the road to RANDAZZO, enemy has been forced to retire each of the SIMETO river and from this position has slowed our advance by mortar and artillery fire. The enemy conducted a continuous rear guard action along the entire front of the Seventh Army. In the Eighth Army zone at 091600B the enemy continued to hold RANDAZZO but east of MT. ETNA the towns of PEDARA, TRECASTAGNI (H99) and ACI REALE were lost.

b. Armor: Fire was received from enemy tanks at C6716 at 081620B. Eighth Army PWs reported approximately 50 tanks were in MESSINA on the 5th of August.

c. Artillery: Sporadic artillery fire received from area west of S. MARCO during the night of August 8/9. An artillery concentration area containing 280-cm howitzer and approximately two battalions of artillery, 105 and 105-cm is reported five to seven km northeast of RANDAZZO August 8.

d. Photo Interpretation: PI shows 115 bomb craters on highway 116 between NASO (C64) and RANDAZZO. Photographs taken August 6 show 515 planes of all types on southern Italian airfields of which 204 are bombers. Comment: This shows a considerable increase in bomber strength since August 1.

e. Air: Thirty bombers raided BIZERTE on August 7. Twenty bombs were dropped in harbor resulting in near misses on one motor vessel. Two enemy aircraft shot down by A.A.

f. Naval: Air reconnaissance observed two merchant ships, probably tankers, in MILAZZO harbor at 081035B. Air reports increased landing craft activity in the MESSINA Straits on August 7. Approximately 40 craft were seen. At 091135B air reconnaissance observed two Seibel Ferries operating three miles northeast of MESSINA small boats crossing the Straits towards Italy and 20 small craft beached four miles north of MESSINA.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Approximately 1300 PW of which 144 were Germans were captured as a result of a successful sea envelopment in the vicinity of S. MARCO. Estimated 94,800 PW taken by Seventh Army to date.

b. Sabotage: Two tunnels reported filled with ammunition located two miles east of CAPOREALE (B22) were blown 8 August.

c. Information from Prisoners of War: PW taken vicinity CESARO August 7 reported the Germans had stripped remnants of the 28th AOSTA Division (Italian) of all artillery. Civilian reports that four batteries of field artillery withdrew night of August 6/7 along unmapped road from C5725 to C7321.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend the general line NASO (C65) - RANDAZZO (C82) - MT. Etna - ZEFFERANA (C90) - J0699.

(2) To retire to the general line PATTI (C85) - MONTALBANO (C83) - CASTAGLIONE (C92) - FIUME FREDDO (D01) with delaying action.

(3) To continue rear guard action to a beachhead position extending from FALCONE (C94) - NOVARO (C93) - FRANCAVILLA (C92) - Fiume FREDDO (D01).

(4) To accompany all of the above by evacuation of troops to the Italian mainland from CAPE MILAZZA and MESSINA giving German troops priority.

Capability (2) augmented by (4) is favored.

From : 091600B Aug 43
To : 101600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 32

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY

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1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Enemy holds positions generally from C6448 - C6539 C6321 - east of the SIMETO River at C7115 - north of MALETTO (C71) - MT. ETNA - north of PADARA (H99) to a point on the coast south of RIPOSTO at D0502.

b. Defensive organization: High ground west of NASO. This position commands the coast road. Heavy and intense A.A. fire received from MILAZZO at 091725B. The volume and accuracy of A.A. fire from the MESSINA Straits area has increased the past two days. Heavy A.A. received from CAPE TINDARI at 091730B. Comment: This increase in A.A. indicates the importance given by the enemy to possible evacuation points or points of resupply.

c. Identifications: (1) German: Indications that the 15th and 71st Regiment of the 29th Motorized Division have withdrawn to the vicinity of PATTI (C84). The 3d Parachute Regiment and a battalion of the 382d PGR are defending the road to RANDAZZO east of the SIMETO River.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Some isolated pockets of resistance still exist in the coastal sector between S. MARCO (C64) and the ZAPPULA River. The enemy continued to effect rear guard action supported by mortar fire during the day. At 101600B the enemy had withdrawn west of the ZAPPULA River and had occupied the high ground west of NASO. There was no indication of organized defensive positions in the coastal sector. On the road to RANDAZZO the enemy has withdrawn east of the SIMET River and continues stubborn rear guard action eastward. Extensive minefields including both Teller and anti-personnel mines, and numerous demolitions of culver and bridges slowed our progress considerably along Highway 120 from CESARO. The enemy continues rear guard action along the entire front of the Seventh Army with his major effort directed towards the defense of RANDAZZO.

b. Armor: Two Mark IV tanks and one Italian light tank were destroyed in S. AGATA (C54) on the morning of August 8. Continued reports that the enemy tanks in the vicinity of C6450 at 080630B.

c. Artillery: The enemy abandoned three 149-mm guns near bridge across ROSMARINA River (5943) on August 8. The decrease in the volume and accuracy of artillery fire received in the north coast sector indicates that the bulk of the enemy artillery now to be Italian. Depleted artillery positions are believed to be in the proximity of C5928, C6628, C6928, C7122. PW statements indicate that both the Herman Goering Division artillery and the 15th Panzer Division artillery are short of ammunition.

d. Photo Interpretation: PI on August 9th shows bridges blown at C836208, C7181l6; 4-gun battery at C813187; road breached at C748111, C749116.

e. Air: Enemy planes flying west to east dropped fourteen bombs on the Allied warships lying three miles off of S. AGATA causing no damage on August 8. ME 109s bombed and strafed the coastal area vicinity C4538 slightly damaging one LST. Enemy air reconnaissance during the night of August 10 was considerably increased.

f. Naval: Air reconnaissance at 091355B observed medium size ship in MILAZZO harbor. Forty fishing boats sited beached at C9848, five boats D0351, ten boats at D0553 by air reconnaissance 100700B. Thirty-five small craft were observed in MESSINA harbor at 100920B. There was in increase of Seibel Ferry service carrying considerable deck cargo throughout the day of August 9th, in the Messina Straits.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Statistics: 95,000 PW, 10,100 enemy dead and wounded, 188 tanks, all types destroyed or captured by Seventh Army to date.

b. Ordnance: Enemy ammunition dump located at C5263A9 on August 8th. An ammunition point is reported six km east of RANDAZZO on the road to CASTIGLIONE on August 8th.

c. Roads: From various sources including PW and friendly civilians, it appeared fairly certain that the enemy has been using extensively roads not shown on the map running generally from C5528 - C6239 - C6627 - C7322. There is a fork on this road at approximately C6627 towards C7318 and then towards FIORESTA (C8633). It also appears that German and Italian engineers have completed a road between LONGI (C663) and GALATI-MAMERTINO (C6737).

d. Battle Order: The following is a G-2 Estimate of the remaining enemy strength on the Island. Possible evacuation during the past week is not considered in the Estimate.

German

	Inf Bns	Guns	Tanks
29th Mtz Div.	6	36 - 48	30
15th Pz Div	6	48	30
H.G. Div.	4	48 - 60	
3d Para Regt	3	12	
4th Para Regt	2		

Italian

4th Livorno	1		
26th Assietta	2		
28th Aosta	2		
54th Napoli	1 (?)		
213th Coastal	7	36 - 48	18 (?)
Tactical Gp Schreiber	1 (?)		
Total	35	216	78

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To delay in successive positions: first position NASO - RANDAZZO - FIUME FREDDO, second position general line PATTI (C84) - RANDAZZO, and final position west of general line FURNARI (C94) - NOVARA (C93) - FIUME FREDDO (D11).

(2) To defend along general line shown as the final delaying position in capability (1).

(3) To evacuate while executing delays in capability (1).

Capability (3) is favored.

The recent appearance of some fishing craft both west and east of the CAPO DI MILAZZO as well as in the Straits of MESSINA as covered in detail on the report may be interpreted in two ways, first that the craft are coming in with useable cargo but no troop reinforcements, and second that troops are being evacuated. The lack of identification precludes a definite deduction as to what remnants are on the Island to retard the advance of the allied forces. Judging by artillery fire encountered in the zone of the Seventh Army, it may be presumed that the small craft reported operating around CAPO DI MILAZZO may be carrying ammunition and on the return trip evacuating troops.

The lack of identification in the RANDAZZO area does not indicate what troops are being withdrawn or what have been evacuated through that area. With the earlier cutting of the CATANIA - BRONTE road, it must be assumed that troops to the north that as well as those opposing the advance of the right flank of the Seventh Army along the CASARO - RANDAZZO road have converged in the RANDAZZO area.

It may be anticipated that along the coastal road the withdrawal will continue to be effected by mines and demolitions but with the absence of resisting troops in the center due to convergence of the 15 th Panzer Division, elements of the Herman Goering Division, and portions of the 3d Parachute Divisions. Stubborn troop resistance may be expected. It may further assumed, however, that the major elements of the 15th Panzer Division have withdrawn from the RANDAZZO area.

From : 101600B Aug 43
To : 111600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 33

Map - U.S.C.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: The enemy defends the general line CAPO ORLANDO (C6552) - C6727 - astride highway 120 at C7618 - MT. ETNA - to a point south of RIPOSTS at D0303.

b. Defensive Organization: Ninety per cent of the Teller mines located in the vicity of C538398 were booby trapped. The high ground west of NASO (C64) afforded excellent observation for artillery fire on our forces advancing across the ZAPPULA River. The enemy continued to occupy this position throughout the day of August 11.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: The enemy position on the high ground west of NASO was outflanked during the night by successful landing operation to the east during the night of August 10/11. Enemy action on CAPO ORLANDO consisted of observed artillery, mortar and machine gun fire against our troops advancing east along the coast road, and local counterattacks against the beachhead position at C7050 which was captured by successful landing forces during the early morning of August 11. At 111600B no attempt to evacuate south along the NASO - RANDAZZO road had been made. The enemy continues rear guard action along Highway 120 to RANDAZZO using mines and demolitions to slow our advance. Although indicated in earlier reports, no strong defensive position northwest of RANDAZZO has been located by our troops moving in from the northwest. Other than isolated pockets of resistance in the vicinity of NASO, which are almost surrounded, the enemy continues a rear guard action along the entire front of the Seventh Army. In the Eighth Army sector, the enemy continued to defend his routes of evacuation west of RANDAZZO and south of RIPOSTO. Otherwise no change.

b. Armor: Five enemy tanks approached our landing force from the west during the morning of August 11 but made no attack.

c. Artillery: Artillery fire from positions west of NASO has been extremely effective throughout the day. Twelve artillery pieces are believed located at C8Q36Q9, caliber is not known. Air reconnaissance observed an intense heavy AA belt in the RANDAZZO area extending five miles eastward of 101138B.

d. Photo Interpretation: Air photos of August 10 show: Six or seven groups of 6-7 rowboats each along the beach from C9948 to D0453. The bridge at RANDAZZO formerly damaged by bombs has now been repaired. Some motor traffic moving both ways between RANDAZZO and LINGUAGLOSSA (C81) at 101200B. Bridges have been blown at C7701R4, C7241?3, C7261?0 and C7111?9. A probable minefield exits on the beach from C990?95 to C990494.

e. Air: Enemy air reconnaissance during the night 10/11 August was continuous over the rear areas.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Abandoned equipment captured August 5 to 10 include four 75-mm guns, four 150-mm guns, two 88-mm guns and one 149/13 gun. PW 95,900, enemy dead and wounded 10,300, guns, 75-mm and larger destroyed or captured 287; all inclusive to August 11 by Seventh Army.

b. Information from Prisoners of War: PW captured August 9th states that a large fuel dump exists immediately south of PUNTAZ at C984156. A PW reports that the 129th Battalion, Panzer Grenadier, are equipped with special self-propelled guns, that this unit arrived in Sicily from Bordeaux, France about two weeks ago and were informed that this unit was to help evacuate troops across the Straits of MESSINA. Summary of Interrogation, German PW, August 9th: PW is of Polish origin and speaks German with a foreign accent. He is a native of the formerly Polish part of Upper Silesia. He took part in the Polish campaign in fall 1939 as a private in a Polish Signal unit. After having been a PW in Germany he was drafted into the German Army. PW states that Germans would not force all Poles into the German Army, but only the Poles from the Upper Silesia and the so-called Carthegau. All other Poles now serving in the German Army would be volunteers.

For further information from Prisoners of War see Annex No. 1 to this report.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change from last report, which was:

(1) To delay in successive positions: first position NASO - RANDAZZO - FIUME - FREDDO, second position general line PATTI (C84) - RANDAZZO, and final position west of general line FURNARI (C94) - NOVARA (C93) - FIUME FREDDO (D11).

(2) To defend along general line shown as the final delaying position in capability (1).

(3) To evacuate while executing delays in capability (1).

Capability (3) is favored

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Annex No. 1 to G-2 Periodic
Report No. 33 dated 11 Aug 43.

10 August 1943

GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. Increased German Planes in Southern Italy.

a. Photographic coverage of Southern Italian Airfields shows a marked increase in German JU-88's and other combat type planes between

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August 2 and August 6. The number of JU-88's increased from 24 on August 2 to 184 on August 6, practically all of which were concentrated in the FOGGIA area on dispersed satellite landing fields. This is within effective JU-88 range of most of our airfields in SICILY, and the flat terrain around FOGGIA allows a wide dispersal of aircraft, also substitution of new satellite landing strips for those we render unserviceable from bombing. In addition to the above figure of 184 JU-88's on Southern Italian Fields, there were 46 indicated by Photo coverage of Northern Italian Fields as of the same date - August 6.

b. Between the same two dates the estimated number of German and Italian Single-Engine Fighters on Southern Italian Fields increased from 90 to 160, of which perhaps 50% are German.

c. Total of all types, including many Italian planes which are ineffective for combat, increased from 257 to 515, or an increase of 28 in addition to the increases as above in JU-88's and estimated Single-Engined Fighters.

2. Extracts from Prisoner of War Reports.

a. An Italian pilot reported in regard to the JU87 or "Stuka" dive-bomber, "These German machines are very old. He maintained stoutly that they were not fitted with any wireless whatsoever, and furthermore that armament and speed were most unsatisfactory. He stated that he now realises that it is suicide to operate them." Later on this same PW expressed his personal opinion, "The sooner we occupy Italy the better it will be for everybody."

b. A German JU-88 pilot recently captured stated, - Theoretically Polz's tactics of bringing all his bombers over the target to swamp the defenses may be very sound, but under present conditions the Luftwaffe is not in a position to operate sufficient aircraft at once to overcome any AA defenses in the Mediterranean area. As a result losses are rising rather than falling and most of the old experienced crews have been lost. I/KG 76, who arrived in FOGGIA on 10 June with 28 crews had shrunk to six crews by the 10th of July. The only experienced pilot left in the I/KG is Oberfeldwebel BRUCHELOS, the rest of the crews are all inexperienced with only one or two operational flights to their credit.

c. The interrogation report on another German pilot includes the following: "About the end of June 1943, German Air Crews were shown a report and given a lecture on the tactical and technical details of the P-47, "Thunderbolt", based on the statements made by a U.S. Air Force Captain who was taken prisoner in French occupied territory." (The moral of this story is obvious. Air personnel who are unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner from here on should be courteous to their captors, but say absolutely nothing except, - "My name is _____, my rank is _____, and my serial number is _____." They may add, "I am sorry, but I am still a member of the U. S. Armed Forces, and it is contrary to any regulations for me to say anything more whatever on any subject of a non-military nature as well as military.")

3. Radio Berlin's Report on the August 4, PALERMO Raid.

"A large group of heavy bombers attacked the harbor of PALERMO, which was full of shipping. In addition to numerous heavy bomb hits on harbor establishments, two Merchantment totaling 13,000 tons, and one Destroyer were sunk. A light Cruiser, three Destroyers, and eight Merchantment were damaged." (Total actual damage was one direct hit on a Destroyer with 5 men killed and 16 injured, but the Destroyer itself was not seriously damaged. One direct hit on a crane in the dock area. That was all.)

4. Enemy Ground Strength left in Sicily.

This was estimated recently at not over 15,000 Germans, and 10,000 Italians still under arms. Food and ammunition supply may be presumed to be inadequate.

5. Booby Traps.

The Third Division reports that a Luger Pistol was "Booby Trapped" on a table. A recuit picked it up resulting in two killed and 14 wounded.

6. MESSINA STRAITS.

Anti-aircraft fire encountered during the past few days in the MESSINA STRAITS is reported as more intense than that over the RUHR Valley. This is probably in preparation for the evacuation of SICILY, but anti-aircraft is a poor substitute for adequate air cover, which the Axis probably expects it be unable to provide and maintain.

7. German Fighter Pilot Moral.

a. From another CSDIC Interrogation report dated 5 August 1943 on an ME-109 pilot comes the following: "PW states that in the week preceeding his capture 19 pilots were lost from his Gruppe, leaving only 18 serviceable aircraft as of July 12." He continues, "At the beginning of July a special order of the day was issued by Major General GALLAND stating that the following conditions must be fulfilled by all GAF fighter pilots in the Mediterranean Area.

(a) An enemy must be shot down, or
(b) Hits must be visible in the A/C to show that the pilot had been engaged in combat, or
(c) The pilot must be shot down himself.

In future no excuses would be accepted and a pilot who did not fulfill one or more of these conditions would be made the subject of an immediate Court of Inquiry with a Court Martial to follow. It was further expected of each formation of fighters who took off that they would shoot down at least one enemy aircraft.

b. According to a prisoner, Reichsmarshall GOERING recently issued the following order of the day to the GAF fighter units in the Mediterranean area. "Together with the Fighter pilots in FRANCE, NORWAY and RUSSIA, I can only regard you with contempt. I want an immediate improvement and expect that all pilots will show an improvement in fighting spirit. If this improvement is not forthcoming, flying personnel from the Kommodore downwards must expect to be reduced to the ranks and transferred to the Eastern Front to serve on the ground." As a result of these proclamations a strong feeling of defeatism is prevalent amongst fighter units, and many pilots, including Staffel-Kapitane have been heard to say that it is better to become prisoners than return to base to face a court martial.

NOTE: This would seem to be an extraordinary manifestation of jittered war nerves extending up through to the top leaders of the Luftwaffe. It is like racking with spurs the flanks of a winded race horse, and its effect on German or any Nationality of high-strung fighter pilots cannot ve favorable. It should prejudice their best judgment, and tempt them to bale out over territory on any provocation, as the lesser of evils. Germany may have still up to 300 Divisions in her ground forces, but her airforce may be close to defeat.

8. Air Support for the Ground Forces in SICILY.

Under date of 4 August a G-2 Summary by the Second Corps describes the general situation at D plus 3 as follows: "The enemy suffered heavily in his rear areas from our strafing and bombing attacks, and there was evidence that his supply situation was disorganized. Thus all enemy forces opposing Second Corps entered into a period of general retreat, from which they had not recovered at the close of the period 31 July."

From : 111600B Aug 43
To : 121600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 34

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Enemy defends the general line PATTI (C85) - TORTORICI (C73) - east of FICRESTA (C83) - west of RANDAZZO - MT. ETNA - GIARRE (D00).

b. Defensive organization: Very dense minefields and many demolitions encountered along CESARO - RANDAZZO road. No organized defensive position encountered along the front of the Seventh Army.

c. Identifications: (1) German: PW 3d battalion, 71st PGR, 29th Motorized Division NASO area. PW reports his battalion almost intact has withdrawn to the TORTORICI area. 926th Fortress Battalion west of RANDAZZO. PW captured August 10 states his unit was covering withdrawl of the 15th Panzer Division withdrawing to MESSINA. (2) Italian: Very young PWs of the 3d Battery, 12th Artillery Regiment, 28th AOSTA Division captured north of RANDAZZO. PWs report they were covering the withdrawal of Italian forces north from RANDAZZO.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: The enemy offered only light opposition to our landing forces at EROLO (C75) on morning of August 11. Later during the day two unsuccessful counterattacks were made using tanks. Enemy forces have withdrawn east of PATTI breaking contact [illegible] night August 11/12. No contact with enemy forces at C7632. The defense of RANDAZZO continues consisting mainly of mined roads covered by artillery, mortar and long range small arms fire. Generally in the Seventh Army zone the enemy continued delaying action in the north; in the center he has evacuated FICRESTA and is withdrawing east of the NAZO - RANDAZZO road, and around RANDAZZO is retiring slowly east under pressure. In the Eighth Army sector the enemy is retreating north along the coastal network. The enemy's retrograde movement in this sector has reached RIPOSTA with no indications of an organized defense yet being encountered. Enemy evacuation of SICILY has begun on a large scale. Air photos covering the MESSINA Straits on August 11 show 33 craft including 10 Seibel Ferries. All eastbound traffic was fully loaded and westbound boats were empty.

b. Artillery: Long range artillery fire encountered along the CESARO RANDAZZO road effectively slowed our progress eastward. Along the coast sector only harassing artillery fire has been received throughout the day. Artillery concentration area at C8118 previously reported was active during the night of August 11/12. An artillery battery reported firing at C805315 at 112240B.

c. Photo Interpretation: PI of August 11 show gun batteries at C992425, C974247, C999468 C933219, D082643 and D343585. Photos August 11 show 100 motor transports between D321588 and D347620 stationary at 1400B. 40 Motor transports, some with trailers, were observed between D364574 and D366584; at 111400B. Approximately 100 motor transports were noted moving east from SPADAFORA (D25) towards MESSINA at 1400B.

d. Air: Four ME-205s and FW-190s dive bombed NASO (C64) at 111230B. Two were shot down. Eight ME-109s were intercepted off CAPE ORLANDO attempting to bomb our shipping. All bombs fell wide of ships. One FW-190 destroyed and one seen to crash into the sea.

e. Naval: Air reconnaissance reports three large transports at D4365 morning of August 11. British submarine, Simoon, reports two hits on 7600 ton, 6" Italian cruiser of the Luigi di Savia class in the Gulf of Genoa on August 9th.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: Seventh Army: PW 96,000, enemy dead and wounded 10,500, aircraft destroyed, all types 253, guns, 75-mm and larger, destroyed or captured 293, August 12 inclusive. Eighth Army: PW 30,000, tanks, all types, destroyed or captured 53, artillery pieces destroyed or captured 174 to August 10.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To delay in successive positions: first PATTI (C84) - RANDAZZO - FIUME FREDDO (D11), second position west of general line FURNARI (C94) - NOVARA (C93) - FIUME FREDDO, and final beachhead position generally BARCELLONA (D05) - TAORMINA (D11).

(2) To defend along the general line shown as the second delaying position in capability (1).

(3) To evacuate on an increasing scale while executing delays in capability (1).

Capability (3) is favored.

The attempt by the enemy to break contact along the coast indicates his desire to salvage as much as possible of his remaining rear guard forces for future use. The ever increasing number of craft including large ships operating in the MESSINA Straits give evidence to a speedy evacuation of the island with MESSINA the principal debarkation point.

The probability of a strong defense at any of the positions of capability (1) is not indicated. However, the enemy with forces available can delay at any of these positions, using time gained to evacuate the bulk of his forces from SICILY to the mainland.

From : 121600B Aug 43
To : 131600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit : Seventh Army
Place : In the Field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 35

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

A. Enemy front line: Generally along line PATTI (C85) to east of RANDAZZO (C82) - MT. ETNA - north of RIPOSTO (D00).

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b. Defensive organization: No organized defensive positions Seventh Army front other than continued demolitions and minefields. Air reconnaissance reports pillboxes at C8014. Friendly civilian reports tunnel at C8065 has been mined and is ready to be blown up. At CASTIGLIONE (C92) road blown for approximately fifty feet at C9919. Main road east of RANDAZZO blown. Minefields located at C8133. Bridge out at C8132. Bad crater at C8119.

c. Identifications: (1) German: 3d Company, 926th Fortress Battalion, This battalion is the only recent arrival on the Island having crossed over on 5th of August. A PW taken northwest of RANDAZZO states that the battalion's mission was to cover withdrawal of the 15th Division artillery. 3d Battalion, 71st Grenadier Regiment, 29th Motorized Division previously reported in reserve at BARCELLONA now identified NASO (C64) area. It is presumably a fresh battalion covering the withdrawal of other units of the 29th Motorized Division.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Little contact with the enemy along the coast road west of PATTI. Our advance delayed by demolitions and minefields. Indications of general withdrawal and enemy disorganization in this area. In the area vicinity RANDAZZO the enemy withdrew under cover of darkness supported by occasional artillery and mortar fire night 12/13 August. No contact with the enemy morning 13th August as our troops entered RANDAZZO. In this area heavy demolitions and minefields were executed by the enemy during withdrawal. No information available of advance in British sector beyond RIPOSTO. Large concentration of motor transports observed vicinity MESSINA probably aiding evacuation. Air reconnaissance reports no movement sighted RANDAZZO - PATTI road 130745B. At the same time, three small freighters and thirty small boats observed at PORTO d'OLIVERI (C9248).

b. Artillery: Little artillery activity encountered due to lack of contact with the enemy.

c. Anti-aircraft: 12 August, enemy anti-aircraft heavy and accurate both sides MESSINA Straits. Heavy and intense at FALCONE (C94). Slight heavy at C9432 (reported supply dump). Little anti-aircraft area BARCELLONA (D05). Light heavy anti-aircraft at CAPE MILAZZO reported 131230B.

d. Photo Interpretation: Extensive bivouac area reported south of MILAZZO vicinity D1055 at 130250B.

e. Air: Little enemy activity 12/13 August other than two bombs dropped vicinity CAPE ORLANDO at 121155B and straffing mission along coast highway F. ROSMARINO at 131205B and east of BROLO at 121830B.

f. Naval: Much enemy naval activity observed by air on 12 August in MESSINA Straits consisting of Seibel ferries, barges, motor launches and two transports vicinity MESSINA. See Photo Interpretation Report Nos. 58 and 59.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To delay in successive positions, first position general line C. TINDARI (C95) - MONTALBANO (C83) - ROCCELLA (C82) - MT. ETNA - FIUME FREDDO (D01), second position west of general line FUNARI (C94) - NOVARA (C93) - FIUME FREDDO and final beachhead position generally BARCELLONA (D05) - TAORMINA (D11).

(2) To defend along the general line shown as the second delaying position in capability (1).

(3) To evacuate on an increasing scale while executing delays in capability (1) Capability (3) is favored.

From	: 131600B Aug 43
To	: 141600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit	: Seventh Army
Place	: In the field

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 36

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, Sicily.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Generally along line C0050 - West of NAVARA (C93)-C9323 - CASTIGLIONE (C92) - CATALABIANO (D01).

b. Defensive organization: No organized defensive positions encountered entire front Seventh Army. Physical road blocks, blown bridges and minefields constituted the main enemy defensive effort. Bridge at C930202 was destroyed with the surrounding area heavily mined and booby trapped. Further bridges reported blown at C92322, C942235 and C928227.

c. Identifications: (1) German: 3d Battalion, 71st FGR, 29th Motorized Division believed to constitute the rear guard in the north coast sector, was formerly identified at PATTI and is reported to have retired east of FUNARI. The 3d Parachute Regiment supported by one battalion of Hermann Goering artillery constitutes the rear guard on south coast. A deserter of the 129th FGR states his unit is scheduled to arrive at MESSINA on August 15. (a) Italian: Reggio battalion is in support of 3d Parachute Regiment along south coast.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: The enemy evacuated east of FALCONE (C94) during the night of 13/14 August. Light contact was gained at 141200B northwest of FUNARI. MONTALBANO (C83) was evacuated night of August 13/14. Reconnaissance elements moving east of RANDAZZO were halted by approximately 100 Germans at C9220. Bridges on principal reads east of RANDAZZO have been demolished with a bulk of the rear guard believed to be withdrawn vicinity of RANCAVILLA (D02). The majority of the remaining troops on the Island have withdrawn to MESSINA where evacuation continues. Over 300 motor transports observed in this area.

Evacuation on a smaller scale is in progress at MILAZZO, air reconnaissance reports two troop transports in MILAZZA harbor at 140715B. In the Eighth Army sector the enemy continues rear guard action north of FIUME FREDDO (D01).

b. Artillery: No enemy artillery activity was reported during the period. Air photos of August 13 show one 4-gun medium battery at D318413, four gun coastal defense battery at D318505 and air reports heavy accurate anti-aircraft fire over SPADAFORA (D25) 132000B, and continued heavy and intense anti-aircraft fire over the MESSINA area.

c. Photo Interpretation: Photo of 13 August show GESSO (D26) to be traffic control point of vehicular movement in the enemy evacuation plan. Some increase in Seibel ferry and landing craft activity in the MESSINA Straits noted. For details see Photographic Interpretation Report No. 60, HQ Seventh Army dated 13 Aug 43.

d. Naval: A road guard reports an unidentified submarine surfaced at 132030B east of CEFALU in the vicinity of C1636.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: PW 97,200, enemy dead and wounded 11,200, aircraft, all types, destroyed or captured 263, guns, 75-mm and larger, destroyed or captured 293, all figures to August 14 by Seventh Army.

b. Information from Prisoners of War: PW taken in the vicinity of PATTI reports that enemy withdrawal was ordered to start on 8 August, that another order to withdraw to MESSINA on August 13 was changed to August 12. This information confirms orders reported by PWs taken in the RANDAZZO area. PW of the 29th Artillery Regt states that the unit has only six guns remaining and that evacuation to Italy was ordered on August 8 with priority to vehicles. PWs taken in the Eighth Army sector are extremely fatigued and state that men are willing to surrender but officers are not.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To execute rear guard actions along the north and south coast roads with delaying positions on the north, west of BARCELLONA (D15) - west of SPADAFORA (D25) - and a final position defense of MESSINA; to utilize available cross ridges on the south coast line of retreat.

(2) To defend the MESSINA area supported by long range artillery from the Italian mainland.

(3) To continue evacuation from MILAZZO and MESSINA during the time gained by delaying action of capability (1).

Capability (3) is favored augmented by (1).

With only a three mile strait to cross a capability of two trips per craft per night can be assumed. A number of craft are capable of making beach landings, so the evacuation of material over beaches is entirely practicable. Using present shipping facilities the enemy can evacuate 400 guns or vehicles and over 10,000 troops per night. Assuming appropriate deductions for dead, captured and deserted (in civilian clothes), it is doubtful if the combined German-Italian evacuation force would total as much as 75,000. Since some evacuation activity has been observed for at least ten days, and if present facilities were fully exploited, the entire estimated force could be moved in seven days. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the bulk of the enemy force has already reached the Italian mainland.

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From	: 141600B Aug 43
To	: 151600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit	: Seventh Army
Place	: In the Field

No. 37

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Enemy holds no general line on the Island of Sicily.

b. Defensive organization: No organized defense encountered. Minefields and demolitions previously completed but undefended were encountered along north coast road today.

c. Identifications: (1) Italian: Fifty PWs from the 101st Battalion, 140th Coastal Regiment were captured S of MILAZZO on 14 August.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: The enemy has evacuated east of SPADAFORA (D25). No contact with enemy at SPADAFORA at 151230. Only light enemy resistance encountered in capture of BARCELLONA at 151000B. Considerable activity was observed in the MESSINA Straits at 151211B. This activity was probably the evacuation of remaining rear guard troops left on the Island. The enemy lost four craft in the MESSINA Straits due to our air action. In the Eighth Army sector, CASTAGLIONE and 100 Italian defenders, all asleep, was lost by the enemy at 1000B. TORMINI (D11) was also lost. Remaining German elements on the south coast area reported by civilians to have withdrawn to S. THERESA (D2028). The headquarters Hermann Goering Division is reported to be located at S. LUCIA (D4657) on the CALABRIA mainland.

b. Artillery: The enemy is reported to have at least twelve long range coast defense batteries employed from CAPE DELL ARMI north covering the MESSINA Straits. Air photos show battery locations at: four guns at D463497, 6 guns D448506, 4 guns D433555, 6 guns D444590, 2 guns D443599; all defense locations as 12 July. Somechange of gun positions may be expected.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Information from civilians: Civilians report that the coast defenses of CAPE MILAZZO have been abandoned by the 24th Artillery Regiment, Italian, and that BARCELLONA is clear of the enemy; the latter has been confirmed.

b. Information from captured documents: Papers formerly belonging to the 3d MF Troops, 29th Motorized Division, German, reveal that the 2d Battalion, 71st FGR 7th and 9th Batteries of the 3d battalion, 29th Artillery Regiment crossed to SICILY on the 14th and 23d of July, embarking at GALLICO MARINA (D4454). All units except the 7th Battery have been identified by combat. This information indicates that GALLICO may also be utilized as a disembarkation point.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) To defend the MESSINA area supported by long range artillery fire from the Italian mainland.

(2) To evacuate remaining rear guard elements by light craft under cover of darkness, after a series of rear guard actions.

(3) To harass forward Allied troops within range by long range artillery fire from positions on the CALABRIA Peninsula.

Capability (2) is favored.

The absence of enemy forces along the north coast as far east as SPADAFORA strongly indicates that the enemy considers no further defense of SICILY. Evacuation across the MESSINA Straits continues. It may be assumed that this activity is a movement of units assigned for rear guards action. While the enemy is capable of a fortress defense of MESSINA, this evacuation does not indicate such an action. If delaying elements still remain along the east coast, evacuation of these elements can be accomplished from any point north of S. THERESA (D2128) by light craft and may even now be in progress.

From	: 151600B Aug 43
To	: 161600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit	: Seventh Army
Place	: In the Field
Time	: 161800B Aug 43

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 38

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Rear guard resistance D2762 and north of SAVOCA (EL3).

b. Defensive organization: No organized defense encountered. Demolitions and minefields encountered east of SPADAFORA today.

c. Identifications: (1) German: PWs of the 29th Engineer Battalion, 29th Motorized Division were taken east of SPADAFORA today.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Light enemy resistance east of SPADAFORA slowed our advance. Enemy rear guard elements at 161400B have withdrawn east of D2761 covering their withdrawal by artillery fire. Enemy artillery destroyed a German ammunition train abandoned just east of SPADAFORA. CAPO DI MILAZZO and the town of MILAZZO are both completely evacuated. Approximately 150 motor transports were left undemolished and no serious effort was made to destroy fixed guns. In the Eighth Army sector, the enemy has retreated north of SAVOCA. Continued activity in MESSINA Straits was observed. An unestimated number of vessels, mostly barges, landing craft, and Seibel ferries, were reported. All craft moving east were heavily loaded. Air reports three ships, one of 5000 tons sighted near MESSINA at 151230B. Enemy positions in MESSINA were under long range American artillery fire during the night of August 15/16.

b. Artillery: Some enemy artillery still remains in Sicily. Reliable sources indicate element of the 2nd Battalion, HD artillery are still on the Island.

c. Photo Interpretation: Air Photos of 151930B show supply dumps sunk in the sand of dry river beds on the CALABRIA peninsula. One dump extends from D460545 to D465541; a second dump extends from D453522 to D460529. A four gun light battery was noted at D325649 on August 15.

d. Air: Fighter activity over the MESSINA Straits has increased.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: PW 97400 enemy dead and wounded 11,500, aircraft, all types destroyed or captured 267; all figures to August 16 by Seventh Army.

b. Information from Prisoners of War: An Italian officer captured at MALVAGNA (C9325) stated that the Germans offered to evacuate some Italian officers and soldiers to the mainland but that the bulk of Italian troops were refused passage. Civilians report that the 29th Engr. Bn. of the 29th Motorized Division, German, has withdrawn to MESSINA. This has been confirmed by combat.

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4. Enemy CAPABILITIES:

No change from last report, which was:

(1) to defend the MESSINA area supported by long range artillery fire from the Italian mainland.

(2) To evacuate remaining rear guard elements by light craft under cover of darkness after a series of rear guard actions.

(3) To harass forward Allied troops within range by long range artillery fire from positions on the CALABRIA peninsula.

Capability (2) is favored.

KOCH
AC of S., G-2

From	: 161600B Aug 43
To	: 171600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit	: Seventh Army
Place	: In the field
Time	: 171845B Aug 43

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 39

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: CALABRIA Peninsula.

b. Defensive organization: No enemy defenses remain on the Island of Sicily The enemy's first line of defense is now the sea coast of the Italian mainland, for details not previously reported see Photographic Interpretation Report No. 62, HQ Seventh Army dated 15 August 43.

c. Identifications: (1) German: Final delaying action MESSINA area was fought by the 29th Engineer Battalion, 29th Motorized Division. Elements of the Herman Goering Engineer Battalion constituted the final enemy opposition to the Eighth Army.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: The enemy concluded delaying action on the Island by withdrawing east of GESSO (D26) into the MESSINA area and embarking for the Italian mainland on the night of August 16/17. Strong American patrols entered MESSINA at 162320B. Light small arms fire and long range artillery fire from the mainland was the only enemy resistance. Official entry into the city of MESSINA at 171000B was unopposed. American troops mopping up north of MESSINA encountered no opposition. In the Eighth Army Sector, SCALETTA (D24) was successfully occupied by a British landing force on the night of 15/16 August. The coast area north of SCALETTA to D3050 is the only remaining territory not controlled by Allied Forces; however, this zone is believed to be devoid of German or Italian troops.

b. Artillery: All known enemy artillery positions in Sicily are now occupied by our troops. Enemy artillery on the Italian mainland delivered harassing fire during the period. These positions are now under counter battery fire from American artillery.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: PW 98,600, enemy dead and wounded 11,600, aircraft, all types, destroyed or captured 267, guns, 75-mm and larger, destroyed or captured 298, tanks all types, destroyed or captured 188; all figures by Seventh Army to 17 August 1943. The above statistics do not include the final mopping up activity in the MESSINA area.

b. Information from captured documents: Captured German field orders reveal that the following evacuation priorities were followed in withdrawing German units to the mainland: Herman Goering Division from the 1st of August; 15th Panzer Division from the 12th of August, and the 29th Motorized Division from the 15th of August.

c. Terrain: A road, D00313 - M30385, (Not shown on map) is suitable for jeeps for 13 miles, thereafter is passable only to animals.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

None. The following possible enemy activities are listed for consideration:

(1) To harass troops within range by long range artillery fire from the Italian mainland.

(2) To sabotage military installations in Sicily. This sabotage to be directed by local Fascists not yet apprehended and by agents purposely left or later infiltrated from Italy.

(3) To conduct spot raids, either naval or commando.

The complete evacuation of Sicily by German troops strongly indicates a defensive enemy attitude. Air photos of the CALABRIA peninsula reveal many strong defensive positions along the coast. The continued absence of the Italian Navy from Sicilian waters and the lack of activity by Axis aircraft is further evidence that the enemy considers the Sicilian campaign finished. Isolated groups, Germans in civilian clothes, and Sicilians still loyal to the Fascist regime constitute a menace that cannot be over-looked. However, no further offensive military operations may be expected.

KOCH
AC of S, G-2

From	: 171600B Aug 43
To	: 181600B Aug 43
Issuing Unit	: Seventh Army
Place	: In the Field
Time	: 181615B Aug 43

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 40

Map - G.S.G.S. 4164, 1:100,000, SICILY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: CALABRIA Peninsula.

b. Defensive Organization: None

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Intermittent artillery fire from the Italian mainland was received in the MESSINA area. Elements of the British Eighth Army made contact with American troops at MESSINA. All enemy resistance on the Island has ceased. No report received of enemy shipping activity in the MESSINA Straits during the period.

b. Artillery: The following battery locations on the CALABRIA Peninsula that can probably fire on Sicily were noted by air reconnaissance of 14 August. (NOTE: DP - Dual Purpose, CD - Coast Defense). Five DP or possible 152-mm CD at 438366, 6 CD probably light at 459435, 4 DP at 452666, 4 DP at 461495, 4 CD possible 280-mm at 462497, 6 DP at 449505, 4 DP at 433555, 4 DP at 436567, 6 DP 445900. Four DP at 440597, 2 CD possibly 280-mm at 443599, 4 DP at 444598, 4 DP at 462599, 4 light CD at 447604. Six forts which may contain guns at 462495, 44553, 452551, 450600, 470599 and 471608.


3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Statistics: PW 98,900, enemy dead and wounded 11,700; by Seventh Army to 18 August 1943.

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ANNEX 7

PRE D-DAY PLAN OF PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE



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ANNEX 8

PHOTO INTERPRETATION REPORT
(SAMPLE)

11 August 1943

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. 58

Sorties Used:

123/138	11.8.43	0945 B hrs	1/12,500	F.L. 24"	A
Covers road from CAPO D'ORLANDO to RANDAZZO and approximately 3 miles on either side, also strip from S. AGATA to MALETTO C. 7615.					
123/139	11.8.43	1045 B hrs	1/15,000	F.L. 24"	A
Covers road from West of RANDAZZO to RANDAZZO to FRANCAVILLA to NOVARA to coast at D 0090.					
123/140	11.8.43	1400B hrs	1/14,500	F.L. 24"	A-B
Covers coast from S. AGATA to MESSINA.					
123/141	11.8.43	1635 B hrs	1/14,500	F.L. 24"	A
Covers area C 5944 - C 7453 - C 9218 - C 7811.					

C 702504	Western approach to road bridge obstructed, but bridge has not been blown.	(123/138 3058/9)
C 735518	Railway bridge appears to be damaged or blocked.	(123/138 3058/9).
C 992425	3, possibly 4, gun battery position on high ground facing West.	(123/139 4079/80)
C 974247	3, possibly 4, gun heavy AA battery.	(123/139 4096/7)
C 999468	Possible 3 gun AA battery in river bed.	(123/139 3072/3)
C 933232	Probable 4 gun heavy AA battery.	(123/139 3105/6)
C 982182 C 980179 C 984177 C 986175	Partial road blocks.	(123/139 3026/7)
C 982180	Complete road block.	(123/139 3026/7)
C 991174 C 975177	Possible road blocks.	(123/139 3026/7)
C 058510	Large museum prominently marked on the North side of BARCELLONA.	(123/140 3040/1)
D 105055385	No further work has been done on the anti-tank ditches round the cross-roads at this point since 4 August.(123/119).	(123/140 3044/5)
D 082643	3 gun light battery at MILAZZO now appears to be unoccupied.	(123/140 3094/5)
D 202567	Hospital.	(123/140 4050/1)


SHIPPING
Sortie 123/140

STRAITS OF MESSINA

Short stretches of coast on the West and East sides of the Straits are photographed. F boat and Seibel Ferry activity is noted (a) in the vicinity of PARADISO where 3 Seibel Ferries and 1 F boat are ramped to shore and 1 F boat lies off; (b) off GALLICO MARINA where 2 Seibel Ferries, 1 F boat and a number of small craft are ramped to shore and 1 F boat lies off; (c) off CANNITELLO where one Seibel Ferry and one Seibel Ferry and one F boat are ramped to shore and 3 Seibel ferries lie off shore. At time of photography 3 small landing boats are approaching and one landing boat is leaving CANNITELLO. A train ferry lies off shore between PARADISO and S. SALVATORE DEI GRECI. (Photos 3061, 3062, 3066, 3067)

MILAZZO
There is no active shipping present.
One Z501 (probably unserviceable) remains moored in the harbor. (Photo 3099)

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
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ANNEX IO

OVERLAY OF AREA COVERED BY COLLATED MAPS



ANNEX II

BEACH INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF LANDINGS BEHIND THE ENEMY LINES

5 August 1943

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY AND CTF 88
JOINT REPORT OF BEACHES AND DEFENSES, ETC., IN SPECIAL AREA

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS.

NOTE: 1. Beach "A" is the same as Beaches "Red 1" and "Green 1".

2. Beach "B" is the same as Beach "Red 2".

3. Beach "D" is the same as Beach "#4".

BEACHES AND OFFSHORE HYDROGRAPHY

1. General.

(a) Remarks and References.

i. The beaches are presented in order, from west to east; the numbering of the beaches considered are A, B, and D; or Red 1, Green 1, Red 2 and 4, respectively.

ii. Gradients and measurements have been estimated and evaluated from snap-charts, aerial photos, and miscellaneous sources. They are not to be construed as infallible - particularly as regards measurements pertaining to under-water obstacles.

iii. References.

Map Series Used:- G.S.G.S. 4229, 1/50,000.
G.S.G.S. 4228, 1/25,000.

Map Sheets Used:- 252 - I, II and III, 1/50,000.
253 - I, SW and IV, SE, 1/25,000 (composite sheet).
253 - II and III, 1/50,000.

Photographic Cover:- 125/106, 1-8-43, 1/12,400.
125/100, 30-7-43, 1/11,000.
158B/66, 28-7-43, oblique.

Other Material:- U.S.I.S. Report on SICILY, C.B. 4096 H(3 Special Interpretation Report KY 38.

Note: There are no large-scale charts of this stretch of coast. Italian Chart 188, the largest scale chart available, is only 1:150,000.

(b) Coast - General.

a. The piece of coast in question stretches from CAPO MILAZZO (C.094577) to the mouth of T. HUZZA (C.125376). In general, there are narrow strips of alluvial plain, backed inland by narrow coastal terraces, behind which is a continuous belt of mountains. Between these strips of plain, the mountains reach the sea.

b. The beaches are for the most part sandy and are suitable for landing of tracked and untracked vehicles in many places. Men could be landed almost anywhere along this strip of coast.

c. For the most part, the coast of SICILY is clear to the 5-fathom line, which hugs the coast, usually within a mile or two of shore. The nearshore hydrography is quite rocky along the Northern shore, but apparently the approach is clear to the 30-ft depth, which lies even closer to shore than along the Southern coast.

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2. Beaches.

(a) (Note: Total length of clear beach is approximately 10,800 yards, divided for convenience into two separate beaches, Red 1 westward, and Green 1 eastward.

BEACH "A" (Westernmost) (Red 1 and Green 1)

i. LOCATION a. Grid Coordinates:

Red 1: C.5834?7 - C.618478; Green 1: C.620480 - C.650517.

b. Center:

Red 1: ((App) C.602454 (Lat. 38-06-05, Lo. 14-41-30E)) Green 1: ((App) C.638498 (Lat. 38-08-28; Lo 14-43-38)

c. Names:

Red 1 : TERRANOVA.
Green 1 : FIANA di NASO

d. Landmarks: A rocky reef extends westward for about 1/2 mile from the castle on CAPO d'ORLANDO. Three rocks of this reef show above water, the westernmost lying about 330 yds offshore immediately opposite the spot described below under "vi" (Details of beach), 600 yds from the castle. CAPO d'ORLANDO, 300 ft high, is conical in appearance when seen from the NW. On its summit is a walled sanctuary and church, which, from a distance, looks like a castle. On a protrusion from the NW side of this conical hill is a building (this castle is taken as zero for the distance measurements in the tabular vi, "Details of beach"), named CASTELLO on Italian Chart 266. The inshore end of the reef SCOGLI d'ORLANDO is at the foot of this protrusion.

At the north foot of the conical hill stands CAPO d'ORLANDO lighthouse, at a height of 88 ft.

ii. Length: yards - Red 1 : 5,200
Green 1 : 5,000

iii. Width : feet - Red 1 : About 300 ft.
Green 1 ; About 250 ft.

iv. Physical consistency of beach - Red 1: Sandy (reported on Aug. 3, 1943, to be possibly soft, possibly not suitable for vehicles), backed by cultivated fields and orchards. Green 1: Sandy (reported on Aug. 3, 1943, to be firm, suitable for vehicles), backed by cultivated fields.

v. Approaches: From seaward, both Red 1 and Green 1 - free of rocks, except rocks at both ends of Green 1.

Red 1 - To the right of the centerline, approaching from seaward, the 2-fathom curve runs 266 yds off the beach. To the left of the centerline, the 2-fathom curve runs 266 yds off the beach for a distance of 2000 yds, where the bottom at that point suddenly raises to one fathom practically for the balance of the distance eastward.

The six-fathom curve runs fairly consistently for a distance of 500 yds off the beach.

Green 1 - To the right and left of the centerline, approaching from seaward, The 2-fathom curve runs fairly consistently parallel to the beach distant 266 yds, except that at the point 1500 yds eastward, the water is 5-fathoms deep, gradually receding a distance of 750 yds either side of the 1500 yds point.

The beach faces northwestward, with unobstructed approaches, and is unsheltered from westerly and northerly winds. The 5-meter depth line lies 2000 ft offshore. Anchorage may be had, with favorable winds, close westward of CAPO d'ORLANDO.

vi. Gradient.

Details of Beach

	Distance S.W. from CAPO d'ORLANDO Castle (Yards)	Width of Beach (Yards)	Charted Bottom Gradient from Depths of 13 to 18 ft. to Water Line.
1.	5700	---	1:39
2.	5300	80	1:60
3.	4400	110	1:60
4.	3600	70	1:57
5.	2600	70	1:48
6.	1600	80	1:65
7.	600	70	1:36

Remarks:

1. At the mouth of the FIUMARA di ZAFALLA.

2. Southwest end of a narrow beach lane, which runs behind beach into CAPO d'ORLANDO.

3. Large walled stream flows across FIANA di NASO hereabouts.

4. R.R. 180 yds and main road 1000 yds behind beach (a secondary road, branching from the main road, runs 650 yds behind beach). Houses along narrow lane behind beach begin to be almost continuous.

5. Large, walled-in stream hereabouts. Beach lane broadens to secondary road.

6. Beach lane 40 yds., R.R. 200 yds., Main road 600 yds., behind beach. Two roads, perpendicular to shore, run under R.R., and connect beach lane with branch and main road.

7. Opposite middle of town. (Caution: Approach to this spot only just clear the rocks SCOGLI d'ORLANDO.

vii. Nature of bottom - sand, mud.

viii. Reefs, Rocks, Shoals, and other hazards: None, except rocks at both ends of beach.

Green 1: See "Landmarks".

Caution: CAPO d'ORLANDO is notorious for the sudden squalls and large sea which are often encountered near it.

ix. Hydrography: a. SURF AREA: One line of breakers is apparent which breaks on the beach.

b. WAVES, SURF and SWELLS: The prevailing direction of wave approach along the western and northern shores of SICILY is apparently from the west and northwest, in line with the prevailing winds. The steep offshore slope along most of the coast of SICILY results in heavy surf whenever waves are running. Many of the beaches are relatively unsheltered. So that presumably landings along open beaches will depend, to a large extent, upon wave conditions.

c. CURRENTS: Currents in the region about SICILY are generally weak and variable, and are controlled, to a large extent, by prevailing winds. A current usually flows eastward along the northern coast of the island, although a westward current from 0.3 to 0.75 knot is also reported.

d. DEPTHS: In many places, foul ground extends a short distance from the shore, but nowhere is the 10-fathom contour more than a mile from the shore, and usually is considerably less. Outside the 10-fathom contour, the approaches to the coast are clear of danger. Depths increase fairly regularly to the 100-fathom contour, which lies 14 miles offshore off CAPO d'ORLANDO.

x. Defenses on the Beach.

a. General Survey.

Beach "A" - Red 1

Possible Mine field

(1) C.605457 - C.581435 - C.581432
(2) C.583435 - C.586430 - C.581423
(3) C.609456 - C.608471 in zig-zag form.
(4) C.597451 - C.593410 - C.593413
(5) C.599409 - C.596408

Pill Boxes - 573429
M.G's. - 587437
535409
572428
4-gun AA - 552408
Probable CD - 2-gun CD on 514385
Wire - Probably runs along extent of beach.
Heavy AA - C.570412 - 3-gun battery in bends of road.

Beach "A" - Green 1

1. Pillboxes at: - C.653518
C.649514
C.648513
C.638502
C.636492
C.657519 (Probable)

2. Possible minefields at:-

C.623471 to C.620471 and from C.621479 and C.618475 inland to railway bridge at C.622475.

3. Wire from C.654513 to C.633494.

4. A.A. position at C.657517 (3-gun light)

5. M.G. at C.657519; C.657509; C.657515.

6. Road blocks at C.655513; C.657512; C.655511; C.661508.

7. Demolitions: R.R. bridges behind beach probably demolished.

xi. Exits:

	P	AFV	MT
Red 1	Yes	Yes	Yes
Green 1	Yes	Yes	Yes

Red 1: Many trails leading to beach. Coastal road is about 3000 ft behind beach. Land for 3000 ft inland, flat to coastal road. R.R. between coast road and main road is obstacle, as it is built of fill-in-places and bridges over streams. There are many places it can be crossed.

At C.591439 and C.597446, the R.R. crosses a stream, and under these bridges, small tanks and MT could pass, joining a minor road at C.592438 and C.598445, respectively, and thence by North, South roads to the main coast road.

Approximately 280 yds east of bridge (C.591439) there is a culvert which might be suitable for small MT and a good road leading on to the main road. The embankment is also breached by four smaller culverts.

Tanks and MT could also gain access to the main coast road by passing under R.R. bridge at C.581431 and thence by bed of stream to either track approximately C.585428 and track C.581425.

Green 1: 1. At the extreme northern end, by road, approximately 22 ft. wide, which joins the main coast road at C.657513.

2. By a series of culverts and bridges of varying width through R.R. embankment.

3. That at C.652513 is from 12 ft to 14 ft wide, access to it is by various roads off the beach, and road eventually joins the main road at C.649506.

4. Culvert approx. 450 yds S.W. suitable for small MT and joins main coastal road also at C.649506.

5. Bridge at C.636486 is from 10 to 12 ft wide and carries R.R. overstream. Bed of stream is now dry. Traffic would join secondary road between R.R. and main coast road, leading eventually to the main coast road.

6. Approximately 1200 yds SW of bridge, at C.632513, there is a level crossing suitable for light traffic and 1 mile further SW another similar. Access to main road by tracks and secondary road parallel to coast.

7. A culvert suitable for small MT, 350 yds NE of R.R. bridge (C.622475), then to C.631471, and left, right, or straight on for the main coastal road.

8. Exit for small MT at S.W. extremity of beach, under R.R. bridge, C.622475, and thence immediately turning N.E. by track to main coastal road.

9. There are several culverts useful as exits, possibly for infantry. A minor road runs entire length of beach, bordered by houses towards its northern extremity.

10. There is also a good secondary road running parallel to the coast between R.R. and main coast road. R.R. embankment for entire length of beach forming tank obstacle.

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11. Main coast road is built up on its seaward side along its entire length and access to it by MT would only be by existing roads. To tanks, however, it would prove no obstruction except N.E. from road fork, C.649506.

12. Two "roads" shown on map, sheet 252 (1st and 2nd editions), as joining the main road to the beach at ref. 630491 and 638501, are in fact streams carried across the plain by means of built-up banks. (A road passes underneath one of these stream at ref. 636487.)

13. The R.R. line runs close to the coast on a low embankment.

xii. Anchorage.

There are no good anchorages off this stretch of coast. Local craft anchor in a few regular anchorages at Green 1, about a cable west of the westernmost rock of SCOGLI d'ORLANDO, in 8 to 9 fathoms, sand bottom, good holding ground, but this anchorage is unsafe, with onshore winds. Local craft also anchor east of CAPO d'ORLANDO on a sand and mud bottom, good holding ground.

(b) BEACH "B", "C", "Red 2".

i. Location (a) Grid Coordinates C.692506
C.745524

(b) Center: C (approx.)
Lat. : 38-49-25 N.
Lon. : 14-49-09 E.

(c) Name : BROLO

(d) Landmarks : A rock about 450 to 600 yards offshore of the point C.723517; useful for a landing craft approach guide. This rounded rock is 46 ft high. The coast is clean except "SCOGLIO BROLO", just mentioned, and a ledge of rocks off PUNTA di TESTA di MONACO, on the western edge of the beach limit.

ii. Length (Yards): 6,000 yds.

iii. Width (Feet) : 200 ft.

iv. Physical Consistency of Beach - Along this coast is a sandy beach 40-100 yds wide, behind which lies a stretch of alluvial country, broken only where the village BROLO is built on a small rocky hill at ref. 722514.

v. Approaches: The approach is clear except for "SCOGLIO BROLO", mentioned above, which serves as a help in the approach. At the centerline nearest the beach and for about 450 yds offshore, the depth is 3-fathoms. This depth increases on the port hand to 5-fathoms about 790 yds from centerline, and on the right at approximately the same distance, the depth becomes four fathoms.

The 10-fathom contour is charted 2000 yds. offshore at the PUNTA di TESTA di MONACO end, closing gradually to 1000 yds. off the CAPO PIRAINO end.

vi. Gradient (estimated): Charted below-water gradient (from small-scale chart): the 18-foot depth contour is charted parallel to the shore and about 300 yards offshore (gradient 1:55).

vii. Nature of bottom: Sand, mud.

viii. Reefs, Rocks, Shoals, and other Hazards: "SCOGLIO BROLO", as mentioned above, and ledge of rocks off the PUNTA di TESTA di MONACO, western beach limit. The CAPO PIRAINO is high, rugged, and fringed with rocks.

Caution: CAPO d'ORLANDO is notorious for the sudden squalls and large seas which are often encountered near it.

ix. Hydrography: a. Surf Area: One line of breakers is apparent, which breaks on the beach.

b. Waves, Surf, and Swells: The prevailing direction of wave approach along the western and northern shores of SICILY is apparently from the west and northwest, in line with the prevailing winds. The steep offshore slope along most of the coast of SICILY results in heavy surf whenever waves are running. Many of the beaches are relatively unsheltered, so that presumably landings along open beaches will depend, to a large extent, upon wave conditions.

c. Current: Currents in the region about SICILY are generally weak and variable, and are controlled, to a large extent, by prevailing winds. A current usually flows westward along the northern coast of the island, although a westward current from 0.3 to 0.75 knot is also reported.

d. Depth: In many places, foul ground extends a short distance from the shore, but nowhere is the 10-fathom contour more than a mile from the shore, and usually is considerably less. Outside the 10-fathom contour, the approaches to the coast are clear of danger. Depths increase fairly regularly to the 100-fathom contour, which lies 1½ miles offshore off CAPO d'ORLANDO.

x. Defenses on the Beach:

Pillboxes : 2 at C.699508
2 at C.713513
2 at C.717515
1 at C.735520

M.G. Possible positions at:
C.724517
C.686509

Wire : From C.690507 to
C.743523

Minefields : Probably East of CAPO d'ORLANDO, from C.699509 to C.7043523.

Note : See overlay to follow.

xi. Exits from the Beach:- (a) The coastal plain is planted largely with orchards. The main East-West road, which is never more than 800 yds. from the sea, runs along the foot of a steep escarpment, except where it crosses five small rivers flowing towards the sea, and in the stretch of country between two of the rivers at ref 7251. The R.R. line, mainly embanked, skirts the coast. The best exit from the beach is towards BROLO, at ref. 725517; others are at refs. 739522 and 743523.

The beach is backed for most of its length by low ground, cultivated and with low walls. The railway emerges from a tunnel at the PUNTA di TESTA di MONACO end, and runs eastward on an embankment; as far as just east of FIUME di S. ANGELO, it is parallel to an about 100 yds from the beach, and thereafter it runs along the edge of the beach. The main coastal road (Route 4) is close inshore of the R.R. at the PUNTA di TESTA di MONACO end, but soon afterwards trends inland, until it is about 600 yds inland of the R.R. at FIUMARA di NASO; it remains from 350 to 600 yds from the R.R. until it crosses FIUMARA di S. ANGELO, after which it gradually closes the coast. Between BROLO and CAPO PIRAINO, a few lanes or tracks lead from the beach, under the R.R., to the main road. The ground between the R.R. and road is cultivated with vineyards and orchards.

Exit for infantry would be by the lanes or tracks mentioned above; elsewhere, it would be over cultivated grounds, over the R.R. embankment, and through the vineyards and orchards to the main road. Behind the road, the ground rises steeply to about 700 ft.

During the summer, the beds of the rivers and streams could be used. Exit would be under the R.R. bridges and on to the road near the road bridges; the road bridge over FIUMARA di S. ANGELO, however, is high, and lies at the entrance of a gorge.

(b)

	P	AFV	MT.
Red two:-	Yes	Yes	Yes

xii. Anchorage: Anchorage can be obtained anywhere off this stretch of coast on good holding ground of sand and mud. When fresh offshore winds are blowing, violent squalls come down from the hills.

3. Daylight and Darkness Tables.

36° 40' N - 15° 00' E (-1) ZT

DATE	SUN-SET	LAST LIGHT	END TWI-LIGHT	MOON RISE	PHASE	MOON SET	BEGIN TWI-LIGHT	FIRST LIGHT	SUN RISE	DATE
					New					
Aug. 5	1903	2004	2042	0852	Moon	2203	0328	0407	0509	Aug. 6
Aug. 6	1902	2003	2040	0949	Aug. 1-2	2235	0330	0408	0510	Aug. 7
Aug. 7	1901	2001	2039	1047		2309	0332	0409	0511	Aug. 8
Aug. 8	1900	2000	2038	1147		2346	0333	0410	0511	Aug. 9
Aug. 9	1859	1959	2037	1248	1st Qtr	-----	0334	0411	0512	Aug. 10
Aug. 10	1858	1957	2035	1315		0030	0335	0412	0513	Aug. 11
Aug. 11	1857	1956	2034	1456		0121	0337	0413	0514	Aug. 12
Aug. 12	1856	1955	2032	1600		0219	0338	0414	0514	Aug. 13

Corrections to Section 1:

1. Page 1, sub-paragraph ii, under 1. (a)., second line, the word "snap" should read "map".

2. Page 3, paragraph 2, under "Remarks", add: "railroad 300 yds behind beach."

3. On page 8, "moon rise", under date of August 10, should read 1351.

ANNEX 12
OFFICERS SECURITY MEMORANDUM

25 March 1943

SUBJECT : Operation HIGOT, Security Instructions.

TO : "XO" and "YO" Officers, Headquarters I Armored Corps.

1. GENERAL

a. The planning of this operation is taking place in an area much less secure than Washington or London. All members of this staff are therefore cautioned to be discreet in their conversation and handling of documents to a point where they will not be suspected of being members of a planning staff.

b. Experience has shown that the three main threats to security are:

(1) Thoughtlessness, which can be prevented by carefully considering the security aspect before taking action.

(2) Carelessness, which can be remedied by disciplinary action.

(3) Failure to follow instructions, which is often due to failure to read the instructions issued.

c. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that even the smallest items of information regarding Operation HIGOT are of a MOST SECRET nature.

2. CLASSIFICATION

a. All officers whose duties require knowledge of the operation will be classified in two lists known as the "XO" and "YO" Lists.

(1) The "XO" List will be maintained for those officers whose duties require fully detailed knowledge of the entire plan. "XO" list officers will have access to the Plans Room and to the Situation Room.

(2) The "YO" List will be maintained for those officers whose duties require only knowledge that an operation is being planned. "YO" officers will have access to the Plans Room ONLY. "YO" officers will receive data pertinent to the operation only at such time and in such degree as required by their duties. "YO" officers will NOT know:

(a) Full details of the objective.
(b) The date.
(c) Full details of the forces involved.
(d) Full details of the methods to be employed.

"YO" officers are cautioned against curiosity regarding details which have not been released to them officially.

(3) "XO" officers will not take "YO" officers into Situation Room without authority in each and every case from Chief of Staff or the Commanding General.

(4) When an officer finds it necessary to consult a section concerning the operation, he will first ascertain which officer in that section is on the required classification list.

(5) The "XO" or "YO" classification of an officer or officers present will be determined before any discussion is opened regarding the operation. This should be done by a direct question, "How are you classified"; to which the reply is "XO" or "YO" as the case may be.

3. CLERKS

Only officers will be classified, but in each section one clerk will be specially detailed to handle typing and filing of HIGOT papers. Clerks will not discuss the operation with other than their own section's

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classified officers. Each Section Chief is responsible for the selection and supervision of his clerk.

4. MAPS

a. Maps should be kept covered when not in use.
b. Maps should be placed in positions where they cannot be observed through street level windows or windows which can be overlooked.
c. Care should be taken that maps indicating exact areas are not in a position where they can be observed by unauthorized personnel.
d. Maps should be requested in a manner which does not indicate the operation to the map supply personnel.
e. Issue of, and requests for, maps should be held to the minimum.
f. Each map drawn will be marked to indicate the section or branch using the same and a record made of its issue.
g. Code names should be used for pertinent areas, cities and countries to avoid habitual use of names which might disclose the operation.

5. RESPONSIBILITY

a. Chiefs of Sections are responsible for ensuring,
(1) That instructions contained herein are observed.
(2) That all other necessary precautions are taken in every instance.
(3) That their offices are secure at every hour of the day from unauthorized entry.
(4) That any documents to be distributed by their section do not fall into unauthorized hands.

6. VIOLATIONS

a. All violations of security will be reported to the Security Officer without delay.
b. Rumors or remarks concerning the operation overheard or reported in or out of the military establishment should also be brought to the attention of the Security Officer.

ANNEX 13

SAMPLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH LEAFLETS

LA GUERRA CONTINUA

Gli alleati vi hanno ripetuto parecchie volte che per ottenere la pace l'Italia deve :

1) SBARAZZARSI DEL FASCISMO.
2) CESSARE DI AIUTARE LA GERMANIA.

Sebbene il regime fascista sia stato abbattuto, tuttavia il nuovo governo italiano continua ad aiutare i tedeschi.

Il Presidente degli Stati Uniti ed il Primo Ministro del Regno Unito Britannico, si sono congratulati con il popolo italiano per l'essersi saputo sbarazzare dell'uomo che lo trascino nella guerra.

Il Generale Eisenhower promise che noi avremmo ridata la libertà alle centinaia di migliaia di prigionieri italiani catturati in Tunisia ed in Sicilia, qualora voi aveste impedito che i prigionieri alleati in Italia venissero trasferiti in Germania.

Gli Alleati speravano che il vostro nuovo governo avrebbe accettato queste condizioni onorevoli.

Per alcuni giorni dopo la caduta di Mussolini, gli Alleati sospesero i bombardamenti delle città italiane. Ora il vostro governo continua a combattere la guerra tedesca. Siamo perciò costretti a proseguire la guerra contro l'Italia con tutti i mezzi a nostra disposizione. Le città italiane saranno bombardate con maggiore intensità.

VOI SOLDATI ITALIANI CHE VI TROVATE IN QUESTO LEMBO DELLA SICILIA SARETE SCHIACCIATI COME LO FURONO LE POTENTI ARMATE DELL'ASSE IN TUNISIA.

Però il popolo italiano ripone tutte le speranze in voi Soldati d'Italia.

Se volete porre fine a questa inutile distruzione dovete agire in modo tale da costringere il vostro governo a rompere l'alleanza con la Germania Nazista.

Vi siete sbarazzati di Mussolini ! Noi crediamo fermamente che vi sbarazzerete pure dei tedeschi e salverete così l'Italia ed i suoi figli da una ulteriore distruzione e sacrificio inutile.

I Governi Alleati hanno offerto all'Italia il mezzo di ritirarsi dalla guerra. Il Popolo Italiano vuole, senza dubbio, accettare questa offerta.

Tuttavia la guerra continua.....

A CHI LA COLPA ?

Translation of Italian Leaflet I. K.

(Front)

THE WAR CONTINUES

The Allies have repeatedly warned you that to obtain peace Italy must :
1. Get rid of Fascism.
2. Cease to aid Germany.

The Fascist regime has been overthrown but the new Italian Government continues to assist the Germans.

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have congratulated the Italian people on having rid themselves of the man who dragged them into the war. General Eisenhower declared we would release the hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners captured in Tunisia and Sicily provided your government prevented the Allied prisoners in Italy being transferred to Germany. The Allies hoped your government would accept these honourable conditions.

For some days after Mussolini's fall the Allies stopped bombing Italian towns. Now your government is continuing to fight Germany's war. Therefore we are compelled to continue the war against Italy, with all the means at our disposal. Italian cities will be bombed on an ever greater scale.

You, in this corner of Sicily, will be crushed as were the large Axis armies in Tunisia. The Italian people place all their hopes on you soldiers of Italy.

If you wish to put an end to this needless destruction you must act and speak so that your government is forced to break the alliance with Nazi Germany. You have got rid of Mussolini. We believe you can also get rid of the Germans, and so save Italy and her sons from further useless destruction and sacrifice !

The Allied governments have offered Italy a way out of the war. The Italian people want to accept this offer.

But the war continues.....

WHO IS TO BLAME ?

ITALIEN STEHT JETZT GEGEN EUCH

DEUTSCHE SOLDATEN !

Hier sind die Tatsachen !

Tatsachen, die die ganze Welt kennt.

Sind sie EUCH bekannt ?

ROM : Mussolini wurde gestuerzt. Die Faschistische Partei ist amtlich aufgeloest. Alle faschistischen Hoheitszeichen wurden entfernt.

MAILAND UND TURIN : Antifaschistische Organisationen uebernehmen in beiden Staedten die Macht. Revolutionaere Parteien haben saemtliche Zeitungen, oeffentliche Gebaeude und die Verkehrsmittel uebernommen. Streikende Arbeiter haben die Kriegsfabriken stillgelegt. Die Faschisten verbergen sich. Massendemonstrationen ziehen durch die Strassen. Sie verlangen Separatfrieden. Ihr Ruf ist : Werft die Deutschen hinaus !

SCHWEIZER GRENZE : Die Gestapo verlaesst fluchtartig Italien. Eine deutsche Flak-Batterie wurde von der bewaffneten Menge beschossen und entwaffnet. Die Schweizer Behoerden verweigern den gefluechteten Faschisten den Uebertritt auf schweizerischen Boden.

PALERMO : Die in die Hauptstadt einrueckenden amerikanischen Truppen wurden von der ganzen Bevoelkerung als Befreier umjubelt. Mit Blumen und Wein wurden sie begruesst.

BERLIN : Als Hitler in der letzten Woche von seiner Unterredung mit Mussolini zurueckkehrte erklaerte er, dass Italien der Achse treu bleiben wird. Der Fuehrer hat sich wieder einmal geirrt.

Translation of German Leaflet G. C.

(Front)

ITALY IS NOW AGAINST YOU

German Soldiers !
Here are the facts !
Facts which the whole world knows.
Are they known to you ?

ROME : Mussolini has been deposed. The Fascist Party has been officially dissolved. All Fascist emblems are being removed.

MILAN AND TURIN : Anti-Fascist organizations are taking over power in both cities. Revolutionary parties have seized control of all newspapers, public buildings, and communications. Striking workers have closed down the war plants. The Fascists are in hiding. Huge demonstrations demand a separate peace. Their cry is : « Throw the Germans out ! »

Swiss Border : The Gestapo is fleeing Italy. A German anti-aircraft battery was fired upon by an armed mob and disarmed. The Swiss authorities are refusing entry upon Swiss soil to fugitive Fascists.


PALERMO : American troops entering the capital were hailed by the inhabitants as liberators. They were greeted with flowers and wine.

BERLIN : When Hitler returned last week from his conference with Mussolini, he declared that Italy would remain true to the Axis. Once again, Der Fuehrer has been mistaken.

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REPORT OF THE A.C. OF S. G-3

(OPERATIONS & TRAINING)


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I. ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

The G-3 Section was organized for the planning and operational phases as shown in the charts below. Certain changes in functions from planning to operations necessitated regrouping personnel as indicated.

I ARMORED CORPS G-3 SECTION PLANNING PHASE




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SEVENTH ARMY G-3 SECTION

OPERATIONAL PHASE



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II. ADMINISTRATION

PLANNING PHASE

In the initial planning phase for Operation "HUSKY", the G-3 Section consisted of four officers and seven enlisted men. During this early planning phase, it was necessary because of security reasons to separate planning from the normal functions of the various staff sections of this Headquarters. As a result, there were only two officers who devoted their full time to the routine functions of the G-3 Section.

On 27 April 1943, Headquarters I Armored Corps, Reinforced, moved to Mostaganem, Algeria. The section was then increased to seven officers and seven enlisted men. During the first two weeks in June (less than 30 days from D Day), eight additional officers and seven enlisted men were assigned or attached to the section.

Meanwhile, the quantity of incoming material had been steadily increasing. This, coupled with the administrative work required for the movement of troops to assembly and mounting areas, the development of the final troop list and the preparation of final plans and orders placed a burden on the administrative sub-section for which it was ill prepared.

OPERATIONAL PHASE

On 23 June four officers of the section boarded LST 325 at Mostaganem and did not rejoin the section until 12 July, when the CP was established at Gela, Sicily. On 28 June the "near-shore control group" of the G-3 Section, composed of five officers and three enlisted men, moved to Bizerte. With this group was the greater part of the files, office equipment and supplies.

On 29 June our Main Headquarters boarded the "Monrovia" at Algiers. Due to limited space, this Headquarters was reduced to the minimum personnel necessary to operate. The G-3 Section was limited to four officers, one warrant officer and five enlisted men. Only the few files, supplies and equipment absolutely necessary for the operation of the section in the field for a limited period of time were carried.

On 12 July Headquarters Seventh Army moved ashore; the advance CP was established one mile east of Gela. This advance CP consisted of the Command Group, Chief of Staff Section, and the G-2 and G-3 Sections. The remainder of the forward echelon set up in the town of Gela. This division of the forward echelon was continued throughout the Sicilian Campaign. The "near-shore control group" and the rear echelon, Headquarters Seventh Army were in Bizerte.

Administration in the field, as compared to that during the planning phase, was relatively simple, since the amount of administrative detail was materially reduced.

III. ORGANIZATION

PLANNING PHASE

This section was charged with the duty of maintaining an accurate list of units under command of the Army showing the exact location, assignment and/or attachment of such units.

Upon receipt of a list of units which were to be available for the operation, a card file system was set up utilizing a 4 x 6 card on which was typed the designation of the unit, the T/O under which it was organized, the location, the next higher headquarters to which it was assigned or attached, and the T/O strength in personnel and vehicles. These cards were arranged under headings according to arm or service and were further arranged numerically under those headings. The next step was to set up a troop list making certain units and parts of units available to sub-task force commanders. This was done at a meeting of all Section Chiefs. At this meeting each Chief of Special Staff Section was asked to nominate the units of his particular arm or service which should be attached to each sub-task force in order to form a balanced force. Units not included in sub-task forces were grouped under the heading of "Army Troops".

After the list of units to be made available to sub-task force commanders was finally approved, the card file referred to above was improved by making an additional set of cards, each card containing only the unit designation. This set was arranged under sub-task force headings.

A 1:200,000 map of North Africa from Bizerte to Casablanca was prepared and location of all units on the troop list within that area were shown using various colored tabs; a color for each of the sub-task force units, and a color for Army Troops. This map proved invaluable in following the progress of movement of units to training, staging, and concentration areas. The final number of troops assigned to Seventh Army for operation "HUSKY" was approximately 230,000.

Another part of the system of maintaining the records was the "Document File". This file contained the authority for all changes in location or status of units. When a change was made on the card of a unit, no erasure was made; instead the old information was lined out in red but was still legible for future reference. The new information was typed on and following was a notation of the "document" authorizing the change. These documents were numbered consecutively and consisted of movement orders, assignment and attachment orders, radios, etc. They were bound in blocks of 100 and were invaluable for reference.

Since changes occurred daily, due to amendments to outline plans, movements of units, or changes in assignments and attachments, it was necessary that the organization sub-section work very closely with the troop movement sub-section as one could not function efficiently without the other.

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OPERATIONAL PHASE

The system of operation of the organization sub-section during the actual operation was much the same as during the planning phase. The one additional duty was to keep a record of troops as they were landed and to be able to tell at a glance just how much of a unit was in Sicily and how much in Africa. It was found advisable to have a member of the organization sub-section act as liaison between the Seventh Army G-3 Section and AFHQ Movement and Transportation Section to assist in coordinating the movement of follow-up units to Ports of Embarkation.

IV. TRAINING

PLANNING PHASE

Training for Operation "HUSKY" consisted of two principal phases: A brief period of refresher training for all units, followed by special amphibious training and a final rehearsal for each sub-task force. This rehearsal included the loading and landing of the assault units and the establishment of an initial beachhead, under conditions approximating those anticipated for the initial attack.

The training policy of Seventh Army for Operation "HUSKY" was to provide the facilities for training and to prescribe only the objectives to be attained. The Fifth Army Invasion Training Center at Port-Aux-Poules, Algeria, on the Gulf of Arzew, was made available for the amphibious training. This training center was controlled by, and under the command of Fifth Army. The Commanding General, Seventh Army, was responsible for arranging the priority in which units would be trained at the FAITC. All technical and tactical details of amphibious training and supervision of such training were the responsibility of the FAITC. While cordial relations existed between the staff of Seventh Army and the FAITC throughout the training period, this division of responsibility proved to be undesirable.

The Training Center course consisted principally of practice in loading personnel and equipment on ships and craft, approaching a selected beach, and debarking under simulated combat conditions, both in daylight and in darkness. In conjunction with amphibious training, the Training Center also conducted exercises for small units in special operations, including street fighting and night attack. Where appropriate, live ammunition was used and battle conditions approximated.

The Training Center was originally intended to train one regimental combat team at a time for a period of two weeks. Due to time limitations it was subsequently necessary to modify this plan and during the latter phase of training as many as three RCT's were training concurrently.

The 1st Engineer Special Brigade at Port-Aux-Poules conducted training of all Engineer Shore Regiments in the operation. This included training of Engineer, Signal, QM, Medical and all other personnel in normal beach groups. In addition, this Brigade trained all drivers of DUKWS (2½-ton amphibian trucks) used in the operation. The Brigade relieved Seventh Army of all details of this type of training except establishing the priority of units undergoing training.

The work of the FAITC and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade was outstanding. The success of the landing operation proved the soundness of training methods, especially since most of the landing craft, the DUKWS, and other special equipment used in this operation had never been used by any of the sub-task forces previously.

The Training Sub-Section of the G-3 Section was responsible for coordinating the order in which units and selected cadres attended training at the FAITC and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.

OPERATIONAL PHASE

The conclusion of the rehearsals by the sub-task forces marked the end of training for the campaign. The training sub-section accordingly suspended its normal functions. Part of the personnel assumed operational duties and the remainder proceeded to Bizerte where it operated the G-3 Section for the "near-shore control group" of the Seventh Army.

V. TROOP MOVEMENTS

PLANNING PHASE

This sub-section worked in the same room with the Organization Sub-Section in order to obtain the close coordination which is necessary. The mobilization of the sub-task forces began prior to the completion of the Tunisian Campaign. Units were scattered from Casablanca, French Morocco, to the Tunisian battle front; some units were in the United States, and others had not been activated.

AFHQ made available an initial list of troops which included many unnamed units, i.e., units whose numerical or alphabetical designation had not been indicated. Final nomination and assignment of all units was eventually obtained as the result of many conferences, telephone calls, and radio messages.

Dates by which service units were to be released for movement was left to "mutual agreement" of this Headquarters and the various headquarters to which the units were attached. This policy caused uncertainty and delay in the movement of many units.

As the units were nominated and dates of release agreed upon, this headquarters submitted requests to AFHQ for authority to move the units to join their proper sub-task forces. Authority was given by G-3, AFHQ, to this Headquarters to move the unit on or about a certain date. The necessary additional transportation was allocated by G-4 Movements and Transportation, AFHQ, and actually furnished by SOS, NATOUSA, through its various Base Sections. This involved the coordination of motor, rail, water and air transportation. Our Headquarters then issued movement orders to the units concerned.

Initially it was necessary to assemble as many units of a sub-task force as possible in the sub-task force training area, and later move the sub-task force to its final staging area. SOS, NATOUSA, through its Base Sections issued the necessary orders for the movement from the final staging areas to ports of embarkation. Ports of embarkation used were Oran, Algiers, Bizerte, and Tunis for the seaborne elements, and Kairouan for the airborne elements.

Thus the 3rd Infantry Division was moved from Port Lyautey, French Morocco to Port-Aux-Poules, Algeria where additional units joined it for training; it was then moved to the vicinity of Bizerte, (in the closing stages of the Tunisian Campaign) back to Jemmapes, Tunisia, and again to vicinity of Bizerte where its final assembly and embarkation took place. The 2nd Armored Division was moved from Rabat, French Morocco to Port-Aux-Poules, where additional units joined it for training; one combat command was then moved overland and by water to Bizerte for embarkation, while the remainder of the division and assault units assembled and embarked from Oran and Arzew, Algeria. The 1st Infantry Division was released upon completion of the Tunisian Campaign, moved from vicinity of Bizerte to Arzew, Algeria where additional units joined it for training, and was assembled at Algiers for final embarkation of assault units. Its follow-up troops embarked from Oran, Algiers, and Tunis. The 9th Infantry Division was released upon completion of the Tunisian Campaign and moved from vicinity of Bizerte to Chanzy, Algeria for training. One RCT and the division artillery then moved to Bizerte for embarkation, the remainder of the division embarking from Oran. The 45th Infantry Division arrived at Oran from the United States, moved to Arzew vicinity for training and then to Oran for embarkation of assault units. Its follow-up troops were embarked from Tunis. The 82nd Airborne Division moved from Casablanca to Oujda, French Morocco for training, then moved to Kairouan, Tunisia by plane, road, and rail for final assembly prior to the assault. Its follow-up troops were moved by plane from Kairouan and by sea from Bizerte.

The final ports of embarkation were not determined until after some units had been nominated and moved to join their sub-task forces. This resulted in some unnecessary movements of units.

A movement and mounting schedule was prepared and published to all headquarters concerned. Although some units did not arrive at destinations as soon as desirable, all units arrived in time to embark on schedule. For the most part, the excellent coordination of these moves was a result of the efficient organization and personal supervision of the G-4 Movements and Transportation Section, AFHQ.

Orders for the movement of units were prepared by this sub-section and issued by radio, letter, or orally. Orders for the movement of service units were coordinated with the staff section concerned. Orders were addressed to the headquarters to which a unit was attached and contained date of movement, destination, transportation facilities available, and new status of unit upon arrival. Information copies of all such orders were sent to the special staff section concerned as well as to all headquarters involved in the movement.

It is vital that a check system be maintained on the movement and arrival of all units. This was accomplished by requiring sub-task forces to report dates and hour of arrival of all units in their assembly areas, and by making a full use of the various special staff sections in supervising the movements of their units. A simple record was kept in the sub-section, which indicated whether or not a unit had finally reached its destination.

Difficulty was encountered in insuring that orders once issued were actually received by the unit concerned; this was caused by the wide dispersion of units and inadequate communication facilities available. This was in part solved by the use of officer couriers travelling in Cub planes.

OPERATIONAL PHASE

The procedure followed by the Troop Movements Sub-Section remained essentially the same as in the planning phase.

Prior to departure of this Headquarters from North Africa a tentative priority list for the movement of units from the staging areas to the battle area was prepared; copies were given to the "near shore control group" and to all higher headquarters concerned. This list was an estimate of the order in which units would be needed in the successive phases of the operation. Although this list was changed to conform to the necessities resulting from the progress of actual operations, it proved to be of great assistance in the movement of units to their staging areas.

After the assault convoy had sailed, G-4 Movements and Transportation, AFHQ, coordinated the movement of all units to the various staging areas where they were embarked by SOS, NATOUSA acting through the Base Section concerned.

Orders were issued by radio, by letter, and in many cases orally for the movement of units within the battle area. All such orders contained the date and hour units were to move, the route, destination, and the place at which the unit passed to the control of the new commander. Staff officers were used to supervise the execution of movement orders wherever possible.

The reports received from the Rear Echelon as to units shipped were often at variance with reports from beach group commanders as to units arriving. The special staff sections proved to be of great assistance in confirming the actual presence of units as they arrived in the battle area. A final check was obtained from the G-3 Reports of subordinate units, which showed that the unit or part of the unit had actually arrived and had come under the control of the proper headquarters. In order that the commander may know exactly which units and parts of units are available to him in the battle area, some such system of records must be maintained.

VI. OPERATIONS

PLANNING PHASE

The duties of the Operations Sub-Section during the planning phase included the study and analysis of all directives, outline plans, and operational instructions of higher headquarters, the Navy and Air Force. Applicable portions of the above were posted on the planning map maintained in the "War Room" available for use of the Commanding General and planning staff. Based upon the commander's decision, Seventh Army outline plans, operational memoranda, and field orders were prepared and published.

Detailed study of outline plans and field orders of all subordinate headquarters was made, and their contents were posted on an operations map available for the use of the entire G-3 Section.

The orientation and instruction of officers who were to be assigned to higher headquarters and adjacent units as liaison officers was also a function of this sub-section.

In preparation for moving aboard the Headquarters Ship and into the field where it would be necessary to operate with reduced personnel and equipment, the records and equipment of the Operations Sub-Section were reduced to a minimum. A separate file was set up which contained copies of those documents of an operational nature which were considered necessary for reference during the initial phase of the operation. Equipment consisted of one small file box, one small box of drafting and map material, two map boards and extra map sheets of the area surrounding the assault beaches.

OPERATIONAL PHASE

Upon moving aboard the Headquarters Ship "Monrovia", a survey was made to determine the existing facilities and arrangements for working space for the combined Army-Navy-Air staffs. As a result of many conferences with ships personnel and navy and air staffs, allocation of all available space was finally made. The space available was entirely inadequate. The G-3 operations map, the G-2 situation map, the Navy operational charts, and the Air Force warning system chart occupied one small war room. This caused the war room to be so crowded that the efficient operation of any one of the staffs was quite difficult.

The Headquarters Ship departed with the assault convoy from Algiers on 6 July. The planning phase ended and the operational phase opened with the breaking of radio silence at H hour on 10 July. The time enroute was used to improve the operational procedure of the joint staffs.

In anticipation of future tactical developments, check lists were made to be used in the preparation of orders for the employment of the floating reserve, the reserve awaiting call from North Africa, and the remainder of the airborne division. During the later rush of events, these check lists proved to be of great assistance in the preparation of orders.

Seventh Army Headquarters functioned on the "Monrovia", standing off the Gela beaches from 10 July until 12 July. During this period the overburdened communications facilities caused considerable delay in the issuance of orders and reception of information. This situation was partially corrected by the establishment of command liaison with the units ashore. Since speedboats were not available, landing craft were used for this purpose.

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Upon moving ashore on 12 July the Advance CP was set up near Gela where the section was joined by four officers and five enlisted men who had arrived on the Headquarters LST. This additional personnel reduced the burden and permitted the resumption of normal sub-section division of duties.

Beginning with D Day, a daily Situation Report (SITREP), transmitted by radio or TWX, and a written G-3 Report with overlay were prepared and distributed. These reports were closed as of 1600 hours daily.

Daily G-3 Reports were dispatched to higher headquarters by air courier. The regularity of these reports was carefully maintained; they were augmented by frequent special reports as the situation warranted.

An example of a SITREP and a G-3 Report with overlay follows.

A 1:500,000 road map of Sicily was initially issued on the basis of one per officer, one per vehicle, and an additional generous issue to all units. This map was found to be ideally suited as an operations map to accompany directives and field orders due to its convenient size, and widespread use throughout the Army.

Full use was made of liaison officers between this headquarters, and adjacent and higher headquarters during the operation. The use of additional radio facilities and planes made this possible. Liaison officers travelling between this headquarters and subordinate headquarters were often delayed by poor roads and the distances involved. Liaison officers with radio equipment for communication with their own headquarters would have improved liaison with our subordinate units. Also the availability of Cub planes for the use of liaison officers when needed would have increased their effectiveness.

The "J" Service (radio intercept) was established to monitor the command nets of subordinate and adjacent units. Using current division radio codes and frequencies, this service was able to intercept messages of subordinate units which furnished operational information much sooner than this same information would have reached Army Headquarters through normal command channels.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

G-3 SECTION — 23 JULY 1943
FWP/car
SECRET — PRIORITY URGENT
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

FROM CG SEVENTH ARMY TO HQ FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP CMA LIAISON GROUP FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP CMA EIGHTH ARMY CMA REAR ECHELON SEVENTH ARMY CMA COMNAVNAM X SITREP NUMBER FOURTEEN X AS OF TWO THREE ONE SIX ZERO ZERO BAKER X CITE C DASH ONE SEVEN FIVE X PAREN A PAREN FIRST DIV ENNA TO HOW ONE EIGHT NINE THREE TO CHARLIE ZERO EIGHT ONE THREE X FORTY FIFTH DIV BAKER EIGHT ONE TWO NINE TO BAKER SIX EIGHT ONE TWO WITH PATROLS TO PALERMO ALONG HWY ONE TWO ONE X THIRD DIV PALERMO X EIGHTY SECOND AIRBORNE DIV CASTELLAMARE TO MARSALA X SECOND ARMD DIV PALERMO PAREN B PAREN CP SECOND CORPS HOW ZERO ONE NINE EIGHT CMA FIRST DIV HOW ONE ZERO NINE NINE CMA FORTY FIFTH DIV BAKER EIGHT TWO ZERO ZERO CMA PROV CORPS CMA SECOND ARMD DIV CMA THIRD DIV PALERMO PAREN C PAREN FIRST CDN DIV TOOK LEONFORTE PAREN D PAREN HOT CLEAR VISIBILITY GOOD PAREN E PAREN SECOND CORPS CAPTURED PETRALIA CUTTING HWY ONE TWO ZERO CMA AND CUT HWY ONE ONE THREE AT RJ SIX MILES EAST OF TERMINI IMERESE X PROV CORPS TOOK MARSALA AND PALERMO PAREN F PAREN EXCELLENT PAREN G PAREN SEVENTH ARMY CUT HWYS ONE TWO ZERO AND ONE ONE THREE AND CAPTURED PALERMO X TONS OF ENEMY EQUIPMENT CAPTURED X REPORTS OF ENEMY PWS AND MATERIEL NOT YET COMPLETED PAREN H PAREN PAREN ONE PAREN MEDIUMS TWO ONE THREE CMA LIGHTS ONE FIVE ZERO PAREN TWO PAREN MEDIUMS TWELVE CMA LIGHTS FOURTEEN

CG SEVENTH ARMY

PAUL D. HARKINS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

(Time Signed)

SECRET

G-3 Report

From: 2/1601B
To : 231600B
Hq. Seventh Army
Agrigento, Sicily
231600 July 1943

No. 14

MAPS: ITALY, 1/100,000, SECOND EDITION.

1. OUR FRONT LINES: See Overlay.

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS: See Overlay

3. INFORMATION OF:
   a. Adjacent Troops:
      1st Canadian Division took LEONFORTE.
   b. Supporting Troops:
      (1) Air Force:
          XII Air Support Command flew reconnaissance missions over MARSALA-TRAPANI-PALERMO area and the Seventh Army zone north and east of II Corps. Bombing and strafing missions were flown on targets of opportunity in the PETRALIA-NICOSIA area.
      (2) Navy:
          Protected shipping discharging at GELA, LICATA and PORTO EMPEDOCLE.

4. WEATHER: Hot and clear. Visibility good.

5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:
   a. 4th Tabor relieved from attachment to Provisional Corps and attached to II Corps:
   b. II Corps:
      (1) 1st Inf Division captured PETRALIA against stiff resistance and cut Hwy 120.
      (2) 45th Division advanced on Hwy 120 and cut Hwy 113 at junction east of TERMINI IMORESE, moved inland, captured COLLESANO and continued east toward CASTELBUONO.
   c. Provisional Corps:
      (1) Task Force X returned to control of 82nd Airborne Division.
      (2) 3rd Division and 2nd Armored Division captured PALERMO and are clearing area of small pockets of resistance.
      (3) 82nd Airborne Division advanced to north and northwest to capture TRAPANI and reduce area MARSALA-TRAPANI-CASTELLAMMARE DEL GOLFO.

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY: Excellent.

7. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS:
   Seventh Army captured PALERMO and cut Hwy 120 at PETRALIA and Hwy 113 east of TERMINI IMERESE.

MADDOX,
G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - C/S	2 - 15th Army Gp	1 - 1st Engr Spec Brig
1 - Arty	2 - Eighth Army	1 - 82d A/B Div
1 - Engrs	4 - II Corps	1 - Rear Ech, 7th Army
2 - G-3	1 - Prov Corps, 7th Army	1 - XII ASC
1 - G-4	1 - 3d Div	4 - Commanding General
1 - AG	1 - 2d Armd Div	

(NOTE: - Overlay to accompany above G-3 Report is over-printed on map on page D-5)

VII. AIR SUPPORT

The XII Air Support Command, North African Tactical Air Force, had the mission of furnishing air support for the Seventh Army in Operation "HUSKY". This unit set up a planning staff with Headquarters I Armored Corps at Mostaganem for purposes of planning the air assault on Sicily prior to D Day, and the support of ground forces beginning D Day. The XII ASC maintained an advance CP with the Seventh Army Advance CP until 2 days before the end of the campaign when it was evident that no more close support missions would be requested.

Air support parties were sent to each division in the assault and an air control party to the II Corps Headquarters. These air support parties accompanied the divisions throughout the campaign during the time they were engaged with the enemy. The procedure prescribed in FM 31-35 was followed.

In addition, pilots with mobile SCR 522 Radios (mounted in light trucks) were sent to combat divisions at various times during the campaign in an effort to improve close support technique by contacting planes in flight. While results obtained were not conclusive, it is felt that this technique warrants further study.

The overall Air Force plan for the operation contemplated only general support during the early phases and until Axis air forces had been neutralized sufficiently to establish definite air superiority over the island. Any diversion to other tasks was to be considered only in exceptional circumstances. The soundness of this plan proved itself as the campaign progressed, and ground troops were able to operate with a reasonable immunity from hostile air attacks. This immunity was maintained during the final phase of the campaign (the advance to MESSINA) and at such an economy of air strength as to make fighter and light bomber planes available for numerous close support missions.

An officer from the G-3 Section was assigned to coordinate all matters pertaining to Air Support with the XII ASC.

Air support for the operation consisted in the main of:

(1) Bombing of selected targets prior to D Day.
(2) General support of the operation by bombing targets in rear of enemy positions.
(3) Close support of the operation by bombing and strafing targets impeding the advance of our ground forces.
(4) Tactical reconnaissance.
(5) Air cover - protection of shipping and troop movements.

To accomplish these, the XII ASC had one reconnaissance squadron and a varying number of fighter-bomber groups. The fighter-bomber groups did not come under the control of XII ASC until D Day. Bomber missions flown before D Day were flown by the Tactical Air Force upon request. The Tactical Air Force continued to fly general support missions throughout the campaign upon request of the XII ASC.

Forty-four close support missions were requested by Seventh Army units during the campaign, and approximately 40 general support missions. Of these, 14 close support missions were refused by the Air Corps because of faulty target designation, lack of planes available, or insufficient time in which to brief and prepare pilots. These close support missions represented only a small part of the activity of the XII ASC, as most of its missions were flown on targets in rear of the enemy front line positions.

VIII. NAVAL SUPPORT

VIII. NAVAL SUPPORT

During the planning phase, the Western Naval Task Force set up a planning staff at Algiers and established liaison with Headquarters I Armored Corps at Mostaganem. While this liaison was beneficial to both Army and Navy planning staffs, it was not sufficient because it did not provide all the close coordination necessary. The development of the final plans could have been expedited and last minute changes avoided if the Naval Planning Staff had been physically present with the Army and Air staffs. After the start of the operation, an officer from the G-3 Section was given the responsibility of coordinating Naval fire support, special landing operations, and use of craft in ferrying troops and supplies along the coastline.

Shore fire control parties from each artillery battalion of each division were given limited training in observing and controlling Naval gunfire on shore targets. Naval liaison officers accompanied each of the regimental combat teams in the assault and remained with them until Naval gunfire support was no longer needed. These officers remained with the ground units advancing westward along the southern coast, and rejoined for the advance eastward along the north coast. The duties of these officers were to maintain radio contact with the Naval force, arrange radio frequencies and details of maps, call signs, etc., and to advise the supported unit on matters of Naval gunfire support.

A Naval officer from Task Force 88 was detailed as Naval Liaison with Seventh Army during the advance along the north coast. No liaison officer from the Navy was present with Seventh Army Headquarters during the southern phase of the campaign.

After landing the assault forces, Naval support consisted of Naval gunfire on shore installations and counter-attacks threatening the operation. Naval gunfire, adjusted by shore fire control parties, greatly assisted in breaking up an enemy counter-attack of infantry and tanks north of Gela on D + 1. In its capture of Agrigento and Porto Empedocle, the 3rd Infantry Division was supported by very effective Naval gunfire.

An idea of the volume of Naval fire used may be gained from the fact that 48 missions were fired during the period August 6 - 12 by Task Force 88 in support of the advance of the 3rd Division eastward along the north coast. These missions varied from 3 to 240 rounds each. Six-inch high capacity (high explosive content) shells were used in most cases, five-inch shells in others. At this time, Task Force 88 consisted of 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers.

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
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HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTH ARMY
SITUATION OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY
G-3 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 14
AS OF 231600B, JULY 1943

SICILY
SCALE 1:750 000

D-5

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IX. NEAR-SHORE CONTROL GROUP

A near-shore control group for Seventh Army was organized at BIZERTE, TUNISIA. Due to lack of personnel it was not possible to assemble this group until July 1st (D-9), after the Army Headquarters at MOSTAGANEM had closed and the forward echelon (reduced) had moved to ALGIERS.

All general and special staff sections were represented. In accordance with plans, however, most of these representatives departed for SICILY on the second (D/8) follow up convoy. Consequently the major part of the work and decisions for all special staff sections were accomplished by the G-1, G-3 and G-4 representatives, who continued to function until the operation had progressed to where there was no further need for such a headquarters.

Procedures and techniques for handling the many details of near-shore control after the start of the operation had to be improvised as problems developed.

Liaison officers from all Sub-Task Forces and from the Navy and Air Force with a full knowledge of the plans and requirements of their particular organizations are necessary to the near-shore headquarters. It was found necessary to keep liaison officers from the near-shore headquarters with the British "Q" movements staff and with Eastern Base Section Headquarters at MATEUR. The G-4 representative kept in daily communication with these officers.

A priority list based on anticipated troop requirements was issued by the G-3 Section during the planning phase. This list, subject to changes made necessary by the situation, was to govern the order in which all units were to embark as craft became available. Certain organizations were indicated as being subject to immediate shipment on call of the Task Force Commander. This list greatly assisted the planning of the transport quartermaster headquarters (pre-stowage planning) established by Eastern Base Section in loading the shipping provided by the Navy.

Complete coordination between the G-3 representative and the transport quartermaster in meeting requirements for troops for the follow up convoys is essential. This was achieved, and calls for the emergency shipment of units ahead of schedule were met without delay or confusion.

X. ORDERS & DIRECTIVES

After the initial assault on 10 July, certain directives and orders were issued in accordance with the directives of higher headquarters.

In connection with the second lift of the 82d Airborne Division scheduled for the night of 11th - 12th July, the following orders were issued:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CHIEF OF STAFF — 11 JULY 1943

SECRET — URGENT

TO: COMMANDING GENERALS: II CORPS
45TH INF DIV
1ST INF DIV
3RD INF DIV
2ND ARMD DIV

NOTIFY ALL UNITS ESPECIALLY AA THAT PARACHUTISTS 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION WILL DROP AT ABOUT 2330 TONIGHT JULY 11-12 ON FARELLO LANDING FIELD H275287

/s/ R. E. CUMMINGS
Colonel, G.S.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff

Time Signed 110845B

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
Office of the A. C. of S., G-3

11 July 1943

MEMORANDUM:

TO : COMNAVNAW
XII ASC

1. A flight of C-47 twin-engined transports will drop parachutists on Farello landing field 3 miles east of GELA between 2230B and 2400B tonight, July 11th.

2. Route: reach coast at SAMPIERI following a northwest course 2 to 4 miles inland, altitude less than 1000', leaving coast vicinity LICATA for return trip.

3. Length of flight - approximately 40 minutes.

4. It is essential that all subordinate units be cautioned not to fire on these friendly planes.

/s/ N. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

Upon securing the initial beachhead, Seventh Army issued the following directive on 13 July:

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO #758

GELA, SICILY
1100
13 July 1943

SUBJECT: Directive

TO : Commanding General, II Corps
Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division
Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division
Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division
Commanding General, XII Air Support Command

1. II Corps:
a. Continue on assigned mission to secure the YELLOW LINE.
b. The 18th RCT reverts to II Corps.
c. The 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions attached to 2nd Armored Division.
d. Release as soon as possible all medium tanks of 2nd Armored Division.

2. 3rd Infantry Division:
a. Continue reconnaissance towards AGRIGENTO, hold CANICATTI and secure RJ at H1052.

3. 2nd Armored Division: (Kool)
a. Remain present location in Army Reserve.
b. 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions attached to 2nd Armored Division from II Corps.

4. 82nd Airborne Division:
a. Reorganize vicinity of present Division CP, in Army Reserve.

5. XII Air Support Command:
a. Occupy all landing fields as soon as possible.

G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

HOBART R. GAY,
Brig General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL: N. G. Maddox
N. G. MADDOX
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

On 14 July the following radiogram from 15th Army Group was received.

SECRET - URGENT

NR J47

TO: SEVENTH ARMY
(SEVENTH ARMY, 8TH ARMY RPTD MAIN HQ 15 ARMY GP FROM FINBAT CI1E 0569

MSG BEGINS OPERATIONS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WILL BE EIGHT ARMY TO ADVANCE ON TWO AXES, ONE TO CAPTURE THE PORT OF CATANIA AND THE GROUP OF AIRFIELDS THERE AND THE OTHER TO SECURE THE NETWORK OF ROAD COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE AREA LEONFORTE-ENNA. SEVENTH ARMY WILL CONFORM BY PIVOTING ON PALMA DI MONTECHIARO AND SECURING THE GENERAL LINE PALMA DI MONTECHIARO-CANICATTI CALTANISSETTA-GAINING TOUCH WITH EIGHT ARMY AT RD JUCTION HOW 1979. BOUNDARY BETWEEN SEVENTH AND EIGHT ARMIES, ROAD VIZZINI-CALTAGIRONE-PIAZZA ARMERINA-ROAD JUNCTION HOW 1979 ENNA ALL INCL TO EIGHTH ARMY. LIAISON WILL BE CAREFULLY ARRANGED BETWEEN SEVENTH AND EIGHTH ARMIES FOR THIS OPERATION

FROM FINBAT

TIME SIGNED 132116B

In compliance with the above radiogram Seventh Army issued the following directive on 15 July: (See page D-7)

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7 Army :
: Initials: :
: Date: 15 July 43 :

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO #758

15 July 1943

SUBJECT: Directive.

TO : Commanding General, II Corps
Commanding General, Provisional Corps
Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division
Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division
Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division
Commanding General, XII Air Support Command
Commanding Officer, 1st Engineer Special Brigade
Commanding Officer, 39th R.C.T.

1. Instructions from higher headquarters have turned the direction of effort of the Seventh Army to the Northwest. A new boundary line is established between the American Seventh Army and the British Eighth Army as follows: VIZZINI - CALTAGIRONE - PIAZZA ARMERINA - ENNA - S. STEFANO, inclusive to the British Eighth Army. Highways 124 and 117, connecting these towns, are assigned to the British Eighth Army.

2. The initial objective of the Fifteenth Army Group (American Seventh Army and British Eighth Army) will be the securing of the line CATANIA - PALMA DI MONTECHIARO with a view to future operations.

3. a. The British Eighth Army, moving within its zone of action, will establish itself on the line CATANIA - ENNA.

b. The American Seventh Army, moving within its zone of action, will establish itself on the line CALTANISSETTA - PALMA DI MONTECHIARO.

c. Upon establishment of the Fifteenth Army Group, as in a and b above, further operations will be directed.

4. Movement of the Seventh Army to the line indicated in 3 b above will be effected as follows:

(See Operations Map attached for zones of action)

a. II CORPS - (Lieut General O.N. Bradley, Commanding)

Mission - Complete present assigned tasks, capture CALTANISSETTA and secure Highway 122 within its zone of action, and be prepared for further effort by dark 19 July.

Troops - As now assigned, less attached elements of the 2nd Armored Division and 83rd Chemical Weapons Battalion.

b. PROVISIONAL CORPS - (Major General G. Keyes, Commanding)

(1) 3rd Infantry Division

Mission - Continue present assigned mission, secure Highway 122 within its zone of action, and be prepared for further effort by dark 17 July.

Troops - As now assigned.

Less: Combat Command "A", which reverts to control of 2nd Armored Division.
Bn, 77th FA Regiment
Bn, 5th Armored FA Group
Co, 47th QM Truck Battalion

(2) 82nd Airborne Division

Mission - Assemble with attached troops in PALMA DI MONTECHIARO area, relieve elements of 3rd DIVISION therein by dark 19 July, prepared to advance west.

Troops - Elements of 82nd Airborne Division now in this theater.
83rd Chemical Weapons Battalion attached
Bn, 77th FA Regiment attached
Bn, 5th Armored FA Group attached
Co, 47th QM Battalion Truck attached
39th R.C.T. with Bn, 155 Howitzer (9th Div) attached

c. RESERVE

2nd Armored Division

Mission - Initially assemble CAMPOBELLO - LICATA area in SEVENTH Army Reserve by dark 19 July.

Troops - All elements 2nd Armored Division assigned or attached and in this theater.

Less: 83rd Chemical Weapons Battalion

d. XII AIR SUPPORT COMMAND

Mission - Continue with present assigned support mission.

5. a. Seventh Army will take over operation of beaches and small ports by dark 18 July.

b. Army reserved or controlled roads will be designated in Administrative Order to follow.

6. a. Axis of communication Seventh Army initially GELA - LICATA - CANICATTI.

b. Axes of other units to be reported.

G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut General, U.S. Army
Commanding.

HOBART R. GAY,
Brig General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL: H G Maddox
H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, G.S.C.
A. C. of S, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy No.
II Corps	1
Main Hq 15th Army Gp (Gen Huebner)	2
3rd Division	3
2nd Armored Division	4
82nd A/B Division	5
XII A. S. C.	6
1st Engr Spec Brig	7
39th Inf RCT	8
G-3	9 - 10
TAC Hq 1hl	11
Main Hq 1hl	12
Eighth Army	13
Provisional Corps	14
Rear Echelon Seventh Army	15
CASABLANCA	16
Admiral Connolly (On Biscayne)	17
AFHQ	18
C/S	19 - 20
G-1	21
G-2	22
G-4	23
Arty	24
Engr	25
Surg	26
AG	27

(NOTE: - For Operations Map referred to in paragraph 4 of above directive, see page D-8)


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HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTH ARMY
OPERATIONS MAP
TO ACCOMPANY DIRECTIVE DATED
15 JULY 1943

PATTON
COMDG

MADDOX
G-3

GAY
C/S

SICILY
SCALE 1:750000

D-8

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On 16 July the following radiogram was received from 15th Army Group:

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
NR 184
TO CG SEVENTH ARMY
MSG BEGINS XXX ON COMPLETION OF THE OPERATIONS ORDERED IN MY 0.569 DATED 13 JUL: EIGHTH ARMY WILL (FROM FINBAT TO SEVEN ARMY, EIGHTH ARMY RPTD MAIN 15 ARMY GROUP MAC CITE 0.599) DRIVE THE ENEMY INTO THE MESSINA PENINSULA ADVANCING BY THREE MAIN AXES. (A) NORTHWARD FROM CATANIA (B) LEONFORTE-REGALBUTO-ADRANA. (C) NICOSIA-TROINA-RANDAZZO. SEVENTH ARMY WILL PROTECT THE REAR EIGHTH ARMY IN TWO PHASES. (1) ESTABLISH A SECURE BASE WITH ONE DIVISION IN AREA ROAD JUNCTION H0887-VILLAROSA-ENNA CALTANISSETTA. (2) THRUST NORTH TO HOLD THE ROAD JUNCTIONS AT PETRALIA AND H0195 SOUTH OF RESUTTANO. PARA THE ROAD VIZZINI-CALTAGIRONE-PIAZZA ARMERINA-ROAD JUNCTION H1979-PASSING EAST OF ENNA-NICOSIA MUST BE LEFT FREE FOR USE OF EIGHT ARMY FOR ABOVE OPERATION. IF IT ENTAILS HEAVY FIGHTING THE CAPTURE OF AGRIGENTO AND PORTO EMPEDOCLE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN ON COMPLETION OF ABOVE TASK. IF THE PORT CAN BE OCCUPIED WITH OUT GETTING COMMITTED SERIOUSLY IT SHOULD BE SECURED EARLY AS IT WILL BE REQUIRED FOR MAINTENANCE IN THE FUTURE. ACKNOWLEDGE

FROM FINBAT
TIME SIGNED 161420B

At a conference between the Commanding General, Seventh Army, and the Commanding General, 15th Army Group, on 17 July, a plan was proposed and approved as shown on the special map reproduced on page D-10.

On 18 July the following radiogram was received:

TO 7TH ARMY 8TH ARMY MAC
FROM FANTOX 0165
REF MY DIRECTIVE FINBAT NUMBER 0599 DATED 16 JULY ON CAPTURE OF PETRALIA YOU WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION BY PUSHING NORTH A DETACHMENT TO CUT THE COAST ROAD THEREBY SPLITTING THE ISLAND IN TWO. AS SOON AS YOU ARE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ON THE GENERAL LINE CAMPOFELICE PETRALIA CATERINA CALTANISETTA AGRIGENTO YOU WILL ADVANCE WESTWARDS TO MOP UP THE WESTERN HALF OF SICILY BUT THIS OPERATION MUST NOT BE STARTED BEFORE YOU ARE READY TO OPERATE FROM A SECURE BASE AS GIVEN TO YOU IN THE ABOVE.
ACK

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TIME RECEIVED: 182158B

Based on the preceding radiogram and the plan shown on the special map on page D-10, Seventh Army issued the directive shown on page D-11.

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On 16 July the following radiogram was received from 15th Army Group:

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
NR 184
TO CG SEVENTH ARMY
MSG BEGINS XXX ON COMPLETION OF THE OPERATIONS ORDERED IN MY 0.569 DATED 13 JUL: EIGHTH ARMY WILL (FROM FINBAT TO SEVEN ARMY, EIGHTH ARMY RPTD MAIN 15 ARMY GROUP MAC CITE 0.599) DRIVE THE ENEMY INTO THE MESSINA PENINSULA ADVANCING BY THREE MAIN AXES. (A) NORTHWARD FROM CATANIA (B) LEONFORTE-REGALBUTO-ADRANA. (C) NICOSIA-TROINA-RANDAZZO. SEVENTH ARMY WILL PROTECT THE REAR EIGHTH ARMY IN TWO PHASES. (1) ESTABLISH A SECURE BASE WITH ONE DIVISION IN AREA ROAD JUNCTION H0887-VILLAROSA-ENNA CALTANISSETTA. (2) THRUST NORTH TO HOLD THE ROAD JUNCTIONS AT PETRALIA AND H0195 SOUTH OF RESUTTANO. PARA THE ROAD VIZZINI-CALTAGIRONE-PIAZZA ARMERINA-ROAD JUNCTION H1979-PASSING EAST OF ENNA-NICOSIA MUST BE LEFT FREE FOR USE OF EIGHT ARMY FOR ABOVE OPERATION. IF IT ENTAILS HEAVY FIGHTING THE CAPTURE OF AGRIGENTO AND PORTO EMPEDOCLE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN ON COMPLETION OF ABOVE TASK. IF THE PORT CAN BE OCCUPIED WITH OUT GETTING COMMITTED SERIOUSLY IT SHOULD BE SECURED EARLY AS IT WILL BE REQUIRED FOR MAINTENANCE IN THE FUTURE. ACKNOWLEDGE

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ACK

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY


TIME RECEIVED: 182158B

Based on the preceding radiogram and the plan shown on the special map on page D-10, Seventh Army issued the directive shown on page D-11.

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SECRET
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CO, 7 Army :
: Initials: :
: Date: 18 July 43 :

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO #758

18 July 1943

SUBJECT: Directive

TO : Commanding General, II Corps
Commanding General, Provisional Corps
Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division
Commanding Officer, 1st Engineer Special Brigade
Commanding General, XII Air Support Command

1. Higher headquarters directs that:
   a. The British Eighth Army will drive the enemy into the Messina Peninsula, advancing by three main roads. (See Map)
   b. The American Seventh Army, upon securing a strong base in the ENNA - CALTANISSETTA area, will drive rapidly to the North and Northwest and capture PALERMO.

2. Scheme of Maneuver.
Seventh Army
   a. Secure base in vicinity of ENNA - CALTANISSETTA - S. CATERINA.
   b. Advance to the North and NorthWest, disrupt enemy communications by cutting Highways 121, 120 and 113.
   c. A powerful armored striking force to follow the advance on the west flank prepared to exploit a break-through or extend envelopment to the West.

3. Plan.
   a. II Corps
   Mission - (1) Secure strong base in rear of British Eighth Army as indicated (See Map).
   (2) Advance within its zone to the North and Northwest, cut Highways 121, 120 and 113, and be prepared to attack PALERMO from the East. (See Map)
   b. Provisional Corps
   Mission - Advance within its zone to Northwest, prepared to ATTACK PALERMO from the South and Southwest. (See Map)
   c. 2nd Armored Division, Reinforced (Army Reserve)
   Mission - Initially follow advance of Provisional Corps prepared to exploit a break-through or extend envelopment to the West.
   d. XII Air Support Command
   Mission - Close support of advance of the Seventh Army.
   e. 1st Engineer Special Brigade
   Mission - As outlined in previous directive.
   x. (1) The above plan will be designated as Plan A, to be executed on Seventh Army order.
   (2) The final assault on PALERMO will be coordinated by Seventh Army. Corps will notify Army when they are in position ready to make this attack.
   (3) Reports will be made on reaching phaselines (See Map). Units will not stop on phase lines unless so ordered by Army.

4. See Administrative Instructions.

5. Seventh Army axis communications. See map. Corps' axes and CP's to be reported.

G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

HOBART R. GAY,
Brig General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL: H G Maddox
H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, G.S.C.
A. C. of S, G-3

1 Incl: Map

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy No.		
II Corps	1 - 3	Admiral Connolly (On Biscayne)	16
Provisional Corps	4 - 6	Rear Ech, Seventh Army	17
2nd Armd Div	7	C/S	18 - 19
XII ASC	8	G-1	20
1st Engr Spec Brig	9	G-2	21
107th AA Group	10	G-3	22 - 23
Hq 15 Army Group	11 - 12	G-4	24
Eighth Army	13	Arty	25
AFHQ	14	Engr	26
COMNAVNAW	15	Surg	27
		AG	28

(NOTE: - For map referred to in paragraph 1a above see page D-12)

The following radiogram of 20 July from 15th Army Group further confirmed the plan of action agreed upon in the conference of 17 July:

210415 M/C 734H
C 1124

TO: 7TH ARMY 8TH ARMY

FROM: 15 ARMY GROUP G-181 20TH

MOST SECRET. 8TH ARMY HAS MET HEAVY RESISTANCE IN THE CATANIA PLAIN BUT SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING A BRIDGEHEAD OVER DITTAINO RIVER. IT'S AXES OF ADVANCE ARE DIRECTED NORTHWEST AGAINST CATANIA MISTERBIANCO PATERNO AND EASTWARDS AGAINST ADRANO. IT NOW APPEARS THAT ALL GERMAN FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN INTO NORTHEAST CORNER OF SICILY THE MAJORITY OPPOSING THE RIGHT FLANK OF 8TH ARMY IN THE AREA CATANIA. 7TH ARMY WHEN IT REACHES THE COAST ROAD NORTH OF PETRALIA SHOULD SEND STRONG RECONNAISSANCES TO THE EAST ALONG THE COASTAL ROAD AND THE ROAD PETRALIA-NICOSIA-CESARO, WHICH WILL BE INCLUSIVE TO 7TH ARMY. IF THE SITUATION PERMITS THESE RECONNAISSANCES SHOULD BE BACKED UP IN STRENGTH. AT THE SAME TIME 7TH ARMY WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE DEMORALIZATION OF THE ITALIANS IN THE WEST TO THRUST TOWARDS PALERMO WITH THE OBJECT OF TAKING THE PORT SECURING ITS LEFT FLANK ON GENERAL LINE SAN GUISEPPE-CORLEONE-SCIACCA. FUTURE OPERATION IS TO MAKE PALERMO THE MAIN AXIS OF SUPPLY FOR 7TH ARMY AND TO DEVELOP A COMBINED OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE GERMANS BY BRINGING AMERICAN FORCES INTO LINE WITH 8TH ARMY WITH A VIEW TO BREAKING THROUGH TO MESSINA. ACKNOWLEDGE.

2045B

2022SLB


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Following the capture of Palermo and the end of organized resistance in Western Sicily, the following radiogram from 15th Army Group, dated 23 July, was received:

M/C No 1285H CIPHER NO 1220 "O"

TO: SEVEN ARMY (R) 8 ARMY C IN C MED MAC

FROM 15 ARMY GROUP 0/211 23 JULY MOST SECRET

EIGHT ARMY IS MEETING CONTINUED HEAVY AND STUBBORN RESISTANCE BY GERMAN FORCES ON A GENERAL LINE FROM THE BRIDGEHEAD OVER R SIMETO THENCE ALONG THE RAILWAY TO CATENANUOVA H6186 AGIRA 4695. TO DELAY THE ENEMY RATE OF BUILD UP THE AIR FORCES ARE BEING DIRECTED TO HAMPER ENEMY RAIL AND ROAD MOVEMENT BY BOMBING KEY POINTS ON THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN THE N E CORNER OF THE ISLAND ON A CAREFULLY CONTROLLED PLAN. YOUR TASK WILL BE TO TRANSFER YOUR AXES OF SUPPLY TO PALERMO AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. YOU WILL LEAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES IN THE WEST OF THE ISLAND TO MOP UP THE REMAINING ENEMY ELEMENTS AND TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE AREA. IN YOUR THRUST EASTWARD ALONG THE COAST ROAD AND ROAD TO NICOSIA TROINA CESARO YOU WILL EMPLOY THE MAXIMUM STRENGTH THAT YOU CAN MAINTAIN. IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE RAPID COLLAPSE OF THE GERMAN FORCES LEFT IN SICILY IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOU EXERT STRONG PRESSURE ON THEIR NORTHERN FLANK AND MAINTAIN THIS PRESSURE CONTINUOUSLY. TO COORDINATE THE ACTION OF THE 7 AND 8 ARMIES THIS EFFORT SHOULD START AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY EVENT BY 1 AUGUST.

Upon receipt of the above radiogram, orders were issued moving all non-divisional artillery units to the II Corps. This movement was completed on 27 July. Warning orders were issued for the movement of the 3rd Infantry Division, and the 9th Infantry Division (upon arrival in Sicily) to the II Corps sector. This regrouping having been made, on 31 July Seventh Army issued the following directive confirming all previous instructions:

COPY NO ___

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO #758

: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG 7 Army :
: Initials: :
: Date: 31 July 43 :

31 July 1943

SUBJECT: Directive

TO : Commanding General, II Corps
Commanding General, Provisional Corps
Commanding General, XII ASC
Commanding Officer, 1st Engineer Special Brigade
Commanding General, 34th AAA Brigade
Commanding Officer, Ranger Force

1. Higher Headquarters has directed that Seventh Army:
a. Attack eastward along the north coast road (Highway 113), and the road NICOSIA-TROINA-CESARO-RANDAZZO (Highway 120), thence northeastward on MESSINA, driving the enemy out of the MESSINA Peninsula, in conjunction with the British Eighth Army on the right.

2. Scheme of maneuver (See map)
a. Advance eastward on MESSINA on two axes within zone of action.
b. Operate in close conjunction with British Eighth Army in driving the enemy from the MESSINA Peninsula.

3. Plan
a. II Corps:
Troops: 1st Inf Div, 9th Inf Div, 3rd Inf Div, 70th Tank Bn (L), 753rd Tank Bn (M), 4th Tabor (Goums), 91st Recn Sq, 19th Engr Regt, 39th Engr Regt, 36th FA Regt, 17th FA Regt, 179th FA Regt (- 1 Bn), 77th FA Regt, 5th Armored FA Group, 2nd Cml Wpns Bn, 3rd Cml Wpns Bn, 106th CA Group (AAA), Supporting Service Units

Mission:
Advance eastward on two axes, i.e., along Highway 113 and Highway 120 maintaining a sustained, relentless drive until the enemy is decisively defeated. Maintain close contact with the left flank elements of the British Eighth Army.

Time of attack:
1 August 1943.

Line of Departure:
S. STEFANO-MISTRETTA-NICOSIA.

Corps Rear Boundary:
ROAD CAMPOFELICE - COLLESANO - PALIZZI - PETRALIA - ALIMENA - VILLAROSA - ENNA, inclusive to II Corps.

b. Provisional Corps:
Troops: 45th Inf Div
2nd Armd Div
82nd Airborne Div
83rd Cml Bn (Sep)
Supporting Service Units

Mission:
(1) Organize and secure the western portion of SICILY. (See Opn Map)
(2) Protect the Port of PALERMO and the rear of II Corps.
(3) Be prepared to support the advance of II Corps by moving reinforcing troops to the East in II Corps zone.

c. XII Air Support Command:
Mission:
Close support of advance of Seventh Army with particular attention to the disruption of hostile supply routes and communications. Reconnaissance over entire sector. Air cover for Naval Task Force 88.

d. 1st Engineer Special Brigade:
Mission:
Continue on present assigned mission.

e. 34th AAA Brigade:
Mission:
Continue on present assigned mission.

f. Ranger Force:
(1st, 3rd and 4th Ranger Battalions)
Mission:
Secure the CALTANISSETTA area and perform such other missions as directed by this Headquarters.

g. Navy:
Naval Task Force 88, consisting of two cruisers and four to six destroyers will be operating off north coast of SICILY. This Task Force will support advance of troops along Highway 113 with Naval gunfire upon request.

x. Army boundary, road GELA - PIAZZA ARMERINA - ENNA - LEONFORTE - NICOSIA - TROINA - CESARO - RANDAZZO (all inclusive to Seventh Army) - Road RANDAZZO to RJ at C 9120 (jointly with Eighth Army) thence NE (Opn Map).

4. See separate administrative instructions.

5. a. Seventh Army axes of communications - Highway 113.

b. Command Posts:
(1) Seventh Army - initially PALERMO.
(2) Corps CP's to be reported.

G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

HOBART R. GAY,
Brig General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL: H. Maddox
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.
A.C. of S, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

Unit	Copy No
II Corps	1 - 4
Prov Corps	5 - 8
XII ASC	9
1st Engr Spec Brig	10
34th AAA Brig	11
Ranger Forces (Lt Col Darby)	12
15th Army Group	13 - 14
Eighth Army	15
COMNAVNAW	16
CTF 88	17
AFHQ	18
Rear Hqs Seventh Army	19
C/S	20 - 21
G-1	22
G-2	23
G-3	24 - 25
G-4	26
Arty	27
Engrs	28
Surg	29
AG	30
Commanding General	31 - 34


(For map referred to in Para. 2 above, see page D-14)

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H.Q. SEVENTH ARMY
OPERATION MAP TO ACCOMPANY
DIRECTIVE H.Q. SEVENTH ARMY
31 JULY 1943

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On 2 August, the following letter of instructions was issued:

: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7 Army :
: Initials: :
: Date: 3 Aug 1943 :

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO #758

Copy No ____ 2 August 1943

300 - C

SUBJECT: Special Operation.

TO : Commanding General, II Corps.

1. Enclosed herewith estimate, G-2 Seventh Army, indicating probable defensive positions of enemy during current phase of operations.

2. In order to expedite the advance eastward along the Axis Highway 113, it is believed that a small amphibious task force might well be employed behind the enemy's main defensive line to attack westward and assist in quickly reducing a strongly held position that might be retarding our advance.

3. The employment of such a task force should be carefully coordinated as to time and place of landing in order to effect decisive results in the minimum amount of time.

4. The following craft are available to lift a force of approximately a reinforced Infantry Battalion:
2 - LST (each carrying 6 LCV(P))
7 - LCT
6 - LCI (L)

5. Naval Task Force 88 and XII Air Support Command will furnish cover for the embarkation and voyage of this force and will cooperate to the fullest extent in supporting the landing and subsequent operation ashore.

6. Maj. General G. KEYES has been designated to coordinate the various Army agencies as well as the Navy and XII ASC involved and is ordered to report to you for temporary duty in connection with this operation.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

3 Inclosures:
Task Force Outline
Summary of enemy situation
Terrain study, NE Sicily

DISTRIBUTION:	Copy No.		
II Corps	1-2	G3 7TH ARMY	8-11
Maj.Gen.KEYES	3	C/S	12-13
Prov Corps	4-5	G-3	14-15
G-4	6	Capt DAVIS (USN) L.O. TF 88	16
XII ASC	7		

(G-2 Estimate referred to in paragraph 1, above, is reproduced in the G-2 Section Report)

(For map to accompany above directive, see page D-16)

In order to intercept and block the enemy retrograde movement to the east along the northern coast, the Commanding General decided to employ a special amphibious landing force, assisted by an airborne task force, to land in the area between Falcone and Barcellona. The directive for this operation follows.

D-15

: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7 Army :
: Initials: :
: Date: 12 Aug 43 :

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO #758

Copy No. ____. 12 August 1943

SUBJECT: Directive.

TO: Commanding General, II Corps.
Commanding General, Provisional Corps.
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 509th Procht Inf Regt.

1. The 157th RCT, having been designated by the Commanding General, Provisional Corps, will form part of a special Task Force to operate under Seventh Army control according to the provisions of the following directive. The troops listed in Par. 3 below are attached to the 157th RCT, with the exception that the 2nd Bn of the 509th Procht Inf is attached only when contact has been made after landing on the night of D-1 Day.

2. a. The enemy is conducting an organized retrograde movement eastward into the MESSINA Peninsula. See current G-2 estimates and periodic reports.
b. II Corps will continue to attack eastward along Highway 113 and Highway 120, with the mission of driving the enemy from the MESSINA Peninsula, in conjunction with the British 30th and 13th Corps operating on its right.

3. A Special Task Force, designated Task Force "X" commanded by Colonel Ankorn, 157th Inf, supported by Naval Task Force 88 and XII ASC, will engage in a combined operation to block the enemy retrograde movement to the East.

Troops:
157 Regt Combat Team
2nd Bn, 509th Procht Inf Regt
One Co, 753rd Tk Bn (M)
One Co, 83rd Chem Bn (Mtr)

4. See Operations Overlay.
a. Task Force "X" will move by sea and by air to the areas indicated, landing under cover of darkness; cut Highway 113 between FALCONE and BARCELLONA and cut the road running south through MAZZARRA - NOVARA - FRANCAVILLA; attack westward on Highway 113 as an axis to join with the 3rd Inf Div attacking eastward along the same axis; prevent any attempt of the enemy to move reinforcements westwards on Highway 113.
(1) 157 RCT, 45th Div, with one Company, 753rd Tk Bn (M) and one company 83d Chem Bn (MTZ) attached, will land at 0300B hours D Day on the beach indicated (See Opn Overlay), establish a beachhead and gain contact with 2nd Bn, 509th Procht Inf.
(2) 2nd Bn, 509th Procht Inf will move from its present location by airborne lift, landing at approximately 2000B hrs, D-1 Day, in selected drop-zone in the vicinity of BARCELLONA. It will proceed at once to secure Highway 113 in the vicinity of BARCELLONA. Upon contact being made, it will be attached to 157 RCT, 45th Div.
b. Naval Task Force 88 provide escort and protection for 157 RCT, 45th Div, plus attachments, support and protect its landing and provide Naval gunfire in support of troops ashore.
c. XII ASC provide necessary air support and air cover for the operation.
d. D Day to be a day between August 14 and August 18, both inclusive, actual date to be announced.
e. Upon gaining contact with the 3rd Division after landing, Task Force "X" will be attached to the 3rd Division.

5. Flights of twin-engine transport aircraft, carrying 2nd Bn, 509th Procht Regt, will fly over a specified lane, at 1000 ft altitude, within designated hours on D-1 Day. All commanders will take necessary steps to prohibit all anti-aircraft fire within this lane during the hours to be designated later.


G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lt. General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

HOBART R. GAY,
Brig. General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL: Maddox
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - C/S	4 - II Corps
1 - AA Sec	1 - 1st Engr Spec Brig
1 - Arty	1 - Naval Opns, Port of PALERMO
1 - Engrs	1 - Prov Corps, Seventh Army
4 - G3 (2 w/o overlays)	1 - Rear Echn, Seventh Army
3 - XII ASC (1-3d ADW)(Troop Carrier Cmd NAAF)	2 - 45th Div
2 - G-3	1 - 2nd Armd Div
1 - G-4	1 - 82nd A/B Div
1 - AO	1 - OTP 88
2 - 15th Army Gp	1 - CO, 2nd Bn 509th Para Regt
2 - Eighth Army	1 - 34 AAA Brig



NOTE: The amphibious operation outlined in Directive Seventh Army dated 12 August 1943 was conducted as prescribed, the seaborne force landing on beaches at BARCELLONA at 0230B hours, 16 August. The landing was made in rear of our front lines as the 3rd Infantry Division had advanced beyond BARCELLONA on 15 August. The landing of the 2nd Battalion, 509th Parachute Regiment was cancelled due to the fact that its objective had already been captured by the 3rd Infantry Division.

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SECRET

ANTICIPATED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
PROPOSED LANDING

MAP TO ACCOMPANY LETTER
HQRS. 7TH ARMY 2 AUG., 1943
SUBJECT : "SPECIAL OPERATION"

SICILY
SCALE 1: 750000
D-16

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XI CONCLUSIONS

The actual mechanics of maintaining troop status records proved to be sound and met the requirements for this operation. The card file was used by every section of the headquarters. A small portable Kardex File is considered valuable as it would save wear and tear on the cards. By use of a Kardex File information could be obtained rapidly without handling the cards.

The organization sub-section and the troop movements sub-section must operate very closely together as one is dependent upon the other and the personnel should be interchangeable.

The additional training necessary to prepare a combat team for an amphibious operation is mostly of a technical nature involving loading on craft, waterproofing vehicles and materiel, debarking on beaches, and crossing or removing beach obstacles.

The use of the existing facilities at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade enabled combat team commanders to complete their amphibious training in the limited time available.

Before plans may be made for the movement and equipping of units, the force commander must know what units are available to him for the operation, their location, and the ports of embarkation for the various sub-task forces. Armed with the above information, the commander can then make the final assignment of units to sub-task forces. If this is done, many unnecessary movements of units will be avoided.

Accurate records of the dates units joined their sub-task forces must be maintained; any record or chart which becomes complicated will not be kept accurately. Sub-task forces must be informed early in the planning phase just what records and reports are required. The use of prepared forms will facilitate consolidation and will assist in obtaining the required information in the form desired.

Sufficient traffic control personnel should be provided at critical points in the battle area in the early stages of the operation in order to properly coordinate and control troop movements.

The need for continuous liaison between headquarters is sufficient to warrant the establishment of a separate Liaison Section in Army Headquarters. The section should be organized under a section chief early in the planning phase. Officers should be carefully selected and thoroughly trained prior to the beginning of the operation.

The efficiency of air support parties would have been greatly improved if they had been formed earlier in the planning phase and given opportunity for training as a team before the start of the operation.

A near-shore control group is essential for amphibious operations. It should continue to function until the force commander can predict well in advance the definite order in which units will be needed. At this point, hirher headquarters should assume the responsibility for the shipment of units.

XII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Each staff section should be brought to full strength at the very beginning of the planning phase of an operation.

When the facilities of a special training installation are used, this installation should be under the direct control of the task force commander for the duration of the training period.

Whenever possible, the training section should be composed of officers experienced in amphibious operations.

After the final assignment of units has been made, the dates by which they are to be made available should be determined by higher headquarters and not left to the "mutual agreement" of subordinate headquarters.

The G-3 Section should be responsible only for establishing the priority of movement of units, and the G-4 Transportation Section, or a separate Movements Section, should be responsible for issuing detailed orders, providing the necessary additional means, and coordinating and controlling the movement.

A staff officer, for coordination of air support, should be assigned to the G-3 Section of all divisions and higher units. He should be from the Air Force, preferably of field grade, and thoroughly trained in ground-air support.

Air support parties should be organized and equipped early in the planning phase of an operation, in order to permit proper training.

The technique of communication between personnel on the ground and planes in flight during the execution of a close support mission should be further developed.

More thorough training in ground-air and air-ground recognition should be given to both air and ground forces to prevent firing on one another.

Army, Navy, and Air Force planning staffs should be located in close proximity to one another throughout the entire planning phase.

During the actual operation, a Naval liaison officer should be on duty with the Army Headquarters at all times when the ground forces are being supported by the Navy.

Shore fire control parties and Naval liaison officers should be given thorough training in arranging, coordinating and controlling Naval gunfire from the shore. This training should include actual firing by Naval vessels on ground targets. In preparation for amphibious operations, regimental combat team commanders and all artillery commanders should become thoroughly familiar with the proper employment of Naval gunfire support.

The near-shore control group should be organized early in order to insure that it will be prepared to function efficiently upon the departure of the Main Headquarters.

H. G. Maddox

H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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REPORT OF THE A.C. OF S. G-4 (SUPPLY & EVACUATION)

CHAPTER I

I INTRODUCTION

The book of experience on the planning and operation of supply activities during the initial landings of the Western Task Force in FRENCH MOROCCO (TORCH Operation) had scarcely been fully completed when word was given for the start of a new volume called "HUSKY".

At that time the G-4 Section, I Armored Corps Reinforced (Force 343), consisted of a handful of officers and enlisted personnel of practically all branches of the service. Most of the officers had gone through the TORCH Operation, one officer was on duty at the TUNISIAN front, but most important of all, the majority of officers in the section had spent some time on duty with troops and were thus better able to visualize future supply operations from the standpoint of the soldier.

The section was organized as follows: G-4, Executive Officer, Administrative, Supply, Automotive, Fiscal Sections, and a Transportation Section of one officer.

The details involved in the planning and execution of the supply mission during the initial landings and subsequent operations covered diverse fields and are too numerous to relate. The remarks that follow are therefore of necessity general in character and cover all elements of the G-4 Section excepting the following: FISCAL SECTION - (See Chapter II); TRANSPORTATION SECTION - (See Chapter III).

II PLANNING

PERSONNEL

As Tables of Organization for a reinforced corps, or even for a field army, do not make provision for sufficient personnel for G-4 Section responsibilities in a landing operation, it was necessary to immediately request additional officer personnel.

It became necessary by D-Day to add a Statistical Section to keep for higher headquarters and the Commanding General of the Army the up-to-date statistics on losses, captured material, and other supply data. Statistical report on major items from 10 July to 17 August 1943 is shown as Appendix "B".

On 24 February there was no Transportation Section set up for this force. There was, however, one officer designated as Transportation Officer in the G-4 Section. He was experienced in water, rail, and motor transportation. After much difficulty, officers trained in highway, rail, and water transportation were added to the section, and later, an officer experienced in petroleum supplies. Most of these officers arrived too late for the planning stage. By 31 August, the Transportation Section consisted of a Chief of Transportation, Highway, Rail, Water, Pack, and Petroleum Sections — a total of approximately fifteen officers and nineteen enlisted men. Air transportation personnel were also attached to the section. Experience has taught us in this campaign that one of the most valuable sections, in a field army is the Transportation Section.

To provide the Army Commander with an additional headquarters to later operate a base of supply, a request was sent to the War Department for a base area group which was to function directly under the control of the Commanding General, Seventh Army, and to be later turned over to a higher headquarters when the Army had moved sufficiently far away from the base as to be no longer able to control its operation. The Base Area Group, as it was known, was formed in the United States, but unfortunately did not arrive until just before departure of the Assault Convoy to Sicily. One-third of the Base Area Group was attached to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade upon arrival in North Africa and moved to Sicily under that headquarters. The entire Base Area Group closed on Sicily by 6 August.

SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS

The initial directive for HUSKY was received the middle of February. The Third Outline Maintenance Project, from Headquarters Force 141, later 15th Army Group, dated 15 April 1943 and amended on 26 April 1943, was based on American troops landing east and west of Palermo and one division landing in the southwestern part of the island in the vicinity of Sciacca. (See Appendix "C").

The American division mounted direct from the United States was to be provided with twenty-one (21) days maintenance and ten (10) units of fire. American troops mounted from North Africa were to be provided with a total of twenty-one (21) days supply for the assault and seven (7) units of fire — these supplies to be carried in the assault, first and second follow-ups. Provisions were to be made for beach maintenance for about thirty days. UGS-11 Convoy, consisting of twenty-one (21) days maintenance and four (4) units of fire, was to arrive in Palermo as soon after D plus 14 as practicable, depending upon the tactical situation. This was the basis for the first Administrative Plan of Headquarters I Armored Corps Reinforced, (Force 343).

In early April a Rear Echelon Headquarters, I Armored Corps, was established in Oran (to be near and work with Headquarters, SOS NATOUSA) where work continued, with a skeleton force of personnel, on requisitions on SOS for all anticipated requirements for the operation up to D plus 165, or the UGS 19 and 20 Convoys from the United States.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I ---------- G-4 REPORT

CHAPTER II ---------- FISCAL SECTION

CHAPTER III ---------- TRANSPORTATION REPORT

CHAPTER I

I ---------- INTRODUCTION.

II ---------- PLANNING.

III ---------- OPERATION.

IV ---------- CONCLUSIONS.

V ---------- RECOMMENDATIONS.

On May 20th, a conference was held at the Rear Echelon Headquarters, with representatives of SOS, the G-4's of all sub-task forces, G-4 of Headquarters I Armored Corps, and others. The "latest" troop list had that day been put into the hands of the sub-task force commanders. SOS representatives required that phase requisitions for the D-Day convoys be in their hands by May 24th, and those for the first and second follow-ups (D plus 4 and D plus 8 convoys) by May 26th. The sub-task forces were therefore required to submit by May 22, their data as to numbers of personnel, numbers and types of vehicles, weapons, radios, and special Engineer heavy equipment that they expected to lift on their assault convoys, and the same information by May 24th for the two follow-ups. This data was necessary for bases for phased requisitions. It was brought to light at this conference that the letter, subject: "Unit Alert Plans - Preparation for Movements by Water", published by Headquarters, NATOUSA, 15 April 1943, had not been distributed to all units. It was vital for the information called for by these plans to be in the hands of sub-task force commanders so that they could prepare their mounting plans based on the shipping allocated to them.

Since SOS, NATOUSA, insisted that in order to meet their already tight transportation schedule they had to have phased requisitions by their set deadlines of May 24th and May 26th, and since it was obviously impossible under the circumstances for the sub-task forces to submit the required information in time, the rear echelon submitted phased requisitions based on the maximum lift in personnel, vehicles, and tanks, of the allotted shipping (to include craft) to each of the sub-task forces at each of their mounting (embarkation) areas. The two later elements, the shipping allocation and the mounting areas, were, at that time, those least subject to major changes prior to D-day. With added "safety factors" to cover later changes in sub-task forces' troop lists and to cover possible losses, phased requisitions were submitted on schedule for CENT, DIME, JOSS, KOOL, the 82nd Airborne, the 9th Infantry Division (the NA Reserve), and a reserve supply for one reinforced Regimental Combat Team to be flown in in an emergency. As information came in from the sub-task forces, substitutions and additions, particularly in ammunition, were made.

Efforts were pushed to get "Unit Alert Plans" into the hands of the proper sub-task force. Units on the troop list arriving in North Africa late were issued copies of Alert Plans and directed to expedite their submission. The issue of T/BA equipment, particularly transportation, on priority, was coordinated with the Mediterranean Base Section.

The middle of May the entire tactical plan was changed but the work done in planning the requirements initially for the I Armored Corps Reinforced (Force 343), such as supply requirements from the United States, was not changed. This new plan called for the American troops to land on the south coast of Sicily at JOSS, DIME, and CENT Beaches. The general overall plan of supply for I Armored Corps Reinforced (Force 343), based on the new tactical plan, is shown in Appendix "C", with extracts from the detailed Administrative Plan for DIME as shown in Appendix "D". Similar detailed plans were prepared for the other sub-task forces. The basic idea in the plan was to provide the soldier with the essentials for combat and not overload him or the beaches with unnecessary supplies. These plans formed the basis for all phased requisitions for supplies from North Africa up to D plus 14, with reserves on the ground at Bizerte and Kairouan to be moved to Sicily on call. That part of the G-4 Section, Seventh Army Rear, in Bizerte, was responsible to call on Eastern Base Section or Headquarters SOS NATOUSA for movement of these supplies. The details of this plan were published in an Administrative Plan on 31 May 1943, and distributed to all headquarters, including SOS NATOUSA.

EQUIPPING OF UNITS

Priority list on equipping of all units for this operation was furnished Headquarters Allied Force by Headquarters I Armored Corps Reinforced (Force 343), and copies sent to all Base Sections, Corps, and divisions. To eliminate the difficulties experienced in mounting the TORCH Operation in the United States, in that secrecy prevented many non-divisional units from knowing just what force they belonged to and when and how they were to be equipped, officers of Headquarters I Armored Corps Reinforced (Force 343) from the services concerned were sent to these various units with instructions to give the commander the general information that his unit was to be a part of a certain force, who the commander of that force was, when and where they were to be equipped, how long they would probably stay in their present location, and, during the visit, to determine the status of equipment of the unit concerned and its readiness for combat. It is believed that these visits by officers of Headquarters I Armored Corps Reinforced (Force 343) eliminated some confusion in the minds of the commanders of small units regarding their future missions.

GENERAL PLAN FOR THE EXECUTION OF SUPPLY MISSION.

This was covered by Memoranda and Administrative Orders from Headquarters I Armored Corps Reinforced (Force 343) to all concerned. Copy of Administrative Order No. 1, with all Annexes, is attached herewith as Appendix "E".

Sub-task Force Commanders were to be responsible for their own supply from ships and other landing craft over the beaches or through any sub-ports, to include the operation of all beach heads until that duty was taken over by Force 343 (Seventh Army). The 82nd Airborne Division was to be supplied by air-drop or through DIME Beaches. See Appendix "C" for location of beaches. Sub-task Forces were built around the following headquarters: JOSS - 3rd Infantry Division; SHARK - II Corps; DIME - 1st Infantry Division; CENT - 45th Infantry Division; KOOL - 2nd Armored Division. Additional service units were allocated to all sub-task forces to assist in their supply mission.

When the supply activities were to be taken over by the Commanding General, Force 343 (Seventh Army), the Commander, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, would assume command of the beach groups and of all non-divisional and non-corps units attached thereto and such other necessary service units as might be attached by the Commanding General, Force 343 (Seventh Army), and would be responsible for the execution of all supply plans within the theater of operations emanating from Force 343 (Seventh Army), including the operation of any seized ports. Force 343 (Seventh Army) was to be responsible for the coordination with Headquarters SOS NATOUSA in the assembling of supplies at various ports of embarkation and their transportation to the theater of operations, and that, supplies would be obtained from SOS NATOUSA and forwarded on an automatic basis or on special request by Task Force and Sub-Task Force Commanders.

The Administrative channel for supply was to be from the Sub-Task Force Commanders and Army troops direct to Force 343 (Seventh Army). The II Corps was to have no administrative functions other than those pertaining to its Corps troops, except in emergency.

LIAISON

During all the stages of planning the mounting of the operation, liaison was maintained with AFHQ, Headquarters Force 141 (15th Army Group), and Headquarters SOS NATOUSA, and also with the Navy. Many problems such as shipping and supply details were discussed and policies determined by conference.

III OPERATION

EXECUTION OF SUPPLY MISSION FROM D-DAY, 10 JULY, THROUGH 31 AUGUST 1943.

On D-Day vehicles and supplies were unloaded over the beaches and supply points opened in the vicinity of Vittoria, Gela and Licata under direction of the Sub-Task Forces. Sub-Task Force KOOL unloaded through the DIME Beaches in the vicinity of Gela. As soon as the beach heads were established, troops began to move to the north and northwest. (See Appendix "F" for details).

By 17 July, the 1st Engineer Special Brigade had taken over the operation of all beaches in the south from the Sub-Task Forces and were operating the supply services in that area under the Seventh Army. New supply points were opened as troops advanced, the main axis of supply being to the north and northwest. Maximum use was made of rail, motor and water transportation.

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Records show that during the period 10 July to 31 July, approximately 104,134 deadweight tons were moved through beaches in Southern Sicily. The daily average tonnage discharged was 4,733 deadweight tons. The greatest daily tonnage discharged on the south shore was 6,638 tons on 18 July. The lowest daily tonnage was 2,090 tons on 28 July, at which time ships were being diverted to the northern part of Sicily.

After the capture of Palermo, the general plan for the execution of the supply mission (See Appendix "F", for details), prepared by G-4 Seventh Army, on 27th of July, to support future operations to the east in the direction of Messina, was in substance as follows:

The main axis of supply was to be transferred from the south and southwestern part of Sicily to the port of Palermo as quickly as practicable. During the period of transition, until depot stocks in the south had been reduced, the 1st Engineer Special Brigade was to be responsible for supply to the north in the direction of Caltanissetta, making maximum use of motor and rail facilities, and to the northwest in the direction of Alessandria and Sciacca, making maximum use of motor and water facilities.

When the main port of Palermo was in operation, troops were to be supplied to the east from Palermo, making the maximum use of motor, rail, water and animal transportation. Supply activities from the Palermo Area were to be under direct control of Headquarters Seventh Army, in coordination with the G-4 Seventh Army, and Commanding Officer, 1st Engineer Special Brigade.

To summarize -- troops moving east were to be supplied from two directions. From the south through the Gela, Licata, Agrigento Areas and from the west through the Palermo Area, the entire operation being coordinated through G-4, Seventh Army.

The Port of Palermo was opened to Army shipping on the 28th of July with the arrival of six coasters from the D plus 14 Convoy. Two of these coasters were sent to Termini to be discharged. Five personnel ships from the 9th Infantry Division convoy were completed 1 August. Seven ships carrying 9th Infantry Division cargo arrived 1 August.

Details as to the operation of the Port of Palermo have been covered by the Transportation Section (Chapter III). Following is a summary of the port working and development from 28 July: When the Port of Palermo was taken over on 28 July, its capacity was only 30% due to the presence of forty-four vessels, craft and barges being sunk alongside of moles and in the channels. With the aid of engineers who bridged wrecks and cleared the harbor the operating capacity of the port was raised to 60% by the 29th of August. During the period 28 July to 31 August, the Port of Palermo received forty-eight ships, excluding craft, consisting of five personnel ships, thirty-two Liberty ships and eleven coasters. During that same period, 120,706 deadweight tons were discharged at this port. The daily average tonnage was 3,658 tons. The largest tonnage discharged up to 31 August, was 5,718 tons on 12 August.

After the Port of Palermo was in operation, supply points were established along the north coast of Sicily as shown in Appendix "F". Supplies were moved by rail, motor and craft to unloading points at Termini, San Stefano, Brolo and Barcellona Beach. Some supplies, such as artillery and mortar ammunition, were moved from the south coast by water in coasters and craft while other essential supplies, such as rations and motor fuel were moved directly from North Africa or out of Palermo in craft and unloaded over the beaches. The 540th Engineer Regiment (Shore) operated all unloading beaches on the north coast during this period.

Rail lines were extended until on the 23d of August they were in operation as shown in Appendix "F". Details as to rail and highway operations are included in Chapter III.

Five officers and two enlisted men of G-4 Section moved on 6 August to the Forward Echelon of the Seventh Army, south of San Stefano. These officers maintained close contact with the tactical units in the forward areas by telephone and personal visits. They also acted as G-4 representatives in the coordination of supply points in these areas. Examples of the operation of supply points in the forward areas are as follows:

Ammunition Supply Point No. 17 and Supply Point No. 14 for rations and motor fuel were opened at San Stefano between 5 August and 8 August. Supplies were initially moved by truck from the railhead at Tusa. On 12 August the rail line from Tusa to San Stefano was opened and supplies were brought in by rail. This area was also supplied by water, using LST's, LCT's and small schooners. Ammunition Supply Point No. 18, at Brolo, was opened on 15 August and supplied entirely by water transportation except for one hundred truckloads of critical ammunition which was moved overland from Palermo.

Approximately fifteen miles east of Brolo the entire road was blown from the face of the cliff for about forty yards. Troops were supplied forward of this point by water, supplies being unloaded at Barcellona Beach. Moving these supplies around by water made possible the continued forward movement of troops, at the same time decreasing heavy truck traffic over the small bridge which had been constructed over the blown area of the road on the side of the cliff.

During the movement forward of troops it was necessary to open a supply point at Cesaro on 12 August. This supply point contained Class I and III supplies for normal Corps requirements.

When the campaign ended with the capture of Messina on 17 August, plans were under way for the establishment of an additional supply point at Randazzo but no supplies were moved forward due to the sudden enemy collapse and anticipated movement of troops to the west.

Immediately after the campaign ended, troops began to move to the south in the direction of Licata and to the west in the direction of Palermo. As much rations and motor fuel as required were issued to troops before departure.

New supply points were then set up, based on Administrative Order No. 4, Headquarters Seventh Army, 23 August 1943. (See Appendix "G"). These supply points, with the exception of No. 6 at Scala, were all on rail lines to make them more flexible and cut down the use of motor transportation. The supply point at Scala was a truckhead to be used in connection with a special operation.

The general plan of supply after the 23d of August, as prescribed in Administrative Order No. 4, was essentially as follows:

All supplies were to be concentrated in supply points shown in Appendix "G".

Palermo was to be developed as a reserve depot and all surplus stocks not required to maintain troops at supply points in other parts of the Seventh Army Area were to be concentrated in the Palermo depot area as quickly as transportation facilities and circumstances would permit.

The main axis of supply for the Seventh Army was to be via Palermo port which was to be worked to full capacity. Plans were immediately put into execution for the re-equipping and resupply of certain units for future operations.

On 31 August, orders were issued inactivating the 6625th Base Area Group of the Seventh Army and reconstituting it as an Island Base Section on the Island of Sicily, with headquarters at Palermo. This Island Base Section was to be under the direct command and control of the Commanding General, NATOUSA. On that same date, all base section supply functions were in the process of being turned over by the Seventh Army to the Island Base Section.

The credit for whatever degree of success history may determine has been attained by the Seventh Army in the execution of its Sicilian campaign supply mission is due to the officers and enlisted men of the transportation units and the services who worked night and day under the most difficult conditions, including enemy action, to provide the private soldier at the front with the means for victory.

IV CONCLUSIONS

1. Present Tables of Organization for reinforced corps or a field army do not provide sufficient personnel in a G-4 Section to properly carry out the supply mission in an amphibious task force operation.

2. A Transportation Section, as an additional Special Staff Section, is essential to the successful operation of the supply functions of a modern corps, field army, or amphibious task force.

3. A base area group or rear service echelon should be provided early in the planning stages of any contemplated overseas operation.

4. Constant liaison must be maintained with all supply agencies of higher and subordinate headquarters, Air Force and the Navy during the planning and operational stages of an amphibious operation.

5. It should not be necessary for a Task Force planning staff, with its limited personnel, to have to submit detailed requisitions on the SOS to include all items of all classes of supply for the entire Task Force and for the entire operation, projecting such requirements as far as five (5) months beyond D Day.

6. The troop list of units to be allotted to sub-task forces must be made final as early as possible, without waiting for the nomination of specific units, so that sub-task force planning staffs can compile and submit sufficient data on which reasonable estimates can be made as to the quantities and types of supplies that should be distributed at each of the mounting places for each phase of the movement.

7. All units on the troop list must be directed to submit up-to-date copies of their "Unit Alert Plans", with accurate information, to the headquarters of the sub-task force, or to their next superior headquarters as soon as their assignment is known. This should include Air Corps service units, Naval shore parties and advance bases.

8. Prescribed "scales" of equipment to be carried by units, depending on the phase of the operation in which they are to be committed and on their individual missions, should be made standard for all units of all types in our Army. Such scales as "assault scale", "light scale", "full scale" could then be prescribed in orders, obviating the multitudinous questions as to what will or will not be taken, and also giving planning staffs specific bases on which to initiate computations for all types of units assigned.

9. It is believed that not enough attention is paid to the selection of personnel in transportation and service units.

10. Supply and administrative installation units must be pushed as far forward as the tactical situation will permit.

11. Modern warfare is a question of transportation. Supplies must be transported to front line troops where and when needed.

12. The pack animal still has a definite roll to play in modern warfare.

V RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Additional personnel must be made available to the G-4 Section of a reinforced corps or a field army at the earliest possible date to assist in planning the supply mission in an amphibious task force operation.

2. A Transportation Section should be authorized for divisions, corps, and modern field armies. That the section consist of a minimum of twelve (12) officers and nineteen (19) enlisted men, plus attached air transportation personnel in a field army.

3. A base area group or rear service echelon should be provided early in the planning stages and operate under the command of the task force or army commander.

4. Sufficient personnel should be provided to carry out the necessary liaison.

5. Staff officers concerned must visit commanders of small units to acquaint them with the essentials of their contemplated mission.

6. The task force planning staff should immediately submit requisitions on SOS for any special items of supply that may be peculiar to the type of operation and not of normal stockage (such as amphibious equipment). Provision should be made to have in the theater sufficient Class II items, over and above normal maintenance, to replace anticipated combat losses.

7. A troop list containing the maximum number of units by type that it is anticipated can be attached to each sub-task force should be drawn up and given to sub-task force planning staffs at the earliest moment possible in the planning phase. Every effort should be made to restrict changes in this list to the barest minimum, and nominations of specific units on these lists should be made early and left unchanged except in extreme circumstances.

8. A standard alert plan, to include details necessary for preparation for water movement, should be required to be maintained up-to-date by all units whether in a theater of operations or not. Copies of these plans should be available from all units at all times on call. Copies of the plan, to include all T/E or T/BA equipment authorized the unit, should be available at all times regardless of the actual status of the organization's equipment, this in addition to a plan based on current status.

9. It should be determined, and indicated in future publications of Tables of Equipment and Tables of Basic Allowances for every type of unit, what organic equipment should be taken by such unit or part of the unit when ordered to move at "assault scale", "light scale", "full scale", etc. Such scales should be made standard for every type of unit. Commanders could make modifications to fit special plans.

10. Officers and enlisted personnel of transportation and service units must be selected with the same care as those of combat units and must be trained as specialists, but most important of all must be able to function under field conditions.

11. Bakery and laundry units, instead of operating with a base section, must be sent forward to support the combat troops.

12. Transportation units, such as rail operation and truck organizations, should be assigned to the Army initially in such quantities as to insure performance of the supply mission over the most difficult terrain and at the most rapid anticipated rate of advance of the Army.

13. Provisions for pack animal transport units should be included in plans where mountainous terrain is indicated.

Walter J. Muller


WALTER J. MULLER,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-4.

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APPENDIX "A" CHAPTER I



DISPOSITIONS OF G-4 SECTION FORCE 343, LATER SEVENTH ARMY FROM FEBRUARY 24 TO AUGUST 31, 1943.

NOTE:- Base Area Group consisting of 147 Officers, 14 Warrant Officers, and 365 Enlisted Men approved by Hq NATOUSA May 3, 1943 to provide personnel for a rear service echelon.

APPENDIX "B" CHAPTER I

STATISTICAL DATA ON MAJOR ITEMS FROM 10 JULY to 17 AUGUST, 1943

ARTICLE	U.S. LOSSES	ENEMY LOSSES	TOTAL	% U.S. LOSSES	% ENEMY LOSSES
Guns, 75mm & up	66	483	549	12.00	88.00
Tanks	40	264	304	13.1	86.9
Vehicles	660	2325	2985	22	78

MAJOR ITEMS OF OTHER ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES CAPTURED AND/OR DESTROYED

Aircraft	353 Each
Motors, Airplane	55 "
Assorted field pieces under 75mm	715 "
Small Arms, Rifles, Pistols, Shotguns, etc.	95,000 "
Ammunition	75,000 Tons
XX Corps Supplies (Misc)	11,500 "
Animals	1,000 Each
Gasoline	3,000,000 Gals.
Diesel Oil	4,500,000 Gals.
Engine Oil	150,000 Gals.
Grease	75,000 Lbs.
Mobile Bakery	4 Each
Mobile Shower Units	4 Each
Mobile Radio Transmitter	1 Each
Tires, Auto Class B	25 Tons
Rations (Equivalent to "B")	4,000 Tons
Railroad Rolling Stock	700 Pcs.
Armored Trains (12 cars per train)	3 Each
Boats, Shore	20 "
Rollers, Road	5 "
Road Repair Material	100 Tons
Pipe, Water	5,000,300 Feet
Lumber, Assorted	35,000,000 Board Feet


APPENDIX "C" CHAPTER I

GENERAL PLAN OF SUPPLY

	JOSS	DIME	CENT	KOOL	REMARKS
D- CONVOY (ASSAULT)	7 Days Maintenance plus 2 1/3 UF for assault. Carried on Craft.	7 Days Maintenance plus 2 1/3 UF for assault. Carried on Combat Loaders. Include 82d AB Div.	21 Days Maintenance plus 10 UF for troops from USA, loss amount carried on 1st follow up. Carried on Combat Loaders. 7 days Maintenance plus 2 1/3 UF for troops from NORTH AFRICA carried on craft.	21 Days Maintenance plus 2 2/3 UF for troops afloat Carried on Craft & MT Ships	HQ Seventh Army Ships 7 days Maintenance plus 2 1/3 UF for troops carried.
D+4 CONVOY 1st Follow Up	7 Days Maintenance plus 1 1/6 UF for troops in Assault & First Follow Up. Carried in Craft and Coasters.	7 Days Maintenance plus 1 1/6 UF for troops in assault and first follow up. Carried in MT Store Ships. Included 82d AB Div.	Remainder of 21 days Maintenance & 10 UF for troops from USA. Carried in MT Store Ships. 7 Days Maintenance plus 1 1/6 UF for troops in Assault & 1st follow up for troops from NORTH AFRICA. Carried in Coasters.	----------	----------
D+8 CONVOY 2d Follow Up	7 Days Maintenance plus 1 1/6 UF for troops in Assault, 1st Follow Up and Second Follow Up. Carried in Craft and Coasters.	14 Days Maintenance plus 2 1/3 UF for troops in Assault, 1st and Second Follow Ups. Carried in MT Store Ships. Includes 82d AB Div.	7 Days Maintenance plus 1 1/6 UF for troops in Assault, 1st and 2d Follow Ups from NORTH AFRICA. Carried in Coasters.	----------	D plus 20, 2,500 Service & Depot Troops with 7 Days Maintenance scheduled for SIRACUSA. Troops, supplies, & vehicles unloaded at SIRACUSA and moved overland to LICATA.
D+14 CONVOY 3d Follow Up	7 Days Maintenance plus 2 1/3 UF for troops in Assault, 1st & 2d Follow Ups. Carried in Craft and Coasters.	1 Tanker	7 Days Maintenance plus 3 1/3 UF for troops in Assault, 1st & 2d Follow Ups from NORTH AFRICA. Carried in Craft & Coasters	----------	4 Ships Ex UGS 11 scheduled to unload at Port #8 SIRACUSA. (Unloaded over beaches)

FLOATING RESERVE- D+14 (21 Days Maintenance 4 UF).
D+14 Convoy. 7 Cargo Ships Ex UGS 11 from USA to be bold in NA ports on call to unload over beaches or ports. 4 Cargo Ships to go to SIRACUSA D+14.(All Ships unloaded over beaches, ports in south or PALERMO- none unloaded at SIRACUSA.

(21 Days Maintenance 4 UF)
D plus 32 11 Cargo Ships Ex UGS 12 from USA.



RESERVE
15 Days Maintenance for 140,000 men on ground available for mvt by craft or coaster.
3 1/2 Units of Fire
25% Combat Vehicles
10% General Purposes Vehicles
10% Weapons
Available on Call.

Supplies for 82d AB Div. available for movement by air.
Emergency Stock Pile, 7 days maintenance, 2 1/3 UF for 1 Inf Rct Reinforced by 3 AA Bns & 1 Tank Bn available for shipment by air.

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EXTRACTS FROM
ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN
INCLUDES INITIAL REQUIREMENTS, SUBSEQUENT MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY — ALL CLASSES EXCEPT AIR CORPS, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED

SUPPLY DIME — SHIP TO SHORE and SHORE TO SHORE
OVER BEACHES UNTIL PORTS IN HORRIFIED ARE IN OPERATION

:Phased requisitions to supply all initial stockpiles at Ports of Embarkation. Responsibility of Force 343.
:Supply of stock piles and maintenance at levels required by requisition. Responsibility of CG, SOS NATOUSA

31 MAY 1943
HQ. FORCE 343

CLASS OF SUPPLY	INDIVIDUAL RESERVE	BEACH OR UNIT RESERVE	REMARKS
CLASS I (RATIONS) (ASSAULT: D)	Type "D" — 1; Type "K" — 1. (Not to be consumed on voyage. Additional Type "K" ration for consumption of troops on craft during crossing. One (1) bottle of twenty-four Halazone tablets per individual. One bottle of salt tablets per individual. //Airborne troops- Two rations, one "D" and one "K"; plus Halazone and salt tablets. Responsibility of C.O. Airborne division.// Above issued to each individual prior to embarkation.	Type "C" — 3; Type "K" — 4. Seven days emergency hospital rations, supplemented by soup, fruit and vegetable juices, milk, coffee and sugar; based on medical expectancy of troops in assault. (Hospital supplement to be especially packed - 25 supplementary rations to a box.) To accompany troops or on same convoy.	Rations to be one-man loads, waterproofed packages for rough handling over beaches. Gratuitous issue of tobacco component for each ration to start with first follow-up, including seven days for the assault. Second follow-up to include fourteen days gratuitous issue of tobacco candy and toilet articles for assault and first follow-up. //Provision should be made for rations for Air Force units in area and Naval shore parties; also include 82nd Airborne Division. //Rations en route on all ships except craft — By the Navy. //All craft except LST's — By the Navy.// On LST'S — By the Navy.
(FIRST FOLLOW-UP) (D plus 4)	Same as above.	Two type "C", two type "K", and three type "B" (5-in-1) rations for troops in assault and in first follow-up. Include seven days hospital rations; additional Halazone tablets for troops in assault and first follow-up. // To accompany troops or on same convoy.	
(SECOND FOLLOW-UP) (D plus 8)	Same as above.	Four type "C", ten type "B" (5-in-1) rations for troops in assault, first and second follow-ups. Include fourteen days emergency hospital rations and extra Halazone tablets for troops in assault first and second follow-ups. // To accompany troops or on same convoy.	
CLASS II (QUARTERMASTER) CLASS IV (QUARTERMASTER) (ASSAULT, FIRST AND SECOND FOLLOW-UPS). Individual clothing and equipment; organization clothing and equipment; expendable supplies; pest control material.	Essentials for combat. One (1) 2 oz. bottle insect repellent - issued to individual prior to embarkation. One (1) 2 oz. can insect powder and one (1) tube of ointment, sunburn, per individual — carried as directed by sub-task force commander.	With assault troops — None except assault packs for 5%. Shoes packaged separately. First and second follow-ups — None except assault packs for 3% for two follow-ups. Shoes packed separately. Additional combat maintenance — As basic loads as directed by sub-task force commander. ADDED REMARKS — QUARTERMASTER CLASS II & IV (2) Special combat maintenance in boxes 18x14x 36 in., maximum weight - 70 lbs. Waterproofed and strapped for rough handling over beaches. Boxes to be marked with green corners & contents. (3) Equipment for pack horses or mules to be provided by QM. Force 343 - available in N.A. for shipment after D plus 20. (4) Provision to be made for Air Corps troops in area.	(1) Assault packs to consist of waterproof bag similar to barrack bag, weight not to exceed 50 lbs, with contents approximately as follows: Haversack, w/pack carrier attached, containing complete mess kit, bath towel, 1 "K" ration, salt tablets, Halazone tablets and insect repellent; gas mask, w/protective cover and ointment inside carrier; belt, web, pistol, w/following attached: canteen, w/cup and cover; pouch first aid; pocket, magazine, with two loaded clips; holster, w/pistol and loaded clip. (Approx. half of assault packs to contain submachine gun w/appropriate supplies; jacket, field; helmet, steel, complete; suit, working, HBT, w/2 hdfs, 2 pkgs, cigatettes, matches, socks and toilet paper; undershirt and drawers; blanket. (Clothing items sorted as medium, large or small with bag plainly marked "L" "M", or "S".) Shoes in packages of twelve pairs, assorted sizes.
CLASS II ORDNANCE (ASSAULT, FIRST AND SECOND FOLLOW-UPS) Includes vehicle and weapon replacements.	None except normal T/BA as modified by special authorization to permit loading.	Six to ten percent individual equipment and spare weapons, including machine guns, 60 and 81mm mortars. (Under DIME control).	Vehicles landing over the beach to be waterproofed by organizations under supervision of representatives of SOS. Unused portion of individual equipment and weapons (small calibre) to remain under control of CG, DIME, until DIME clears NA. Balance to then revert to control of CG, Force 343. Replacement of major calibre weapons and vehicles to be supplied from reserve by CG, Force 343 on request of CG, DIME.
Cleaning & Preserving Material	As prescribed by sub-task force commander.	Packages of cleaning and preserving material to be carried by smallest combat unit in sufficient quantity to care for weapons for at least seven days. Each follow-up to carry supplies to maintain level of seven days for all Force troops in HORRIFIED.	Until DIME Force has completely cleared NA, responsibility of CG DIME to maintain level of seven days supplies for all his troops in HORRIFIED.

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CLASS OF SUPPLY	INDIVIDUAL RESERVE	BEACH OR UNIT RESERVE	REMARKS
CLASS II ENGINEER (ASSAULT, FIRST AND SECOND FOLLOW-UPS) Includes organizational equipment and expendable supplies	None except T/BA modified for this operation to permit loading.	Assault: One BCT set per battalion combat team. First follow-up: One additional BCT set per battalion combat team in assault. Second follow-up: None. Subsequent follow-ups: Normal Class II maintenance of UGS convoys.	All packages to be one-man loads (under 100#) with the exception of sandbags. Waterproofed packages for rough handling over beaches.
CLASS II MEDICAL CLASS IV MEDICAL (ASSAULT, FIRST AND SECOND FOLLOW-UPS)	None, except T/BA in hands of individuals and unit medical detachments. Individuals: First aid packet with sulfanilamide powder and package of sulfadiazine tablets. Issued to individual prior to embarkation.	Assault: Seven days combat maintenance, augmented by blood plasma, special drugs and biologicals essential for this operation. To accompany troops or on same convoy. First follow-up: Seven days special combat maintenance for troops of assault and first follow-up. Second follow-up: Fourteen days combat maintenance for troops of assault, first and second follow-ups. Subsequent follow-ups—in seven day lots.	Packages to be one-man loads 20x24x30 inches, weight not to exceed seventh lbs. Waterproofed and strapped for rough handling over the beach. Should include Air Force units, Naval shore parties, and airborne troops in area.
CLASS II SIGNAL (ASSAULT FIRST AND SECOND FOLLOW-UPS)	None except T/BA modified for this operation to permit loading.	To accompany troops or on same convoy. Seven days combat maintenance for assault. With first follow-up: seven days maintenance (combat) for troops of assault and first follow-up. With second follow-up: fourteen days combat maintenance for troops of assault, first and second follow-ups. Subsequent follow-ups--in seven day lots.	All packages to be one-man loads, 12x12x24 in. weight not to exceed seventh lbs. Waterproofed and strapped for rough handling over beaches.
CLASS II CHEMICAL WARFARE (ASSAULT, FIRST AND SECOND FOLLOW-UPS)	Essentials for immediate combat. Individuals in assault units furnished with training gas masks will turn service or diaphragm masks in to unit supply for reissue at appropriate time. Protective cover, ointment, protective; eye-shields; and shoe impregnite to be carried by individual. Anti-gas cape will not be carried by U.S. troops	For personal or organizational anti-gas equipment: None, except T/BA and that carried in assault pack. Assault: Seven days maintenance for 4.2 mortars and flame throwers. First follow-up: Seven days maintenance, as in assault. Second follow up: fourteen days maintenance, for 4.2 mortars and flame throwers.	(See note reference Assault Packs — Note 1 under Quartermaster Class II.)
CLASS III (ASSAULT, FIRST AND SECOND FOLLOW-UPS) Motor fuel, lubricants, and diesel fuel. For ground vehicles and Engineer equipment.	Vehicular tanks — 90% filled. Organic motor fuel 5-gal. cans — filled. Oil -- Five (5) qts. in 1-qt or 5-qt. cans for assault. Vehicular grease guns to be filled prior to embarkation.	To accompany vehicles or on same convoy: For Assault: Seven days motor fuel and lubricants based on the following: Wheeled vehicles, 5-gal. (Imp) per day; half-track vehicles, 25-gal. (Imp) per day; half-track vehicles, 50-gal (Imp) per day; plus additional for Navy. First follow-up: Seven days for assault and for first follow-up. Second follow-up: Fourteen days for assault, first and second follow-ups. Subsequent follow-up: Gasoline available for first fifteen days in 5-gal. cans and 55-gal. drums.	(1) Motor fuel and diesel oil to be in 5-gal. cans initially; later in 55-gal drums. Bulk storage to be set up as quickly as practicable. Estimated time — D plus 16. (2) Lubricants and greases — Allowance of engine oils - 5.5 gals. per 100 gal. of motor fuel. Gear oil, one gal. per 100 gal. of motor fuel. Chassis grease - 1.6 lbs per 100 gal. of motor fuel. (3) Oil in 5-gal cans. Grease, except water pump, in 25 lb. pails. Water pump grease in 1 lb. cans. Cans to be plainly marked showing contents.
CLASS IV ORDNANCE Weapons spare parts. Automotive spare parts.	Assault kit of small, fast-moving parts and reduced tool kits to be carried by individual mechanics of all echelons.	Organic loads of fast-moving parts carried by organizations in the assault, first and second follow-ups.	No replacement of spare parts except in emergency by special demand of CG, Force 343. Organic loads to be displaced as heavier transportation becomes available.
CLASS IV ENGINEER	- - - - -	Assault: Materials for beach hards and piers; materials for demolitions; materials for beach fortification. First follow-up: Beach development supplies and additional beach fortification materials. Second follow-up: Construction material at each beach head for particular jobs at each beach head area. Air field materials, bridge materials and water treatment supplies.	- - - -

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CLASS OF SUPPLY	INDIVIDUAL RESERVE	BEACH OR UNIT RESERVE	REMARKS
CLASS IV SIGNAL	None except that required by situation.	Materials necessary to execute special wire plan of Force 343 to be packed and held in NA on call by D day.	Batteries in packages, waterproofed for rough handling over the beach and under 70#. Construction material packed in 70# packages or as small a unit as possible.
CLASS V (AMMUNITION)(ORDNANCE) Except Air; including amount to be carried in vehicles and on individuals.	Normal organic loads for individuals and weapons participating.	Assault: 2 1/3 UF. First follow-up: 1 1/6 UF for all troops in assault and first follow-up. Second follow-up: 2 1/3 UF for all troops in assault, first and second follow-ups.	UF as prescribed in Incl. # 2, ltr. AG 471 (2-13-43) OB-S-D-M, Fib. 16, 1943. To include airborne. No toxic chemical munitions to be carried.
Anti-tank mines Anti-personnel mines	Normal organic loads for troops participating.	To be determined.	To be determined.
CLASS V (AMMUNITION)-(CHEMICAL WARFARE) Except air; including 4.2 chemical mortar ammunition (smoke and HE); grenades, incendiary, white and colored smoke; smoke floats; smoke pots: flame thrower refills.	Organic loads for individuals and weapons participating. T/BA allowance modified by Force 343 for all items except 4.2 chemical mortar ammunition.	Same as Ordnance Class V for 4.2 mortar ammunition (HE and WP, 50% each); flamethrower refills (3 UF). Seven days maintenance of grenades, colored smoke (yellow) M16; grenades, incendiary M14; grenades, smoke, hand HCM3; pots, smoke HCM1; floats, smoke HCM4; grenades frangible, M1 (FS and IN) for assault, first and second follow-ups.	UF as in ltr. WD, OC-CWS, Dec. 10, 1942. No toxic chemical munitions to be carried. Colored smoke as in the SOI.
WATER (ASSAULT AND FOLLOW-UP)	Each individual -- One (1) canteen of water. Each vehicle -- Radiators filled. T/BA load of 5-gal. cans in field trains, as directed by sub-task force commander.	Assault: Sufficient for four (4) days at the rate of one gallon per man per day, including vehicles, in 5-gal. cans. To accompany troops or on same convoy. Thereafter: One gallon per man with kitchen on D plus 4. Local sources will be developed by D plus 6. 2,000 gpd distillation units are available to sub-task forces if desired to insure an emergency supply of 1 qt. per man per day.	Engineer water supply company, with well drilling detachment, to develop sources as quickly as possible. Water cans to have some identifying mark on handles, such as strips of tape or wire, so as to distinguish them from motor fuel cans at night.

OFFICIAL:

Muller
MULLER, G-4.

PATTON,
Cmdg.

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APPENDIX "E" CHAPTER I

See Administrative Order No. 1, to Field Order No. 1, Annexes 1 to 8, under Summary of Operations.


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
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APPENDIX "F" CHAPTER I

APPENDIX "G" CHAPTER I





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CHAPTER II

FISCAL SECTION

ORGANIZATION

The Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, subject to policies and instructions promulgated by higher authority was charged with final responsibility and authority of procurement policy and procedure within his zone of operation.

He was assisted by a staff of 3 officers and 4 enlisted men.

Acting under the above authority, the functions of this section were to enunciate policies, coordinate, supervise and advise lower echelons on matters reference Fiscal Control, Requisitions, Commodity Source and Price Control, Civilian Labor, Real Estate, and Claims.

PLAN

The planning phase of the Sicilian Campaign started at Rabat, French Morocco in the later part of April 1943. Shortly thereafter the headquarters moved to Algeria, the forward echelon establishing its headquarters at Mostaganem, and the rear at Oran. Most, if not all of the Fiscal planning was accomplished at Mostaganem, the rear echelon being mainly concerned with normal procurement functions.

It had been decided that the responsibility for the occupation of Sicily would be jointly British and American, and that it would reflect every characteristic of an Allied undertaking. With that in mind, the plan of the Fiscal Section, Seventh Army, was two-fold:

In coordination with the Special Staff Sections and subject to the approval of the Commanding General, Seventh Army, to issue policies and regulations governing fiscal procedure and the procurement of supplies and services within the assigned Seventh Army Area, and prices to be paid therefor.

Having determined its own policy, to insure a uniform method of operation throughout the American Seventh and British Eighth Armies, and to maintain same until such time as another headquarters assumed control.

With reference to the former, a simple, workable, and expeditious means necessarily had to be devised whereby supplies (Property - public or private, movable or immovable) and services (civilian labor), necessary to accomplish the tactical mission, could be obtained. Having once obtained the required supplies and services, it was then equally important that a uniform policy and method of payment be established. To insure a sound economic policy, commodity prices and wage levels necessarily had to be consistent throughout the island. In short, procurement had to be accomplished by that method of negotiation which would facilitate the prosecution of the war, result in the most efficient award and which, above all, would protect the interests of the Government.

With reference to the latter, the Fiscal Officer made innumerable visits, during the months of May and June 1943, to Headquarters 1&1, ANGOT, and also to Tripoli, Libya, where conferences were held, with the end in view to crystallise and coordinate a common method of procedure throughout the forces under 15th Army Group. Information gained from these conferences resulted in the publication of Annex #7, to Adm O, #1, Hq. Force 343, "Procurement Policies and Procedures, Force 343", dated 11 June 1943. (Adm O. #1, Field Order #1).

One of the principal methods of procurement listed therein is by requisition. The requisition, copy annexed (Annex #1), had to be especially phrased in English, Italian and German, and made applicable to any type of property, public or private. Security reasons necessitated an officer going to Cairo, Egypt to have the booklets printed in triplicate and bound in booklet form consisting of twenty-five requisitions each.

A sufficient number of these requisition books were immediately distributed to all Corps, Division and Brigade Commanders to be used in the manner, and under conditions as directed. Similarly, each of the above Commanders and Special Staff Sections, Seventh Army, were sub-allotted sufficient funds by the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, in order to accomplish normal procurement functions.

It was contemplated that as soon as practicable after the reduction of an area, and when the tactical situation would permit, the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, will be relieved of the responsibility for the conduct of fiscal and procurement policies within such designated area, except those that directly affect the components of the Seventh Army.

FISCAL OPERATION

The Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, accompanied the advance Headquarters, Seventh Army Echelon on the Headquarters Ship Monrovia, landed on 10 July 1943, and established his office at Gela, Sicily, on 11 July 1943.

Pursuant to the provisions of Annex #7, Para 3 e (2) Assistant Fiscal Officers, G-4 Section, Seventh Army, were assigned to Sub-Task Forces as Fiscal Liaison Officers to assist in fiscal and procurement functions.

One officer was attached to American Liaison Group, on June 27, 1943, and landed at Syracuse, Sicily, on 21 July 1943.

Another officer was attached to the G-4 Section, Headquarters II Corps, on June 26, 1943, and landed West of Scoglitti, Sicily, on 10 July 1943.

A third officer remained with the Rear Echelon Hq. Seventh Army at Oran, subsequently moved to Bizerte, and later arrived at Licata, Sicily, on 27 July 1943.

The above officers on detached services returned to Headquarters Seventh Army, shortly after the consolidation of our positions in Sicily.

Functions of Fiscal Section

FISCAL CONTROL

The Fiscal Section supervised and coordinated all fiscal operations within Seventh Army and initiated action necessary to effect efficiency and economy.

The Fiscal Section maintained and controlled the records and files pertaining to funds allotted to the Seventh Army Commander for administration of obligations.

Sub-allotments were made as needed and such reports were required as were necessary to insure that the exact status of funds was available to the Commanding General at all times.

REQUISITION CONTROL

As directed by the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, one of the principal methods of affecting procurement was by means of the attached requisition. A fully detailed explanation for their use is stated in Annex #7, (Adm O. #1, Field Order #1) in addition to the instructions to both the owner and requisitioning officer on the reverse sides of the duplicate and triplicate copy respectively.

Original copies of all accomplished requisitions were forwarded immediately by the requisitioning officer to the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army. Each requisition, if proper in form and if it further complied with established policy, was recorded and filed according to its appropriate classification. Information thereon was promptly abstracted and forwarded to the proper supply section, Seventh Army. (Requisitions covering engineer property were abstracted and referred to Engineer, Seventh Army, etc.).

This office then placed a value upon the requisitioned articles, payments for same being made by, or as directed by, the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, depending upon the circumstances surrounding the particular requisition.

The following types of property were requisitioned by Seventh Army units in Sicily, originals of which have been forwarded to, and are on file in, the Fiscal Office, Seventh Army.

REAL ESTATE

Theaters	Hotels	Garages	Barracks
Apartment Bldgs	Apartments	Storage Plants	Storerooms
Houses	Warehouses	Factories	Harbors and Docks
Land	Railway System	Bathhouses	Vaults

VEHICLES

Passenger Cars	Trucks (Tires, Tubes and Batteries)	Motorcycles	Bicycles

BOATS

Steamships	Sail Boats	Tug Boats	Floating Derrick

FURNITURE OF ALL KINDS

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

Picks	Shovels	Saddles	Icebcmns	Wheelbarrows	Water Pumps
Carts	Typewriters	Pressors	Radios	Tubes	Fuel Oil
Grain	Paper	Hay	Straw	Soap	Flour
Fish	Ammonia	Nails	Brushes	Cement	

COMMODITY SOURCE AND PRICE CONTROL

Consistent with the needs of the local population and with a minimum of interference to the local economic situation, the local resources in the theater were fully utilized in connection with the procurement of supplies for the fighting troops.

To further this end, the supply Arms and Services were instructed to exercise the widest liberality, consistent with good judgment in their procurement of local supplies and materials.

Early in the planning phase of the operation, the AMGOT authorities and Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, studied at great length the Commodity prices then in effect in Sicily. Upon concurrence by AMGOT, this office published Supplement #1 to Annex #7, "Procurement Information and Price Control List", dated 17 June 1943, (Adm. O. #1, Field Order #1) distribution having been made to all Seventh Army Units.

On information from the same source shortly thereafter, this office, on 24 June 1943, had distributed Supplement #2 to Annex #7 (Adm. O. #1, Field Order #1), again to all Seventh Army Units.

However, upon arrival in Sicily a situation existed comparable to that which existed in North Africa shortly after the Allied landings; namely, commodity prices were increasing by leaps and bounds due to the newly arrived troops, with a resulting flourishing black market.

Since prior experience indicated that the only solution would be rigid, firm commodity price control, the Fiscal Section continually consulted with the various Provincial AMGOT and Civil Affairs Representatives in an effort to expedite control of the prices being paid for supplies.

As a result, Supplement #1 to Annex #3 to Adm. O. #1, dated 23 August 1943 (Annex #2, copy annexed), was published and distributed down to companies.

Should a price be desired on any items not covered by directives, procuring officers were informed of same by this office upon request.

Throughout the operation, the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, maintained a close liaison with AMGOT for the purpose of determining sources of supply of commodities and of obtaining advice as to proper prices to be paid therefor.

CIVILIAN LABOR

It was the policy of the Seventh Army that a maximum use be made of civilian labor by all U.S. Forces to the end that the American soldier would be used, if possible, in a supervisory capacity, the bulk of the work being done by natives. Every native who was employed reduced the number of American soldiers who must be transported, maintained, fed, clothed, and housed. Furthermore, the payment made to these natives continued to assist the economy of the country.

Procurement of Civilian Labor

It had been agreed upon, in the planning phase, that the Regional Civil Affairs and AMGOT officers would furnish the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, with reliable sources of civilian labor throughout Sicily, the rules and regulations governing same and the prevailing wage rates applicable thereto.

Wage Rate Control information was initially published and distributed to all units in Supplement #2 to Annex #7, etc., dated 24 June 1943 (Adm. O. #1, Field Order #1).

Before the Seventh Army labor demands in Palermo reached a considerably high level, this office held numerous conferences with the local AMGOT officer in Charge of Labor, whereby there would be established a labor pool, under AMGOT control and supervision, subject to be drawn upon by using Arm or Service. This was actually accomplished and found to be satisfactory. (See Supplement #3, to Annex #7, dated August 1, 1943) (Adm. O. #1, Field Order #1).

Maintenance of Wage Levels

Closely allied with the maintenance of a firm commodity price level was the control of wages paid to civilian labor. Wages paid to a dock hand in Palermo had to be consistent and comparable with that of a dock hand in Syracuse, taking into consideration any difference in living conditions and costs.

The same directives mentioned above in Procurement of Labor were distributed to all Seventh Army Units, specifying in each the rate of pay, with the condition that the stated wage would not be exceeded, nor any type of labor not mentioned in the directive be paid, without the prior approval of the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army.

As recent as August 21, 1943, the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, with the Labor Officers of the 15th Army Group and British Eighth Army, attended a conference at the office of the AMGOT Headquarters Labor Office. As typical of the types of discussions held and conclusions reached, the minutes of this meeting are annexed hereto. (Annex #3).

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PROCUREMENT OF BILLETS AND PAYMENT THEREFOR

In conjunction with A. C. of S., G-1, and the Real Estate Section of the Engineer Office, Seventh Army, this office arranged for the procurement and occupancy of all real property and billets of Seventh Army. All requests for billets were directed to the A. C. of S., G-1, who in turn forwarded the said request to this office for further action. The locations were plotted upon a map, and, if in proper form, the request was then indorsed on to the Engineer Real Estate Section where inventories and inspections were accomplished prior to actual requisitioning. The originals of all such requisitions were likewise forwarded to this office.

In connection with the payment for billets and other real property and appurtenances requisitioned, conferences were held with members of the 15th Army Group and the following decisions were put into effect:

1. Billets were not paid for except in cases of undue hardship resulting to the owner-occupant, in which event ex gratia payments in the discretion of the Fiscal Officer were made.

2. In requisitioning hotels where the premises were taken over as a going concern, the proprietor was repaid only for the expenses he incurred in providing those facilities. (Out of pocket expenses).

3. At the time of this report, the question of payment of rentals for all properties other than billets is being held in abeyance pending decisions reached by a Joint Committee on Rents, Purchases and Requisitions to be formed under 15th Army Group, comprising 3 American (including Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army) and 3 British Officers.

Complete payments for requisitioned private property, subject to approval of the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, were made at the earliest practicable date, in accordance with established policy.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

All demands for financial redress submitted on account of property damage or personal injury caused by U. S. armed Forces were presented to this office until such time as a representative of the Claims Commission shall be present to handle such matters.

This office assumed the responsibility of sifting the many and varied claims presented, endeavoring to ascertain that only bona fide claims were being retained, and have been able to dispose of many matters in accordance with regular procurement policy. In our opinion, the Claims Commission was relieved of much unnecessary work and effort.

CONCLUSION

1. In summarizing the historical record of the Fiscal Section, Seventh Army, during the Sicilian Campaign, it is clearly evident that the success of the Fiscal operation may be directly attributed to careful planning prior to actual invasion. With the exception of a few changes regarding minor details, no changes in policy were made. The flexible provisions of the directives were phrased so as to cope with the tactical situations that might confront any particular unit under any condition.

2. While the immensities of the new problems have been clearly taken into consideration, it is urged that in any future operation, the appropriate Military Occupation Authorities be impressed with the importance of further expediting the establishment of a firm control over commodity prices and wages in the zone of their operations. Prompter action along those lines in Sicily might well have forestalled the creation of conditions, especially the black market, which continued to flourish for some time at the expense of the Seventh Army. This is not mentioned in any manner of criticism but merely as a suggestion for better operation in the future.

3. From experiences gained from this and prior operations, satisfactory, practicable, and simple solutions were presented for the numerous problems that arose. Above all, it was our express desire that prompt and proper negotiations be carried on, while providing a uniform method of operation throughout the British and American Armies, with the primary purpose always in mind to facilitate operations and provide for the fighting troops.

ANNEX 2

23 August 1943

SUPPLEMENT #1 (To Annex #3, to Adm. O. #4, Hq. Seventh Army).

PROCUREMENT INFORMATION AND PRICE CONTROL LIST

I LABOR

1. Effective immediately the following rates of pay will be used for the hiring of civilian labor by all components of the Seventh United States Army.

ANNEX 1

REQUISITION
Requisizione
Anforderungsbefehl

REQUISITION No. 148

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES
Esercito degli Stati Uniti
Heer der Vereinigten Staaten

PUBLIC PROPERTY
Proprietà Pubblica
Oeffentliches Eigentum

PRIVATE MOVABLE PROPERTY
Proprietà Privata Mobile
Privateigentum beweglich

PRIVATE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
Proprietà Privata Immobile
Privateigentum unbeweglich

(Check one only)
(Segnare una sola casella)
(Nur Zutreffendes ankreuzen)

To
A
An

(Name — Nome — Name)
(Nr. Road or other legal address — Numero di Strada, o indirizzo legale — Genaue Adresse)
(Name of Province — Nome della Provincia — Provinz oder Kreis)

You are hereby required to deliver for use of the Army of the United States the following described property, goods, or services.
Siete richiesti a consegnare per uso dell'esercito degli Stati Uniti, la proprietà, materiali o servizi descritti come segue.
Sie werden hierdurch aufgefordert das nach nachstehende Eigentum bzw. Gegenstände zum Heeres der Vereinigten Staaten zu überlassen und evtl. die folgenden Dienstleistungen auszuführen.

Quantity — Quantità — Anzahl	Unit — Unità di misura — Einheit	Description — Descrizione — Beschreibung	For Fiscal Division use only — Sistemato per uso dell'Ufficio Fiscale — Zur Rechnungsabteilung

For the Commanding General
per il Generale Comandante
Der Kommandierende General

(Name and Grade — Nome e Grado — Name und Dienstgrad)

(Organization — Organizzazione — Truppenteil)

(For convenience, this form will also be used in the requisition of immovable property both public and private)
(per convenienza questa forma sarà usata anche per proprietà immobile pubblica e privata)
(Dieses Formular ist auch für die Anforderung von Immobilien in privatem oder öffentlichem Besitze zu verwenden.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO REQUISITIONING OFFICERS

AUTHORITY: ANNEX ..... TO ADMIN. O. ..... TO F.O. .....
REFERENCES: FM's 27-5, 27-10, and 360-10

All requisitioning officers will thoroughly familiarize themselves with conditions set forth in the above. The requisition will be completed in triplicate by Requisitioning Officer. Requisitioning will normally be made on local civil officials through District Commanders. In case no necessity requisition will be made direct upon the owner of the goods or services. If address of owner is unknown, it will be so stated.

PUBLIC PROPERTY—Information regarding public property occupied or utilized will be entered upon this form in the same manner as private property. The name to be shown as "Owner: State Property" and original and duplicate copies of this form will be forwarded through command channels to Fiscal Div. G-4 Force 243, without delay.

PRIVATE PROPERTY—**Description:** Description of property will contain all necessary information for complete identification, in order to obviate future claims against the United States Government.

Motor Vehicles will be identified by make, year of manufacture, type of body, number of cylinders, motor number, serial number, and condition to be described as good, fair, or poor.

All Other Articles Bearing a Serial Number and a License Number will be so identified, e.g., radios, machinery, bicycles, etc.

Livestock will be identified by class, breed if able to determine, approximate size and weight, color, age, and sex in the case of dairy animals.

Real Property will be identified by full description of type and location, including contents and furnishings. Location will be described by local address, or map co-ordinates in the event the local address is not appropriate.

Miscellaneous Items will be described insofar as possible according to weights and measures systems of the country occupied otherwise by units of U.S. Standard Weights and Measures.

Distribution: The ORIGINAL of the requisition will be forwarded immediately through command channels to Fiscal Div., G-4 Force 243. Where requisition is made direct upon the owner, the DUPLICATE will be delivered to him. The TRIPLICATE will be retained by the officer, and should he be served for any reason, all available information will be shown, and EXTRA copies forwarded as instructed above for original. The triplicate copy will be retained by requisitioning officer.

INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPERTY OWNERS

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUISITION—Any person who fails to comply with a requisition or who conceals or destroys or alters or removes property subject to requisition without the approval of the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army, or who otherwise violates any of the provisions of these instructions will be punished by a military tribunal.

PAYMENT—Payment for goods or services requisitioned and taken will be made as soon as practicable. Claims for payment must be presented upon application to the District Commander, United States Army, not another than five (5) days after date of requisitioning, and not later than thirty (30) days after date of requisitioning. This copy of Requisition is your receipt and should be retained in your possession pending final disposition.

ISTRUZIONI AI PROPRIETARI

NON-ADEMPIMENTO DELLA REQUISIZIONE—Qualsiasi persona che non ottemperisca alla seguente richiesta o che nasconda o distrugga di oggetti per evitare ubbidienza a questa richiesta, sarà punita da un tribunale militare.

PAGAMENTO—Pagamento per materiali o servizi requisiti e presi sarà fatto quanto prima per questi materiali o servizi verranno domandati mediante domanda diretta al Comandante Distrettuale, Esercito degli Stati Uniti non prima di cinque (5) giorni dopo la data di requisizione e non più tardi di trenta (30) giorni dopo la data di requisizione. Questa copia di Requisizione è la vostra ricevuta e dovrebbe rimanere in vostro possesso fino su sua disposizione finale.

ANWEISUNGEN FUER DEN BESITZER

ANFORDERUNG NICHT ERFUELLT—Wer einer Anforderung nicht nachkommt oder irgendwelche Gegenstände verbirgt oder vernichtet, beschädigt oder entfernt, ohne Genehmigung der Behörde, an der Anforderung zu entrichten, wird strafrechtlich belangt.

BEZAHLUNG—Das anforderbare Heer wird die Anfrage auf Bezahlung für derartige Gegenstände bzw. über Dienst-und Arbeitsleistungen sobald wie möglich nach Ablauf der Bearbeitung einer Prüfung unterziehen. Diese Anfrage sind frühestens fünf Tage und spätestens dreissig Tage nach dem Datum der Anforderung dem Ortskommandanten des Amerikanischen Heeres einzureichen.

Dieser Anforderungsschein gilt als Quittung und ist bis zum Abschluss des Verfahrens sorgfältig aufzubewahren.

a. No exceptions will be permitted without prior approval of the Fiscal Officer, Seventh Army.

b. This supplement supercedes all prior supplements published by Headquarters I Armored Corps or Seventh Army, pertaining to procurement policies & procedures.

2. A labor pool has been established for Palermo, Sicily, and surrounding territory and, except under emergent conditions, all civilian labor hired by the Seventh Army in this district will be secured through the labor pool.

a. Labor of all classifications will be secured by informing the Labor Advisor, Civilian Supply Branch, AMGOT of such labor requirements.

(1) The above agency can be contacted by phoning 16990 or by making personal call at #22 Via Phillip Parlatore, Palermo, Sicily.

(2) 24 hour service will be maintained by this agency.

(3) Any transportation required will be furnished by the using Arm or Service.

(4) All time keeping, payrolls, and security checks, will be the responsibility of the using Arm or Service.

(5) The above agency will be informed of labor requirements at least 24 hours prior to the time the labor will be required.

b. All civilian labor now employed by the Seventh Army who are not registered with the above agency will be required to register not later than 5 August 1943.

(1) All non-registered civilian labor that may be employed by reason of emergent conditions subsequent to this date, will be required to register within 48 hours after employment.

3. The following rates apply to a day of 8 actual working hours exclusive of meal time or time required to travel to and from the job.

4. Overtime will be paid for all time over 8 hours worked in one day, at the rate of one and one half times the regular rate.

5. All civilian labor will be hired at the minimum rates, for a probationary period of one work week.

a. After working one work week the rate of pay for the civilian employee may be revised within the maximum limit, at the discretion of the employing Arm or Service.

6. Arms or Services hiring and paying civilian employees will make no deductions from the civilians pay for unemployment or sickness benefits or similar reasons.

a. Such payments for the benefit of the work will be made by the worker as, and when he is able to, at his own discretion.

7. Contractors working for components of the Seventh Army will be bound by the labor laws of the areas in which they operate and are not exempt by reason of being employed on military projects.

a. Such contractors will be required to make customary payroll deductions for the workman's unemployment and sickness and similar benefits but will not make any deductions in behalf of any labor organization, or society or for any commission to any organization, society, or individual, or for any similar reason.

8. Wage rates in existing services e.g., railroad, public utility, etc., will be continued unchanged until further notice. In such instances, even when taken over by the Army, the civilian personnel of the organization should not be placed on the Army payroll.

9. RATES OF PAY CIVILIAN LABOR:

CLERICAL	LIRE Min per day	LIRE Max. per day
Clerks, male	70	110
" , female	60	90
Interpreters, (oral)	70	110
" , (Translating)	90	110
Storekeepers	70	110
Typists, male	70	110
Typists, female	60	90
CLASSIFIED LABOR		
Apprentices to all trades	30	70
Armature Winder	75	120
Blacksmiths	70	110
Battery Workers	70	100
Boiler Makers	75	110
Bookbinders	75	100

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" , Assistants	70	90
Bricklayers	75	100
Carpenters	70	100
Caulkers	70	90
Coppersmiths	75	120
" , Assistants	70	90
Chainmen	70	90
Concrete workers	70	90
Coopers	70	100
Engineer, Locomotive	75	110
" , Steam, Stationary	70	100
Electrical Wiremen	75	120
Electricians	75	120
Farriers	70	100

CLASSIFIED LABOR	LIRE Min per day	Max. per day
Firemen, Oil Fuel	70	90
Bakers	70	90
Fitters, Electrical	70	120
Foreheyman	70	100
Glaziers	70	100
Lineotype operators	70	90
Lithographers	80	120
" , Assistants	80	120
Masons	70	90
Machinists, Engineering	70	110
" , Tool Room	75	110
" , Woodworking	70	100
Mechanics, Instrument Repairer	90	120
" , Sewing Machine	90	90
" , typewriter	70	100
" , " , Assistants	60	80
" , Wireless	90	120
Operators, Crane	70	100
" , Winch	70	90
Moulders	80	120
Painters, Polishers and Signwriters	70	100
Patters Makers	75	110
Platers	70	100
Plumbers	75	100
Plasterers	70	100
Printers	80	120
Riggers	70	100
Rivet Heaters	70	90
Riveters	70	100
Riveters, Holder-up	70	90
Saddlers	70	100
Sawyers	70	100
Sheet Metal Workers	80	120
Shipwrights	75	110
Stokers & Firemen	70	90
Smelterers	70	100
Tentmakers	70	90
Tinsmiths	70	100
Toolmaker	70	100
Quarrymen - Stonecutters	70	90
Vulcanizers	70	100
Welders	80	120
MARITIME LABOR		
Boat Repairer	60	80
Coxswain	—	70
Salvage hand	—	70
Tug Boat Engineer	—	95
" " Fireman	—	70
Master Salvage hand	—	85
Diver	—	95

MARITIME LABOR	LIRE Min per day	Max per day
Boat hands	—	60
Shipwright chargehand	—	85
Pilots	—	128
Tug Boat Master	—	95
Stevedores	—	95
" , Head	—	80
Draughtsmen	—	95
Foremen	—	90
UNSKILLED LABOR		
Watchmen	53.3	80
Unskilled laborers	—	80
Stevedores	—	80
Foremen	—	70
Boys, up to and including the age of 17 yrs	—	50
Unskilled women	—	50

II COMMODITY PRICES

1. The following prices are those established by the Allied Military Government of Sicily and were applicable in the Province of Palermo as of 20 August 1943.

2. Effective immediately, all personnel of the Seventh Army WILL NOT pay more than these prices for any article listed hereon.

3a. Commanding Officers of all echelons will bring these prices to the attention of all personnel in their command.

b. Military personnel will immediately report all violations of this price list, or discrepancies between prices posted and prices charged. Report to be made to AMGOT Liaison Officer, Seventh Army, and to contain name, address of offender, price posted, price charged, circumstances of violation, and the name and unit of individual making report.

3. Provincial List of Maximum Prices in effect from August 20th until further notice.

RETAIL

TYPE AND QUALITY		PRICE Lire,Cent
Bread, Pasta, Flour, Rice, Peas, Beans & Potatoes		
Bread		
Made with Hard Grain Flour 88%	al Kg.	3.60
Bread Sticks	"	4.20
Bread Sticks Superfine	"	8.00
Small Bread Sticks in Packets	"	11.00
Pasta		
First Quality made with Hard Grain Bran 88% Dry, loose	"	4.20
Dry, in Packets	"	4.50
Glutinated Parts		
Hyperglutinated and made for Dietetic orders, large or small size loose	"	19.00
In packets or small bags 225 grams net	"	5.50

TYPE AND QUALITY		PRICE Lire,Cent
Wheat - Flour one kind	al Kg.	3.75
Rice	"	2.70
Ordinary	"	3.00
Medium Quality	"	3.60
Fine Quality		
Kidney Beans	"	11.00
Ordinary	"	12.00
Superfine		
Lentils	"	10.50
Medium - Sieve 6	"	11.50
Large - " 7	"	12.00
Large - " 7.5	"	7.00
Beans		
Chick Peas	"	10.00
In bulk	"	11.00
Large Size	"	8.00
Chick Beans		
Peas	"	10.00
Whole	"	11.00
Broken	"	5.00
Potatoes		
Oil		
Oil, Refined		
Refined oil with acid 1 grade	Litre	22.00
Olive with acid 2 gr. 1.7	"	20.50
" " " up to grade 5	"	20.00
Oil common with acid 5 to 7 grade	"	19.00
Milk		
In the city Pasteurised at the dairy in one litre bottles	"	7.00
in other towns, un-pasteurised	"	5.00
Cheese		
Aged within 4 months	al Kg.	35.00
Pecorino siciliano	"	33.00
Caneastrato	"	33.00
Eggs		
Fresh, country	per egg	5.00
Frozen, imported	—	—
Sugar		
Refined, Powdered	al Kg	9.00
Crystallised	"	8.75
Honey		
Sold loose		
in cans or pots, wt. fr 5 - 25 kgs	"	32.00
in cardboard boxes wt up to 1 kg (Net wt)	"	31.50
in glass pots of any kind wt up to 1 kg	"	37.50

TYPE AND QUALITY		PRICE Lire,Cent
Canned Fish		
Codfish (undried)	al Kg	9.00
Stockfish "	"	8.40
Salted anchovy imported from Spain	"	45.55
" " without heads	"	24.50
Whole salted large anchovies	"	13.00
Cornelians	"	17.50
Sardines in oil - boxes of appr. 200 grams		6.00
" " tomato sauce - in tins of appr. 200 grams		5.50
Tunafish in oil	al Kg	38.00
Ventresca e tarratelle sott'olio	"	47.00
Bussonoglie e briciole sott'olio	"	26.00
Small Tunafish in oil	"	51.00
Raw Tunafish - Box of Approx. 500 grams	"	14.00
Salt Water Eels, small	"	33.50
" " " , medium	"	35.50
" " " , large	"	38.50
" " " , best quality	"	46.50
Acquadella amarinate	"	20.00
Filletted anchovies in sauce, box of 1 kg approx 200 gr per box		10.50
Anchovy paste, aluminium tube of approx. 65 gr.		4.50
Tunafish in tomato sauce	"	35.50
Salted Meat in Bags		
Raw Ham	"	41.90
Cooked Ham	"	34.95
Coppa Crudo	"	31.45
Mortadella	"	20.70
Raw Salami	"	33.40
Cooked Salami	"	21.65
Cooking Sausage	"	23.15
Salted Tongue, raw	"	25.00
" " , cooked	"	31.30
Fresh Meat		
Veal and Beef		
First Quality	"	42.00
Second "	"	39.00
Third "	"	35.00
Filet	"	45.00
Sirloin	"	43.00
Beef (fr bull, cow, or steer)		
First Quality	"	40.00
Second "	"	37.00
Third "	"	33.00
Filet	"	43.00
Sirloin	"	41.00
Entrails		
Liver and Kidney	"	25.00
Heart	"	20.00
Rent	"	14.00
Milt & Lungs	"	10.00

TYPE AND QUALITY		PRICE Lire,Cent
Tripe (cooked)	al KG	20.00
Raw tripe	"	6.00
Interiora	"	6.00
Whole Head	"	9.80
Testa vuota	"	8.00
Brain (one)	"	28.00
Tongue	"	20.00
Spolpo di testa	"	14.00
Legs	"	7.00
Tail	"	6.00
Udders	"	8.00
Caldume	"	6.00
Mutton and Goat Meat		
Young he-goat	"	30.00
Lamb (young)	"	28.00
Cornatella	"	24.00
Head	"	20.00
Lamb, goat meat, mutton	"	25.00
Ram, goat	"	22.00
He-goat	"	16.00
Head	"	20.00
Poultry and Rabbits		
Rabbit (one)	"	27.00
Geese and Ducks	"	32.00
Turkeys (cocks)	"	39.00
Hens	"	42.50
Guinea Fowl	"	44.00
Fowls	"	44.00
Turkeys (hens)	"	40.00
Pigeons		
Fish		
First grade lobster, dentex, seacreb, codfish, (over 150 gr) goldfish, grayling, sole, swordfish, rock-mullet.	al Kg.	45.00
Retail price at Palermo		
Second Grade eel, anchovy, small codfish (under 150 gr) white and red mullet, tunafish,	al Kg.	36.00
Retail price at Palermo		
Third grade, fish for broth,	"	27.00
Retail price at Palermo		
Fourth grade, polupus (more than one kilo)	"	18.00
Retail price at Palermo		
For the small coastal production localities all these prices will be reduced about 10 per cent for sale for local consumption		
Ordinary Wine		
Sold direct to the consumer elsewhere than at the place of manufacture, by the producer.	Litre	7.65
Grade 10	"	7.85
Grade 11		

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TYPE AND QUALITY		PRICE Lire,Cent
Grade 12	litre	8.10
Grade 13	"	8.30
Grade 14	"	8.50
Grade 15	"	8.70
Grade 16	"	8.90
Sold to the consumer through a dealer		
Grade 10	"	8.10
Grade 11	"	8.30
Grade 12	"	8.50
Grade 13	"	8.70
Grade 14	"	8.90
Grade 15	"	9.10
Grade 16	"	9.30

MAXIMUM PRICES OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLES

Garden Produce		
Dry Garlic	al kg.	10.00
Broccoletti di rape, bieta da erbucce in foglie, bieta da erbucce (erbette) in cespugli (giri)	el kg.	2.00
Broccoli	"	4.00
Artichokes with tops, & without tops		2.50
Little artichokes, (a bunch of 6 heads)		2.50
Carrots 1st Quality	"	5.00
" 2nd "	"	4.50
Cauliflower, head, minimum circ. cm 25	"	2.80
" , of local production without leaves	"	4.00
Cabbages	"	0.70
Onions, white, red, green	"	5.00
Spring onions	"	5.50
Salads		
Endives	"	2.75
Lettuce	"	2.40
Egg Plants	"	0.35
Large peppers, red, yellow, green	"	5.00
Green peppers	"	4.00
" " , Small	"	3.50
Tomatoes	"	4.50
" , for salad	"	5.00
Radishes	"	0.40
Spinach	"	6.00
Vegetable marrows not less than 40 cm long	"	4.00
Pumpkins	"	4.00
Fresh fruit		
Water-melons	"	5.00
Figs	"	7.00
Fichidindia	"	4.00
Melons	"	6.00
Sweet Olives	"	12.00
Pears	"	8.00
Peaches	"	10.00

TYPE AND QUALITY		PRICE Lire,Cent
Plums and Prunes	al Kg.	7.00
Sorb Apple	"	5.00
Muscatel grapes (small)	"	9.00
Large grapes	"	10.00
Common, white and black grapes	"	6.00
Citrus Fruits		
Lemons (green)	"	2.00

The above maximum prices can be increased by the communes to take into account the cost of transportation.

MAXIMUM PRICES OF ICE CREAM	At the Counter	Served at table
in glasses	4.40	5.50
Granite		
in glasses	2.50	3.20
cones or cardboard cups		
large	2.00	1.80
small	1.00	0.80
on the street		
Sundae	2.30	1.80
Plain	1.80	1.30
in cups	3.60	4.60
Hot Coffee in cups	1.50	
Cold " in glasses	1.75	

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES	PRICE
Barber Shops	
First Class	
Monthly Account	30.00
Shave	4.00
Haircut	5.00
Shave and Haircut	8.00
Second and Third Class	
Monthly account	20.00
Shave	3.00
Haircut	4.00
Shave and Haircut	6.00
Washing and Ironing clothes - Laundry and Soap	
Washing and ironing of one uniform or civilian suit	30.00
Cleaning the above	45.00
Washing and Ironing a shirt	5.00
one pair of trousers	3.00
Towel	2.00
Socks (pr)	1.00
Sheet	6.00
Pillow	2.00
Drawers	1.50
Undershirt	1.50
Handkerchief	0.25
Collar	0.25
Pair of Pajamas	10.00

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES	PRICE Lire,Cent
Military Trousers	13.00
Soap 1 Kg.	15.00

For First Class Hotels the above prices will be increased 50%. For other hotels, 35%.

4. In accordance with the proclamation issued by the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory on August 23, 1943, the following prices for wines & liquors will prevail:

TYPE AND QUALITY		PRICE Lire,Cent
Wine, minimum of 10 grade	4 cn.	3.00
Marsala	"	5.00
Moscato	"	5.00
Asti Spumante	"	25.00
Dry Vermouth	2 cn.	4.00
Sweet "	"	5.00
Cognac or liquors	"	10.00

The price of wines or liquors in hotels is 50% higher than the above prices. The buying of wines or liquors in bottles is NOT authorized under any circumstance.

5. All dealers in the above commodities or services are also required to comply with the following conditions.

a. The maximum prices are established according to these definite limits and must be used in the shop. This contemplates that prices lower than the maximum may be charged, but not higher, except for the increases authorized above, it is necessary to show prices clearly on a card with a correct description of the merchandise on sale. The quantity and the type of the goods and the appropriate price. Anyone selling at a price higher than the maximum established by the authorities will be punished by imprisonment up to three years and a fine of from 3000 to 30000 lire. For minor infringements, the fine will be 500 lire. For those aiding and abetting, contraventions punishment will be by the temporary or permanent cancellation of the license and a fine of from 300 to 5000 lire. In proven cases, the shop will be closed for a period.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

HOBART R. GAY,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

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" 50 " " " Fiscal Officer, G-4, Seventh Army.

ANNEX 3

Subject: Labor Conference — 21 August 1943.

To: Lt. Col. Seitz.

1. The following is a report on the conference conducted this morning on Army labor matters.

2. Present were: Col. C. Strother, Dep. Director P & L 8th Army (Catania)
Lt. Col. W.E. Lyds, 15th Army Group (ADL)(Civil)
Major L.E. Gooding, HD Transport, Portbase
Major V.D. Finn, Finance, Portbase
Major R.D.K. Jackson, Labor Director, 7th Army
Lt. L. Berger, Ass't - Seventh Army
U.S.N. Commander E.M. Ragsdale, NCB - Palermo
U.S.N. Lt. D.D. Ballantyne - NCB - Palermo

3. Army Wage Scale.

a. 7th and 8th Armies, Navy and A.F. are complying with Army Wage Scale Directive. They are of the view this scale is operating effectively and should not be revised.

b. 8th Army believe maxima should not be paid, but pay reassessments when made should be between the minimum paid and the maximum. Recommended that maxima be reduced. 7th Army disagree. Believe maximum scale should be left unchanged, but will submit memo to AMGOT on question which is then to be referred to 8th Army for comment.

c. All present agreed that Army Wage Scale problems should be submitted to AMGOT for final consideration and over all policy determination. Should act as coordinating and official wage organization.

d. Discussion disclosed conflict in overtime pay policy. 7th Army directive provides for payment time and 1/2 for hours in excess of 8 in a day. 8th Army pays straight time for hours in excess of 8 in a day, though generally employs very few for work over 8 hours. Navy had been paying time and 1/2 for work beyond 48 hours in a week. Navy agreed to revise its policy to accord with 7th Army.

e. All representatives request AMGOT determine Inland policy on overtime, holiday pay, night work compensation etc. (Were advised that study would be initiated so that policy could be established, and that announcement would be made later.)

f. 8th Army has added new wage categories to its directives on labor as follows:

Boat Repairer	60	80
Coxswain		70
Salvage hand		70
Tug Boat Engineer		95
Tug Boat Fireman		70
Master Salvage hand		85
Diver		95
Boat hands		60
Shipwright chargehand		85
Pilots		128
Tug Boat Masters		95
Stevedores, supervisory		85
Draughtsmen		80
Foremen		90

4. Civilian Non Military Wage Scale.

a. 7th and 8th Army and Navy are of opinion that the civilian pay scale for those employed by civilian employers is too low compared to cost of living and should be revised immediately. The black market is a serious threat to stability of Inland and welfare of people and the Army, and should be broken by resort to very drastic means available. (They were advised that problem is under consideration and action being taken).

b. Representatives of Army urge that present Italian basis of supplementing income on basis of so much per child and dependent be abolished, and that a man be paid what he is worth based on cost of living, and other relevant economic considerations. (I have already started a study of this question and will submit recommendations shortly).

c. Col. Strother stated that utility pre-occupation rates of pay are very low, about 55 lire per day, and should be revised. He submitted that Army scale is higher, cost of living higher, and that benefits workers get under old system should be computed, added to base pay and then increase pay to Army scale. Major Jackson of 7th Army concurred. (Agreed to investigate this problem and submit recommendations to AMGOT for appropriate action. Study initiated this P.M.).

5. Inland Resources Board.

a. Col. Strother wants AMGOT to establish a board to which labor contracts and other labor matters would be submitted for approval prior to execution. In emergency, permit execution of contract subject to filing with board. 8th Army at moment has policy of having all contracts filed with it for approval prior to execution, except in emergency. 7th Army strongly disagrees this policy and opposes such a board. Would agree only to filing of contracts with board for its information, but not for its approval. Based on experience states a board would result in type of bureaucracy which would delay and obstruct forces of war rather than help. (Agree to submit its view to AMGOT for consideration).

6. Navy.

a. Interest primarily in operation of shipyard.

b. Approval policy rotating shipyard employees.

c. Raised question of supplying noon-day rations to civilian employees. Were advised that this was contrary to policy. Alternative would be to secure AMGOT approval increase in rations for workers where Navy felt absolutely necessary. 8th Army has followed this policy successfully.

7. Miscellaneous.

a. 7th Army is making study of stevedore wage contract and employment problem. Will submit copy report to this headquarters.

b. 8th Army pays R.R. employees its side of Inland. 7th Army runs R.R. but A.M.G. pays bill. 8th Army desires statement policy this question. (Referred to Transport Office this Hq. for preliminary conference).

c. 8th Army has established rates of pay for civilians injured at work. 7th Army has submitted request to AFHQ for statement policy. View that scale established by 8th too high and that there should be Inland wide policy for Inland. The 8th Army plan which was carried over from Tripolitania is:

1. If person injured gets full pay for 3 months after which can be reviewed again.

2. If person killed the case submitted to AFHQ as a claim.

d. Col. Strother believes imperative to consider and establish rates of pay to be used on mainland in event of occupation. Major Jackson suggests formula be: Payment of prevailing wage rates subject to study and revision after occupation. Col. Strother believes present W.D. scale should be carried over to mainland as is for start.

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e. Agreed to send Major Jackson copy of letter dated 18 August 1943, regarding coal labor contract which was presented to conference by Col. Strother (copy given 7th Army 22 August 1943), a copy attached.

DAVID A. MORSE,
Capt., AC.,
Labor Section

AMGOT HQ.
15th Army Group.

Note:
Copies to
Col. C. Strother - 8th Army
Lt. Col. W. Lyte - 15th Army Group
Major E. Jackson - 7th Army
Commander Ragsdale - USN

CHAPTER III


TRANSPORTATION REPORT

ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION DIVISION

Planning for the HUSKY Operation commenced in mid-April, when the I Armored Corps was located in Rabat, French Morocco. The need for a special staff section that thought and dealt only with transportation was at once apparent. Accordingly a Transportation Division in the G-4 Section was organized. Personnel for this division were obtained by transfer from the Base Sections, SOS, from tactical organizations and from replacement centers in North Africa. The majority of these officers had had previous experience in the TORCH Operation and had actual knowledge of conditions in the North African Theater. From the outset, the growth of this organization was slow, as it was extremely difficult to obtain officers possessing the requisite qualifications in training and experience. The molding of these officers into a unified organization was further hampered by a division of the headquarters into a forward and a rear echelon, with part of the officers in Mostaganem and the remainder in Oran. Only when the Seventh Army Headquarters was established in Sicily did the Transportation Division function as an entity. Its organization was as shown in Appendix "A".

GENERAL

The initial disposition of the forces of the Seventh Army contemplated landing three independent forces simultaneously, with a fourth force in floating reserve. Each force was charged with its own maintenance until such time as consolidation could be effected and the Army could resume the responsibility for supply. The 1st Engineer Special Brigade was the agency selected for consolidating and controlling all supply activities as they were relinquished by the several divisions. In effect this Brigade Headquarters functioned as the SOS of the Seventh Army. Initial maintenance was to be over the beaches until such time as a major port could be captured. Plans were accordingly made for continued beach maintenance for a period of at least thirty days. In the event that beach maintenance should prove inadequate, arrangements were made for a partial use of the Port of Syracuse after D+11. A force of 2,500 service troops loaded on one troopship, two MT/Store ships and two LST were scheduled to arrive at Syracuse on D+10. These troops, known as the American Liaison Group, were intended to establish depots in the vicinity of Syracuse and to ship supplies forward to the Seventh Army. However, the success of beach maintenance due in large part to continued good weather, a friendly air superiority which reduced enemy interference to a negligible quantity and allowed ships to lie off the beaches in comparative security, and the dependability and efficiency of the 2-1/2 ton amphibious trucks in lightering cargo, together with the rapid advance of our troops to the northwest made it advisable to continue unloading supplies as close as possible to the combat area and to abandon any thought of basing on Syracuse. Accordingly the vehicles and equipment of this Service Group were moved immediately to the Licata Area after disembarking at Syracuse. The bulk of these service troops, which were on the troop ship, disembarked at Licata. On 17 July the 1st Engineer Special Brigade took over all unloading operations and supply establishments from the 1st Division and 2nd Armored Division at Gela and vicinity. On 18 July the 1st Engineer Special Brigade took over all unloading operations and supply establishments from the 45th Division at Scoglitti. On 19 July the Brigade took over operations of Licata and the adjacent beaches, thus putting under one head all supply activities in the Seventh Army area. Coincident with the transfer of supply responsibility from division to Army, the shore engineers and Army service units which had been initially assigned the several task forces were reassigned and attached to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. Port Empedocle fell on 16 July. The beach organization formed around the 540th Engineers was then moved from Scoglitti to Port Empedocle. With the advance of the divisions inland the Brigade established supply points at Sciacca, Corleone, Canicatti and Caltanissetta.



The capture of Palermo on 22 July placed in our hands for the first time a deep water port capable of accepting ships bringing stores from the United States. On 24 July the 540th Engineer Regiment (-Gp) moved from Gela to Palermo to open that port. A great amount of work was done in cleaning up the harbor area and piers, opening road exits and bridging over wrecked vessels so as to secure more berthing space. The first ships to enter the harbor were six coasters on 28 July. These coasters had been loaded with maintenance stores in North Africa and were diverted from the south coast. Their arrival was most fortunate as they brought essential food, gasoline and ammunition which heretofore had to be trucked overland from the south coast. However, when the port was initially put into use, it could only be operated at approximately thirty per cent of its full value due to forty-four vessels, crafts and barges that were sunk alongside of moles and in the channel.

Following berths and anchorages have become available for:

	Liberty Ships	Coasters
Alongside Berths	5 (1 of which is 17')	3
Alongside wrecks bridges over	3	3
Anchorage inside harbor	2 or	2

Anchorage inside the outer breakwater has been used for Naval vessels and tankers. The average rate of discharge was 4370 long tons per day. On 1 August operation of the Port of Palermo was taken over by the 10th Port of Embarkation. The 540th Engineers then moved eastward to Termini Imerese and prepared to function as shore engineers directly in support of the thrust along the coast towards Messina.

The main impetus for supply came from the 1st Engineer Special Brigade in the south. At this time the Brigade was relieved from any responsibility for supply operations in and around Palermo, these to be performed directly by the Army. The general plan was for supplies to flow into Niocosia from the south and into Cefalu and later San Stefano from Palermo. Until 8 August rail facilities from Palermo reached only to Cefalu. Terremuso Beach in the vicinity of San Stefano was opened by the 2nd Battalion, 540th Engineers on 3 August and closed on 13 August. During this period two Italian schooners and four LST discharged rations, gasoline and ammunition at San Stefano immediately in rear of the divisions. The schooners had been requisitioned by the Navy in Palermo and were loaded out there. The LST had been loaded on the south coast by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade and sailed around. These coastal movements served two purposes. First they augmented the stocks of rations and ammunition coming off the ships in Palermo and secondly they relieved the demands for hauling by truck. With the advance of the 3rd Division another beach maintenance point was opened at Brolo Beach on 16 August. This remained open until 19 August. During this period one LST was unloaded and a coaster partially discharged. These had also been loaded out on the south coast. Their cargo was principally ammunition.

On 25 August 1943 supply duties on the south coast passed to the control of the 6625th Base Area Group (Provisional). At the same time Army service troops in that area were detached from the 1st Engineer Special Brigade and either attached or placed in direct support of the Base Area Group. On the 4th of September supply activities centering on Palermo were also taken over by the Base Area Group. Necessary Army service troops were attached to or placed in direct support of the Base Area Group. Thus by the 4th of September all supply and transportation in the Seventh Army Area was centralized under the direction of the Base Area Group.

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SCALE OF SHIPPING

Navy transports and craft used in the assault comprised the following:

CENT FORCE (45th Div)	DIME FORCE (1st Inf Div)	JOSS FORCE (3d Inf Div)	KOOL FORCE (2nd Armd Div)
1 Hq Ship	1 Hq Ship	2 LSI(S)	2 Troop Ships
7 APA	3 APA	37 LST	7 MT/Store Ships
6 XAPA	3 XAPA	70 LCT	5 LST
5 AKA	2 AKA	52 LCI(L)	7 LCT
13 LST	2 LSI(S)		22 LCI(L)
8 LCT	25 LST		
5 LCI(L)	19 LCI(L)		

A general breakdown of troops, vehicles and supplies carried on these ships is shown in Appendix "B".

Shipping to bring in the build-up of troops and vehicles came from two sources:

(1) Navy craft which established a shuttle service between Tunis-Bizerte and Sicily. Details of sailings of craft are shown in Appendix "C".

(2) Additional shipping set up and scheduled to arrive as follows:

	CENT	DIME	JOSS
D+1	7 MT/Store ships 2 Coasters	4 Troop Ships 10 MT/ Store Ships	4 Coasters
D+8	2 Coasters	7 MT/Store Ships 1 Tanker	5 Coasters
D+14	2 Coasters		4 Coasters

D+28 Remainder of 9th Division in 5 troop ships and 7 MT/Store ships, all to be found from shipping used in previous convoys. Actually the 9th Division disembarked at Palermo during the seven days 1 August to 6 August.

With this shipping set up it was expected that by D+14 there would be a week's supply landed on the island. Continued maintenance relied upon ships arriving from the United States in regular UGS Convoys at the following rate:

Convoy	Date Available	No. Ships	Tonnage
UGS-11	19 July	14	90,831
UGS-12	3 Aug.	12	73,199
UGS-13	19 Aug.	16	96,244
UGS-14	29 Aug.	10	56,963
UGS-15	8 Sept.	5	30,000
	Total	57	347,237

These ships were to be held in North Africa until called forward at the rate at which they could be accepted. The actual rate of acceptance of these maintenance ships was:

Convoy	Date Accepted	Port	No. Ships	Tonnage
UGS-11	26 July	South Coast	5	33,128
UGS-11	6 Aug.	South Coast	2	12,687
UGS-11	7 Aug.	Palermo	7	45,016
UGS-11	10 Aug.	South Coast	3	18,838
UGS-12	10 Aug.	Palermo	3	18,068
UGS-12	23 Aug.	Palermo	6	36,293
UGS-13	28 Aug.	Palermo	7	41,496
UGS-13	3 Sept.	Palermo	1	9,378
UGS-13	8 Sept.	Palermo	3	17,220
UGS-14	8 Sept.	Palermo	6	23,411
UGS-15	8 Sept.	Palermo	11	29,400
		Total	11	252,535

A comparison of the tonnage bid by the services to be delivered from the States by 8 September (347,237) with the tonnage actually received (252,535) reveals that actual accomplishment was 94,702 tons short of what was considered necessary.

Combat loaded ships and craft and all ships of convoys to include the D+8 Convoy were equipped before sailing with the essential stevedore gear necessary to discharge their cargoes. All gear was top loaded and precautions taken to ensure its availability. It was anticipated that the tactical situation might permit discharge of some of these ships, in particular the coasters, at newly established ports or beaches and that therefore all ships should have aboard such stevedore gear. Upon completion of discharge of any ship or craft, stevedore equipment was recovered and taken ashore for future use in the ports. Further, in anticipation of working four ports in the Seventh Army Area, detailed requisitions for port equipment were prepared and submitted to SOS, NATOUSA, for delivery in the first ships to arrive from the United States. Much of this equipment, particularly cranes, barges and trailers, did not arrive as scheduled. Particular attention was paid to the fact that the initial landing would be an amphibious operation relying chiefly on DUKWs and LCTs to discharge vessels lying at anchor off the beaches. Six cargo nets 12'x12' were provided for each DUKW. To further fulfill expected needs and to expedite discharge of the combat loaders, ammunition and rations were block stowed on all vessels of the assault convoy making it feasible to unload any one item as needed.

ENGINEER SHORE REGIMENTS

Engineer Shore Regiment performed their function as a Force SOS in admirable fashion. This decentralized method of operation in the initial stages wherein the Shore Regiment is placed under the direct control of the division proved to be their greatest handicap. It is recommended that these regiments be placed in support of the divisions. Control of their operations is an Army function and should not be delegated to lower echelons.

NAVY

Unloading operations depended largely upon the use of Navy craft. Control of these craft remained with the Naval officer afloat, with the result that it was extremely difficult to locate the craft and to utilize them to the best advantage. Similarly the Naval officer afloat controlled the movements of ships lying off the beaches and discharging. It is thought that better control and a closer identity of purpose between the Army and Navy would have been achieved had the control of the movements of ships and craft been vested in a Naval officer established ashore with the Army personnel in charge of unloading.

In unloading operations the LCT proved to be the most adaptable and most efficient craft for lighterage purposes. The fact that it was originally conceived as an assault craft should not preclude its use for strictly cargo handling purposes. To that end, specific allocation of craft to be used for this purpose alone should be made in advance, and arrangements made for basing them on shore.

RAILROADS

Railroads were taken over and operated directly in support of the advance of the Army. Operation was under the direction of the 727th Railway Operating Battalion. A complete report of operations by this battalion is attached as Appendix "E".

HIGHWAYS

Highway operations were divided into two sectors; the south sector was operated by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, the north sector by Seventh Army. However, Army coordinated all movements in both areas. Further detailed operation as noted in Appendix "G".

PETROLEUM

Construction and operation of pipelines and bulk storage installations for white fuels was by the Engineers. Requirements for such facilities and scheduling of tankers were determined by the Transportation Division. Appendix "F" outlines fully the planning, operations and operational statistics.

COMMUNICATIONS

Throughout the operation there was a general lack of communications, due mainly to the rapidity of advance and the changing of headquarters. Lack of railway communications prevented dispatching more than one train on a line until verification of the fact that the train had reached its destination. Highway traffic control was difficult due to the great distances and lack of communications.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In amphibious operations, control of all unloading operations should be in one headquarters on land. This headquarters should be manned jointly by the Army and Navy with full power to control ships and dispatch craft.

2. Bids by the several services for supplies should be scrutinized with a view to determining what can reasonably be expected to be discharged in the time required with the facilities available.

3. Consideration should be given to the establishment of communications which will serve supply channels. A definite allocation of communications separate from those demanded for tactical purposes should be made and provision made to guarantee fulfillment.

4. Before the start of operations, Army service units deemed necessary should be placed in support of the landing forces. Control of these units should remain with the Army to ensure that they are brought in at the desired time and are employed as originally intended.

APPENDICES TO HISTORY OF THE TRANSPORTATION DIVISION

APPENDIX "A" - Chart Showing Organization of Transportation Division

APPENDIX "B" - Troops, Vehicles and Supplies carried on Assault

APPENDIX "C" - Sailing of Craft from TUNISIA

APPENDIX "D" - Tables Showing Discharge Rates
1. Tonnage discharged in ports and beaches of SICILY
2. Personnel discharged in ports and beaches of SICILY
3. Vehicles discharged in ports and beaches of SICILY

APPENDIX "E" - Railroad operation in Seventh Army sector of SICILY


APPENDIX "F" - Petroleum Storage and Distribution

APPENDIX "G" - Highway Operations

APPENDIX "H" - Pack Transportation

APPENDIX "A"

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION - SEVENTH ARMY



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APPENDIX "B" TROOPS, VEHICLES AND SUPPLIES CARRIED ON ASSAULT

		CARGO			VEHICLES		TROOPS						
		Ammunition	Rations	Water	Gasoline V-80 - V-100		Engr.	Sig.	Misc.	Total Stores Long Tons	Total Tonnage	Total Vehicles	Total Troops
CENT	19 Combat Loaders (inc ANCON)	7065	368	572	1214		132	1 1/5	1007	10359	17209	2238	21790
	13 LST	767	51	58	240	252	14	73	47	1502	6453	632	3010
	8 LCT										365	52	83
	5 LCI (L)												934
	Total Assult	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	11861	--	2922	25817
DIME	8 Combat Loaders (excl Monrovia)	2678	298	629	797	289	171	42	236	5140	No Info	739	10061
	15 LST									No Info	No Info	380	5664
	19 LCI (L)												2979
	2 LSI (S)												547
	Total Assult	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5140	--	1619	19251
JOSS	37 LST (Stores loaded on LST, LCT, & LCT 3 or 4)	4068	647	551	1250	299	30	88	174	7107	No Info	2623	14865
	70 LCT									inc above	No Info	826	5274
	52 LCI (L)												6956
	2 LSI (S)												550 est.
	Total Assult	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7107	--	3449	27645
KOOL	2 Troop Ships and 7 Cargo Ships	4512	1040	269	4890	250	234	136	299	11630	15620	1052	2500
	5 LST										3178	323	1269
	7 LCT										534	67	427
	22 LCI (L)												3826
	Total Assult	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	11630	--	1442	8022
	Total Assult	19090	2404	2079	8391	1090	581	340	1763	35738		9432	80735
	Percent of Total Supplies	53.3	6.7	5.7	23.5	3.1	1.6	1.0	5.1		ration 1 Vehicle: 8 1/2		

VEHICLES

		2 1/2 T Truck	W.C.	1/4 T	Half Track	Cat Angle	1/4 T Amph.	MTC	Amb.	Tanks Med.	Tanks Lt.	Misc Trks	DUKW	1 & 1/4 T Trks	Misc Trlrs	Ammo. Carr	90 mm AA	40 mm AA	155 Gun	155 How	105 How	75 SP	4.2 Motor	37 AT	37 AA	57 MM	50 cal AA
CENT	19 C/L (inc ANCON)	2,238	336	106	712	35	39	3	10	4			49	408	477	24	206		56		10	36	12		96		27	
	13 LST	632	95			28					55	7	259		61			8			3	3	1		4			
	8 LCT	52	1										11	38	1				.	1								
	Total Assult	2,922	432	106	712	63	39	3	10	4	55	7	319	146	539	24	206	8	56	1	13	39	13	--	100	--	27	--
DIME	8 C/L (excl Monrovia)	739	90			10							502	7	113							1			16			
	15 LST	880	207		10	75				6	5		300	136	36				31		12	20			42			
	Total Assult	1,619	297	--	10	85	-	-	-	6	5		802	143	149	-	--	-	31	-	12	21	-	--	58	--	--	--
JOSS	37 LST	2,623	400			329					118	68	1016	59	406				32	9	8	12	18	16	70	30		32
	70 LCT	826	25			3					49		532	38	7						8	51	3	1	68	39		2
	Total Assult	3,449	425	--	--	332	-	-	-	-	167	68	1548	97	413	-	--	-	32	9	16	63	21	17	138	69	--	34
KOOL	7 Cargo Ships	1,052	235	78	230	58	8	8				16	68	39	242	11	--		16			1	6		29		7	
	5 LST	323	33			87					56	4	102	16	13				5			3	1		3			
	7 LCT	67	10			6					12		17	4	5				7			8						
	Total Assult	1,442	278	78	230	151	8	8	-	-	68	20	187	59	258	11	--	-	28	-	-	12	7	-	32	-	7	-
	Total Assult	9,432	1432	184	952	631	47	11	10	10	295	95	2856	445	1359	35	206	8	147	10	44	135	41	17	328	69	34	34

NOTE: Vehicles for which a classification is shown are in many cases included under "Mis. Trks."

APPENDIX "C" SAILING OF CRAFT FROM TUNISIA

BIZERTE

Craft Type	Number Sailing	Sailing Date
LST	38	8 July
	14	14 "
	18	17 "
	4	20 "
	11	21 "
	18	22 "
	1	23 "
	11	24 "
	4	25 "
	16	26 "
	18	29 "
	14	31 "
	18	2 August
	5	5 "
	19	7 "
	13	12 "
	10	13 "
	6	17 "
Total Trips	238	

Average Turnaround 6.3 Days

TUNIS

Craft Type	Number Sailing	Sailing Date
LST	34	8 July
	18	15 "
	19	17 "
	7	18 "
	17	21 "
	7	23 "
	17	26 "
	13	1 August
	3	4 "
	13	6 "
	3	9 "
	4	12 "
Total Trips	162	

Average Turnaround 5.8 Days

BIZERTE

Craft Type	Number Sailing	Sailing Date
LST	86	7 July
	5	11 "
	8	16 "
	9	24 "
	3	30 "
	4	31 "
Total Trips	115	
LCI	47	7 July
	9	11 "
	11	14 "
	5	21 "
	10	26 "
	1	28 "
	3	30 "
	8	8 August
	11	13 "
Total Trips	105	

TUNIS

Craft Type	Number Sailing	Sailing Date
LST	4	8 July
	9	16 "
	4	31 "
Total Trips	17	
LCI	47	6 July
	16	11 "
	1	18 "
	3	8 August
	2	9 "
Total Trips	69	

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APPENDIX "D"

1. TONNAGE DISCHARGED IN PORTS AND BEACHES OF SICILY*

RATE OF DISCHARGE OF SUPPLIES IN LONG TONS FROM PORTS AND BEACHES IN SICILY

JULY	SCOGLITTI	GELA	LICATA	PORTO EMPEDOCLE	PALERMO	TERMINI IMERESE	TORREMUZZA (S.STEFANO)	BROLO BEACH	TOTAL
10*		2000	4714	Opened 18 July					6714
11*	7801		475						8276
12*		1351	1425						2776
13	1284	924	2200		Opened 28 July	Opened 1 August Closed 13 August	Opened 3 August Closed 17 August	Opened 16 August Closed 19 August	4408
14	1353	1096	620						3069
15	860	2288	285						3433
16	536	2558	9						3103
17	1919	2927	1709						6555
18		3826	1669	1943					6638
19		2528	742	73					3343
20	Closed 17 July	2756	640	131					3527
21		2488	2079						4567
22		2506	2657	570					5733
23		2506	2357	1168					6031
24		2818	2359	1851					7028
25		1310	2053	2107					5470
26		1346	1523	3238					6107
27		789	1584	2727					5100
28		93	1384	613					2090
29			1599	1011					2610
30			2207	670	2192				5069
31			3476	1203	2145				6824
	13753	35310	37766	17305	4337				108471

* Accurate only for total of 1st 3 days.

RATE OF DISCHARGE OF SUPPLIES IN LONG TONS FROM PORTS AND BEACHES IN SICILY

AUGUST	SCOGLITTI	GELA	LICATA	PORTO EMPEDOCLE	PALERMO	TERMINI IMERESE	TORREMUZZA (S.STEFANO)	BROLO BEACH	TOTAL
1			3246	654		811			4711
2			3214	1190	2246	700		Opened 16 August Closed 19 August	7350
3			2068	2042	2148	594			6852
4		80	4612	1814	2818	380	967		10671
5		250	3528	1894	1869	839	235		8615
6		250	2219	1773	2414	239			6895
7			2800	1500	1436		88		5824
8			2220	471	2370		309		5370
9			1548		1440		270		3258
10			1382	56	2899		791		5128
11			940	962	4726	765	745		8138
12			1275	1458	5718	1024	670		10145
13			1566		5200	1327	194		8287
14			1345		5412	985			7742
15			1280		5007	760			7047
16			1566	15	4557	566			6704
17			2060	982	3665	203		585	7495
18			2115	893	3593	3	Opened 3 August Closed 13 August	420	7024
19			1905	938	3244			136	6223
20			1387	481	3215				5083
21			1071	391	4356				5818
22			1122	232	4738				6092
23			1168	1063	4921				7152
24			816	1140	4484				6440
25			1228	710	3917				5855
26			1193		5143				6336
27			1272	Opened 18 July	5267				6539
28			857		4912				5769
29					5054				5054
30					4834				4834
31					4766				4766
		580	51003	20659	116369	9196	4269	1141	203217
APPENDIX "D" JULY		35310	37766	17305	4337	-	-	-	108471
	13753								
Aug.	-	580	51003	20659	116369	9196	4269	1141	203217
Total	13753	35890	88769	37964	120706	9196	4269	1141	311688

2. PERSONNEL DISCHARGED IN PORTS AND BEACHES OF SICILY

RATE OF DISCHARGE OF PERSONNEL

JULY	SCOGLITTI	GELA	LICATA	PORTO EMPEDOCLE	PALERMO	TERMINI IMERESE	TOREMUZZA (S.STEFANO)	BROLO BEACH	TOTAL
10*		20655	18464						39119
11*	22654		1931						24585
12*		2506	75						2581
13	300	1338	159	Opened 18 July	Opened 28 July	Opened 1 August Closed 13 August	Opened 3 August Closed 13 August	Opened 16 August Closed 19 August	1697
14		2644	671						3315
15		1530	4664						6194
16		251	5200						5451
17	Closed 17 July	279							279
18		1817							1817
19		1258	2908						4166
20		1047	2291	353					3691
21		35							35
22			2225						2225
23		1034	1318	362					2714
24		322	2805	535					3662
25		659	5028						1167
26			713						713
27									
28									
29			2498	981					3479
30			2311	1600					3911
31			1023						1023
	22854	35375	49764	3831					111824

* Accurate only for total of 1st 3 days

RATE OF DISCHARGE OF PERSONNEL

AUGUST	SCOGLITTI	GELA	LICATA	PORTO EMPEDOCLE	PALERMO	TERMINI IMERESE	TORREMUZZA (S.STEFANO)	BROLO BEACH	TOTAL
1			177		8175				8352
2			305		2393				2698
3			1338		347				1685
4					2137		330		2467
5				Opened 18 July	3794	Opened 1 August		Opened 16 August Closed 19 August	3794
6					792				792
7		Closed 7 August except for Tankers	669		4481				5150
8			1225						1225
9									
10			397		2728		138		3263
11			448		5046				5494
12					2				2
13			639						639
14			16		3183		Opened 3 August Closed 13 August		3199
15					5149				5149
16					2888				2888
17			1021						1021
18									
19					3460				3460
20					169				169
21									
22									
23									
24									
25									
26					2				2
27					132				132
28									
29									
30									
31									
			6235		44878		468		51581
July	22854	35375	49764	3831	-	-	-	-	111824
August	-	-	6325	-	44878	-	468	-	51581
Total	22854	35375	55999	3831	44878		468		51581

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APPENDIX "D"

3. VEHICLES DISCHARGED IN PORTS AND BEACHES OF SICILY

RATE OF DISCHARGE OF VEHICLES

JULY	SCOGLITTI	GELA	LICATA	PORTO EMPEDOCLE	PALERMO	TERMINI IMERESE	TORREMUZZA (S.STEFANO)	BROLO BEACH	TOTAL
10*		1027	3310						4337
11*	2179		406	Opened 18 July					2585
12*		438	36						494
13		712	158		Opened 28 July	Opened 1 August Closed 13 August	Opened 3 August Closed 13 August	Opened 16 August Closed 19 August	870
14		31							31
15		216	599						815
16	165	602	729						1496
17	471	666							1137
18		457		394					851
19		284	1310	16					1610
20		326	830	196					1452
21		93	397						490
22		10	132	77					219
23		255	476	95					826
24		310	1160	130					1600
25		307	87	6					400
26		24	103	5					132
27									
28			825	43					868
29			809	163					972
30			322	5					327
31									21512
	2813	5848	11719	1130					

*Accurate only for total of first 3 days

RATE OF DISCHARGE OF VEHICLES

AUGUST	SCOGLITTI	GELA	LICATA	PORTO EMPEDOCLE	PALERMO	TERMINI IMERESE	TORREMUZZA (S.STEFANO)	BROLO BEACH	TOTAL
1			20	5					25
2			194		19			Opened 16 Aug.	213
3			659		696		77	Closed 19 Aug.	1355
4			23		454				554
5			8		249				257
6					216				216
7			293		329				622
8			501		60				561
9					9				9
10			155		12				171
11			139	5	1291		4		1439
12				6	7				13
13			288		6				294
14			25		1063				1088
15			31						31
16			8		1447		Opened 3 Aug. Closed 13 Aug.		1455
17			12		16			37	65
18			7	7	34				48
19			24		25	40			89
20			15		327				342
21									
22			3		3				6
23				5	4				9
24					29				29
25					8				8
26			16		11				27
27				Opened 18 July	13				13
28			9		2				11
29					21				21
30					4				4
31					6				6
			2430	28	6361	40	81	37	8977
July	2813	5848	11719	1130	-	-	-	-	21512
August	-	-	2430	28	6361	40	81	37	8977
Total	2813	5848	14149	1158	6361	40	81	37	29989

Closed 17 July

Closed 7 August except for tankers

APPENDIX "E"

RAILROAD OPERATION IN SEVENTH ARMY SECTOR OF SICILY

The first detachment of the 727th Railway Operating Battalion arrived at Licata as follows: July 12, three officers and eighteen enlisted men; July 15, four officers and forty-one enlisted men. The remainder of the battalion arrived on July 22 and July 26. The first train departed Licata 1130, 12 July 1943, for the purpose of inspecting and repairing the track between Licata and Campobello. The track was broken in several places. Repairs were made the same day.

13 July 1943 a train was operated to Falconara. The track was broken in three points. Twenty-eight empties were placed for loading at Falconara, afternoon of 13 July 1943, of which thirteen were loaded and moved to Campobello. Thus, the first service was established.

COMMUNICATIONS

Signal Supervisor, with three enlisted men of the Signal Section arrived with the second echelon, first detachment at 1630, 15 July. Signal Corps was contacted for dispatcher's circuit Licata to Campobello. Negotiations with Signal Corps were subsequently continued for extension of dispatcher's circuit, as track mileage operated was increased. The remainder of the small signal section arrived 24 July.

From Palermo east to Cefalu the signal communications were established by using civilian signalmen, under the protection of American soldiers. A Signal Corps circuit was used from Cefalu to San Stefano and was connected into the stations by Italian civilians. The telephone lines from Palermo, west to Trapani and from Alcamo to Castelvetrano were rebuilt by Italian civilians and a representative from the Signal Corps.

The Signal Section proceeded to recondition circuits as soon as circuit assignments were made. Telephone service was provided closely following the extension of railheads and in some cases service was provided ahead of train service.

The communication problem was complicated by the almost entire lack of interurban telephone circuits, other than railway circuits. First priorities on wire facilities were allocated for Army tactical and operational circuits, and in some cases Air Corps service. Wires were found badly damaged by bombs and combat fire and cut up by combat units providing front line tactical communication.

The line wire was patched up wherever possible. Large quantities of field wire laid to bridge the longer sections of wire damage.

The transmission losses in these sections of line made it impossible to establish through dispatching circuits over the entire line operated. The operation had to be sectionalized. Station to station manual block was established for train movements.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in maintaining continuous communication due to the following factors:

Line wire breaks due to traffic, small arms fire, and nicks in line wires due to previous combat.

Signal Corps rearrangements of circuits.

Long sections of field wire being cut out of dispatcher's circuits by saboteurs.

Sabotage, including numerous cases of fine wire being wrapped around all circuits on the line.

The lack of roads paralleling the railway made the use of track motor cars imperative for line repairs as the line could not be reached with road transportation.

TRACK

Track and bridges were repaired between Campobello and Canicatti by Maintenance of Way Company. Canicatti established railhead 18 July 1943. Tracks were heavily damaged at Campobello, Canicatti, St. Cataldo, Caltanissetta, Xirbi, Imera, Enna and Dittaino. Some damage to tracks at all other stations.

The first tunnel west of Enna was found caved in about the middle of the tunnel. This was cleared by hand and cribbed up.

Overhead bridge east of Pirato was found with six concrete posts demolished. Timbers were used to make temporary repairs. An eight foot fill, a highway diversion across the track at this point was removed. Track opened to Dittaino 4 August. Repairs made to seven tracks at that point. This station available for use as railhead 7 August. By 13 August all damaged track including yard tracks within the Southern Section of the Inland had been repaired and placed in service. Work started 23 August 1943 to open the railway for operation east of Dittaino. Inspection of track Licata to Dittaino, and Port Empedocle to Canicatti made 18, 19 and 20 August 1943, indicated track in good condition, except in need of surfacing between Xirbi and Imera and between Licata and St. Elmva.

The tracks from Palermo to Cefalu were opened with the help of Italian railroad workers. The Corps of Engineers constructed three bridges between Cefalu and San Stefano and men from the Maintenance Company of this organization, cleared and repaired the breaks in the track.

Near Isola Del Femine a tunnel approximately 800 feet long was badly damaged by demolitions. This tunnel was reopened by using Italian railroad workers. Many of the stations west of Palermo contained bombed and burned railroad equipment. Tracks were cleared and put in service by soldiers of the Maintenance of Way Company.

The line between Dittaino and Garbini was turned over to the Americans by the British 23 August 1943. Two bridges and thirty breaks in the railroad were repaired and the line opened 28 August 1943.

WATER

From the outset, operation of trains were delayed account inadequate water supply. Supply lines and installations were damaged at all water stations. It was necessary to supplement the regular water supply at Xirbi, Villarosa, Pirato and Port Empedocle by finding new water sources as demands were made upon the railway for movement of increased tonnage. Some trains were given water from five gallon water cans. Water cars and water trucks were pressed into service. It is estimated that 5% of the tonnage handled was water for the locomotives.

In the Southern Section no boilers of locomotives were washed until 12 August account insufficient water. By 12 August an adequate supply had been developed and all installations in service. Regular boiler washing program was set up at this time.

Outstanding service rendered by the water service section of the Maintenance of Way Company in repairing and maintaining water supply lines and installations. Excellent work was also done towards developing new sources of water.

LOCOMOTIVES

From 13 to 26 July, five road and one yard locomotives were available for service. During the period 26 July to 13 August an additional thirty-seven locomotives were repaired and placed in service. Of these, twenty-three were at outlying points. Many of these locomotives had been machine-gunned, robbed of machinery, parts, etc.

In the Northern Section, sufficient locomotives, in usable condition were found and placed in service. In the Northern Section there are a total of 137 locomotives, of which 72 were serviceable.

In the Southern Section there are a total of seventy-three locomotives, of which fifty-five locomotives were serviceable.

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TRAFFIC MOVEMENT - NORTHERN DISTRICT

28 July 1943 to 1 September 1943 Inclusive


FROM	TO	NET TONS
Palermo	Campofelice	10086
Palermo	Cerda	1532
Palermo	Cefalu	6260
Termini Imerese	Tusa	937
Palermo	Tusa	9969
Palermo	San Stefano	9696
Termini Imerese	Palermo	417
Palermo	Milo	2001
Palermo	I.D. Femine	717
Palermo	Brancaccio	5873
Palermo	Sciara	2637
Palermo	Terrasini	2137
Palermo	Trapani	2985
Palermo	Castelvetrano	557
Palermo	Licata	1025
Palermo	Caltanissetta	252
Palermo	Termini Imerese	2487
Palermo	Gerbini	1457
Palermo	Lascari	592
	TOTAL TONS	61617

TRAFFIC MOVEMENT

SOUTHERN and CENTRAL DISTRICTS

12 July 1943 to 1 September 1943 Inclusive

FROM	TO	NET TONS
Licata	Nicosia	1853
Licata	Gerbini	2095
Licata	Pirato	6315
Licata	Enna	350
Licata	Campobello	2101
Licata	St. Oliva	6955
Licata	Canicatti	7119
Licata	Porto Empedocle	333
Licata	Dittaino	3270
Licata	Palermo	1030
Licata	Caltanissetta	24410
Licata	Agrigento	210
Licata	Termini Imerese	890
Gela	Comiso	110
Gela	Canicatti	378
Gela	Licata	21353
Porto Empedocle	Canicatti	754
Porto Empedocle	Caltanissetta	2282
Porto Empedocle	Gela	4372
Porto Empedocle	Pirato	2856
Porto Empedocle	Nicosia	2338
Porto Empedocle	Licata	207
Porto Empedocle	Palermo	261
Porto Empedocle	Dittaino	588
Porto Empedocle	Gerbini	1016
Porto Empedocle	St. Oliva	111
Ragusa	Gela	4500
St. Oliva	Pirato	5844
Vittoria	St. Oliva	1461
Vittoria	Pirato	5844
Campobello	Canicatti	640
Caltanissetta	Gela	242
Caltanissetta	Pirato	560
Pirato	Licata	795
Pirato	St. Oliva	2067
Enna	Porto Empedocle	664
Dittaino	Gerbini	688
	TOTAL TONS	112406



FLOW CHART OF RAILROAD SHIPMENT TONNAGES



EQUIPMENT

In the initial operation between Falconara and Campobello there were approximately one hundred cars of the various classes available for service. There are about 2,800 serviceable freight cars divided approximately as follows:

1610 - Box
1140 - High Gondolas
395 - Low Gondolas
60 - Flat Cars
70 - Tank Cars (Gas)
80 - Refrigerators
45 - Water Cars

90% of these cars are in good condition, many of them new and they will require a minimum of maintenance. There are approximately 500 freight cars which had been bombed or burned.

FUEL

In the initial operation between Falconara and Campobello, one hundred tons of coal was available at Licata. Reconnaissance of the railway showed the following coal available:

250 tons - Port Empedocle
100 tons - Licata
200 tons - Aragona Caldare
250 tons - Caltanissetta
400 tons - Xirbi
1,000 tons - Palermo
800 tons - Alcamo
200 tons - Castelvetrano

E-17


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SECRET

The coal situation at both Licata and Palermo became critical, but in both places sufficient coal was secured to continue operations. At Licata coal was secured from the Navy. 3,000 tons of coal was unloaded at Licata, part of which will be shipped to Palermo. This was sufficient coal for three weeks operation.

STRUCTURES

At almost every station, the yard, tracks and buildings had been damaged. The worst damage had been caused by air raids, but considerable damage had been done by the retreating Italians, and looting by the civilians. Stations at Canicatti, Caltanissetta and Alcamo were the most severely damaged. In many of the stations the telephone and telegraph instruments had been either removed or damaged beyond repair. Tracks were rebuilt and the debris cleared away by members of this organization, Italian civilians and prisoners.

SUPPLY

In the Southern section only a small amount of supplies were found. There was practically no oil or grease and a few other critical items of this nature. There was only a small supply of locomotive repair parts. At Palermo a well equipped storehouse was found and with the exception of a few critical items, sufficient material is on hand for maintenance of the locomotives for six months. The critical items were: locomotive lubricants, repair parts for air pumps and diesel motors and belting for machines.

NARROW GAUGE

The narrow gauge railroad from Licata to Margonia was opened and a few supply trains operated. After 20 July, there was no further need for the line and operation was stopped.

RAILHEADS
(Into railheads only, no out-bound shown)

	DATE ESTABLISHED	LOADS HANDLED	NET TONS
CAMPOBELLO	13 July	119	1591
FALCONARA		(No Record)	
CANICATTI	18 July	272	3629
GELA	20 July	315	4820
CALTANISSETTA	27 July	311	5222
VITTORIA	16 July	128	1842 (Incomplete)
PIRATO-ENNA	1 August	1135	18070
DITTAINO-GERBINI	23 August	230	3172

No accurate record of the cars handled at LICATA and ST. OLIVA.

CEFALU AREA	29 July	2454	25713
SAN STEFANO AREA	9 August	922	17328
FEMINE-TERRASINI AREA	29 July	123	2237

	DATE ESTABLISHED	LOADS HANDLED	NET TONS
MILO-TRAPANI AREA	16 August	297	4478
CASTELVETRANO	20 August	43	700
LICATA	22 August	131	2154
	GRAND TOTALS	6480	90956

TROOPS MOVED 7316

PRISONERS MOVED 1985

In addition to the above, 610 carloads of empty drums, salvage, signal and engineer equipment were handled.

A hospital train of 12 cars was operated daily from Cefalu or San Stefano from August 1 to August 25, and handled a total of 3775 casualties.

On the 1st of August civilian passenger train service was inaugurated for workers in the Palermo district. Regular schedules were established on the lines east and west of Palermo and on the narrow gauge south from Palermo.

OPERATIONS

Operation of trains depended upon the opening of track and availability of water. The following figures cover the number of trains operated, cars and net tons handled for the period 13 July to 23 August inclusive:

FIRST DISTRICT: East of LICATA

SECOND DISTRICT: North of LICATA

THIRD DISTRICT: PORT EMPEDOCLE to CANICATTI

FOURTH DISTRICT: PALERMO East

FIFTH DISTRICT: PALERMO West

SIXTH DISTRICT: PALERMO South

FIRST DISTRICT

	NO. OF TRAINS	LOADS	MTYS	NET TONS
EAST	102	883	514	13951
WEST	102	1092	299	15857

SECOND DISTRICT

	NO. OF TRAINS	LOADS	MTYS	NET TONS
NORTH	272	3809	106	58042
SOUTH	279	758	3329	12420

THIRD DISTRICT

NORTH	99	623	92	10331
SOUTH	99	103	391	1267

FOURTH DISTRICT

EAST	132	2454	115	43000
WEST	130	349	2115	3490

FIFTH DISTRICT

EAST	61	26	476	208
WEST	62	525	0	8177

SIXTH DISTRICT

NORTH	28	77	126	924
SOUTH	30	131	0	2154

NOTE: A train operated from Licata through to Pirato is counted as two trains account split at Caltanissetta.

On account of the heavy grade in this area practically all trains were operated with two engines and in many cases East of Caltanissetta three engines were used per train.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that a Signal construction company be assigned to the railway operating battalion during the initial states of an invasion.

Dependable communications are absolutely essential to railroad operation. The signal section of an operating battalion has only twelve men, which is entirely inadequate for extensive reconstruction. The Signal Corps is of necessity more interested in tactical circuits, which leaves no personnel to construct a circuit for the railroad.

2. It is recommended that the administrative control of a railway operating battalion be kept under the command of one officer, reporting to one headquarters, regardless of the different areas in which the battalion may be operating. It is absolutely necessary that the commanding officer be free to move personnel and organizational equipment from one section to another section of the railroad as conditions change. There is neither sufficient personnel nor organizational equipment to divide the battalion into several separate sections and then maintain efficient operation.

3. It is recommended that a provisional railway traffic company be formed and assigned to the railway operating battalion. During the recent operations it has been necessary to use a large percentage of the officers and enlisted personnel of the operating battalion for this work, which deprived this organization of many of its technically trained personnel. (Note: A separate recommendation will be forwarded on this subject.)

APPENDIX "F"
PETROLEUM STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION

FOREWORD

During the early stages of planning for the campaign of Sicily by Force 343, considerable thought was given to the possibility of supplying the airfields at Ponte Oliva and Comiso with bulk 100 Octane airplane gasoline as soon as possible after these fields fell into our hands and also supplying the ground forces with bulk 80 Octane MT gasoline. The thought being that such a project would assist to alleviate the necessity of hauling gasoline in packed containers over the beaches and to eliminate the return or empty containers to the mainland for refilling, to reduce losses by leakage and to a great extent reduce road haulage. To achieve this it was planned to erect bolted steel storage tanks at suitable locations near Gela, construct a 4" military pipeline to both Ponte Oliva and Comiso airfields and erect such storage as would be necessary at each of these airfields.

PLANNING

The details of plans for the erecting of storage tanks and construction of pipelines were as follows:

The 1st Phase of project which was to be completed by D+8 called for the erection of one 5,000 barrel tank at Gela and one 1,000 barrel tank at each of the airfields, and construction of 7-1/2 miles of pipeline to Ponte Oliva Airfield. By D+12 it was hoped to complete a second 5,000 barrel tank and construct 23 miles of pipeline to Comiso Airfield. This project was to provide 12,000 barrels of 100 Octane gasoline storage for use by the Air Corps.

The Second Phase called for erection of six 5,000 barrel tanks of which two were to be completed by D+16, two by D+20 and the remaining two by D+24. It was intended that the first two 5,000 barrel tanks would be used for 100 Octane and the remaining six for V-80 gasoline.

In the initial stages it was also expected to fill empty containers from these storage tanks.

Berthing and discharging of tankers was to be accomplished by either making use of a known fishing pier at Gela which it was hoped would be capable of berthing shallow draft tankers or by construction of a submarine pipeline approximately 3,000 feet in length, at which depth it would be possible to handle vessels of average draft. If the submarine line was to be constructed the U.S. Navy had agreed that moorings would be constructed so that tankers could be anchored while discharging.

Phased requisitions covering tankage and pipeline equipment and material were prepared and plans were for the material to arrive in Sicily in two periods. The material necessary in the First Phase of construction was to arrive on D+4, Second Phase to arrive on D+8 convoy.

The 696th (formerly 2602nd) Engineer Pipeline Company was assigned the task of construction and operation of all installations planned. This unit was to arrive in Sicily on D+4 convoy.

ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PLAN

The 696th Engineer Pipeline Company arrived at Gela on D+6; disembarkation of personnel and equipment was completed by D+8. Material for the construction of projects started arriving on D+6, but was badly scattered along the Gela beaches which required considerable time on the part of pipeline personnel in locating and assembling.

A reconnaissance indicated that the fishing pier, while badly damaged by bomb hits, could be used for berthing shallow draft tankers. Berthing depth at end of pier is approximately seventeen (17) feet.

The First Phase of plans which included erection of one 5,000 barrel tank, 4" pipeline to Ponte Oliva Airfield and three (3) 4" lines from tanker berth at end of pier to shore storage was completed and water tested by D+11 and construction of second 5,000 barrel tank was in progress. The first tanker with 10,000 barrels of 100 Octane gasoline was discharged on D+11. Because of delay in the arrival of material such as pipe, tanks and pumps, the pipeline to Comiso Airfield and erection of storage was not completed until D+26 when line was placed in operation.

In the meantime an additional 5,000 barrel tank was erected at the Gela tank farm.

The entire installation on completion in the Gela Area consisted of the following:

3 - 5,000 barrel shore tanks located near Gela pier
3 - 4" pipelines from tanker berth at end of pier to shore storage
7-1/2 miles of 4" pipeline from shore storage to Ponte Oliva Airfield

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1 - 1,000 barrel tank at Ponte Oliva Airfield plus approximately 1,650 barrels of existing storage which was also connected making a total of 2,650 barrels storage at Ponte Oliva Airfield. 22 miles of 4" pipeline was laid from Gela storage to Comiso Airfield

1 - 1,000 barrel tank at Comiso plus existing storage connected amounting to 3,276 barrels. Total 4,276 barrels storage available at Comiso Airfield. A grand total of 19,926 barrels of 100 Octane gasoline is now available in the Gela Area.

Dispensing facilities were installed at Gela shore storage and at both Ponte Oliva and Comiso Airfields.

Tankers at the time of this writing are making regular scheduled deliveries and these airfields are being supplied 100% from bulk storage.

Due to the rapid advance of our forces which made available the existing storage at Port Empedocle and Palermo, the Second Phase of construction program which called for erection of six (6) 5,000 barrel tanks at Gela for 80 Octane gasoline was abandoned.

PORT EMPEDOCLE

After the fall of Port Empedocle it was decided to provide V-80 gasoline storage by making use of the existing storage facilities.

Existing storage found was as follows:

Three (3) 3,600 barrel tanks underground near Port Empedocle, tanks had been used for Diesel Oil. Two of these tanks were cleaned for V-80 gasoline use and connected to a 4" pipeline which was laid to the tanker berth. The remaining tank was left for storage of Diesel fuel.

Use was made of approximately 1,650 barrels of existing underground and above ground steel storage located at the Standard Bulk Plant near the railroad depot. A 5,000 barrel steel bolted tank was also erected at this point and a six (6) car loading rack constructed for loading tank cars. A 4" pipeline was laid from this storage to the underground storage mentioned above so that tankers can discharge to either or both installations. Berthing depth for tankers is twenty (20) feet. Complete canning and drumming facilities were installed. The first tanker was discharged 3 August. Total storage available at Port Empedocle amounts to 13,850 barrels.

PALERMO

Considerable storage space was found at Palermo which is enumerated as follows:

Underground storage at the Uditore Tank Farm located about three miles west of town. This storage consists of three 17,580 barrel concrete metal lined tanks for gasoline storage and two 11,400 barrel concrete tanks for Diesel fuel. Two eight inch pipelines, one for Diesel and one for gasoline, feed this storage from tanker berth at Banchina Quattrovente, a distance of approximately three miles.

A rail tank car loading rack connected by pipeline to Uditore Tank Farm was constructed at the railroad spur near Lolli station. Loading rack will accommodate six cars.

A 5,000 barrel steel bolted tank was constructed at the Uditore installation and a four inch pipeline laid to the Palermo airport with connection to the existing storage amounting to approximately 125 barrels.

The first tanker with 19,000 barrels of V-80 gasoline was discharged 17 August 1943.

Naval storage found at Palermo consists of twelve underground concrete storage tanks having a capacity of 916,880 barrels which had been used for fuel oil. A fourteen inch pipeline connected this storage to the tanker berth. Complete pumping facilities for discharging tankers and servicing Naval Craft were found and minor repairs necessary to operate facilities have been completed. Connections to ten of the above mentioned tanks and feeder lines were found to be badly damaged by demolition charges.

CONCLUSIONS

In view of the difficulties encountered in the initial stages of operations in Sicily, it is generally conceded that plans as originally made had gone off remarkably well. However, certain lessons were learned which should be noted for guidance in future operations.

1. Future operations which require pipeline and storage construction must be carefully coordinated by the Engineers, through G-4, with the Quartermaster, Air Corps and Transportation.

2. Units assigned to construction and operations should be relieved of their duties in sufficient time to enable them to enter into all plans laid for the procurement and movement of materials. This procedure is justified for the following reasons:

a. Depot personnel ordinarily have a very limited knowledge of pipeline materials and are not in many cases able to identify all items for shipment.

b. Units in the field of operations have to rely on materials shipped to perform their assignment and if these materials are not shipped as planned completion of projects will be delayed, as many of these items are not available from other Engineer stocks.


c. It is considered necessary that definite arrangements following the plan be made for movement of pipeline personnel. This is justified because other Engineer units would not be able to carry out the pipeline construction program on a schedule comparable to that of experienced personnel. Material, equipment and personnel should if at all possible, be loaded on the same ships.

d. Incidental and unforseen construction requirements will always enter into the bulk storage and pipeline construction picture. For this reason surplus of pipeline supplies must be ordered to take care of such emergency construction.

e. Careful and detailed studies should be made of beach areas where submarine lines are to be constructed, pertinent information such as shore conditions, tides, character of soil topography, and so forth, should be carefully studied in order to make proper selection of locations for submarine lines, storage tank sites and pipeline routes.

f. A pipeline and bulk storage construction program urgently needed can be successfully executed on schedule by careful planning, proper materials and skilled personnel.

BULK PETROLEUM STORAGE SICILY



Bulk Storage Facilities in Sicily in Areas Listed:

Location	No. of Tanks	Bbls Total Storage	Present Contents
Gela	3	15,000	100 Octane Gasoline
Gela	2	2,000	Diesel Oil
Ponte Oliva	1	1,000	100 Octane Gasoline
Ponte Oliva	Various	1,650	100 Octane Gasoline
Comiso	1	1,000	100 Octane Gasoline
Comiso	Various	3,276	100 Octane Gasoline
Port Empedocle	1	5,000	80 Octane Gasoline
Port Empedocle	2	7,200	80 Octane Gasoline
Port Empedocle	1	3,600	Diesel Oil
Port Empedocle	Various	1,500	80 Octane Gasoline
Palermo	3	52,920	80 Octane Gasoline
Palermo	2	22,680	Diesel Oil
Palermo	1	2,125	100 Octane Gasoline
Palermo	12	916,880	Black Oil
Licata	1	5,000	Diesel Oil

Total Capacity all grades	1,043,831 bbls
Total Capacity 100 Octane	27,051 bbls
Total Capacity 80 Octane	66,620 bbls
Total Capacity Diesel Oil	33,280 bbls
Total Capacity Black Oil	916,880 bbls
Grand Total Capacity	1,043,831 bbls

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APPENDIX "G"

HIGHWAY OPERATIONS

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SECTION I

OPERATIONS

PHASE A - PLANNING

Planning for motor freight transportation, HUSKY Operation, was inaugurated the latter part of April with the organization of a Transportation Division in the G-4 Section, I Armored Corps. Immediate efforts were initiated to assemble a competent highway staff. However, only one experienced officer was available until 26 June when through efforts of Chief of Transportation AFHQ one other officer was assigned.

The Highway Transportation Officer with the help of attached personnel made a complete study of the Sicily road net and from tactical plans then in preparation developed an appreciation of the contemplated motor freight requirements. On the basis of this study it was recommended that ten (10) QM Battalions (Trk) be made available to meet supply requirements. Close contact was maintained with 1st Engineer Special Brigade and with the other agencies involved in the operation, to assure complete coordination.

In addition to general plans, steps were initiated to obtain equipment and supplies essential for efficient highway operation, to arrive in the theater by D+11. Approximately 2,500 pre-constructed signs were ordered from ABS and MBS to provide for the marking of main supply routes, dumps and port installations. Sign maintenance supplies were also requisitioned to arrive in the theater at the same time.

In the allocation of troops to Force 343 for the operation a Group Regulating Station was included to provide control personnel for highway operations. However a particular unit was not designated and, although every effort was made to obtain this designation, no decision had been made by 10 June. On 15 June, SOS, NATOUSA on direction of AFHQ ordered a detachment 2nd Group Regulating Stations (20 Officers - 40 E/M) to be assigned I Armored Corps to meet an urgent need for regulating personnel and to partially fulfill the commitment made for a complete regulating group. Considering anticipated needs in the theater this group was sufficient only for initial operation and a new request was informally submitted to G-1 and G-3, AFHQ for a decision on the balance of the group.

On 3 July, G-3, AFHQ advised informally that a group Regulating Station could not be provided, although set up in the 343 troop list. Hence a letter was initiated to Commanding General NATOUSA requesting authority to organize a Regulating Company (Provisional) of fifty (50) officers and 200 E/M, with the assigned detachment 2nd Group Regulating Stations as a cadre. This request was, because of the short time available, carried by hand through necessary channels at AFHQ. Through concerted efforts by the Highway Division, approval was granted on 7 July for organization of the 6623 Regulating Co. (Prov.). A liaison officer was immediately designated from the assigned cadre to represent 7th Army in organizing the provisional company. Personnel was obtained from 1st and 2nd Replacement Depots in Africa. At the time authority was granted for the organization a T/E was approved by G-1 AFHQ and this equipment was drawn from ABS concurrently with the organization procedure. The regulating cadre was scheduled to arrive in the theater on D+10. Shipping priority for the balance of the company was obtained to arrive in the theater by approximately D+20.

PHASE B - LANDING 10 JULY TO INITIAL PORT OPERATION 28 JULY

First elements of the Highway Division landed on Sicily from LST on beach east of Licata at 1100, 10 July 1943 (D plus 4). Party consisted of Highway Transportation Officer, Assistant, Motor Control Officer, and one enlisted man. Operation on the Island was begun by Highway at 1000, 15 July 1943, at Seventh Army Main Headquarters, Gela.

Recommendations of the Highway Division on traffic circulation were embodied in Traffic Section (Paragraph 5) of Adm. Order No. 2, 17 July which designated main and alternative supply routes to II Corps, and to 82nd Airborne Division and Provisional Corps. Highway personnel immediately made detailed traffic surveys of potential routes radiating from Gela and Licata.

In accordance with previous plans the 1st Engineer Special Brigade assumed responsibility for consolidation of all beach supply points on 17 July. The next day they began stocking the advance supply points of Agrigento and Caltanissetta by truck from the beach supply points. The laying down of an initial stock of 1800 tons was accomplished thru the use of 230 organic vehicles attached to the Brigade. No QM truck companies had yet been attached. On 19 July one QM Truck Company began hauling from Canicatti Railhead to Caltanissetta. Seventy-five (75) vehicles were obtained from the 107 AA Group on 21 July in order to meet the haulage problems of the fast moving front. These AA vehicles were returned as vehicles of the QM Truck Company's became available. In general DUKWS of the two QM Truck Battalions attached to the Brigade and trucks and DUKWS of the Brigade units were used on the beach and port to railhead operation with separate truck companies handling the more distant phases of railhead and over the road operation.

The Highway Division maintained close coordination with the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, which had assumed the functions of supply when the Divisions moved forward, and the supply lines lengthened.

Moving with main headquarters to Agrigento on 20 July, a road net circulation plan was developed in relation to supply lines for the Red, White and Blue tactical phases, overlay of routes being accompanied by the table showing highway distances necessary to supply forward points of Provisional Corps, 82nd Airborne Division, and II Corps. Coordination with 1st Engineer Special Brigade on movements was continued through these phases. At this time recommendations for allocation of functions and responsibilities over road movements between Army and Corps were made. By informal arrangement with G-3, 7th Army, the Highway Division inaugurated control of convoy movements on Army roads and coordinated inter-corps movements with respective G-3's.

Staff of Highway Section was supplemented on 23 July by arrival of Traffic Engineer and three enlisted men, and further on the following day when another officer was attached for temporary duty. All were from Detachment 2nd Group Regulating Stations which formed cadre of 6623 Regulating Company (Provisional), which had landed at Licata on 22 July.

Advance detail of Highway Division moved to Palermo on 25 July, and balance of the Division followed on the 26th. The following day Movements Control Officer reported for duty, on detached service from Regulating Company.

PHASE C - PORT OPERATION, PALERMO

Reconnaissance of the Palermo area for development of a traffic circulation plan was started immediately on arrival. All Special Staff Sections were instructed to "select depot and dump sites in the Palermo area and report their locations without delay to the Engineer, Seventh Army, in order that access roads could be repaired and a recommendation made on traffic circulation" (Letter 26 July AG to 1st Engr. Special Brigade, Provisional Corps, II Corps, 20 & 540 Engineer Regiments, on responsibility for coordinating repair and rehabilitation, Par. 4). Traffic engineering section of Highway Division worked in close liaison with services and Engineer, 7th Army, in selection and marking of dump sites and routes.

At 1600 on 28 July, initial motor freight operations at port were begun with sixty-nine trucks and nineteen DUKWS upon arrival of two LCT's; three coasters berthed shortly thereafter and discharge began at 1900 of the same day.

The Port of Palermo was operated initially by the 540 Engineers. Highway port operations were controlled by personnel of the Detachment (Cadre) 6623 Regulating Company (Provisional). This detachment, consisting of only nineteen officers and forty enlisted men, maintained a twenty-four dispatch and operational control of moter movements at the Port.

Until arrival of main group from Africa on 4 August, this cadre of the company had neither vehicular nor organizational equipment. The main group, consisting of twenty-eight officers (including liaison officer) and one hundred sixty enlisted men debarked from LST at 1900, 4 August, and five officers and eight enlisted men immediately reported for duty at the port.

Principal difficulties encountered in the beginning of Highway port operations were:

1. Lack of familiarity of dispatchers and drivers with locations in the city.

2. Lack of completely marked routes to destinations.

3. Lack of means other than color markings and code identifications for telling to what service and what dump of that service cargo should be directed.

4. General difficulties of blackout operation.

5. Coordination with services in operation of dumps and delay in selection of dump sites.

These difficulties were alleviated by: temporary marking of military routes by sign crews loaned by 540th Engineers. Temporary sign erection was practically completed 1 August.

Road Patrol, consisting of three (3) officers, constantly circulated over the city directing drivers to destinations. Wherever practical, convoys were formed at the port, and guided to dumps, either by road patrol or by guides requested from the services and the QM truck companies.

Liaison officers of the services assisted proper determination of cargo destination, but dispatch of cargo to destination was primarily accomplished by "dead reckoning" on the part of the Regulating Company.

First day's operations at the port showed the following results:

	First Shift 281600 to 290700	Day Shift 290700 to 291900	Total
Trucks	61	88	75 Average
Total Trips	58	225	283
Total Tons	165.5	636.8	802.3
Average trips per truck	1-	2.56	3.56
Average tons per truck	2.7	7.24	9.94

By way of comparison the same figures are shown for period 27 August, 1900 to 28 August, 1900:

	28-29 July	27-28 August	% increase
Trucks	75 average	230 Average	340
Total Trips	283	1800	535
Total Tons	802.3	4641.9	478
Average trips per truck	3.56	8.04	126
Average tons per truck	9.94	21.05	112

Dispatch of trucks and space available at Port Motor Pool made dispersion of vehicles at required minimum distances of seventy-five yards extremely difficult. Authority to close interval in pool, submitted to AGS G-4 in memorandum 29 July, was granted by Chief of Staff, with provision that each truck unit would be responsible for dispersion of vehicles on alerts.

During the first nine days of operation at the port, no telephones were in operation between the piers and the central dispatching office, and in order to secure trucks, it was necessary for dispatchers at shipside to walk to the central dispatching office or to the motor pool. Telephones were installed 6 August, and greatly increased the efficiency of the pier operation.

Due to shortage of supervisory personnel at the Port, the Highway Road Patrol initially was operated directly under the Highway Division, G-4. Road Patrol was instituted concurrently with initial port discharge, serving several initial and continuing necessary purposes. Initially it served as guide for vehicles from the port to dumps and return, especially at night. Its chief functions were control and policing of vehicle operation to detect and eliminate loitering, thus shortening turn around time. Equally important was a constant vigilance of dumps to locate and anticipate bottlenecks in unloading which would slow vehicle return to the port. The patrol, thru its transportation experience, was able in many instances to coordinate with the services by devising some discharge short cuts, and where correction could not be made on the ground, circumstances were reported to Highway Division or to the Port Office for necessary action thru higher channels. With dumps isolated and telephone communications scant, the Patrol performed an important liaison function.

Dispatching control of all vehicles of QM truck units assigned or attached to Seventh Army was assigned to the Division on 29 July, by memorandum from G-4 to all such units and to the 10th Port of Embarkation. General policy of centralized dispatch control was established and placed in operation as recited in detail in Appendix "I".

By 1 August, a total of eleven dumps had been designated, Ordnance and Quartermaster having three each, Signal two, and Air Corps, Chemical Warfare, Engineers and Medical one each. These dumps were located at distances ranging from .3 miles to 10.3 miles, with an average distance of 2.74 miles from the Main Port Gate.

On 4 August the four rail yards, which had been known by their local names, were designated Yards A, B, C, and L, and marked with directional signs to facilitate motor freight dispatching.

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Permanent signing program was completed by 12 August. On 31 August approximately 500 signs marked 38 dumps and 35 miles on 16 alphabetically lettered routes. Dumps were numbered, with a definite block of numbers assigned to each service. By this time the 38 dumps were distributed among the services as follows: Quartermaster, 12; Ordnance 4, Engineers 1; Signal 3; Chemical Warfare 5; Air Corps 5; Medical 1; Organizational Equipment "Farm" 1; AMGOT 1; Staging Area 1; and 4 rail yards.

Distances from main gate of Port to dumps now ranged from .2 miles to 11.2 miles with average of 3.4 miles.

During discharge of UGS 11 (beginning 7 August) 215 tons QM Class I, 480 tons QM Class III and 700 tons Ordnance Class V were loaded daily for rail shipment east to railheads.

In coordination with 10th Port of Embarkation and Provost Marshal, Seventh Army, SOP for handling prisoner of war labor details at Port was established in Administrative Memo #3, 4 August.

The first Dispatch Log showing routing to the thirty dumps then in existence was published 12 August, accompanied by a mimeographed map showing dump locations and routes, and 350 copies were distributed to interested agencies. Supplements were published as needed. The system of military routes had been established by the Highway Division, and concurred in by Provost Marshal and Engineer Section, Seventh Army, Commander of Military Area, and AMGOT.

Lack of a positive air raid alert and all clear signal resulted in considerable confusion and lost time nightly. Such a signal was recommended early in the Port Operation, but the signal installed has been only partially effective. As a result of this situation, a detailed study of a port evacuation plan was inaugurated and is being presented to the 10th Port of Embarkation for execution.

Memorandum of G-4, 12 August established policy that selection of storage facilities be coordinated with Highway Division for harmony with general traffic circulation plan and adequate notice to Highway Division on any matters effecting its operation. Each service was directed to designate a liaison officer, available on twenty-four hour basis to the Highway Division.

Stock levels beyond original contemplated capacity of dumps, and ever increasing distance from port to dumps prompted recommendation (17 August) that Class I and Class III dumps be located adjacent to rail to minimize requirements of truck movement in loading cars, within a radius of five miles of port, and that Ordnance Class V dump be relocated in proximity to port with access by rail, and better facilities for operation by truck.

PHASE D - OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF PALERMO

Road Movement Section, which had been established within the Highway Division Staff prior to arrival at Palermo, instituted operations immediately after issuance of Administrative Memorandum #3, dated 2 August, which established the axis of supply for North shore operations at Palermo.

In anticipation of operation, tables of highway mileages and necessary operating forms had been prepared to provide accurate control and information.

The principal function of Movements Section was to secure and organize vehicles to travel as convoys, provide specific orders for convoy commanders as to origin, destination, authority to pick up loads; to coordinate movements to prevent congestion; to establish routes and schedules; and later, to supervise and coordinate traffic control activities. Through the advance information thus furnished to Movements, and by close contact with all services, the section has been able to minimize empty vehicle movements thus speeding delivery of the necessary loads as well as greatly increasing efficiency of equipment use.

An example of this occured on the first major move arranged by the Movements Section on 4 August, when it became necessary to move rations and ammunition immediately from Agrigento and Licata to Palermo. A convoy of 170 trucks was partially loaded with equipment of the 104th Coast Artillery Barrage Balloon Battery, at that time debarking at Palermo Port, for movement to Licata. The convoy then loaded the necessary supplies and had returned to Palermo within thirty-six hours of request of the Highway Division for movement.

Movements from Palermo continued heavy until 10 August, the heaviest day being 7 August when 296 tons of ammunition were moved to San Stefano, in addition to personnel movements and normal movements of other supplies.

Following tactical advance and reconstruction of rail lines the movement by highway from Palermo diminished, and dispatch from forward railhead was substituted. Dispatch stations were inaugurated at Campofelice Railhead 7 August, Cefalu on 8 August, and at Tusa (San Stefano) Railhead on 8 August. Manning each dispatch station is a minimum of one team consisting of one Motor Freight Dispatch Officer and two enlisted men. From two to five truck companies have operated from these railheads, moving materials from railhead to local dumps, or to supply points at San Agata, Capo de Orlando, Barcellona, and other forward points. On 11 August, daily commitments for movement forward were 400 tons.

from Tusa. These truck companies also helped move personnel from the front at the end of the campaign, relocating units throughout the American Sector.

Close coordination between Army Services, Corps, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, and in some instances, individual divisions were required. One example was the emergency movement of Air Corps bombs from Termini and Palermo to Gela. Through coordination with II Corps and 1st Engineer Special Brigade, it was possible to divert and substitute trucks to meet this emergency commitment.

To expedite movements it was necessary to load direct at shipside for emergency over the road movements to meet demands for critical supplies for tactical units. Proper coordination and advanced planning for movements often increased operational efficiency by combining as many as six separate movements in a single convoy round trip.

In preparation for coordinated movement control a SOP for Motor Movements was approved as an annex to Administrative Memorandum #4, 28 August.

On 24 August an aerial survey was made of Control Station locations.

The first formal Highway Control Station was established in Palermo, west of junction of Highways 113 and 121 on 20 August. The dispatch station at San Stefano was already functioning in a dual capacity as Highway Control Station and Freight Dispatch Point.

The first scheduled organic convoy movement under this control was scheduled from a location west of Palermo to Catania on 27 August.

PHASE E: TRUCK AVAILABILITY AND USE

Each Quartermaster organization referred to began operation in the Sicilian Campaign with full T/E equipment of 48 vehicles per company, unless otherwise indicated. Personnel available under T/O, however, allowed for maximum vehicle operation on only a single shift, 24-hour basis. Limiting operations factor was therefore, driving personnel rather than vehicles. Each company was able to furnish, for regular 24-hour operation over extended period, only an average of 32 vehicles, or 2/3 of vehicle strength, this being accomplished only by pressing supervisory NCO's into service as drivers.

138th QM Company (Trk), short three men, landed at Port Empedocle 23 July, arrived at Palermo on the 27th and went into operation at Palermo Port the following day. One platoon was moved to Termini Immerese 30 July on DS with 540 Engineers in port operations there, returning to Palermo 28 August. In addition to the 48 2-1/2 ton trucks, this company operated three 10-ton Semi-Trailers.

144th QM Company (Trk) landed 29 July, arrived at Palermo the following day, and became available for dispatch the next day.

First Battalion, 27th QM Regiment (Trk) (Less Co. C, in States) landed 31 July, and was available for dispatch at Palermo 2 August. All three companies were dispatched for duty from Cefalu railhead August 5 and 7, then companies A and B went on to Tusa on 11 August.

Vehicles of three companies of 1st Battalion 46th QM Regiment (Trk), with drivers of one company were landed at Syracuse 19 July, and drivers shuttled vehicles to Licata, at which point balance of vehicles and personnel of the Battalion were landed on 23 July. The Battalion moved to Palermo on the 27th and operated there until transfer to FORTBASE, Catania, 28 August.

Second Battalion, 47th QM Regiment (Trk) arrived in the theater in July, Company F arriving and working at Canicatti Railhead on the 19th, and balance of the Battalion being in operation by the 25th. The following day companies F, G and H moved to Caltanissetta, moving supplies from that railhead to Petralia. These companies moved forward to Parata railhead on 5 August, hauling to Nicosia. Company F was transferred to II Corps on 26 August. Company E had been attached to 82nd Airborne Division and continued with that attachment until 25 August, at which time it came under Army control, and was immediately placed on DS to QM, Seventh Army.

52nd QM Bn. (DUKW) landed on South Beaches with initial assault, and continued operation there under 1st Engineer Special Brigade until 19 August, at which time the Battalion was ordered to North Africa.

53rd QM Battalion (DUKW) participated in landings 10 July, with Company D attached to 2nd Armored Division and balance of Battalion to 1st Infantry Division staying with that attachment until 30 July, when they reverted to Army control. Companies A and D were on DS to 540th Engineers, operating ports of Termini and Torremuzo, until 25 and 28 August respectively. 67 DUKWS were withdrawn from this organization for shipment to Africa on 19 August, and were partially replaced by DUKWS transferred from the 52nd QM Bn.

Two companies of 54th QM Battalion (Trk) had arrived in Sicily on 26 July, balance of battalion arriving by the 30th. One company was immediately sent to Caltanissetta railhead, thence to Parata on 5 August and to Nicosia on the 8th. Balance of the battalion operated, beach and port supply points on the south coast, all under 1st Engineer Special Brigade until the battalion was transferred to Army control (replacing 1st Battalion 46th), arriving Palermo 29 August, with initial dispatches on the same night.

Arriving in theater 2 August and reporting for dispatch the following day, all of the 55th QM Battalion (Trk) operated at the port on local dispatch at Palermo, until 12 August, when companies A and B were sent to Tusa Railhead, Company A returning to Palermo on the 18th.

To meet emergency requirements for trucks, units other than quartermaster truck organizations have been called upon to furnish trucks. For the first three days of port operation at Palermo the Company D, 205th QM Battalion (GS) furnished twelve vehicles, and the 3rd Infantry Division furnished 25.

The gap between departure of the 46th (last port operation 1900, 26 August) and arrival of the 54th (first operation 1900, 29 August) was filled by securing 25 trucks from the 2nd Armored Division (Service Battalion) and 50 trucks from Field Artillery units of the 9th Division (60th, 26th, 34th and 84th Battalions).

Dump trucks for coal and bulk material movements at the port have been furnished by the 437th Engineer Dump Truck Company (eight from 12 to 14 August) and the 427th Engineer Dump Truck Company (ten from 29 August).

For movement of cases, timbers, poles and pipe which because of size could not be handled in 2-1/2 ton cargo trucks, equipment has been borrowed from Air Corps and Engineering units. Captured Italian flat bed trailers have been adapted and put into condition for use behind 2-1/2 ton trucks.

HISTORY OF HIGHWAY DIVISION

PHASE F - ORGANIZATION

1. STAFF ORGANIZATION: The Highway Division, Transportation Branch, G-4 was organized to function both as a staff and operating unit, with part of the staff and all of the operating personnel being supplied by the 6629rd Regulating Company (Prov), which is controlled by the Division. As indicated by the accompanying organizational chart the Division is divided into five sections, each with a specific functional responsibility. The officer personnel in each of the sections was allocated in accordance with operational requirements.

To assure efficient operation and to continuously control all highway operating agencies the Division was operated on a 24-hour basis, all officers being on call at any time of the day or night.

In general, the functions of the five sections were as follows:

a Movements Officer - Planning and execution of all "over the road" supply movements; Control of Motor Freight Dispatch Officers operating QM truck units in the field; Control of convoy movements on all moves over Army road nets and inter-corps movements.

b Traffic Engineer - Selection and designation of military supply routes; preparation of highway circulation plans; signing and sign maintenance of supply routes, dumps and supply points; coordination with Engineer, Provost Marshal, AMGOT and other agencies on matters pertaining to traffic control, traffic regulation and circulation plans.

c Administrative Officer - Office control and records; liaison with Highway Port Officer on Highway Port Operations.

d Motor Control Officer - Control of all QM Truck Units and availability of cargo vehicles for movement of all supplies; allocation of cargo trucks to Movements Officer and Highway Port Officer for movement of supplies in their respective operations. Handling of miscellaneous dispatch requests.

e Highway Port Operations - Operation of all motor freight transport from shipside to rail yard or to dump with complete control of movement of every cargo vehicle through pier supervision, dispatchers and port motor pool operation. Control of Highway Patrol.

2. HIGHWAY PORT OPERATIONS: Staffed by personnel of the 6629rd Regulating Co. (Prov.) all operations are under direction of the Highway Port Officer, who was also commanding officer of the Regulating Company. Actual operations were supervised by an Assistant Highway Port Officer for each of the two shifts, day and night.

A pier supervisory officer constantly circulated over the entire Port area, coordinating operations as a whole, and solving operating problems as they

arose, as well as supplying the Highway Port Officer with current information on pier operating conditions. Shipside supervisory officers control and superintend actual loading and dispatching of trucks, which was done by EM dispatchers. Supervisors anticipate requirements, and order trucks sufficiently in advance of actual need to accomplish a steady supply, minimizing standing time at shipside.

Orders for trucks at shipside were placed thru the Central Dispatching Office, and were there coordinated for relaying and actual movement from the Motor Pool. Routing of such ordersthru the Central office was necessary for smooth operation, particularly when "rationing" of trucks from the pool must be effected.

The administration and records section handled actual details of the central dispatching office, statistical compilation and analysis of dispatch tickets. Motor pool personnel dispatched trucks from the Pool, and coordinated operating matters with liaison officers of the truck organizations. Gate checkers verified dispatching of vehicles, and undue delays if any between shipside to gates.

A Road Patrol, serving directly under Highway Port Officer, policed operations outside of the Portaires, and , by furnishing information on unloading conditions to the Port Officer and his assistants, allowed anticipation and prevention of bottlenecks which might increase truck turn-around time.

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
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3. MOVEMENTS CONTROL: Movements control stations served the dual purpose of traffic control and dispatching. For traffic control purposes, the stations verify time schedule of convoys, coordinated movements where necessary, because of early or late arrival at check point, to prevent traffic conflicts. Where necessary, vehicles were checked to assure efficient use of cargo transport by limiting as much as possible "dead-head" operation. Organic convoys originating within Station territory were furnished road clearances by the Station, after coordination with the Movements Control Officer. Stations also served as liaison with Corps and Divisions using Army road net.

The dispatching function of Movements Control Stations included control of QM truck units in station area, provided transport for movement of supplies, supervised loading and dispatching of vehicles and formation and operation of convoys.

All movement information was cleared thru Movements Control Officer to adjacent control stations which were affected, assuring close traffic control of all convoy traffic on the Army Road Net.


Mobile sub-stations were located at important supply points which fed traffic into main control stations. By operating these mobile sub-stations it was possible to control convoy movements originating at out of the way points and assure a smooth flow of movements into the principal military supply routes.




PHASE G - MISCELLANEOUS

During the campaign the movement of military transport in the vicinity of towns and more densely populated areas was seriously handicapped by movement of animal drawn civilian vehicles on main supply streets and routes. The frequency of this interference and the resulting congestion made necessary some definite action to control civilian traffic. As a result of this continuing problem the Highway Division on 30 July prepared and recommended a set of traffic regulations for control of civilian traffic. The regulations were concurred in by the Provost Marshal, Engineers and AMEXT. Since the regulations were exclusively for civilian control they were published by AMEXT as "Avvisso No. 20", 4 August, and that agency made arrangements for enforcement by civilian police. In general, the regulations prohibited the use of military supply routes by carts and bicycles where alternate routes were available, limited speed of civilian vehicles, prohibited peddling on such thorofares and restricted civilians riding in military vehicles. In addition herded livestock was prohibited on such routes except for a minimum specified period.

In order to make most efficient use of cargo transport, during the campaign close liaison was maintained with the Provost Marshal for evacuation of prisoners of war from the front. Enclosures were located in close relation to main supply routes, and prisoners were moved back on vehicles which had moved supplies forward.





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SECTION II

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of motor freight operating experience acquired in the TORCH operations and currently in the HUSKY operation, the Highway Division makes the following recommendations which it believes will facilitate planning on future operations and substantially increase efficiency of operation, both in initial and subsequent operational stages:

1. To assure adequate and concrete highway planning for contemplated operations in a new theatre, a thoroughly experienced highway planning staff of at least four officers should be provided to develop necessary planning, procure necessary supplies and form the nucleus of the staff and operating division upon inauguration of motor freight operation in the theatre.

2. Quartermaster truck battalions should be reinforced:

a. With sufficient driver personnel to provide operation of all vehicles on a two-shift, 24-hour basis from shipside to dump.

b. With 24' flat-bed 4-wheel trailers to be towed behind 2½-ton 6x6 cargo trucks - a minimum of five per company, for the movement of poles, pipe, timber, heavy cases and various other commodities which, because of size, cannot be transported in conventional 2½-ton cargo trucks.

c. With sufficient 4-ton wreckers and common 3rd echelon maintenance tools to allow a minimum of one company per battalion to perform its own repairs as a self-contained unit isolated from ordinary 3rd echelon maintenance facilities.

3. Prior to entering the theatre, adequate sign stock should be prepared to provide a rapid means of signing dump installations and local routes. Materials should be light in weight for easy handling and mounting, and accompanied by an adequate supply of maintenance equipment. In preference to prepainted signs, it is recommended that appropriate legend be prepared in the theatre to meet any conditions encountered.

4. At least four officers of the Highway staff should arrive in the theatre on D-day to be thoroughly familiar with the requirements of supply as they develop and to modify previously planned operational procedures, in order that operations may be smoothly organized as soon as motor freight movements under control of the Highway Division are instituted.

5. Adequate planning for efficient operation of motor freight transport under blackout conditions is of primary importance, and materials should be procured in advance to provide flourescent markings on signs and markings so as to assure some degree of night visibility.

6. For efficient port operation, a positive air raid signal, preferably of the visual type, to indicate "alerts" and "all clears" is essential to avoiding inefficiency through confusion. Efficient port motor freight operations cannot be maintained without such provision.

7. Provision should be made to inaugurate an adequate system of operational records as soon as motor freight operations are started.

8. Prior to entering the theatre all supply services concerned should have positive direction as to the selection and establishment of supply dumps in relation to efficient transportation operation.

SECTION III

OPERATIONAL DATA

APPENDIX

Index

Appendix	1	Operational Procedure, Motor Control Section.
Appendix	2	Operational Procedure, Movements Control Section.
Appendix	3	Dispatch Log for Palermo Area.
Appendix	4	Chart: Daily Tonnage Highway Port Operations, Palermo, 28 July - 31 August.
Appendix	5	Table: Daily Tonnage Highway Port Operations, Palermo, 28 July - 31 August.
Appendix	6	Chart: Daily Truck Availability and Use, Palermo Port, 28 July - 31 August.
Appendix	7	Table: Daily Truck Availability and Use, Palermo Port, 28 July - 31 August.
Appendix	8	Flow Chart: Motor Freight Operations, Palermo Port, 28 July - 31 August.
Appendix	9	Flow Chart: Motor Freight Operations, Sicily, 17 July - 31 August.
Appendix	10	Chart: Daily Over-the-road Ton Miles, 24 July - 31 August.
Appendix	11	Table: Daily Over-the-road Ton Miles, 24 July - 31 August.
Appendix	12	Chart: Total Tonnages by Services.
Appendix	13	Table: Total Tonnages by Services.
Appendix	14	Map: Military Route System & Dump Locations, Palermo Area, 31 August.
Appendix	15	Traffic Sign Designs.
Appendix	16	S.O.P. Motor Movements.

APPENDIX I

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

MOTOR CONTROL SECTION

INDEX

Paragraph	Topic
1	Purpose of Section.
2	Policies.
3	Dispatching of Vehicles. a - To Port b - Misc. Hauls c - Convoys & Over-the-Road Moves
4	Reports. a - Unit (1) Daily (2) Periodic b - To G-4 c - By Motor Control Section (1) Daily (2) Periodic
5	Cargo Vehicles requested from Seventh Army units.
6	Aid from G-4 Automotive Section.
7	Aids to Motor Control Section. ANNEXES "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F".

1. The "Motor Control Section" of Highway Division is formed to dispatch cargo vehicles for port operations, convoys, movement of supplies for the services, personnel moves, etc. The Port of Palermo is given first priority for vehicles, and any other dispatching is made according to the importance of the move.

2. It is understood that the "hoarding" of vehicles by this section is absurd, because tonnage and movements will pile up and would, at some future time, place a serious problem on our hands. However, certain policies have been made, and some requests for transportation are turned down. Some of these requests are listed here with explanations for their rejection, but the acceptance or rejection is up to the person who will dispatch the vehicle.

a. AMGOT. We often get requests from this organization for trucks to haul supplies for civilians, AMG personnel, and miscellaneous details. Except in extraordinary circumstances, these are refused because the AMG has control of all the civilian cars, busses, and trucks on the Island of Sicily. From all of these vehicles, even though it may place a burden on the civilians, it is believed that enough can be procured to supply the needs of that organization without hindering the operations of the Army.

b. Personnel. Because of the shortage of cargo vehicles on the Island, we have established the policy of making troops march to and from their destinations around Palermo. This is particularly true in regards to moving men to and from the staging area, the railroad stations, port, and stockade. We do, however, furnish transportation for the baggage and equipment of these men. (Many organizations to which we furnish transporation use some of it to carry personnel. The POW labor at the port is an outstanding example of this, but the trucks are out of our control, and the port is assuming responsibility of using cargo transportation for personnel, and still moving the required tonnage.)

c. POW. Prisoners march to the P of E for transfer to the United States, England, or Africa. They carry their own equipment.

3. Highway Form #1 (Annex "A") shows the form used to dispatch vehicles. The original is given to the organization furnishing the vehicles, and the representative of that organization signs the duplicate which is retained in our file.

a. Port. As was given in Par. 1, the port has first priority on vehicles. At 1500 each day, the port calls this office giving the vehicle requirements for the night shift of that date and for the following day shift. Organizations have their representatives in this office at 1700 to pick up the dispatch slips for the two shifts mentioned.

b. Miscellaneous dispatches are made during the day and vehicles are usually ordered by 'phone or messenger. When this is done by 'phone, no receipt for the request is obtained them, so a confirmation call is usually made.

c. Vehicles for over-the-road moves are dispatched by the Motor Control Section, but control of the movement is delegated to the "Movements" Section who coordinate the moves with other convoys over the official routes. Highway Form #2 (Annex "B") is the form used by the convoy commander, issued by this office, and returned by the convoy commander at the completion of the trip.

4. The reports delivered to and originating from this section are few in number and very simple. Information reports are made only on request.

a. Unit reports.

(1) Units under the control of the Highway Division submit a "Daily Vehicle Morning Report" for 2½ - T cargo trucks at 1000 each day. This form is shown in annex "C" and is self explanatory. Another form, Annex "D" prepared by the 53 QM Bn (DUKW) is the form made by that organization because of the two types of cargo vehicles - 2½ - T cargo trucks and 2½ - T amphibious trucks in use in that unit. The reverse of this form contains information pertinent to that unit, and as the one copy serves both that unit, and this office, it is accepted in lieu of our form.

(2) No other reports are requested on a regular basis. When a change of status of equipment occurs, a report is submitted, and we may also request a report of vehicles in Ordnance Shops, reasons for deadline vehicles, etc.

b. Motor Control Section.

(1) The Motor Control Section prepares a daily record of vehicles used the previous 24 hours by the Seventh Army installations (Annex "E"). The miscellaneous dispatches are broken down as shown by Annex "F" and the convoys and other pertinent data are also shown for record.

(2) Periodic reports are discussed above.

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5. When requests for vehicles are more than we can supply, and the requests are of sufficient importance, vehicles are drawn from the organic transportation of units of the Seventh Army, II Corps, and Prov. Co ps. These are requested for a specific length of time, and are returned to the organizations at the end of that period. This practice is not desired, and it is kept to a minimum, for Transportation Section units can generally supply the required vehicles.

6. The G-4 Automotive Section aids the Highway Division in many ways. As the Automotive Section handled the transportation prior to the formation of this separate section, they have much advice to offer regarding policies and operation. It gets periodic strength and deadline reports from each unit in the Seventh Army, and some of this information is used by us. It makes automotive inspections in unit areas, and gives advice to the unit on the truck operation, performance, and maintenance. And it is from the reports of that section, and the aid from it, that we request cargo vehicles from Seventh Army units to supplement our movements.

HD FORM # 1
(6/11/43)
Revised 500 cp
(25/8/43)

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
HIGHWAY DIVISION, G-4 SEC.
A.P.O. # 758, U.S. ARMY.

ANNEX "A"

19__ : B Hour
(date) (Time)

TYPE OF VEHICLE(S) 2½ Ton, 6x6, Cargo, or DUKWS, NUMBER REQUIRED _____

REQUESTED BY _____ (name) (organization) (telephone)

REPORT TO _____ (name) (organization) (telephone)

AT _____ B Hours 19__
(location) (time) (date)

TO BE USED FOR _____

LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED _____ HOURS, _____ DAYS.

REQUEST RECEIVED BY _____

REMARKS _____

DISPATCH ASSIGNED TO _____ B hour
(dispatcher) (organization) (time)

DISPATCH CONFIRMED _____ B Hours 19__ _____
(time) (date) (dispatcher)

To be made out in duplicate, original going to unit concerned, copy to be signed by Dispatcher receiving same, and return to Highway Division, Transportation Section, Seventh Army Headquarters, APO 758.

Hwy #2
8/43 - 500

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
Transportation Section, G-4
Highway Division

ANNEX "B"

FREIGHT CONVOY MOVEMENT AUTHORITY

Date of Oper. _____ (Movements Officer) Station _____

I Organization of Convoy

a. No. of Trucks _____ Units ____ No. of Trailers _____ Units _____

b. Vehicles per March Units _____ min No. of March Units ____ March Units per Serial _____ No. of Serials ____

c. Time gap btwn March Units _____ min Time gap btwn Serials _____ min Time Length of Convoy _____

d. Convoy Commander _____ (Rank) _____ (Organization)

II Movement Control Schedule

Time to leave I.P. _____ I.P.Time _____

a. Bivouac Area

b. Loading Points	No. of Trucks Sched.	Actual*	Arrival Time Sched	Actual*	Departure Time Sched.	Actual

c.	Scheduled Time	Late	Actual Times*	Late
I.P. Time 1st March Unit				
I.P. Time Last March Unit				

III Routing of Convoy _____

CONTROL POINTS	First March Unit Scheduled Time (head)	First March Unit Actual Time(head)*	Last March Unit Scheduled Time (tail of column)	Last March Unit Act Time * (tail)
Destination			Unloaded	

REMARKS:

* To be filled in by Convoy Commander.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY, Transportation Section G-4, Highway Division.

Requisition to C.O. _____ (ASP or Dump)

You are authorized to release to Convoy Commander _____ the following material and/or supplies

No.	Description	Wgt.(tons or lbs)

Signature _____

Title _____

Service _____

(To be filled in by Convoy Commander)

Total tons actually loaded and moved _____

Total number of vehicles loaded _____ Trailers _____

Total number of vehicles not loaded _____

Disposition of empty vehicles _____

Shortages _____

Sig. _____ (Convoy Commander)

_____ (Organization)

ANNEX "C"

HEADQUARTERS _____

DATE _____

DAILY VEHICLE MORNING REPORT (2 1/2-T Cargo Trucks and 2 1/2-T Dukws)

T/BA Strength	Actual Strength	Dead-Lined	D/S	On Dis-patch	Available for duty

_____ (Signature)

_____ (title)

* When a Bn or higher unit reports, report must be broken down by company.

** Last four (4) columns must agree with column 2 (actual strength).

ANNEX "D"

HQ 53RD QM BN
APO 758

SUBJECT : Vehicle Status Report as of 0700 Hours.

TO : Highway Transportation, G-4 Section, Seventh Army.

	Actual Strength Cargo Vehicles	Cargo Vehicles On deadline 2, 3&4 echelon to be out of service one or more days	On duty at Port or other hauling	Called but standing by in Co. area	Available for call	Remarks
2½ Ton Trucks						
DUKW'S						
2½ Ton Trucks						
DUKW'S						
2½ Ton Trucks						
DUKW'S						
2½ Ton Trucks						
DUKW'S						

* Suitable for land only
** Suitable for land or water

Vehicles held for Company use:

Type	Total	On Deadline	Company Numbers
1/4 Ton C&R			
3/4 Ton C&R			
3/4 Ton W/C			
2½ Ton 6x6			

Total Vehicles in Company

1/4 Ton C&R	
3/4 Ton C&R	
3/4 Ton W/C	
2½ Ton 6x6	
DUKWS	

Company numbers of vehicles on deadline, type, and reason for deadline:

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ANNEX "E"

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
Transportation Section, G-4
A.P.O. #758

TRUCK DUTY ROSTER

1943

UNIT	ACTUAL STRENGTH	DEAD-LINE	PORT DUTY: TERMINI	PORT DUTY: CEFALU	PORT DUTY: PALERMO	CONVOY DUTY	MISC HAULS	AVAIL-ABLE
DAY								
1st Bn 27 QM Regt (trk)(Co. C)								
1st Bn 46th QM Regt (trk)								
53rd QM Bn (DUKW)								
2 1/2 T Cargo trks								
2 1/2 T DUKWS								
55th QM Bn (trk)								
138th QM Co (trk)								
144th QM Co (trk)								
Totals								
NIGHT								
1st Bn 27 QM Regt (trk)(Co. C)								
1st Bn 46 QM Regt (trk)								
53rd QM Bn (DUKW)								
2 1/2 T Cargo trks								
2 1/2 T DUKWS								
55th QM Bn (trk)								
138th QM Co (trk)								
144th QM Co (trk)								
Totals								

ANNEX "F"

MISCELLANEOUS DISPATCHES

1943

ORGANIZATION	NO. OF TRUCKS	ASSIGNMENT	TOTAL EST. NO. TRK HRS.

PROGRESS

STATION	ARR.	DEP.	REV.

REMARKS:

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 2

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE, MOVEMENTS CONTROL SECTION

1. At time of interview with Convoy Commander, or his representative, complete details concerning the convoy are recorded on form provided for that purpose. (Annex A).

2. Schedule is arranged setting forth speeds, halts, bivouacs, etc.

3. Schedule is then checked to see that there is no conflict with other schedules previously arranged.

4. If Corps Routes are involved it becomes necessary

   a. To inform Corps concerned of the move.

   b. To coordinate the move with any the Corps may have scheduled.

5. Maps, or strip maps, with route clearly indicated in crayon are issued on the basis of one (1) per march unit.

6. Convoy Authorization is granted by assigning convoy a number and completing "Convoy Auth. Form". (Annex B). This form clearly sets forth rules and regulations governing all convoys, and when completed, establishes specific regulation for the particular convoy in question.

7. Between the hours of 1800 and 2400 each day interested Movements Control Stations are informed of all details concerning convoys arranged for the next day.

8. Movements Control Stations will:

   a. Complete "Station Record of Movement" form. (Annex C).

   b. Complete "Daily Station Log" in duplicate (one for Hq) (Annex D).

   c. Report progress of all convoys to Hq, Movements Control.

   d. Report progress of all convoys to next station enroute.

   e. Report, investigate, and correct all irregularities.

   f. At specific times each day (0800 morning and 2000 evening) report strength to Headquarters. At this time communication is checked, clocks and watches will be synchronized.

9. Headquarters posts exact progress of convoys (on Convoy Control Sheet - Annex E - and later on bottom half of data sheet #1) and files completed data sheet when move has been completed.

10. Headquarters and Control Stations will endeavor to eliminate movement of vehicles not loaded to capacity.

APPENDIX 2
ANNEX A

ROAD MOVEMENTS CONTROL
CONVOY DATA AND PROGRESS RECORD

_____ (Date)

Organization _____ Tel _____ Convoy Number _____

Convoy Commander _____ Authority to Move _____

Vehicles: Total ____ 1/4T ____ 3/4T ____ 1 1/2T ____ 2 1/2T ____ Others ____ Over

Officers _____ EM _____ Others _____ Completely Loaded? _____

From _____ To _____ Via _____

I.P. _____ at _____ Hrs on _____

Bivouac _____ E.T.A. (destination) _____

APPENDIX 2
ANNEX "B"

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
A.P.O. 758

AUTHORIZATION FOR ROAD MOVEMENT

Officer issuing authorization _____ Date _____

I - ORGANIZATION

1. Your convoy designation is _____. (This number will be shown on the front of each vehicle)

2. Your convoy commander is _____.

3. You will place heavier loaded, slower moving vehicles at the head of your column.

4. Maximum number of vehicles per March Unit will be 20. Maximum number of March Units will be 5. Time Gap between March Units will be 3-5 minutes. Time Gap between Serials will be a minimum of 25 minutes.

5. With convoys of ten (10) vehicles or more an officer in a command vehicle will be in charge.

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II TIME AND SPEED SCHEDULE

1. Your Initial Point (IP) is_____.

2. The lead vehicle will pass IP at_____hours on_____19____.

3. Your convoy will conform to the following time table:

HIGHWAY CONTROL STATION	ARRIVAL TIME LEAD VEHICLE	DEPART TIME TAIL VEHICLE	REMARKS

4. Convoys of ten (10) or more vehicles will avoid stopping the whole column by sending a small advance party (including kitchen trucks when desirable) to check at all Control Stations on the assigned route(s) at least thirty (30) minutes ahead of the main body. Advance parties will thus be able to furnish requested information, receive instructions or schedules from Control Stations, and areas for bivouac, or escort.

III CONVOY OPERATION

1. Speeds:
   a. Speeds will be commensurate with safety at all times.
   b. Maximum speed on highways outside of city limits will be thirty (30) miles per hour during daylight hours and twenty (20) miles per hour during hours of darkness unless otherwise designated by military signs.

2. Density—Open country seventeen (17) vehicles per mile, i.e. a minimum distance between vehicles of one hundred (100) yards, to be maintained at all times. In cities and towns interval between vehicles will be retained and individual vehicles will reduce speed to required speed limits.

3. Flags—A blue flag will be carried on the lead vehicle and a green flag on the tail vehicle of each serial.

4. Guides—To aid in organisation of convoy at IP, to control movement of convoy through towns or over one-way bridges, or through intersections or other points of potential conflict, guides will be posted by Convoy Commander as needed.

5. Halts—Rests or halts for meals will not be made in towns, on bridges, defiles, curves, or with vehicles standing on the travelled portion of the roadway. Vehicle interval may be adjusted to meet exigencies of terrain characteristics on halts provided vehicles are never closer than seventy-five (75) yards one from the other.

6. Passing—No convoy will overtake another convoy proceeding in the same direction without specific authority shown in the Road Movement Approval.

7. Radio—Complete radio silence will be maintained except in an emergency.

8. Convoy Commanders will be responsible for discipline and policing of their convoys. Orders will be issued by Convoy Commander to prevent personnel from throwing any articles from moving vehicles.

9. Convoy Commanders may, at their discretion, clear highways of civilian vehicular traffic to the extent necessary to permit free passage of convoys.

IV SUPPLIES AND BIVOUAC AREAS

Current information concerning the availability of supplies, water points, bivouac areas, Ordnance units, First Aid Stations, and Hospitals can be obtained at Highway Control Stations or Highway Division, G-4, Seventh Army.

V VEHICLE BREAKDOWNS

Drivers of disabled vehicles will signal the following vehicles to proceed. Such vehicles will not be abandoned; they may be left under guard and must be reported to nearest Highway Control Station.

VI LIGHTS

1. Between sunset and sunrise all convoys will operate with "dim-out lights" and with marker lights lit.

2. Dim-out lights will conform to either of the following standards (AFHQ Cir. 59, 29 July 1943):
   a. Headlights will have the painted black-out shields as used in Great Britain.
   b. Headlights will have the face of the lense painted black with paint removed to allow for a crescent shaped space two (2) inches long and one-half inch high with top of space one (1) inch below center line of lense.

3. If vehicles are operated during an alert the marker lights will be lit.

VII AIR DEFENSE

In the event of Actual Air Attack, vehicles will halt at open interval along the side of the road and all suitable weapons will be brought to bear on attacking aircraft. Personnel not manning weapons will disperse and take cover.

VIII ACCIDENTS

1. In all cases of accidents the driver will immediately fill out the Drivers Report (Form No. 26) and Army Form A 3681 (Eng - It).

2. Form 27 - Investigating Officer's Report will be completed.

3. It will be the Convoy Commander's responsibility to see that the nearest Claims Office is advised through channels of all pertinent information. In the case of serious personal injury all possible assistance will be rendered and the facts reported in the most expeditious manner.

IX UNAUTHORIZED FIRING OF WEAPONS

Attention is directed to the fact that the careless and unauthorized discharge of firearms is a violation of the 96th Article of War. Personnel in convoy are enjoined from the unauthorized use of any weapon. Convoy, serial and march unit commanders will appoint the senior officer, non-commissioned officer or private in each vehicle to assume direct responsibility for the conduct of personnel in such vehicles and maintenance of discipline at all times.

STATION RECORD OF MOVEMENT — APPENDIX 2, ANNEX "C"

Station_____

Date (A)_____ Direction (B)_____ Convoy Designation(C)_____

Organization(D)_____ Convoy Com.(E)_____

Vehicles(F)_____ Officers(G)_____ EM(H)_____

Cargo Inspected by(I)_____ Available Space(J)_____(men) (K)_____(tons)

Origin(L)_____ Destin.(M)_____ Fla(N)_____

Lead Veh. Arrived at (O)_____ Tail veh. cleared at (P)_____

Time lead vehicle due at next station (Q)_____ To bivouac at (R)_____

For Station Use only:

Call completed to Hq. at_____By_____Spoke to_____

Call completed to next Station at_____By_____Spoke to_____

March Units	Time Lead Veh.	Time Tail Veh.	March Units	Time Lead Veh.	Time Tail Veh.

Station _____ DAILY STATION LOG DATE _____

To be prepared as a schedule of Convoys for the day.

Convoy Desig.	Organization	Convoy Com.	Veh	Pers	Antic time of Arriv.	Act. time of Arriv.	Act. time of Depart	Convoy Destin.	Inspection for freight	Time Rep to H.Q.	Time Reported next Stop

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
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
APPENDIX 2
ANNEX - F



CONVOY CONTROL SHEET

(Date)

Convoy Number	ORGANIZATION CONVOY COMMADER	FROM	TO	VEHS	PERS	PALERMO ARR	PALERMO DEP	TERMINI ARR	TERMINI DEP	STEFANO ARR	STEFANO DEP	AGRIGENTO ARR	AGRIGENTO DEP	TRAPANI ARR	TRAPANI DEP		



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APPENDIX – 3

MOTOR TRANSPORT DISPATCHING ORDER

To assure an accurate basis for statistical records and to provide necessary information for the control of all motor freight vehicular movements, a motor transport dispatching order is used. Each driver, upon his vehicle being loaded, is given this order in triplicate. One copy is picked up at the exit gate at the point of origin of the load and the order checked for correct destination; one copy is delivered to the officer or NCO at the dump to which the load is consigned; the remaining original dispatch order is receipted at the dump at the time of delivery of the load and is retained by the driver, being turned in to the Highway Division checker upon return of the driver and vehicle to the point of origin. Dispatching orders are collected periodically during each 24 hour period from the checkers and are sorted and tabulated in the Administration and Records office of the Highway Port Officer. These daily tabulations form the basis for all highway statistical records and reports.

A facsimile of the Motor Transport Dispatching Order is reproduced below to indicate the extent of information and data recorded thereon:

M. T. Dispatching Order

Driver must turn in receipted copy to port. Green copy to be retained by dump. If load is refused, telephone port for instructions for driver. If no telephone available, send driver back to port with explanation written on back of this ticket.

T. C. _____ Trailer _____
Truck No. _____ Capacity _____ tons No Trailer _____ Date _____
Loaded at _____ Checked By _____ Time Dispatched _____
(Origin-Ship No., Wire, etc.)
Take to _____ Use Exit No. _____ Follow Route _____
Return to _____ Dispatched by _____
Material In Load _____ lbs
No. Pieces | Description | Identifying Mark | Weight
Load Received At _____ By _____ Time _____ Date _____

T I M E	Out of Fuel	Loading Began	Loading Completed	Arrived Destination INTO PORT
	Unloading Completed	Into Fuel	Out of Fuel	

N. T. O. C. This portion is to be made on every case. Other entries are to be completed on special orders.

DISPATCH LOG FOR PALERMO AREA

Quartermaster (Dumps 1-9 Incl)

DUMP #1
Class I - La Favorita Park (Race Track)
ROUTE A-B-C and #1 signs

DUMP #2
Class II & IV - Area south of railway yards near passenger station
ROUTE O-M-E and #2 signs

DUMP #3
Class III - On the west side of Via Real Favorita four (4) miles from the main port gates
ROUTE A-B-C to dump

DUMP #4
Salvage - Engineers Barracks on Via Porrazzi (Route M)
ROUTE O-M to dump

DUMP #5
Cold Storage - On the east side of Via F Parlatore north of Via Dante (Route H)
ROUTE A-P-H or O-P-H and #5 signs

DUMP #6
Bakery - Caserma S. Antonio on the southwest corner of Corso Tukory and Via Oreto (Routes M & E)
ROUTE O-M to dump

APPENDIX 3

H.D. Form #5

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY - A.P.O. 758
Highway Division - Transportation Branch

ROAD PATROL REPORT
(Prepare in duplicate)

Date _____
Period Covered _____

I DUMP CHECKS:

TIME	DUMP NO.	Number Vehicles Unloading	Number Vehicles Loading	Number Vehicles Waiting	Unloading Personnel	Vehicle Capacity of Dump

II REMARKS:

(Continue on reverse side)

_____ (Patrolman) _____ (Rank)

DUMP #7
Coal Yard - On Via Cristoforo Colombo near Customs Bldg.
ROUTE A to dump

DUMP #8
Class III - On the west side of highway #121 one-half mile south of Portella di Mare, approximately seven (7) miles from main port gate
ROUTE O - Highway #113 - Highway #121 to dump.

Ordnance (Dumps 10-19 Incl)

DUMP #11
Class II & IV - Aircraft Works, Psa Olivuzza
ROUTE APH or OPH to dump

DUMP #12
General purpose vehicles, combat vehicles and towed weapons. Artillery Barracks on Via Monte Pellegrino
ROUTE A-B to dump

DUMP #14
Class V (Ammunition) - On highway #113, 10.3 miles east of main port gate
ROUTE O and Highway #113 to dump

Engineer (Dumps 20-29 Incl)

DUMP #20
Class II & IV - Caserma della Maria near Via Malaspina (Route G)
ROUTE A-P-H-G or O-P-H-G and #20 signs

Signal (Dumps 30-39 Incl)

DUMP #30
Class IV (Poles and heavy cable) - On the east side of Corso Dei Mille (Route N) near Fiume Oreto
ROUTE O-M-N to dump

DUMP #31
Class II & IV - Engineers Barracks off Via Porassi (Route M)
ROUTE O-M and #31 signs

DUMP #32
Class IV (Wire, 2 x 4's, hardware) - Off Via Porazzi (Route M) near Engineers Barracks
ROUTE O-M and #32 signs

Chemical Warfare (Dumps 40-49 Incl)

DUMP #40
Class II - Westerly end of Via Dante
ROUTE A-P-H or O-P-H to dump

DUMP #44
Class V - On Highway #113, 10.3 miles east of main port gate
ROUTE O and Highway #113 to dump

Air Corps (Dumps 50-59 Incl)

DUMP #50
Technical Supplies - Warehouse on Via Cristoforo Colombo (Route A)
ROUTE A to dump

DUMP #51
Gas - Out Via Allarello to an area west of the airport
ROUTE O-M-L-K or O-P-L-K and #51 signs

DUMP #52
Ammunition - La Favorita Park (Race Track) Dump is located 1.3 miles from main entrance to the park
ROUTE A-B-C and #52 signs

DUMP #53
Air Signal - On the east side of Corso Dei Mille (Route N) near Fiume Oreto
ROUTE O-M-N to dump

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
Transportation Section, G-4

DISPATCH LOG FOR PALERMO AREA

First Issue
12 August 1943

First Supplement
21 August 1943

Quartermaster (Dumps 1-9 and 100-109 Incl)

DUMP #100
PX Warehouse - 11 Via Lascaris
ROUTE A-P or O-P and #100 signs

Ordnance (Dumps 10-10 incl)

DUMP #15
Class V - Isola Delle Femmine 9.4 miles northwest of main port gate on Highway #113
ROUTE A-B-C-E and Highway #113 to dump

Chemical Warfare (Dumps 40-49 incl)

DUMP #41
Class V - Isola Delle Femmine 9.4 miles northwest of main port gate on Highway #113
ROUTE A-B-C-E and Highway #113 to dump

DUMP #48
Class V, Pots, Smoke, HC M1 - At the westerly end of Via Pasubio
ROUTE A-B-P-E and #48 signs

DUMP #49
Class V, Pots, Smoke, HC M1 - Iron Works, Via Malaspina near Engineer Dump #20
ROUTE A-P-H-G or O-P-H-G to dump

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AMGOT (80-89 incl)

DUMP #80

Flour - Arenella Chemical Company on Via Papa Sergio, 2.5 miles from main port gate
ROUTE A to dump

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
Transportation Section, G-4
APO 758

DISPATCH LOG FOR PALERMO AREA — First Issue 12 August 1943

Second Supplement 31 August 1943

Quartermaster (Dumps 1-9 and 100-109 incl)

DUMP #9
Class III - On the east side of Highway #121 approximately 6 miles south of Highway #113. Distance from main port gate is approximately 11 miles.
ROUTE O - Highway #113 - Highway #121 to dump.

DUMP #101
Class I - On the east side of Via Amiro Giafar 0.7 mile south of Route O (Highway #113)
ROUTE O and #101 signs

DUMP #54
Air Engineer - On the north side of Via Lincoln (Route M) near the R.R. Station
ROUTE O-M to dump

Medical (Dumps 60-69 Incl)

DUMP #60
All Classes - On the south side of Via Lincoln (Route M) near Via Duca Archirafi
ROUTE O-M to dump

Miscellaneous

DUMP #70
Organizational equipment - On the north side of Via Duca Di Verdura (Route F) west of Via Monte Pellegrino (Route B)

STAGING AREA
Route O-P-H-J or A-P-H-J to area


RAIL YARD A
East side of Via Cristoforo Colombo
ROUTE A or ROUTE O to yard

RAIL YARD B
West side of Via Monte Pellegrino
ROUTE A-B or O-B to yard

RAIL YARD C
West of Corso Dei Mille (Route N) south of Via Lincoln (Route M)
ROUTE O-M-N to yard

RAIL YARD L
North of Lolli Station. Entrance off Via Malaspina (Route G)
ROUTE A-P-H-G or O-P-H-G to yard

STOCKADE
South side of Corso Calatafimi
ROUTE O-L to stockade



TRAFFIC CIRCULATION PLAN

PALERMO 11 AUGUST 1943

H.Q. 7th ARMY, APO 758
Highway Division - Transportation Branch, G-4

12 August 1943

APPROVAL

The system of military routes outlined on the reverse side of this sheet has been approved by: Transportation Section G-4 and concurred in by the Provost Marshal and Engineer Sections, 7th Army, Commander Military Areas, and A.M.G.O.T.

PURPOSE

The routing system has been designed principally for the use of motor freight vehicles and convoys. Among the benefits to be derived from use of designated streets are: Assurance of direct access to all dumps, minimum interference by civilian traffic, good maintenance of the more desirable streets, decrease in number of "lost" trucks, and more efficient use of motor transport.

DIRECTIONAL MARKING

Traffic moving from the port to various dumps is directed by route signs with a letter designation and words "Dump Route". Traffic proceeding toward the port is directed by route signs with a letter designation and the words "Port Route". Where necessary, arrows are used in a vertical position to indicate straight through direction and in a horizontal position to show a turn to the right or left.

ROUTE DESIGNATIONS

The letters A to P (excluding "I") have been used to indicate the military routes. The letters have been assigned to the routes counter clockwise beginning with the north-south road along the port. For example, ViaFrancesco Crispi is "A" Dump Route". Via Monte Pellegrino is "B Dump Route", and Via Imperatore Federico is "C Dump Route". Only one letter is assigned to each route with the exception of the one along the port. In this case the letter "A" is used for northbound traffic and "O" for southbound traffic. This simplifies dispatching by always making the first route used "A" if the vehicle is to turn right out of the port and "O" the first route used if the vehicle is to turn left out of the port.

DUMP SIGNS

A series of numbers has been assigned exclusively to each service. All dumps are marked with signs giving the dump number. A dump sign has the word "Dump" on the top line, the service and class on the second line, and the dump number appears at the bottom of the sign.

JUNCTIONS

A sign reading "Junction Route" and the route letter is placed ahead of the intersection of routes to furnish advance notice of a junction with another route. For example, a driver proceeding along "B" Dump Route will find a sign reading "Junction RouteF" about 150 feet before the intersection with route F.

E-30


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APPENDIX 4 –

DAILY TONNAGE HIGHWAY PORT OPERATIONS PALERMO 28 JULY to 31 AUGUST 1943



APPENDIX 5

TABLE OF TONNAGE
HAULED FROM SHIPSIDE
From July 28, to August 31, 1943

APPENDIX 5

DATE		TOTAL TONNAGE	RAIL	DESTINATION SUPPLY POINT	DUMP
July 28:	AM	165.5			165.5
	PM	636.8	100.0		536.8
29:	AM	956.5	345.9		610.6
	PM	772.5	303.6	48.0	420.9
30:	AM	1106.5	483.8	65.5	557.2
	PM	883.7	339.4		544.3
31:	AM	1206.9	466.6	68.5	671.8
	PM	630.9	145.1		485.8
Aug 1:	AM	419.7	145.9		263.8
	PM	108.1			108.1
2:	AM	256.4	54.0		202.4
	PM	291.2	12.0		279.2
3:	AM	964.9	179.4		785.5
	PM	405.1	151.5		253.6
4:	AM	998.7	378.6		620.1
	PM	595.8	26.5		569.3
5:	AM	1305.3	413.9		991.4
	PM	605.5			605.5
6:	AM	1456.9	273.1	18.00	1183.8
	PM	737.8	3.3		716.5
7:	AM	1115.0	372.3	81.3	961.4
	PM	945.2		70.2	875.0
8:	AM	1754.4	638.6	18.0	1097.8
	PM	1213.6	158.6		1055.0
9:	AM	2271.1	1430.1		841.0
	PM	1566.7		45.0	1521.7
10:	AM	2753.3	866.6	84.4	1802.3
	PM	1642.9			1642.9
11:	AM	3114.7	848.0		2266.7
	PM	2048.0			2048.0
12:	AM	3159.2	859.8		2299.4
	PM	1213.3			1213.3
13:	AM	2933.6	1154.8		1778.8
	PM	2745.8	508.1		2237.7
14:	AM	3322.1	1331.6		1988.5
	PM	2294.9		12.0	1275.1
15:	AM	2852.6	1069.1	37.5	1766.0
	PM	2275.4	566.6	27.0	1681.8
16:	AM	1913.8	543.7		1370.1
	PM	1801.1	672.4		1131.7
17:	AM	2405.9	668.0		1737.9
	PM	2183.5	527.1	27.0	1629.4
18:	AM	2152.5	467.5	45.0	1640.0
	PM	1385.4	368.2	18.0	999.3
19:	AM	2002.3	578.7		1423.6
	PM	1512.7	386.7		1126.0
20:	AM	2290.9	365.2		1925.7
	PM	1975.6	206.3		1769.3
21:	AM	2633.7	940.2		1693.5
	PM	2015.1	680.7		1334.4
22:	AM	2952.8	626.6		2326.2
	PM	1909.1	169.5		1739.6
23:	AM	3437.8	418.6		3019.2
	PM	1972.4	443.3		1529.1
24:	AM	3163.0	340.8		2822.2
	PM	1269.5	127.5		1142.0
25:	AM	3463.9	330.9		3233.0
	PM	2298.7	388.0		1910.7
26:	AM	3850.7	1336.8		2513.9
	PM	1913.3	744.9		1168.4
27:	AM	3712.1	1560.5		2151.6
	PM	1929.8	362.2		1567.6
28:	AM	3156.5	885.1		2271.4
	PM	2266.4	526.4		1740.0
29:	AM	3080.8	315.9		2764.9
	PM	2237.8	143.6	10.5	2083.7
30:	AM	3408.8	488.1		2820.7
	PM	2243.5	182.6		2060.9
31:	AM	3046.3	10.0		3036.3
	PM	2139.7	84.3		2055.4

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO #758

_____ (Date)

MEMO:

TO :

1. Summary of Motor Transport operation for period from _____ to _____.

NO. OF TRUCKS	NO. OF TRIPS	TONNAGE *	TRUCK HOURS OF OTHER USE

* includes tons to rail

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2. Summary of Motor Convoy Operations for the same period :

Origin	DESTINATION	TRUCKS	TONNAGE	SERVICE

Highway Division
Transportation G-4
Hqs Seventh Army
APO #758

HIGHWAY PORT OFFICE
HIGHWAY DIVISION

31 August 1943.

1. By Shift No. 2 working from 1900 hours 30 0700 hours, 30 - 31 August.

2. DUMPS:

	NO. OF TRIPS	TONNAGE
QUARTERMASTER I:		
Port to Dump #1	265	821.3
QUARTERMASTER II & IV:		
Port to Dump #2	20	41.6
QUARTERMASTER III:		
Port to Dump #3	16	41.7
Port to Dump #7	95	146.0
Port to Dump #9	30	102.9
Port to Rail Yard "L"	7	25.2
ORDNANCE II & IV:		
Port to Dump #11	20	47.1
ORDNANCE V:		
Port to Dump #11	1	3.0
Port to Rail Yard "C"	26	83.1
ENGINEER II & IV:		
Port to Dump #20	39	103.0
SIGNAL II & IV:		
Port to Dump #30	3	6.0
Port to Dump #31	7	18.3
AIR CORPS SUPPLIES:		
Port to Dump #50	6	11.4
Port to Dump #51	209	690.4
Port to Rail Yard "L"	23	74.3
MEDICAL II & IV:		
Port to Dump #60	7	18.0
MISCELLANEOUS:		
Port to Gear Whse	5	8.5
Port to Pier #6	1	1.5
3. TOTAL LOADS AND TONNAGE	780	2243.5

4. Empty vehicles dispatched from the pool for various reasons.

REASON:	NO.	OUT	IN
To haul prisoners to port	5	0510	
To haul guards for the 10th Port	2	0630	0800
To haul civilian labor as directed.	1	0540	0710
To haul civilian labor as directed.	1	0540	0645
To haul water from water point	1	1930	0630
To hauls guards as directed	1	11955	2115
To haul 38th Personnel as directed.	1	2015	2030
5. TOTAL EMPTY VEHICLES DISPATCHED	12		
TOTAL LOADED VEHICLES DISPATCHED	780		
TOTAL VEHICLES DISPATCHED	792		

6. Vehicles available in the motor pool for this period.

53rd Q.M. Co. B	8
53rd Q.M. Co. C	7
53rd Q.M. Co. D	11
54th Q.M. Co. A	32
54th Q.M. Co. B	24
54th Q.M. Co. C	26
54th Q.M. Co. D	28
55th Q.M. Co. A	31
55th Q.M. Co. C	34
55th Q.M. Co. D	32
138th Q.M. Co.	25
Total	256 Trucks
53rd Q.M. Co. C	1 Duck
Total	259

7. Actual hours of operation from 1900 hours to 0700 hours 30 - 31 August.

D. F. NOBLE
MAJOR, T. C.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
Transportation Section, G-4
APO #758

30 August 1943.

MEMORANDUM :

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

1. Summary of Port Motor Transport operations for period 0700, 29 August 1943 to 0700 30 August.


No. of Trucks	No. of Trips	Tonnage* (short tons)	Truck hours of other use
254	1792	5319	92 Trucks 302 hours

*includes 460 tons to rail

2. Summary of Motor Convoy Operations for the same period:

Origin	Destination	Trucks	Tonnage (short tons)	Service
Certa		16	384 Trk/hrs	Railhd
S.Stefano	Falcone	69	232.5	AAF
S.Stefano	ASP 19	10	40	13th FA Brig
ASF 17a	ASP 19	22	88	13th FA Brig
Lascari Railhd	Lascari Dump	6	96	9th Div.
Lascari Dump	ASP 19	10	40	13th FA Brig
Cefalu	Lascari	6	144	QMC
Palermo	Gangi	1	Mail	APO 758
		140	640.5	

APPENDIX 6



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
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APPENDIX 7

DAILY TRUCK
AVAILABILITY AND USE
From July 28 to August 31, 1943

DATE	AVAILABILITY TRUCKS	AVAILABILITY TRUCK HOURS	USAGE SHIPSIDE ORDER	USAGE OTHER OPERATIONS
July 28	75	1800	1800	
29	92	2208	2208	
30	89	2186	2186	
31	96	2304	2304	
Aug. 1	105	2520	2520	
2	149	3576	3576	
3	148	3552	3552	
4	74	1776	1776	
5	144	3456	3096	
6	132	3168	3070	98
7	171	4104	3974	130
8	202	4848	4588	260
9	229	5496	5392	104
10	260	6240	6099	241
11	252	6048	5986	62
12	260	6240	6154	86
13	262	6288	6172	116
14	272	6528	6383	145
15	254	6096	5500	596
16	245	5880	5793	87
17	221	5304	5132	172
18	223	5352	5118	234
19	228	5472	5276	196
20	220	5280	5053	227
21	252	6048	5858	190
22	252	6048	5767	281
23	255	6120	5931	189
24	212	5808	5701	107
25	257	6168	6075	93
26	227	5448	5186	262
27	244	5856	5662	194
28	257	6168	6005	163
29	236	5664	5362	302
30	247	5928	5810	168
31	262	6288	5971	317

APPENDIX 8




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
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APPENDIX 9





APPENDIX 11

DAILY OVER-THE-ROAD
TON MILES
From 24 July to 31 Aug.

DATE	7TH ARMY OPERATIONS	1ST ENGR. SPEC. BRIG. OPER.	TOTAL
July 24		5,025	5,025
25		20,085	20,085
26		141,585	141,585
27			
28		13,520	13,520
29		30,268	30,268
30		15,872	15,872
31		1,682	1,682
Aug. 1		1,950	1,950
2		1,305	1,305
3		2,250	2,250
4		7,610	7,610
5	159,009	17,910	176,919
6	24,483	15,675	40,185
7	20,430	4,954	25,384
8	33,995	2,146	36,141
9	15,060	5,545	20,605
10	22,846	8,778.5	31,625
11	15,346	9,011	24,357
12	46,204	5,905	52,109
13	21,071	27,658	48,729
14	20,783	1,729	22,512
15	30,161	3,220	33,381
16	16,760	3,765	20,525
17	8,483	4,035	12,518
18	5,192	1,536	6,728
19	9,007	730	9,737
20	255	520	775
21	255	1,560	1,815
22	755	240	995
23	2,055		2,055

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
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APPENDIX 11 (CON'T.)

24	1,316	1,316	27	36,316	36,316	30	27,090	27,090
25	11,709	11,709	28	24,773	24,773	31	21,939	21,939
26	31,305	31,305	29	32,684	32,684			

APPENDIX 12


TONNAGE HAULED FROM SHIPSIDE
BY SERVICE
July 28 To August 31, 1943



APPENDIX 13

SERVICE	TONNAGE HAULED	PERCENTAGE
QM	55831.6	46.5
ORD	29388.0	24.0
AIR CORPS	18288.6	15.0
ENGINEER	7767.9	6.5
SIGNAL	3627.9	3.0
ORGANIZATIONAL	1334.6	1.0
MEDICAL	679.9	0.5
CWS	674.9	0.5
AMGOT	308.0	0.2
MISC	3429.6	2.8
	121400.9	100.0

APPENDIX 14




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
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APPENDIX 15

TRAFFIC SIGN DESIGNS





APPENDIX 16

REF: PP-4 C-P

COPY NO._____

Hq. Seventh Army
A.P.O. #758, U.S. Army
28 Aug. 43 1600B

ANNEX NO. 1 to ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 4

S. O. P. MOTOR MOVEMENTS

I PRINCIPAL ARMY TRAFFIC ROUTES:
The routes shown as principal supply roads, Par 4a (1) Administrative Order No. 4 this Headquarters, will be designated as Principal Army Traffic Routes. The movement of convoys of ten (10) or more vehicles upon these routes or while crossing these routes will be coordinated through Army Highway Control Stations.

II CORPS RESPONSIBILITY:
Coordination with and control by Army on these routes does not relieve Corps from the responsibility of march discipline and convoy policing of their own march units. Each Corps will be responsible for full control of motor movements on other roads within each Corps Area.

III ARMY HIGHWAY CONTROL STATIONS:
The following Army Highway Control Stations and substations will be established:

	Location	Date Open
1.	Palermo - 2 miles west of Jct Hwy 113 and Hwy 121	Now Open
1.A	Junction of Highway 113 and road to Cinisi near Terrasini	To be announced
2.	Agrigento - Junction of Highways 118 & 115	28 August
2.A	Licata - Junction of Highways 115 & 123	To be announced
2.B	Gela - Junction of Highways 115 & 117	To be announced
3.	Six (6) miles east of Termini Imerese Junction of Highways 120 & 113	26 August
4.	S. Stefano - Junction of Highways 113 & 117	26 August
5.	Trapani - Junction of Highways 113 & 115	To be announced

Additional Army Highway Control Sub-Stations will be established as required. Corps will be advised of changes and additions.

6. Army Highway Control Stations and Sub-Stations will be marked with Highway Signs at the site. Informational or directional signs will be placed strategically on the routes.

IV CORPS HIGHWAY CONTROL STATIONS:
Corps may utilize Army Highway Control Stations where feasible for regulation of intra-corps movements and may establish highway control stations upon corps controlled routes.

V MOTOR MOVEMENTS PROCEDURE:
1. Convoy commanders will be responsible for adherance to the following operational procedure prescribed, as well as any special instructions given when road movement authority is granted or those given by Army Control Stations encountered enroute.
2. Unit commanders or Highway Freight Dispatchers will not dispatch more than four (4) vehicles individually on over-the-road movements except in an emergency. Five (5) or more vehicles will be formed in convoy under a convoy commander.
3. The commanders of all convoys of ten (10) or more vehicles which involve movements upon or crossing the above routes or into VIII Army Area will contact the nearest Army Highway Control Station or Highway Division, Transportation Branch, G-4, 7th Army, before movement is made. When clearance has been arranged, convoy commander will be given road movement approval and instructions in written form where practicable.

VI CONVOY ORGANIZATION:
Convoy organization will be based on the following principles unless Convoy Movement Authority specifically alters any factor:
1. Maximum number of vehicles in any one march unit.....20
2. Maximum number of march units in any one serial.....5
3. Time Gap between march units.....3-5 minutes
4. Time Gap between Serials.....Minimum of 25 minutes
5. With Convoys of ten (10) vehicles or more an officer in a command vehicle will be in charge.

VII CONVOY OPERATION:
Convoy operation will conform to the following regulations unless Convoy Movement Authority specifically authorizes such change.
1. Speeds:
a. Speeds will be commensurate with safety at all times.
b. Maximum speed on highways outside of city limits will be thirty (30) miles per hour during daylight hours and twenty (20) miles per hour during hours of darkness unless otherwise designated by military signs.
c. The maximum speed on city streets will be twenty (20) miles per hour during daylight hours and fifteen (15) miles per hour during hours of darkness unless otherwise designated by military signs.
2. Density—Open country seventeen (17) vehicles per mile, i.e., a minimum distance between vehicles of one hundred (100) yards, to be maintained at all times. In cities and towns interval between vehicles will be retained and individual vehicles will reduce speed to required speed limits.
3. Flags—A blue flag will be carried on the lead vehicle and a green flag on the tail vehicle of each serial.
4. Markings—The Convoy Commander will be responsible that each vehicle is marked with the assigned convoy number. Instructions on marking will be furnished when Movement authority is granted.
5. Guides—To aid in organization of convoy at IP, to control movement of convoy through towns or over one-way bridges, or through intersections or other points of potential conflict, guides will be posted by Convoy Commander as needed.
6. Halts—Rests or halts for meals will not be made in towns, on bridges, defiles, curves, or with vehicles standing on the travelled portion of the roadway. Vehicle interval may be adjusted to meet exigencies of terrain characteristics on halts provided vehicles are never closer than seventy-five (75) yards one from the other.
7. Passing—No convoy will overtake another convoy proceeding in the same direction without specific authority shown in the Road Movement Approval.
8. Radio—Complete radio silence will be maintained except in an emergency.
9. Advance Parties—Convoys of ten (10) or more vehicles will avoid stopping the whole column by sending a small advance party (including kitchen trucks when desirable) to check at all Control Stations on the assigned routes at least thirty (30) minutes ahead of the main body. Advance parties will thus be able to furnish requested information, receive instructions or schedules from Control Stations, and areas for bivouac, or escort.
10. Convoy Commanders will be responsible for discipline and policing of their convoys. Orders will be issued by convoy commander to prevent personnel from throwing any articles from moving vehicles.
11. Convoy Commanders may, at their discretion, clear highways of civilian vehicular traffic to the extent necessary to permit free passage of convoy.

VIII SUPPLIES AND BIVOUAC AREAS:
Current information concerning the availability of supplies, water points, bivouac areas, Ordnance units, First Aid Stations, and Hospitals can be obtained at Highway Control Stations or Highway Division, G-4, Seventh Army.

IX VEHICLE BREAKDOWNS:
Drivers of disabled vehicle will signal the following vehicles to proceed. Such vehicles will not be abandoned, they may be left under guard and must be reported to nearest Highway Control Station.

X LIGHTS
1. Between sunset and sunrise all convoys will operate with "dim-out lights" and with marker lights lit.
2. Dim-out lights will conform to either of the following standards (AFHQ Cir. 59, 29 July 1943):
a. Headlights will have the painted black-out shields as used in Great Britain.
b. Headlights will have the face of the lense painted black with paint removed to allow for a crescent shaped space two (2) inches long and one-half inch high with top of space one (1) inch below center line of lense.
3. If vehicles are operated during an alert the marker lights will be lit.

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XI AIR DEFENSE:

In the event of Actual Air Attack, vehicles will halt at open interval along the side of the road and all suitable weapons will be brought to bear on attacking aircraft. Personnel not manning weapons will disperse and take cover.

XII ACCIDENTS

1. In all cases of accidents the driver will immediately fill out the Drivers Report (Form No. 26) and Army Form A 3681 (Eng - It).
2. Form 27 - Investigating Officer's Report will be completed.
3. It will be the Convoy Commander's responsibility to see that the nearest Claims Office is advised through channels of all pertinent information. In the case of serious personal injury all possible assistance will be rendered and the facts reported in the most expeditious manner.

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Adjutant General

APPENDIX "H"

PACK TRANSPORTATION

SEVENTH ARMY-SICILY

SUMMARY

1. Planning and Preparation.
2. Sicilian Campaign Activities -
   - I. Procurement of Campaign Animals and Equipment.
   - II. Forage and Conditioning.
   - III. Personnel.
     - a. Mule Leader
     - b. Trained Personnel
   - IV. Disposition of Animals.
3. Improvement Suggestions -
   - I. Size of Pack Trains
   - II. Special Equipment
   - III. Recommendations for Animal and Equipment T/O -
     - a. Animals
     - b. Saddles
     - c. Miscellaneous Equipment

1. Planning and Preparation:

In anticipating the necessity of establishing adequate pack animal transportation for the Sicilian Campaign, an Assistant G-4 officer, Seventh Army, was assigned this duty in the latter part of June, 1943. Preparations in Africa consisted of receiving 200 Phillips Cargo Pack Saddles and 85 light riding saddles shipped from the United States. Near Ferryville, 109 horses and mules captured from the enemy were kept, but because of their poor physical condition and lack of shipping space, they were left to be sold to the public at auction. The Phillips Cargo Pack Saddles were later used in the Sicilian Campaign, 125 going to the 9th Division and 75 to the 3rd Division. The light riding saddles, plus some 200 Italian pack Saddles and other minor supplies, were left in reserve.

2. Sicilian Campaign Activities:

I. Procurement of Campaign Animals and Equipment.

By reason of the rough terrain bounded by the towns of Cefalu, Caltanissetta, Catania and Messina, about 4,000 pack animals were necessary for the completion of the Campaign. Animals used in this territory were captured from the Italian Army, bought, or rented from the civilian population. A small percentage was brought over from Africa with the respective units. Many civilian animals were commandeered by our soldiers along their route of combat. Units procuring civilian animals would have the civilian police call in the horses and mules in their town for the unit to select from. The unit requisitioning officer and unit Veterinarian, a civilian Veterinarian and town representative, along with the animal owner, were usually present at the time the sale or rental was made. A value was placed on each animal and a rental value of 50 Lire per day was paid the owner with the understanding that if the horse or mule were lost or killed, the agreed price, plus rental fee, would be paid or a like animal from our forces would be substituted. Average prices paid for animals are as follows:

Mule	$150.00
Horse	120.00
Donkey	40.00

Mares were $10.00 less than the price of male animals.

The animals were distributed by truck to the troops for combat and supply use. The average pack carried weighed between 250-275 pounds, consisting of water, rations, signal equipment and ammunition. In addition to the animals, the Allied Forces made use of many pack Saddles, carts and wagons. These articles of equipment were likewise secured from the Italian Army and the civilian population, paying $60.00 for carts or wagons and $40.00 for saddles. This equipment was also returned to the owners at the end of the Campaign.

II. Forage and Conditioning.

Generally speaking, at the outset of the Campaign the animals were in fair condition, weighing approximately 900 pounds on the average and standing 14 hands high. In this respect, they are similar to the Texas mule except they are a small or boned animal. However, due to hard use of the animals and also the lack of suitable forage, they lost some 30-50 pounds each during their 15 days use. There was a noticeable lack of suitable forage available for horses and mules. Oats, favo or mule beans, fieno hay, bran and native grass, both green and dry, and salt were used as forage. This was secured from the civilian population, the Italian police, and along the route of combat. Prices paid for forage are as follows:

Oats	$ .035 per kilo (2.2 lbs)
Favo Beans	.025 per kilo
Hay and straw	.01 to .02 per kilo

About 8 pounds of grain and 10 pounds of hay were fed to each animal per day when the forage was available. The favo beans were not considered satisfactory and the African Mules didn't like the wheat. There was also difficulty in getting forage and water to the forward areas and it was necessary to rotate the animals, that is, when some of the mules were hauling supplies, the others were being fed and watered at the mulehead.

III. Personnel.

Forces using pack animals and equipment were the 1st, 3rd, 9th, 45th, II Corps, Provisional Corps and the French Goums.

a. Mule Leader.

To operate efficiently, one mule or horse leader per animal is required. Certain personnel such as in the heavy weapons company can be used for this purpose, but additional personnel are required to lead animals which do not form part of the organic transportation. This is necessary in order not to reduce the combat strength.

b. Trained Personnel.

At least 4 pack Masters and one stable Sergeant should be assigned to a regiment which is about to take part in this type of operation. A Regimental Veterinarian is necessary for lengthy operations.

IV. Disposition of Animals.

With the end of the Campaign, every effort was made to return the animals to their former owners. The various owners painted identification numbers on their animals, or branded their hoofs to facilitate their return. Of the 4000 animals used, approximately 1500 were killed by enemy action. More were rendered unserviceable because of bad feet, saddle sores or bad physical condition. Many of which we have no record, were turned loose when they were of no further service to our troops.

3. Improvement Suggestions:

I. Size of Pack Trains.

In future operations, the pack animals should be sent out in groups of 10-12 to reduce the casualties from enemy action. A block and tackle carried with each group of animals to aid in crossing the more difficult terrain, would help.

II. Special Equipment.

Veterinarian kits and supplies should be issued and experienced horse-shoeing squads should be formed with each regiment.

III. Recommendations for Animal and Equipment T/O:

The following is a suggested T/O for a regiment:

a. Animals.

320 Mules
31 Riding Horses

Distribution as follows:

Organic	Horses	Mules
Regt Hq	5	5
Bn (each)		
Attach Bn		10
Hvy Weapons Co	1	34
Rifle Co	1	5
Bn Hq	4	6
Total (Regt)	29	200
Administrative		
Service Train	2	180
	31	380

b. Saddles.

320 Pack saddles
31 riding saddles complete with saddle bags
30 litter saddles (top and not side type, i.e.) (French Goum Type)

c. Miscellaneous Equipment.


1 Halter per animal
1 Lead rope per animal
1 Feed bag per animal
1 Bucket per 5 animals
1 Grooming set per animal- brush, curry comb, hoofhook.

It is felt that these are minimum requirements and it is further urged that these provisions be carried into effect prior to embarkation if the operation is an overseas one, or prior to starting on a land operation.

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ANTIAIRCRAFT

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REPORT OF THE ANTI AIRCRAFT OFFICER

I. REQUIREMENTS PHASE

Based on initial studies of the tactical plan ENSA - FISH - GROG - HOOK prior to 15 March 1943, a request was made to AFHQ by the Artillery Officer, I Armored Corps, Reinforced, for an allotment of a small number of Antiaircraft Artillery units. As the plan developed it appeared that further study was required. On 11 April, an Antiaircraft Artillery Officer was assigned to assist the Artillery Officer in revising his estimates. On 20 April a new request was made to AFHQ based on the new estimates for the maximum requirements. On 10 May 1943, it was mutually agreed upon by the Antiaircraft and Coast Defense Section, AFHQ and the Artillery Section, I Armored Corps, Reinforced to allot units to Operation Husky substantially as follows:

4 Regiments
8 Separate Gun Battalions
10 Separate Automatic Weapon Battalions
5 Separate Searchlight Battalions
10 Separate Airborne Batteries
2 Brigade Headquarters
6 Group Headquarters
1 Harbor Defense Battalion

Further study after revision of the original tactical plan to CENT- DIME - JOSS - KOOL showed no need for more units.

II. ATTACHMENT PHASE

At the conclusion of the Tunisian Campaign all AAA units nominated for HUSKY were either in staging area following arrival in Africa or protecting vital areas in Tunisia and Algeria. Since more units were required for the Operation than had been engaged in Tunisia, the additional units had to come from those newly arrived in the theater and still in the process of being equipped. In addition a proportion of the new units was required to replace units of the HUSKY troop list, still in tactical positions, prior to shipment for Sicily.

A list of units to be assigned First Armored Corps, (Reinforced) was prepared by AFHQ in conjunction with Artillery Section, First Armored Corps, (Reinforced), showing present employment, availability and dates on which units should be attached to Sub-Task Force or moved to staging area. A shortage of equipment was immediately apparent and priority list was given the Base Section in order to insure the proper units being equipped at the proper time. Constant checking by this Section was required to get units out of the staging area on time. Two Automatic Weapons Battalions which had been in active combat in Tunisia were also in the staging area at this time being equipped with self-propelled Guns. No units in the staging area were under the control of First Armored Corps, (Reinforced) at this time. All movements and attachments were made by AFHQ or Fifth Army, on recommendation of this Section. Many units could not be relieved as early as desired because organizations in staging areas were not being equipped as rapidly as planned.

Two considerations governed the sub-allotment of AAA to Sub-Task Forces. The first was consideration of AAA requirements for the combat elements. The second was the vital points, as ports and airfields, that were in the sector of each Sub-Task Force. As a result of careful study and estimated rate of advance, one Self-propelled Battalion, one Automatic Weapons Battalion and one Gun Battalion were given to each assault Sub-Task Force. Then because this would be inadequate for defense of vital objectives, a Regiment was given to JOSS as they had the only port. This would make available in Sicily, as soon as assault Sub-Task Forces were complete, four Gun Bns, four AW Bns, four SP Bns, one S/L Bn. It was expected this would be completed by D plus 8. This was not considered adequate, but was the best that could be expected with the limited lift available. Again based on a predicted rate of advance, the rate of flow of the AAA remaining under Army control was set up. This was combined, in the Artillery Section, with Field Artillery units and the combined list was then fitted in with lists of other sections.

The Army plan in brief for the initial stages provided the Sub-Task Forces with sufficient AA to protect their rear area installations pending the arrival of the 34th AAA Brigade on or about D plus 8. An AAA Group Headquarters was provided each assault force to plan and coordinate this defense.

With the arrival of the 34th AAA Brigade, necessary AAA units attached to Sub-Task Forces, except Self-propelled Battalions, needed for rear area defense were to be attached to the Brigade, the Brigade assuming responsibility for this defense. The 2626 AAA Brigade would remain in North Africa and supervise training, equipping, and shipment of units remaining in North Africa.

On approximately D plus 50, the 2626th AAA Brigade was scheduled to arrive. At that time the area of responsibility would be divided with the 34th Brigade on order from this Headquarters. The 8 AAA Group Headquarters would then assume responsibility for shipping the remaining AAA units to Sicily.

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III. STAGING PHASE

Sub-Task Force AAA was attached to and joined Sub-Task Forces as rapidly as they could be made available. Amphibious training was conducted at the PAITC for as many units as possible. During the staging and loading for the assault, units scheduled for the follow-up convoys were set up to provide defense for Sub-Task Force concentrations and other vital points.

Force Troops were relieved from area defense in North Africa as rapidly as possible after D-Day according to schedule set up by AFHQ, based on our priority of shipment, and sent to staging area. All Force AAA units were under operational control of 2626 Brigade in Perryville. Units not immediately scheduled for shipment were deployed for protection of staging area.

IV. ASSAULT PHASE

For the initial assault operation the following AAA units were attached to Sub-Task Forces as indicated:

JOSS (Licata and two adjacent beaches)
106 AAA AW Bn (SP)
443 AAA AW Bn (SP)
436 AAA AW Bn
688 AAA MG Btry (AB)
689 AAA MG Btry (AB)
105 AAA Group
2 RAF Bln Detachments

DIME (Gela and two adjacent beaches)
105 AAA AW Bn (SP)
103 AAA AW Bn
107 (A & B AAA AW Bn
690 AAA MG Btry (AB)
691 AAA MG Btry (AB)
692 AAA MG Btry (AB)
693 AAA MG Btry (AB)
106 AAA Group
2 RAF Bln Detachments

CENT (Scoglitti and three adjacent beaches)
441 AAA AW Bn (SP)
400 AAA AW Bn
694 AAA MG Btry (AB)
695 AAA MG Btry (AB)
696 AAA MG Btry (AB)
697 AAA MG Btry (AB)
103 Barrage Balloon Btry (VIA)
107 AAA Group
1 RAF Bln Detachment

82nd AB Division
80 AAA AW Bn (AB) (Organic)

2nd Armored Division (Floating Reserve)
107 AAA AW Bn (less btries A & B)
433 AAA AW Bn

9th Infantry Division (In North Africa in Reserve)
Reported no lift available for AAA.

The AAA units were combat-assault loaded with the maximum number of weapons placed above deck in order to present concentrated AA fire points.

Beginning with the second assault wave, Self-propelled and MG (Airborne) units accompanied each wave, initial positions being along the beaches, with a depth of about 300 yards. As the towed and Self-propelled Field Artillery units moved inward, each sub-attached AA unit was diverted from vulnerable area defense to close-in vulnerable point defense of their primary objectives.

The barrage balloons were initially flown from the various landing craft during the early stages of unloading but were transferred to the beaches upon stabilization of the ground units. The 103 Barrage Balloon Battery was moved from CENT to JOSS on D-Day at request of the NAVY.

Although the aerial activity through D plus 12 was relatively light, except for the first three days, the AA units on beach and assault missions had over a hundred engagements, definitely destroying 18 planes in addition to preventing many others from accomplishing their assigned missions of bombing and strafing.

V. CHANGE OF DIRECTION - NORTH WEST

With the issuing of orders changing the direction of Seventh Army attack to the Northwest, it became apparent that Army would have to assume responsibility for AA defense of beaches, ports and airfields in the rear areas to free the Sub-Task Forces for forward movement.

Lacking a Brigade Headquarters, the 107th AA Group from II Corps was selected for the AA and CD defense of the Agrigento-Gela-Comiso areas. Specific VP's were indicated by Army Headquarters in the rear areas and in most cases specific units selected to defend them. All Sub-Task Force AA except SP Battalions was taken from the Sub-Task Forces and attached to the 107th Group for this purpose:

Attached 107th Group - South shore

107th AAA AW Bn
433rd AAA AW Bn
436th AAA AW Bn
400th AAA AW Bn (SM)
401st AAA Gun Bn
10 MG Batteries
Det 102nd BB Btry
5 Bln Dets. RAF

Attached II Corps

106th AAA Group
105th AAA AW Bn SP
103rd AAA AW Bn SP

Attached 3rd Infantry Division

106th AAA Group
443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)

Attached 45th Infantry Division

441st AAA AW Bn (SP)

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Attached 2nd Armored Division

106th AAA AW Bn (SP)

VI. CHANGE OF DIRECTION – EAST

With the capture of Palermo, 22 July, and the cutting of highway 113, the rear area responsibility of the Army increased. The Commanding Officer, 62nd AAA Regiment, was charged with responsibility of AA and CD defence of Palermo and Boca di Falco airfield, and had the 105th AAA Group, with 2 Bns, attached. Two airfields were then opened at Termini Imerese, and the Commanding Officer, 105th AAA Group, was charged with the AA and CD defense of Termini Imerese harbor and nearby airfields. The attachments were as follows:

105th Group - Termini Imerese

214th Gun Bn
436th AAA AW Bn

62nd AAA Regiment - Palermo

2 batteries 401st AAA Gun Bn

107th Group - South Shore

401st AAA Gun Bn - 2 Batteries
400th AAA AW Bn (SM)
433rd AAA AW Bn
215th AAA Gun Bn
10 MG Batteries

II Corps

106th AAA Group
103rd AAA AW Bn
107th AAA AW Bn

1st Infantry Division

105th AAA AW Bn (SP)

3rd Infantry Division

443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)

45th Infantry Division

441st AAA AW Bn (SP)

2nd Armored Division

106th AAA AW Bn (SP)

With the arrival of the 34th AAA Brigade, 29 July 1943, the Commanding General, 34th Brigade was charged with responsibility for all AA and CD defense for the entire Seventh Army rear area. As additional AAA arrived they were assigned to areas according to priorities set up by XII Air Support Command for airfields and G-4 for ports and beaches, the latter being used along the north shore as the advance east continued.

When the 2626th Brigade arrived, 18 August 1943, the area of responsibility of the Seventh Army was split along a line running west from Enna to the west coast south of Marsala. Responsibility was given 34th Brigade for all VP's north of this line and 2626th Brigade for all VP's south of this line. The lack of AAA with II Corps was recognized by the attachment of certain units thereto. Shifting of units from Brigades to Corps took place as follows:

107th AAA AW Bn relieved from attachment to 107th AAA Group and attached to II Corps.

688th AAA MG Battery relieved from attachment to 107th AAA Group and attached to Headquarters Company, Seventh Army.

431st AAA AW Bn attached to II Corps.

694th and 695th AAA MG Battery (AB) relieved from attachment to 34th Brigade and attached to II Corps.

VII. D PLUS 38

Upon the completion of the Sicilian campaign in the Northwestern part of the Island around Messina, all of the AAA units with the exception of the 4 SP Bns, were relieved from Division attachment and attached to the two Army Brigades for ports, airfields, and other static defenses in the western half of Sicily.

1st Inf Div	34th AAA Brig		2626th AAA Brig	
105 SP Bn	4 Group	167 Gun Bn	1 Group	406 Gun Bn
	105 Group	410 Gun Bn	106 Group	689 AB Btry
2nd Armd Div	62 Regt	403 Gun Bn	107 Group	690 AB Btry
	68 Regt	688 AB Btry	400 AW Bn	691 AB Btry
106 SP Bn	436 AW Bn	694 AB Btry	433 AW Bn	692 AB Btry
	107 AW Bn	695 AB Btry	103 AW Bn	693 AB Btry
3rd Inf Div	214 Gun Bn	103 BB Btry	431 AW Bn	696 AB Btry
			215 Gun Bn	697 AB Btry
443 SP Bn			216 Gun Bn	104 BB Btry
			401 Gun Bn	
45th Inf Div				
441 SP Bn				

VIII. RECAPITULATION

In Sicily	In Africa
2 Brigade Headquarters	0
5 Group Headquarters	1
2 Regt Headquarters	2
10 Gun Battalions	2
8 AW Battalions	7
4 SP Battalions	0
2 S/L Battalions	5
10 MG (AB) Batteries	0
2 BB Batteries	1

Reassignment of Army AA Units:

In preparing Fifth Army for a future operation the following units were released by Seventh Army on call:

2 Group Headquarters
2 Regt Headquarters
5 Gun Battalions
4 SP Battalions
7 AW Battalions
5 S/L Battalions
6 MG (AB) Batteries
2 BB Batteries (1 on loan only)

This left the following AAA units under Seventh Army for protection of one major port and 12 airfields:

2 Brigade Headquarters
4 Group Headquarters
2 Regt Headquarters
7 Gun Battalions
8 AW Battalions (2 still in North Africa 1 Sept)
3 S/L Battalions (1 still in North Africa 1 Sept)
4 MG (AB) Batteries
1 BB Battery

Rate of build up or estimated rate of arrival of units was based on an estimate of rate of advance of Sub-Task Forces and a balance between lift available and availability of units for shipment from North Africa. The following table is reproduced as the estimate that was first submitted.

The estimated rate of arrival as determined by the Sub-Task Force Commanders was as follows:

	Gp Hq	Regt Hq	AW Bn	SP Bn	90mm Gun Bn	S/L Bn	AB Btries	Total Bns
Cent - D to D plus 8	1	-	1	1	1	-	4	4
Dime - D	1	-	1	1	-	-	4	3
D plus 4	-	-	1/2	-	-	-	-	1/2
D plus 8	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Joss - D	1	-	1	2	-	-	2	3 1/2
D plus 8	-	1	1	-	2	1	-	7
Kool	-	-	1/2	-	-	-	-	1/2
								19 1/2 Bns

D plus 14 and following, Force troops:

	Brig Hq	Gp Hq	Regt Hq	(By Bns) AW	Gun	S/L	Total Bns
D plus 14	1	1	-	3	1	1	5
D plus 18	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
D plus 22	-	-	1	2	1	2	5
D plus 30	-	1	-	-	2	1	3
D plus 45	1	-	1	1	2	1	4
D plus 60	-	1	1	-	2	2	4

Total Force Troops 2

Attached to Force Reserve:

Kool 1/2 AAA AW Bn.
9th Division 1 AAA AW Bn.

The actual rate of arrival agreed with the schedule set up with the exception that D plus 8 follow up brought those scheduled for D plus 4, successive arrivals being 4 to 8 days late

The arrival of Force troops was as follows; included are Sub-Task Force troops which were immediately placed under Army control:

	Brig Hq	Gp Hq	Regt Hq	SP Bn	AW Bn	Gun Bn	S/L Bn	AB Btry	Total Bns	Total Bns to date
D	-	3	-	4	4	1	-	10	11 1/2	11 1/2
D plus 8	-	-	1	-	1	2	-	-	3	14 1/2
D plus 10	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	15 1/2
D plus 20	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
D plus 28	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	16 1/2
D plus 31	-	1	1	-	2	3	1	-	7	23 1/2
D plus 36	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	25 1/2

Training: Initial training plans called for a course of instruction at Fifth Army Invasion Training Center (FAITC) plus a complete rehearsal of the planned landing by as many units as could be accomodated by the Center. This instruction was to include water proofing, loading on various craft and unloading.

Due to the amount of time required to work out various problems which appeared and also since so few units were available for amphibious training prior to the staging phase, only 4 AW Bns were given training prior to going to staging area. The Bns attached to Sub-Task Forces were given rehearsals with those Sub-Task Forces while the Army troops in general received little additional training. Water proofing alone was given each unit.

As far as amphibious training was concerned there seemed to be a lack of planning for getting towed guns off the beach during the assault phase. SP Guns came off in very good shape. Other phases of training are difficult to evaluate, but it is felt that units newly equipped with SP guns should have some target practice to familiarize themselves with the weapon. Also most AW Bns had had no firing since the close of the Tunisian Campaign or in some cases since the arrival from the states. Some Gun Bns had never fired with Radar Control. It is felt that if the caliber of the air opposition had been higher, less satisfactory results would have been obtained by the operation as a whole due to those deficiencies in training.

Recapitulation from D-Day to August 17 of firing at enemy planes:

	Total Rounds	Rounds Per Day	Total Planes	Rounds Per Plane
90mm	2037	50	5	407
40mm	13526	338	19	710
37mm	12243	308	24	510
50 cal.	241820	6040	2	-
			Total Planes - 50	

Above does not include 62 planes probably destroyed.

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IX. CONCLUSIONS

In view of the lack of aerial activity, very few definite conclusions on AAA can be reached from the Sicilian Campaign. But the following are reasonable conclusions on amphibious operations, from this and the Torch Operation:

a. The relative Air Force strengths determine requirements of AAA.

b. No amount of Air Force can entirely eliminate enemy aerial activity.

c. With friendly air superiority, almost all gun targets will appear at night.

d. One SP or AW Bn cannot adequately protect a division. Two must be considered a minimum.

e. Field Artillery should have first priority in the division for AA defense as it has first priority for enemy air attack.

f. Overall first priority is shipping.

g. The question of attaching AAA to units defended or assigning missions has not been determined. Adequate AAA was not available to the Corps and Divisions to do more than protect field Artillery. The principle of assigning missions and keeping all under AAA control is considered correct.

X RECOMMENDATIONS

Allotment of AAA

The following are recommended allotments of AA:

Per Div - 1 Group Hq
2 AW Bns (1 SP)
1 Gun Bn

Armored FA Group - 1 AW SP Bn

Combat Command - 1 AW SP Bn

In the above no allowance is made for rear area installations including ports, rail yards, airfields, etc., which should be the direct responsibility of either Corps or Army for AA defense. The allotment of AAA to Corps will depend on the situation. It should not be less than one Group Headquarters with 2 AW Bns and 1 Gun Bn.

The AA and CD defense of all ports, airfields, rail heads, should be the responsibility of a Brigade or Brigades, under Army control.

A Liaison Officer from Air Headquarters should be present with the Army Air Support Command so the plans of all Air Force units can be known in advance.


Despite their constant employment, AAA units require training the same as any other units and plans for this must be continuous, expecially between operations.

AAA units with front line divisions require relief the same as the divisions do and replacement should be made to units available for this purpose.

M. B. THOMPSON,
Lieut Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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REPORT OF THE ARTILLERY OFFICER

A. THE PLANNING PHASE

1. ARTILLERY SECTION:

At the beginning of the planning phase the Artillery Officer was also the Antiaircraft Officer and Anti-Tank Officer. He was assisted in the performance of these duties by the Assistant Antiaircraft Officer and Assistant Anti-Tank Officer. Tank units were also placed under the Artillery Officer. The Artillery Officer was responsible for the coordination of training of the Naval Shore Fire Control Parties and the preparation of the Naval Gun Fire Support Plan, Field Artillery Plan, Antiaircraft Plan and Coast Defense Plan for the operation.

The Artillery S-2 Section was responsible for the dissemination of intelligence matter and the preparation of S-2 estimates. Terrain studies of the beaches and adjacent terrain of the operation "HUSKY" were made from available documents and maps. This information was transferred in detail to overlays to the scale of 1/25,000 maps of the area. A Liaison Section of one officer and one enlisted man was established with the Photo Interpretation unit of Headquarters, I Armored Corps, Reinforced. A study was made of photo interpretation reports to evaluate targets of primary importance to subordinate Artillery units. Artillery targets were transferred to overlays to the scale of 1/25,000 maps of the area. A study of the organization, strength, and armament of German and Italian Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft Artillery, and Anti-Tank Guns was made and distributed with the above mentioned data to subordinate Artillery units concerned with the operation. The Artillery S-2 Section was further charged with the distribution of special air photographs and mosaics required by artillery units.

The Artillery S-3 Section was primarily responsible for supervision of training of subordinate units. This was a difficult and delicate task, since most of the units were attached to Fifth Army training establishments for training. Therefore, frequent inspections were made to determine state of training and to give any possible assistance, but no training directives were issued and complete control was impossible. Arrangements were made to have as many units as possible take the amphibious, waterproofing, and transport quartermaster training at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center. Also several tank destroyer battalions were attached to the Fifth Army Tank Destroyer Training Center for training. Records and charts were kept by the section showing location, strength, status of assignment and attachment, contemplated movements and sub-task force assignment of all field artillery, antiaircraft, tank destroyer and tank organizations which were to be in the operation. Assistance in obtaining bivouac areas and firing ranges was given to units, and the Artillery S-3 advised on necessary troop movements during the assembly of troops prior to the operation. The preparation of the Field Artillery and Antiaircraft annexes to the Field Order was done by the S-3 Section.

The Artillery S-4 Section was concerned primarily with giving all possible assistance to subordinate units in equipping themselves. Officers of this section made frequent visits to units to determine shortages and advise on securing necessary supplies and also kept in close touch with the supply agencies of the Base Sections. This assistance in securing supplies was especially valuable to newly-arrived organizations who were in need of much equipment and were unfamiliar with the supply proceedures in the African Theater. The S-4 was also concerned with ammunition supply plans and records.

A Counterbattery Section was established and organized in the Artillery Section, consisting of two officers and four enlisted men. The Counterbattery Officer was responsible for setting up a standard operating procedure for Counterbattery and the training of the section, none of whom, officers or enlisted men, had any previous counterbattery knowledge or experience. Counterbattery plans and orders were coordinated with the planning of the Sub-Task Forces. The Counterbattery Officer was also charged with the duty of coordinating Naval gunfire support with the Sub-Task Forces by means of Artillery Shore Fire Control Parties. The Section was prepared to function with Sub-Task Forces if so directed. An enemy battery file was maintained and coordinated with the Artillery S-2. Photo interpretation reports were studied for Counterbattery missions.

A letter to the Chief of Staff, I Armored Corps, Reinforced, 26 May 1943, requesting authority to organize an Air OP Section within the Artillery Section was approved. The Air OP Section was established with an authorized strength initially of two officers and eight enlisted men. The Artillery Air OP Section provided the necessary courier service between this Headquarters, Headquarters Sub-Task Forces and other subordinate units. The Artillery Air Section was responsible for maintaining accurate records of the strength and personnel assigned to the Artillery Air Sections of all subordinate units as well as the number and condition of airplanes and other air section equipment. The Air Section also coordinated the procurement of airplane parts and supplies for all subordinate units.

2. FIELD ARTILLERY:

Artillery units assigned to Headquarters Seventh Army for operation "HUSKY" were:

13th Field Artillery Brigade:
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 13th Field Artillery Brigade
17th Field Artillery (155mm Howitzer M1918 A3, truck-drawn)
178th Field Artillery (155mm Howitzer M1918 A3, truck-drawn)
36th Field Artillery (155mm Gun M1, tractor drawn)
1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion.
5th Armored Artillery Group:
58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer M-7, SP)
62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer M-7, SP)
65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer M-7, SP)
77th Field Artillery (Two battalions, 155mm Howitzer M1918 A3, truck-drawn).

The following additional Field Artillery units had been requested but were unavailable due to shortage of shipping:

18th Field Artillery Brigade (less 77th Field Artillery)
6th Armored Artillery Group
One Battalion Pack Artillery (less animals).

3. TANK DESTROYER:

Tank destroyer units assigned to Headquarters Seventh Army for the operation were:

1st Tank Destroyer Group:
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Tank Destroyer Group
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion
894th Tank Destroyer Battalion
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion
645th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

4. TANK UNITS:

Tank units assigned to Headquarters Seventh Army for the operation were:
2nd Tank Group:
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 2nd Tank Group
70th Tank Battalion (Light)
191st Tank Battalion (Medium)
753rd Tank Battalion (Medium)
757th Tank Battalion (Light)
756th Tank Battalion (Light)

5. ANTIAIRCRAFT:

In accordance with General Order #9, dated 31 July 1943, the Artillery Officer was relieved of his duties as Antiaircraft Officer and an Antiaircraft Officer was appointed effective 1 August 1943. A separate report of antiaircraft operation is being submitted by the Antiaircraft Officer.

B. THE OPERATION

1. FIELD ARTILLERY:

Beginning on D-Day, Field Artillery units were landed as follows:

"JOSS" Force (3d Infantry Division)

D - Day

62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
1st Battalion (less one battery), 77th Field Artillery.
Battery "A", 36th Field Artillery.
Battery "B", 1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion.

D + 4

Detachment from Headquarters, 36th Field Artillery.
1st Battalion (less Battery "A"), 36th Field Artillery.
Headquarters 5th Armored Artillery Group.
58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
Remainder 77th Field Artillery.

"SHARK" Force (II Corps)

"DIME" Force (1st Infantry Division)

D - Day

Battery "A", 1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion (plus detachment, Headquarters Battery).

D + 4

17th Field Artillery.
Battery "F", 36th Field Artillery.

"CENT" Force (45th Infantry Division)

D - Day

Battery "D", 36th Field Artillery

D / 4

1st Battalion, 178th Field Artillery.
Battery "E", 36th Field Artillery.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (less detachment), and 2nd Battalion, 36th Field Artillery, (less "D", "E", and "F" Batteries) arrived in Sicily 2 August 1943.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 13th Field Artillery Brigade, arrived in PALERMO, SICILY, 13 August 1943.

178th Field Artillery (less 1st Battalion), and Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion (less detachment) remained in North Africa.

The D - Day landings of Field Artillery units was successful at all beaches. Notable features in the landings were as follows:

The feasibility of landing light, medium and heavy Field Artillery weapons early in the assault was proven. This filled a long-felt need, since early support was made available to the assault troops, saving the heavy casualties formerly associated with landings by unsupported Infantry. It was made possible by modern landing craft which made it unnecessary to wait for the capture of a port before landing heavy materiel.

The 105mm Howitzer M-7 (SP) proved a superior vehicle for landing operations. It was debarked in much as six feet of water and was able to come ashore under its own power. Being able to fire at any time, without the delay of going into position, it furnished immediate support as soon as it reached the beach. Its operation over soft sand was excellent, except that operation parallel to the water-line was not feasible, since sand worked into the tracks and threw them. The 3d Infantry Division Artillery, which had had previous training with armored artillery weapons, made excellent use of the M-7's of the attached 5th Armored Artillery Group, exchanging the towed guns of the Divisional light battalions for them. This enabled them to gain the advantage of the M-7 as a landing vehicle without disrupting the Regimental Combat Team organization by substituting a strange armored battalion for the organic Combat Team Artillery. The armored battalions came ashore with the towed howitzers of the Division and the weapons were exchanged as combat conditions permitted.

On D / 5, the 1st Battalion of the 77th Field Artillery and the 62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion were relieved from attachment to the 3d Infantry Division and attached to the 82nd Airborne Division, which moved to the west on MARSALA and TRAPANI. The remaining Field Artillery units continued with the 3d Infantry Division in its attack northward on PALERMO.

On D / 21, PALERMO and the western end of the island having fallen, all attached Field Artillery with the Provisional Corps was released and attached to II Corps for the operations directed upon MESSINA. These units (1st Battalion 36th Field Artillery, 5th Armored Artillery Group and 77th Field Artillery) moved east and joined II Corps in the vicinity of ALIA. They were employed, with the remainder of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade, to support the advance of II Corps in its attack. The very heavy concentration of Field Artillery was an outstanding feature in the taking of the strong enemy position at TROINA. Also, the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (at reduced strength, employing two four-gun batteries) participated in two amphibious operations of units of the 3d Division which made landings behind the enemy lines along the north coast of the island. On the second of these the eight M-7's of the 58th Battalion were instrumental in stopping a tank attack which threatened the entire landing force. In this operation the Battalion lost seven of its M-7's (the eighth one was damaged) and the men continued the fight as Infantry.

A Photo Liaison Section consisting of an officer pilot and an enlisted man was attached to the Photo Interpretation Unit of Seventh Army for the operation. Its mission was to secure Field Artillery information from air photograph interpretation and to forward this information directly to artillery units. It also received requests for special Artillery missions and transmitted them directly to the Photographic Squadron. During the early stages of the operation this unit was based at LA MARSA, TUNISIA. On D + 8 an advanced detachment (including the officer of the Photo Liaison Section) arrived in SICILY and established headquarters at PONTE OLIVIO airport. On D + 13 the remainder of the unit arrived in SICILY. Photos and photo interpretation reports were flown by the officer pilot to II Corps. A total of thirty-eight missions was accomplished. This service proved invaluable in the dissemination of vital artillery information, especially the locations of hostile batteries.

The Artillery Air OP Section was used extensively during the operation to provide air courier and passenger service. The Air Section frequently flew the Commanding General and his staff on missions incident to the operation.

2. TANK DESTROYER:

All Tank Destroyer units were held under Seventh Army control. The 601st and 645th Tank Destroyer Battalions were ordered to be prepared to move to SICILY on four hours notice at any time after D + 4. The remaining Tank Destroyer units were to be moved subsequently as need for them was forseen and craft were available. As the operation progressed, no employment was forseen for the Tank Destroyer units of sufficient importance to justify the diversion of craft for their movement. Therefore no Tank Destroyer units were brought to SICILY at any time during the operation.

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ARTILLERY UNITS LANDED IN SICILY

KOOL
FLOATING RESERVE
XX 2
II 78
II 92
II 18
II 32
451 AW
433 AW
107 AW(-)

3 DIV ANTIAIRCRAFT
D 105
D 436 AW
D 586 689 MG(AB)
D 106 SP
D+4 104 BB
D+8 62
D+8 214 GUN
D 443 SP

JOSS
3 DIV
D DAY 16
36(-1 BTRY) 7 3 RN
HQ 5 GP B 9(M) B 39
AFTER D+8 58 62(-1 BTRY)
65 10
77 (LESS 1 BN) (LESS 1 BTRY)

1 DIV ANTIAIRCRAFT
D 106
D 108 SP
D 103 AW
D 690-691 MG 692-693 (AB)
D+4 A 107 AW
D+4 B 107 AW
D+8 215 GUN

45 DIV ANTIAIRCRAFT
D 400
D 4 DIGUN
D 44 ISP
D 694-695 696-697 MG(AB)
D 107
D 102(1/3) BB
D 103 BB

JOSS
3 DIV
77(-) D+4

82 AB DIV
456
1 BTRY W/EACH BN 505 PRCHT REGT (3)

II CORPS
AFTER D+8
G 36

DIME
(1 DIV)
A 1 OBSN D
E 36 D+4
70(L) D+4
17(-) D+4

15
39 (1 BTRY)
9(-B) (M)
62

30 E 39 26
36 1 RN 33
41 4 RN
77 (-1 BTRY)
B 1 OBSN

CENT
(45 DIV)
D 36 D
753 (M) D
F 36 D+4
I 178 D+4
Z 178 AFTER D+8

16
7 158
5 160
171
189(M)

SICILY
SCALE 1:750000

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3. Tank Units:

The 70th Tank Battalion (L) was attached to the 1st Infantry Division for the landing and was landed on D - Day with the "DIME" force. It subsequently was relieved from this attachment and was attached to II Corps, in which role it fought throughout the campaign. The 753rd Tank Battalion (Medium) was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division, landed with the "JOSS" Force on D - Day, and remained with this force until D + 21, at which time it was relieved and attached to II Corps. Elements of the Battalion participated in amphibious landings behind the enemy lines on the north coast with units of the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions. The other tank units were held in AFRICA on call; however, since no necessity for their employment arose, they were never sent to SICILY.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Probably the outstanding lesson for Field Artillery was the feasibility of landing craft, medium and heavy artillery materiel early in an assault, from modern landing craft. The 105mm Howitzer M7 (SP) proved to be one of the best non-amphibian landing vehicles of any arm. This vehicle was debarked in as much as six feet of water, but came ashore under its own power without difficulty. It was found that on a soft sloping beach, operation must be perpendicular to the water-line since travel parallel to water-line causes a thrown track due to sand banking up inside the track. Other types of Field Artillery materiel landed successfully on D-Day included the 105mm Howitzer M2 (towed), 155mm Howitzer M1918 A3, 155mm Howitzer M1 and 155mm Gun M1.

2. The 105mm Howitzer M7 can be fired with fair accuracy from the deck of an LCT prior to the grounding of the craft.

3. When the 105mm Howitzer M7 is employed, heavy supply and maintenance requirements must be planned for, since frequent repairs and parts are needed.

4. It is again emphasized that integrity of Field Artillery units must be maintained in order to secure the most effective fire support. When decentralization is necessary, units should revert to centralized control at the earliest possible time.

5. Survey must always be instituted in every position, even when good maps are available.

6. The Artillery Air OP has fully proven its effectiveness. Communication difficulties were encountered due to the short range of the SCR-610. A longer-range is needed.

7. Steps must be taken to reduce the shine of the fore part of the barrel of the 155mm Howitzer M1, since positions are revealed by the reflected light.

8. Better machining and finishing of the parts of the breech-block and firing mechanism of the 155mm Howitzer M1 are needed to prevent jamming and malfunctioning.

9. Both the 4-ton and 6-ton trucks have proved inadequate as prime movers for the 155mm Howitzer M1.

10. A stronger limber-lifting screw must be provided for the 155mm Gun M1.

11. Principles of Tactics and Technique of Field Artillery, as taught by Field Artillery School, have again proved sound.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the utmost care be exercised to insure that only uniform lot numbers on projectiles, powder charges and fuses be issued. This is essential to effective firing.

2. White Phosporous smoke shell, which is to be replaced as a screening agent by the new HC-Base Ejection Smoke Shell, should not be completely withdrawn, since it has proved to have excellent casualty and incendiary effects, and has a very strong morale effect on the enemy. This last was testified to repeatedly by prisoners. It is therefore recommended that both HC-BE and WP continue to be provided for artillery units. Recommended percentages (of total smoke) are: HC-BE - 80%, WP - 20%.

3. Extensive enemy use of land mines in defensive and delaying operations has made it essential that Field Artillery units be equipped with mine detectors to avoid heavy personnel and material losses when occupying positions. Engineer personnel is normally not available for this purpose, since road clearance and other missions have a higher priority than clearing artillery position areas. Authority has been secured from SOS NATOUSA for the issue of mine detectors to field artillery units in this theater on the basis of one per headquarters battery and three per firing battery. It is recommended that Tables of Equipment be modified to allow these mine detectors for all field artillery units (including especially those in the US) to permit necessary training of artillery personnel in their use.

4. All artillery units agree on the desirability of longer range for artillery weapons. Since we have seen frequently out-ranged by German medium and heavy guns, longer-range materiel is needed for counterbattery.

5. It is essential that time shell furnished for the 155mm Howitzer be fused with the M67 fuse.

6. Elimination by rigid Ordnance inspection of all artillery weapons which do not have an expectancy of serviceability beyond the immediate campaign in prospect should be accomplished from both units and replacement stocks prior to shipment from staging area.

7. The training of more highly-specialized air photograph interpreters in division and higher photo interpretation units is essential to provide artillery units with proper photo interpretation.

/s/ John M. Willems
JOHN M. WILLEMS,
Colonel, Field Artillery,
Artillery Officer.

AIR ANNEX TO ARTILLERY REPORT

1. Changes in organic equipment, duties of personnel, and tactics of employment of the artillery air sections have gradually taken place within combat units as a result of operations in Tunisia and Sicily. So that these changes resulting from battle experience could be recorded and recommendations for changes in existing tables of organization and tables of equipment based upon practical knowledge could be formulated, a conference of combat experienced division, group, corps, and army artillery air officers was held at Palermo, Sicily, on September 3, 1943, attended by officers from the following units:

Seventh Army Artillery Air Officer (Sicily)
II Corps Artillery Air Officer (Tunisia and Sicily)
2nd Armored Division Artillery Air Officer (Sicily)
1st Infantry Division Artillery Air Officer (Tunisia and Sicily)
3rd Infantry Division Artillery Air Officer (Sicily)
9th Infantry Division Artillery Air Officer (Tunisia and Sicily)
45th Infantry Division Artillery Air Officer (Tunisia and Sicily)
5th Field Artillery Group Air Officer (Tunisia and Sicily).

The following are the lessons learned by these artillery air officers and their recommendations for necessary modifications in the present artillery air sections.

2. Lessons Learned:

a. Tactics.

(1) In the artillery battalion the principle of organic air observation has proven to be sound. The successful adjustment of artillery fire from the air is dependent upon teamwork built up between pilot, observer, and the artillery battalion as a result of intensive training together. Only one airplane has been required by the battalion. The reserve plane was rarely used by the battalion.

(2) The division artillery air sections used their two organic airplanes for adjusting artillery fire of the division, but it was also found in combat that numerous vital reconnaissance and liaison missions for the division other than artillery observation were demanded of the liaison airplanes in the division artillery section. Therefore, their airplanes were employed more for vital reconnaissance missions for both the division artillery and the division than for observation of division artillery fire. More missions were required than the two organic airplanes could possibly fly. All the division artillery commanders employed the reserve planes of the battalions at the division artillery field in order to accomplish the additional missions required and until airplanes are issued to the other arms and services for this reconnaissance employment it is necessary that no reduction be made in the total number of airplanes already assigned to the division artillery and to the artillery battalions.

(3) The group artillery air sections employed their airplanes in the same manner as division artillery commanders, using the battalion reserve planes at the group artillery field for additional reconnaissance and fire missions for the group artillery.

(4) The corps artillery air section did not adjust corps artillery fire because the radio communication was inadequate and because the Cub and Aeronca airplanes available were not capable of accomplishing that mission which would require flying several miles behind enemy front lines to observe corps artillery targets. No night flights were attempted because neither the Cub nor the Aeronca are suitable or equipped for this type of flying. However many vital reconnaissance missions were flown for the corps commander and the corps artillery commander.

(5) The army artillery air section did not adjust any artillery fire. However, several vital reconnaissance missions were flown for the army commander and his staff. The air section also flew a great number of important courier missions for all the staff sections of the army headquarters.

b. Technique.

(1) Forward observation methods of adjusting artillery fire from the air as now taught at the Field Artillery School have proven to be quick, efficient and sound.

(2) The technique of flying while observing fire conceived and taught at the Field Artillery School is not practical. Observation cannot be obtained by flying a few hundred feet over the battery position and adjusting the fire of that battery upon targets three or four thousand yards away because the targets cannot be seen from that distance and because our front lines and the enemy front lines are always indistinct and difficult to locate even when flying directly over them.

(3) It has been found necessary to fly up to and over the enemy front lines from altitudes of 500 feet up to 3000 feet in order to obtain observation required to accomplish the mission. Even then the observer had to have binoculars to locate the target. In many cases flights were made about one thousand yards off shore at an altitude of two thousand feet in order to adjust our artillery fire upon enemy targets several miles behind the enemy front lines, which adjustment by any other means would have been impossible due to terrain obstacles.

c. Communication.

(1) In general the 610 radio installed in the airplane has not been satisfactory because of its weight and its short range. A lighter radio of much longer range is required. This is especially true in medium and heavy artillery battalions.

(2) It was found necessary to provide additional radio communication for the artillery air section. A 610 radio installed in a 1/4 ton truck was used for ground reconnaissance communication and for liaison between the artillery command post and the battalion airfield. Another 610 radio installed on the 3/4 ton weapons carrier was necessary to communicate with the airplane while in the air and with the reconnaissance 1/4 ton truck.

(3) In order to maintain communication between the division artillery command post and the division artillery airfield a 193 radio was provided at the airfield to operate on the division artillery command channel. This radio was absolutely necessary because of the distance between the airfield and the command post and the lack of adequate wire communication. Two additional 608 or 610 radios installed on 1/4 ton trucks were necessary for liaison and ground reconnaissance purposes.

(4) A radio having increased range is vitally needed by the corps artillery airplanes. No missions were flown for either adjustment or surveillance of corps artillery fire because the 610 radio was inadequate. Two 610 or 608 radios installed in 1/4 ton trucks were also necessary to maintain communication between the artillery command post and the airfield and for ground reconnaissance missions.

(5) No radio communication was necessary for the airplanes of the army artillery section, or for ground reconnaissance and liaison.

d. Materiel.

(1) Airplanes.

(a) One airplane is sufficient for the battalion air section. The reserve plane was nearly always attached to the division artillery air section.

(b) The two organic airplanes and the three reserve planes of the battalions are sufficient to accomplish all group artillery missions.

(c) The two organic airplanes and the four reserve airplanes of the battalions are sufficient for the division artillery to accomplish all its missions.

(d) Four airplanes are required to fulfill the corps artillery missions.

(e) Eight airplanes were required for the army missions. The army section should also maintain a pool of about 20% reserve pilots and airplanes in order to provide rapid replacement for pilots and airplanes lost by the divisions in combat. While these pilots and planes are in reserve they could be used to fly the many courier missions for the army headquarters.

(f) In general the Aeronca (L-3-C) is not suitable for combat. The Cub (L-4-B) is barely satisfactory, but does not have sufficient power, performance, or weight carrying capacity to efficiently and safely accomplish combat missions. Because of this lack of power and light construction many minor crack-ups have occurred on the rough, short, and difficult fields encountered in Tunisia and Sicily. An airplane having increased horsepower, better performance, more speed, more rugged construction, and having luminous and accurate instruments is vitally needed. Both the Stinson (L-5) and the Interstate (L-16) airplanes incorporate these improved features.

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(2) Transportation.

(a) The battalion air section has found that an additional 1/4 ton truck is necessary for ground reconnaissance and liaison with the battalion command post. The half-track in the armored battalion air section does not have sufficient cargo capacity to carry all the section and individual equipment.

(b) The group artillery air section has found that three 1/4 ton trucks are necessary for reconnaissance, liaison, and radio communication. Three additional 3/4 ton weapons carriers and three 1/4 ton trailers are necessary to supply the battalion reserve planes attached to group headquarters and to carry kitchen equipment.

(c) The division artillery air section has found that three 1/4 ton trucks are necessary for reconnaissance, liaison, and radio communication. Two additional 3/4 ton weapons carriers and two 1/4 ton trailers are necessary to supply the four battalion reserve airplanes at the division artillery airfield. An additional 3/4 ton weapons carrier and 1/4 ton trailer are necessary to carry the air section kitchen equipment.

(d) The Corps artillery air section requires two 1/4 ton trucks for liaison and ground reconnaissance. Two 3/4 ton trucks and two 1/4 ton trailers are required to supply the four airplanes. One additional 3/4 ton truck and one 1/4 ton trailer are necessary to transport kitchen equipment. Three 2½ ton trucks with 1 ton trailers are necessary to transport section equipment, replacement spare parts, and supplies for the divisions. Another 2½ ton truck and trailer are necessary to recover and repair cracked-up airplanes for the divisions.

(e) The army artillery air section requires two 1/4 ton trucks for liaison and ground reconnaissance. One 3/4 ton weapons carrier and one 1/4 ton trailer are necessary to carry equipment for each two airplanes assigned to the army section. One 2½ ton truck with one 1 ton trailer is sufficient to carry the spare parts and equipment of the section . One additional 3/4 ton weapons carrier with a 1/4 ton trailer is necessary to haul kitchen equipment.

(3) General equipment.

(a) Each battalion, group, division, and corps artillery air section has found that observers must have binoculars.

(b) All air sections have found that kitchen equipment is absolutely necessary.

e. Personnel.

(1) Officer pilots have proven far superior to enlisted pilots because they are more dependable, better educated and more experienced in artillery.

(2) Officer observers who have been previously trained by their units have fired missions in a superior manner. Observers who have not been previously trained failed to accomplish their missions many times because they were not used to flying and were therefore unable to orient themselves, find the bursts, or locate the targets, and they were often too air sick, too inexperienced or too scared to even operate the radio satisfactorily. This necessitated the employment of officer pilots as observers in the battalions where the observers had not been previously trained. Regularly assigned observers should and can draw flying pay under the provisions of a War Department order dated August 5, 1943.

(3) Mechanics have been superior. They have been well trained by the Field Artillery School and much credit is due them for the performance of all the field artillery airplanes.

(4) New pilots have lacked cross country experience and have become lost on several occasions in Africa and Sicily as a result. Most of the enlisted pilot replacements are unable to read maps satisfactorily.

(5) No field artillery personnel has been seriously injured or killed in the Sicilian campaign as a result of airplane accidents. However, an air corps pilot, accustomed to flying heavy airplanes, crashed a commandeered Aeronca in the mountains of Sicily and was instantly killed.

(6) Three combat experienced air officers should be ordered to the Field Artillery School under the principle of rotation of key officers in order to explain to the school the problems encountered in combat and to help the school adjust its training to prepare pilots and mechanics for actual combat conditions based on experience rather than on theory. These officers should also become corps artillery air officers of units expecting to go overseas in order to properly train and equip the artillery air sections for combat.

f. Enemy action.

(1) Our planes have been attacked on nine different occasions by several enemy aircraft, but none were shot down. Standard evasive measures of rapid descent, contour flying, and weaving have been successful.

(2) Our planes were often attacked by antiaircraft and rifle fire, but none were shot down. Again standard evasive measures were successful in avoiding most of the fire. An airplane having increased speed and greater performance is needed to avoid antiaircraft fire when flying at low altitudes.

(3) Most of our success in the use of liaison airplanes is due to our air superiority. If the enemy should ever equal our air power or obtain air superiority a high percentage of losses of personnel and airplanes must be expected.

g. Supply.

(1) The supply of essential spare parts has been completely inadequate. No system of automatic supply of essential items of air corps equipment has yet been developed. Cubs and Aeroncas continually require many spare parts for dependable operation because they are not designed for rough combat conditions.

3. Upon the basis of these lessons learned in combat, the following tables of organization and tables of equipment for the air section of battalion, division, group, corps, and army are recommended:

Artillery Battalion Air Section

PERSONNEL	MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
1 1st Lt., Bn. Air Off., Pilot	1 Airplane, Liaison
1 2nd Lt., Asst., Bn. Air Off., Pilot	1 Truck, 3/4 ton, WC, w/w
1 2nd Lt., Observer	1 Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4
1 T/3, Mechanic	1 Trailer, 1/4 ton
1 T/5 Mechanics assistant	1 Gun, machine , cal .50 w/mount
1 T/5 Chauffeur	2 Binoculars, pr.
	1 Radio, SCR 619 (airplane)
	2 Radios, SCR 610
	1 Mine detector
	1 Stove, for field range
	Sufficient equipment to maintain one airplane

Group Artillery, and Armored Division Artillery Air Section

PERSONNEL	MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
1 Captain, Arty Air Off., Pilot	5 Airplanes, Liaison
1 1st Lt., Eng Off, Pilot	1 Truck, 2½ ton, lwb, w/w
5 2nd Lts., Pilots	4 Trucks, 3/4 ton, W/C, w/w
1 2nd Lt., Observer	3 Trucks, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4
1 M/Sgt, Chief of Section	1 Trailer, 1 ton
1 Tech Sgt. Supply, Mechanic	5 Trailers, 1/4 ton
3 T/3 Mechanics (one per 2 ap)	3 Guns, machine cal .50
3 T/5 Mechanics, assistant (one per 2 ap)	2 Binoculars, pr.
1 T/3 Radio technician	1 Mine detector
3 T/5 Radio operators	5 Radios, SCR 619, one per ap
1 T/4 Cook	2 Radios, SCR 608
1 Basic, cook's helper	1 Radio, SCR 193
7 T/5 Chauffeurs	1 Kit, radio repair and tuning
	1 Range, field, complete
	2 Mess chests, officers
	1 Tent, CP complete w/pins and poles
	2 Tents, wall, large, complete w/flys, pins and poles
	Sufficient equipment to maintain five airplanes already authorised

Infantry or Motorised Division Artillery Air Section

PERSONNEL	MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
1 Captain, Div Arty Air Off., Pilot	6 Airplanes, Liaison
1 1st Lt., Div Arty Eng Off., Pilot	1 Truck, 2½ ton, lwb, w/w
6 Lts., Pilots	4 Trucks, 3/4 ton, W/C, w/w
1 Lt., Observer	3 Trucks, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4
1 M/Sgt., Chief of Section	1 Trailer, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4
1 Tech Sgt., Supply Sgt.	5 Trailers, 1/4 ton
3 T/3 Mechanics (one per 2 ap)	3 Guns, machine, cal .50 w/mounts
3 T/5 Mechanics, assistant (one per 2 ap)	2 Binoculars, pr.
1 T/3 Radio technician	1 Mine detector
3 T/5 Radio operators	6 Radios, SCR 619, one per ap
1 T/4 Cook	2 Radios, SCR 608
1 Basic, Cooks helper	1 Radio, SCR 193
7 T/5 Chauffeurs	1 Radio repair and tuning kit
	1 Field Range, complete
	2 Mess Chests, officers
	1 Tent, CP, complete w/pins poles
	Sufficient equipment to maintain six (6) airplanes.

Corps Artillery Air Section

PERSONNEL	MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
1 Major, Corps Arty Air Off., Pilot	4 Airplanes, Liaison
1 Captain, Corps Arty Eng Off., Pilot	4 Trucks, 2½ ton, lwb, w/w
4 Lts., Pilots	2 Trucks, 1/4 ton, 4x4
1 M/Sgt, Chief of Section	4 Trailers, 1 ton, cargo
1 Tech Sgt., Supply	3 Trucks, 3/4 ton 4 x 4 W/C
1 Tech Sgt, Repair	3 Trailers, 1/4 ton
4 T/3 Mechanics	2 Guns, machine, cal .50
4 T/5 Mechanics assistants	2 Binoculars, pr.
1 T/4 Cook	1 Mine detector
1 Basic, cook's helper	4 Radios, SCR 619, one per ap
2 T/5 Radio operator	2 Radios, SCR 608
9 T/5 Chauffeurs	1 Range, Field, complete
	1 Mess Chest, officers
	1 Tent, CP, complete w/pins and poles
	2 Tents, Wall, large, complete w/flys, pins and poles
	Sufficient equipment to maintain four airplanes already authorised by T/BA. Also extensive third echelon repair equipment.

The mission of this section is to provide artillery air observation for corps artillery fire, air reconnaissance for the corps commander, supplies for the division air sections, and third echelon repairs and maintenance for all the airplanes in the corps.

Army Artillery Air Section
(Organic)

PERSONNEL	MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
1 Major, Army Arty Air Off., Pilot	8 Airplanes, Liaison
1 Captain, Army Arty Supply Off., Pilot	1 Truck, 2½ ton, w/w
1 Captain, Army Arty Operations Off., Pilot	5 Trucks, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4
8 Lts., Pilots	2 Trucks, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4
1 M/Sgt., Chief of Section	1 Trailer, 1 ton
1 Tech Sgt., Supply	5 Trailers, 1/4 ton
4 T/3 Mechanics	3 Guns, machine, cal .50
4 T/5 Mechanics assistants	2 Binoculars, pr.
1 T/4 Cook	1 Mine detector
1 Basic, cook's helper	8 Radios, SCR 619, one per ap
8 T/5 Chauffeurs	1 Range, Field, complete
	2 Mess Chests, officers
	1 Tent, CP, complete w/pins and poles
	2 Tents, wall, large, complete w/flys, pins, and poles
	Equipment to maintain eight (8) airplanes.

(Replacement Pool)

20 Lieutenants, Pilots	20 Airplanes, Liaison
10 T/3 Mechanics	10 Trucks, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4, W/C
10 T/5 Mechanics assistants	2 Trucks, 2½ ton, w/w
12 T/5 Chauffeurs	10 Trailers, 1/4 ton
	2 Trailers, 1 ton
	2 Mess Chests, officers
	20 Radios, SCR 619, one per ap
	Equipment to maintain ten (10) airplanes.

The mission of the army artillery air section is to provide essential reconnaissance for the army commander and the army artillery commander, and to provide a 20% replacement pool of reserve pilots, mechanics, and airplanes for a total of one hundred (100) airplanes already assigned to the division, corps, and army artillery units in combat while flying courier missions for army headquarters.

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REPORT OF THE CHEMICAL OFFICER

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TACTICAL OPERATIONS

PLANNING PHASE

During the planning stage of Operation Husky, the Chemical Officer, Force 343 (Seventh Army) faced three separate problems. (1) the employment of CWS troops; (2) Preparations for the Protection Against Chemical Attack of the Task Force; (3) Preparations for the employment of CWS munitions by all arms.

Employment of CWS Troops

Before decisions could be made relative to the employment of CWS units, these units had to be made available to the Force. In March arrangements were made which culminated in the movement of the 3rd, 83rd, and 84th Chemical Battalions (Mtz) from the United States to North Africa, and their assignment to the Force. The 2nd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) was scheduled to continue training in the States and sail later with the 45th Division. At the same time, the 69th and 78th Chemical Smoke Generator Companies, the 21st Chemical Decontaminating Company, the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company and the 63rd Chemical Depot Company, already in the North African Theatre of Operations, were earmarked for assignment to the Force. Of these units, the 21st Chemical Decontaminating Company was the only one that had been under the control of I Armored Corps, prior to the preparations for Operation Husky. The 12th Chemical Maintenance Company was assigned to Atlantic Base Section. The 69th Chemical Smoke Generator Company was assigned to Eastern Base Section. The 78th Chemical Smoke Generator Company was assigned to Headquarters Command, Allied Force Headquarters. These assignments and attachments were left undisturbed until it was actually necessary to move units into staging and mounting areas.

The 3rd, 83rd and 84th Chemical Battalions (Mtz) did not arrive in North Africa until 8 May - two months prior to D-Day. The procedure of staging and receiving organizational equipment consumed three weeks to a month. Thus, the battalions were not in a position to begin working with the divisions to which they were to be attached until 5 weeks prior to D-Day. As soon as each battalion was released from the Mediterranean Base Section Staging Area, it was attached to a Division and moved to the proper division area.

The 3rd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division and moved overland by organic motor transportation to the vicinity of Bizerte. The 83rd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) was attached to the 1st Infantry Division and moved to the vicinity of Clemencecau, Algeria. The 84th Chemical Battalion (Mtz) was attached to the 9th Infantry Division and was moved to the vicinity of Nagente, Algeria. However, by this time, each of these divisions was preoccupied with the problem of re-equipping, of preparing Unit Alert Plans, of packing equipment, and of deploying subordinate units for embarkation. One company of the 83rd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) no sooner arrived in the 1st Infantry Division area than it was immediately moved again to join the 1st Ranger Battalion, 100 miles to the West.

Because of the late date on which the Chemical Weapons Battalions joined their respective divisions, there was little opportunity for combined training and for instructing Infantry regimental and battalion commanders and their staffs of the capabilities and limitations of the 4.2" morter. This was unfortunate - because it was, in effect, a new weapon, with which no infantry personnel in the North African Theater had had any experience.

At the time of the arrival of the Chemical Battalions (Mtz) in North Africa, only one of these battalions, the 3rd, had had any previous amphibious training. It had been hoped that it would be possible to fit the 83rd and 84th Chemical Battalions (Mtz) into the training program at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center. Because of the time element, these battalions received only sketchy preparation for the problems of amphibious maneuver.

In the meantime, the Chemical Officer, Force 343 (Seventh Army) and the Chemical Officer, Force 141 (Fifteenth Army Group) were in frequent contact with the staffs of the divisions to which chemical battalions were attached. The object of this liaison was to familiarize division staffs with the correct employment of Chemical Battalions (Mtz). Particular stress was given to the possibilities of employing 4.2" morters to cover the assault landings, using techniques recently developed and perfected in the Amphibious Training Center in the United States.

While it was not possible to subject the Chemical Battalions to adequate amphibious training, opportunities for general training during the pre-invasion period were, nevertheless, not overlooked. Each of the battalions had been prevented from participating in training exercises for a considerable length of time, during which it had been alerted at its home station in the U. S., packed its equipment, moved to a staging area, embarked for overseas and been immobilized in the Mediterranean Base Section staging area in North Africa. Therefore, a request for a training allowance of 30 rounds per morter was requested from NATOUSA and approved. This was triple the amount that would have been available to the Battalions under existing allowances and provided an excellent opportunity to give all personnel intensive training in reconnaissance, selection and occupation of position, fire direction, and service of the piece.

Thus, the Chemical Battalions were able to embark, with personnel in good physical condition and with all men thoroughly familiar with their weapon. The only exceptions to this were replacement personnel - both officers and enlisted men, who joined the battalions from Replacement Pools just prior to embarkation, without adequate previous experience with the 4.2" morter.

During the period of training firing, a large percentage of defective White-Phosphorus-filled 4.2-inch shell was discovered. Investigation revealed that a portion of this ammunition had been loaded on transatlantic transports - in the bilges, and that, due to lack of a waterproofed package, the shell fuses had corroded. Arrangements were immediately concluded with SOS NATOUSA to inspect all 4.2-inch shell in Africa, to segregate defective rounds to improvise waterproofing for ammunition earmarked for the operation.

The 2nd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) arrived in Africa, combat loaded, with the 45th Infantry Division, to which it was attached on 25 June 1943. This battalion had undergone thorough amphibious training in the United States and had been fortunate enough to experience combined training with the Infantry units, which it would support during the operation.

CWS Service Units

During this phase, the CWS service companies that were to form part of the Force continued their activities, under the control of the commands to which they were attached. Commanding Officers of these units were ordered to report for instructions to the Corps or Division headquarters, under which they were to serve during the operation. In addition all these service units were contacted by the Chemical Officer or Assistant Chemical Officer, Force 343(Seventh Army) and oriented as to their future employment. The maintenance of the status quo, as far as service units were concerned, allowed SOS NATOUSA to make its supply dispositions with a minimum of disruption and, at the same time, allowed the units to gain experience in the same type work which they were to perform in Sicily. As the time approached for embarkation, and as the need for them to perform duties relative to the operation became apparent, the units were relieved of attachment to various commands and moved to proper staging and mounting areas. The 69th and 78th Chemical Smoke Generator Companies moved to Bizerte and provided effective area smoke operations over that port during the critical embarkation period.

Preparations for the Defense Against Chemical Attack.

Intelligence reports from Sicily revealed very little likelihood of the use of toxic chemical agents by the enemy during the operation. Nevertheless, certain measures were taken to prepare the Force for any eventuality. A series of Army Chemical Warfare Schools, to qualify as many unit gas officers and non-commissioned officers as possible for Division, Corps, and Army troops were conducted by Chemical Officer, II Corps. Similar schools were conducted in the Divisions. All units were equipped with full T/BA protective equipment. Because of experience in previous operations, in which it had been found that the Service Gas Mask was too heavy for assault forces, arrangements had been made to equip all personnel in the assault convoy with training type gas masks.

Preparations for the Employment of CWS Munitions.

Grenades, colored smoke, M16; grenades, hand smoke, (HC)M8; grenades, incendiary, M14; and grenades, frangible, M1(FS) were available to the force. Grenades, Smoke, (WP) M15, were sought vigorously but were not available for shipment from the United States. In order to provide a basis of issue for these grenades, a Basic Load table (Appendix I) was prepared, approved by the Chief of Staff, submitted to Headquarters Force 141 (Fifteenth Army Group) and approved for publication.

Plans for the procedure for ground-air identification involved, among other things, the use of colored smoke grenades. Tests were carried out, in conjunction with the Signal Officer and the Air Officer, to determine the effectiveness of these grenades. Orders from higher headquarters stipulated that only yellow smoke would be used for front line identification during daylight - and only yellow flares at night. A plan for the distribution of yellow flares, which the Ordnance Officer had obtained from British sources, was prepared and put into effect.

OPERATIONS PHASE

From D-Day until the cessation of hostilities in Sicily, the Seventh Army Chemical Officer had little to do with the operation of the Chemical Battalions (Mtz). The battalions were attached to Divisions and Corps as needed - and all tactical control was centered with the Commanding Generals of the Divisions and Corps. The Army Chemical Officer rendered all assistance possible to the Battalions, to enable them to accomplish their missions. However, for the most part, the responsibility of the Army Chemical Officer for the Chemical Battalions was one of supply of ammunition and replacement parts for the 4.2" chemical morters.

Chemical Battalions (Mtz).

Chemical Battalions (Mtz), equipped with the 4.2-inch chemical morter, were employed in operation HUSKY for the first time. A detailed account of the operations in which the three battalions which reached Sicily took part is to be found in the day to day journal of activities in this book. The 2nd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) saw more action than the other two units, disembarking with the 45th Infantry Division, as part of the CENT sub task force, the Battalion participated in all major encounters in which this Division was involved. The battalion advanced steadily from South Shore to North and then turned east to play its part in the final drive to Messina. When the 45th Infantry Division was relieved by the 3rd Infantry Division, the 2nd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) remained in the line, was relieved and attached to the 3rd Infantry Division, and continued to give effective support throughout the campaign.

The 3rd Chemical Battalion landed with the 3rd Infantry Division,


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as part of the JOSS sub task force, encountered little opposition and was in the forefront of the advance to Palermo. As the eastward drive began to shape up, the 3rd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) was relieved and attached to II Corps. During this phase of the operations, the unit was sub-attached to the 9th Infantry Division for one week. However, during the time the Battalion was under II Corps control, it did not fire any missions but was used chiefly as a transportation unit. It is believed that the terrain traversed and the nature of the opposition in several instances were ideal circumstances for the use of both high explosive and white phosphorus shell, fired from 4.2-inch mortars.

The 83rd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) disembarked with the 1st Infantry Division and 1st Ranger Battalion, as part of DIME sub task force. This battalion saw sharp action in the first two days of land operations in the vicinity of Gela and exceeded every demand made upon it. The battalion, while still attached to the 1st Infantry Division, participated in the capture of Butera. Following the fall of this town, the 83rd Chemical Battalion was attached first to the 2nd Armored Division and later to the 82nd Airborne Division, for the advance along the south shore into western Sicily. The few targets which presented themselves during this advance were dealt with summarily by the 4.2-inch mortars.

The deployment of Chemical Battalions (Mtz) in the final stages of the operation is to be found on map, "Location of CWS Units - End of Sicilian Campaign, 20 August 1943."

In general the three Chemical Battalions (Mtz) had similar experiences during their first combat operation. Each was called upon, at times, to fire missions beyond capabilities and beyond its range. Each distinguished itself on every occasion its weapons were employed correctly. Each proved the devastating effect of white phosphorus as an anti-personnel weapon, as well as a screening agent. Each proved the effectiveness of the new HE-filled 4.2-inch chemical mortar shell - both against personnel and against emplacements. Each suffered to a certain extent because of the limited range of the present 4.2-inch mortar. Each found the present 4.2-inch mortar sight inadequate. Each experienced the need for a mortar with traverse up to 1000 mils, in order that rapid adjustment could be made without displacement. Each found the battalion too large for efficient operation.

But chiefly each suffered most seriously because of inadequate and improper T/BA transportation. The heavy transportation at present authorized the battalions is not suited for combat operations. Light vehicles such as trucks, 1/4-ton, 4 x 4 and trailers, 1/4-ton, when available to the battalions on a loan basis from the divisions to which they were attached, were the only satisfactory answer to this problem. (See Appendix II).

CWS Service Units

The CWS service companies were employed in Sicily almost exclusively in supply missions. A report of their activities is included in the Supply Section of this book.

The location of these units and their respective detachments is shown on map, "Location of CWS Service Units - End of Sicilian Campaign, 20 August 1943."

The 12th Chemical Maintenance Company, in addition to its supply function, performed admirably in effecting immediate repair work on 4.2-inch mortars for the Chemical Battalions (Mtz). This company was stationed at an advance ASP, and on two occasions took its repair equipment into the front lines to perform maintenance on mortar equipment. This was done in spite of lack of mobility of the unit. In the course of this repair work, certain necessary changes in mortar equipment were noted, particularly regarding the amount of replacement parts that should be made available. Elevating screws were frequently found to be bent. Base plates frequently cracked. Some unheat-treated barrels were found. The 83rd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) improvised a better sight for the 4.2-inch mortar, the standard sight being inadequate for battalion needs. In addition to mortar maintenance, the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company also continued to recondition 4.2-inch mortar shell and to repair, recondition and salvage CWS protective equipment, including gas masks, decontaminating apparatus, etc. The 21st Chemical Company (Decontaminating), on one occasion, was ordered to an advance ASP, to stand by for action, in the event that leaking gas-filled artillery shells were discovered.

Chemical Smoke Generator Companies

The 69th Chemical Smoke Generator Company arrived at Palermo shortly after that port had been opened. Because of the size of the port, it was decided not to attempt to produce an area screen with the single company. The 78th Chemical Smoke Generator Company arrived two weeks later.

In the meantime, a complete smoke plan had been drawn up and approved by the Anti-Aircraft command and all necessary construction work on smokepot ovens had been completed. Upon the arrival of the 78th Chemical Smoke Generator Company, area smoke screen protection was made available at the port of Palermo immediately. A test run was conducted, revealing certain weaknesses in the screen. These were corrected immediately, leaving Palermo harbor well protected against air attack.

The size of the port necessitated the use of Pots, Smoke (HC) M1, to supplement the smoke of the mechanical generators. Some difficulty was experienced in this regard because of the amount of work required to keep pots burning—due to their short burning time. Also, the Navy objected strenuously to the use of pots, because of the bright flash they produce when burning. Even ovens were not able to hide this.

Use of Smoke by Seventh Army

In general, it may be said that smoke was used to a greater extent by all arms in Operation Husky than it had been in previous operations. On some days both Division and Corps artillery fired as much as 35% smoke shell. Screens were used to assist in infantry attacks and were also used to obscure the enemy's observation of infantry preparations and deployment for attack.

The casualty effect of white phosphorus was used to excellent advantage by infantry mortars, artillery and 4.2-inch chemical mortars. It is interesting to note that the enemy apparently was unprepared for the large scale use of white phosphorus, and that the average enemy soldier appeared to be almost completely uneducated as to its effect.

The incendiary effect of white phosphorus also played a prominent role. On one occasion, a German infantry unit was forced to abandon a well prepared position, because of a large fire started in a wheat field by white phosphorus. On numerous occasions grass camouflage netting on fixed positions was set afire by white phosphorus, forcing the enemy to displace.

On one occasion the Chemical Officer, 3rd Infantry Division was called upon to screen an inlet and beach in a forward area. A supply ship was to be brought in at this point - under enemy artillery fire at the time. Plans were made to produce an effective screen, using Pots, Smoke, Floating (HC) M4 and Pots, Smoke (HC), M1. Materials and personnel to operate this impromptu smoke installation were assembled. However, the unloading point of the supply ship was changed and the screen was not employed.

Flamethrowers.

Flamethrowers were used on only one occasion, and that to burn out a wheat field, from which enemy infantrymen were resisting.

CWS Grenades

Colored smoke grenades were used on a large scale by some divisions - and on a very limited scale by others. In the final stages of the operation, the use of this munition was much more frequent than it had been earlier - due to greater familiarity with the procedures of ground-air identification. The attack order of the 3rd Infantry Division on one occasion prescribed that yellow smoke would be displayed by all forward elements for thirty minutes prior to the assault. Numerous suggestions have been made that a faster burning grenade, producing a heavier, more concentrated cloud of colored smoke, be developed.

Grenades, Smoke, (HC) M-8 were not found to be a useful munition by combat troops. This grenade is regarded as having little tactical value, because of the small amount of smoke produced and the absence of any secondary effect. Grenades, Smoke (WP) M15, causing casualty and incendiary effect, in addition to producing a heavy volume of smoke, were in demand, but were not available.

Grenade, Incendiary, (M14) was used in limited quantities only. The chief use of this munition was in connection with demolition work by the engineers.

Captured Enemy Material.

In the course of the campaign a vast assortment of enemy chemical warfare material was captured. This material included German and Italian gas masks of various types, spare parts for gas masks, protective clothing, decontaminating agents and equipment, flamethrowers, collective protector sets, German Lositan personnel decontaminant, British Protective Ointment (which had been captured and relabelled by the Italians), colored smoke grenades and signals, rocket smoke devices, incendiary grenades, rocket incendiary shells, irritant smoke pots and candles, large stores of Chlorsulfonic Acid smoke material, and a substantial quantity of liquid vesicant agents.

Among these liquid vesicant agents was pure Mustard, in bulk and in artillery shell, and a 50-50 mixture of Mustard and Phenyldichlorarsine. As soon as it was feasible, this material was assembled at two places - Base Ammunition Depot No. 1 at Cerda for Class V materials; and Class II Depot, Palermo, for Class II and IV supplies. Samples of every article believed to be of interest were sent to Chief, Chemical Section, Allied Force Headquarters, for study.

In each case a preliminary report was prepared by Chemical Officer, Seventh Army, to accompany captured material shipped to the rear.

CONCLUSIONS

1. General conclusions that can be drawn are:-

a. Chemical Battalions are an effective unit in support of Infantry.

b. There should be more combined training of all supporting units with the unit to which attached, and especially infantry battalion and regimental commanders should be instructed in the employment of 4.2-inch chemical mortars.

c. Many changes in T/O and T/E of CWS units are necessary.

d. Certain mechanical changes in 4.2-inch chemical mortars, accessories and packaging of ammunition are necessary.

e. The Unit of Fire and/or Day of Supply of certain chemical grenades needs to be revised.

f. There are tactical disadvantages in the use of the Flamethrower and the smoke pot indicating that further development is needed.

2. Details of these conclusions are brought out in the following recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That, when an amphibious operation is being planned, participating units be brought together for extensive combined training - in the same formations that will be employed in the operation itself.

2. That classes in the employment of Chemical Weapons Battalions and 4.2-inch mortars be instituted at the Infantry School for Battalion and Regimental commanders and staffs.

3. That the T/O and T/E for a Chemical Mtzd Battalion (Sep) be revised as indicated in Appendix II.

4. That whenever possible, each Chemical Mtzd Battalion (Sep) remain attached to one Infantry Division, and not transferred from one division to another.

5. That the following changes be made on the 4.2" chemical mortar, accessories and shell package.

a. Increase range to 4500 yards or make a special lightweight shell.

b. Ship only heat-treated barrels overseas.

c. Furnish an accurate sight, of simple design similar to the Italian 81-mm mortar sight, which will sight to flanks or rear.

d. Strengthen the elevating screw.

e. Increase traverse to at least 1000 mils.

f. Strengthen the base plate by heavily welding the Y-angle.

g. Pack 4.2" mortar shell in a water-tight package similar to the 105-mm Ordnance shell packing.

6. That further development work on the present issue flamethrower be discontinued and development directed toward the production of a one-shot, throw-away type flamethrower.

7. That the following changes be made in regard to chemical grenades:

a. Deliver as soon as possible in quantity, and include in the Basic Load of all combat troops, the Grenade, Smoke, WP, M15.

b. Discontinue issue of the Grenade, Smoke, HC, M8 for combat purposes.

c. Decrease the Basic Load of M14 Incendiary Grenades.

d. Make available a colored smoke grenade that will produce an im-

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mediate thick clouds of colored smoke, and include them in the Basic Load of all combat troops.

e. Discontinue manufacture and issue of Smoke Frangible grenades.

8. That a longer burning smoke pot, with flash-hider, be developed for use in harbor smoke protection.

9. That Chemical Service Battalions, including four (4) Service Companies, and a Battalion Headquarters with Medical Detachment be organized and assigned, one per Field Army.

10. That Chemical Companies be renamed Chemical Service Companies, to perform all Maintenance, Depot and Decontaminating functions; that they be trained in the United States at the same Post as Chemical Weapons Battalions and that Separate Service Companies be authorized one (1) Warrant Officer for administrative work.

11. That the following change in T/E be made:

a. The 7½ KW generator of the Maintenance Company be mounted on a trailer.

b. Smoke Generator Companies be authorized welding equipment.

12. As all harbor smoke installations need two or more Smoke Generator Companies, Battalion Hqrs Detachments for S.G. Battalions should be authorized for each main Port.

13. That a Chemical Laboratory Company or section be assigned to each Task Force the size of an Army, for on-the-spot analysis of captured enemy munitions.

SUPPLY OPERATIONS

PLANNING PHASE

In the early stages of planning phase for Operation HUSKY, in March and early part of April, 1943, details as to exact troop strength, the maintenance plan and the overall supply plan were so uncertain that definite planning was not possible except for major items of equipment. These were requisitioned on the U.S. by the Chemical Officer, AFHQ, and included smoke pots for harbor protection, flamethrowers and flamethrower fillings, training gas masks to equip assault troops. The training gas masks were requested as a result of the lesson learned in operation TORCH when large numbers of service and diaphragm gas masks were discarded on the beaches by the troops due to their excessive weight and bulk. It was felt that with a lighter mask the individual soldier would be less likely to throw it away. Later events proved this supposition to be substantially correct.

Start of Planning.

At the end of March and early in April, various representatives of the supply section moved to Oran to work in close liaison with SOS, NATOUSA, in formulating and executing the supply plan for operation HUSKY. The CWS supply section moved to Oran about 20 April 1943 and immediately submitted the necessary requisition for the UGS-11 convoy, which would be the first convoy from the U.S. to supply Force 343 at Horrified. It was unfortunate that the CWS Supply Section had not been set up in Oran prior to this date as all other supply sections had been set up and were familiar with the supply plan and had established liaison with SOS, NATOUSA.

Logistical Data.

Logistical data necessary for preparing requisitions was lacking in the section upon arrival at Oran. This was corrected by the timely aid of the estimates section of MMS, CWS Section, who were extremely cooperative and gave us access to all their logistical data and aided materially with the preparation of requisitions.

"Phase"Requisitions.

After the first two convoy requisitions, work was begun on the "phase" requisitions. These requisitions were for the supplies to accompany the sub task forces on the assault, and subsequent follow ups. Each sub task force and each follow up required a separate requisition, with time to be laid down, and embarkation point to be laid down at, for each lot of supplies. Numerous inevitable changes in troop strength and units participating required additional phase requisitions on SOS, or changes on ones already submitted.

CWS Class II Restrictions.

Under the 3rd Outline Maintenance Plan, no CWS Class II Supplies were to be carried forward into Sicily, but such supplies as needed for maintenance were to be earmarked from North African Stores for the first twenty-one days, subsequent 21 day maintenance requisitions were submitted for UGS-11 and following convoys, each convoy with a 15 day interval, building up the reserve to a 30 day working level, supplies after that to be requisitioned on a 15 day basis only. These Class II supplies were to be held in North African Depots subject to call forward to HORRIFIED as needed. Shipments on convoys from the U.S. were not to be sent to HORRIFIED but unloaded in North African ports.

Later events proved the plan reasonably sound, as no gas warfare was encountered but it was proven that a small portion of this maintenance was needed, especially for the replacement of combat losses of gas masks, of which there were no replacements in Sicily for several weeks after the operation started. The only Class II supplies that reached Sicily in the early phases of the Campaign were maintenance parts for the 4.2-inch Chemical Mortar, maintenance for the flamethrowers and the extra training gas masks that were a component part of the assault packs prepared by the QM for beach maintenance.

CWS Class V Plan.

The restriction imposed by the maintenance plan on Class II supplies in no way applied to Class V, which includes grenades (chemical) of CWS issue, 4.2-inch mortar shell, smoke pots and floats, flamethrower fillings. Due to confused D/S and U/F figures on colored smoke grenades, white smoke grenades and incendiary grenades, maintenance factors and a Basic Load Plan was set up on these items. Later events proved these factors to be excessive, chiefly due to no use of the HC white smoke and incendiary grenades. Colored smoke grenades were used to a certain extent but not as extensively as planned.

CWS Service Troops.

For the handling of CWS Class II Supplies detachments of the 21st Chemical Decontaminating Company, 63rd Chemical Depot Company, and 12th Chemical Maintenance Company were allotted to the sub task forces. As to how the supplies were handled when over the beaches was a responsibility of the sub task forces and no definite plan was formulated until such time as 7th Army would take over the supply installations. As later proven, such a plan should have been formulated prior to departure for Sicily, as it was necessary to make such plans upon arrival in Sicily. In short, these plans as finally carried out, provided for handling of CWS supplies by CWS personnel in Ordnance ASP's. Results were very satisfactory.

Faulty Ammunition.

Complicating the supply of 4.2" mortar shell for the battalions was the discovery of bad shell, necessitating reconditioning and waterproofing of a large number at the last minute. Also, one shipment of shell was destroyed by explosion, necessitating replacement from already limited stocks.

Finish of Supply Planning.

Towards the end of the planning phase the phase requisitions were completed and only a few additional phase requisitions were necessary plus routine convoy requisitions upon PEMBARK. Most of the time in this latter period of the planning phase was occupied by coordinating the requipping of units alerted for operation HUSKY with SOS, NATOUSA and seeing that the chemical units participating secured full T/BA equipment of all types. Complicating this was the fact that SOS had frozen all stocks necessary to cover phase requisitions, leaving in some cases shortages of certain items which participating units had not received. Thus a lot of labor and time was necessary to release this material to units to bring them up to T/BA.

Supply Liaison.

Just prior to movement of the CWS Section officers leaving on D-Day convoy to embarkation point, one officer was left in Oran to act as liaison with SOS. One officer went to Biserte for liaison with ENS and one officer joined main headquarters of Force 343. Upon arrival of D-Day group in Algiers, liaison was established with MMS representative there, and with Chemical Officer, AFHQ, and supply problems on gas masks, smoke pots and grenades worked out satisfactorily. Liaison was also established with the units loading at Algiers and shortages checked. Upon boarding headquarters ship it was found that a considerable number of personnel were not equipped with the training gas masks. Necessary arrangements were made and then secured from MMS.

OPERATION PHASE

Initial Phase.

Upon arrival in Sicily, the responsibility of unloading supplies from ship to shore was, until taken over by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, the responsibility of the sub task force concerned. At this time the CWS supply section of 7th Army exercised no direct control over the supply installations set up separately by the different Task Forces. Beach dumps were set up by the CENT force in the vicinity of Scoglitti and Vittoria, by the DIME force in the vicinity of Gela on Red-green beach and by the JOSS force at Licata. All of these dumps contained CWS Class II and Class V supplies.

Handling of the supplies by the sub task forces and establishment of dumps was done by the use of service troops allotted to these forces. In the case of JOSS force, prior to their departure from North Africa they set up what they termed a "Force Depot", which contained detachments from each service destined to arrive in Sicily shortly after the first landing. This group took over the establishment of all dumps and depots once the supplies had been landed over the beach. Their plan was very successful for handling CWS supplies. The CWS section of the Force Depot was a detachment of the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company.

The time interval between landing in Sicily and the taking over of all supply functions from the Sub-Task Forces was occupied by the CWS supply section in checking beach dumps and inland ammunition dumps, coordinating the supply of CWS Class V among the task forces, checking supply of 4.2-inch mortar shell to the Chemical Motorized Battalions and collecting and evaluating captured German and Italian CWS material.

Formulation of Supply Plan.

The 1st Engineer Special Brigade took over the operation of all beach dumps and ASP's, 17 July 1943, under technical control of 7th Army. Responsibility for supply by 1st Engineer Special Brigade was from ship to shore to forward depots. At this time plans were formulated with consent of Ordnance so that in each ASP there would be a CWS section for CWS supplies, to be operated by CWS personnel. For this purpose a detachment of 12th Chemical Maintenance Company was utilized at Gela. CWS Class V supplies in Vittoria - Scoglitti area were stored in Ordnance ASP's and later concentrated in the Gela - Licata area. A representative of the CWS supply section, 7th Army, was detailed on TD with the 1st Engineer Special Brigade for coordination of CWS supplies.

In as much as three chemical battalions were operating in three different directions from the South shore, it was necessary to set up a target for CWS Class V supplies to include 4.2-inch mortar shell for CWS sections of Ordnance ASP's at Caltanissetta, Agrigento, and Petralia. Targets were set up for Sciacca and Allessandria but were shortly cancelled due to tactical changes of the mortar battalions. The supply of 4.2-inch mortar shell in the Vittoria - Scoglitti area was utilized to support the 2nd Chemical Battalion (Mtz) attached to the CENT Force. All targets were submitted to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade for fulfillment. Shortage of transportation delayed the complete filling of all targets set up, but sufficient material did arrive at ASP's to fill tactical needs. (See Map, Chemical Warfare Ammunition Supply Points).

Expenditure Reports.

Expenditure reports throughout the action were of little or no value in estimating daily expenditures of CWS material. In some cases these were included in Ordnance expenditure reports but were incomplete.

Supply for North Shore.

Upon arrival at Agrigento a definite supply plan was formulated. The decision was reached that the Seventh Army would operate supply installations on the North shore and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade would operate existing supply installations on South shore including the ports of Porto Empedocle and Licata. Upon arrival at Palermo, plans were made by CWS supply officer and the Ordnance ammunition officer for the establishment of ASP #14 at Bagheria, ASP #13 at Terwini Imerse and ASP #15 at Campofelice. For operating the CWS section of ASP #14 one platoon of the 21st Chemical Company moved from the Vittoria area to Palermo and thence to Bagheria. This platoon established and ran ASP #14 for approximately one week until the arrival of an ordnance ammunition company. Upon arrival of a second platoon of the 21st Chemical Company at ASP #14, a detachment was moved to ASP #15 to operate the CWS section of this ASP. Normal flow of supplies to these two ASP's was by truck to ASP #14 and by rail to ASP #15. At the same time CWS Class V supplies were moving into ASP's #8 at Petralia and #12 at Caltanissetta from the South shore. The CWS section of ASP #12 was being operated at this time by a detachment of the 63rd Chemical Depot Company with the balance of the 63rd Chemical Company operating CWS sections of ASP's at Licata, and Agrigento under the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. The 12th Chemical Company (less detachments) was then moved to Nicosia to operate CWS section ASP #16. A detachment of the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company, arriving directly in Palermo from North Africa, established the CWS Class II Depot at Palermo and later, upon arrival of balance of 21st Chemical Decontaminating Company, moved forward to San Stefano and established CWS section ASP #17. Supplies for CWS section of ASP #17, consisting mainly of mortar shell and colored smoke grenades, were moved from the South shore by coaster. Due to crowded condition of ASP #17, these supplies were moved forward some 12 miles east of San Stefano and then later moved to vicinity of S. Agata where the CWS section of ASP #18 was established by the same detachment. (For Comparison of Expenditures of 4.2" Mortar Shell with build up of depot stocks, see Graph #1).

CWS Class II Depot.

During this period the CWS Class II Depot at Palermo, operated

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CHEMICAL WARFARE AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS

C W S GLASSIDER OPENED 11 AUG.	A S P NO. 14 C W S SECTION OPENED 28 JULY	B A D NO. 1 C W S SECTION OPENED 27 AUG.	A S P NO. 15 C W S SECTION OPENED 30 JULY	A S P NO. 12 C W S SECTION OPENED 27 JULY CLOSED 8 AUG.	A S P NO. 17 C W S SECTION OPENED 7 AUG. CLOSED 17 AUG.	A S P NO. 18 C W S SECTION OPENED 14 AUG. CLOSED 24 AUG.	A S P NO. 16 C W S SECTION OPENED 3 AUG.
F G L M				G H M N			H J N O
A S P NO. 9 C W S SECTION OPENED 20 JULY	A S P NO. 8 C W S SECTION OPENED 22 JULY	A S P NO. 5 C W S SECTION OPENED 15 JULY	A S P NO. 3 C W S SECTION OPENED 11 JULY CLOSED 18 JULY	A S P NO. 4 C W S SECTION OPENED 15 JULY	A S P NO. 1 C W S SECTION OPENED 11 JULY CLOSED 26 AUG	A S P NO. 2 C W S SECTION OPENED 11 JULY CLOSED 26 AUG	

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by a detachment from the 21st Chemical Decontamination Company, was put in operation and supplies consisting of large quantities smoke pots, smoke floats, fuel oil and Fog oil were unloaded at Palermo and moved to the bivouac area of the 69th Chemical Smoke Generator Company. On 14 August an urgent radio from SOS NATOUSA called for 50,000 training gas masks to be shipped to North Africa for other operations. This necessitated the turning in of all training gas masks in the hands of troops and exchanging them for service and diaphragm masks. A "production line" was set up at the CWS Class II Depot to service, test and pack these masks for shipment to North Africa.

Concentration of CWS Class V Supplies on North Shore.

Just prior to the close of the campaign, a site was selected by Ordnance for Base Ammunition Depot #1, 9½ miles east of Palermo. A CWS section was selected and a detachment from the 21st Chemical Decontaminating Company was moved into the area. This location was soon changed to the vicinity of Cerda and the detachment was moved to the new area. Base Ammunition Depot #1 was selected as the concentration point for all CWS Class V supplies on the North shore and movement of supplies into it was begun about 19 August.

Liaison with Base Area Group

During the latter part of the campaign, representatives of the CWS section of the Base Area Group worked in the office of the Chemical Officer, Seventh Army, so that they would be familiar with the supply set up when they took it over from Seventh Army at a later date. At the same time a representative of the Base Area Group was working with the 1st Engineer Special Brigade on the South shore.

CONCLUSIONS

1. General conclusions that can be drawn from the operation are:-

a. CWS Supply planning operations started at a late date and with insufficient logistical data.

b. The plan for sending forward no Class II replacement supplies did not prove to be sound.

c. Certain changes in equipment and maintenance factors are necessary.

d. The "Force Depot" system as used by JOSS Force was successful.

e. The plan for CWS sections, with CWS personnel, in Ordnance ASP's was highly successful.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CWS Supply planning should begin at the same time as other supply sections.

2. Complete logistical data must be at hand.

3. Ship forward at least 5 D/S of Class II items for troops participating, to come in at least by D plus 15.

4. Requisitions for supplies to be shipped into theater must be submitted early enough to insure their arrival in time for distribution to troops.

5. Light weight gas masks are necessary, at least for assault troops. Should not exceed weight of present training gas mask.

6. Proper Day of Supply on chemical grenades should be used. Since operation HUSKY, data received from Office of the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, gives proper Day of Supply.

7. Determine beforehand if troops intend to utilize weapons and supplies issued to them. Some items were carried, with no tactical plan for their use, such as flame throwers, HC Smoke and Incendiary Grenades. Division and Corps Chemical Officers should have full appreciation of tactical plan at earliest opportunity.

8. Formulate as early as possible a concrete supply and maintenance plan and have as few additions and changes to it as possible.

9. Have formulated beforehand a definite ammunition storage and forwarding plan. In the case of CWS Class V supplies, this should be worked out in conjunction with Ordnance.

10. The "Force Depot" system as utilized by the JOSS Force for handling supplies over the beach to dumps should be followed by Sub-Task Forces.

11. Insure sufficient transportation to be allotted for moving supplies forward.

BRUCE T. HUMPHREVILLE,
Major, CWS,
Chemical Officer

ANNEX I

SECRET - BIGOT

: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, I.A.C. :
: Init: :
: Date: 31 May 1943 :

BASIC LOAD - CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE - CLASS V

GRENADES, for Destruction and Screening Purposes	WHITE PHOSPHORUS, M15 or Substitute HC Smoke, M-8	Incendiary THERMITE M-14	Frangible, AT-M1 (or latest type)
Each fuel consuming combat vehicle including tanks, halftracks, scout cars, armored cars, carriages, Motor S.P., and prime movers except mtcls, truck ¼ ton in Recn units, and TD vehs.	4	4	-
Each gun, 37mm, 40mm, or 57mm.	-	2	-
Each gun or howitzer, 75mm 3" 90mm,105mm (or prime mover)	-	6	-
Each gun or howitzer, 155mm or larger	-	8	-
Each mortar	-	1	-
Each truck, ¼ ton in Recn unit	3	2	-
Each mtcl. in Recn unit	-	1	-
Each vehicle or mount in TD unit	12	4	-
Each rifle Co.	20	10	10
Engrs. Assigned to Amphib. operations			
Hq. & Serv. Co.	10	5	-
Bn. Hq. Co.	10	5	-
Shore Co.	20	10	10

GRENADES, Signalling for Air-Ground Recognition. (only two (2) colors loaded at one time)	Smoke (Violet) M16	Smoke (Yellow) M16	Smoke (any future colors) M16
Each tank	3	3	3
Each halftrack	3	3	3
Each scout car	3	3	3
Each vehicle, except mtc. and those listed above	1	1	1
*Each Bn Hq Inf.	10	10	10
*Each Co Hq Inf.	5	5	5
*Each Regt Hq Inf.	10	10	10

*In addition to vehicular authorization.

ANNEX II

Recommended T/O for CHEMICAL REGIMENT


Headquarters Company — 6 mortars (no mortar platoon set-up)
Approx. 95 EM 4 Officers
Approx. 17 ½-ton truck & trailers
2 - 3/4-ton Weapon Carrier
2 - 2½-ton trucks
1 - 1-ton trailer

Battalion (3 companies)
Battalion Headquarters Detachement: Approx. 20 EM 5 Officers
Approx. 4 ½-ton trucks & trailers
1 - 3/4-ton Weapon Carrier

3 Weapons Battalions

Regiment (3 weapons battalions)
Regimental Headquarters Company: Approx. 120 EM 12 Officers
Approx. 6 ½-ton trucks & 4 trailers
14 - 2½-ton trucks
13 - 1-ton trailers
1 - Ambulance, 3/4-ton
2 - 3/4-ton C & R
2 - 3/4-ton Weapon Carrier
1 - Radio Carryall


The above is the recommendation of two Chemical Battalion Commanders. It has not been tried out, consequently figures are approximate.



Above is a graph showing the status of supply and rate of expenditure of 4.2 inch mortar shell in Operation HUSKY from D-Day, 10 July 1943, until the conclusion of the campaign in Sicily. H.E. and W.P. filled shell have been lumped together. Expenditures of the two types were approximately equal. All expenditures were made by the 2nd Chemical Battalion (Mtzd), 3rd Chemical Battalion (Mtzd), and 83rd Chemical Battalion (Mtzd), equipped with the 4.2 inch Chemical Mortar, M1al. Amounts of 4.2 inch mortar shell shown as set up for assault and follow-up convoys represents amounts set up for loading in North Africa on D, D plus 4, and D plus 8 convoys, plus amount loaded in U.S. by Cent Force.

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ENGINEER

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REPORT OF THE ENGINEER

I. INTRODUCTION

This report of the engineer activities during the Sicilian Campaign starts with the planning stage and carries through the operation to the 22d of August 1943, five days after the fall of Messina. During this time, fifteen different types of engineer units were engaged.

Plans were initiated on the 25th of March 1943 by the Engineer Section, I Armored Corps, organized according to the normal T/O, which provides six officers.

A considerable amount of detail is included in the first part which covers the planning stage. This is considered necessary because the success of any operation, in so far as higher headquarters is concerned, depends more upon the planning which preperes units to perform their role and insures the presence of adequate personnel and supplies when needed, than upon any other factor.

II. PLANNING STAGE

a. It was necessary to plan not only for all of the many and varied engineer functions in a combined operation, but also for the prompt repair of a major port and of the utilities of a city of 400,000. It was expected that all of these would have been subjected to our own bombardments as well as the demolitions and perhaps bombardments of the enemy. Also, it was necessary to insure the supply of water on an island that had no surplus even with only normal demands, and to insure the quick passage of our troops over roads in mountainous terrain crossed by a myriad of ravines and gullies.

b. The plans had to be made with a small staff without any indication of the development of the problem beyond the initial stage and involving supplies whose requirements had to be anticipated in many cases by upwards of 90 days in order to obtain shipment from the United States.

c. The first step in the planning was to set up the basis for planning. As little was known of the course of action after the initial assault, the following assumptions were made:

(1) Palermo would be taken by D / 8.
(2) Damage to the harbor and lines of communications would be severe. The Engineer would provide for all necessary repair and construction to include D / 60.
(3) Responsibility for the movement of troops and supplies at all beach heads would rest initially with each sub-task force commander.
(4) The 1st Amphibian Brigade would subsequently establish and service beach dumps and initiate repair of all ports used.
(5) Special engineer troops would be available to Sub-task Force Commanders for assistance in maintenance of lines of communications, clearance and laying of minefields, water supply, camouflage of supply installations, construction of bulk fuel storage, maintenance of lightering points. These troops and responsibilities would pass to Army by D / 14 or as soon thereafter as the occupation of the west end of the island was completed.

Based on these assumptions an engineer staff planning guide was made up by the Engineer while the members of the engineer section familiarized themselves with all available information on Sicily. The purpose of the guide was to control the planning to be sure it was coordinated, in accordance with policy and complete, and to outline the general solution desired. When compiled it covered some 29 subjects in 62 pages.

The staff then expanded this into the engineer task force planning guide by working out the details of the various subjects. These were consolidated and a copy of the detailed guide furnished each of the key members of the section to insure our complete coordination and to familiarize everyone with all the plans. The operation was changed from the west end of Sicily to the east end on May 19, requiring a complete revision of the guide. It was then briefed into a planning guide (Incl. #1) for general distribution among all the engineers of the task force to guide all the engineer planning to insure coordination throughout.

On May 29, the guide was presented to each Sub-task Force Engineer and on June 13 the complete Engineer plan was presented to the same group at a conference.

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The annexes to the Administrative Order and to the Field Order were completed on June 15 and 18 respectively.

Training.

The problems involved during the training particularly included passage of natural and artificial obstacles in the water and artificial obstacles on and beyond the beaches during the assault, operation of supply installations for a large force over the beach for a period estimated at 60 days, and the training of Task Force engineer service units.

a. The assumed function of the Engineer of the Seventh Army in connection with the assault was to determine the type of obstacles likely to be encountered on the beaches, determine the best method of passing each, to insure that this information was passed on to the Sub-task Forces and incorporated in their plans and training, and to insure that the necessary supplies for the recommended method of assault were available for proper combat loading.

At the direction of the Commanding General, arrangements were made early in March and a program set up for a Company of the 36th Engineer Regiment to conduct experiments at Port Lyautey, French Morocco, to determine the best method for the passage of artificial obstacles in the water and on the beaches. This program was interrupted just as it was getting under way, by the movement of the 36th Engineers to Arzew with the 3d Division. No engineer troops were available to replace them until early in May when engineer units at the FAITC were made available to continue the experiments.

During the period, aerial photographs were continually studied to determine the development of beach obstacles on the beaches of Sicily and descriptions were obtained of beach obstacles employed by the Germans along the channel coast of Western Europe. From these an estimate was made of the probable obstacles that would be encountered, and passage of these obstacles was included in the program of experiments.

The experiments were completed the end of May, conclusions reached and recommendations passed on to each of the Sub-task Force Engineers including our estimate of the maximum obstacles likely to be encountered, the best method to overcome each obstacle, and information on how the necessary supplies would be set up to facilitate loading for the assault.

During this period, periodic checks were made on the assault training at the FAITC. These revealed that the obstacles then being used for the training were inadequate and it was not until the late stages of the training that adequate obstacles for proper training were included.

During May, experiments were also continued to determine the best method for unloading vehicles on shores screened by false beaches. There were two possibilities, either removing the false beach or providing a suitable connection between vessels grounded on the false beach and the shore. The possibility of blowing or dredging channels through the false beaches was investigated.

The Navy did not believe dredging early in the action was practicable and the possibility of dredging was eliminated by the Navy on May 26th. Experiments on blasting were conducted by blowing bars with bangalore torpedoes, explosive mats and bulk charges. These were completed on 18 May 1943, and while they indicated that this might be a possible solution, it was not considered a satisfactory one. In the meantime, the Navy was experimenting with steel pontoon causeways and the Army with the construction of hasty piers by a variety of means. The construction of the piers did not prove practicable. The Navy causeways appeared the logical solution if a practical scheme for launching them could be arrived at. Contact was maintained with the Navy in all experiments. Up to the end of May, no satisfactory solution had been presented, because the Navy desired to eliminate all towing if possible, although a satisfactory solution had been worked out by the C.B.'s in the United States prior to their embarkation for North Africa.

The result was that up to that date, no units had had any practice in unloading vehicles from grounded LST's. A report was made to the Commanding General to this effect, as a result of which a combined Army and Navy Board was set up on June 1st to decide on the proper solution to this problem as well as to other problems including the supply of bulk water from Navy craft to shore tanks.

A recommendation on the solution of the causeway problem which was nothing more than the procedure developed months before at Newport was made on June 5th, and from that date on, it was possible to give drivers practice in unloading vehicles from LST's over the causeways. Proficiency was reached in their use so that the first vehicles were generally unloaded in 22 minutes, although changes first had to be made in the ramp design.

A critical part of the training in the passage of obstacles was the program for mine training. Training in mines had been continuous in the I Armored Corps since December. From March until the units moved to the FAITC, arrangements were made to keep the quota of the I Armored Corps at the Fifth Army Mine School filled and to continue the unit mine schools within the Corps. The latter part of April, the methods of instruction at the Fifth Army Mine School and the FAITC were checked to be sure that their instruction was coordinated and in conformity with the ideas of the Commanding General, Force 343. During this entire period we were badly handicapped by a failure to procure sufficient enemy mines for training purposes, despite repeated attempts to do so.

b. The function of the Engineer, Force 343, in connection with the training of shore engineer regiments was to insure for the Commanding General that the training to maintain our supply was adequate. On June 3 the Commanding General of the 1st Amphibian Brigade was charged with the responsibility of training, equipping and organizing the shore units. The training was handicapped because training in invasion tactics was carried on at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center over which this headquarters had little control.

A regular check of the training was made through periodic visits by members of the section and inadequacies were called to the attention of the Commanding General.

In determining methods of water supply, it was decided that the supply of water in bulk over the beaches would be desirable. On June 9 arrangements were finally made to equip twenty LST's to carry 10,000 gallons of water each. A standard procedure was outlined by the joint Army-Navy Board for the delivery of this water. Shore Battalions were equipped with canvas tanks and hose and were instructed in the method to be used. The actual operation proved highly successful.

c. A serious handicap in the training of engineer service units lay in the fact that many units were not available to the Task force until shortly

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before D day and in many cases not until after D day. Further, these units were spread from Oran in Algeria to Tunis and Bizerte in Tunisia. The only control that could be exercised over the training of these units was through personal contacts by members of the section to inform the Commanding Officers of the units that they would probably take part in an overseas operation in the near future, give them what very general idea of the operation was possible in view of the security requirements, and to assist them directly in the most important parts of the training, which were considered to be mine and camouflage training and water discipline.

Personnel.

During the planning phase the Army Engineer was considerably handicapped by the lack of an adequate staff. On April 7 a request was made for sufficient experienced officers to increase the staff from that of an Army Corps to that of a Reinforced Corps. The majority of these officers did not report until late in May, when the planning was practically completed. The Engineer Section of the proposed Base Area Group did not arrive in the theater until June 25, too late to do any planning.

In determining the engineer units necessary for the operation, the planning guide established a tabulation of all the missions the engineers would probably be called upon to accomplish during the first 60 days. Against this tabulation of missions a list of the necessary engineer units to accomplish each was set up, including a chronological transfer of responsibilities as the action progressed. From this list the requirements for engineer units for the operation were determined.

Supply.

It was necessary that our supply requirements for the operation be submitted to SOS on April 18, approximately 90 days before D day. It was extremely difficult to complete this list properly in the 3½ weeks between March 25th and April 18th. This lack of time and lack of knowledge of the complete tactical plan necessitated the requisitioning of equipment and supplies to meet all possible emergencies and thus resulted in some over supply.

a. Initially, the requirements for mine detectors was set up on the basis of the general directive of the Commanding General, Force 343. Later this had to be reduced and a T/BA which was approximately half again as large as that recommended to the War Department by AFHQ at the close of the Tunisian campaign, was submitted to the Signal Corps (See Recommendations on changes in T/BA).

On the 20th of June we received final assurances that the issue would be completed in accordance with the revised T/BA, but in many cases late deliveries prevented adequate training in the use of the instrument.

b. Special attention was given to the supply and loading of pest control materials in view of the fact that the operation was to be through a country noted for insect borne diseases.

c. On June 5 there was set up at each port of embarkation for each sub-task force a tactical stock pile consisting of the estimated maximum supply requirements of the task force engineers. This was done in order that they could draw on these stockpiles and insure the desired loading of the supplies they would require for the assault and for the first follow-ups. These included two Bailey bridges for each sub task force. A total of ten were available. Two were allotted each sub-task force for the operation, and the remaining four were kept in task force reserve. Recommendation for the shipment of these bridges was made as follows:

Date	Force	No. Bailey Bridges
D	Dime	1
D + 4	Dime	1
D + 8	Dime	1
D + 14	Cent	2
	Joss	2
	Task Force (Joss)	1
D + 20	Task Force	2

d. Another supply problem was the proper loading of bulk fuel storage supplies to insure that they could be readily located and identified to facilitate prompt delivery and to insure completion of the initial part of the installation by D + 8, the main portion by D + 12 and the balance by D + 20.

These materials were specially marked with two parallel red stripes around each box in addition to the regular engineer marking. One hundred and fifty percent of the estimated required supplies were ordered for the project. Efforts were made to have these supplies deck loaded in equal halves on two coasters due to arrive on D + 4 and for a member of the section to travel on one of the coasters with the supplies. This was not possible and the supplies were finally loaded on seven different ships.

e. In March AFHQ assumed the responsibility for the supply of maps. The initial requirements for maps were determined on April 1st on the basis of a tentative troop list. These requirements were revised and submitted to Force 141 on April 15th when more positive information on the troop list was available. On May 28th, the Division Engineers were informed of the map distribution plan under which Force 343 assumed responsibility for bundling the maps by regiments and for divisional troops, for delivery by June 26th. A request was made on the Sub-Task Force Engineers at this same time for their detailed map breakdowns.

The initial plan contemplated the completion of the delivery of all maps by June 15 to a breakdown depot that was to be established by Force 343 at Constantine. The map depot was established at Constantine on June 5th. On June 18th we were informed that the maps would not be available until June 29th (D - 11). This presented a very complicated problem to insure delivery in time, and yet maintain the necessary security. It required detailed information that was still not definite on the assignment of units to ships and craft that were spread from Oran to Bizerte and delivery to a variety of widely spread points while still maintaining the proper security. A.F.H.Q. agreed to make the breakdown and arrangements for delivery of the maps. The executive officer and both map officers of the Engineer Section were sent to Algiers and Constantine on June 24 to insure the proper execution of the plan. Maps were delivered successfully according to the following schedule:

June 29 - 30	To assault units embarking at Algiers and Oran.
July 1 - 2	To assault units embarking at Bizerte and Tunis.
July 2	82nd Airborne Division at Constantine Airport.
July 2	To Follow-up units embarking in Algiers.
July 4	To Follow-up units embarking at Bizerte and Tunis.
July 9	At Bizerte and Oran for units of 9th Division.

f. An important item, was to insure that engineer units were accompanied by adequate equipment. This created the problem of selling the idea that engineer operational equipment such as bulldozers, compressors and dump trucks are just as essential to the engineers if they are to accomplish their missions successfully, as are rifles to the Infantry and field pieces to the Artillery, a fact that is too often lost sight of. A special effort was made to insure that a policy was established to provide proper consideration for the loading of engineer equipment and a caution to follow-up on this policy was given to the Sub-task Force Engineers at the meeting on June 13th.

The Engineer Section moved to the Monrovia on June 29 (D - 11) but control was exercised over the issue of the maps until D - 9 and efforts were made to influence the training of Task Force units until D - 4 and their proper equipping up to D day.

III. OPERATIONS

A. General

Favorable comment on the work of the Engineers in the Sicilian Campaign has been made by the higher headquarters commanders. This has resulted principally from the work performed by the combat engineer units in maintaining lines of communication, and the clearing of mined areas. It has been in effect, a field day for engineer troops in that there has been a great deal of engineering work to be done, and in general, sufficient personnel and equipment available to accomplish the work efficiently. This applies not only to the combat engineers and the missions mentioned above, but applies as well to all engineer service functions performed under the supervision of Division, Corps and Army engineers.

A detailed narrative of the day by day operation of engineer units is not attempted herein nor is it considered necessary to repeat in detail the engineer reports of the various subordinate headquarters. Particular reference is made to complete reports already prepared by the Engineer, II Corps and the Commanding Officer 1st Engineer Special Brigade on the activities with which they have been more intimately connected. The report does, however, deal to some extent with all phases of engineer work and engineer supply, giving particular attention to those functions which have been of immediate interest to the Army Engineer.

B. Narrative

From the beginning, engineer activities followed quite closely the plan as worked out prior to D day. These activities began at H hour or shortly thereafter in the areas of all sub-task forces. Engineer units landed according to schedule and with few exceptions all engineer units were soon engaged in their normal role. Beach roads and beach dumps were immediately established in the vicinity of Scoglitti, Gela, and Licata so that unloading was proceeding satisfactorily on these beaches early on D day. All Engineer units landed were initially under control of the engineers of the sub-task forces. It developed however, that the division engineers were primarily involved in their normal combat missions and were not greatly concerned with the operation of the beaches and supply dumps. The Commanding Officers of the shore regiments, therefore, were in comparative independent control of their respective unloading operations until responsibility was assumed by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade on July 19.

Members of the Engineer Section were ashore at Licata and Gela on D day and thereafter maintained close liaison with the Engineer shore groups, and other engineer units in those sections.

Beginning on 12 July, daily situation reports were received from the Engineers of subordinate headquarters, and through these reports and frequent visits to the forward areas, the section was kept informed on the problems of all units. All information of importance was forwarded to Engineer, 15th Army Group in daily Sitreps. During the initial phases of the operation, to include capture of the bridgehead from Caltanissetta to Agrigento, engineer problems other than unloading over the beaches and through the damaged port of Licata, were not serious. Few bridges were destroyed and only occasionally were mined areas encountered. All beaches, however, were mined and some heavy equipment was lost before the shore engineers were able to adequately clear and mark safe lanes. Preparation of landing strips and the rehabilitation of airdromes was initiated on D-day by the combat engineers in the II Corps sector, and by the 815 Engineer Battalion in the 3rd Division Sector. Supervision of this construction was assumed by the Air Force Engineer during the first few days of the attack and was thereafter of little concern to the Division, Corps or Army Engineers. Preparation of bulk fuel storage facilities was started on 16 July at Gela. Complete details as to this work are included elsewhere in the report.

The engineer section of headquarters was established in Gela on 11 July. It remained there until 23 July when it moved to Agrigento. During this period, there were no engineer units directly under the control of the headquarters. Upon formation of the Provisional Corps for the advance on Palermo, 17 July, one officer of the Army Engineer Section was attached to that headquarters as Engineer liaison officer. No attempt was made to organize a Provisional Corps Engineer Section, with the result that the 3rd Division, 2nd Armored Division, and 82nd Airborne Division operated with little technical supervision from the higher headquarters during the rapid advance from Agrigento to Palermo. During this advance, however, no serious engineer problems were encountered. Comparatively few bridges were destroyed, and in only one or two cases did they result in noticeable delays in the movement of traffic. In many cases, the principal roads had been mined for demolition, but the rapid advance had apparently prevented the enemy from setting off charges and few craters were actually blown. Although some anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields were encountered, they were neither numerous nor extensive, and were not considered a serious obstacle.

During this same period, the II Corps moving north from Caltanisetta, was running into greater difficulty opening and maintaining lines of communication because of more extensive and thorough enemy demolitions. It immediately became evident that Bailey Bridges would be required in large numbers earlier than expected and necessary steps were taken by this section to procure them from Africa as soon as available shipping would permit. The II Corps was able, however, through the excellent work of the engineer combat regiments and battalions, to construct bypasses around demolitions in sufficient time so that the rapid advance to the north coast was not seriously impeded. In this sector the increased use of mines on all roads soon made the constant use of mine detectors necessary.

On 24 July, an Advance element of the Army Engineer Section arrived in Palermo for an early reconnaissance of the Port Area and all utilities. On the following day the remainder of the section arrived in Palermo. Plans were soon made for the port reconstruction which had been started by the 20th Engineer Regiment on 24 July, and also for the rehabilitation of necessary utilities. From that time on, engineer reconstruction work was accomplished by the various special engineer troops working under the direct supervision of Army Headquarters. Necessary coordination with AMGOT and the Engineer Section, Base Area Group, was accomplished. Several officers of this latter section were attached to the Army Engineer staff until the G.A.C. was organized.

The II Corps continuing its operations had turned east and had begun to advance toward Messina. It was apparent at once that the engineer problem from there on would be increasingly difficult. The enemy was accomplishing systematic demolition of all bridges on the principal routes, almost all roads were mined, and extensive anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields were encountered, particularly along the coast road. At this time, however, the Bailey Bridges previously ordered began to arrive and were immediately shipped to II Corps for use. In addition, the Army Engineer directed the transfer of approximately 16 D-7 bulldozers from the shore regiments of the 1st Special Brigade to the II Corps combat facilitated, and kept pace with the rapid advance to Messina.

Behind the Corps rear boundary, the 20th Engineer Regiment and 343rd Engineer Regiment shared road maintenance responsibility within the Army zone. Similar responsibilities were assumed by the 1st Special Brigade and the Provisional Corps within their respective areas. Additional work accomplished by these two regiments included the reconstruction of 6 railroad bridges, clearing of minefields, destruction of enemy mine stocks and miscellaneous construction work in and around Palermo. On 23 August, the 20th Engineer Regiment began the construction of trestle bridges, culverts and concrete fords at all demolished bridge sites on Route 113, between Palermo and Capo d'Orlando to insure passable routes throughout the rainy season. On 23 August, the 343rd Engineer Regiment began work on a similar mission between Capo d'Orlando and Messina and on the road between Capo d'Orlando and Randazzo. This assignment was the result of an agreement reached in conference on 14 August between the Engineer, 15th Army Group, and the Engineer, Seventh Army. On other principal routes, similar work is being accomplished by engineer units of subordinate headquarters and by civilians under direction of AMGOT and the Engineer, Base Area Group.

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C. Troops.

Inclosure #2 shows in detail the initial attachment and schedule for arrival of those units which eventually came under control of the Seventh Army Engineer. Adequate personnel was available to perform necessary tasks and at no time have any units been idle.

In general, each engineer unit was engaged primarily in the role for which organized. Perhaps the only real exceptions were the use of 1 Bn. of the 39th Engineer Regiment as combat infantry in the attack on Gela, and the 20th Engineers on a flank security mission during the early stages of the 3d Division attack.

D. Mines.

During landing operations, enemy-prepared beach defenses were found to contain large quantities of Teller and "S" mines, some of which were hooked in series with trip-wires and pull igniters. Although a large percentage of these mines were booby-trapped, the action of sand and salt water caused many to be inactive. The mining of prepared inland positions was similar, although in many cases large, carefully prepared, bulk charges and delayed-action charges were used in place of mines. In the Enna-Caltanissetta area, enemy mining was comparatively light. From Termini Imerese to Messina, along the coast, heavy mine belts around demolitions and road craters were encountered. Indiscriminate mining of road shoulders forced Division Engineers to sweep every road and shoulder thoroughly before opening to traffic.

During the operation, two new types of enemy mines were encountered, a German Wooden Box Mine equipped with a metal detonator and an improvised German mine made of a plastic explosive wrapped in paper or cloth tied together with a string and provided with a bakelite detonator. When buried below one inch of soil, neither type could be picked up with our mine detector.

In the lava beds of the Mount Etna area, the M 1 detector failed due to the metallic content of the soil.

On several occasions, captured enemy documents furnished timely information on deliberate minefields and enabled our engineers to wire in and by-pass these known fields. On D plus 1, at an Italian Regimental C.P., a map was discovered that contained exact location and number of mines prepared in the Vittorio-Gela beach sector. About 90% of the information contained was accurate. Engineer units were materially aided by speedy dissemination of this information. In the Milazzo area, a German F.W. from a Pioneer Regiment gave accurate information as to local minefields laid by his unit.

The 17th Engineer Battalion was equipped with four Scorpions mounted on M-4 Tanks which arrived at Licata on July 14. Due to the rapid advance, this equipment never received an adequate test under battle conditions. No trailers and prime movers had been provided for these units and movement over mountainous roads proved slow and tedious. Tests showed that Scorpions "walked" over twenty miles wore out their bogeys and were unserviceable. During the Orlando-Milazzo advance, these vehicles were attached to the 3d Division Engineer for aid in clearance of heavy minefields encountered. After the long road march, the Scorpions arrived in poor condition and were not repaired until too late for adequate trial under combat conditions.

E. Camouflage:

Prior to the operation, a new type of garnished net was ordered for all T/BA vehicles of the Forces. These nets were 100% flat garnished with 70% sand and 30% green garlands. The reverse side of the nets were sprayed to give a total 75% green tone. This gave two-way reversible nets suitable for either sandy or green terrain. Each vehicle was authorized one such net of adequate size and a dump of 250 large-size nets was established at each of three main beach heads. The latter were used for concealment of beach stores. These nets were most satisfactory. They blended excellently with the terrain and troops made maximum use of them. Prior to the operation, Base Sections had been requested to "tone down" all stores packed in finished white packing cases. Those cases that did arrive with dull earth colors added materially in the concealment of small stock piles.

For shore operation camouflage, one platoon of Co. B, 601st Engineer Bn., was assigned to each Sub Task Force. These platoons were to arrive on D plus 4 to aid the divisions in camouflage of dumps and installations. Due to change in plans, only one platoon arrived in time and worked with the 1st Division Artillery. The battalion was later assembled in the Palermo area.

Camouflage and track discipline was generally good, particularly the artillery concealment. Toward the end of the campaign, due to rapid movement and lack of enemy air activity, there was a tendency to relax in dispersion and track discipline. Our air superiority permitted some latitude with regard to concealment in the selection of dump sites.

Late in the operation, a dummy railhead was planned. This included a dummy extension of the railhead from San Stefano to Caronia, involving the erection of three dummy bridges, and the erection of a dummy dump at its terminus; though work progressed rapidly no indication was received of its effectiveness due to the rapid completion of the campaign.

F. Water Supply.

The water supply plan for operation HUSKY was generally well carried out from the landing until the final successful conclusion of the campaign. Water was brought ashore in five-gallon cans and pumped ashore from bulk transport for the first five days' operation. At one beach of the Joss force, 40,000 gallons were pumped ashore to canvas storage tanks by 1030 of D day. Dime beaches did not attempt to bring bulk water ashore early in the operation, but made use of this method after D plus 2 at the Gela beach. In most cases, organic engineers had developed local supplies shortly after landing and actually much of the water brought in was not needed. On the moves inland, the organic engineers clearly demonstrated their ability under normal conditions to supply water to troops to which they are assigned and little difficulty was experienced in developing local supplies. With few exceptions, all city water distribution systems, where combat had occurred, were crippled or put completely out of service by bombing or shell fire. Effort was made to use city supplies as little as possible because of the shortages already effecting the cities.

Water supply troops assigned to sub-task forces luckily were not needed early in the operation as only one company arrived on schedule. This company was of great assistance in operating water points for Army troops in the Gela area and later came directly under II Corps control and backed up the Corps on its drive across the Island and up the coast to Messina. The other two companies, arriving too late, reverted to Army control without being of any use to their sub-task forces.

Only one well was drilled early in the campaign at the Ponte Olivo Airport. Since that time, several wells have been drilled for hospitals and staging areas in the Palermo area.

Water Supply for Hospitals - The furnishing of water for the 91st and 59th Evacuation Hospitals developed into a major project. The city water supply was on only during daylight hours, whereas the overcrowded hospitals required 24-hour service. Initially, at the 91st, two 3,000-gallon canvas tanks were erected on the roof of an adjoining building, piped to the plumbing system and filled from tank trucks. This water supplied the night demand and carried through until city water was turned on in the morning. In order to make the hospitals independent of the city system, wells were drilled both at the 91st and 59th. A 25,000-gallon wooden tank was being erected on the roof to replace the canvas tanks and a pipeline was run to the 59th. The 40lst Engr. W.S. Bn. operated these installations on a 24-hour basis.

It is impossible to accurately tabulate the actual amount of water used in this campaign, but it is estimated that the consumption averaged well over 2 gallon/man/day rather than the 1 gallon/man/day as planned.

Distillation units proved of little value in this operation and could well have been left off the list of necessary Engineer Water Supply Equipment. Large quantities of water supply equipment were abandoned by the enemy. A great deal of this equipment was picked up by units for their own use. Strategic Engineering Studies, prepared and distributed by the Chief of Engineers, proved to be accurate and complete, were at times indispensible, and in many cases possessed more information than the natives themselves.

IV. CONSTRUCTION

A. Roads and Bridges.

In general, main roads in Sicily were found to be in excellent condition. Surfaces were black top or waterbound Macadam, grades and curves normally easy, widths sufficient to accomodate two-way military traffic. Towns and villages provided bottlenecks with sharp curves and narrow streets. Bridges and culverts were so constructed as to support all military loads. Considerable road repair machinery such as rollers and portable rock crushers were found in many localities and stock piles of crushed stone and asphalt were distributed throughout the lengths of all main highways in sufficient quantities to take care of initial repair.

Second class roads were usually in fair condition, but curves were of short radius, grades were steep and widths so narrow as to be unable to support two-way military traffic. However, in most localities, the network was sufficient so that these secondary roads could be used to excellent advantage by making them one-way and controlling traffic circulation.

During the Sicilian campaign, the Germans demolished approximately 130 highway bridges and cratered the roads in approximately 40 places.

The conclusions drawn during the planning stage that blown bridges could easily be by-passed in dry weather proved true. Division and Corps Engineers had little difficulty in constructing suitable by-passes and holdups were not serious. Army Engineers moving in to take over main supply routes to Corps rear boundaries found roads and by-passes in excellent shape for the most part. Initial work consisted in removing road blocks, widening bottlenecks, repairing road surfaces and improving some by-passes.

Second phase work consisted in making by-passes all-weather by either building culverts to take normal flow and paving the slopes of fills or construction of wooden trestle bridging. Of three bridges blown between Palermo and Trapani, the 17th Engineers constructed one trestle bridge and one deep-fill by-pass with culvert on the Palermo-Lercara Friddi-Agrigento road. The 20th Engineers were charged with the improvement of some 18 by-passes on Route 113 between Palermo and Capo d'Orlando while the 343d Engineers repaired some 21 by-passes from Capo d'Orlando to Randazzo and Capo d'Orlando to Messina.

When the swing to the eastward was made, it was decided that it would be extremely advantageous to be able to relieve the road traffic by transporting supplies eastward by rail as far as practicable. The railroad was operative as far east as Cefalu. Reconnaissance of the road from Cefalu to S. Stefeno revealed 4 blown bridges and 1 blown tunnel entrance with considerable track repair necessary.

Reconnaissance of the railroad east of S. Stefeno showed 4 bridges blown in the first five miles and a total of 7 in twenty miles. Gaps were long, and it was not considered feasible to repair the road east of S. Stefeno in time to be of use.

It was decided, therefore, to repair the railroad to a point one mile west of S. Stefeno and establish a railhead at that point. The location selected was a junction of main supply routes to the 3d Division along the coast road and the 9th Division along Route 117 and 120. It was estimated that 1,000 tons per day could be placed at the railhead (Incl. #7). The blown bridges were repaired using wooden trestle. Notable about the repair of one bridge was the use of some prefabricated trestle bents located in the shipyard at Palermo. Considerable time was saved by their use. Also noteworthy was the repair of one bridge by the use of the Bailey bridge for railroad with additional decking for motor vehicles. While not actually necessary for operation, one bridge was also rebuilt using wooden trestle. The repair of these bridges opened up use of the existing siding in S. Stefeno for use as railroad water point at that end of the run. Repair of the railroad and construction of the railhead was accomplished by the 20th Engineers in such time as to permit a train to be sent through on August 9th.

The railroad in the southern sector was operative from Licata and Agrigento to Caltanissetta and eastward to Libertinia where a bridge was blown over the Dittaino River. On the road northward from Caltanissetta to Termini Imerese a bridge was blown at Sciara. To permit shipment by rail from the South dumps to Palermo, it was thought advisable to rebuild this bridge. The gap was 96 feet long by some 35 feet high. Parts for a prefabricated, bolted, sectionalized Austrian railroad bridge had been located near Roccapelumbe. The 343d Engineer G.S. Regiment was assigned the job of rebuilding this bridge using the Austrian Bridge. With no instructions and only a line drawing, they proceeded to solve the intricacies of erection and completed the structure in 7 days, permitting a train to cross on August 22d.

With the occupation of all airfields in Sicily by the NAAF, it became necessary to supply some 500 tons per day at Gerbini. The 343d Engineer G.S. Regiment was assigned the task of rebuilding the bridge at Libertinia using a double-double Bailey bridge to cross a 35-foot gap. This was accomplished in three days, the first train crossing on August 28th.

Through coordination of the Engineer, 7th Army, and AMGOT, provincial road authorities were put to work on the main highways for normal repair and maintenance and for permanent reconstruction of damaged bridges.

B. Bulk Fuel Storage.

Original bulk fuel storage plans called for the construction of two 5,000 bbl. tanks for V-100 gasoline at Gela with pipelines to Ponte Olivo and Comiso Airfields and two 1,000 bbl. tanks erected at each field. Some 20,000 bbl. storage for V-80 was also contemplated at this location.

Construction was started with levelling of the tank site on the afternoon of July 16 and tank erection commenced on July 17 with the arrival of materials. The first 5,000 bbl. tank, the eight miles of pipeline to Ponte Olivo and three 4-inch pier to Port, storage lines of approximately 2,000 feet each were completed and tested by July 21. This was accomplished in spite of the fact that one-third of the Pipeline Company was not disembarked until the night of July 18; that all connections, flanges, etc., had to be improvised because these critical items had not been shipped; and that such materials as did arrive were badly scattered along the Gela beaches, requiring a large percentage of the Company's time collecting the necessary parts for the installation.

Between July 21 and July 28, sufficient additional materials arrived to permit the following construction.

a. Two additional 5,000 bbl. tanks at Gela.
b. Twenty-two miles of pipeline to Comiso with three pumping stations.
c. Rehabilitation of Comiso storage and erection of an additional 1,000 bbl. tank.

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The latter installation was not completed until August 5, due again to lack of materials.

With the rapid movement of the action westward, it was decided to change the location of the V-80 storage to Porto Empedocle. Existing storage of some 1600 bbls. was rehabilitated, an additional 5,000 bbl. tank erected and pipeline to pier constructed by July 31. This storage was later augmented by the Navy turning over two additional tanks totelling some 7,500 bbls. which were not needed for diesel.

The Agente Generale Italiano di Petrolio installation in Palermo was found to be in excellent condition, except that the main pumping station had been demolished by the enemy. Rehabilitation work was started on August 2, with civilian labor under Army supervision, and completed on August 9 after additional Pipeline Company personnel had arrived. Approximately 52,000 bbls. of gasoline storage and 23,000 of diesel storage was made available. A diesel tanker discharged into the installation on August 10.

To provide V-100 storage for Boccadifalco Airport, an additional 5,000 bbl. tank was erected at the Agente Generale Italiano di Petrolio farm and approximately one mile of pipeline laid to the airfield.

C. Port Reconstruction.

1. Gela - Initial port reconstruction was confined to the Port of Gela. A 200 ft. gap had been blown in the pier some 400 ft. offshore preventing use of the pier for vehicle unloading. The initial plan was to use a standard 175 ft. section of pontoon causeway with armored treadway ramps at either end to bridge the gap. When it became known that additional causeway was available, this plan was discarded in favor of utilizing the causeway as an entirely separate pier to a new beach exit road alongside the existing concrete pier. Two 175 ft. sections were joined, making a total length of 350 ft., the onshore section was beached as solidly as possible by bulldozer and a wooden ramp attached, the whole section being fastened by chain and cable to the existing concrete piers. Two additional 175 ft. x 14 ft. pontoon sections were secured to make a causeway 175 ft. x 28 ft. and fastened to the first sections at the offshore end to make an L-shaped structure. Because of a sand bar at the offshore east end of the causeway, LSTs were limited to a single birth adjacent to the existing pier. LCTs could use the additional pier space. To accomodate more LSTs, the pier was changed as shown on Inclosure #10. The new beach exit road was constructed of pierced plank matting. This work was done by the 1st Engineer Bn.

The Navy C.B.s constructed the pontoon causeway while the 531st Engr. Regt. removed underwater debris.

2. Licata - Porto Empedocle: No major repairs were necessary at either Licata or Porto Empedocle.

3. Palermo - The port of Palermo was badly damaged by operations of Allied aircraft. There was no attempt at deliberate demolitions. The entire area was covered with bomb craters and debris of surrounding buildings and port buildings. Considerable damage was done to quays and berthing spaces. The railroad pier was covered with burned-out cars and torn-up track. Many hulks were sunk at the piers.

Repair was initiated by the 20th Engineer Combat Regiment on July 23, the day after the capitulation of the city. The first consideration was to provide berths for LCTs, LSTs and coasters and ramps for DUKWs. Removal of debris, filling of craters, levelling of pier areas, and preparation of port exits received first consideration. Steps were cut in existing masonry piers to accommodate the ramps of LSTs. After initial repair was completed to permit docking and unloading wherever berths were available, ramps were constructed over sunken vessels and the superstructure removed to provide additional berthing space.

Later improvements consisted, in general, of improvement of the port area, removal of damaged structures, laying water lines to each pier, removal of minor underwater obstacles and general repair. No long-term program of repair was contemplated.

The 343d Engineer G.S. Regiment took over from the 20th Engineer Combat Regiment on August 1st and were relieved on August 11th by the 1051st Port Construction and Repair Group upon their arrival. The 540th Engr. Regt. (Shore) did some work in the area confined mainly to cutting ramps for LSTs.

The chronological record follows:

July 23 - Reconstruction commenced.
July 26 - First LCTs arrived.
July 28 - Coasters arrived.
July 29 - 1st Train from port.
Aug. 1 - 9th Div. LSTs and XAPAs arrived. 343d Engr. G.S. relieved 20th Engr. Combat Regiment.
Aug. 11 - 1051st Engineer Port Construction and Repair Group relieved the 343d Engineer G.S. Regiment.

D. Other Construction.

Upon capitulation of the city of Palermo, the establishment of 7th Army Headquarters in that city and the creation of main dumps in the vicinity, the work requests poured in. Bivouac areas were necessary, buildings required for headquarters, billets, storehouses, laundries, bakeries, ordnance maintenance shops, all needed repair. There was an immediate demand for power and utilities. Evacuation hospitals set up in unoccupied buildings at the Poly Clinic Hospital required screening, revision of plumbing and water supply.

Main supply routes were established throughout the city from port to dumps, and streets were opened up, cleaned of debris, craters filled, and work started on permanent repair. There were some 40 major breaks in the water system and a great many more in the sewer system which had to be repaired. The power situation was critical, as there was only sufficient water in the power reservoir for 30 days' supply and thermal plants capable of feeding the 70 KW grid at Palermo and Empedocle were damaged by bombing and not operational.

Main Supply Routes in Palermo - Initial clearing of the main supply routes was accomplished by the 540th Engineer Combat Regiment. The 343d relieved the 540th of this responsibility and remained in charge of the work until the 6625th Base Area Group assumed control. Prisoner of War labor, under troop supervision, was used to great extent. An officer of the 343d was placed in the position of Street Commissioner and reactivated the municipal bureau in charge of street repair and maintenance. All work was done under direct supervision of this officer and priority established for repair of Main Supply Routes with civilian routes a secondary consideration. For these later repairs, the Army aided by furnishing dump trucks to the civil authorities. In addition to street repair, the work of repairing sewers and water mains was coordinated and expedited.

Power Plants - The power company officials were immediately contacted upon establishment of 7th Army Headquarters in Palermo and all power operations came under control of the Engineer, 7th Army. The officials made a reconnaissance of the power system accompanied by an officer of the Engineer Section and a complete report on the system obtained with estimates of materials and time required for permanent repair. Immediate repairs to distribution lines were initiated and crews started on the work of cleaning up the thermal plants. Materials were made available to permit utilization of the remaining water in the reservoir by pumping to the outlet. With arrival of the 1090th Engineer Special Utilities Company, the rehabilitation of power plants at Palermo and Porto Empedocle was placed under their control. Instead of the stipulated two months required for repair, the Utilities Company promised operation of the Palermo plant by September 1st and the Empedocle plant shortly after.

Steps were taken to get small diesel power plants at Gela, Trepani, Licata, Caltanissetta and Racalmuto into operation to supply local power needs and permit cutting these cities off the 70 KW grid.

Staging Area - The largest project was the construction of a 15,000 man staging area. This project was assigned to the Base Area Group under supervision of the Engineer, Seventh Army. Maximum use was made of captured material. The basis of design was a tent camp with semi-permanent kitchens, mess sheds, bath houses, pit latrines, dispensaries and administration buildings.

V. SUPPLY

A. General - Little difficulty was experienced in meeting our needs for essential supplies. The situation was considerably aided by the availability of a large amount of captured enemy materials. In the case of equipment, however, some items proved lacking and others were not available in the necessary numbers. A recommendation regarding the necessary changes in T/BA is included under "Lessons Learned".

B. Critical Items - Two items proved to be critical, Bailey bridges and bulldozers.

The loading of the Bailey bridges for the assault and follow-up convoys was not properly supervised, with a consequence that items loaded on any particular ship did not provide complete units. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the ships were landed on various beaches widely dispersed and often on beaches other than those for which they were scheduled. Consequently, it was a tremendous problem to assemble the bridges in complete units and to have them available according to the original schedule.

To correct this situation as quickly as possible, two complete bridges were requested to be delivered in Licata already truck loaded on LSTs. These arrived in fine style, although in Palermo, instead of Licata, and were moved directly from the port to the bridge site without delay. Later on, deliveries of Bailey bridges on coasters arrived in good shape, so that there was an ample supply on hand in the forward dumps when the campaign closed. An additional ten were in reserve, five being enroute when the campaign closed.

Bulldozers - The R-4 angledozer proved inadequate for the work required of it and had to be replaced by heavier D-7s and D-8s. Fortunately, several of our units already had some of these heavier dozers, but the attrition by mines became high and aggravated the situation. This condition was relieved by pooling and by transfers between units, including aviation engineers, who were most helpful and cooperative.

C. Loading of Supplies - The rapid accumulation of supplies from numerous widespread sources and the lack of detailed information on ship arrivals and departures prevented a comprehensive plan for the loading of engineer supplies.

D. Operational Beach Dumps - Previous to mounting the operation in Africa, one platoon of the 462d Engineer Depot Company was broken up into detachments and attached to the Shore Regiments of each force.

Since the Cent force was mounted in America, its detachment was assigned to the Dime force. Initially the Engineer beach dumps on the Cent beaches were operated by personnel of the Shore Regiment. Considerable confusion occurred on the beaches and in the dumps of the Cent force, much equipment was scattered and considerable time elapsed before it could be consolidated and inventories made. This demonstrated conclusively that the Shore Regiments need the help of trained Engineer Depot personnel.

Supplies stored in the beach dumps consisted solely of Class IV tactical supplies. These beach reserves consisted of tools, lumber, demolition supplies, field fortification supplies and camouflage materials. The amounts proved adequate. Stock records maintained consisted of a simple listing of items and quantities on a sheet of writing paper. As items were received or issued, quantities were erased and new entries made. To provide a record of supplies used, all supplies issued were listed on a tally out showing receiving unit and quantities drawn.

About D / 5 new dump sites were selected which were closer to the main road net and more accessible to the ports which by that time were taking the bulk of the tonnage unloaded. New dump sites were picked at Gela and Licata and later at Porto Empedocle. The beaches at Scoglitti were closed out because of lack of port facilities. The new dump sites were picked with the thought in mind that they would be more or less semi-permanent. It was necessary, therefore, to pick areas that would permit a great deal of expansion. No covered storage space was available in any of the suitable areas and since it was not contemplated that Class II supplies would be stored in any of these dumps none was constructed. The stock records were set up on regular stock cards and tally in's and tally outs were prepared for incoming and outgoing shipments.

A definite need for certain Class II items developed in the earlier phases of the operation, particularly in Artillery fire control and calculating sets. A special small mobile stock of Class II items should accompany an early follow-up in depot vehicles. About D / 12 some Class II supplies began to come into the dump in Gela. Because of the lack of covered storage space and insufficient personnel to run a separate warehouse, it was necessary to evolve an efficient and safe system of handling these supplies in open storage. Boxes of Class II supplies were opened, and inventoried, numbered and a careful record kept of box and contents. The boxes were nailed up and stacked according to number. As each item was posted to the stock record, the corresponding tally in number was also posted. With the above system it was possible to look up any item on the stock card and determine the quantity on hand and its location in the dump.

E. Operational Base Depot - On D / 12, the remainder of the 462d Engineer Depot Company arrived in Licata. The company was sent immediately to Palermo to open a base depot. An excellent site was selected in Palermo with rail siding, twenty acres of open storage space, seventy-five thousand square feet of brand new, camouflaged warehouse space and additional motor vehicle sheds sufficient to accomodate the 469th Engineer Maintenance Company.

The depot company had about four days to prepare the depot for stock during which time an orderly and efficient depot was established.

Stock records were kept on improvised cards about 8" x 12" with space for the nomenclature and unit, and columns for dates, voucher numbers, receipts, issues and balance. The regular tally-in and out procedure was used.

F. Operation of Engineer Supply Section - In order to fill requisitions received from the front, it was necessary to have in the Engineer office an up-to-date and accurate record of stocks available in the base depot and each of the dumps. This was accomplished by daily change of status reports from the depot and each of the dumps. These status reports listed only those items on which there were any issues or receipts during the twenty-four hour period and gave the old balance, amount received, amount issued and new balance. The new balances were posted to stock cards in the Engineer Office which showed in separate columns the balance in the depot and each dump. The above procedure greatly facilitated supply.

G. Engineer Maintenance - The fact that numerous makes and models of mechanical equipment are issued under a single nomenclature, combined with the necessity of ordering three months in advance of need, made the maintenance of complete stocks of spare parts in the Base Area depots impractical. A requisition for spare parts sufficient to maintain the equipment of units tentatively assigned the Force for a period of six months, was submitted to SOS NATOUSA during the last week of May, for delivery to North Africa by 15 August 1943.

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In order to bridge the gap between D day and the arrival of the convoy, the third week in August, two steps were taken:

1. Units were reminded to carry their complete allotment of organizational first and second echelon spare parts. It was expected that this would carry them until the arrival of the 469th Maintenance Company on D + 30.

2. The 469th Engineer Maintenance Company was required to carry in their organic vehicles all available additional stocks of spare parts which were to be amplified by early deliveries on coasters of the necessary items not available by the time of their departure in order to provide sufficient maintenance of all equipment within the force for an additional 90 days.

Lack of shipping in the first convoys practically nullified preparations listed as step 1. Many vehicles carrying spare parts were assigned low shipping priorities because they were considered non-operational. Step 2 did not work out satisfactorily because too broad coverage was attempted. The carrying of large stocks of spare parts for equipment constantly in use to the exclusion of parts for equipment not likely to see hard service would have worked more satisfactorily.

Often, after equipment had been destroyed by mines, units made a partial cannibalization for parts which they did not actually need at the time. This deprived the Heavy Maintenance Company, which completed cannibalization of these units, the supply of which was often critical.

Bowl pins on bulldozer blades broke frequently during heavy service. A large number of bulldozers were damaged by enemy mines. The most usual damage occurred on the tracks and the rollers, although in several cases the under part of the engine was ruined and in other cases the final drive assembly and the frame legs were blown to pieces. The stock of many of the parts involved was limited because of the size of the parts, and the only solution to this handicap on the battlefield is cannibalization.

Considerable difficulty was had with flat bed trailers on tires, tubes, rims, wheel bearings, and brake parts. In many cases, the damage was due to the inadequacy of the vehicle for its mission; however, numerous failures of 16-ton trailers loaded with D-7 tractors indicated that many of them were caused more by mishandling than by inherent weaknesses. Below recommended air pressure in tires and excessive speeds caused most of the failures.

Magnetos, engine starters and spark plugs as well as oil and air filters, fan belts and hydraulic oil pumps for hydraulic bulldozers and graders have a high premium. Hydraulic lines on bulldozers and road graders, clutches on graders and the main clutch on bulldozers are easily broken.

H. Handling of Captured Engineer Equipment.

In the southern area, one officer from the Engineer section of the 6615th Base Area Group was detailed to reconnoiter the southwestern part of island for the purpose of locating and inventorying enemy Engineer material. This officer visited every major town and covered all of the main road nets. A list of supplies, location and organization or persons controlling them, was compiled. It was found that the Civil Affairs Officer in each town was one of the best sources of information on supplies, both military and civilian in any locality. Supplies which were found unguarded were reported to the nearest unit commander or the local Civil Affairs Officer and guard requested.

Due to the shortage of truck transportation, it was not possible to haul all of the material located into Engineer dumps. A great deal of this material was disposed of by sending units needing supplies directly to the captured material rather than drawing from the Engineer dumps. Material for which there was an immediate and continual need was hauled into the Engineer dumps as fast as transportation facilities permitted.

Lists of captured material were furnished periodically to the Engineer, Seventh Army, giving the location, quantity and condition of captured material. These lists were used for filling requisitions.

In the vicinity of Palermo, a great deal of enemy material was captured in warehouses that were needed for storing American supplies, and consequently had to be moved into the Engineer Depot. Wherever practical, captured supplies were left in their original location and placed under civilian or military guard. Material was then issued direct to using units. Priority in moving was given to those supplies for which there was an immediate need. All enemy dumps reported on situation reports from Army units were listed, and were later investigated and inventoried.

Mechanical equipment such as cement mixers, generators, air compressors and similar equipment were brought into the depot and reconditioned by the 469th Engineer Maintenance Company and put to work on port reconstruction, utilities work and often issued to units rather than American equipment. The 105ist Port Construction & Repair Group and the 1090th Engineer Utilities Company had not received their T/BA equipment from North Africa, and they were equipped almost entirely with captured equipment. Almost all equipment captured was in excellent condition. With the exception of searchlight units, very little of the mechanical equipment had been sabotaged.

The salvage of captured searchlights and sound detection equipment was turned over to the 62d C.A. This organization hired several civilian searchlight experts and was able to get several units in operation.

Large stocks of pioneer tools were captured in Palermo. Although of poor quality and not altogether satisfactory as substitutes for T/BA tools, they were of great value for prisoner of war labor. About 1,500 shovels and 1,000 picks were captured, most all of which were issued.

I. Fiscal.

The extensive repair, particularly in the Palermo area, and the operation of the Engineer Depot, required the employment of a large number of civilian laborers. These employees were paid according to the wage rates established by the Commanding General, Seventh Army, using an eight hour work day and a 48 hour week. They were paid time and a half for all overtime in any one day and were paid weekly.

It was also necessary to expend funds for the purchase of necessary local supplies.

VI. REAL ESTATE

The real estate section began functioning in Palermo on July 26.
The original objective of the section provided for a central agency for control in the requisitioning of real property to be taken over for the use of 7th Army and attached units. A directive published prior to the operation provided for the acquisition of real estate by the unit desiring the property followed by a requisition submitted by the unit concerned. However, in order that all records of property could be kept in a central office, the Engineer assumed this function. This central office requisitioned all property required by 7th Army units in the Palermo area and acted as a clearing house for all requests of subordinate units.

An effort was made to collect sufficiently detailed records to assist in setting up fiscal records if and when payments are to be made and to provide necessary data to a probable claims commission in order to facilitate adjustments of claims against the Army. To do this, it was necessary to have records as to dates of occupation and vacating property, condition of property before and after occupation and complete and comprehensive inventory of all movable property on the premises upon occupation and when vacated.

The personnel of the section consisted of two officers, one clerk and one interpreter. A card file was set up to include (1) properties requested but not requisitioned (2) properties requisitioned but not vacated, and (3) properties vacated. A work sheet was set up on each property in which the Army had any interest. The work sheet included in chronological order any matter of importance pertaining to that specific property. All allied papers were attached to the work sheet to form the complete file.

A total of approximately 225 requisitions were completed and 150 requests were being processed when the Base Area Group took over.

Difficulties were encountered due to lack of available public records, and looting of public and private property by civilians prior to occupation by allied forces.

VII. MAPS

A. Map Supply and Distribution.

1. Distribution prior to the landing.

The map depot was established at Constentine by the two map depot detachments June 5. Bulk maps for initial issue to troops and for Army reserve began to arrive at the map depot immediately. However, in the early shipments, coverage was by no means complete even for the initial assault area. Complete coverage did not arrive until after June 25. This made the work of making the initial breakdown extremely difficult. With the help of the Survey Directorate, AFHQ, the breakdown to units was made and delivery to ships and staging areas was begun on D-11 only and completed on D-1, four days prior to sailing. Delivery of maps to assault units was completed D-8.

The initial issue to troops covered only the area of the initial objectives. Small map depot detachments were attached to each division to carry a 20% replacement for the initial area and division coverage for the immediate areas beyond. These detachments were to consolidate and their stockage was to be reinforced by a bulk reserve shipment by D plus 4.

The maps arriving with the units mounted in America were slightly different in coverage and in some cases in edition than those provided by Survey. These units were therefore given a supplementary issue to make up for this difference in the initial assault area. Reserve stocks remained on the ships to be unloaded on the far shore.

2. Distribution during the operation.

After the landing, the operation moved so rapidly that remapping became necessary by D plus 5. At this time, consolidation of the depot detachments and stocks had not as yet been made and the stocks unloaded with the 45th Division were just being collected in dumps behind the beaches. It was only by the extreme efforts of all concerned that the units were mapped in time.

During the succeeding days, two depots were set up in Gela, but the depot detachment's transportation did not arrive until early in August. The Army continued to map the divisions, but because of lack of transportation, it became necessary for divisions to call at the depot for bulk issues. Soon after the Army Headquarters was established in Palermo, the Map Depot moved there.

A critical situation developed when the drive turned to the East toward Messina, and the II Corps was heavily reinforced, particularly with artillery. The units were operating in a comparatively confined area and new units were moved in suddenly without warning. A temporary solution was affected by providing the II Corps Engineer with a stock of 500 copies of all sheets within the area of projected operations. It was planned because of the indefiniteness of the situation to reinforce those with bulk deliveries as the need arose. This became necessary when the 9th Division was attached to the Corps, and it became necessary to fly the additional maps over from North Africa.

3. Maps Supplied.

a. Small Scale maps: GSGS 2758, 1/M. Colored topographic strategic map.

b. Intermediate Scale: GSGS 4230, 1/250,000 (Army Air). In seven sheets this colored map gave fairly good detail. However, it was little used although suitable as a roadmap and available in quantity.

c. Medium Scale: GSGS 4164, 1/100,000. This was a multicolored map of good accuracy, and it was the largest scale map having complete coverage. It was widely used as a situation map, road map, and topographic map.

GSGS 4229, 1/50,000. This map had a brown monochrome base with blue grid and stream and red road overprints. It was used by all arms as a basic map. The fact that complete coverage was not available was a distinct disadvantage. The map was of good accuracy both in detail and contour.

d. Large Scale: GSGS 4228, 1/25,000. This map was printed in the same style as GSGS 4229 except that the grid appeared in the base color. Complete coverage was not available. It was widely used by all units whenever coverage existed.

e. Map Substitutes: Series AF - No91 Photomap 1/25,000. This covered the initial assault area only, was poor in quality and had blank areas in many sheets due to inadequate air cover. It was not used to any appreciable extent.

Beach Mosaic, 1/10,000. This photomap showed the area of assault beaches only. Of fair quality it was used by some troops on the initial landing.

f. Special Maps: Roadmap, 1/500,000. This was a hastily compiled multicolored road map. Lacking in detail, its advantage lay in showing the island in one chart. It was not gridded, which proved to be a disadvantage.

Roadmap, 1/200,000. This map was issued to the 45th Division before embarking in America. A multicolored map in three sheets, it showed great detail and was easily read. It proved a very desirable map, although available only in limited quantities.

Water Resource overprint, 1/100,000. This overprint showed all known and probable aqueducts and wells, and was invaluable to water supply and engineer units.

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Town Plans: Plans of nine principal towns were available, including a photomap plan of Gela. Town plans proved indispensible and the photo town plan proved an adequate, though not a preferable substitute.

Defense overprints were provided for defended portions of the coastline. These were used in last minute planning and in some cases in the assault.

4. Map Depot Personnel.

In order to effect the map distribution two map depot detachments, each of one officer and twelve EM were hastily formed early in June. These units proved inadequate both in organization, personnel and equipment.

B. Employment of Topographic Units.

1. Survey Sections.

1st Survey Section of the 62d and 66th Engineer Topographic Cos. (Corps) were available during the operation. Control available in the area was extremely scarce and confined principally to the primary triangulation nets.

Because of the scarcity of known control, the Engineer Survey Platoons were attached directly to the Artillery sections of II Corps and 3d Division respectively. Early in the operation, an attempt was made to provide artillery with survey tied to basic control. The advance soon became so rapid, however, that survey could not keep pace and was given up temporarily. Fortunately maps proved of sufficient accuracy for use as firing charts.

After the fall of Palermo, both survey platoons were attached to II Corps Artillery. At this point, the front was somewhat stable and survey was resumed. Survey was confined almost entirely to fourth order triangulation from short bases tieing to recovered map and control data when possible.

2. Photomapping and Reproduction Sections.

The 62d Engineer Co. was assigned directly to II Corps and worked under their direction throughout the campaign. The 66th Engineer Co., less the Survey Platoon, was assigned to Army and operated from North Africa. It was employed in printing defense overprints and filling gaps in map stocks.

Early commitment of the 66th to the printing of defense overprints, which it was planned to prepare in North Africa until D plus 12, prevented the unit from being transported to the Island in the early stages. Later, shipping became a premium and the unit never reached Sicily. However, several times the unit was required to print maps to be flown to Sicily.

3. Photo Interpretation.

Prior to the operation, the Engineer requested that an engineer photo interpreter be assigned to the engineer section. This officer did not arrive and on July 17, at the engineer's request, an officer was attached from 15th Army Group for this purpose. During the operation, this officer remained with the G-2 photo interpretation unit at Ponte Olivo airport. All sorties flown were interpreted for engineer intelligence daily and the reports dispatched each morning to Corps and Army by sub plane. The reports included the location of river crossings and defiles, enemy demolitions and the possible work required for bypassing, and the location and photography of minefields.

The reports, although received regularly by the Corps Engineer 48 hours after the flight and although accurate as to location and extent of demolition, were of little actual value to Army, Corps, or Division engineers. In practically every case the reports reached Corps and division after more accurate ground reconnaissance had been made. The estimates of work required varied greatly from actual practice. The location and plots made of two minefields were found to be accurate and proved of assistance in lifting the fields although in both cases they were in rear areas.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

A. Planning -

1. An adequate staff must be available immediately to permit the detailed study of all possible needs. For an operation of this size organized with a Base Area Group as an integral part of the command, an Engineer staff for a reinforced corps is adequate if supplemented by a few key members of the Base Area Group and, for short periods of the planning stage, for detailed technical advice, by liaison officers from special engineer units. Requirements for troops and supplies needed in a planned operation must be based upon a reasonable amount of experience and knowledge of the responsibilities of the various organizations as well as the capabilities of the various troop units, their personnel, and equipment and the supplies required to permit efficient operation in the field.

2. Critical items of Engineer Class IV Supply require at least ninety days between requisition and delivery. The mission must be defined in ample time to complete plans whose execution demand these items.

B. Training -

1. Complete coordination must be effected between the Army and the Navy early in the plans and training period. Such coordination can best be accomplished by the creation of a joint Army-Navy board organized for a sensible and amicable solution of mutual problems.

2. Experimentation must be completed prior to the commencement of the training period, or failing that, be conducted by troops other than those involved in the operation. By this is meant primarily, innovations in landing methods, passage of obstacles, and related subjects.

3. The training program preparing troops for active operations must not be interrupted or interfered with by numerous demonstrations that disrupt training schedules involving both services and take valuable time from training periods.

4. Components of beach groups must be assembled early to permit the coordination necessary for efficient operation. Even under the best of conditions, considerable confusion on the beaches during early stages of the landing is inevitable. Each component, regardless of size, must be properly trained and adequately controlled to insure its efficient functioning as part of the beach group. Sufficient time, therefore, should be provided to properly establish standard operating procedures, and develop necessary teamwork. This applies particularly to Military Police who are to control traffic across mined beaches.

5. Realism in training is essential regardless of the risk to personnel and equipment. Unless some attempt is made to reproduce enemy action and erect obstacles likely to be encountered, any training will fail in the principal aim of preparing each soldier to meet any eventuality.

6. Mine training, including the operation of the detectors, must be given to all branches of the service. The greatest menace of mine warfare is the mental fear it creates. Familiarity with mines will soon dispel this fear. In addition, proper training of other branches in mine detection and removal will eliminate the unreasonable demands now being made on engineer troops to accomplish this often simple mission.

7. Care in the placing of obstacles, particularly barbed wire, in front of well camouflaged fortifications is important. We encountered many exceptional examples of camouflage of fortifications, but in many cases the value of the camouflage was lost because the locations were given away by the barbed wire around them and by lack of track discipline.

C. Loading of Supplies -

1. Control of the loading of personnel, supplies and equipment should not be too greatly decentralized. It is true that division of the parent force into numerous commands places initial responsibility upon sub-task force commanders, which should permit to a certain degree his absolute decisions as to loading of personnel and supplies. The possibility of assumption of control at an early date by the higher headquarters, however, demands adequate control to insure proper arrival of troops and supplies based on the overall picture. The advisability of the task force retaining a small part of the shipping space provided each sub-task force until all last minute requirements are known should be considered to provide for unexpected late demands on the task force as a whole.

2. Loading of items of a complicated or highly technical nature must be supervised by personnel capable of identifying parts and who realize the necessity for orderly placement on shipboard. For instance a Bailey bridge lacking an essential part might better remain on the dock in a base area than take up valuable space on a transport.

3. Prime movers and trailers must be loaded on the same craft with the equipment they move. Valuable time is lost in the preparation of beach roads and dumps if the tractors of shore regiments are used as prime movers in the unloading of LCTs and LSTs.

D. Landing -

1. Engineer personnel with mine detectors or personnel trained in probing (a ramrod is good in the sand) must precede vehicles coming ashore. Mines were encountered on practically all beaches, and valuable equipment was lost because of a failure on the part of beach groups to properly provide for their removal prior to the arrival of motor equipment.

2. Adequate traffic control personnel and a large quantity of signs should be landed early. Considerable confusion must be expected in the landing of large numbers of vehicles and quantities of supplies on an unfamiliar beach. This confusion can be eliminated and traffic channeled to follow mine cleared lanes only by proper signposting and control of traffic.

3. Centralized control of unloading and the consolidation of supply dumps should be effected at the earliest possible moment consistent with tactical needs, even preceding the assumption of command by the Task Force.

4. Beach markers must be simple. The extensive use of Dukws has particularly made this mandatory. Flank markers to define the limits of the beach, landing point markers and road exit markers for vehicle and Dukw drivers are all that are required.

5. Beach groups should operate in support of Sub-Task Forces rather than under assignment or attachment. This is necessary to eliminate a great deal of interference on the part of staff personnel with the operation of the beach units.

6. Better means should be provided to insure control of shipping off shore. Supplies carried on the ships are needed by the units ashore, and the points to which they are delivered should be determined by those for whom the supplies are intended. Otherwise, as in the past operation, supplies will often be landed distant from the point where they are required.

7. In the unloading of supplies the Dukw has proved an exceptionally fine piece of equipment and has accentuated the importance of bulldozers on the beaches early in order to properly construct the necessary roads, and it has also made the sleds previously used by the shore units obselete.

E. Operations -

1. Sufficient transportation should be furnished the engineer headquarters section to permit close liaison and supervision of the varied and widely separated engineer works.

2. Photo interpretation by a trained officer is of great value in the planning of combat engineer work in the forward echelons. Although photomaps have not been received with complete favor by the combat elements, information that has been provided units daily from interpretation of aerial photographs from an engineer point of view by an expert has been of value in giving advance information on minefields, sites for possible demolitions and defensive installations. This necessitates early and continued coverage. Minefields must be picked up when or shortly after they are laid and before action of the weather eradicates the traces. They should be reported prior to the time advance units enter the area to be of special value. The report of probable demolition sites together with a description of possible bypass sites delivered well ahead of the front line would be of value in planning. To receive the full value of the report, photographs of the site must be in the division engineer's possession, although they need not show the actual demolitions.

3. It should be made clear to civilian agencies with the task force that they must work thru the task force engineer as long as operations require.

4. All personnel should have a greater appreciation of the value of maps. Unreasonable requests for maps during the operation probably resulted because initial issues were generous, giving the impression that maps were available to be expended as desired.

5. Subordinate unit commanders must be made to appreciate their responsibilities in supervising the inventories of the contents of private properties they occupy.

F. Organization -

1. An organization trained in the nomenclature, care, transport and erection to handle the Bailey bridge as a heavy ponton company does the ponton bridge is highly desirable. Perhaps the same unit could be trained to perform this dual mission, depending on the terrain encountered. This has been made the subject of a separate communication to higher headquarters and will not be covered here. A recommended T/O is attached as inclosure #3.

2. There is a definite need for a mobile map depot company or similar organization. One of the most vital functions of the engineer during the operation has been the supply of maps. The volume, because of the unexpectedly large number of troops concentrated in a small area, has been tremendous. In many instances additional personnel was required to assist the small map depot detachments in the sorting, packaging and issue of maps. In addition, with a rapidly moving force, the map supply must be mobile so that maps are steadily available when and where called for. A recommended T/O is attached as Inclosure #4.

G. Supply and Equipment -

1. All major items of engineer equipment must accompany units on their initial landings or on an early convoy thereafter. Engineers require their specialized equipment to accomplish normal missions of road repair, and the

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construction of bypasses and bridges. Lack of this equipment obviously reduces the efficiency of these units, and further, may make it impossible to perform the role for which organized. It is difficult to sell the idea that engineers are just as impotent to fulfill their mission without their equipment as would be artilleryman without their field pieces. This applies particularly to angledozers, trailers and prime movers.

2. Bailey bridges should be available early in the operation in terrain the nature of Sicily. Upon the ability of the engineers to rapidly bypass or repair demolished bridges depends the rapid progress of the artillery and other equipment and of the operation as a whole. Since the rate of progress cannot be accurately predicted, this can be just as essential in the early stages as at any later time. Adequate facilities to accomplish this mission should be available from the beginning.

3. Additional end pieces for Bailey bridges should be provided in this type of terrain. This need is obvious when it is realized that the greater number of bridges erected have been in lengths of less than the bridge unit of 120'.

4. Services must be informed at the earliest possible date of available ship tonnages for supplies on each convoy.

5. A special small stock of Class II Items should accompany an early follow-up in depot vehicles.

6. Our present T/BAs do not provide adequate equipment to meet the present day demands for speed.

H. Engineer Maintenance. -

1. The greatest over-all benefit can be derived from equipment wrecked on mines if units are prevented from extracting parts other than those actually needed at the time and are required to report such equipment promptly to the maintenance company for cannibalization.

2. Provisions should always be made for at least a detachment of units equipped with repair and shop trucks with loose tools to accompany the equipment on any move. Otherwise, even locked tools will be pilfered.

3. The components of echalon sets are sound, but provision must be made to supply all the parts necessary to complete each set.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The immediate assignment, upon receipt of first planning directive, of the complete engineer staff plus key personnel of the Base Area Group, if the latter is to be an integral part of the command.

B. The early creation of a joint Engineer Army-Navy planning board.

C. The early assemblage of the components of beach groups, regardless of size.

D. Realism in training.

E. Adequate mine training for all branches of the service.

F. Bailey bridge training for all engineer combat and general service units.

G. The limitation of decentralization of the loading of personnel, supplies and equipment.

H. The supervision of loading of technical engineer equipment and supplies by engineer personnel.

I. The simple ship loading of prime movers and their trailers.

J. The early loading of engineer personnel with mine detectors.

K. The centralization of control of unloading and consolidation of supply dumps at the earliest possible moment.

L. Simplification of beach markers.

M. The operation of beach groups in support of, rather than under sub-task forces.

N. The supply of aerial photos covering the Division route of advance well ahead of the front lines.

O. The organization of Bailey Bridge Companies.

P. The organization of Engineer Map Depot Companies.

Q. The loading of all major items of engineer equipment with the unit.

R. The provision of additional end pieces for Bailey Bridges.

S. The changes in T/BA enumerated in Inclosure #11.

GARRISON H. DAVIDSON,
Colonel, C. E.,
Engineer.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I - BRIEF OF PLAN

INDEX

I Assumptions
II Missions
III Troops
IV Construction - Policy
Sub-Task Forces
Later - Communication
- Utilities
- Shelter
Base Area
Labor
Real Estate
Funds
V Supply — Class II & IV
Water
Engineer Intelligence
Maps

I. ASSUMPTIONS

1. This plan will probably have to be modified depending on the availability of shipping.

2. It is assumed that the tactical operation will develop into four phases as follows:

a. 1st Phase, D to D plus 8. Assault to capture a bridgehead extending roughly through Ragusa, Vizzini, Caltageroni, Mazzarino, and Campobello.

b. 2d Phase, D plus 8 to D plus 15. Extension of bridgehead by western assault force of Kool force to include Agrigento and Porto Empodocle.

c. 3d Phase, D plus 15 to D plus 30. Movement to north by Cent and Dime to protect the left flank of the British in their advance on Messina.

d. 4th Phase, after D plus 30. Final reduction of western part of Island.

II. MISSION

1. In addition to their normal missions, engineer units will be assigned the following:

a. Operation and improvement of beaches and initial ports.

b. Repair of a coastal crash-landing strip, two airfields and an inland landing strip.

c. Construction of bulk fuel storage.

2. During the initial phase, all engineer missions must be accomplished by engineer troops of the D and D plus 4 convoys under supervision of the sub-task force commanders (engineer).

3. When Task Force 343 takes contro, the 1st Special Brigade

3. When Task Force 343 takes control, the 1st Special Brigade will function as the Task Force Supply Agency between the shore line and the division dumps except for the supply of water and maps.

4. The Engineer, Force 343, will assist in this by the repair, clearance and maintenance of the lines of communication between the rear boundaries of subordinate units and the line of dumps established by the 1st Special Brigade which initially will be near the beaches.

III. TROOPS

1. The Engineer Section, I Armored Corps, Reinf., will be organized as follows:

ENGINEER
Col. Davidson

EXECUTIVE
Lt. Col. Chambers

ADMIN.	MAPS	OPERATIONS	SUPPLY	CONSTRUCTION
Lt. Van Aken	Major Webster	Maj. King	Major Gaynor	Lt. Col. Eller
	Lt. Lee	Maj. Miles	Capt. Hilleke	Communications Man
	Photo Interpreter	Capt. Trygg		
		Lt. Rogers		Utilities Man

2. For the operation and improvement of beaches and ports, all engineer units of the beach group will operate initially under direct control of their respective task-force commanders (engineers). They, and the necessary engineer service units, will pass to control of the 1st Special Brigade when all supply activities are taken over by the Commanding General, Force 343. Additional service units will be under the control of the 1st Special Brigade upon arrival. These include:

a. 437th Engr. Co. (D.T.) (less 2 Plat)
b. 462d Engr. Co. (Dep) (less 1 Plat)
c. 343d Engr. Regt. (G.S.)
d. 469th Engr. Co. (Main)
e. Det., 6th Engr. Plat. (F.F.)
f. 2657th & 2658 Map Dep. Det. (less Det.)
g. Co. "B", 601st Engr. Bn. (Cam) (less 4 Plat)
h. Det., 8th Engr Plat. (F.F.)
i. 401st Engr. Bn. (W.S.) (less 3 Co)
j. Hq & Hq Co., 105lst Port Repair Co.
k. 1090th Spec. Utilities
l. 402d Engr Bn. (W.S.)
m. 387th Sep. Bn. (Cld)

3. When Task Force 343 assumes control, the following units will revert to its control for combat operations.

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a. 20th Engr. Regt. (C)
b. 401st Engr. Bn. (H.S.) less det.
c. 4 Plats., "B" Co., 601st Engr. Bn. (Cam)
d. 66th Engr. Co. (Topo) (less Survey Plat.)
e. 175th Engr. Regt. (C.S.)
f. 427th Engr. D.T. Co.
g. 376th Sep. Bn.
h. Co. "A", 85th Hwy Ponton Bn.

4. The following installations should be captured intact by the respective sub-task forces and preserved.

a. Railways

(1) At Licata - Sheet 271 (940340) 1:100,000
Depot and water and workshops adjacent thereto.
Priority.

(2) At Comiso - Sheet 276 (535165) 1:100,000
Depot, Water, and Workshops.

(3) At Canicatti - Sheet 267 (860820)
Depot, Water, and Workshops.

b. Thermo electric generating stations

(1) Coal.
Porto Empedocle - Sheet 271 (555585)
10,000 KW.

(2) Diesel
Agrigento - Sheet 271 (630570)
1020 KW.

Gela - Sheet 272 (220300)
260 KW.

Licata - Sheet 271 (940340)
175 KW - 2100 volts.

c. Bridges

(1) RR bridge at Licata - 0.5 km. S.E. station over F. Salso.

(2) Highway bridge at Licata - 100 yes upstream from RR bridge. Over F. Salso.

(3) RR bridge 3.3 kms. East of station at Ragusa.

(4) Highway bridge - Ragusa-Modica road, 3-1/2 mi. from Ragusa.

(5) RR and highway bridges over F. Gela about 1 mi. East of Gela. Sheet 272 (236297).

(6) Highway bridge over F. Ippari at Vittoria.

IV. CONSTRUCTION PLAN

Policy.

The policy of Force 343 for construction will include only those works which are considered absolutely essential for military needs. Because of limited shipping lift methods of construction must be used which will require the maximum use of available local material and minimum use of materials and supplies which must be shipped in.

Construction common to all Sub-Task Forces.

The normal Engineer missions are common to all sub-task forces. These include

1. Repair and maintenance of lines of communication.

2. Field fortifications and beach defenses.

3. Prisoner of war inclosures.

4. Construction of limited covered storage for perishable supplies.

A limited amount of materials and supplies for these operations have been set up to arrive at an early date including bridging, sand bags, wire, pierced plank for improvement of beach roads, tentage for depots and a limited amount of railroad material.

Local materials will be used to repair the roads but a small amount of bridging will have to be taken to repair some of the critical bridges that may be destroyed. In general, streams may be crossed without the bridges by detouring, using natural fords, or cutting the banks down. It is estimated that the JOSS force will need about 160 feet of bridging, the DIME force about 430 feet, and the CENT force about 280 feet with an average depth of about 15 feet.

The following are specific missions assigned each sub-task force. They will be relieved of these responsibilities when the 1st Special Brigade or the Aviation Engineers can take over.

Shark Force Special Construction.

1. Repair of airfields and landing strips.

a. As soon as captured to repair the runway at Comiso airfield or construct a substitute runway to be available for operation not later than D plus 8.

b. As soon as captured to repair the runway at Ponte Olivo airfield or to construct a substitute runway to be available for operation not later than D plus 8.

c. When taken, to construct a landing strip at Biscari landing field.

2. Repair of jetty at Gela.

a. The existing 1050 feet jetty should be repaired as soon as is possible for use in unloading vehicles from LSTs and to accommodate a shallow draft tanker.

3. Bulk Fuel Storage.

a. The requirements for aircraft and vehicle gasoline will exceed 1000 tons per day. To relieve the congestion of the beaches and the necessity for handling gasoline in cans bulk fuel storage and pipe lines to the Ponto Olivo and Comiso airfields will be constructed as soon as possible.

b. On D plus 4 sufficient materials will arrive to erect 1 - 5000 bbl. tank at or near Gela and to complete the pipe line to Ponte Olivo with the erection of 1 - 1000 bbl. tank at that point to accommodate a shallow draft barge by D plus 8. The pipe line to Comiso will be well under way by D plus 8 and construction of the necessary 3000 feet submarine line will be started on D plus 4.

c. By D plus 12 an additional 5,000 bbl. tank should be ready near the port and an additional 1,000 bbl. tank at Ponte Olivo and 2 - 1,000 bbl. tanks erected at that airport, the pipe line should be completed to Comiso. This will provide approximately 14,000 bbl. storage for V-100 gasoline.

d. It is anticipated that by D plus 20 additional storage of 20,000 bbl. will be completed for V-80 gasoline.

e. For this construction the 2602nd Engineer Pipe Line Company will be available on D plus 4.

f. The following is the schedule for tanker arrival at Gela. It is based on the availability of 2 - 6000 bbl. barges, 1 - 750 ton tanker, 1 - 1000 ton tanker and 4 - 3000 ton tankers.

Size of vessel	Cargo	Arrival Date	Destination Hour
6000 bbl.	V-100	D plus 8	0001
6000 bbl.	V-100	D plus 10	1800
750 T.	V-100	D plus 12	1800
1000 T.	V-100	14	1200
3000 T.	(V-80 - 18,000 bbl. (V-100 - 9,000 bbl.	16	0001
750 T	V-80	18	0001
1000 T	V-80	19	0001
3000 T	V-80	20	0001
750 T.	V-100	D plus 21	1200
3000 T	V-80	23	0600
1000 T	V-100	24	1800
3000 T	V-80	26	0001
750 T	V-100	28	0001
3000 T	V-80	29	0001
1000 T.	V-100	31	0001
3000 T	V-80	32	1200
750 T	V-100	35	0600
3000 T	V-80	36	0001
1000 T	V-100	38	0001

Joss Force special construction.

1. Repair of the Port of Licata.

a. It is doubtful if the use of the Port can be denied to LST by enemy demolitions. Ramps can be constructed from the existing quay or the pontoon causeways used to the port shore area.

b. The quay should be repaired as soon as possible including the roads and railroad within the port area and leading from the port.

c. Materials for this repair work including lumber, track and turnouts will be made available at an early date. For temporary repair local materials should suffice.

2. As soon as captured to repair landing strip at airfield in the vicinity of Licata.

Kool Force special construction.

1. There is a possibility that the Kool Force will be responsible for initial reconstruction of the port of Porto Empedocle.

2. LSTs with causeways will be able to utilize this port until temporary repairs can be made so that existing quays can be used by coasters. Roads and railroad repair within the port area and leading from the port should be commenced as soon as possible.

3. Materials and supplies for this work will be made available at an early date but local materials must be relied on for temporary repair.

Later Construction prior to the fall of Malicious.

1. Communications.

a. No extensive road construction is anticipated. Work will be limited to maintenance and sufficient local materials should be available to meet most of the demands with a small amount of binder required to be brought in.

b. Standard guage railways will be repaired as soon as possible, but demolished bridges must be passed by earth embankments and improvised trestles in the early phases. Railway water facilities must be restored.

2. Utilities.

a. Utilities will be repaired only insofar as is necessary for essential military needs and maintaining sanitation.

b. Water for military purposes will be supplied by the early development of local sources.

c. Electricity will be furnished by unit equipment.

3. Shelter.

a. Depots. Wood frame, tarpaulin covered warehouses will be provided only for supplies that would be damaged by exposure. It is estimated that 20 - 20' X 100' structures will suffice.

b. Lumber will be provided for flooring hospital tents only. Existing facilities will be used insofar as is possible.

c. No troop housing will be provided except by use of local facilities with a minimum of reconditioning. Latrines, kitchens and bath facilities only will be constructed when the situation becomes stabilized enough to permit.

d. Initially, there is no contemplated construction other than previously outlined. For bakeries and laundries mobile equipment should be used. All existing structures will be utilized to the fullest extent.

Initial Construction after the fall of Malicious.

Upon capitulation of the island the first phase of reconstruction includes hasty and temporary repairs to port installations, roads and railways, water supplies, sewers and utilities. This will be carried out in accordance with our original plan drawn up when we were the Western Task Force assigned the mission of capturing the west end of Horrified, modified as required by the existing situation. Materials and supplies for the execution of the original plan have been requisitioned.

Second phase construction.

This will include the following in the priority shown:

1. Highways including bridges.
2. Hospitals.
3. Depots, troop shelter and service installations.

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Repair and maintenance of main roads on Horrified as lines of communication for military needs only is contemplated. No construction of new roads is planned. Construction of hospitals includes flooring and screening of ward hospital tents and the use of existing buildings where available with a minimum of revision. Covered depots will be standard 20' x 100' warehouses and will be limited to those required for perishable supplies. Requirements for troop shelter are based on providing screened kitchens, bath houses and latrines and a minimum of headquarters buildings. Such service installations as require to be housed will be constructed but only after maximum use of existing structures has been made.

Supplies have been requisitioned for the following projects to provide equipment and material thru D plus 120. Supplies for projects beyond D plus 120 will be requisitioned about D plus 15 or D plus 30.

Highways
Bridges
Hospitals
Housing and service installations
Sanitation including pest control
Water Supply
Fire fighting
Utilities
Demolition
Camouflage
Equipment
Rigging

LABOR

1. All civilian labor will be hired and paid by the using Arm or Service.

2. Labor will be hired by direct negotiation and not through any labor agency, labor organization or labor service.

3. Contracting for construction, etc., will be accomplished in the usual manner, provided, such contracting is not in violation of par. 2 above and it has been determined that the Enemy State is not a party to the contract, either directly or indirectly.

4. Prevailing wage rates will be paid but in no case will the maximum rates of pay, as published in the price list, be exceeded without prior approval of the Fiscal Officer, Force 343.

5. Revised and detailed pay rates schedules will be issued at the earliest practicable date.

6. Pay periods will not be longer than on a calendar week basis, Sunday through Saturday, except to provide for emergency conditions.

7. Payrolls will be paid by Class B Agent Officers.

PROCUREMENT OF REAL ESTATE

"Real Estate" includes lands, buildings and all forms of immovable property.

"Enemy State Property" includes all property owned, controlled or administered by any State at war with the United States, and also property of companies, institutions or bodies in which any such State has any substantial interest or over which it exercises substantial control."

The following provisions will govern the acquisition of all real estate on Horrified by units of Task Force 343.

1. How procured. - D plus 5 to D plus 30

a. By immediate occupancy, in the event of urgent necessity, leaving question of rent to be determined by G-4, Task Force 343.

b. By informal written agreement between the Unit Purchasing and Contracting Officer and the owner when ownership has been definitely established. This informal written agreement will follow the form outlined in Section III, Par. 5b, AR 30-1415 and will be prepared in triplicate, one copy being furnished the owner of the property, one copy retained by the disbursing officer paying the account and one copy forwarded the Engineer, Task Force 343.

After D plus 30

c. By procurement through the Engineer, Task Force 343, utilizing the requisition form for convenience. Requisitions should show specific requirements, location (where necessary, including map reference), and details of improvements or modifications, if any, to adapt the property to the purpose for which required. The Engineer, Task Force 343, should be consulted if extensive alterations involving the expenditures of large amounts of critical materials be required. Compensation to be determined by G-4, Task Force 343.

2. Purpose. - Since all initial accommodations for troops will be tented, buildings will not be requisitioned for billeting troops.

Buildings will be acquired for storage of supplies liable to deteriorate by exposure to the elements.

3. Conditions. - All rentals or acquisitions of real property are subject to the following conditions: (FM 27-10)

a. No property of the Enemy State will be purchased or paid for.

b. Where the ownership of the property is unknown, or doubt exists as to whether it is public or private, it shall be treated as public property until ownership is definitely settled.

c. Property of municipalities and of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and science, even when Enemy State property, shall be treated as private property (FM-27-10).

REPORT REQUIRED. A report, designed to protect the United States Government from any unjust claims arising from the occupancy of all real estate, grounds as well as buildings, will be required on all property occupied. This will include all the following information.

REAL ESTATE ACQUISITIONED

_____ (Date)

Date occupied: _____. Occupied by: _____
Description, location and area of premises: _____
_____
Purpose for which used: _____
_____
How acquired: _____
Name and address of owner: _____
_____
Monthly rental: _____. Has lease been executed? _____
Is Copy attached? _____
Condition upon occupancy: _____
_____
_____
Improvements required: _____
_____
Improvements completed: _____
_____
Cost of improvements, if accomplished by U.S. _____
Condition upon vacancy: _____
_____
_____

Reports will be as complete as possible and will be submitted to immediate headquarters where they will be consolidated and forwarded through channels to reach this headquarters as soon as possible after the occupancy of the real estate.

After D plus 30, this headquarters will be notified, in advance, of the date any property is to be vacated.

FUNDS. Funds will be made available to each sub-task force engineer. The amounts and the fiscal procedure will be the subject of a separate memorandum.

SUPPLY PLAN

D to D plus 8

Class II: BGT sets plus selected items including a tactical stockpile.

Class IV: Selected items for specific projects.

After D plus 8

Class II: Normal supply in 21-day increments every 15 days until 4-day reserve is established.

Class IV: Sixty-day supply in even increments in consters from North Africa in anticipated order of requirements which may be varied for special items on demand and by convoy from the United States. Additional sixty-day supply to arrive in two equal increments D plus 90 and D plus 105 by convoy from the United States.

Initially, sub-task force commanders are responsible for their own supply. When supply activities are taken over by the Commanding General, Force 343, the Commander, 1st Engineer Special Brigade will be responsible for the execution of all supply plans within the theatre of operations.

V.

Water to be provided on the basis of one gallon per man per day. Sufficient supply on this basis for five days operation to be brought in five gallon cans or by the Navy in bulk.

Sources of water are available to sub-task forces as follows:

Force	5 Gal. Cans	Bulk-LSTs	Local (g.p.d.)
Cent	7,400	30,000 (3)	497,000 Vittovia aqueduct 1,000,000 Springs-S Croce Camervina
Dime	13,000	50,000 (5)	*367,000 - Gela aqueduct 252,000 - Gela river wells
Joss	17,500	90,000 (9)	150,000 Licata aqueduct Salso River
Kool	7,500	30,000 (3)	----------

* A spring of 79 gpm has been reported at Berdia but not confirmed.

A limited number of 2,000 gal. distillation units are also available.

Five gallon cans to the above total have been ordered to the ports of embarkation where they will be filled by the S.O.S. base section.

The decision as to how many 5 gallon cans will be taken and whether any distillation units will be included rests with each sub-task force commander.

Organic engineers will perform their normal functions including the necessary development of water sources.

The 401st Engineer Water Supply Bn. will develop water supplies in the rear areas, including decontamination of sources and boring wells. It will furnish water in 750-gallon tankers to division and corps water points and to beach groups as required.

If later operations entail the movement of two forces in opposite directions, it is planned to attach one lettered company to each and to leave the balance of the battalion to supply service troops in the rear area.

The 402nd Engineer Water Supply Bn. will be on call in North Africa to supplement the work of the 401st if the demands become too great.

ENGINEER INTELLIGENCE

The procedure for providing the artillery with engineer map information and for producing up to date collated maps will be as follows:

Prior to D day.

a. Personnel - A team will be set up in the vicinity of La Marsa Airport. It will consist of:

1. G-2 photo interpreters.
2. One Artillery counterbattery officer.
3. One Engineer officer with the photomapping platoon of the 66th Engr. Co. Top.

b. Mission - This team will have the primary mission of furnishing the Artillery counterbattery officer with the map coordinates in terms of the British Grid, of targets selected and located by him with the aid of the photo interpreters on the photos. It will have the secondary mission of keeping up to date a collated trace so that collated maps may be printed on short notice.

c. Photo Procedure - G-2 will be responsible for obtaining photos. Initially, at least two sets of photos will be prepared, one set to be used by the interpreters and one set by the Engineers in order to speed up the process of restitution. After these

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photos have been furnished the priority of printing and delivery of additional copies by G-2 will be as follows:

1. 1 set G-2 Division requesting the sortie
2. 1 set G-2 Corps concerned
3. 1 set G-2 Army
4. Additional selected prints as desired by the original requesting agency.
5. All other requests.

One set of photos will immediately be given to G-2 interpreters who will interpret, plot and annotate them. They will then be given to the counterbattery officer who will select the targets he desires. The photos will then be given to the engineers who will give the counterbattery officer the coordinates of the target. These coordinates will be obtained by restituting from the map as described in FM 6-40, and it is understood that with the facilities available they cannot be more accurate than the maps we are using. The counterbattery officer will then handle the data as he sees fit.

The other set of photos will immediately be given to the engineers who will plot the photo on the map and immediately select and restitute at least three control points. When the annotated photos arrive the engineers will then plot the target and read the coordinates.

If only one set of photos are received it will go to G-2 interpreters and then the engineers in turn who cannot plot and restitute the control points until they receive the annotated prints. This will of course slow down the procedure.

After the counterbattery information has been given to the Artillery, the engineers will plot all annotated data on a trace of the 1/25,000 map. This will be done daily. Upon call from G-2, the engineer will print editions of collated maps.

II - D to approximately D plus 12

No change except that requests for sorties will be radioed back to La Marsa using available channels. Pilots will be briefed by their own air corps people, but our G-2 will insure the presence of a representative to guard against misunderstanding.

G-2 will also have a man available where the prints are made to determine before they are dry whether they are suitable and whether the sortie will have to be reflown.

No prints or map grid corrections can be furnished units prior to D plus 12.

III - After D plus 12

a. Upon the establishment of a G-2 photo interpretation section in the vicinity of an airfield on Horrified, probably Ponta Olive, the same type of team as described in I above will be set up using the 62nd Engr. Co. Top. in place of the 66th Engr. Co. This company will have leapfrogged and moved to Horrified in the early phases to enable it to begin operations by D plus 12.

b. G-2 will handle the requests for sorties directly with our reconnaissance squadron.

IV - Ground Control

a. On D and D plus 4 the Survey platoons of the 66th and 62nd Engr. Cos. will land on Horrified with the missions of:
   1. Surveying in corps artillery points for Joss and Shark.
   2. Obtaining sufficient supplementary control points to enable a radial line plot to be made to determine map accuracy.

b. This control data will be assembled at the 62nd Engr. Co. which will establish the survey center and make the control point.

The information found in this plot will then be incorporated in the restitution process. At the time that the annotation begins on Horrified the 62nd Engr. Co. will also assume responsibility for preparing collated traces and maps until the 66th Co. can arrive on Horrified, at which time the 66th Co. will serve Joss and Kool and the 62nd Co. Cent and Dime.

MAP PLAN

A. The Engineer Map Plan for Operation Husky provides the following issues for each Sub-Task Force.

1. Initial issues.

a. To the Sub Task Force Engineer for troops covering their area of initial operations, to be delivered in bags destined for the following lower units:

(1) An Infantry Regiment
(2) Division Artillery
(3) All other divisional troops and Divisional Headquarters.
(4) Each Regiment not part of a division.
(5) All other Sub-Task Force Troops.

(Categories 3 and 5 will have to be broken down by Engineers of the Sub-Task Force.)

b. To airborne units coverage of the areas of Joss and Shark.

c. To the 9th Division coverage of the area of immediate operations of Joss and Shark.

d. To Headquarters II Corps and Headquarters I Armored Corps complete coverage.

e. To Artillery Headquarters Force 343 covering extra artillery units and AA MAPOG maps.

f. To the Navy of sheets requested by them.

2. Reserves.

a. Sub Task Force - A limited reserve to be carried by the sub-task force engineer so that he may immediately provide for unforseen contingencies. This consists of complete coverage of Horrified in the following scales and quantities per division:

1/100,000 - - - 100 copies
1/250,000 - - - 200 copies

b. Beach Reserve - A beach reserve carried by the Map Depot Detachment attached to each sub-task force. This consists of:

(1) 20% of the initial issue in 1. a. above.
(2) 200 copies of 1/100,000, 1/50,000 and 1/25,000 sheets covering the area of anticipated subsequent operations of each sub-task force.

3. Stocks.

a. Coverage of the balance of the island in all scales to be stocked half in the main depot on the island and half in North Africa.

B. ISSUE.

1. On D - 14 - The Engineer, Force 343, will deliver initial and reserve issues to the Engineers of the Sub-Task Forces on D minus 14. In the event that all maps are not available to 343 in time to allow breakdown and delivery by D minus 14 partial deliveries will have to be made after that date.

A Map Depot Detachment will be attached to each Sub-Task Force on D minus 14. This detachment will consist of:

Dime and Joss - 1 Officer, 4 E.M.
Cent and Kool - 4 E.M.

2. D - 7 to D - Between D minus 7 and D day a map depot will be established at Bizerte to hold reserve stocks and serve reserve troops. Prior to D - 7 the depot will be at Constantine.

3. D day - On D day the map depot detachments will form emergency depots at the beaches on which they land.

4. D plus 4 to D plus 8 - Between D plus 4 and D plus 8 they will consolidate and form two depots in two towns within the beach head. One Depot will serve Cent and Dime, one will serve Joss and Kool. These depots will be reinforced as soon as possible by reserve stock held in Africa and will be moved as the situation indicates.

5. It should be noted that maps will be delivered in rolls of fifty, each roll being coded. It is contemplated to furnish each sub-task force engineer with a code list.

6. Attached are the following tables and indices:

a. Breakdown units and bagmarking

b. Quantities of sheets in unit bags.

c. Assortment of sheets for each distribution with indices.

ANNEX 2 - LANDING SCHEDULE

Incl. #2

Final Pre-D-day Plan For

Debarkation of Engineer Units

Unit	D	D plus 4	D plus 8	Follow Ups
CENT - 45th Div:				
40th Engr. Regt. (c)	2326			
Det., 2657 Map Depot	5			
Co. B, 401st WS Bn. (-1500 gal. tanker sect.)	3			105
19th Engr. Regt. (C)	391	10		1074
814th Engr. Bn. (Avn.)	9		366	441
Plat., Co. B, 601st Cam. Bn.				15
DIME - 1st Div:				
531st Engr. Regt. (Shore)	2050	5	26	22
Det., 2657 Map Dep. Det.	5			
Plat., 462nd Depot Co. (-det)	44			
39th Engr. Regt. (C)	641	707	45	47
696th Petr. Distr. Co.	3	175		10
Co. C, 401st W. S. Bn. (-1500 gal. tanker sect.) (plus well-drilling det.)	3	126	8	
Plat., 437th D. T. Co.		41		
809th Engr. Bn. (Avn.)	12	364		443
62d Topo. Co.			96	5
Plat., Co. B, 601st Cam. Bn,			15	
JOSS - 3d Div:				
36th Engr. Regt. (C)	1565	62	102	124
2d Bn., 540th Engr. Regt.	536	25	9	22
Det., 2658 Map Dep. Det.	5			
815th Engr. Bn. (Avn.)	225 (79 D + 1)	273	233	
20th Engr. Regt. (C)	1214	19	101	73
Det., 462d Depot Co.	10			
Co. A, 401st W.S. Bn. (-1500 gal. tanker Sect.)		80		13
Plat., Co. B, 601st Cam. Bn.				15
Survey Plat., 66th Topo Co.	29	4		38
KOOL - 2d Armored Div:				
540th Engr. Regt. (C) (less 2d Bn.)	792			88
Det., 401st W.S. Bn.	31			5
Det., 2658 Map Dep. Det.	4			
Det., 462d Depot Co.	10			
1 Plat., Co. B, 601st Cam. Bn.				15

The following Army units were to sail on follow-ups after D plus 8 in priority as shown:

1.	Rem., 437th D.T. Co.	69	11.	427th D.T. Co.	122
2.	Rem., 462d Dep. Co.	152	12.	Rem., 401st W.S. Bn.	125
3.	343d Engr. Regt.	1322	13.	1051st Port Constr. & Rep. Grp	247
4.	1206th Firefighting Plat.	25	14.	1090th Utilities Co.	182
5.	Rem., 2657th Map Dep. Det.	4	15.	387th Sep. Bn.	1118 (Never Arr. in Sicily)
6.	Rem., 2658th Map Dep. Det.	4	16.	66th Topo. Co. (less Survey Plat.)	87 " "
7.	Rem., Co. B, 601st Cam. Bn.	27	17.	376th Sep. Bn.	1118 " "
8.	1206th Firefighting Plat.	26	18.	Co. A, 85th Hvy Pont. Bn.	165 " "
9.	175th Engr. Regt. (GS)	1322	19.	6617th Wire Clearance Co.	200 " "
10.	469th Maint. Co.	181			

Actual Arrival Dates of All Units Which Eventually Came Under Control of the Army Engr.

For D-day Assault:

Dime Sub Task Force			
Det. Co. C, 401st Engr. Bn.	1 officer	2 EM	1 veh.
2657 Engr. Map Dep. Det.	no officers	4 EM	no veh.
1 Pl. 462d Engr. Depot Co. (-Det)	1 officer	20 EM	3 veh.
39th Engr. Combat Regt. (-Bn)	25 officers	520 EM	30 veh.
Det., 696th Engr. Petr. Distr. Co.	1 officer	2 EM	no veh.

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Joss Sub Task Force
3d Bn, 540th Engr. Shore Regt. 21 officers 538 EM 156 veh.
20th Engr. Combat Regt. (-Det) 45 officers 970 EM 106 veh.
2658 Engr. Map Depot Det. no officers 4 EM no veh.
Det., 462d Engr. Depot Co. 1 officer 10 EM 1 veh.

Kool Sub Task Force
Det., H & S Co., 401st Engr. Bn (WS) 1 officer 25 EM 6 veh.
Det., 462d Engr. Depot Co. no officers 10 EM 1 veh.
540th Engr. Shore Regt. (-Bn) 26 officers 659 EM 113 veh.

Cent Sub Task Force
2657 Engr. Map Depot Det. 1 officer 4 EM no veh.
Det., Co. B, 401st Engr. Bn. 1 officer 2 EM 1 veh.

After D-Day:
Arr. Gela beach July 13 to 1st Inf Div
39th Engr. Combat Regt (-Bn) 29 officers 659 EM 35 veh.

Arr. Gela beach July 13 to 1st Inf. Div.
Co. C & Det. H & S Co. 401st Engr. Bn, 4 officers 117 EM 33 veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 14-16 to 3d Inf. Div.
Survey Det., 66th Engr. Topo. Co. 1 officer, 32 EM 6 veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 13-18 to Seventh Army
2658 Map Depot Det., no officers 5 EM no veh.

Arr. Gela beach July 16th to Seventh Army
696th Engr. Petr. Distr. Co. (-Det) 4 officers 171 EM 33 veh.

Arr. Gela beach July 17 to 31 to II Corps
Det. 39th Engr. Combat Regt., 1 officer 1 W.O. 192 EM 215 veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 18 to 3d Inf. Div.
Co. A. 401st Engr. Bn. (WS) Det 3 officers 87 EM 20 veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 18 to 7th Army
Det. 105ist Engr. Port Grp. 3 officers no EM no veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 18 to 20th Engineers
Det. 20th Engr. Regt. 1 officer 72 EM 44 veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 19 to 20th Engineers
Det. 20th Engr. Regt. 1 officer 88 EM 47 veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 19 to 1st Special Brigade
Det. 1090th Engr. Util. Co. 2 officer no EM no veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 20 to 20th Engineers
Det., 20th Engr. Regt. no officers 22 EM 16 veh.

Arr. Porto Empedocle July 20th to 1st Inf. Div.
1 Pl. Co. B, 601st Engr. Bn. no officers 11 EM 4 veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 22 to 7th Army
462d Engr. Depot Co. (-Pl) 5 officers 154 EM 26 veh.

Arr. Gela beach July 23 to II Corps
Co. B, 401st Engr. Bn (-Dets) 2 officers 54 EM 17 veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 21-24 to 1st Inf. Div.
Dets. A S & Co. C, 401st Engr. Bn. no officers 8 EM 6 veh.

Arr. Licata 24 July to 20th Engrs.
Det. 20th Engr. Regt. 1 officer 15 EM no veh.

Arr. Licata beach July 25 to II Corps
1 Pl. Co. B 601st Engr. Bn. (-4 Pl) 2 officers 27 EM 6 veh.

Arr. Gela beach July 24th to II Corps.
1 Pl. Co. B, 601st Engr. Bn. 1 officer 14 EM 3 veh.

Arr. Palermo July 28 to 7th Army
343d Engr. G.S. Regt. (-Bn) 24 officers 563 EM 84 veh.

Arr. Licata July 29 to 7th Army
1206 Engr. FF Platoon 1 officer 26 EM 9 veh.

Arr. Licata July 29 to 7th Army
437th Engr. D.T. Co. (-Pl) 2 officers 67 EM 30 veh.

Arr. Licata July 30th to 20th Engrs.
Det. 20th Engr. Regt. 3 officers 179 EM 122 veh.

Arr. Licata July 30th to 7th Army
2 Platoons Co. B, 601st Engr. Bn., 2 officers 28 EM 6 veh.

Arr. Licata July 30th to 7th Army
8th Engr. F.F. Plat., 1 officer 26 EM 11 veh.

Arr. Palermo Aug 2 to 7th Army
Det. 401st Engr. Bn. 14 officers 142 EM 92 veh.

Arr. Palermo Aug. 2 to 7th Army
2658 Map Depot., no officers 3 EM 3 veh.

ANNEX 3 - T/O, BAILEY BRIDGE CO.

ENGINEER BAILEY BRIDGE COMPANY

Arr. Palermo Aug. 3 to 7th Army
2657 Engr. Map Depot Det. no officers 3 EM 4 veh.

Arr. Palermo Aug. 4 to 7th Army
Rear Echelon 540th Engr. Shore Regt. 40 officers 1 WO 134 EM 90 veh.

Arr. Palermo Aug. 4 to 7th Army
1051st Engr. Port Grp., 12 officers 215 EM no veh.

Arr. Palermo Aug. 4 to 7th Army
1st Bn. 343d Engr. G.S. Regt. 24 officers 2 WOs 636 EM 85 veh.

Arr. Palermo Aug 7-11 to 7th Army
1090th Engr. Util. Co. (-Det.) 4 officers 170 EM 14 veh.

Arr. Palermo Aug 4 to 7th Army
469th Engr. Maint. Co., 6 officers 180 EM 70 veh.

Arr. Palermo Aug 4 to 7th Army
427th Engr. D. T. Co. 4 officers 118 EM 58 veh.

Arr. Palermo Aug 11 to 7th Army
Det. 1090th Engr. Util. Co. 1 officer 17 EM 14 veh.

ANNEX 4 - T/O. MAP COMPANY

Tentative
Table of Organization
No. 5-

ENGINEER MAP DEPOT AND DISTRIBUTION COMPANY
(Army)

1	UNIT	2 Technician grade	3 Company HQ	4 HQ Platoon Det. Motor Pool	5 Map Plat. (Reproduction)	6 Total Company	7 Enlisted Cadre	8 REMARKS
2	Captain		1			1		
3	First Lieutenant			1	1	2		
4	Second Lieutenant				1	1		
5	Total Commissioned		1	1	2	4		
6	First Sergeant (585)		1			1	1	
7	Master Sergeant, Chief, map storage and distribution (821)		1	1	1	3	1	
9	Staff Sergeant, including,		3			7	5	
10	Mess (82k)		(1)			(1)	(1)	
11	Motor (813)		(1)			(1)	(1)	
12	Supply (821)		(1)			1	1	
13	Corporal, including,		(1)			(1)	(1)	
14	Clerk, Company (405)					1		
15	Technician Grade 4					(34)		
16						1		
17	Private, 1st Class	Incl	14	19	19	(21)	5	
18	Private					(25)		
19	Automobile mechanic (01a)	4	(1)				(1)	
20	" " (01a)	5	(1)					
21	Bugler (Messenger) (803)		(1)					
22	Clerk, map supply rcd. (374)	4		(1)	(1)		(1)	
23	Carpenter, general (050)		(1)					
24	Clerk, general, (055)	5		(3)	(3)			
25	Clerk, general, (055)			(2)	(2)			
26	Clerk, supply (32a)	5	(1)					
27	Cook (060)	4	(1)					
28	Cook (060)	5	(2)				(2)	
29	Cook's helper (521)		(2)					
30	Folder, Paper (521)			(2)	(2)		(1)	
31	Map editor (07b)	4		(1)	(1)			
32	Map editor (07b)	5		(1)	(1)			
33	Truck driver, heavy (245)	5	(1)	(2)	(1)			
34	" " (245)		(1)	(2)	(2)			
35	Truck driver, light (345)	5	(1)	(1)	(2)			
36	" " (345)			(2)	(3)			
37	Basic (521)		(1)	(2)	(1)			
38	Total Enlisted		50	50	50	100		
39	Aggregate		51	51	51	105		
0	Carbine, Cal. 30		20	21	21	105		
Q	Trailer, 1-ton Cargo		1	2	4	15		
Q	Truck, 1/4-ton		1	1	3	11		
Q	Truck, 3/4-ton WC			2	2	8		
Q	Truck, 2½-ton Cargo		2	4	3	15		
Q	Trailers, Tank, 250 gal.		1			1		

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
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ANNEX 5

DEMOLISHED BRIDGES




ENCLOSURE NO. 3
TO
SEVENTH ARMY ENGR REPORT
SICILIAN CAMPAIGN


DEMOLITIONS ON
PRINCIPAL ROUTES

● ROAD BRIDGE DEMOLISHED
× R.R. BRIDGE DEMOLISHED/DESTROYED
◉ LARGE CRATER

ROAD BRIDGES

1.	120'	SINGLE-SINGLE	
2.	80'	D	- S
3.	80'	D	- S
4.	90'	D	- S
5.	120'	T	- S
6.	60	D	- S
7.	70	D	- S
8.	50	S	- S
9.	120	T	- D - Construction Bn of Northwest
10.	130		
11.	85	D	- D





PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF RAILHEAD.

(NOT TO SCALE.)

ENGINEER SECTION
SEVENTH U.S. ARMY.

RIGHT

ANNEX 6

LAYOUT, RAILHEAD AT SAN STEFANO


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


ANNEX 8

PLAN OF UTILITIES DEMOLISHED

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ANNEX 7 PLAN OF PORT OF PALERMO



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
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ANNEX 9

PONTOON CAUSEWAY AT GELA PIER



USE OF PONTOON CAUSEWAY AT GELA PIER
NOT TO SCALE
ENGR. SECTION SEVENTH ARMY

ANNEX 10

RECOMMENDATIONS – CHANGES IN T/BA

1. Combat Engineer Battalion

TRANSPORTATION

Motorcycles – 3 additional – The number of motorcycles now issued (and it is understood the new T.E.s cut them out altogether) are not sufficient. During the Sicilian Campaign, those we had were invaluable due to the inadequacy of our radio communications and to the continual sabotage of our telephone lines. They are also necessary for the prompt dissemination of information such as captured documents, particularly minefield layouts and photo-interpretation reports that are valueless unless placed in the hands of combat troops immediately. The additional motorcycles are required for battalion headquarters to insure communication with the lettered companies as well as with higher headquarters when radio and telephone service are not available and to provide the necessary convoy control on the march.

1/4-ton Trucks – 2 additional – Prompt and continuous reconnaissance is vital, and adequate control of convoys to insure proper discipline is essential. The present allowance of light vehicles is not sufficient to enable the companies to properly perform these important missions. Also, the 3/4-ton C & R is often too unwieldly for both purposes, especially over difficult terrain and narrow roads.

Two additional 1/4-ton trucks are necessary for headquarters company as follows:

a. One for the combined S-2 and S-3 Sections of the battalion headquarters for their reconnaissance work. At present transportation permits sending only two reconnaissance parties from the battalion at the same time. This is not enough.

b. One for the battalion executive officer who is charged with the control of the battalion convoy when it is on the march and now has no transportation.

3/4-ton W.C. – Nine additional – Each company requires four vehicles of this size. In combat there were continuous demands for small mine detector parties to operate on missions distant from the company. At present, no adequate transportation exists, and the use of a dump truck as a substitute eliminates the dump truck from construction projects and compels the mine detector party to use a vehicle which frequently is not sufficiently mobile over difficult terrain. The fourth vehicle is necessary for supply and motor maintenance.

HEAVY EQUIPMENT

Angledozer, D-7 – One D-7 Angledozer with 20-ton trailer and prime mover must be authorized per battalion. The R-4 Angledozer proved too light in Morocco, Tunisia and Sicily for much of the work. Throughout all of these campaigns, it has been necessary to supplement the bulldozing equipment of the combat battalions with the heavier D-7s in order to accomplish the mission.

1 Shop Truck, General Purpose – Present day operations place a tremendous premium on availability of heavy engineer equipment, especially in the forward areas. To repair this equipment quickly when necessary, and to maintain it properly, the general purpose shop truck is necessary. It is believed that this item of equipment was inadvertently omitted when T/E 5-16 was published.

COMMUNICATIONS

Radios – The problem of proper communications within the combat battalion has been complicated by the speed with which modern operations move and the resultant wide separation of units. Constant communication must be insured between division headquarters and the battalion and between battalion headquarters and the companies.

The following is considered the proper allowance of radio equipment:

SCR 193 or 506 – 5 additional – These sets are necessary in place of the one 284 now authorized, two for battalion headquarters and one for each lettered company. SCR 506 would be more satisfactory because of preset requency channels.

SCR 511 – 2 additional – Eleven of these walky-talky sets are necessary, two for battalion headquarters and three for each line company to insure communications by the battalion with its reconnaissance parties and proper control by the companies over their platoons.

Note – SCR 593 – The twnty-seven of these now authorized are sufficient.

GENERAL EQUIPMENT

Mine Detectors – The present T/BA of mine detectors is entirely inadequate. Mine detectors should be issued on the basis of twelve per lettered company and six per H & S company. The extensive use of mine warfare by the Germans has placed a great premium on this item of equipment. Its use may be limited in future operations if the Germans develop the use of the wooden and plastic non-metallic mines we encountered. However, adequate provision must be made for this item of equipment for use against metallic mines of which there must be a large supply. The present detectors should be improved by waterproofing the coils, strengthening the fragile parts and providing a more shock-absorbing case.

Compasses – 12 additional – Four compasses of an improved type are necessary per lettered company. The laying of minefields and the accurate and prompt report of enemy fields requires a compass better than the present lensatic compass. A compass such as the British Mark III should be issued in addition to the lensatic compasses now authorized.

Shower Units (32 head) – One unit would be desirable per battalion. Units have been improved in this force using distillation units for heating purposes. This proved to be of great value in providing divisions with bathing facilities during periods when they were out of the line.

Binoculars – 10 additional – 10 are necessary in place of the present 6 per headquarters company, and 6 per lettered company in place of the present 4. The requirement for binoculars has been increased because of their need for aircraft identification.

2. Armored Engineer Combat Battalion

TRANSPORTATION

1/4-ton Trucks – 3 additional – The total number of 1/4-ton trucks should be increased by three, and the type of trucks should be changed. At present, forty-six Amphibian trucks and eleven plain trucks are authorized. The amphibian trucks should be reduced to four and placed in headquarters company, and the plain trucks should be increased to fifty-six on the basis of eleven in headquarters company, ten in each lettered company, four in the bridge company and one for the medical detachment.

M-3 Half Track – Some of the half tracks, in the company maintenance section, should be changed to 2½-ton trucks with winch. The total number of half-tracks is now forty-six. Seven of these should be replaced with 2½-ton trucks with winch.

Ambulances – 2 additional – The two M-3 half tracks of the medical detachment should be changed to ambulances to provide a total of three.

Communications

SCR 510 Sets – All SCR 510 sets should be replaced with SCR 528 sets, to be issued on the basis of five per lettered company, two in the bridge company, and six in the headquarters company.

HEAVY EQUIPMENT

D-7 Angledozers – Each battalion should be equipped with one D-7 Angledozer with 20-ton trailer and prime mover. The same remarks as under the combat battalion apply.

Cranes,-truck mounted – 1 additional – The present 8-ton 4 x 4 crane authorized for the bridge company is too light and should be replaced by 8-ton 6 x 6 truck-mounted cranes, and an additional crane authorized.

GENERAL EQUIPMENT

Mine detectors: The same remarks as for Combat Battalion apply. The basis of issue should be 12 per lettered company and six in headquarters company.

Shower Unit: (Same as for Combat Battalion.)

Compasses: (Same as for Combat Battalion.)

Binoculars: These should be increased on the same basis for the Combat Battalion.

3. Combat Engineer Regiments

TRANSPORTATION

Motorcycles – 13 additional – As in the combat battalion, there is a definite need for more motorcycles for messenger work and convoy control. It is recommended that these be available on the following basis: Two per lettered company, two per battalion headquarters, and three for H & S company.

1/4-ton Trucks – 2 additional – The same remarks as for the combat battalion applies for the combat regiments. The new T/Es correct the present deficiencies, for the lettered company but two additional trucks should be allotted to the H & S company.

3/4-ton W.C. – As for the combat battalion, the present allotment is not sufficient, but the deficiency is corrected by the new T/Es.

Ambulances – 1 additional – One is not sufficient. The allowance should be increased to two.

Heavy Equipment – D-7 Angledozers – 3 additional – Heavier angledozers are as essential for the combat regiment as for the combat battalion. In addition to the present R-4s, three D-7 angledozers with 20-ton trailers and prime movers should be allotted to each combat regiment.

Motor Patrols – 1 additional grader – The allowance of motor patrols should be increased. Work is often assigned on a battalion basis and an additional road grader would have been of tremendous value. It is recommended that the allotment be increased to two per regiment.

COMMUNICATIONS

Radios – The present authorization of radios is not adequate. There is no radio provided for the company headquarters nor for the platoons of H & S company. It is recommended that radios be issued in the following basis:

SCR 193, or 506 – 2 per regimental headquarters, 1 per battalion and 1 for each lettered company headquarters; the SCR 506 would be more satisfactory because of preset frequency channels.

SCR 511, one per platoon – – – –	20
SCR 593, one per squad of lettered company –	54

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Field Telephones - It is recommended that fifteen field telephones, together with four-five cord switch boards, be issued per regiment, so that adequate telephone communication in companies, battalions and staff sections will be possible.

General Equipment

Mine Detectors - It is recommended that mine detectors be issued on the basis of twelve per lettered company and a reserve of twlve in H & S company, or a total of 84 mine detectors per combat regiment.

Compasses - The same remarks regarding compasses as made for the combat battalion applies to the regiment, and it is recommended that the improved compass be issued on the basis of four per lettered company.

Binoculars - It is recommended that they be issued on the basis of six per lettered company; two per battalion headquarters and ten per H & S company.

4. Engineer General Service Regiment

Heavy Equipment - As in the case of the combat units, the bulldozers now supplied the general service regiments are inadequate. It is recommended that each general service regiment be equipped with six D-7 angledozers with 20-ton prime movers in place of the R-4s. This on the basis of one per company.

Permanent or semi-permanent line of communication repair including the construction of bridges is one of the main functions of these units. The following equipment is recommended to permit them to properly accomplish this mission:

2 - concrete mixers
2 - moto cranes
1 - rock crusher with two prime movers
1 - asphalt distributor
1 - road roller

5. Engineer Water Supply Battalion

TRANSPORTATION

2/4-ton C & R - 1 additional - The allotted number of C & Rs should be increased by one. Of the four authorized at present, each company is authorized one and the one in headquarters and service company is on T/O authority for the battalion commander; consequently, there is no light vehicle of this type for H & S company's use.

2/4-ton W.C. - 2 additional - These are necessary for the well drilling section for water reconnaissance work and because this section frequently operates independently. At present no light transportation is authorized.

Trailer, 1/4-ton - 5 additional - There is not sufficient light cargo transportation in the unit at present. It is recommended that five 1/4-ton trailers be allotted on the basis of one per lettered company and two per H & S company. These vehicles are necessary and ideal for water maintenance and reconnaissance work.

EQUIPMENT

Water purification Equipment - 2 additional - Six portable water purification units with hypochlorinators are required, one per lettered company and three in H & S company for issue to companies when required. During the present operation we actually had this equipment.

Canvas Tanks, 3,000-gallon - The present allowance of 3,000-gallon water tanks is wholly inadequate and should be increased to provide a total of 48 for the battalion.

6. Topographic Company

TRANSPORTATION

1/4-ton truck - 2 additional - The number of 1/4-ton trucks has not proved sufficient. The rapidity with which the survey platoons must extend control to support artillery survey necissitates individual transportation for survey parties. It is recommended that two additional 1/4 ton trucks be allotted the company for this purpose.

3/4-ton truck, W.C. - At present the Topographic Co. is allotted two 3/4 ton weapons carriers and two 3/4 ton carry alls. Carryalls proved to be of no value and should be eliminated entirely. The allotment of weapons carriers does not provide sufficient flexability for the survey platoon and it is recommended that the present allotment of weapons carriers and carryalls be changed to five 3/4 ton weapons carriers.

SURVEY EQUIPMENT

It is recommended that the following be added to the survey equipment for the reasons stated:

6 ea Heliotropes for assistance in long distance triangulation.

6 ea SCR #510 two way radios to assist in the rapid coordination of field survey parties and the rapid check and dissemination of data.

6 Signal beacons similar to the British M1 to provide a portable signal which can quickly be erected without the use of local materials.

2 pr. Binoculars M3 (total of 6) to facilitate rapid identification of control stations.

GENERAL EQUIPMENT

One additional 5 KVA generator is needed.

ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT

The present armament (rifles) of the survey platoon is unsatisfactory and cumbersome. It is recommended that pistols be substituted for rifles.

7. Engineer Maintenance Company

EQUIPMENT

Shop, Motorized, General Purpose - Two additional general purpose shops should be provided to give the company a total of four.

Compressors, Air (2.7 Cfm) - Two additional air compressors should be provided.

8. Engineer Depot Company

EQUIPMENT

Crane, mobile - 3 additional - The present TBA authorizes only one mobile crane, which is wholly inadequate. An engineer depot or dump cannot operate without a crane. In the campaign just closed, our depot company operated four depots and dumps and for this purpose we were able to obtain eight cranes. It is recommended that this company be equipped with four Moto Cranes.

9. Engineer Utilities Company

TRANSPORTATION

2/4-ton Trucks, WC - 2 additional - As in the case of other units, the light transportation of this organization is inadequate and the allotment of 3/4-ton trucks, WC, should be increased by two to provide a total of six.

1/4-ton Truck - 2 additional - The same applies to the 1/4-ton, which should be increased by two to provide a total of four.

EQUIPMENT

This company should be furnished the following additional equipment:

Two additional pipe-fitting sets and two carpenter sets.

Other Units

The following additional types of engineer units have been under the control of Engineer Section, Seventh Army, for varying periods during the Sicilian campaign. Their operations thus far have not revealed the necessity for any major changes in T/BA, and thus no recommendations for changes are made at this time.

Port Construction and Repair Group
Company of Camouflage Bn.
Petroleum Distribution Co.
Dump Truck Co.
Map Depot Det.
Firefighting Platoon

General Recommendations

a. Each unit operating a kitchen should be provided with one 250 gallon water trailer.

b. Brushes in all sign painting sets should be increased 100%.

c. Mine detectors should be packed in water and shock proof containers.

d. Air compressors should have capacity of 150 cu. ft. per minute.

e. Spare parts for heavy equipment should be provided in larger quantities.

f. Fifty percent of the D-handled shovels in squad and platoon sets should be eliminated and long handled shovels substituted.

g. 150 ft./minute rock drils with the air compressor should be substituted for the lighter drills.

h. It would be highly desirable to replace the 4-ton prime mover and the 8-ton trailer for the R-4 Angledozer with a low bed 6-ton truck. The present prime mover and trailer proved unwieldly on the narrow winding Sicilian roads. The additional 3/4-ton trucks will make up for cargo carrying capacity eliminated.

Note - Recommendations on the Shore Regiments are not included in this report since they are covered in the report of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.

ANNEX II

RECOMMENDED BASIS ISSUE

MINE DETECTORS

This and the following pages indicate the basis used for the issue of mine detectors to units of the Seventh Army. This issue proved adequate and is recommended.

INFANTRY DIVISION

Infantry Division	Per Unit	Reserve	No. Units	Total
Engineer Bn.				
Per Letter Co.	12		3	36
Per H & S Co.		6	1	6
Reconn. Troop				
Reconn. Section	1		6	6
Troop Hq.		2	1	2
Infantry Regt.				
Reconn. Plat.	2		3	6
Pioneer Plat. (Bn.)	3		9	27
H & S Co.		3	3	9
Signal Company	3	2	1	5
Ordnance Company	3	2	1	5
Total				102

ARMORED DIVISION

Armored Division	Per Unit	Reserve	No. Units	Total
Engineer Bn.				
Per letter Co.	12		4	48
Per H & S Co.		6	1	6
Reconn. Bn.				
Recorn. Co.	6		4	24
Hq. Co.		4		4
Armored Regt.				
Reconn. Plat.	2		1	2
Reconn. Plat. (Bn.)	3		3	9
Serv. Co.		3	1	3
Signal Co.	9	3	1	12
Maint. Co.	3	1	1	4
Total				118

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AIRBORNE DIVISION

Organization	Per Unit	Reserve	Total
Engr.	12	2	14
Inf. Regt.	7	1	24
Sig.	3	1	4
Ord.	2	1	3
Total			45

CORPS TROOPS

Corps	Per Unit	Reserve	No. Units	Total
Engineer Combat Regt.				
Per Letter Co.	12		6	72
Per H & S Co.		12	1	12
Signal Bn.				
Per Const. Co.	4		2	8
Per Wire Co.	4		1	4
Bn. Hq.		3	1	3
Total				99

TASK FORCE TROOPS

Task Force	Per Unit	Reserve	No. Units	Total
A. Engineers				
General Service Regt.	1		6	6
H & S Co.		2		2
Shore Regt.				
Per Letter Co.	3		9	27
H & S Co.		3		3
Water Supply Bn.				
Per Letter Co.	2		3	6
H & S Co.		2		2
Aviation Bn.				
Per Letter Co.	3		3	9
H & S Co.		3		3
B. Tank Bn.				
Per Hq. Co.	3	1	1	4
C. Tank D Bn.				
Per Letter Co.	3	1	3	10
Per Hq. Co.	3	1	1	4
D. Ordnance Co. (M.M.)	6	2	1	8
E. C A Bn. (AA)	6	2	1	8

Note - A task force reserve of 20% of the total issue was established and carried in the Signal Depot for replacements.

ANNEX 12

FIRST ENGINEER SPECIAL BRIGADE

SHORE ENGINEERS IN SICILY
(10 July 1943 et sequi)

I—FOREWORD

1. CONTENT AND PURPOSES: This paper is not a treatise on the Shore Engineers but a resume of the conclusions of the responsible Engineer commanders covering only certain points which seem to be of major importance and interest. They are presented in order to afford basis for improvement in organization, technique, and operation with an eye on further employment of the Shore Engineers.

II—HISTORY

2. LANDING: Three Engineer Shore Groups were used in the landing, one with each of three reinforced Infantry Divisions, landing at Licata, Gela, and Scoglitti. A fourth and small group landed with the floating reserve in the vicinity of Gela over already established beaches. The organization of the four groups is shown at Appendix "A".

3. DUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE SHORE ENGINEERS: In this operation the Shore Engineers performed their usual mission of landing troops, equipment, and supplies and establishing beach dumps. In addition they were charged with the execution of all supply plans of the Seventh Army from the time the Army assumed control of the situation ashore. Troops were attached for the latter purpose so that at one time the Shore Engineer Brigade numbered, with attachments, not far from 20,000 officers and men. At first the axis of supply was north and south. Then it was shifted to northwest and southeast. Finally, the other two axes still in operation, an east and west axis was set up with Palermo as a base port. The territory covered in these operations embraced the island of Sicily west of the line Scoglitti—Vittorio—Mineoia—St. Stefano, all inclusive. About D+20 the Army began to relieve the Shore Engineers in the operation of advanced supply points (army dumps) by a re-arrangement of attached troops and the assignment of directing personnel from the Army Headquarters.

4. BEACH MAINTENANCE AND PORTS: Favored by ideal weather except for a few hours now and then, by an almost total lack of enemy interference after D+1, and by the use of the small ports of Licata and Empedocle, little difficulty was experienced in carrying out unloading operations as planned, so far as the factors referred to were involved. With fair weather and no enemy, beach maintenance, except for heavy lifts, could have been continued indefinitely on a scale large enough to insure supply. However, the maximum use of deep water ports at the earliest moment is still the real goal for continued operation. The results of operations to include D+21 appear at Appendix "B".

5. RAILROADS: The railroads were damaged only slightly. The Shore Engineers began to put them back in operation by D+1. They were the decisive factor in the rapid pushing forward of the supply lines because there were simply not half enough supply vehicles to have carried the tonnage which the rapid advance demanded.

III—ORGANIZATION

6. SHORE GROUPS: a. The backbone of Shore Engineer operation was the Shore Group, composed essentially of a shore regiment, a signal company, and ordnance (MM) (Q), a medical battalion, a quartermaster battalion, (DUKW), and a naval beach battalion. This group was augmented for the occasion by small detachments of service personnel such as dump operating details of the various services, railway personnel, gasoline supply troops, and truck companies.

b. One outstanding lesson learned was the vital importance of the permanent establishment of the group in its essential components - "permanent" in the sense of existence so long as amphibian operations are in prospect. Complete and detailed indoctrination and training, discipline, the development of esprit and elan, thorough acquaintanceship, supply and the maintenance of equipment, demand permanence, particularly if more opposition is expected to be encountered in future undertakings. A proposed Beach Group organization is shown at Appendix "C".

7. THE ENGINEER SHORE BRIGADE: The Shore Groups, after the initial stages, passed to the control of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. The Brigade headquarters is organized on a permanent basis. For this occasion it was reinforced by personnel from a base area group designated to take over eventually the normal supply and administration of the rear area.

8. BRIGADE TROOPS: a. The Brigade Signal Company, the 286th, performed invaluable service. It needs a construction section in order to provide wire communication over extensive areas.

b. Ordnance Small Arms Platoon: Such a platoon is assigned and is necessary.

c. Postal Unit: In view of the number of troops in the Brigade, a postal unit is essential and should be permanently attached or assigned.

d. Finance Detachment: An adequate number of Finance Department personnel is a necessity, both for the payment of troops and the handling of supply, rent, and civilian labor accounts.

e. Medical Service: There is none in Brigade headquarters. There should be.

f. Quartermaster: There should be a Brigade Quartermaster with a Quartermaster Headquarters.

g. Ordnance: There should be a Brigade Ordnance Officer with suitable assistance.

h. Engineer: A Brigade Engineer with suitable assistance is a necessity in connection with port repairs, roads, railroads, water, power, and kindred items.

i. Motor Officer: A Brigade Automotive Officer with technical assistance is a vital need if motor maintenance is ever to be lifted above its present unsatisfactory status.

9. BRIGADE ORGANIZATION IN GENERAL: Except for troops attached for some particular operation, the Brigade should be organized on a "permanent" basis for the reasons already stated in 6 b, above. Based on its normal mission of landing men, equipment, and supplies, the organization shown at Appendix "C" is considered to be necessary. Such an organization can support the landing of three Infantry Divisions with attachments and maintain them, not having too much hard luck, for an indefinite period. If the mission of the Brigade is enlarged, as it has been, to include the operation of supply lines and advanced supply points and rear area installations, necessary attachments, made well in advance, can be provided.

10. ENLARGEMENT OF UNITS: The personnel which has borne the brunt of operations here has been the vehicle personnel. An examination of the motor vehicle operators' situation will reveal that in most cases only one driver per vehicle is provided and in no instances more than a few spares. Success calls for twenty-four hour operation of all vehicles and machinery. There never can be enough vehicles so what there are must be used to the maximum. Considering other necessary duties, there is not enough manpower in the units of the beach groups to provide two shifts of qualified drivers. On many occasions large numbers of vehicles stood idle on account of driver exhaustion. Drivers can hold out for two or three days, at the cost of an increased accident rate, and then they crumple. An additional operator should be authorized for every vehicle and machine in the Engineer Brigade and in addition 20% spares.

11. SHORE VERSUS COMBAT ENGINEERS: a. In this operation the shore engineer troops consisted of one engineer shore regiment (the 531st), two combat engineer regiments of three battalions each (the 36th and 40th), one combat engineer regiment of two battalions (the 540th). Both the 36th and the 540th came to Africa last November as shore regiments and have had extensive shore engineer training throughout their histories. Both performed well. The 40th Engineers was an untried combat regiment with shore training which did not hit its stride until sometime after the landing.

b. This operation demonstrated the fallacy of the idea that shore engineering is a side line which can be picked up by combat (and general service) regiments and then dropped after an operation. In the first place, combat engineers have not the strength, the organization, nor the proper assortment of specialists to do the job most efficiently. In particular, they lack the proper number of officers and the battalion headquarters and service companies which are essential to successful operation. The shore engineers work for the greater part by battalions spaced over a considerable stretch of territory. These battalions must be very largely self-contained and self-sustaining. Combat engineers do not have the facilities to effect a sound and efficient organization of their battalions in this regard. The shore regimental headquarters does not enter the scene ashore until the show is well along but it, too, is essential and cannot be organized out of what is available in the combat regiment.

c. The supply and the preliminary preparation of equipment and material for a shore operation is a long complex, and arduous task only to be undertaken by shore engineers who have the experience, detailed knowledge, and time to attend to it. It is one of the most important parts of successful operation and is not to be lightly undertaken by combat engineers who have to learn as they go through a few weeks of "training". Either they learn too late or never learn at all.

d. The training of shore engineers is a long drawn out process that cannot be handled by lectures and "exercises". Knowledge of ships and craft and work with, aboard, and around them cannot be acquired in a few weeks. It is vital to success that the shore engineers, whose work is in perhaps the hottest spot of all until the enemy is pushed well back and his air power beaten down, think, dream, eat, and live shore engineering. Confidence in their ability as a result of sound and thorough training plus pride in their calling are the elements, the moral factors, that will make the difference between success and failure in a tough operation. Part-time shore engineers are deprived of these most necessary aids (spark plugs) by the very nature of their employment.

e. On the equipment side, the combat engineers are loaded down with much unwanted combat engineer equipment, which either must be lugged along or left behind, for the greater part, with stay back details. The latter weakens them in manpower and makes their equipment non-available if it should be needed. On the other hand, they do not have the heavy equipment needed for shore operations. The shore engineers do have, except in transportation, more and better equipment for combat engineering as it is practiced by the typical combat engineer regiment than do the combat engineers themselves.

f. On the training side, there is nothing that combat engineers know or do that is strange to shore engineers. In this operation, the shore engineers have worked on communications (road, bridges, and railways); removed mines and booby traps; executed various construction projects; and fought as infantry. Companies and battalions of them have worked inshore as far as sixty and seventy miles.

g. The conclusion is this: - in the light of the foregoing, it is far better to organize, equip, and train troops which are to perform shore engineer tasks as shore engineers than to superimpose shore engineer functions on combat engineers as a part-time avocation. Soundly trained shore engineers can operate effectively as combat engineers without change in their thinking, organization, or equipment; combat engineers cannot operate effectively as shore engineers without change so revolutionary as to make them, in effect, shore engineers but even then they are liable to be the victims of undermanned, improvised, ill-adapted organizations; inadequate supply, preparation, and training; divided thinking; and of a burden of unnecessary and unwanted equipment.

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IV—NOTES ON OPERATION

12. General: As a whole, doctrine and methods were found to be sound and no basic changes in either seem to be necessary or desirable.

13. Army - Navy Liaison: Better information regarding ship movements and the nature of cargoes, more promptly received, would have been of great assistance. The situation might have been improved had the Brigade had liaison officers aboard the flagship, with ship to shore communications of radio and fast boats, to secure and send in the details of projected ship movements, ship's manifests, and of changes in plan, as they became available.

14. Interferences: a. Better results would have been attained had there been a more wide-spread knowledge of the purpose and functions of shore engineers. In effect they operate a marine terminal. They can carry on with the desirable degree of efficiency only if the beaches are kept clear of people and property; if every effort is made to avoid using their vehicles and equipment outside of the terminal area, and if command channels are followed by troops ashore in seeking equipment, supplies and priorities.

b. Well in advance of future operations it might be found helpful if time could be made available for the study of the capabilities of the shore engineers.

(1) If initially they diverted, in whole or in part, to assist, with men and equipment, in tactical operations.

(2) If they are confined to beach operations.

Such a study would be materially helpful to the engineers and those they support in reaching and understanding of their respective duties and difficulties.

c. Since it would seem that normally it might be expected that more than one tactical unit will use a given beach, the shore engineers should be in support of incoming units and not attached to them. The period of detachment is apt to be a time of delay and confusion that it is well to avoid. If shore groups are to be attached to some landing unit temporarily, care should be taken to leave them in the beach areas so disposed as to be able to take care of units landing later.

15. Unloading Over the Beaches: a. This was the first large scale employment of DUKWS. They proved to be very sturdy vehicles that could go anywhere. When the water and land hauls were short (a mile each, as at Licata) and rough seas did not interfere, their performance was up to advance expectations. Under the conditions stated, they are a reliable and rapid means of getting supplies from ship to dump. The number supplied was about right. However, where the water haul was long it was much more satisfactory and rapid, even at the cost of extra manhandling, to bring cargo in in LCT's. The LCT's with parts of the bulwarks cut away were especially useful as a DUKW could be loaded on either side while unloading was proceeding via the ramp.

b. On the land side, many DUKW hours were lost and some DUKWS ruined for use as boats by excessively long hauls; by accident; by improper employment of cranes and "A" frames; by underinflation of tires; poor driver instruction, control, and direction; and b lack of efficient guides and traffic control, including sign-posting of roads and installations. Many DUKWS were diverted from their primary mission and used as trucks for long distances inland, thus disrupting the unloading plan; frequently clogging important roads with the ungainly bulk of the DUKWS; and getting the DUKWS involved in various types of accidents that probably would not have occurred had the DUKWS been confined to their proper orbit.

c. Some DUKWS were sunk because they were overloaded by personnel aboard ship who persisted in crowding in cargo in spite of warning given by the drivers.

d. The use of beach sleds for carrying shore engineer equipment and supplies met with varying degrees of success. One regiment reported very good results; one regiment had fair results; another regiment wants to burn its sleds. All regimental commanders agree that DUKWS would eliminate the sled problem.

e. In manhandling cargo 8 foot chutes for the DUKWS were very useful. On the LCT's the ordnance type of roller conveyor was most useful in moving freight down the ramps.

f. The small angle-dozer was definitely of little use. The D-7's were exactly what was required but their blades should be trimmed so that they will more readily fit in craft. The small highwheeled prime mover used around airfields would have been very useful.

g. One item sadly lacking was a sufficient supply of tires and tubes for the DUKWS. This was a last minute matter that never got attended to. Brake fluid for DUKWS was another major lack. In this general connection, the equipping of shore troops was very late and never entirely or satisfactorily completed. This delay was seriously felt during the operation. Some equipment was very slow in arriving; some never came at all or was incomplete; some was apparently the cast-off property of other units because it was received in non-operable condition—there was not time to repair it.

h. The Navy pontoon causeways were invaluable but they do need better or heavier anchors to keep them from broaching. More of them would have been useful. On the flat beaches encountered here they were, until the small ports were opened, the only means of unloading vehicles and tanks rapidly and in quantity.

i. Naval Beach Companies: These units did well considering their limited training. They did not confine themselves to the bare outlines of their prescribed duties but lent a hand at whatever had to be done. They would have been much more useful had they had one or two fast boats for communication and traffic control and had they had small temporary salvage parties at work. Such salvage parties, equipped with small gasoline driven pumps, would have been able to re-float numbers of swamped craft almost immediately. They were withdrawn by the Navy without notice to the Brigade, an action which hampered proposed further operations.

16. Operations on Beaches:

a. Defense: Anti-aircraft defenses of the beach should be under one command. This was not always the case. The 37 mm anti-tank gun currently issued the shore engineers is felt to be inadequate. Six larger caliber guns per battalion, which need not be equipped with prime movers since equipment is available to move them the few necessary hundred yards, would be an improvement. Barrage balloons on beaches will break up strafing.

b. Water: A reserve of water at the rate of one gallon per man, brought in cans, is considered to be sufficient. The water purification units furnished the shore regiments should be divided among the shore battalions and waterpoints opened at the earliest moment. It was found practicable to pump water from LST's into canvas tanks ashore.

c. Mines: More casualties were caused by mines then were necessary. Men and vehicles would have been saved had there been better discipline; and had there been better control and direction. Traffic must be confined to cleared areas. Mine detectors must be divided among the craft and not collected in one boat and sunk all together as happened in one instance.

d. Kitchens: The shore engineers should set up their kitchens promptly and serve simple hot food and drink to all comers, particularly walking wounded and other casuals, either coming or going, who frequently arrived exhausted. A hot drink put many back on their feet.

e. Staging: Shore engineers must promptly select staging areas and organize them for incoming troops, providing the necessary guides, signs, and facilities to settle the troops quickly and reporting their arrival to higher headquarters at once so that they may be moved on without delay.

f. Dumps and Transportation: Shore engineers must plan and study in advance the details of dump operation and must be prepared to set up a centralized transportation service, under rigid control, for the movement of supplies from beach to dump. In this connection, it is imperative that cargo vehicles be landed on a very high priority in order to provide means for getting supplies off the beach. Beaches must be kept clear.

g. Local Purchase and Hire: Before embarking all the details in connection with these items must be settled and the necessary forms and funds placed in the hands of purchasing and contracting officers in each battalion and higher unit. These officers will need clerical assistance instructed ahead of time.

h. Camouflage: Efforts to camouflage installations and bivouacs must be pushed. The beach itself cannot be hidden. Dummy boats would only confuse our own situation on beaches which are always overcrowded. Personnel and equipment cannot be spared for dummy beaches.

i. Fire Protection: If space permits, fire fighting equipment on the beach and in the dumps would be a great assistance.

j. Lights: A great hardship in night unloading is the absence of lights in ship's holds. As soon as the situation admits, some light ought to be provided. This might be fairly early in the operation and is worth considerable trouble to arrange.

k. Beach Road Material: The light reinforced netting, burlap backed, with wicket-shaped hold downs was found entirely satisfactory except on grades. On grades of over 5% pierced steel plank was the only good answer. The cloverleaf bar from artillery ammunition crates was useful as a hold down.

l. Treadway Bridge: No use was made of this equipment and no use of it in landing operations where it encounters wave action is considered practicable.

m. Air Corps Dumps: The Air Corps has so much specialized equipment that a detail of AIF Corps personnel to assist in the dumps would be a decided advantage.

n. Water Proofed Vehicles: The current method of water-proofing vehicles proved satisfactory except that in the case of 1/4 ton trucks the vehicles almost invariably "drowned out". This may have been due to excessive operation after water-proofing and before embarking. Drivers of all water-proofed vehicles must be taught how to slip into the water and avoid setting up bow waves.

o. Trailers: These were a prolific source of trouble and should not be landed until they can be brought in the dry. Essential equipment, such as signal apparatus, is better handled in DUKWS.

p. Naval Command: Due to unfamiliarity with naval organizations and methods, considerable confusion arose in attempts to find out what part of the Navy was responsible for a given activity or undertaking, what Naval Officer was in charge, and where he was and could be reached. The establishment of a consolidated naval headquarters ashore in each division area (or at least a liaison post) would be of great assistance. Such headquarters would be in charge of all naval shore activities except the beach companies.

q. Freight Lightering: The most useful freight lighter was the LCT. With rough water or ships anchored out more than a mile it was found better practice to unload into LCT's and transfer the freight at the beach than to use DUKWS for the entire haul. However, LCT's were frequently shifted between ports or taken away entirely, without notice, and this caused delay and confusion. In the future, considerable prior thought to provision of LCT's for each unloading point will be profitable.

r. Slings and Nets: Slings and nets should have been used to a greater extent in loading and unloading vehicles. Breaking of packages is lessened and the transfer process speeded up. Nets should be spread in vehicles if they are hand loaded and the vehicles unloaded by crane of "A" frame derrick.

17. Vehicle Maintenance: Vehicle maintenance must be systematic, continuous, and thorough. If Army Regulations and other orders are followed to the letter, as they can be even in times of pressure, the problem is solved. There was a general non-compliance which proved costly. Officers who do not take care of their vehicles, no matter who they are, should be summarily relieved and drastically dealt with. The invariable excuse was that everyone was "so busy".

V— TRAINING

18. Basic Soldiering: The operation showed the need for more and better instruction of the individual officer and soldier. They need detailed instruction in clean and orderly living in the field; how to get along with little and make that little do; how to take care of arms, equipment, and clothing and the necessity for doing so; their personal responsibility for government property of all sorts. They must be taught and required to perform their individual duties. They need the alertness that comes from physical fitness, and insistence on military courtesy and the smart performance of all duties. They need commanders of all grades who know what to do, how to teach others, and who are possessed of the physical strength to work all day and all night and the determination and the moral courage to exact from the subordinates a full performance of all their duties under all circumstances.

19. Discipline: a. Instant and instinctive obedience has got to be taught all ranks. Too much time is wasted in argument, discussion, and coaxing. It was found that commanders of all grades in the Brigade were reluctant, for one reason or another to take summary and certain action against the recalcitrant, the laggard, and the neglectful and shiftless. Either they were lazy, ignorant, or lacking in the necessary force of character or, based on past experience, they felt that they would not be supported or would be adversely criticized. The greatest need shown in this operation was the need of discipline on the part of individuals and control on the part of commanders.

b. Work Aboard Ship: All shore engineer companies should receive practical training in working cargo on ships with particular attention to the training of winch drivers. A great shortage of hatch crews and winchmen became felt very early. With proper training beforehand, ships can have hatch crews from the shore engineers in the absence of the expected arrival of other troops who are to furnish them.

20. Combined Training: a. Before coming on this operation, much time was spent on combined training. The units of the Brigade were attached to sub-task forces and passed from control of the Brigade Commander for some two months. The result was that the shore engineer units, in some instances, were left too much to their own devices in matters of discipline, administration, internal economy, supply, and their own training. It is believed that shore group troops should remain under Brigade control throughout and that combined training involving the shore engineers should be arranged between the Brigade and other commanders concerned.

b. The combined training was quite unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the shore engineers because it was not carried through completely so far as involved them. Landings were conducted with reduced personnel and reduced equipment and were generally brought to a halt long before more than a token quantity of shore engineers equipment and of other stores and vehicles had been landed. There is some profit but not much in landing a few shore engineers and a little equipment and then returning to bivouac. The responsible commanders should make earnest effort to enlarge and lengthen the exercises so as to give the shore engineers a realistic workout. This would include landing considerable numbers of vehicles and considerable quantities of supplies and their dispersal in dumps.

VI— SUPPLY

21. ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT: This was generally satisfactory but not all of it arrived. Additional equipment needed is one more crane per engineer shore company and speedboats at the rate of two per battalion, regimental, and Brigade headquarters of the shore engineers. A flight of three Cub airplanes for Brigade headquarters is desirable in any operation as widespread as this.

22. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT: a. The bag, field, and the accompanying suspenders should be replaced, in active operations, by the infantry pack for all individuals of the Brigade. Walking is very much in order. There is no known method by which a soldier can carry his equipment in a pack around a musette bag except at the cost of suffering and untimely fatigue.

b. For campaign, men should be stripped down to what they can reasonably carry on their backs on a long march. Worn articles should be replaced out of small reserve stocks in Army supply points. Barracks bags should be left in garrison. The manpower consumed in this operation, along with the consumption of gasoline and wear and tear on vehicles, carting around barracks bags and other unnecessary baggage would add up to a staggering total.

VII—GENERAL REMARKS

23. FUTURE OPERATIONS: So far as involved this Brigade, it is considered essential that it be read into the situation very early in the day in order to make its experience available to the planning heads and to those with whom it will work; to discover and work out the problems peculiar to the expedition which affect the operations of shore engineers; and to spread proved shore engineer doctrine among all concerned.

24. THE BRIGADE SITUATION: Before this Brigade undertakes another large-scale operation it needs these things:

a. A sound and permanent organization with the essential Brigade and beach group troops permanently assigned.

b. Time for refit and overhaul, estimated at six weeks from arrival in a training area.

c. Time for perfecting its training in basic soldiering and raising of standards, estimated at two months, including the six weeks required under b., just above.

Eugene M. Caffey

EUGENE M. CAFFEY
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Commanding

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
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APPENDICES TO ANNEX 12

ORGANIZATION USED
ENGINEER SPECIAL BRIGADE ORGANIZATION
SICILIAN OPERATION



Additional Reinforcements From 7th Army
12th CML Co (Maint)
63rd CML Co (Depot)
46th QM Co (GR)
1st Bn, 46th QM Regt. (Trk)
2nd Bn, 47th QM Regt. (Trk)
54th QM Bn (Trk)
548th Army Postal Unit
727th Ry Opn. Bn.
175th Engr. General Service Regt.
2602nd Engr. Pipeline Co.

ORGANIZATION USED
BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS CO. ORGANIZATION
(CONTROLING FOUR REGIMENTAL BEACH GROUPS)
SICILIAN OPERATION

Grade	PERMANENT BRIGADE STAFF: Commanding Officer	Adjutant Section	Intelligence Section	Operations Section	Supply Section	Reconnaissance Section	Brig. Hq. Company	Total Brig. Hq. & Hq. Co.	SPECIAL STAFF ATT. FOR SICILIAN OPERATION: Provost Mar. Section	Chaplain Section	Ordnance Section	Signal Section	Engineer Section	CWS Section	QM Section	Medical Section	Transp. Section	Base Purch. Section	Adjutant Gen. Dept.	Company Overhead	Total atchd personnel	Total Brig. Hq & Atchd Personnel
Colonel	1							1			1										1	2
Lieutenant Colonel		1						1		1	1		2		1	1	2	1			9	10
Major				2	1	1		4	1		2	1	2			1	1	1	1		10	14
Captain			1		2		1	4			1	1	3	1	2	1	3		1	1	14	18
Lieutenant		2	1	1			4	8	1			1	2	1	2		2	1	1		10	18
Total Officers	1	3	2	3	3	1	5	18	2	1	5	3	9	2	5	3	8	2	3	1	44	62
Warrant Officers		1						1			1					1	1	1			4	5
Master Sergeant					1			1	1		1	2	2		1	1	2		1		11	12
1st Sergeant							1	1				1									1	2
Tech Sergeant							1	1			2		1					1	1		5	6
Staff Sergeant		2		1			1	4			1			1		1	1		1		5	9
Sergeant		1		1				2			1					1	1				3	5
Corporal		4						4					1	1	1	1			2		6	10
Technician, 3rd Grade												1							2		3	3
Technician, 4th Grade		5	1		1	1		8			1	1	1			1	1	2		1	2	10	18
Technician, 5th Grade		2		1	1		11	15	2	1		2	4	1	1	1	4		4	8	28	43
Private, First Class		2					17	19					1		2	1	1				5	24
Private				1			19	20	1	1	2	1	4	1	1	3	1	1	1	13	30	50
Total Enlisted Men		16	1	4	3	1	50	75	4	2	8	7	15	4	7	10	12	2	13	23	107	182
Aggregate	1	20	3	7	6	2	55	94	6	3	14	10	24	6	12	14	21	5	16	24	155	249

ORGANIZATION USED
40TH ENGINEER REGIMENTAL BEACH GROUP
SICILIAN OPERATION

Grade	40th Engr. Regt. (C)	528th QM Bn. (Serv)	52nd QM Bn. (MOW)	608th Ord. Co. (Amm.)	Det. 3407th Ord Co (MM) (Q)	74th Signal Co. (Spec.)	TOTAL	Naval Beach Bn. No. 1	Aggregate
Colonel	1						1		
Lieutenant Colonel	4	1	1				6		
Major	2	1	1				4		
Captain	22	6	5	1		1	35		
Lieutenant	41	11	12	5	3	5	77		
Total Officers	70	19	19	6	3	6	123		
Warrant Officers	3	2	1				6		
Master Sergeant	5	1		1	1	1	9		
1st Sergeant	10	4	4	1		1	20		
Tech. Sergeant	9	2		6	2	2	21		
Staff Sergeant	61	13	22	7	3	12	118		
Sergeant	129	21	29	12	1	10	202		
Corporal	96	69	56	12	1	4	238		
Technician, 3rd Grade					5		5		
Technician, 4th Grade	71	14	20	10	13	21	149		
Technician, 5th Grade	349	26	86	16	31	50	558		
Private, First Class	562	341	117	50	12	48	1130		
Private	723	429	163	65	22	65	1467		
Total Enlisted Men	2035	920	497	180	91	214	3917		
Aggregate	2089	941	517	186	94	220	4046	419	4465

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ORGANIZATION USED
36th ENGINEER REGIMENTAL BEACH GROUP ORGANIZATION
SICILIAN OPERATION

Grade	36th Engr. Regiment	71st Signal Co. (Spec.)	56th Medical Battalion	Co A, 504th MP Battalion	64th Ordnance Co. (Amm.)	Sect. Co C, 205th QM Bn (GS)	Plat 86th QM Co. (Bkd)	Det 462nd Engr Co (Dep.)	2nd Bn. 540th Engr. Regt.	36ist QM Bn. (Aqtn)	Det. 3497th Ord. Co. (MM) (Q)	Engr Map Depot Detachment	Total Military Units	Navy Beach Bn. No. 2	Aggregate
Colonel	1												1		
Lieutenant Colonel	4		1						1	1			7		
Major	2		1							1			4		
Captain	22	1	14	1	1				5	6			50		
Lieutenant	41	5	19	4	5		1	1	12	9	3		100		
Total Officers	70	6	35	5	6		1	1	18	17	3		162		
Warrant Officers	3												3		
Master Sergeant	5	1	1		1					3	1		12		
1st Sergeant	10	1	5	1	1				3	3			24		
Tech. Sergeant	9	2	3		6					1	3		24		
Staff Sergeant	61	12	13	7	7		1		18	12	4	1	136		
Sergeant	129	10	29	12	12	1	1	1	42	16	1		254		
Corporal	96	4	16	12	12		2		31	18	1	1	194		
Technician, 3rd Grade											8		8		
Technician, 4th Grade	71	21	15	4	10			2	15	15	16		169		
Technician, 5th Grade	349	50	37	12	16	5		2	100	44	33		648		
Private, First Class	562	48	157	63	50	10	14	2	172	84	19	2	1183		
Total Enlisted Men	2015	214	470	192	180	26	33	9	605	305	113	4	4166	413	4774
Aggregate	2088	220	505	197	186	26	34	10	623	322	116	4	4331		

ORGANIZATION USED
540TH ENGINEER REGIMENTAL BEACH GROUP
SICILIAN OPERATION

Grade	540th Engr. Regt. (-2nd Bn	3d Team, 286th Signal Company	2d A, 26ist Med. Bn.	Co D, 53rd QM Bn. (POM)	Det 3497th Ord Co (MM) (Q)	396th QM Port Bn	Sec. Co B, 205th QM Bn (GS)	Det. 365th Engr Map Depot	Det 462nd Engr Co (Depot)	Co B, 504th M.P. Bn.	Det. 51st Med. Col Bn.	Total	Co A, Naval Beach Bn. No. 4	Aggregate
Colonel	1											1		
Lieutenant Colonel	2					1						3		
Major	2					1						3		
Captain	12		2	1		5				1	8	29		
Lieutenant	17	1	6	3	1	12		1	1	4	12	58		
Total Officers	34	1	8	4	1	19		1	1	5	20	94		
Warrant Officers	3					2						5		
Master Sergeant	5					2						7		
1st Sergeant	4		1	1		4				1	2	33		
Tech. Sergeant	9	1			1	14						25		
Staff Sergeant	25		3	5	1	48		1		7	8	98		
Sergeant	45		7	7	2	72	1		1	12	16	163		
Corporal	34		4	14	1	40				13	10	116		
Technician, 3rd Grade														
Technician, 4th Grade	41	11	4	5	2	93			1	4	4	165		
Technician, 5th Grade	149	16	9	21	2	101	5	2	3	12	26	346		
Private, First Class	218	6	43	28	4	248	9	1	2	63	114	726		
Private	275	14	52	39	5	301	11	1	2	80	130	911		
Total Enlisted Men	805	48	124	120	18	923	26	5	9	192	310	2580		
Aggregate	845	49	132	124	19	944	26	6	10	197	330	2679	135	2814

ORGANIZATION USED
531st ENGINEER REGIMENTAL BEACH GROUP ORGANIZATION
SICILIAN OPERATION

Grade	531st Engr Shore Regiment	Detm. 286th Sig Company	26ist Med Bn (- Co A)	Hq Co 504th M.P. Bn.	69th Ord Co (Amm)	Sect Co "A" 205th QM Bn (GS	Platoon 100th QM Co (Bkd)	Engr Map Depot Detachment	Det 462nd Engr GD Depot	3497th Ord. Co. (MM) (Q)	3497th Ord. Co. (MM) (Q) (-Det.)	53rd QM Bn (POM) (-Co D)	TOTAL	Naval Beach Bn. No. 2 (-1 Co)	Aggregate
Colonel	1												1		
Lieutenant Colonel	4		1	1								1	7		
Major	8		1	1								1	11		
Captain	23		6	2	1					1	1	4	38		
Lieutenant	66	3	16	6	5		1			2	3	9	111		
Total Officers	102	3	24	10	6		1			3	4	15	168		
Warrant Officers	4											1	5		
Master Sergeant	9		1	2	1								13		
1st Sergeant	13		3	1	1					1	1	3	23		
Tech. Sergeant	20	5	3	6	6					1	3		44		
Staff Sergeant	70	1	8	3	7		1	1		3	5	17	116		
Sergeant	127	3	18	3	12	1	1			1	1	22	189		
Corporal	116	1	9	3	12		2	1				42	186		
Technician, 3rd Grade		3								3	6		12		
Technician, 4th Grade	59	16	12	10	10					7	16	15	145		
Technician, 5th Grade	389	34	27	15	16	5				14	30	65	593		
Private, First Class	567	25	95	8	50	10	14	2		6	18	89	884		
Private	689	25	122	18	65	10	15	1		10	24	124	1105		
Total Enlisted Men	2057	113	298	69	180	26	33	5		46	104	377	3308		
Aggregate	2163	116	322	79	186	26	34	5	19	49	108	393	3421	305	3178

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION
HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
1ST ENGINEER SPECIAL BRIGADE
T/O 5-510-1S, 6 April 1943
Modified

Grade	Brigade Hdqtrs	Admin. Section	Intell. Section	Supply Section	Opns. Section	Fin. Section	I.G. Section	Med. Section	C.W.S. Section	QM Sect. T/O 10-276S	Sig Sect. T/O 11-5178, 6/4/43 (Modified)	Chaplain Section	Ord Sec. Col 3 T/O 9-97S, 17/3/43	Postal Section Col 9, T/O 12-605, 12/3/43	Engineer Section	Hq. Co. T/019-7 1/3/43	Total Hq. & Hq. Company
Brigadier General	1																1
Colonel	1																1
Lieutenant Colonel				1	1			1a		1a	1a						2-3a
Major	2	1	1		1	1	1	(2)	1			1	(1)		(1)		9-(4)
Captain		1		1	1										(1)	1	4-(1)
First Lieutenant	1	1	1					(1)					(1)	(1)		2	5-(3)
Second Lieutenant					2												2
Total Commissioned	5	3	2	2	5	1	1	(3) 1a	1	1a	1a	1	(2)	(1)	(2)	3	24-(8) 3a
Warrant Officers		1						(1)									1-(1)
Master Sergeant		1		2	1	1		(1)							(2)		5-(3)
1st Sergeant																1	1
Tech. Sergeant		1	1		1		1						(1)		(1)		4-(2)
Staff Sergeant		1		1	2	1			1				(1)	(1)		2	8-(2)
Sergeant		2	2					(1)	1			1		(2)		1	6-(2)
Technician, 4th Grade		3	1	1	4	1 (1)		(2)	1				(1)	(3)	(3)	3 (2)	16-(12)
Corporal																2	2-(6)
Technician, 5th Grade		3	3	1	5	1 (1)		(2)				1	(2)	(4)	(2)	11(16)	25-(18)
Private		6	1	1	4	1							(2)	(3)	(1)	20(18)	33-(6)
Total Enlisted Men		18	8	6	17	5	1	(6)	3			1	(7)	(12)	(9)	40(26)	99-(52)
Aggregate	5	20	10	8	22	6 (3)	2	(3)	4			2	(9)	(13)	(11)	43(26)	*123(60)3a

a. Special staff officer in addition to duty as unit commander.
( ) Required, but not authorized by T/O 5-510-1S, 6 April, 1943.
* Includes 10 Drivers; 6 Cooks, 10 Orderlies.

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RESULTS OF OPERATION
UNIT PROGRESS
SICILIAN OPERATION
July 10 to July 31, 1943

July	36th Engr. Regt., Licata and Joss Beaches. Moved Over Beaches: Pers	D/W Tn	Veh.	Evacuated: Wounded	P's W	40th Engr. Regt., Porto Empedocle and Cent Beaches. Moved Over Beaches: Pers	D/W Tn.	Veh.	Evacuated: Wounded	P's W
10	18454	4714	3310	200	0	(22654*	7801*	2179*	81*	
11	1931	475	406	36	524					
12	75	1425	36	1	0					
13	159	2200	158	84	1375	200	1284		5	1809
14	671	620	0	16	6	-	1353			2302
15	4664	285	579	121	0		860			954
16	5200	9	729	103	264		536	165	241	-
17	0	1709	0	0	0		1919	471	-	-
18	0	1669	0	47	0	0	1943	394	26	816
19	2908	742	1310	40	2978	0	72	18	0	1800
20	2291	640	860	26	758	353	131	196	-	-
21	0	2079	397	260	0	?	?	?	?	?
22	2225	2627	132	11	0	?	570	77	-	-
23	1318	2367	476	0	478	362	1168	95	0	1800
24	2805	2359	1160	0	1935	535	1851	130	0	900
25	508	2053	87	0	640	0	2707	6	0	1300
26	713	1529	103	0	440	0	3238	5	0	0
27	0	1584	0	0	0	0	2727	0	0	1792
28	0	1384	0	0	3800	0	613	0	0	675
29	2498	1599	825	820	0	981	1011	43	0	3280
30	2311	2207	809	0	500	1600	670	163	0	3102
31	1023	3476	322	0	720	0	1203	5	0	598
TOTALS	49764	37766	11719	974	14417	26685	31685	3945	353	21328

*Total for 1st 3 days.

Appendix B, Page 1

RESULTS OF OPERATION
PROGRESS, SHIPS & CRAFT
SICILIAN OPERATION
July 10 to July 31, 1943

Licata Port & Yellow Beach Name on Type of Ship	Arrival	Unloaded
7 LST	July 10	July 11
5 LST's, 4 LST's	July 10	July 12
2 LCT, 7 LCI, 5 LST	July 10	July 13
3 LST, 3 LCI	July 10	July 14
16 LST, 9 LCT, 4 LCI	July 14	July 15
13 LST, 6 LCT, 12 LCI	July 14	July 16
1 Coaster	July 14	July 18
15 LST, 6 LCT	July 18	July 19
15 LST	July 18	July 20
4 LST, 2 LCT, Chateau Thierry Levant	July 22	July 22
9 LST, 5 LCT	July 22	July 23
16 LST	July 24	July 24
Bollata	July 20	July 25
1 LST, 2 LCI, 1 LCT	July 24	July 25
2 LST, 2 LCI, 3 LCT	July 25	July 26
Washington	July 18	July 27
Briske	July 26	July 27
Pisz	July 18	July 26
10 LST, 1 LCT	July 29	July 29
Morris	July 22	July 30
12 LST, 5 LCT, 1 LCI	July 30	July 30
9 LST, 11 LCT	July 31	July 31

*Sailed for Palermo with load.

RESULTS OF OPERATION
UNIT PROGRESS
SICILIAN OPERATION
July 10 to July 31, 1943

July	531st Engr. Regt., Gela and Dime Beaches. Moved Over Beaches: Pers	D/W Tn	Veh.	Evacuated: Wounded	P's W	Total All Ports & Beaches. Moved Over Beaches: Pers	D/W Tn.	Veh.	Evacuated: Wounded	P's W
10	20655	2000	1027	0	0	(39119	6714	4397	200	0)*
11						(24585	8276	2585	117	524)*
12	2506	1351	458	348	490	2581	2776	494	342	490)*
13	1338	924	712	41	161	1697	4408	870	130	3116
14	2644	1096	31	43	0	3315	3069	31	59	2308
15	1530	2288	216	0	322	6194	3433	815	123	1276
16	251	2558	602	40	168	5451	3103	1496	384	432
17	272	2727	666	0	120	279	8535	1137	0	120
18	1817	3026	457	0	433	1817	6638	691	73	1249
19	1258	2528	284	0	500	4166	3343	1010	40	2278
20	1047	2756	396	0	0	3691	3521	1452	26	756
21	35	2488	93	0	0	35	4557	490	260	0
22	0	2506	10	0	0	2225	5733	219	11	0
23	1014	2506	252	0	0	2714	6031	826	0	2278
24	322	2818	310	0	0	3642	7028	1600	0	2835
25	659	1910	397	0	0	1167	8970	400	0	2140
26	0	1346	24	0	0	713	6107	132	0	440
27	0	789	0	0	0	0	5100	0	0	1792
28	0	93	0	0	0	0	2090	0	0	4475
29	Gela Port & Dime Beaches Closed					3479	2610	868	0	3280
30						3911	2877	972	0	3602
31						1023	4679	327	0	1318
Totals	35375	35310	5848	472	2194	111824	104734	21512	1772	27939

*Accurate only for total of 1st 3 days.
Daily totals are approximate.

Appendix B, Page 2

RESULTS OF OPERATION
PROGRESS, SHIPS & CRAFT
SICILIAN OPERATION
July 10 to July 31, 1943

Gela Port and Dime Beaches Name on Type of Ship	Arrival	Unloaded
Thurston, Chase, 20 LCI, Barnet, Lyon, 5 LST, Dickens, Monrovia	July 10	July 11
Charlotte, Prince, Charles, 6 LST	July 10	July 12
7 LCT, 27 LCI, 6 LST	July 11	July 12
Stanton, Batalgouse, Oberon	July 10	July 13
7 LST	July 10	July 14
Meeker, Gilman		
Parker, Rowan (Sunk)	July 11	July 15
Brown	July 11	July 16
Bouvard, 12 LCI, 4 LST	July 14	July 16
Adams, Forward, 6 LST	July 14	July 17
Evans, Fullilter, Iredell, Few, Williamson	July 11	July 18
Denova, Ranger	July 14	July 18
Scott*	July 18	July 19
Costigan	July 14	July 21
Bradford	July 14	July 22
Caldwelle, Martin*	July 18	July 24
Matthews*, Dallege*	July 18	July 25
Payne*	July 18	July 26
Titus**, Snipe**, Abbey**	July 18	July 28

Beach and Port Closed

* Cent D of 4 ships partially unloaded at Cent Beaches.

**Sailed for other Ports still loaded.

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RESULTS OF OPERATION
PROGRESS, SHIPS &
CARGO
SICILIAN OPERATION

July 10 to July 31, 1943

Porto Empedocle and Cent Beaches	Arrival	Unloaded
5 LST's	July 10	July 11
9 APA's, 2 LST	July 10	July 12
5 AKA, 3 LST, 4 APA	July 10	July 13
1 LST	July 10	July 14
2 LST	July 10	July 15
Scotts, Paynes, Woodrows, Matthews, Caldwells, Martins, Abbeys, Titus, Snipes, DeLiegos, Bickett*	July 16	July 18
Mars	July 19	July 23
Kreman 3 LCT, 2 LST	July 18 July 24	July 24 July 24
Perry	July 18	July 25
1 LST	July 25	July 26
Howell, Jan	July 18	July 27
Ulla	July 18	July 28
Snipe, Webster 2 LST	July 18 July 29	July 29 July 29
4 LCI, 5 LST	July 29	July 30
1 LST	July 30	July 31

* Ships sailed for Dime Beaches for completion of unloading. Bickett completed unloading off Cent Beaches.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION, ENGINEER SHORE BRIGADE
Basis: 3 Beach Groups
Provision of previously deficient staff.
Provision of essential services.

Headquarters & Headquarters Co., Co. Brigade
T/O 5-510-1, 6 Apr., 1943, Revised as indicated on Page 2

3 Regimental Beach Groups See Page 3

Q.M. Hq & Hq Co T/O 10-276 S. To be activated
Lt. Col. - 1
Major - 1
Captain - 1
1st Lt., - 1
4
M/Sgt - 1
1st Sgt - 1
T/Sgt - 1
S/Sgt - 6
Sgt - 2
Cpl - 3
T/4 - 2
T/5 - 5
Pvt - 41
62

286th Sig. Co. T/O 11-5 17 S (Modified) To be changed from T/O 11-517
Lt. Col - 1
Capt - 1
1st Lt. - 3
2nd Lt. - 4
9
M/Sgt - 3
1st Sgt - 1
T/Sgt - 7
S/Sgt - 5
Sgt - 4
Cpl - 4
T/3 - 7
T/4 - 24
T/5 - 39
Pvt - 83
177

161st Ord. Plt. T/O 9-97
1st Lt. - 1
W/O - 1
T/Sgt - 1
S/Sgt - 1
Sgt - 2
Cpl - 2
T/3 - 1
T/4 - 5
T/5 - 8
Pvt - 9

Military Police Platoon T/O 19-7 To be authorized and activated
Major - 1
1st Lt. - 1
2nd Lt. - 1
3
S/Sgt - 1
Sgt - 5
Cpl - 6
T/4 - 1
Pvt - 54
70

Medical Det. Brigade T/O 9-510-1 MS To be authorized and activated
Captain - 2
1st Lt. - 1
3
T/Sgt - 1
S/Sgt - 1
Sgt - 1
Cpl - 1
T/4 - 1
T/5 - 7
Pvt - 16
28

Typical Reinforcements from Corps or Army Troops:
One - Engineer Railway Operating Bn (T/O 5-125)
One - Q.M. Graves Registration Co. (T/O 10-297)
One - Chemical Company (T/O 3-67)(Depot)
One - Army Postal Unit (T/O 12-605)
Detachment, Engr. Pipeline Co.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF REGIMENTAL BEACH GROUP
(THREE PER BRIGADE)

Grade	Permanent Brigade Units: Engr Shore Rgt. T/O 5-521 (Mod)	Sig.Co. (Specl) T/O 11-5178 (Modified)	QM Bn (DUKW) T/O 10-55	Medical Bn T/O 8-15	Ord Co (AM) (Q) T/O 10-23	Total Perman. Beach Group	Typical Attachments of Corps or Army Units for Sustained Supply over Beach: QM Bn (Serv) T/O 10-65	QM Co (GS) T/O 10-77	QM Co (Bkd) T/O 10-197	QM Co (Depot) T/O 10-227	M.P. Co. T/O 19-37	Ord Co (Amm) T/O 9-27	1 Plat, Engr Dept. Co T/O 5-47	QM Port Bn T/O 10-265	QM Bn (Trk) T/O 10-55	Total Attch'd Units	Naval Beach Bn	Aggregate
Colonel	1					1												
Lieutenant Colonel	4		1	1		6	1							1	1	3		
Major	8		1	1		10	1							1	1	3		
Captain	23	1	5	14	1	44	6	1	1	1	1	1		5	5	21		
Lieutenant	66	5	12	19	6	108	11	2	3	3	4	5	1	12	12	53		
Total Officers	102	6	19	35	7	169	19	3	4	4	5	6	1	19	19	80		
Warrant Officers	4		1			5	2							2	1	5		
Master Sergeant	9	1		1	1	12	1			2		1		2		6		
1st Sergeant	13	1	4	5	1	24	4	1	1	1	1	1		4	4	17		
Tech. Sergeant	20	2		3	5	30	2					6		14		22		
Staff Sergeant	70	12	22	13	8	125	13	4	5	8	7	7	1	48	22	115		
Sergeant	127	10	29	29	2	197	21	5	3	4	12	12	2	72	29	160		
Corporal	116	4	56	16	1	193	69	2	7	4	13	12	3	40	56	206		
Technician, 3rd Gr.					11	11												
Technician, 4th Gr.	59	21	20	15	29	144	14	4	1	10	4	10	2	93	20	158		
Technician, 5th Gr.	387	50	86	36	61	621	26	13	1	13	12	16	6	101	86	274		
Private, 1st Class	567	48	117	157	30	919	341	43	41	48	63	50	12	248	117	963		
Private	689	65	163	194	46	1157	429	53	51	61	80	65	14	301	163	1217		
Total E. M.	2057	214	497	470	195	3433	920	125	110	151	192	180	40	923	497	3138		
Aggregate	2163	220	517	505	202	3607	941	128	114	155	197	186	41	944	517	3223	444*	7272**

* Require 27 additional personnel to permit Bn. to operated its own mess.
** Includes Naval Beach Bn.


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






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






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
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
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












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REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

The following is a report of the role played by the Office of the Headquarters Commandant in the recent invasion of Sicily and the campaign following that invasion. Viewing the invasion as a single phase, and in order to facilitate analysis and discussion, the report is divided, roughly, into three stages or periods, viz., Preliminary Stage - Secondary Stage - (Covering the period on board ship) - and Final Stage. However, since these periods or stages tend to merge and overlap, in the nature of things this pattern cannot be strictly followed at all times. The narrative portion of this report is followed by a summary of conclusions drawn and recommendations made, with an eye to eliminating, in future campaigns, those factors which more or less tended to retard operations.

PRELIMINARY STAGE

Working in conjunction with officers from G-1 and G-4, this section left Mostaganem for Bizerte, June 1, with a convoy, for the purpose of establishing a Headquarters and setting up billets and bivouac areas. (Apparently original plans were later revised, and the location employed as our Rear Echelon). This advance group consisted primarily of enlisted personnel of the Headquarters Company and skilled civilian employees, the latter carried along to help put buildings in a habitable condition. This was necessitated by the condition of the new location, where, literally, not a single building was fit for occupancy without a good deal of labor.

Meanwhile, back at Mostaganem, an officer from the Headquarters Company had been designated as TQM of the Headquarters Command Ship and Headquarters Company representative. Another Headquarters Company officer, acting in the capacity of Headquarters Commandant took charge of that section of the Headquarters Company, personnel and supply, scheduled to travel on the LST. Their duties and activities are discussed below.

Thus, it may be seen, functions normally allocated to the Office of the Headquarters Commandant, were being actively carried out in three separate areas.

At Bizerte, a French Caserne was chosen as Headquarters, bivouac areas were spotted, billets found. As noted above, the city was a shambles with consequent damage to public utilities - water and electricity. Because of the magnitude of the task, it was found necessary to engage the services of many additional civilians as plumbers, painters, plasterers, etc. The aid of Army Engineer and QM units was enlisted to clear away the debris. It was found necessary to scout the surrounding communities for essential building materials whose need could not be anticipated. During the month of June and early July, small and large detachments of Headquarters Personnel arrived, from time to time, and were assigned space and quarters. Vehicles of the *** QM Company were used for transportation and these shuttled back and forth between Mostaganem and Bizerte.

Toward the middle of June, the officer designated as TQM assumed his duties. In a conference with G-3, the situation was outlined and a visit to the ship resulted in full knowledge of the manifold duties. These included the establishment of liaison between ourselves and the Navy; the loading of freight, vehicles, and personnel; assignment of billets, rearrangement of facilities, and messing assignments; the selection and transporting of a ship's platoon to the boat and acquainting them with their duties; and, the reception of road convoys and loading of the personnel aboard.

Due to repair and modifications aboard the MONROVIA, the loading time in Oran was sharply limited. The ship's platoon had arrived several days prior to loading and were familiarized with the loading technique. The Headquarters Command Ship sailed for Algiers with the Assistant TQM and ship's platoon aboard.

Arrangements were made in Oran, for the majority of initial and reserve supplies for the landing phase. Headquarters Ships had not been included in the supply plan the intention being to outfit them from the surplus included in the reserves of each Task Force.

At Algiers, loading of cargo was completed satisfactorily, including extra tonnage.

A third officer from the Headquarters Company continued as Headquarters Commandant at Mostaganem. He carried out the usual functions of the office, and facilitated the despatch of further convoys to Bizerte, i.e., personnel, equipment, and supplies. Later, he supervised loading of the LST which sailed for Tunis.

SECONDARY STAGE

The section of the Headquarters Commandant at Bizerte took no part in initial landing operations. Alerted on D-1, vehicles proceeded to the loading docks prepared to load at a moment's notice. The LSTs did not return until D+3, however, at which time loading took place. The trip to Licata proved uneventful, unloading was rapid and without incident. The group bivouaced approximately one mile inland, for the night, and proceeded by highway to Gela the following morning.

Billeting facilities aboard the MONROVIA were found to be wholly inadequate. With three messes operating, no difficulty was encountered. Three sittings were required for the Officers' Mess, both Army and Navy. When the Troop Commander came aboard, the ship's platoon passed under his jurisdiction, and remained on troop detail until the start of unloading.

FINAL STAGE

Prior to unloading of personnel, the TQM, announced priorities, compiled personnel lists of the boat teams and executed unloading operations.

Vehicles and bulk cargo were unloaded with despatch.

Off-shore at Gela, contact between the LST and Headquarters Command ship was established. The LST was unloaded with little incident. The first LCT landed at 0400, D plus 2. The last landed about 1030.

Bivouac areas were selected and work commenced on a building in town which had been selected as Main Headquarters by an advance party from G-1.

CAMPAIGN

After about ten days, Headquarters moved on to Agrigento. Several days later, this was repeated at Palermo. In the latter place, the problem of messing was somewhat magnified due to the growth of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company personnel, it was necessary to establish six distinct messes.

Later and Advance CP was established at San Stefano and later moved to the vicinity of Naso. At these sites, the Headquarters Commandant selected bivouac areas, set up the CP, and provided local security with units of the 204 MP Company.

CONCLUSIONS

1. It was found impossible for one officer to perform the duties of TQM, Headquarters Commandant, Company Commander and Billeting Officer.

2. The ship's platoon was inadequate. Upon completion of loading, it was placed on troop detail which lasted until unloading started.

3. The Headquarters Command Ship was found inadequate for the assigned mission; messing, billeting and operating facilities were at a premium.

4. Loading and unloading were both hampered by lack of sufficient personnel.

5. The 1/4 ton truck and trailer proved to be the most valuable vehicle for personnel. Six 2½ ton trucks were sufficient to transport messing facilities, cleaning supplies, and tentage for the initial move ashore but insufficient for an extended move. Additional trucks were needed for enlisted personnel, office equipment, fuel and lubricants.

6. The use of half-tracks for transportation in this Headquarters was found impractical.

7. The Headquarters supply proved satisfactory in the case of rations, two trucks fully loaded, being carried on the LST.

8. The duty platoon, consisting of 22 men, was found insufficient.

9. Establishing the main Headquarters immediately after landing in a war-torn city proved difficult.

10. The Medical Detachment proved to be exactly what was required and very essential.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the TQM officer on the Headquarters ship be a permanent officer of the ship. This officer should work with the units to be embarked and with G-3 concerning the operation of the Headquarters on the ship. Another officer should be detailed as ship's Headquarters Commandant and a third officer should be detailed to assist the TQM officer.

2. The ship's platoon should consist of a minimum of 75 men, and it should remain under the jurisdiction of the TQM who should coordinate its work with the Commander of Troops.

3. That the Headquarters ship personnel be attached to a sub-task force for supply purposes.

4. That the TQM furnish priority in loading and unloading vehicles, that G-3 - G-1 compile personnel lists for each boat, and the troop commander execute unloading.

5. That the use of half-tracks be discontinued in amphibious operations in Army Headquarters.

6. That motor oil for complete change of every vehicle going ashore be carried. Two 3/4 ton weapons carriers should be provided for personnel and equipment.

7. That the duty platoon be composed of at least 30 men under supervision of an experienced non-commissioned officer capable of setting up a CP and operating several kitchens.

JOHN H. OLIN,
Major, Infantry,
Hq. Commandant

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REPORT OF THE ORDNANCE OFFICER

Early in February, the I Armored Corps was given its mission in the Sicilian Campaign. The Commanding General then detailed a group of officers to proceed to AFHQ, to represent him in the nomination of troops for Force 343, the official designation of the American forces in the mission. The Ordnance Officer, I Armored Corps, was one of the officers in this group.

The ordnance troop list as finally approved, consisted of the following units:

One (1) Hq & Hq Detachment, Ordnance Bn (MM) w/attchd. Medical
Two (2) Hq & Hq Detachments, Ordnance Bn (Am) w/attchd. Medical
One (1) Hq & Hq Detachment, Ordnance Bn (HM)(Q) w/attchd. Medical
One (1) Hq & Hq Detachment, Ordnance Bn (MM)(Q) w/attchd. Medical
Three (3) Hq & Hq Detachments, Ordnance Bn (M&S) w/attchd. Medical
Eight (8) Ordnance Companies (Am)
Three (3) Ordnance Companies (HM)(FA)
Three (3) Ordnance Companies (HM)(Tk)
Two (2) Ordnance Companies (MTS)(Q)
Four (4) Ordnance Companies (D)
Three (3) Ordnance Companies (HM)(Q)
Five (5) Ordnance Companies (MM)(Q)
Seven (7) Ordnance Companies (MM)
One (1) Ordnance Company (Bomb Disposal)
Three (3) Ord Cos. (HM)(Tk) w/Tk Rec Attached
Three (3) Ord Cos. (MM)(AA)

These ordnance troops were in addition to the organic ordnance service in the tactical units assigned to the corps. After the troop list had been approved, Ordnance units were assigned to sub-task forces for initial assault and follow-up as follows:

JOSS

Assault	Follow-up
2 Ordnance Companies (Am)	One (1) Hq & Hq Det., Ord Bn (M&S) w/attchd. medical
Det., Ordnance Co (MM)(Q)	One (1) Ord Company (MM)
	One (1) Ord Company (MM)(AA)
	1st Platoon, Ord Co (Bomb Disposal)
	One (1) Ord Company (MM)(Q)
	One (1) Ord Company (HM)(Tk)
	One (1) Ord Company (Depot)
	One-half (½) Ord Company (MTS)(Q)

KOOL

One (1) Ord Co (Am) - Det.	Det., Ordnance Co (Am)
Det., Ord Co (MM)(Q)	Det., Ordnance Co (MM)(Q)

DIME AND CENT

Assault	Follow-Up
Two (2) Ordnance Com. (Am)	One (1) Hq & Hq Det., Ord Bn (Am)
Det., Ord Company (MM)(Q)	One (1) Hq & Hq Det., Ord Bn (M&S) w/attchd. Medical
	Two (2) Ordnance Companies (MM)(AA)
	One (1) Ord Co (HM)(Q)
	One (1) Ord Company (Depot)
	One-half (½) Ord Co (MTS)(Q)
	One (1) Ord Company (MM)
	Two (2) Ord Companies (MM)(Q) - Det. 3rd Platoon, Ord Company (HD)

SEVENTH ARMY

One (1) Hq & Hq Det., Ord Bn (MM) w/attached medical
One (1) Hq & Hq Det., Ord Bn (M&S) w/attached medical
One (1) Hq & Hq Det., Ord Bn (HM)(Q), w/attached medical
One (1) Hq & Hq Det., Ord Bn (MM)(Q) w/attached medical
One (1) Ord Bn (Am) w/attchd medical
Five (5) Ord Companies (MM)
Three (3) Ord Companies (HM)(Q)
Three (3) Ord Companies (HM)(FA)
One (1) Ord Company (HM)(Tk)
One (1) Ord Co (Bomb Disp)(less two (2) platoons
One (1) Ord Company (MTS)(Q)
Two (2) Ord Companies (Depot)
Three (3) Ord Companies (HM)(Tk) w/attached Tk Recovery
Three (3) Ord Companies (Am)
One (1) Ordnance Company (MM)(Q)

In the early stages of the planning, the ordnance units assigned to the sub-task forces were moved wherever possible in order that they might be in close support of the tactical troops. As a result, ordnance units were located all the way from Casablanca, Morocco, to the Tunis-Ferryville-Bizerte area.

Because of the priority for movement of tactical troops, ordnance units were continually set back on the priority list for shipment to Sicily which resulted in only the following units being available for combat maintenance and the mission of rehabilitating the units at the close of the campaign:

Two (2) Hq & Hq Det., Ordnance Bn (M&S) w/attchd Medical
One (1) Ordnance Battalion (MM)(Q) w/attached medical (Hq & Hq Detachment)
Two (2) Hq & Hq Det., Ordnance Bn (Am) w/attchd medical
Four (4) Ordnance Companies (MM)
Five (5) Ordnance Companies (MM)(Q)
Three (3) Ordnance Companies (HM)(AA)
One (1) Ordnance Company (Bomb Disposal)
Two (2) Ordnance Companies (HM)(Tk)
Three (3) Ordnance Companies (Depot)
Two (2) Ordnance Companies (MTS)
Eight (8) Ordnance Companies (Am)

Throughout the entire planning period and actual operation, ordnance troops assigned to the Army were used to augment ordnance service of the sub-task forces as well as their maintenance mission for Army troops.

On April 14, 1943, the Special T/O for I Armored Corps, Reinforced, was approved. The necessity for immediate advance planning placed an unusually heavy burden on the Ordnance Section which was understrength in special technically qualified personnel so that personnel from ordnance units of the corps were placed on special duty with the Ordnance Section to partially ameliorate this situation. Although as soon as a new T/O was approved action was taken to bring this section to full strength, this was not accomplished until the latter part of May due to the necessity of obtaining personnel of proper professional background, capacity, and experience. During the operation, twenty-one officers, three warrant officers, and twenty-seven enlisted men were actually used by the Ordnance Section.

When Headquarters was moved from Rabat, the planning and supply section - Materiel, parts, and ammunition - was set up in Oran. The administrative and maintenance sections and the Headquarters of the Ordnance Section moved to Mostaganem. Daily contacts were maintained between the two offices. Inspection and contact visits were made to all ordnance units assigned to I Armored Corps. During this period, ordnance contact and service parties were inspecting and repairing ordnance equipment of combat and service units of the corps.

Experimental work carried on by direction of the Ordnance Officer under the supervision of the Ordnance Service developed two new weapons which proved highly successful. Both weapons used the 81mm mortar, one consisting of a harpoon type hook attached to a cable to be thrown into enemy wire entanglements; upon being withdrawn, the destruction of the entanglement resulted. The second consisted of using two standard 81mm mortar shells connected by a bangalore torpedo, thus projecting rather accurately from 300 yards with a maximum range of 800 yards approximately 10½ pounds of TNT which exploded on impact. After these weapons had been perfected and test fired, samples were made of the bangalore projectile and furnished to each division to enable them to proceed with their manufacture; the wire entanglement removing unit was produced in quantity by the Base Regiment and distributed to the combat units.

During the latter part of June, the Ordnance Section was again divided. The Ordnance Officer and an officer from the Ammunition Section, a warrant officer from the Supply Section, one stenographer and one driver remained at Mostaganem to accompany the assault when it was mounted; a small liaison group was left at Oran and the balance of the section proceeded to Bizerte to coordinate the last-minute supplies for the troops being mounted from that area and to coordinate the job of pushing Ordnance units, supplies, and materiel to Sicily and filling last-minute requirements of the troops. The first Ordnance Section personnel which did not accompany the assault joined the section at Gela and the remainder joined at Agrigento. Throughout this early period, constant use was made of officers attached from Army Battalion Headquarters to augment the section. The entire Ordnance Section moved to Palermo on 25-27 July.

Until after combat ended in Sicily, a 24-hour ordnance service and supply schedule was maintained, pushing ammunition, supplies, and materiel forward to the using units. Because of the terrain, artillery played a major part in this campaign with a resultant increase in the use of artillery ammunition. The certain solution of the supply problem was only obtained by thorough coordination between the Transportation Section - including Air, Rail, Water, and Truck - the ammunition companies, and the Ordnance Section. Fast moving action provided the Ammunition Section with a real problem. Mixed lot numbers were a normal condition.

Of almost equal importance is ordnance maintenance. A great variety of parts are required to provide coverage for the ordnance equipment of a modern army. Trained ordnance mechanics and supply personnel must be available. Equally necessary is thorough military training of these units so that when operating under actual combat conditions they function smoothly. Generally, these desired conditions were the rule among the ordnance maintenance and general supply organizations.

The thorough planning, particularly with reference to the supply of replacement equipment and spare parts which was accomplished by the Ordnance Section at Oran, paid its dividends in Sicily in that, in general, troops in combat did not have to go without ordnance supplies at any time.

The ordnance units performed well during the combat operations. Many were under fire. One officer and eleven enlisted men were killed and fifty-two officers and men were awarded the Purple Heart.

In the rear areas man power shortage, resulting from shortage of ordnance organizations, was corrected by the use of some 2,100 natives employed as laborers, skilled mechanics, and clerks.

PLANNING AND SUPPLY SECTION

At Rabat, French Morocco, March 30, 1943:

1. Started compiling a list of weapons, armored vehicles and motor transport vehicles in order to plan for an initial base depot stock and maintenance supplies for operation HUSKY. Many of the units assigned to the force were not in the theater or were actively engaged in Tunisia, making it impracticable to receive reports as to major items on hand at the time. Computations for these units were made on the basis of what they were authorized, information being taken from appropriate T/BA's, T/E's, T/O's, Ordnance Equipment Charts and special authorizations.

Left Rabat April 5, 1943, arrived at Oran, Algeria, April 6, 1943:

2. Requisitions for a period of thirty days were computed and typed for initial stockage for the Army Base Depot, using figures compiled as stated in paragraph 1 for a basis. This stockage was based on Addendums to SNL's as prescribed by Standard Nomenclature List and Ordnance Major Item List with maintenance and distribution factors published by the Chief of Ordnance. On or about April 20, 1943, 14 requisitions for convoy UGS-8A totaling 2,952 tons of ordnance supplies were forwarded to SOS, NATOUSA. These requisitions covered items which were not available from stocks of supplies in North Africa, such as waterproofing kits, Very pistols, rechargers for fire extinguishers, carriages, and cradles for machine guns, etc. On or about May 8, 1943, six requisitions for convoy UGS-9, a total of 115 tons of ordnance supplies, were prepared. The requisitions covered essential critical items which were not available in North Africa. These requisitions were also forwarded to SOS, NATOUSA. The following table shows requisitions submitted for initial depot stocks, subsequent maintenance and replacement stocks, and depot equipment for the period D # 15 to D+165.

CONVOYS	REQUISITIONS	QUANTITY	APPROX. DATE SUBMIT.	PERIOD	TONNAGE
UGS-11 & 12	1 to 50	50	4-18-43	D+15 to D+45	41,960
UGS-13 & 14	51 to 283	233	5-17-43	D+45 to D+75	32,891
UGS-15 & 16	284 to 464	181	6-15-43	D+75 to D+105	21,800
UGS-17 & 18	465 to 647	183	6-30-43	D+105 to D+135	22,000
UGS-19 & 20	648 to 841	194	7-15-43	D+135 to D+165	21,900
				TOTAL TONNAGE	140,551

TABLE #1

On April 15, 1943, a separate Depot Section was established to submit requisitions as listed above. This section utilized the services and experience of ordnance maintenance and depot personnel who had taken an active part in the North African operation. Using charts prepared by the Planning Section, a careful check was made on maintenance parts and spare major items required for all items of Ordnance equipment known to be in the theater or scheduled to arrive in time to be used in the HUSKY operation. Each vehicle, weapon or instrument was studied seperately and a thirty day maintenance stock was requisitioned based on SNL Addendums modified by the experience and knowledge secured during the North African campaign. Each seperate SNL Group was covered by a separate requisition, using as a basis the number of that item which would be maintained during each 30-day period. On requisitions for tools and common items, a complete study was made of all major items to be requisitioned; the advice of maintenance units was of particular value. In all requisitions, every effort was made to insure an adequate supply for these items which had been scarce or not available at all in North Africa.

The Planning Section continued to modify its weapon and vehicle lists and also turned to compiling what was to be known as 'Assault and Follow-up Kits'. The quantity and type of maintenance parts that were included in these kits were essential, fast moving, unit assemblies, standard hardware, special tools and cleaning and preserving materials, etc. The information as to what were fast moving parts was derived from reports furnished by the II Corps which was engaged with the enemy at the time in Tunisia and from various ordnance maintenance and depot companies and two technical observers from the O.M.C. The Assault Kits were to be set up and packed in such a way so that the heaviest one could easily be carried by two men, no assault kit to exceed the weight of 100 pounds.

In addition, a spare major item list was prepared using maintenance and replacement factors and capacity for movement of such by Ordnance light, medium,

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and heavy companies. From this list were prepared phased requisitions for the weapons which were requested shipped direct to the various ordnance companies. These major items included all weapons up to and including 81-mm mortars.

A list of critical items for MTS companies was also published for their information in order that a more balanced stockage would be carried to meet requirements in the HUSKY Operation.

The Planning Section prepared forms for Ordnance Status Reports required by Force 141 and made plans to keep record of the reports.

Arrived at Biserte, Tunisia, June 20, 1943:

3. Requisitions for convoy UGS-21 and 22 were prepared by personnel of the 6625th Base Area Group (Prov) with the aid and advice of personnel from the Ordnance Section, I Armored Corps (Reinf). These requisitions were partially completed by July 10, 1943.

The ordnance requisitions which were submitted to the Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA, for each of the two convoys averaged 1,800 pages with the weight for the original copy of approximately nine pounds and all seven copies of approximately fifty-two pounds.

On or about July 12, 1943, reconnaissance was made in Sicily to plot out locations for supply points. Locations selected were at Licata which were placed under control of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.

An Army Collecting and Evacuating Point was established at Caltanissetta on August 3, 1943 under jurisdiction of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. The Army Base Depot, and Evacuation Depot, Class II and IV Supplies, opened at Palermo, August 3, 1943. Other collecting points for ordnance materiel were opened at Sperlinga and Cefalu on August 10, 1943.

Daily inventories of major items and major unit assemblies received from depots were posted to stock record cards maintained by this section. All captured enemy material and allied salvaged material were likewise inventoried daily at collecting points and depots and posted to another set of stock record cards. These were then used as a basis for making reports to higher headquarters.

During the period of July 28th to August 18th, 1943, the following allocations were made of Ordnance major items by the Ordnance Section, Seventh Army.

July 28th to August 7th: REPLACEMENT OF MAJOR ITEMS

UNIT	ITEM	QUANTITY
II Corps	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	50
	Motorcycle, solo	1
	Trailer, 1/4 ton	30
	Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, ambulance	7
	Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, WC	12
	Carriage, motor, multi-gun, M15	3
	Carriage, motor, multi-gun, M13	2
	Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, C&S	4
	Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	10
	Truck, 4 ton, 6x6, wrecker	2
	Trailer, 1 ton, 2 wheel, cargo	10
	Car, half-track, M2	3
	Car, scout, M3A1	1
	Carriage, motor, 75mm howitzer, M8	5
	Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3	13
	Gun, 57mm, M1	12
	Howitzer, 155mm	2
	Gun, 155mm	1
	Gun, 37mm, AT, M4A1	10
	Gun, 40mm, AA	1
	Howitzer, 105mm, M2, towed	5
	Carriage, motor, 105mm howitzer, M7	6
	Mortar, 81mm, M2, comp.	10
	Tank, light, M5	17
	Tank, medium, M4A1	6
	Truck, 7-1/2 ton, prime mover	2
	Truck, wrecking, M1	1
2nd Armored Division	Car, half-track, M2	3
	Car, scout, M3A1	1
	Carriage, motor, 75mm, howitzer, M8	4
	Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3	3
	Motorcycle, solo	8
	Tank, medium, M4A1	8
	Trailer, 1/4 ton	4
	Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, ambulance	1
	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	7
	Truck, 4 ton, 6x6	1
	Truck, wrecking, M1	1
	Vehicle, tank recovery, T-2	1
3rd Infantry Division	Carriage, motor, 37mm, M6	1
	Carriage, motor, 105mm, howitzer, M7 (in lieu of T-19)	1
3rd Infantry Division (Cont'd)	Howitzer, 105mm, M2A1	1
	Trailer, 1 ton	1
	Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4, C & R	15
	Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, carryall	2
	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	23
	Truck, 4 ton, 6x6, cargo	1
	Truck, 7-1/2 ton, prime mover	1
	(in lieu of 6 ton prime mover)	
	Truck, 7-1/2 ton, cargo (in lieu of 6 ton prime mover.	1
45th Infantry Division	Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3	2
	Gun, 37mm, AT, M4A1	3
	Gun, 57mm, M1	2
	Howitzer, 105mm, M2A1	2
	Trailer, 1/4 ton	13
	Trailer, 1 ton	9
	Truck, 1/2 ton, 4x4, C&R	13
	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	5
	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo, LWB (in lieu of SWB)	8
	Truck, 4 ton, 6x6, cargo	1
82nd Airborne Division	Gun, machine, cal..50, HB flex, w/mount tripod and accessories.	3
	Launcher, rocket, AT, M1	13
	Mortar, 81mm, M2, comp.	6
	Mount, tripod, cal..30, M1917A1	1
	Projector, signal ground, M1	1
	Sight, Mortar, M1	
1st Ranger Battalion	Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, WC	1
Hq & Hq Company Seventh Army	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	2
	Motorcycle, solo	2
G-4, Automotive Section, Hq 7th Army	Motorcycle, solo	1
	Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, WC	1
42nd Ord Bn	Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, WC	1
	Truck, wrecking, M1	4
339th Ord Co (MTS) (Q)	Truck, 4-5 ton, 4x4, COE, tractor	4
II Corps	Howitzer, 155mm, M1 — August 7th to August 15	2
	Howitzer, 155mm, M1918A3	2
	Truck, 3/4 ton, WC	6
	Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	6
	Trailer, 1 ton	8
	Gun, 155mm, M1	1
	Truck, 3/4 ton, ambulance, 4x4	1
	Gun, 57mm, AT, M1	4
	Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3	4
	Tank, medium, M4A1	5
	Carriage, motor, 105mm, howitzer, M7	7
	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	5
	Truck, 4 ton, 6x6	2
	Car, half-track, M2	3
	Car, scout, M3A1	2
	Tank, light, M5	2
	Truck, 6 ton, 6x6, prime mover	1
2nd Armored Division	Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2 wheel, cargo	1
	Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	4
	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	8
	Truck, 3/4 ton, carryall	1
	Car, half-track, M2	5
3rd Inf Division	Howitzer, 105mm, M2A1	1
	Howitzer, 155mm, M1918A3	2
45th Inf Division	Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4,	22
	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6	2
	Trailer, 1/4 ton	11
	Trailer, 1 ton	6
	Truck, 3/4 ton, WC	2
Co "C", 249th QM Battalion (Serv)	Truck, 3/4 ton, WC	1
August 16th to August 18th:		
45th Inf Division	Gun 37mm, AT, M3, complete	2
2nd Armored Division	Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3	3
	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, welding	1
40th Engineer Regiment	Gun, 37mm, AA, M3A1	4
6616th QM Car Co (Prov)	Car, 5 pass., light sedan	5
Signal Depot, Seventh Army	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	1
106th AAA Bn (AW) (SP)	Car, half-track, M2	4
991st Ordnance Co (HM) (TK)	Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, welding	1

OPERATION OF ARMY ORDNANCE

DEPOT #1 PALERMO SICILY

The Army Ordnance General Depot #1 at Palermo, Sicily, was established and operated by the officers and personnel of the 201st Ordnance Company (D) and the 339th Ordnance Company (MTS). On July 31, 1943, one-half of the 339th Ordnance Company arrived in Palermo and was assigned for bivouac and operation out of vans to an area near the port. On the following day, one-half of the 201st Ordnance Company arrived and was assigned for bivouac in the S.A.A.S. Aircraft Plant and for operation out of vans. On August 3, one-half of the 339th Ordnance Company moved from the port area into the aircraft plant. Both of these half companies had landed at Syracuse in the southeastern part of Sicily on July 21, 1943, and them operated for a week beginning July 23 at Licata and Gela on the south Sicilian coast. They had come overland with their equipment of vans and stock to Palermo. On August 7, the other half of the 201st Ordnance Company arrived at Palermo by L.S.T. from Biserte. On August 10 the other half of the 339th Ordnance Company arrived from Biserte.

On August 8 a full survey of the aircraft plant was made. This survey revealed that there were sixteen useable warehouses in the plant containing a total floor space of some 245,000 square feet, and one office building containing floor space of some 4,000 square feet. The area and warehouses were sketched according to scale for purposes of clarity. A meeting of all officers and key non-commissioned officers was then held and a plan assigning the use of each building was adopted.

For the most part, however, the warehouses were at this time filled with the machinery and materiel of its former aircraft manufacturing occupants. During the week following some 600 tons of this materiel were disposed. Most of it went to the United States Army Air Corps for reclamation. Some excess lumber was taken by the United States Engineer Corps and several hundred lockers and other miscellaneous materiel went to the Army Quartermaster Corps. Numerous truck loads of scrap lumber were removed to a vacant lot for use by the civilian population. Excellent cooperation was received from all of the other Army units mentioned in this removal and reclamation work.

The need for additional storage space, satisfactory in the open, was immediately apparent. Arrangements were made to procure and put into use some 22 acres of open field immediately west of the aircraft plant. With the help of the Army Engineer Corps a road was opened from the aircraft plant area into the open field. The open field was in turn walled in to make it possible to retain the advantage of one unit.

During the first few days of August an open field of some 15 acres had been procured for use as a Vehicle and Artillery Pool near the airport. This area was found to be a little too small. Moreover, on August 7, the Air Corps requested its evacuation. On August 12, a 40-acre field near Pallavicino, approximately six miles from the main depot installation, was procured and all depot stock vehicles and rolling artillery were moved into it.

The basic plan of our operations was adopted on August 10. Each of the buildings in the principal depot area were assigned a letter and particular use. Principal streets were established and made one-way in order to expedite the flow of traffic through the area. The depot office was established in the office building on the main street near the entrance of the depot area. All requisitions from incoming units were received here. The Shipping and Issues department was established at the other end of the principal street near the exit gate. All units drawing ordnance materiel from this depot were held upon their presentation of the requisition at the depot office when to call for materiel at the Shipping and Issues department. 'Rush' requisitions were processed in one-half hour; ordinary and less urgent requisitions were processed in 24 to 36 hours. All receiving was done by a section set up for this purpose in a clearly marked building and lot

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
adjoining the main street. The 22 acre field adjoining the principal depot area on the west was divided into 14 lots, marked from one to fourteen respectively. Each of these lots was assigned a particular use, the overall purpose of which was to take care systematically of excess and bulk storage of regular Ordnance properties which would not be injured by exposure to weather, of the three classes of salvage and captured enemy vehicles and artillery.

Each of the 11 officers and 380 enlisted men of the two companies were assigned to specific tasks. Because the operations were of such large scale, the use of Italian laborers was necessary. Starting on August 9, between 350 and 400 such laborers were used daily on tasks ranging from policing latrines to working in the carpenter shop and repairing weapons.

All warehouses had been put into use by August 15 and operations were then proceeding smoothly.

During the period August 3 to August 18, 1943, inclusive, the Depot handled 1549 requisitions totaling 404 tons of ordnance spare parts and major assemblies, and 1556 tons of vehicles and rolling artillery. During this same period 5443 tons of ordnance spare parts and major assemblies and 2291 tons of vehicles and rolling artillery were received. Some 180 tons of materiel were brought to the Depot in their vans by the two Depot Companies. Large sea shipments of stock first began to arrive at the Depot on August 9, 1943.

The operation of the Army Ordnance Depot #1 was turned over to the 6625th Base Area Group (Prov) on August 21, 1943.



ORDNANCE BASE DEPOT

SCALE 1" = 42'

TOTAL FLOOR SPACE 249,000 Sq F



VEHICLES AND WEAPONS POOL — TANK AND ARTILLERY SECTION

DISPERSED AGAINST BOMBING ATTACKS IN 44 ACRE AREA



PART OF THE 22 ACRE SORTING AREA

ARMY ORDNANCE DEPOT #1 - SICILY

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AMMUNITION SECTION

On April 20, 1943, at Oran, preliminary work was started on ammunition supply for the several phases of the HUSKY Operation.

Using figures compiled by the Planning Section showing total quantities of each type of weapon to be used in the various forces, and number of units of fire as prescribed by the Administrative Order, phased requisitions were submitted on May 24, 1943, to supply two and one-third (2-1/3) units of fire combat loaded, in addition to organic load, for the troops in the assault.

Phased requisitions were submitted for troops in the first follow-up to carry one and one-sixth (1-1/6) units of fire for weapons in their possession plus one and one-sixth (1-1/6) units of fire for weapons of the assault troops.

Phased requisitions for troops in the second follow-up provided for one and one-sixth (1-1/6) units of fire for weapons in their possession plus one and one-sixth (1-1/6) units of fire for weapons in the assault and first follow-up.

The phased requisitions for the third follow-up provided for one and one-sixth (1-1/6) units of fire for the entire force.

These phased requisitions were broken down by the sub-task forces CENT, DIME, JOSS, KOOL, and WOLF. They were submitted to the Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, and were to be filled from ammunition stocks already in North Africa or ammunition arriving from the United States prior to D Day.

In addition to the above, requisitions were submitted for one unit of fire for a Regimental Combat Team, to be placed at Kairouan Airport for transport by air in case of emergency.

Units of fire were as prescribed by letter, War Department, The Adjutant General, file AG 471 (2-13-43) OB-S-D-M, dated February 16, 1943. Rate of expenditure was estimated at one-third (1/3) unit of fire per day for first seven (7) days; one-sixth (1/6) unit of fire per day for the next fourteen (14) days; one-third (1/3) unit of fire per day for subsequent fourteen days; and one-sixth (1/6) unit of fire per day thereafter. The objective was to build up a reserve of seven (7) units of fire for Seventh Army by D + 40.

In order to insure that an automatic supply of ammunition would be furnished, under any eventuality, a letter of instructions accompanied by graph indicating amounts of ammunition to be shipped from North Africa and dates same should arrive at Sicily, was furnished SOS, NATOUSA. A list showing the quantities and types of weapons to be in the hands of each sub-task force was also attached. Two graphs for supply of ammunition for each sub-task force were furnished. One of the graphs indicated amounts and dates ammunition should arrive in Sicily in case UGS 11 and 12 were unloaded in North Africa. The other chart indicated amounts and dates when ammunition should arrive at Sicily in the event UGS 11 and 12 could be unloaded in Sicily.

Also during the period from May 1, 1943, to May 14, 1943, requisitions were prepared for ammunition to be shipped from the United States on UGS 11 and 12. These requisitions were submitted to Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, for four (4) units of fire for Force 343 to be shipped on UGS 11, and for three units of fire to be shipped on UGS 12. All ammunition was requested by rounds and types. The requisitions forwarded to PEMBARK by the Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, failed to list ammunition by rounds and type but instead called for four (4) units of fire to be shipped on UGS 11 for all weapons of the Force. Therefore, when units of fire were computed by PEMBARK, percentages of all types including H.S. Gas (Toxic Chemical), as designated by the War Department as a unit of fire, were considered in the computation.

Information (copy of radio from NATOUSA to SOS, NATOUSA) to the effect that H.S. Gas Shells were being shipped on UGS 11 first reached this headquarters on June 8, 1943. Ordnance Officer, SOS, NATOUSA, was informed on the same date that there was no requirement for H.S. Toxic Chemical Munitions to be shipped to Sicily on either UGS 11 or UGS 12. Realizing the danger of H.S. Gas shells inadvertently getting in the hands of artillery batteries actively engaging the enemy, immediate steps were taken to intercept all this ammunition. All toxic gas shells that arrived in Sicily was either shipped to North Africa or placed in a specially prepared toxic gas dump under supervision of Chemical Warfare Troops.

Due to limited tonnage capacity of UGS 12, PEMBARK wired the Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, asking permission to reduce ammunition tonnages to 50% of original requirements. This was coordinated through this headquarters and authority for the reduction was granted. Manifests of UGS 12 indicate that in making the reduction, consideration was not given to securing a balanced shipment. Reduction was made by deleting heavy and medium artillery ammunition from requirements instead of reducing all types proportionately, thereby an excess of small caliber ammunition was delivered to Sicily.

A requisition for three (3) units of fire for Force 343 was submitted to Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, on May 21, 1943. This requisition was to meet anticipated expenditures and was to be shipped from the United States on UGS 13.

Due to the rapid progress of the operation, expenditures of ammunition were not as great as anticipated. On July 29, 1943, a message, by air courier, was sent to the Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, requesting that plans for automatic supply of Ordnance Supplies should be voided, and that special requirements after the arrival of UGS 11 would be obtained by coordination with the Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA. This message was confirmed by radio message to the Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, dated July 31, 1943.

A.S.P.'s and Depots were established and closed as indicated:

ASP #	OPENED	CLOSED	PLACE	OPERATED BY
1	10 July	21 July	Scoglitti	1st Engr Spec Brig
2	10 July	21 July	Vittoria	1st Engr Spec Brig
3	10 July	21 July	Gela	1st Engr Spec Brig
4	10 July	31 July	Gela	1st Engr Spec Brig
5	10 July	31 July	Licata	1st Engr Spec Brig
6	10 July	21 July	Licata	1st Engr Spec Brig
7	10 July	21 July	Campobello	1st Engr Spec Brig
8	20 July	29 July	Caltanissetta	1st Engr Spec Brig
9	21 July	31 July	Agrigento	1st Engr Spec Brig
10	22 July	31 July	Sciacca	1st Engr Spec Brig
11	22 July	31 July	Alessandria	1st Engr Spec Brig
12	23 July	11 Aug	Petralia	1st Engr Spec Brig
13	30 July	Open	Termini	Army
14	30 July	Open	Bagheria	Army
15	30 July	Open	Campofelice	Army
16	4 Aug	26 Aug	Nicosia	Army
17	5 Aug	Open	San Stefano	Army
18	14 Aug	25 Aug	Brolo Beach	Army
**19	26 Aug	Open	Scala	Army

* Later designated as Base Ammunition Depot #2


** Later designated as ASP #6

As the campaign moved to the north coast and north central part of the island, Ammunition Supply Points were established by Ordnance Ammunition Troops under the control of Seventh Army. ASP #13 was established near Termini Imerese to store ammunition being unloaded at that point. ASP #14 was established ten (10) miles east of Palermo to provide storage for ammunition being unloaded in the port of Palermo. ASP #15 was established at railhead at Campofelice and supplied by rail from the Port of Palermo. ASP #16 was established near Nicosia and was stocked by truck from railhead at Pirata where it was brought by rail from the south coast. ASP #17 was established just west of San Stefano to provide storage for ammunition unloaded from LST's and to supply troops operating east of this point. Later ammunition was shipped by rail from Palermo to railheads at Tusa and San Stefano. ASP #18 was established on August 15, 1943, at a point four (4) miles west of Capo d' Orlando and partially stocked by ammunition unloaded from a freighter at that point. ASP #19 was established near Barcellona on August 26, 1943, primarily with ammunition for the 155-mm Howitzer M1918 and 155-mm Gun, M1.


Upon completion of active operations, ammunition was ordered consentrated in the following depots and ASP's:

	PLACE	OPERATED BY
BAD #1	Cerda	6625th Base Area Group
ASP #2	Palermo	6625th Base Area Group
BAD #3	Licata	6625th Base Area Group
ASP #4	Campofelice	Seventh Army

Provisions were made for the concentration of captured enemy ammunition at various ASP's, stored in special areas at safe distances from our own ammunition. An estimate of tonnage of captured enemy ammunition was approximately sixty thousand (60,000) tons. The majority of this was medium and large caliber artillery ammunition including fixed, semi-fixed and separate loading rounds.



ABOVE
TEMPORARY BEACH HEAD STORAGE,
AT A.S.P. NO. 17.
CONGESTION DUE TO RAPID
UNLOADING FROM L.S.T.'S



BELOW
ANTIAIRCRAFT AMMUNITION STORAGE
A.S.P. NO. 14

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MAINTENANCE SECTION

The prime mission of the Maintenance Section, as well as all other ordnance activities, is: "PUSH MAINTENANCE SERVICE TO TROOPS IN THE FORWARD ECHELONS AT ALL TIMES UNDER ALL CONDITIONS." This standard operating procedure at all times, particularly during this operation, has proven sound.

Throughout the maintenance organizations, skilled mechanics for every type ordnance materiel had carried on these contact and service operations continuously. Approximately 12,000 man hours per day were spent on 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance. Technical command inspections, spot-check inspections and maintenance were carried on throughout all the units of the Seventh Army. These operations were carried on continuously until D Day.

Detachments of Ordnance Maintenance troops were in the initial landings carrying hand tools. The ordnance service provided in this manner was responsible for overcoming many stoppages, contributing materially and directly to the success of the operation in the initial stages of the campaign.

Immediately following the assault, improvised mobile shops were set up and the scope of maintenance operations increased accordingly. Ordnance maintenance service extends from watch repair through field ranges, wheeled and track vehicles to tanks, field artillery and amphibious vehicles.


Ordnance maintenance personnel and materiel were assigned to the ports in Sicily to assist in the unloading, shipside servicing, and evacuation of ordnance materiel and vehicles.

Some captured materiel was used by our forces. The maintenance of this materiel presented problems as to parts supply which was overcome by cannibalism.

After the close of the campaign, maintenance tasks tripled. Two Infantry Divisions, an Airborne Division, an Armored Division and a majority of all anti-aircraft and coast artillery units were contacted, serviced, and repairs and maintenance accomplished.

A Bomb Disposal Company was divided between the several sub-task forces. They removed and destroyed some 60 tons of unexploded enemy and allied bombs as well as a considerable quantity of unserviceable enemy ammunition and grenades.


The Maintenance Section, together with personnel from maintenance units of the Seventh Army, work closely with the Ordnance Intelligence Team from Allied Force Headquarters in procuring and cataloguing in preparation for shipment captured ordnance material and equipment.




LOCATIONS OF VARIOUS MAINTENANCE UNITS . .



Third echelon repair shop at Fiat works, Palermo



Rebuilding engine assemblies in machine shop at Fiat works in Palermo 3405th Ord. Co. (MM)



Removing 105mm Howitzer from damaged gun.



Machine shop truck (MM) set up in the field

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ORDNANCE INSTALLATIONS

This data indicates the scope and rapidity of movement of various types of ordnance service.

GELA

		ASP #3	AD #5	Opened	Closed
603rd	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)			10 July	31 July
69th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)			10 July	22 July
63rd	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)			10 July	22 July
	MAINTENANCE SERVICE				
3407th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)			10 July	6 August
3497th	Ordnance Company (Duks) (Plat)			10 July	

LICATA

		ASP #6	AD # 5		
62nd	Ordnance Battalion (Ammunition)			5 August	
58th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)			23 July	29 July
63rd	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)			22 July	26 July
64th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)			23 July	29 July
	MAINTENANCE SERVICE				
42nd	Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance & Supply)			19 July	22 July
99lst	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Tank)			19 July	22 July
3rd	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance)			19 July	22 July
3405th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)			23 July	29 July
93rd	Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)			19 July	22 July
3408th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)			19 July	22 July
26lst	Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)			5 August	
	SUPPLY				
359th	Ordnance Company (MTS)			23 July	29 July
350th	Ordnance Company (MTS)			26 August	
20lst	Ordnance Company (Depot) (Detachment)			23 July	29 July
78th	Ordnance Company (Depot) (Detachment)			5 August	5 Sept

PORTO EMPEDOCLE

		ASP #9			
608th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition) (Detachment)			21 July	31 July
	MAINTENANCE SERVICE				
3407th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance)(Q)			21 July	6 August

CALTANISSETTA

		ASP #12		Opened	Closed
69th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)			2 August	7 August
	MAINTENANCE SERVICE				
43rd	Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance & Supply)			30 July	3 August
3406th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance)			30 July	3 August
262nd	Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)			30 July	3 August
83rd	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Tank)			30 July	3 August
	SUPPLY				
330th	Ordnance Company (MTS)			23 July	29 July
79th	Ordnance Company (Depot)			23 July	29 July
	BOMB DISPOSAL				
235th	Ordnance Company (Bomb Disposal)			30 July	3 August

PALERMO

		MAINTENANCE SERVICE		
42nd	Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance & Supply)	30 July	8 August	
99lst	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Tank)	30 July	7 August	
3rd	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance)	30 July	11 August	
93rd	Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)	30 July		
3408th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	30 July	15 August	
3405th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	30 July		
54th	Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)	9 August		
43rd	Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance & Supply)	9 August		
	SUPPLY			
330th	Ordnance Company (MTS)	5 August	9 August	
78th	Ordnance Company (Depot) (Detachment)	9 August	10 August	
359th	Ordnance Company (MTS)	2 August		
20lst	Ordnance Company (Depot)	2 August		
	BOMB DISPOSAL			
235th	Ordnance Company (Bomb Disposal)(Detachment)	30 July		

VITTORIA

	ASP #2	Opened	Closed
Controlled by Engineers		10 July	21 July

SCOGLITTI

	ASP #1		
Controlled by Engineers		10 July	21 July

RAGUSA

	AD #14		
58th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)	20 July	8 August
609th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)	6 August	25 August
	MAINTENANCE SERVICE		
42nd	Ordnance Battalion (M & S)	28 July	29 July
99lst	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Tank)	28 July	29 July
3rd	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance)	28 July	29 July
93rd	Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)	28 July	29 July
3408th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	28 July	29 July
	BOMB DISPOSAL		
235th	Ordnance Company (Bomb Disposal) (Detachment)	28 July	29 July

PETRALIA

	ASP #8		
69th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)	20 July	4 August
63rd	Ordnance Battalion (Ammunition)	26 July	2 August
	MAINTENANCE SERVICE		
43rd	Ordnance Battalion (M & S)	23 July	28 July
3406th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	23 July	28 July
262nd	Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)	23 July	28 July
83rd	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Tank)	23 July	28 July
	SUPPLY		
330th	Ordnance Company (MTS)	23 July	28 July
79th	Ordnance Company (Depot)	23 July	28 July

CENTURIPE

	Maintenance Service		
Unit		Opened	Closed
3rd	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Det)	10 August	25 August
3407th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	7 August	1 Sept
	SUPPLY		
78th	Ordnance Company (Depot)	10 August	11 August
330th	Ordnance Company (MTS)	10 August	25 August

CAMPOBELLO

	ASP #15		
58th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)	30 July	16 August
53rd	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)	17 August	25 August
	MAINTENANCE SERVICE		
99lst	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance (Tank)) (Det)	17 August	

SPERLINGA

	Maintenance Service		
3rd	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Det)	11 August	29 August
29th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance)	15 August	29 August
3408th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	16 August	29 August
99lst	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Tank) (Det)	11 August	29 August
	SUPPLY		
20lst	Ordnance Company (Depot) (Detachment)	7 August	29 August
78th	Ordnance Company (Depot) (Detachment)	11 August	29 August

TERMINI IMERESE

	Maintenance Service		
3497th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Duks)	29 August	
99lst	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Tank)	29 August	

TRAPANI

	Maintenance Service	Opened	Closed
67th	Ordnance Battalion (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	25 August	
3rd	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance)	25 August	
3408th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	25 August	
	SUPPLY		
78th	Ordnance Company (Depot) (Detachment)	25 August	
330th	Ordnance Company (MTS)	25 August	

NICOSIA

	ASP #16		
69th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)	4 August	25 August
604th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)	5 August	
608th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition) (Detachment)	4 August	14 August
63rd	Ordnance Company (Ammunition) (Detachment)	7 August	25 August
	MAINTENANCE SERVICE		
43rd	Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance & Supply)	4 August	9 August
3406th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	4 August	29 August
262nd	Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)	4 August	29 August
83rd	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Tank)	4 August	29 August
99lst	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Tank)	7 August	29 August
3rd	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Det)	7 August	25 August
3408th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	16 August	25 August
42nd	Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance & Supply)	8 August	29 August
9th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance)	15 August	29 August
	SUPPLY		
78th	Ordnance Company (Depot) (Detachment)	7 August	25 August
	BOMB DISPOSAL		
235th	Ordnance Company (Bomb Disposal) (Detachment)	4 August	29 August

SAN STEFANO

	ASP #17		
604th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition) (Detachment)	4 August	11 August

ALESSANDRIA

	ASP #11	Opened	Closed
64th	Ordnance Company (Ammunition)	22 July	31 July

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MAINTENANCE SERVICE

42nd	Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance & Supply)	22 July	27 July
991st	Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Tank)	22 July	27 July
3rd	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance)	22 July	27 July
93rd	Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)	22 July	27 July
3408th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q) (Det)	22 July	27 July

BOMB DISPOSAL

235th	Ordnance Company (Bomb Disposal) Detachment	22 July	27 July

CORONA

Maintenance Service

3407th	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance) (Q)	9 August	1 Sept
3rd	Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance)	11 August	25 August

SUPPLY

78th	Ordnance Company (Depot) (Detachment)	10 August	25 August
390th	Ordnance Company (MTS)	11 August	25 August

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Variation from T/Bs and T/E should be avoided when ever possible. This results in difficulty of ammunition supply, maintenance, replacement and possible depletion of reserve stocks below a safe level.

2. When adding or substituting a new weapon, it is necessary to insure adequate ammunition supply, spare parts, reserve stocks, proper prime movers, and firing tables.

3. Ammunition supply, to be most successful, must follow the normal ordnance supply system.

4. Consideration must be given to special terrain and other conditions in planning replacement equipment and parts.

5. The importance of proper air and oil cleaning devices and prompt replacement and supply of filter elements cannot be overestimated.

6. Modern warfare emphasizes the artillery weapons. The proportions of artillery ammunition must be determined after a careful analysis of the probable tactical employment of artillery for the particular operation.

7. An adequate Army Ordnance Staff must be provided. In my opinion, the optimum for such a staff will consist of twenty-one officers, three warrant officers, and thirty-five enlisted men.

8. Ammunition companies must accompany any large amphibious assault.

9. In amphibious operations, light and medium maintenance personnel should arrive in the combat area as soon as practical after the assault group.

10. In amphibious operations, ordnance heavy maintenance, unless required earlier to support self-propelled equipment, should arrive in the combat area after about 30 days.

11. Major weapon and vehicle casualties are generally complete casualties with little chance of economical repair; therefore, spare parts should be limited to organic loads in Line organizations and Ordnance maintenance organizations for the first 30 days, supplemented by generous replacements of vehicles and complete weapons. All replacements must be complete ready for combat. Depot supplies, including replacement tool sets, should arrive in the theater after 30 to 45 days.

12. During combat, Ordnance Service must be pushed as far forward as practical. Replacement vehicles and weapons must be furnished on demand. As soon as a unit is withdrawn from the line, it must be overhauled and excess equipment returned to the pool.

13. A vigorous, forceful policy of pushing Ordnance Service of all types forward to the troops must be followed at all times, and a case must not arise of troops in combat having to come to the rear for supplies. Adequate ordnance troops must be made available to permit the execution of this policy.

14. Extended supply lines requires improvision with complete coordination between Ordnance and Transportation Services. This was exemplified in the Sicilian operation where the length of the supply lines at various times was equivalent of an advance through France into Germany.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That in future operations, an adequate, thoroughly trained and experienced Army Ordnance Staff be available to plan and prepare for the operation immediately after the assignment of the mission.

2. That reasonable numbers of ordnance supply and maintenance troops be placed under Army control sufficiently in advance in order that the Army may coordinate their supply and training to insure that they may fit smoothly into their assigned role.

3. The relations between Ordnance Service and Transportation Section, G-4, is vital. These staffs must have adequate training in combined operation prior to an operation.

4. That Base Shop battalions arrive as soon as the situation permits to overhaul and preserve our equipment and collect and preserve enemy equipment.

T. H. NIXON,
Colonel, Ordnance Dept.,
Ordnance Officer.

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2. Procedure for Handling Prisoners of War
3. Work Sheet for Preparation of Nominal Rosters
4. Form for Prisoner of War Nominal Rosters
5. Form for Prisoner of War Strength Return
6. Military Police Plan
7. Amendment to Military Police Plan
8. Instructions for Paroling Prisoners of War
9. Form for Application for Parole
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Prisoner of War Installations
Straggler Patrols and Collecting Points

The Provost Marshal Section began preparation of plans for execution of its functions upon notice that the I Armored Corps, Reinforced, expected to participate jointly with the British in an operation against the Axis forces on the Island of Sicily.

The initial plan of establishing rear echelon Prisoner of War cages near Bizerte was discarded when decision was made to turn all Prisoners of War over to the Navy in Sicily, who would convoy them to base sections in Africa.

In the revised plan, prisoner of war cages were to be initially established on the shore of Sicily after beach heads had been secured at points convenient to Joss and Dime operations (Gela and Licata). Personnel estimated for this operation was as follows (in addition to the organic Military Police organizations):

Three Military Police Prisoner of War Escort Guard Companies, two of which were to guard the two major Sub-Task Force Prisoner of War cages, and the other to escort prisoners of war to cages or to the evacuation point.

Two Military Police Prisoner of War Processing Platoons, one of which to be assigned to each Sub-Task Force cage for documentation of prisoners of war before evacuation.

One Corps Military Police Company for traffic control in and near the Command Post and Army straggler control.

Two Military Police tactical Battalions, one to be used to reinforce the four Sub-Task Forces; the other to police and control Army area traffic; then, when assault forces had passed, to cooperate with Civil Affairs in the control of captured territory, the reorganization of civil police forces, and for possible emergencies.

Initial plans covering landings on the west and northwesterly section of Sicily were changed to the southerly shore of the island on beaches extending east from Licata to the vicinity of Punta Secca. The Military Police plan was changed accordingly.

On 21 May the Provost Marshal received the final troop list for the operation. This indicated withdrawal of the 101st Military Police Battalion. The Provost Marshal at once requested another tactical Military Police Battalion to replace the 101st. No other battalions were available within the theater, and the request could not be granted. Recommendation was then made for attachment of two additional platoons to the 204th Military Police Company. Two officers and ninety men from tank and tank destroyer battalions reported to the 204th Military Police Company for temporary duty (for purpose of the expected operations) about the middle of June. Military Police training and indoctrination of these attached troops was begun at once.

Conferences with Provost Marshals of subordinate units were instituted relative coordination of their plans with the general scheme for employment of the Military Police, and especially the handling of Prisoners of War. Annexes 1 to 5 inclusive explain the detail, procedure and forms for handling of prisoners of war.

As Civil Affairs officers did not join Force Headquarters until late in the planning phase, time for full coordination between Provost Marshals and Civil Affairs officers was not available.

From all of the conferences, and from information available up to this point, the Military Police Plan was published and distributed to all echelons. (See Annex No. 6.)

It had been originally recommended that Naval personnel guard prisoners of war in their evacuation from Sicily to North Africa; however, instructions were later received that the task force would have to provide guards for these prisoners, and would be responsible for boat guards from Sicily to North Africa. This resulted in publication and promulgation of an amendment to the Military Police Plan (See Annex No. 7).

Personnel of the Provost Marshal Section entered the operation in three groups; the first (two officers and two enlisted men) aboard the Flagship U.S.S. Monrovia; the second (one officer and one enlisted man) aboard the Headquarters L.S.T. 325; and the third (one officer and three enlisted men) with the rear echelon of Headquarters, which remained at Bizerte until D plus four, when it moved to Sicily on L.S.T's.

The forward groups went ashore on D plus one and established headquarters at the rear command post in Gela. Only the forward group of the 204th Military Police Company, consisting of three officers and 145 men, was available to Army headquarters at this time, and the need for additional personnel, especially for security of vital installations, was urgent. Besides control of military traffic, keeping roads clear of native horse-drawn vehicles engaged in evacuation, and the control of stragglers, the Provost Marshal was charged with the guard of two echelons of the Army headquarters, the billet of the Commanding General, and old ammunition dumps and headquarters left behind by the retreating enemy. Many deposits of enemy hand grenades, ammunition, small arms, stores of land mines, and field pieces were scattered in buildings in town and in the fields on the plain behind the City. To prevent accidents and possible sabotage, these dumps required guards for which no troops other than the Military Police were available. The 204th Military Police Company met all requirements by working details in six-hour shifts until assistance was obtained from a company of the 82d Airborne Division, which was re-organizing at Gela. The latter troops took over much of the guard, freeing the Military Police for their more normal functions.

Lines of communication at this time were comparatively short, as enemy resistance was strongest in the vicinity of Gela. Distances from the City to the forward lines were not great enough to make the straggler situation very much of a problem. The few stragglers encountered consisted, in general, of individuals and small groups left behind to guard dumps and beachhead positions by assault units as they progressed inland. These stragglers were in nearly all cases easily directed to their organizations, often on foot, when parent unit was in the immediate neighborhood. Others were returned to their organization in Military Police transportation, or on vehicles from their units coming to Gela for ammunition, rations, or water.

The military police units attached to the sub-task forces were, during this period, operating the Prisoner of War system and control of areas taken and occupied by these forces. Army control at this point did not extend beyond the immediate vicinity of Gela, the beachhead extending inland fan-wise for only about eight kilometers from the city.

Prisoners of War were being evacuated by each sub-task force from its own beachhead direct to North Africa. An Officer from the Army Provost Marshal Section visited the other beachheads, finding that in many instances prisoners were being loaded on boats without nominal rosters having been made. Because of this, no accurate record is available as to the number of prisoners evacuated to North Africa in the early stages of the invasion.

On 15 July, the first of the Army Prisoner of War cages, with a capacity of 5,000, was opened on the plain behind Gela, to relieve the Dime Force, which had been using a small stockade in a stadium in the City. The 342nd Military Police Escort Guard Company and an unnumbered Prisoner of War Processing Detachment were relieved from attachment to the II Corps and returned to army control for operation of the Army cage at Gela.

Water and rations being difficult to supply at the Army cage behind Gela, on account of the lack of sufficient transportation, it was decided to continue the use, as long as practicable, of the original stockade in the City, which had a direct water supply, was closer to the dumps, and very near the beach from which prisoners were being evacuated. Fortunately, the prisoner turnover was rapid enough to permit use of the original stockade throughout the operation until it was closed on 28 July.

Need for personnel to guard prisoners on vessels enroute to Africa was seen. Request was made and granted for late-arrival troops from North Africa to be immediately sent to Sicily for return with prisoners as boat-guards. Four hundred men and four officers, comprising two equal groups, from tank destroyer units were sent from Africa for this purpose.

The speed with which the task forces were advancing had resulted in numerous requests for establishment of Army cages at additional points to which combat units could evacuate their prisoners. On 18 July, another Army stockade was opened at Licata, and on 19 July the third Army cage was opened at Porto Empedocle. Requests for Army cages at Sciacca, Canicatti, Caltanissetta, and Campobello were also received in approximately the order mentioned. With the exception of Sciacca, all of these points were inland, and the establishment of Army cages thereat was not considered advisable for the following reasons:

1. Personnel was insufficient for operation of Army cages already established, which had necessitated the attachment of personnel from combat units.

2. All available transportation was with combat units, so that movement of prisoners from inland cages to ports and beachheads could not be practicably accomplished.

3. Proper operation and control would have been impossible due to shortage of supervisory personnel.

Upon opening the Licata cage, the 379th Military Police Escort Guard Company and the 264lst Prisoner of War Processing Platoon was relieved from attachment to Joss Force and returned to Army control. Detachments from these units, together with part of the attached boat guards, were sent at once to Porto Empedocle to operate the new stockade at that point. Another small detachment was sent to Sciacca to assist the 82d Airborne Division in processing their prisoners and to evacuate them from Sciacca to the Army cage at Porto Empedocle.

During the period 20-23 July the Army headquarters moved from Gela to Agrigento. At this time the first definite straggler line was established, operating along the Army rear boundary (Route #115 from Agrigento to Gela), with a collecting point at Agrigento.

Hospitals brought released patients to the Provost Marshal for their return. In one instance, just prior to leaving Gela, three truckloads of approximately sixty hospital evacuees, all from different organizations, were left at the rear command post late in the afternoon. A place had to be found for them to spend the night; rations and water were provided, and the men sent to their units the following day by stopping vehicles which were going in the directions of the divisions of which the units to which these men belonged were a part. Replacement or Casual Battalions, through which such individuals should have been returned to their units, were not in operation. The Provost Marshal thereupon began the development of a system through the Military Police straggler collecting points for the return of hospital evacuees with the least delay.

During the period 25-26 July, the Army Headquarters moved from Agrigento, establishing a rear command post in the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Building, and the forward command post in the Palace at Palermo.

The 342nd Military Police Escort Guard Company and an unnumbered Prisoner of War Processing Detachment moved to Porto Empedocle. Detachments of the 379th Escort Guard Company and the 264lst Processing Platoon, which had been at latter point, rejoined their units at Licata.

During occupation of western end of the island, some twenty thousand (20,000) captured enemy troops had been concentrated at Prizzi, centrally located to the south of Palermo. As combat units moved to the east there was again a shortage of transportation for supplies and evacuation of prisoners to ports. The Prizzi cage was closed, the prisoners being evacuated to Palermo and Porto Empedocle as transportation became available.

Authority was now received for the parole of all prisoners whose permanent residence was in Sicily. Such prisoners were released direct from the cages under supervision of officers who had been especially trained in prisoner of war administration. Instructions for parole are outlined in Annex 8, and the form for Application for Parole is shown as Annex 9.

Of a group of some five thousand (5,000) prisoners held at Trapani, those eligible were paroled and released on the spot. The balance were taken to Palermo for evacuation.


An additional problem was the return to their units of hospital dischargees, which had become critical by this time, the number of released patients at peak periods amounting to as many as 150 daily. With the installation of Army supply points at Cefalu and in the vicinity of Enna, straggler collecting points were set up at these points as well as at the main supply point at Palermo, to route this personnel back to their units. Approximately 800 stragglers were handled through these collecting points. Hospitals in Palermo were instructed to deliver their discharged patients to the Local Class 1 Dump, where the Military Police took charge and secured transportation to their units for them on the daily trains and ration trucks calling at that point. Written instructions were furnished military policemen operating these collecting points, and frequent inspections made with view to improving noticeable deficiencies in the system. (See Annex No. 10). As personnel learned from experience, the operation of straggler control continued to improve throughout the campaign until its close.

As the combat troops progressed eastwardly, requests began to come in for

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new Army Prisoner of War cages in forward area. The problem was met through establishment of transfer cages in the vicinity of the forward Army supply dumps. The first of these were at Cefalu and Enna. Combat troops brought their prisoners to these cages on empty trucks moving to the rear for supplies. They were then transferred to southern areas. These transfer cages were moved forward as the Army supply line advanced. At the end of the campaign, transfer cages were in operation at Tusa (railhead for S. Stefano), Nicosia and Enna.

Shortly after Army Headquarters moved to Palermo, fifteen platoons of military police boat guard personnel arrived at the port aboard two vessels. These men were at once detailed to supplement the hard-pressed guard personnel while waiting for shipping to evacuate prisoners to North Africa. This employment consisted of placing them on the supply trains to pick up and return prisoners from the forward Army evacuation cages.

The Army straggler lines and collecting points also followed movement of Army supply points, and at the close of the campaign were operating at the same points as the Prisoner of War transfer cages.

Transfer, paroling and evacuation of Prisoners of War had progressed during the first weeks of August to such a degree that Army cages at Sciacca, Porto Empedocle, and Prizzi could be closed out on the 12th, 14th and 15th, respectively. The remaining evacuation stockades were at Licata and Palermo only. The 342nd Military Police Escort Guard Company and the unnumbered Prisoner of War Processing Platoon were moved from Porto Empedocle to Tusa where they remained until the close of the campaign, when they were returned to the Palermo stockade.

Annex No. 11 lists statistical data reference Prisoners of War processed through the various cages as of the close of the campaign. Annex 12 shows the Straggler Patrols and collecting points in Sicily.

LESSONS

I. Coordination with other sections of the headquarters, particularly Civil Affairs, and Counter-Intelligence Corps, and with the Provost Marshals of lower units, is essential for proper planning and execution during the operation.

II. The Military Police personnel and units allotted to the Army for the operation was not sufficient to efficiently carry out the duties which it was called upon to perform.

III. The personnel of the Provost Marshal section was too small to permit adequate supervision of all the Provost Marshal activities.

IV. Transportation for moving Prisoner of War Escort and Processing personnel, rations and water for Prisoners of War, and transportation of Prisoners of War was insufficient.

V. Army Prisoner of War cages should be located near rail or water transportation unless organic motor transportation is provided, due to difficulties of movement for evacuation and provision of rations and water.

VI. The handling of Hospital evacuees in conjunction with Military Police Straggler control presents special problems and requirements.

CONCLUSIONS

I. The Provost Marshal, Civil Affairs Officers, and Counter-Intelligence Corps should coordinate their plans from the initial planning stages straight through to the completion of the operation, keeping each informed of matters pertaining to the functions of the others.

II. There should be a larger allowance of trained Military Police personnel and in event this is not possible, that any personnel attached to existing Military Police organizations be provided early enough to train them for the work which they will perform.

III. To adequately supervise and control all Provost Marshal activities, particularly that of liaison with subordinate units, the Provost Marshal should have a larger staff.

IV. Transport allowances for care and movement of Prisoners of War and personnel handling prisoners be increased.

V. Means of transportation is essential to the proper handling of Prisoners of War, both for supply of rations, of water, and movement of personnel.

VI. While not desirable, released hospital patients can be handled through straggler control posts in emergencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. That Civil Affairs police personnel be assigned to the headquarters at the beginning of the planning phase of any new operations to permit their working with and participating in the preperation of joint police plans for the operation.

II. That the following minimum personnel be provided for any future operation of equivalent size and nature.

1. Prisoner of War Escort Guard Company with each Sub-Task Force and to each Corps and Army headquarters to man the cages and escort Prisoners of War to evacuation points.

2. Each ship which is to be used to evacuate Prisoners of War be provided with one guard platoon as part of the ship's complement, together with supplies and equipment to remain on board at all times for escort of prisoners during evacuation, to obviate use of organic police or combat units for this duty.

3. A Processing Platoon, with one officer in command, of the following personnel to be attached to each Military Police Escort Guard Company:

a. A receiving section of four (4) E/M.
b. An interpreting and rostering section of twenty-four (24) E/M.
c. A record section of six (6) E/M.

4. The Army Headquarters be provided with two tactical Military Police Battalions.

III. That one officer from the Provost Marshal Section be attached to each Sub-Task Force to serve as liaison between the Army Provost Marshal and Sub-Task Force Provost Marshals.

IV. That a minimum of four (4) 2½-ton trucks with trailers and two (2) ¼-ton Recon. trucks be allowed each Military Police Escort Guard Company, and two (2) 2½-ton trucks with trailers for each Prisoner of War Processing Platoon.

V. That there be one army Prisoner of War stockade located centrally within the Army area and convenient to transportation facilities for evacuation of prisoners of war. That any additional cages necessary be located at Army Supply Points and operated only as transfer cages to the Army stockade.

VI. That when released, hospital patients are returned through the medium of Straggler Control Posts, all Medical installations be directed to return such personnel direct to the nearest Straggler Collecting point, together with a list of the personnel delivered. Also that one 2½-ton truck, with driver, be assigned from Army pool to each Collecting point to transport the personnel received direct to their units.

Claude O. Burch
CLAUDE O. BURCH,
Lt. Col., Cav.,
Provost Marshal.

ANNEXES

1 INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING PRISONERS

19 June 1943

SUBJECT: Prisoners of War.

TO : Commanders of All Units, I Armored Corps, Reinf.

1. The attached information is published for the guidance of all members of your command who are concerned with the handling of prisoners of war.

2. During the initial operations, commanders must make definite and positive plans, well in advance, for the collecting, security and maintenance of prisoners of war captured by their units.

3. Although military police organizations will relieve combat units of the custody of prisoners of war as soon as the situation permits, circumstances may prevent this action for an indefinite period.

4. The provisions of the Geneva Convention (FM 27-10), which provides for humane and adequate care of all prisoners, shall be followed.

2 PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING PRISONERS

19 June, 1943

SUBJECT : Procedure for Handling Prisoners of War.

TO : All Unit Commanders, I Armored Corps, Reinforced.

The following extracts from texts referring to prisoners of war and other information available are emphasized for the guidance of those concerned.

1. Prisoners of War.

The following, when captured, shall be treated as prisoners of war.

a. All persons belonging to the armed forces of the enemy, captured in the course of military operations, land, sea or air.
b. Individuals who follow or accompany armed forces, such as correspondents, newspaper reporters, contractors and their employees, shall be entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they are in possession of a certificate from the enemy authorities.
c. Wounded and sick of the enemy forces.

All other captured enemy civilian personnel shall be considered as internees until their classification is determined by proper authority and shall be kept separate from prisoners of war.

2. Procedure After Capture.

a. One of the most important sources of tactical information regarding the enemy is interrogation of prisoners of war. The unit making the capture may interview prisoners briefly.
b. After initial questioning, prisoners will be immediately sent to division prisoner of war collecting points. It shall be the responsibility of the unit making capture to furnish escort guards for this purpose.
c. Until such time as there is a Force enclosure established, evacuation of prisoners of war will be accomplished by the Navy direct from sub-task force collecting points. A receipted roster will be obtained from the naval officer in charge of loading for each group loaded out.

3. Instructions for Handling Prisoners.

a. Prisoners will be disarmed, searched, and ordered to remain silent.
b. A message showing time and place of capture and the unit effecting the capture, will be sent back with the prisoner escort.
c. Prisoners will retain steel helmets, gas masks, identification tags, insignia of rank, decorations, photographs of no military value.
d. Documents will be labeled so as to identify the owner. The documents will be sent back with the prisoner's escort.
e. To prevent bribery by prisoners, money will be taken from them. A receipt will be given. Money will be sent back with other military documents.
f. Prisoners will be segregated into groups: Officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted men, and civilians. (Note) (German and Italian corporals are enlisted men, not NCO's). There will be further segregation by nationalities.
g. All prisoners will be tagged with W.D.P.M.G. forms #1, at division collecting points when established, which will contain the date, place of capture, and the capturing unit. (Note) All units will check P.M.G. forms #1 in their possession and any forms which have printed in Par. 2 on the back of the tag the words, "No tag-No food" will have such part lined out. This action is directed to prevent reprisals. These tags will remain on each prisoner until he is turned over to a task force enclosure.

4. Nominal Roster.

a. A nominal roster in quadruplicate will be made as quickly as possible at division enclosures and during initial phases will be done at collecting points before turning prisoners over to Navy for evacuation. Disposition will be as follows:

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1 copy to accompany prisoners group
1 copy to G-1 (Force)
1 copy to Provost Marshal (Force)
1 copy to be retained by division collecting points.

b. These forms will be sent back with prisoner's escort to force stockade.
c. Prisoners will not be held by division or sub-task forces but will be evacuated as rapidly as facilities are available, to force cage.

5. Attention is directed to Sec. III, Circular Number 94, Headquarters NATOUSA, dated 23 May 1943, repeated in Daily Bulletin Number 139, Headquarters I Armored Corps, Reinforced, 28 May 1943.

This circular will be read and fully explained to all members of this command at a regular formation.

6. Souvenir Hunting

Under no circumstances will the troops take articles of any kind from prisoners of war.

7. Assistance By Prisoners

Unwounded prisoners on the way to the rear may be used to assist in carrying wounded prisoners. If chaplains or medical personnel are among the prisoners, their service will be utilized.

8. Wounded Prisoners.

Medical personnel will report the presence of wounded prisoners to interrogating teams. They will deliver documents taken from such prisoners to G-2. Medical personnel will also report statements made by the prisoners if the statements appear to be of military value.

9. Civilian Prisoners.

When civilians are made prisoners, they will be handled in the same manner as other prisoners of war.

10. Prisoners of War are in the power of the hostile power, but not of the individual who captured them.

11. Prisoners of War have the right to have their persons and their honor respected.

3 WORK SHEET FOR PREPARATION OF NOMINAL ROSTERS

PRISONER OF WAR WORK SHEET
For Preparation of Nominal Rosters

LUOGO_____

Prigioniero Italiano — 7th Army A.P.O. # 758

Nome — Prenome — Grado (Indicare qua.)

Identita e numero matricola — Aeronautico ( )

Reggimento — Marina de Commercio ( )

Luogo de nascito - Citta - Provincia - Paese — Armata ( )

Data de nascita — Data de cattura — Borghese ( )

Luogo de cattura — S.U. Armata que ha cattura. — Fucilieri de Marina ( )

4 FORM FOR PW NOMINAL ROSTERS

HEADQUARTERS
A. P. O. #_____

NOMINAL ROSTER - PRISONER OF WAR

Date _____

Nationality — Sheet No. — Total count

Surname	Christian Name	Rank	Date of Birth	Date of Cap.	Capturing Unit	Enemy Unit

Transportation Identification _____ (Number of boat, train or truck)

(NOTE) This form is to be made in quadruplicate: 1 copy to P.W. 7th Army, 1 copy to G-1 7th Army, 1 copy retained and 1 copy accompanying prisoners listed.

5 FORM FOR PW STRENGTH RETURN

Strength Return P.W.C. _____
From _____ to _____ 1943

German Officers
A. On hand
B. Received
C. Evacuated N.A.
D. Transferred in Sicily

German E/M
E. On hand
F. Received
G. Evacuated N.A.
H. Transferred in Sicily

Italian Officers
I. On hand
J. Received
K. Evacuated N.A.
L. Transferred in Sicily

Italian E/M
M. On hand
N. Received
O. Evacuated N.A.
P. Transferred in Sicily

Italian E/M of Sicilian Residence
Q. On hand
R. Received
S. Paroled

Protected Personnel Already Included in Totals Above
T. German Medical Off.
U. German Medical E/M
V. Italian Medical Off.
W. Italian Medical E/M
X. German Chaplains
Y. Italian Chaplains

Prisoners of War Required for Labor Gangs _____

U.S.A. Administrative Detachment
AA. Officers
BB. E/M

U.S.A. Guard Organization
CC. Officers
DD. E/M
EE. Organizations

U.S.A. Medical personnel
FF. Officers
GG. E/M

6 MILITARY POLICE PLAN

15 June, 1943

MILITARY POLICE PLAN

1. MISSION

The mission of this TASK FORCE will involve a "Theatre of Operation" and a landing over an extended and hostile beach line. Since there are no suitable harbors capable of being used for supplying the Sub-Task Forces, it will be necessary to supply these forces over beach heads for considerable time. The following plan is set up as a guide to Sub-Task Force Provost Marshals in the preparation of their plans of operations.

2. MILITARY POLICE.

a. Military Police duties in the area of each Sub-Task Force will include:
(1) Traffic control at the beach heads and along the lines of communication thereto.
(2) Guarding and disposition of Military Prisoner of War and Civilian internees.
(3) Maintenance of Law and Order in towns and areas occupied by our troops.
(4) Coordination with Civil Affairs personnel in these areas.
(5) Cooperation with the Coun er Intelligence Corps in the apprehension of individuals and facilitation of searches and seizures.
(6) Control of movements of inilviduals including evacuation of civilian population.
(7) The protection of vital installations, including deposits and records of financial and governmental institutions.

b. Personnel.
(1) Assigned Units.

	Officers	EM	Veh
* 504th Military Police Battalion			
HQ & HQ Co	10	69	16
Co. "A"	5	192	26
Co. "B"	5	192	26
Co. "C"	5	192	26
342 MP Escort Guard Co	3	134	4
379 MP Escort Guard Co	3	134	4
— P.W. Processing Detachment	1	45	0
— P.W. Processing Detachment	1	45	0
* Does not include Med Det	3	15	4

(2) Organic Military Police.

* HQ & HQ Det. 2629 MP Bn	3	16	8
204 MP Co. IACR	5	192	26
202 MP Co. II Corps	5	192	26
45th Div MP Plat	3	77	24
1st Div MP Plat	3	77	24
3rd Div MP Plat	3	77	24
9th Div MP Plat	3	77	24
2nd Armd Div MP Plat	4	45	20
82nd Airborne Div MP Plat	2	36	8
* Does not include Med Det of	2	6	0

c. Situation.
In this operation there will be special situations arising in addition to the normal duties and functions covered in B, 1 above for which special measures must be planned.
(1) The landing will be made on a definitely hostile shore. After forcing back of hostile troops, a certain amount of fifth column activity is to be expected requiring constant surveillance and guard.
(2) Sniping will undoubtedly be prevalent, especially in towns where there is an opportunity for cover and hiding. Snipers must be ferreted out and either killed or captured.
(3) The civilian population cannot be expected to be friendly. Therefore, rigid control and regulation of their movement will be required.
(4) During the assault phases at least, no reliance can be placed upon the use of any existing civil law enforcement groups. Even should one or more organizations as a whole be found cooperative a certain period of time will be necessary for reorganization before it can be allowed to function. Even then close supervision and coordination by the Provost Marshals and Civil Affairs Officers will be required.
(5) In the territory covered by the initial operations there are about twenty towns and villages, six of which have a population varying from 20,000 to 40,000.


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LICATA	20,641
FEDERAL	31,918
RAGUSA	40,480
VITTORIA	34,769

These towns will present special problems as related to the above situations.

d. Distribution.

The organic Military Police of the Sub-Task Forces will be required by those forces to handle the normal military police functions and duties within these forces such as, tactical traffic control, operation of straggler lines and straggler collecting points, handling of Prisoners of War at Division collecting points and C.P. operation. They cannot therefore be considered as Force troops. This leaves the 50th Military Police Battalion, the 342d and 379th Prisoner of War Escort Guard Companies, and two Prisoner of War Processing Detachments available for assignment to assist Sub-Task Force Commanders in their mission. They have been allotted initially as follows:

(1) Co. "C" 50th Military Police Bn is assigned to the "CENT" Assault.

(2) The 50th Military Police Bn (less companies "A", "B", and "C") and 342nd Military Police Escort Guard Co., and one Prisoner of War processing Detachment is assigned to the "DIME" Assault.

(3) Co "A" 50th Military Police Bn, the 379th Prisoner of War Escort Guard Co, and one Prisoner of War Processing Detachment is assigned to "JOSS" Assault.

(4) Co "B" 50th Military Police Bn, is assigned to "KOOL" Force (Reserve).

These units will be required for beach control, traffic control in the beach areas, at dumps, along the lines of communication, and as Prisoner of War Guards, Prisoner tagging and preparation of nominal rosters. With the taking and occupation of towns in each Sub-Task Force area the problems previously discussed will present themselves. At the present time there are no reserve Military Police units available to meet any situations arising therefrom. It will be necessary for the Sub-Task Force Provost Marshals to meet them with combat troops or to substitute combat troops in some of their other installations to relieve sufficient Military Police for these special duties. Should additional Military Police Units be made available later to Force 343, they will be held as Force 343 reserve to make available to Sub-Task Force Commanders on request for use as aid to the Civil Affairs officers and as security police in captured towns and areas.

3. PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES.

Until such time as there is a Force 343 enclosure established on SICILY, evacuation of Prisoners of war and Civilian Internees will be accomplished by the Navy direct from Sub-Task Force beaches to enclosures at BIZERTE and TUNIS in NORTH AFRICA. Prior to movement for evacuation, Sub-Task Force commanders will be responsible for having them properly tagged and that a nominal roster has been prepared in quadruplicate. The Navy escort commander will receipt for the prisoners and Internees received by him at the beach by signature on one copy which will be retained by the Sub-Task Force. One Copy will accompany the Prisoners or Internees and the remaining two copies will be forwarded direct to Commanding General, Force 343.

Until a Prisoner of War enclosure is established on SICILY by Force 343, daily radio reports will be made by each Sub-Task Force Commander to Commanding General, Force 343, giving only total number of prisoners evacuated during day. As soon as conditions permit the Provost Marshal, Force 343, will establish a Prisoner of War and an Internee enclosure on SICILY in the vicinity of GELA with a capacity of approximately 15,000. Sub-Task Force commanders will be notified of the time and date of opening and its exact location. Upon receipt of this notice all Prisoners of War and Internees will be evacuated to the Force 343 enclosure by Sub-Task Forces together with all four copies of the nominal roster. The enclosure commander will receipt by signature for the prisoners or Internees on the file copy and return it to the escort commander for return to the apprehending unit. He will keep one copy for his file and forward the remaining two copies to Commanding General, Force 343. The Provost Marshal Force 343 will assume control of Prisoners of War and Internees at the Force enclosure. He will be responsible for feeding prior to their transfer to NORTH AFRICA. Evacuation will be as rapid as rostering and available shipping space will permit. It is contemplated that Prisoners and Internees will not be held for more than a maximum of three to five days for turn around of ships. Civilian Internees will be kept separately from Prisoners of War. The Commaning Officer of the Force 343 enclosure will segregate and hold, upon request from G-2 prisoners of Internees desired for special interrogation. The estimated daily rate of Prisoners based on G-2 estimates is:

	D to D plus 5	D plus 5 to D plus 15	After D plus 15
Maximum	2500	8000	8000
Minimum	1000	1000	830
Total estimated to D plus 30		30,000	

Medical. Emergency medical treatment for Prisoners of War and Internees at Sub-Task Force Collecting Points will be arranged for by Sub-Task Surgeons. The Surgeon, Force 343 will provide a Medical Detachment at Force 343 enclosure by D plus 10 or upon the opening of the enclosure

Quartermaster. The above mentioned supplies and equipment have been requisitioned.

Engineers. Request has been submitted to Corps of Engineers for material, location and construction of force enclosure to accomodate 15,000 prisoners and Internees on SICILY, to be ready by D plus 10.

Civil Affairs. The Provost Marshal will coordinate closely with the Public Safety Division of the Civil Affairs Section Force 343. Initially and until such time as existing civil police have been reorganized the Provost Marshal 343 and Provost Marshals of Sub-Task Forces will be responsible for the control of Military and Civilian personnel, the maintenance of Law and Order, the control of Traffic, registration and circulation of civilians, and recommendations for the protection of vital installations. In so far as available, Military Police personnel permits, the Provost Marshal Force 343 and Provost Marshals of Sub-Task Forces will furnish detachments of Military Police for assistance of the Public Safety Officers in the enforcement of the laws and regulations of the Military government and in the reorganization and supervision of any existing civilian police forces.

7 AMENDMENT TO MILITARY POLICE PLAN

AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO ANNEX 6. ADM. O. NO. 1. 22 June 1943

MILITARY POLICE PLAN

1. Classified Document above subject this headquarters, dated 15 June 1943, is hereby amended and amplified as follows:

2. The first paragraph of Section III is rescinded and the following is substituted therefor: Until such time as there is a Force 343 Enclosure established on SICILY, evacuation of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees will be accomplished by Sub-Task Forces to Enclosures in NORTH AFRICA. Escorts will be found from personnel already on SICILY as determined by Sub-Task Force commaniers. Prior to movement for evacuation, Sub-Task Force commaniers will be responsible for having prisoners of war and Internees properly tagged and a nominal roster prepared in quadruplicate. The Commaniing Officer at the Enclosure in NORTH AFRICA to which the prisoners are evacuated will receipt for them on one copy which will be retained by the Sub-Task Force. One copy will accompany the prisoners and the remaining two copies will be forwarded direct to Commanding General, Force 343.

3. Persons suspected of threatening security will be arrested by combat troops or CIC personnel. After preliminary interrogation such persons will be released or turned over to Prisoner of War details for evacuation. Prisoner of War escort personnel will accept for evacuation such civilian prisoners, both male and female, as may be turned over to them by CIC Detachments or combat troops. Civilian prisoners will be segregated from military Prisoners of War and will be evacuated to Division and Corps Prisoner of War cages (Civilian Zing) to the rear. Such prisoners should not be evacuated from SICILY without prior consent of the security staff.

4. Prisoners of War, whether civilian or military, will not normally be evacuated in ships carrying Allied lying wounded, and will not be evacuated on combat loaders. The number of prisoners embarked on any ship will be governed by the sanitary facilities abroad.

8 INSTRUCTIONS FOR PAROLING PRISONERS

27 July 1943

Instructions for the Provost Marshal and Civil Affairs Officer

Subject: Parole of Prisoners of War.

1. Prisoners of War in the custody of units of the Seventh Army may be released on parole subject to the following conditions:

a. Only Italian soldiers (enlisted men), Prisoners of War, whose permanent home and residence is in that part of Sicily now or later occupied by forces of the Seventh Army will be paroled.

b. No prisoner will be forced to accept a release on parole. Enlisted men will submit their applications through a commissioned officer of the Italian Army.

c. Where a prisoner desires a parole to a place other than his permanent home, he will be required to give reasons therefor, satisfacotry to the Provost Marshal.

d. The prisoner will be required to submit his application for parole on the form prescribed (copy enclosed) and the conditions enumerated therein will be carefully explained in the Italian language. The Provost Marshal is responsible that all paroled prisoners fully understand the conditions under which the parole is granted and the penalties for violation thereof.

e. German prisoners will not be paroled.

f. Prisoners needed for intelligence purposes will not be paroled.

g. Military prisoners only will be paroled. Civilian internees will not be released from custody without the prior approval of G-2 in each case, after consultation with civil affairs.

h. Applications will be submitted in triplicate; one copy when approved will be given to parolee, one copy will be transmitted to G-1 and one copy to the Civil Affairs Officer, Headquarters, Seventh Army. The Civil Affairs Officer will immediately transmit his copy to the appropriate Civil Affairs Officer in the vicinity of the parolee's designated residence or destination. The local Civil Affairs Officer may terminate any parole at any time.

i. G-2 agencies will furnish lists of individuals operationally dangerous who will not be paroled. Parolees on such lists will have their paroles immediately canceled and will forthwith be taken into custody.

j. The procedure for reporting is a direct responsibility of the appropriate field Civil Affairs Officer, who, within his means, will cause parolees to report to his office, or will have periodic inspections made of parolees by personnel under his supervision. Where deemed necessary, inspection of parolees may be made through G-2 agencies in cooperation with the local Civil Affairs Officer.

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9 FORM FOR APPLICATION FOR PAROLE

No.

APPLICATION FOR PAROLE
Richiesta di liberazione sulla parola

PLACE
Luogo
DATE
Data

TO: Commanding General, Seventh Army, United States (Allied Forces).
Al Generale Comandante la 7ª Armata degli Stati Uniti FF. AA. Alleate

Thru:
Per tramite

an officer of the Italian Army
Un Ufficiale delle FF. AA. Italiane

DATA ON APPLICANT
Generalità del richiedente

NAME
Name

SERIAL NUMBER
Numero di matricola

GRADE
Grado

ITALIAN ARMY
delle FF. AA. italiane

SICILY (Residence)
Residente in Sicilia

TOWN
Comune di

PROVINCE
Provincia di

OCCUPATION
Occupazione o mestiere

DATE OF BIRTH
Data di nascita

PLACE OF BIRTH
Luogo di nascita

MARRIED (if wife not living, so state)
Stato civile (coniugato, celibe, vedovo):

Number of minor children or dependents other than wife
Numero dei figli minori o dipendenti oltre la moglie

I, the aforementioned described individual
Io, suddetto

Grade: *Grado:*

Italian Army, whose permanent home and address is as entered above, now a
delle FF. AA. italiane, domiciliato come sopra, ora

prisoner of war of the United States, request that I be released on parole for the
prigioniero di guerra degli S. U., richiedo la liberazione su parola allo

purpose of going (strike out words not applicable) to (a) my home at the place
scopo (cancellare le parole non applicabili di:) (a) tornare in famiglia

shown above, to (b)
(b) *recarmi a*

, and engaging in a
per esercitare

useful occupation. In the event that this application is approved, by signing my
un impiego utile. Se verrà accolta questa mia domanda colla mia

name to this application, I promise and agree, on my personal honor, to be
firma mi impegno sul mio onore personale di

bound and scrupulously to fulfill and abide by the following conditions:
attenermi alle seguenti condizioni:

a. On reaching my above destination I will immediately report to and
All'arrivo alla destinazione summenzionata mi iscriverò sul

register with the nearest Civil Affairs Officer (AMGOT), and thereafter will
registro del più prossimo ufficiale del Governo Militare Alleato, e d'allora innanzi

personally report to the said Civil Affairs Officer as ordered by him. I will
mi presenterò presso il suddetto ufficio agli intervalli prescritti dall'Ufficiale.

not change my place of residence without the prior approval of the Civil
Aderirò agli Affari Civili. Io non cambierò il domicilio senza previo nulla osta

Affairs Officer with whom I am registered.
dell'Ufficio del Governo Militare Alleato presso cui sarò iscritto.

b. I will obey promptly and fully, in letter and spirit, all orders and
Mi atterrò alla scrupolosa osservanza, a tutti gli ordini ed

instructions contained in Proclamations, General Orders, Ordinances or Regu-
istruzioni contenuti nei Proclami, Ordini Generali,

lations issued under authority of the Military Governor of occupied Sicily.
Avvisi o Regolamenti emessi dal Governo Militare Alleato della Sicilia Occupata.

c. I will refrain from all acts hostile to the Allied Forces or helpful to
Mi asterrò da qualsiasi atto di ostilità contro le FF. AA. Alleate,

the enemies of said Allied Forces, from all acts of violence, and from any act
e che possa giovare i nemici delle suddette FF. AA. di ogni atto di violenza,

calculated to disturb public order in any way.
o di qualsiasi atto che potrebbe cagionare un disturbo dell'ordine pubblico.

d. I understand fully that in the event I violate any of the foregoing
Riconosco che se mi rendo colpevole di venir meno a qualsiasi delle

conditions, my parole will be cancelled and that I may be brought to trial
suddette condizioni, sarà annullata la liberazione su parola, e sarò tradotto

for such violation before a court martial. I also understand that if I am
innanzi al Tribunale Militare. Riconosco inoltre che se sarò ripreso portando armi o

recaptured bearing arms or otherwise engaging in war against the Allied Forces
belligerante in qualsiasi altro modo contro le FF. AA Alleate, avrò perduto i

I thereby forfeit the privilge of being treated as a prisoner of war and will be
miei diritti di essere trattato da prigioniero di guerra e,

immediately tried before a military tribunal and will be liable to be shot.
tradotto innanzi ad un Tribunale Militare delle FF. AA., sarò passibile della
pena di morte

Prisoner of war
Firma del prigioniero

Witness
Testimone

Submitted thru
Trasmesso da

Signature and rank of officer Italian Army
Nome grado ufficiale delle FF. AA. Italiane

Headquarters, Seventh Army
Q. G. della 7ª Armata
A. P. O. No. 758

Date *Data:*

The foregoing application is approved and the applicant will be released on parole.
By command of Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.:

Provost Marshal

The Parolee will carry on his person at all times his copy of this document
Il liberato porterà con sè sempre la propria copia di questo documento
It will be exhibited to any member of the Allied Forces or any member of the
che deve essere esibito, su domanda, a qualsiasi facente parte delle FF. AA. Alleate
Carabinieri or local police upon demand.
o dei CC.RR. o a qualsiasi altro agente delle organizzazioni di Pubblica Sicurezza.

10
INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING STRAGGLERS

10 August, 1943

INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING STRAGGLERS

1. Personnel on duty at Straggler collecting points will arrange for the return of Military personnel to their units by the first available transportation moving in the direction of the unit.

2. A written order on message forms will be given to the group leader directing his return to his organization without delay, reporting on arrival to the Commanding Officer thereof. A copy will be forwarded thru nearest message center to the unit and a copy retained for file.

3. Stragglers other than hospital evacuees being returned to duty will be marched, where the distance is not prohibitive, under the control of the senior non-commissioned officer or soldier in the group.

a. Seventh Army straggler points are in operation at class 1 dump, PALERMO ASP # 17 West of San Stefano and ASP # 16 NICOSIA.

4. Hospital evacuees will be accorded special consideration. Personnel at collecting points will be responsible for routing recovered wounded via any available transportation to their units. Any unusual delays will be reported promptly to Provost Marshal, Seventh Army, or to the division of which the unit is a part.

5. Medical installations have been instructed to leave discharged patients at the Supply point nearest their installation.

6. During the time personnel from medical installations are being held for transportation to their respective units they will be attached to service unit at the class 1 supply point for rations and administration.

7. Military Police at the PALERMO dump will make all arrangements required to place stragglers on the daily ration train moving from PALERMO to ASP # 17. The Military Police at ASP # 17 will make arrangements to have these men transferred from there to their proper units by ration trucks or other available vehicles.

8. Where the soldiers unit is not located in the forward areas, evacuation from PALERMO will be made by the first available transportaion moving in the direction of the unit.

9. Military Police have authority from the Commanding General to stop any transportation and place hospital released soldiers aboard when the transportation is going to or in the vicinity of the soldiers unit.

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11 PRISONER OF WAR STATISTICAL DATA

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO # 758 U.S. ARMY

9 September, 1943

Prisoner of War Status Report as of 9 September, 1943

POW on hand in Sicily	Total	German Officers	German E/M	Italian Officers	Italian E/M	Others
POW Enclosure #1	9,299	—	0	66	9,233	
Labor Camps outside Palermo	3,715	—	2	1	3,712	
Military Hospitals (Staff & Patients)	1,470	0	9	145	1,239	Sicilians 77
Paroling Teams outside Palermo	15			5	10	
Total	14,499	0	11	217	14,194	77
Evacuated						
Palermo	14,202	4	492	925	11,893	Slovene 873 Pole 15
Empedocle	30,335	14	1002	1182	28,137	
Gela (estimate)						
W/O Nominal Rolls	2,360		270	90	2,000	
Licata	25,310	4	574	408	24,324	
W/O Nominal Rolls (estimate)	1,428				1,428	
Total	73,635	22	2,338	2,605	67,782	888
Paroled						
Sicilians	33,762				33,762	
Chaplains & Doctors	308	22	—	308	—	—
Grand Totals	122,204	22	2,349	3,130	115,738	965


Paroled

Palermo	19,260
Prizzi	6,242
Licata	3,495
Empedocle	766
Trapani	2,028
Tusa	6,201
Aleano	606
Alessandria	250
Alimimusa	4
Montamaggiore	242
Misacquimo	214
Bivona	200
Burgio	139
Calamanaci	49
Camp Fiorito	56
Cefalu	309
Cianciano	236
Contessa Entel	77
Corleone	425
Ficusza	3
Giuliano	102
Maisala	47
Menfi	357
Nicosia	305
Palazzo Adr.	29
Ribera	440
Salemi	117
Osmluca	304
St. Stefano	231
Sciacca	675
Sclafani	64
Villa Frnachesa	53
Enna	127
Massara V.	109
	33,762

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REPORT OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER

PLANNING PHASE

The initial directive for the Sicilian Operation, known during the planning phase as Operation "HUSKY", was received about 21 February 1943 when the Signal Officer was directed to report to the Chief Signal Officer, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria, for instructions. Information was there received that an operation was planned to capture the island of Sicily, and that the units involved would be composed of British and American troops.

An estimate was requested as to the types of Signal troops required and the numbers desired. As a basis for this estimate, information was given that the American forces would probably consist of the I Armored Corps, Reinforced, another Corps, probably the VI Corps, later changed to II Corps, the total force consisting of four Infantry Divisions, one Armored Division, and one Airborne Infantry Division, with the necessary attached troops. Based on the above, the following estimate of the types and number of Signal troops was made:

1 - Armored Signal Battalion
2 - Signal Battalions
1 - Construction Battalion
1 - Signal Service Battalion
1 - Signal Repair Company
2 - Signal Depot Companies
1 - Port Signal Service Company
1 - Radio Intelligence Company w/attached personnel of Signal Intelligence Service
1 - Signal Pigeon Company
4 - Signal Companies (Special)
8 - Units of Signal Photo Company

As each staff section of the I Armored Corps, Reinforced, would probably be augmented, with the possibility of the Corps being expanded to an Army Headquarters; personnel requirements of the Signal Section were given as sixteen (16) officers and fifty (50) enlisted men. The approved number of officers was twelve (12). The number of enlisted men was not reduced, but the total, during the planning and execution phases did not exceed twenty-one (21) at any time.

At an early stage in the planning phase, it was recognized that a Base Signal Section would be required to take over from the tactical troops as the operation progressed. A request was submitted for the necessary personnel to include twenty (20) officers and approximately forty (40) enlisted men. Information was received that the greater number of these officers would be ordered to the African Theater from the United States, but that they would probably not be available to assist in the planning phase. Accordingly, a number of officers were attached to the Signal Section for duty with the Base Section to assist the Army Signal Supply Officer in requisitioning and supplying all Signal troops within the force.

Eighteen Signal Corps Officers were detailed to form the 6625th Base Area Group, Provisional, Seventh Army, and arrived at Casablanca on 25 June, 1943, reporting subsequently to the Army Signal Officer at Palermo, Sicily.

As of "D" Day, 10 July 1943, the following troops were assigned to I Armored Corps, Reinforced (Seventh Army) for the Sicilian Operation:

Army Ground Force Signal Troops:

UNIT	O.	W.O.	E.M.
Signal Section, Seventh Army	13	0	21
Base Section, Seventh Army	28	0	7
1st Armored Signal Battalion	42	0	992
51st Signal Battalion	36	1	891
53rd Signal Battalion	36	1	917
229th Signal Operations Company	11	1	295
128th Radio Intelligence Company	4	0	227
206th Signal Depot Company	9	5	246
81th Signal Port Service Company	12	1	152
286th Signal Company (Amphibious)	8	1	310
1st Signal Company	10	1	310
3rd Signal Company	10	1	290
9th Signal Company	13	1	315
45th Signal Company	9	1	308
71st Signal Company (Special)	6	0	184
72nd Signal Company (Special)	6	0	188
74th Signal Company (Special)	6	0	131
82nd Airborne Signal Company	5	1	118
142nd Armored Signal Company	10	0	219
Dets. 1 & 3, 163rd Signal Photo Company	2	0	12
Dets. 1 & 2, 196th Signal Photo Company	1	0	6
Dets. 1, 2, & 4, 177th Signal Repair Company	9	0	208
Det. 849th Signal Intelligence Service	0	0	71
2 Dets. 2650th Radio Relay Company	0	0	13
4119S Signal Radio Direction Finder Det.	0	0	6
4119T Signal Radio Direction Finder Det.	0	0	6
Total	286	15	6443

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Army Air Force Signal Troops:

XII Air Support Command:

UNIT	O.	W.O.	E.M.
Signal Section, XII Air Support Command	4	0	2
927th Signal Battalion, A. S. C.	22	0	468
Total	26	0	470

III Air Service Area Command:

439th Signal Construction Battalion	17	1	400
1016th Signal Company, Service Group	2	1	78
1059th Signal Company, Service Group	2	1	80
1062nd Signal Company, Service Group	2	1	78
1072nd Signal Company, Service Group	2	0	45
1073rd Signal Company, Service Group	2	1	75
907th Signal Depot Company, Aviation	10	4	232
Total	37	9	988

1st Air Defense Wing

562nd Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion	27	0	560
318th Signal Company, Wing	3	0	88
Total	30	0	648

Communications During the Planning Phase

During the planning and training phase of the operation, speedy communications became a major problem due to the distances between the various headquarters and troop units. Direct telephone lines were set up between Mostaganem, Algiers, Oran, Relizane, and Arzew.

Teletypewriter circuits were set up one each between I Armored Corps, Reinforced (Mostaganem); Allied Force Headquarters (Algiers); Mediterranean Base Section (Oran); II Corps (Relizane), Invasion Training Center (Arzew Area); 1st Engineer Special Brigade (Arzew Area); and 9th Infantry Division (Sidi-Bel-Abbes Area).

Radio links were established between I Armored Corps, Reinforced, and Headquarters Force 141 (15th Army Group), and Fifth Army.

A radio command net was established to include: II Corps, 1st Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Armored Division.

A radio administrative net was established to include: I Armored Corps, forward and rear echelons, the 1st Engineer Special Brigade; and the 111th Observation Squadron.

Scheduled motor courier service was established between Mostaganem, Relizane, Oran, Magenta, and Oujda.

At the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign and after units which had participated in that operation had assembled in their respective training areas, under I Armored Corps, Reinforced, the problems of communication became more difficult and involved as the distance between headquarters and units became greatly increased. Units were placed generally in Casablanca, Oujda, Sidi-Bel-Abbes, Oran, Mostaganem, Relizane, Algiers, Constantine, Philippeville, Tebessa, Gafsa, Kairouan, Bizerte, and Tunis. The approximate road and air distances, in miles, involved between these points are:

Mostaganem to Oran - 50 miles (road)
Oran to Oujda - 135 miles (road)
Oran to Magenta - 82 miles (road)
Mostaganem to Relizane - 36 miles (road)
Oran to Casablanca - 450 miles (air)
Oran to Algiers - 235 miles (air)
Algiers to Constantine - 210 miles (air)
Constantine to Bizerte - 195 miles (air)
Bizerte to Tunis - 40 miles (air)
Constantine to Tebessa - 126 miles (road)
Tebessa to Gafsa - 105 miles (road)

The total air line distance between the two extremes of the area, Casablanca to Bizerte, is approximately eleven hundred (1100) miles.

To deliver both tactical and administrative messages, maps, overlays and regulations to these far flung units in a maximum of twenty-four hours presented a communication problem which required all the ingenuity of the members of the Signal Section. This was accomplished by the maximum use of radio telephone, teletypewriter, motor messenger, and an air courier officer service set up jointly by the Adjutant General, I Armored Corps, Reinforced, and the Signal Section. The Adjutant General furnished five officers as air couriers, who, working directly under the Signal Officer, were responsible for the safe delivery of all classified documents between Corps Headquarters and the various units of each S-Task Force. These officers traveled a total of two thousand, two hundred and sixty (2260) miles by air daily, excluding special delivery runs. Planes of the Air Transport Command and the Air Courier Service, U. S. Army Air Corps were used.

Sub-message centers were set up by I Armored Corps, Reinforced, at Constantine, Tebessa, and Bizerte, the personnel for these message centers being drawn from the 51st Signal Battalion. At other points the message center facilities of Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers; Fifth Army, Oujda; Mediterranean Base Section, Oran; and the Atlantic Base Section, Casablanca, were used. The air courier officer would deliver messages and parcels to the sub-message centers, who in turn would deliver by motor messenger to the unit. A total of over seven hundred (700) miles were traveled daily by these motor messengers, making a grand total of approximately three thousand (3000) miles traveled daily in the distribution of correspondence.

Following are the statistics showing the volume of message traffic handled during the planning phase by the message center:

	Radio	Teletypewriter	Administrative	Total
28 April - 1 May	20	140	1000	1160
2 May - 8 May	35	245	1750	2030
9 May - 15 May	50	560	5500	6110
16 May - 22 May	65	875	10200	11140
23 May - 29 May	75	1085	10800	11960
30 May - 5 June	100	1250	12000	13350
6 June - 12 June	115	1400	12800	14315

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	Radio	Teletypewriter	Administrative	Total
13 June - 25 June	190	1500	13400	15090
26 June - 26 June	160	1610	14000	15750
27 June - 3 July	125	1950	10500	12975
4 July - 9 July	80	925	6500	7505
Grand Total	935	10940	99450	111325
Daily Average	12.8	149.9	1362.3	1525.0

In addition to the above, the message center, I Armored Corps, Reinforced, Rear Echelon, at Oran, handled an average of twenty-five (25) electrical messages, and one thousand (1000) administrative pieces per day, many of these originating at the Forward Echelon.

Training of Signal Troops

In the planning phase of the operation, the training of Signal troops presented quite a problem. Only one Signal Battalion and two Division Signal Companies had had any combat experience. Those units which took no part in the Tunisian Operation had been operating the communication agencies at various headquarters and had had little or no opportunity to carry an adequate Signal training program to a successful conclusion. In many instances units had received new or replacement personnel to the extent of approximately twenty-five percent of their total strength. These men being basics were not trained as Signal specialists and the time available for training was so limited that very little could be accomplished to develop a well trained team.

One special training problem was a change ordered by Allied Force Headquarters in radio procedure. This entailed the training of all radio operators in Link-Sign Procedure. Representatives of the majority of the Signal units were assembled at Mostaganem for this purpose. Two one-day schools, one month apart, were held for this instruction. The training of the various units in Link-Sign Procedure was accomplished by the personnel instructed at the two one-day schools.

It was decided that training in the use and maintenance of the British Speech plus Simplex and Speech plus Duplex equipment was necessary, since it was planned to make this equipment available to American troops. Accordingly, a School was established at the request of the Signal Officer, I Armored Corps, Reinforced, at which members of the 1st Armored Signal Battalion were trained in its use.

Training in the installation, operation, and maintenance of Signal Corps carrier equipment was given at a seven-day school, conducted by the Mediterranean Base Section.

"J" Service (Friendly Intercept)

Orders from Allied Force Headquarters to attach two British Officers who had operated the "J" Service with the British First Army, to Headquarters I Armored Corps, Reinforced, were received on 29 May 1943. The object of this attachment was to regulate the introduction of "J" Service into the American Army and to train personnel in the necessary functions of the service.

To provide a speedy and accurate source of information to G-2 and G-3 Staffs at Army and Corps by interception of friendly forward nets.

To monitor said nets with a view to a check on breaches of security. (Any such breaches to be dealt with by Divisions).

Arrangements were made for the interception on board headquarters ships. Radio Intelligence Platoons of the 1st and 3rd Divisions had been warned that they would be used for "J" intercept, and it had been suggested that a similar course be adopted with other infantry divisions.

Arrangements were made for the assembly and distribution of codes and Signal Operations Instructions. The staffs of the sections concerned were informed as to the advantages and limitations of "J" Service. An attempt was made to coordinate I Armored Corps, Reinforced, "J" Service, and the Eighth Army "J" Service.

"J" Service was placed under control of G-2, I Armored Corps, Reinforced. The various Radio Intelligence Platoons were controlled by G-2 of Divisions. It is considered that a more satisfactory arrangement would be to control all "J" Platoons from Army Headquarters. The following is a suggested organization:

Army Headquarters Control Officer and assistant; one radio transmitter, three operators, and two clerks. Three "J" Platoons consisting of two officers (or one officer and an assistant), four AM receivers, four FM receivers, and sufficient transport to carry personnel, baggage, and rations. Each unit to be self contained for a short period, should it be operating away from its headquarters.

Signal Supply During the Planning Phase

The Signal Supply personnel for the Operation "HUSKY" were designated during April and became an operating team about 1 May 1943, although most of the personnel did not report until 1 June 1943, at Rear Headquarters, located at Oran, Algeria.

Initial estimates of the Signal requirements were made and requisitions submitted for not only the equipment necessary to bring all units up to T/BA allowances, but also for the first twenty-one (21) day maintenance for this operation. Considerable special equipment was needed for Operation "HUSKY", and it became necessary to improvise and purchase from any source available the particular items needed. One particular such installation was the radio set, SCR-299, mounted within a moisture proofed housing which in turn was installed on the two-and-one-half ton amphibious truck.

Twelve such installations were made and issued to the various Sub-Task Forces. Their satisfactory use during and after the landing phase has justified the time and effort spent on them. They are highly recommended as essential items of equipment for any future amphibious operation.

During the planning phase, a total of twenty-nine (29) requisitions were prepared to be filled in the United States and sixty-three (63) requisitions to be processed in the North African theater. These requisitions represented approximately nineteen thousand, two hundred and twenty (19,220) tons of Signal equipment which it was necessary to receive, record, and issue, or prepare for over-water transportation to Sicily to form the initial stock for the Signal Supply Depot when established on the island. Of particular interest, and a constant source of trouble, was the procurement of waterproof bags, which were supplied to units for wrapping Signal items, where the probability of damage from salt water might be encountered. Many items required special packing to prevent damage when being handled over the beaches. The fact that only a small percentage of the equipment actually handled was damaged is proof of the excellent job performed by the Signal Supply Forces.

Four Sub-Task Forces were to be supplied, three to go ashore simultaneously on "D" Day, and one to be held in reserve. Available shipping allotted to each Sub-Task Force and place of mounting, as well as turnaround of vessels dictated the number of days maintenance to be carried by each group. Phase requisitions for Class II and Class IV supplies were prepared and submitted to S.O.S. as follows:

For CENT Force - 21 Day maintenance combat loaded in U.S.
For DIME Force - 7 Day maintenance LST & LCT loaded in North Africa with two more 7 day maintenance shipments to arrive on subsequent follow-up convoys.
For JOSS Force - Same arrangement as for DIME Force.
For KOOL Force - 21 day maintenance combat loaded in North Africa.

Other special phased requisitions were prepared for such units as Special Ranger and Airborne Units and were processed. To facilitate the handling and caring for these supplies, S & I Sections of the 206th Signal Depot Company were attached, one each to JOSS, DIME and CENT Forces. This was a very satisfactory arrangement. All supplies, after first 21 day maintenance were to arrive from the U.S. on schedule convoys. 15 days added reserve was packed and held in North Africa to take care of any unforeseen emergencies.

Headquarters Ships

Headquarters ships were provided for Seventh Army, II Corps and 45th Infantry Division combined, and 1st and 3rd Divisions. In addition, each Regimental Combat Team improvised its own headquarters upon the ship transporting it. Each headquarters divided its personnel and equipment so as to provide an alternate command post in the event its headquarters ship was sunk. Of the above ships, only one was completely constructed as a headquarters ship; the others were improvised within the African theater.

The number of radio channels which can be permitted on any headquarters ship due to space limitations and interference due to proximity of sets is rather small. Each of the three services, Army, Navy, and Air Corps specified the minimum number of channels which would perform their required mission while afloat and during the landing phase. The following number of channels were used by each of the headquarters while afloat:

Channels

	Army		Navy		Air Corps	
	Trans.	Rec.	Trans.	Rec.	Trans.	Rec.
Seventh Army	5	6	10	13	6	7
II Corps	4	5	11	13	6	8
1st Division	6	12	11	13	3	4
3rd Division	6	12	10	12	3	4
45th Division	4	10	See II Corps		See II Corps	
Each Regimental Hq.	4	4	--	--	-	-

The channels listed above were as follows:

Seventh Army - Command Net (A-1)
Reporting Net (A-3)
Airborne Units Net
Fifteenth Army Group Link (F-1)
Monitor Receiver
FM Voice Channel

II Corps - Command Net (C-1)
Reporting Net (A-3)
Airborne Units Net
Seventh Army Link (A-1)
Monitor Receiver

1st Division - Command Net
Ship-Shore Net
II Corps Command Net (C-1)
Reporting Net (A-3)
Airborne Units Net
Monitor Receivers
FM Voice Channel

3rd Division - Command Net
Ship-Shore Net
Seventh Army Command Net (A-1)
Reporting Net (A-3)
Airborne Units Net
Monitor Receivers
FM Voice Channel

45th Division - Command Net
Ship - Shore Net
II Corps Command Net (C-1) (After landing)
Reporting Net (A-3)
Monitor Receivers
FM Voice Channels

Each Regimental Headquarters including attached Shore Engineer Unit - AM Command Net (Inf)
FM Command Net (Inf)
AM Shore Battalion Net (Engr)
FM Shore Battalion Net (Engr)

As far as possible the actual radio sets used were Naval equivalents for normal sets used by the Army, the reason for this being that Naval radio sets are manufactured with the view of withstanding a salty atmosphere. As a result of these arrangements, all three services had individual channels after radio silence was lifted which could be devoted to their own missions. It had been found in Operation "TORCH" that Naval channels were entirely inadequate to carry Army and Air Corps traffic. The number of radio channels to be provided for each service depends upon the mission of that service and the number of subordinate units in the Task Force. Furthermore, the channels for the three services are entirely separate, and must be kept so for efficient and prompt operation. In the Sicilian Operation, particularly in the over-water and landing phase, it was found that too much traffic was being handled for the number of channels available. This was caused by a tremendous number of administrative messages being forced upon these stations from higher headquarters at a time when there should have been nothing but tactical traffic. All messages to be transmitted by any headquarters must be carefully edited by the Chief of Staff or his Deputy. Similarly, all incoming messages should be delivered to the same officer to provide for proper and speedy distribution within the headquarters.

Special radio channels were provided to Naval line ships and to Naval fire support parties which accompanied the various Sub-Task Forces ashore. This procedure had been previously tested, and as in a former operation, again worked to perfection. The radio sets used by these parties must be of sufficient power and range to cover the distances required and must be light enough to be readily carried while ashore. In the Sicilian Operation these sets were SCR-193's, mounted in one-quarter ton trucks. They were carried by Artillery personnel from the various units accompanied by Naval Liaison Officers who directed the fire of Naval vessels.

As previously stated, all headquarters ships, except the U.S.S. ANCON, carrying II Corps and the 45th Infantry Division Headquarters, were improvised. Thanks to the cooperation of the Navy and Air Corps, communication facilities of all ships worked well. However, the headquarters ships were badly cramped for space. There was insufficient room for radio operators, for message center and code clerks, and for the war room. This space could not be increased by improvisation, due to the structure of the ships themselves. Because of this, there were radio stations scattered over widely separated spaces. This caused difficulty of control, reduced the number of channels which could be provided and in general slowed up the clearing of radio messages.

The radio control room itself was, besides being too small, almost completely without ventilation. The temperature during this period was extremely high. This caused much unnecessary hardships on the radio operators. The message center room was shared by all three services, and was so congested that the Message Center Officer was unable to supervise its operation without interfering with the men at work.

It was necessary to have several separate code rooms. There was a U. S. Navy code room, a British Navy code room, a U.S. Army code room, a British cryptographic section requiring separate space, and an Air Corps set up. The space provided was scarcely adequate to get the men and their machines into place.

The fact that very few garbled messages were reported was due to the high grade personnel only. The war room on the MONROVIA was so constructed that messengers had difficulty in delivering their messages. It is strongly recommended

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that the U.S. provide specially constructed and designed headquarters ships for any future amphibious operations. Improvisation of ships can be made to work, but will never be satisfactory.

Signal Communications Plan

The culmination of the planning phase for the Signal Section was the issuance on 21 June 1943 of the Signal Communication Plan, which is attached as Annex No. 10 to Field Order No. 1, reproduced elsewhere in the main report of operations.

OVER-WATER AND LANDING PHASE

During the time the force was at sea, radio silence was maintained by all services. Communications between ships was by means of blinkers, used only during daylight hours. All radio nets were constantly monitored with the dual purpose of maintaining absolute radio silence within the force and to receive any broadcast sent from shore stations in the nets.

"H" Hour, "D" Day was to be 0245B (0045Z) 10 July 1943. Radio silence was broken at 0305B. During the period at sea, the time of lifting radio silence was controlled by the naval commander.

When silence was lifted, all radio nets were quickly established and communications remained excellent during this phase of the operation. Some delay was occasioned in the clearing of important messages, due to an excessive amount of administrative traffic being handled. Much of this traffic was overclassified. This difficulty was soon placed under control. It was directed that all messages to be transmitted over Army channels be approved by the Chief of Staff before being sent. In this way outgoing administrative traffic was eliminated. It was found impossible to eliminate such incoming traffic. The conclusion thus reached and which was maintained thereafter, was that only tactical traffic would be handled by radio during this phase. In future operations arrangements must be made that at all headquarters of the force, radio traffic must be limited to tactical needs only, or have separate nets established for tactical and administrative needs.

A resume of traffic handled by the radio sets of Seventh Army during the period afloat show:

Day	Date	Messages	Groups*
"D"	10 July 1943	104	6966
D + 1	11 July 1943	115	8836
D + 2	12 July 1943	158	14056

*The groups figure does not show the total groups actually sent, as many of the messages were to multiple addressees, which required transmission over several nets. The total groups transmitted was approximately double this figure.

Frequency modulated sets provided to the divisions and lower units worked very successfully during the landing phase.

Radio sets, SCR-299, mounted in two-and-one-half ton amphibious trucks, were used successfully in the operation. They provided the most reliable high powered radio communications during the landing phase. They were able to operate either on land or on water.


The story of the part played by the Signal Corps in the Sicilian Operation can best be divided into the phases between movements of the Army Command Post. These periods are as follows:

On board the U.S.S. MONROVIA -	10/12 July 1943
Gela	12/21 July 1943
Agrigento	21/25 July 1943
Palermo	25 July 6/August 1943
San Stefano di Camastra	6/15 August 1943
Naso	15/20 August 1943


Period 10/12 July 1943, U.S.S. MONROVIA

During this period the command post was established on board the U.S.S. MONROVIA. Due to the nature of the operations, radio provided the only means of communication. Radio silence was lifted at 0305B, 10 July 1943. In spite of the crowded conditions aboard ship, and the small number of radio operators who could be carried, necessitating each man to work long hours, traffic was cleared with an efficiency and speed which left little to be desired.

One variance from established command and communications channels was noted during the landing phase. The action became so rapid in the initial stage that it was necessary to operate an Army radio set directly in the Corps-Division net to obtain early information on the situation. This was done and proved of inestimable value to the Army Commander.



Seventh Army Message Center Aboard U.S.S. Monrovia.



Waterproofed Mounting of Radio Set SCR-299
Mounted in 2½ Ton Amphibious Truck.



Radio Set SCR-299 in 2½ ton Amphibious truck.

Building of House and all Installation Work
Performed by 1st Armored Signal Battalion.

Army Radio Control Aboard U.S.S. Monrovia.




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Period 12/21 July 1943, Gela

During this period the Army headquarters was set up at Gela. The 1st Armored Signal Battalion received orders to establish the Signal agencies and be ready to open the command post at 1600B, 12 July 1943. It had been decided that the command post would be divided into a tactical headquarters and a rear echelon, containing all administrative sections. This necessitated a set-up of two command post installations. The Signal Officer and his staff were placed at the rear echelon, causing him to be somewhat out of touch with the tactical developments. Frequently this caused some delay in taking effective action.

As soon as the roads to Licata and Ragusa were cleared of enemy troops, work was started on rehabilitation of two open wire circuits each way. Considerable damage was done to all overhead wires in this area by the retreating enemy. Improvements in these lines were then attempted. These improvements included the soldering of splices, transposing circuits to avoid cross talk, replacing insulators and poles, retying and properly sagging the lines.

Considerable trouble was encountered from enemy sabotage to these lines. Before the end of the campaign a number of suspected enemy saboteurs had been taken into custody. The trouble was effectively reduced by the arrest of every person identified as having knowledge of wire construction, operation, or maintenance in the general area around Licata and Canicatti.

Little difficulty was experienced with radio transmission or reception during these dates, the principal causes of delays being that all messages were of such length, that considerable time was used in encoding, transmitting, and decoding, and that a sufficient number of radios had not been landed to care for the voluminous traffic. One additional cause was the fact that many messages were overclassified, causing a build-up of traffic at peak hours.

Early during this phase it was noted that the operation would continue along two axes, one north towards Caltanissetta, and the other generally northwest to Agrigento - Castelvetrano, thence northward to Palermo, which axis necessitated the formation of a Provisional Corps to be composed of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division. The 2nd Armored Division was later placed under this Corps. An acting Corps Signal Officer was detailed with message center and radio personnel and equipment, drawn from the 1st Armored Signal Battalion. It was planned that only motor messenger and radio communications with Army and subordinate units would be used, due to the lack of sufficient Signal wire personnel to reconstruct and maintain open wire routes.

Period 21/25 July 1943, Agrigento

The advance of the Seventh Army had progressed so rapidly that by 18 July, a move of the Command Post was necessary. The city of Agrigento was chosen as the site, and communication facilities installed, the command post opening officially at 1200B, 21 July 1943.

Wire communications were extended northward and efforts were redoubled to keep pace with the rapid advance of II Corps, this being accomplished by the various wire crews working from dawn till well into the night. The speed of the advance did not permit the thorough rehabilitation of open wire lines that should have been made. The use of carrier equipment was impractical due to the unbalance existing on all circuits, many such circuits being composed of different gauges of wire as well as having copper and iron wire interspersed. In many instances it was found that it was easier and quicker to replace the existing wire plant with new wire. Very little damage was done to the pole plant in this area. Sabotage continued to be a source of much trouble. As an example, on the Syrial-h cable between Palma and Agrigento during one twenty-four hour period, this cable was burned into three times and hacked with an axe five times. Switching centrals were installed at Gela, Licata, Naro, Canicatti, Campobello and Palma to control the wire net and give greater flexibility to the system. These installations consisted of one or more BD-72 switchboards with three operators. Radio continued to be the principal agency of communication to Provisional Corps, and worked satisfactorily.

By 24 July two circuits of open wire lines had been extended to Villafrati, twenty-two miles southeast of Palermo, to the general vicinity of Vallelunga Frateneno, thirty-three miles northwest to Caltanissetta, and to Alimena, twenty-one miles east of Vallelunga Frateneno.


In this phase radio reception was extremely difficult due to the poor ground conductivity in the area and that the distances between command posts were, in a number of cases, beyond the range of the lower powered sets.


Teletypewriter service was established to II Corps and Gela, but worked only intermittently due to poor grounds, strong leakage to ground and numerous cases of sabotage on the lines.

Period from 25 July to 6 August 1943: (Palermo)

On 22 July the city of Palermo surrendered to units of the Provisional Corps. Corps Headquarters were established in the Royal Palace (Palazzo Reale) in Palermo. Plans were made to open Seventh Army Headquarters in that city at 1200B on 25 July. It was decided to move both the tactical and administrative headquarters. A dual installation of signal agencies was made; the Advance at the Royal Palace and the Main Headquarters located in the Post Office Building.

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SEVENTH ARMY

F G

LINE ROUTE MAP

L M

0800 B 23 JULY 43

G H

M N

-LEGEND-

OPEN WIRE

SPIRAL-4

FIELD WIRE

UNDERGROUND CABLE

TP. REPEATER STATION

SICILY

SCALE 1:750000

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In Sicily it was found that there were two communication systems. The Poste Telefoni and Telegraphi, which was state owned and operated, and which furnished all telegraph and long distance telephone service to Italy and foreign countries. The Societa Esercizi Telefonici, known as S.E.T., is a privately owned local and inter-island telephone company operating in the western half of Sicily. This company furnishes the local telephone service and a limited amount of long distance within the island. The Poste Telefoni and Telegraphi equipment was located in the Palermo Post Office, and was not damaged. This office was placed under military guard and no one permitted to enter, as all the long distance equipment to Italy was installed in this building. Use was made of the local dial telephone system insofar as practical. The personnel of S.E.T. were assembled at the telephone office and seemed willing and anxious to cooperate with the Army Signal personnel to restore the local telephone plant. Considerable damage had been done by a direct bomb hit on the Telephone Building, which destroyed all of the long distance central office equipment, but only slightly damaged the local dial equipment.


One signal officer and five enlisted men experienced in maintenance of central office equipment were placed in charge of the S.E.T. dial office. Civilian telephone service was discontinued with the exception of those lines approved by the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT). The equipment was found to be dirty and dusty from the bombings and badly in need of maintenance. Walls and windows of the building were repaired by signal troops. All equipment was cleaned and adjusted by signal personnel and civilian employees. There were four telephone trunk lines connecting the tactical and main headquarters, with a total of one hundred and nine dial lines in operation at this time. There were twenty-six common battery trunks and eighteen locals operated from the main switchboard. Central office and local installations were made for the Navy, Harbor, Anti-aircraft office and local installations were made for the Navy, Harbor, Anti-aircraft Defense and other units in the Palermo area. The use of the dial system as the principal exchange of army headquarters was found to be unsatisfactory and a three position TC-1 Switchboard was installed.

Considerable destruction, due to bombings, of underground cables and open wire circuits was encountered within the city of Palermo. The rehabilitation of the open wire circuits, which inside the city were mostly placed over the tops of three and four story buildings, presented quite a problem, until, it was solved by the use of the local fire department's extension ladder. (See accompanying photographs) Pending the completion of the rehabilitation of the open wire lead in the city, a ten-pair, rubber covered cable was laid from the main switchboard to the outskirts of Palermo, at which point it was connected to the open wire. During this phase the remainder of the 51st Signal Battalion arrived at Palermo, adding one additional Construction Company, and a Headquarters Company.

On 26 July, the rehabilitation of the open wire routes along the north coast, towards Termini Imerese and Cefalu, were started and was pushed with all possible speed to establish wire communications to II Corps, whose axis had been changed from Gela - Palermo to Palermo - Messina. Switching centrals were established at Termini and later at Cefalu. Initially, four circuits were reconstructed from Palermo to Cefalu with two circuits then carried to San Stefano di Camastra with the signal troops working immediately behind the combat troops. From Palermo to Messina the signal troops were confronted with a new and more serious handicap in the form of hundreds of mines. Placed along pole lines and along the railroad right of way between ties, where it was necessary to work as most of the wire leads followed the railroad tracks. Special signal men had been trained in the use of mine detectors and rendered yeoman's service in finding, and in many instances removing these deadly weapons. The low casualty rate of signal personnel from mines was due to the excellent work performed by these men. Considerable difficulty was experienced along the northern coast due to sabotage and subordinate units cutting in on the lines. As the circuits became longer, more care had to be exercised in re-transposing, resagging, and in the soldering of all splices. Several crews of two men each were assigned to the all important job of soldering all splices in the line.

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"CIRCUIT DIAGRAM"
HQ. SEVENTH ARMY
AS OF 0930B 26 JULY 45
MAP OF SICILY



TRAFFIC DIAGRAM
HQ SEVENTH ARMY
AS OF 0930B 26 JULY '43

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SEVENTH ARMY
LINE ROUTE MAP
1200 B 26 JULY 43

-LEGEND-

- OPEN WIRE
- SPIRAL-4
- FIELD WIRE
- UNDERGROUND CABLE
- TP. REPEATER STATION

SICILY
SCALE 1:750000

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Period from 6 August to 15 August 1943, San Stefano di Camastra

By 6 August the Germans and Italians had been driven eastward to a line running generally north and south through San Agata - San Fratello. A location near San Stefano di Camastra was chosen for the next Army Headquarters. It was decided that the administrative headquarters would remain in Palermo. Tactical headquarters opened at San Stefano at 1930B, 6 August 1943.

During this and the preceding phases the 1st Armored Signal Battalion furnished all radio links for both the tactical and administrative headquarters, Seventh Army, and Provisional Corps. In addition to the above, two SCR-299 sets were furnished for a liaison net between Seventh and Eighth Armies and were located at the command post of the latter. One British radio detachment located at Headquarters Seventh Army operated the 15th Army Group - Seventh Army net. On July 31 and July 30, the 229th Signal Operations Company took over the operations of the radio sets at Sels and Agrigento, respectively. The 1st Armored Signal Battalion continued to operate all radios at Provisional Corps until relieved by the 51st Signal Battalion on August 15th. At this time seven sets were in operation at the tactical headquarters, and eight in operation at the administrative headquarters.

Switchboard installations at the tactical headquarters consisted of two TC-4 switchboards, with thirty-nine local telephones and fourteen trunk lines. The zero board, where all testing of lines was performed, was located about one-half mile from the main switchboard and was connected by two ten pair rubber covered cables. Switching centrals were placed at Termini Imerese, Cefalu, and Petralia.

Teletypewriter service was established to the Administrative headquarters at Palermo, II Corps, 3rd Division, and 45th Division.

Wire construction in this phase continued along the coastal route, practically all being along the railroad tracks, with lateral open wire lines being rehabilitated or by placing Spiral-4 cable or long range field wire to the successive locations of II Corps Command Posts. This method of construction provided greater flexibility of circuits as it furnished alternate means of wire communications for both telephone and teletypewriter traffic. At this time the 1st Armored Signal Battalion succeeded in converting several bicycle type railroad hand-cars into motor driven hand-cars to be used along the railroad right of way to rehabilitate the telephone circuits. These cars greatly speeded the construction and maintenance of wire lines. Due to the peculiar situation as to the location of Command Posts, Army Headquarters, 3rd and 45th Divisions being located along the northern or coastal axis, and II Corps, the 1st and 9th Divisions along the southern axis about twenty-five miles south of the coastal road, both running in a parallel direction east and west, direct lines were constructed to the 3rd and 45th Divisions so that the Army Commander could get early information of the progress of the operation from liaison officers at these divisions. Wire communications to the rear were being improved until there were eight circuits between Palermo, Termini Switch, and Cefalu Switch, and six circuits between Cefalu Switch and San Stefano.

Scheduled and special motor messenger service was established to II Corps, located two miles east of Petralia, Provisional Corps at Palermo, 3rd Infantry Division at Mistilneri, 2nd Armored Division at Monreale, 82nd Airborne Division at Trapani, and with Agrigento.

Special Air Messenger service was used to II Corps, 82nd Airborne Division and to Agrigento, using Cub planes of the Artillery Section for a period of three days, after which the planes could no longer be spared.

Radio control was initially established within the tactical Command Post in the Royal Palace but was later moved to the transmitter area when the daytime noise level adjacent to the Command Post became so high as to seriously affect communications. The dispatch of messages between the message center and radio control was handled by teletype and motor messenger. Thirteen radio links were placed in operation at this time.

During the occupation of Palermo, a German ultra-short-wave radio-telephone set was found on top of a mountain overlooking the city. This set worked in the 500 - 600 megacycle band and was extremely directional. This equipment appeared to be only slightly damaged. Since it was learned that the Signal Intelligence Service was anxious to secure such a set, orders were issued to dismantle and send it to higher headquarters. This set was shipped from Palermo on or about 8 August 1943.

Period from 15 August to 20 August 1943, Vicinity of Naso


During this and the previous phase, the rapid advance of Seventh Army was assisted by two landings made behind the German lines along the coast, in the vicinity of Torremnova and Brolo. During these landings one SCR-299 radio set, mounted in a 2 1/2-ton amphibious truck, was furnished the 3rd Division and was used very successfully. The front line had moved forward and it was again necessary to move the Army Command Post. A reconnaissance for location was made and a site selected five miles off the wire axis in the vicinity of Naso. The Command Post opened at 1200B, on 15 August 1943.

The same radio nets were set up as at San Stefano with one addition. On 17 August one SCR-193 radio, mounted in a scout car, was sent to the 3rd Division to provide a direct link back to Army Headquarters. Wire communications were re-established with the 3rd Division at Cefalu Marea, approximately thirteen miles from Messina on 17 August. II Corps Command Post had moved to a point north of Cesaro. No open wire circuits existed on the road running south from San Agata to Cesaro, so two spiral-4 cables were laid to provide Army - Corps communications.

The tactical headquarters of Seventh Army closed at Naso, and opened at the Royal Palace in Palermo already, on August 1943.

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Signal Troops Involved	AFV	MV	EM
Army Ground Forces	764	15	6443
Army Air Force	12	12	1106
Total	779	24	8549



Rehabilitation Difficulties - Palermo

Wire Route	Rehabilitation in Miles			
	Open Wire Line	Virtual Value	Wire to
10 July to 21 July	109	154	111
21 July to 27 July	129	183	547
25 July to 6 Aug	143	345	686
6 Aug to 15 Aug	164	369	730
15 Aug to 20 Aug	143	210	1103
Total	948	1187	4791

Spiral four cable - approximately eighteen hundred (1800) miles of spiral four cable was laid by the Army Ground Force Troops. Army Air Force totals not available.

Radio: The following is the day by day totals of messages and groups sent by radio during the operations.

Date	Messages	Groups*	Date	Messages	Groups*
1 July	102	1440	21 July	172	1671
11 July	115	1836	1 Aug	195	23519
2 July	150	11056	2 Aug	196	23519
10 July	135	11805	3 Aug	171	17001
11 July	147	15494	4 Aug	169	21311
12 July	132	10408	5 Aug	166	19544
13 July	166	17323	6 Aug	169	21480
17 July	111	10561	7 Aug	254	42805
18 July	142	16053	8 Aug	271	27708
19 July	102	9121	9 Aug	228	28643
20 July	177	17731	10 Aug	211	28170
21 July	147	14294	11 Aug	111	35049
22 July	168	17504	12 Aug	179	37582
23 July	139	17082	13 Aug	158	27704
24 July	152	15007	14 Aug	224	34379
25 July	179	13854	15 Aug	261	38659
26 July	175	17215	16 Aug	337	75421
27 July	159	18707	17 Aug	277	30032
28 July	142	19091	18 Aug	236	24160
29 July	174	20136	19 Aug	228	29626
30 July	181	20779	20 Aug	241	27095

Total:

Number of Days of Operation	40
Total Messages (Incoming and Outgoing)	8,309
Average Number of Messages per day	198
Groups Handled (See Note*)	885,342
Average number of groups per message	107

Note*: The groups figure does not show the total groups actually sent, as many of the messages were to multiple addresses, which required transmission over several nets. The total groups transmitted was approximately double this figure.

REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF SIGNAL AGENCIES

Message Center:

Pre-assault phase.

A complete Army Message Center was established by the 1st Armored Signal Battalion on board the Army Headquarters Ship "U.S.S. MONTICELLO" at 0001B, 1 July 1943 (D-4) and continued to operate until 1600B, 11 July 1943, (D plus 2), at which time the Command Post opened at Sele, Sicily.

Personnel for a second message center, furnished by the 1st Armored Signal Battalion, were loaded on LST 325 on 24 June 1943. The mission of this group was to set up a signal center ashore in Sicily before the Army Command Post aboard the U.S.S. MONTICELLO closed.

During the period prior to "D" Day it was necessary to continue the operation of the Army Signal Centers at Mostaganem and Oran. The 229th Signal Operations Company relieved the 1st Armored Signal Battalion at these places on 29 June 1943.


Upon receipt of orders to close the signal center at Mostaganem on 30 June 1943, a small message center operated by the 229th Signal Operations Company was set up to serve the headquarters group at Algiers and was opened on 30 June 1943. The message center for Army Rear at Oran continued to operate until 16 July 1943, to serve parts of staff sections left at that point. On 6 July 1943 a signal center opened at Bizerte, Tunisia, manned by the 51st Signal Battalion, and was designated as Seventh Army Rear. At this time the Tactical Headquarters officially opened aboard the USS MONTICELLO.

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
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
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
"CIRCUIT DIAGRAM"
HQ. SEVENTH ARMY
AS OF 1600 B AUG 1, 1943




"CIRCUIT DIAGRAM"
HQ. SEVENTH ARMY
AS OF 1400 B AUG. 20, 1943



"TRAFFIC DIAGRAM"
HQ SEVENTH ARMY
AS OF 1600 B 7 AUG '43



"TRAFFIC DIAGRAM"
HQ. SEVENTH ARMY
AS OF 1400 B AUG. 20, 1943




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Due to the crowded conditions aboard the USS MONROVIA, space was provided for two SIGABA and three M-209 operators but the unusually heavy traffic in the M-209 cipher device required two extra code clerks. The two SIGABA machines were found to be inadequate due to the large number of high priority secret messages, therefore the probability of error was greatly increased due to not being able to use the SIGABA in tandem and insufficient time to check the accuracy of coded messages. It was essential due to the extremely urgent nature of the traffic handled that messages not only be cleared but that they be cleared immediately without a back-log of messages. This was impossible due to the fact that five or six urgent messages came into the code room at one time. It is felt that a minimum of four SIGABA machines were required.

Assault Phase.

Message center operations aboard the USS MONROVIA began on "D" Day when radio silence was lifted and by 2359B a total of 104 messages and 6853 code groups had been handled. Traffic was progressively higher on the two succeeding days afloat amounting to 135 messages and 9994 groups on D plus 1 and 174 messages and 14742 groups on D plus 2.

The message center personnel on board LST 325 was landed on 11 July 1943 (D plus 1) and was prepared for operation when the Command Post was established ashore.

As the operation progressed inland and the Army Command Post was opened at Palermo, it was necessary to place sub-message centers in central locations to handle the administrative traffic. The 229th Signal Operations Company took over the operation of the message centers at Gela and Agrigento, thus assuring complete administrative coverage of all rear areas.

When the tactical headquarters was established, the 51st Signal Battalion relieved the personnel of the 1st Armored Signal Battalion at the administrative headquarters in Palermo and continued to operate this Echelon until the close of the operation.

Pigeons

Due to the lack of transportation, pigeons were not used at any time during the Sicilian operation. Had they been available it was felt that this agency of Signal Communications could have been used to great advantage as the mountainous terrain and the rapid advance of the troops, made the use of pigeons an ideal means of communication. In many instances units were sent into the mountains to clear enemy points of resistance and to flank positions held. Baskets of pigeons could have been carried by these troops and used advantageously. Many instances occurred where these units were out of communication with their perent organization, for periods of twenty-four hours due to the restriction of radio silence; when surprise was necessary to these operations. Pigeons in these cases would have warranted the space necessary for their shipment to Sicily.

Visual Communications

No instances of the use of visual communications were reported to the Army Signal Officer. However the use of yellow smoke to indicate the positions of front line troops to friendly aircraft was habitual.

Signal Intelligence Activities

Planning


The part which Signal Intelligence "Y" (enemy intercept) activity was to play in Operation "HUSKY" was determined and planned by higher headquarters.

At the start it was planned to have the 128th Signal Radio Intelligence company divided into three detachments each with a detachment of 849th Signal Intelligence Service. It was later found that it would be possible to form only two sections of 849th S.I.S. and the 52nd Wireless Intelligence Section (British) was loaned to us to serve as the third intelligence unit.

The larger unit, Detachment 1 of the 128th Signal R.I. Company, and Detachment A of the 849th S.I.S., was to operate under the direction of Seventh Army. Detachment 2 of the 128th Signal R.I. Company and the British 52nd Wireless Intelligence Section was to operate under II Corps. Detachment 3 of the 128th Signal R.I. Company and Detachment E of the 849th S.I.S. was to operate under the 3rd Division, Reinforced.

It was agreed that advance parties with II Corps and 3rd Division would be with the assault group. Each group would consist of one officer from the Signal Intelligence Staff, three code clerks and three radio operators from the 128th Signal Radio Intelligence Company. Each group would be equipped with a 3/4-ton truck, and SCR-188 transmitter-receiver, and a special cipher system.

The purpose of the advance parties was as follows: The remainder of the three detachments of the 128th Sig. R.I. Company and the 849th S.I.S. were to operate in the Bizerte area until time as there was established in Sicily a secure bridgehead of approximately 10 miles. The bulk of the



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128th/849th organization remaining in North Africa would forward any intelligence through its own channels of communication to the advance party who would give it to his G-2.

During the planning stage of the operation it was assumed that the remainder of the 128th/849th would be brought to Sicily about D plus 20. The remainder of the three dets, would then go to their assigned units, join up with the advance party, and begin normal operations.

Operations

The three units of the 128th/849th were set up and operating according to plan on 20 June in the Bizerte area. Each of the three units were physically removed from one another in order to simulate the actual working conditions anticipated later.

Enemy intercept and the intelligence derived therefrom was not too successful, mainly because of the difficulties of intercept expected when operating at such distances from the enemy. However, sufficient training and continuity was obtained during this period to show that all possible effort to provide preleading information is warranted.

The advance parties left their respective units late in June and as no communication with them was planned prior to landing in Sicily, nothing further was heard from them until after the invasion.

On or about D plus 7 it was realized that events were moving far ahead of schedule and it was apparent that the operations of the 128th/849th could be carried on far better in Sicily than in North Africa. Transportation arrangements were made and they arrived in Sicily on August 9.

On 10 August the following movement of units were made: Detachment 1, 128th Signal R.I. Company with Detachment A of the 849th S.I.S. to San Stefano with Seventh Army; Detachment 2, 128th Signal R.I. Company with 52nd Wireless Intelligence Section to Hq II Corps. In compliance with the general policy of not placing these units below Corps level, Detachment 3 of the 128th Signal R.I. Company with Detachment E of the 849th S.I.S. was held in San Stefano at Army Headquarters to work as a unit in order to get as much field experience as possible.

Considering the lateness of arrival in the theater and the scrambled state of communications on the part of the enemy at that time, the few items of intelligence gained from PI/SIS activity were about what could have been expected. It is believed that enough intelligence of value to G-2 was obtained during this extremely short period of operation to warrant bringing the unit to Sicily.

The combined organization of detachments of a Radio Intelligence Company (approximately 80 men) with attached Signal Intelligence personnel (approximately 20 men) working with Army and Corps Headquarters as exemplified in the combination of the 128th Signal R.I. Company and the 849th S.I.S. and their assignment as in this operation, demonstrates the necessity of these two seperate units working together to accomplish a single objective.

The desirability of keeping the organization in its present highly mobile state cannot be overemphasized. It is absolutely necessary that these units maintain as close physical contact with their assigned headquarters as is possible.

The correctness of the inclusion in T/O of Army Headquarters Staff of an officer who controls these SI/SIS units at Army and Corps who acts as Army G-2 adviser in Signal Intelligence matters is apparent. The presence of this officer at Army Headquarters, the assistance he is able to offer the units under his control and the close coordination of their activities are evidence in themselves of the advisability of Army supervision.

"J" Service (Friendly Intercept)

"J" Service, that is the monitoring and reception of friendly radio stations was used by the Seventh Army during the entire Sicilian operation.

"J" Service so called after the British "J" Service, is the monitoring and interception by radio, at a headquarters usually not lower than a division, of the radio nets within that and adjacent units. This service has the dual mission, first to provide early information as to the operations, locations, and movements of friendly forward troops and secondly to monitor friendly nets with the view to checking on the radio security within that unit. During lull periods the receivers may be used to intercept enemy traffic.

"J Service operates directly under the full control of Army G-2. All information is forwarded direct to Army G-2 by the most expeditious means available, but normally through the "J" Service radio net. This information is made available to the division G-2 by means of a telephone connected to the Division switchboard. It is likewise available to adjacent division G-2 through the medium of other "J" stations operating in the Army "J" net.

The following is taken from the report of the "J" Service control officer, Seventh Army, and shows the type of intercepts derived from this service.

Use of Individual Codes

Numerous instances have occurred where our "J" service, without any prior knowledge, have kept track of the movement of friendly troops by the interception of non-standard codes. It must be assumed that the enemy can likewise make use of this same information.

The use of a standard code throughout an Army or independent corps, frequently changing the reference points or other distinguishing items, does not identify any particular unit of the Army or corps.

Army Pictorial Services

The photographic coverage on Operation "HUSKY" began some thirty days prior to the 7th Army Invasion of Sicily.

A complete pictorial record in both still photographs and motion pictures was made of the tremendous preparations for the invasion, the vast number of large and small craft that were to be used, the extensive training schedule for the troops that were to take an active part, and of numerous other activities that were then in full progress.

On all tactical maneuvers such as Paratroop landings, amphibious invasions, pill-box destruction, and street-fighting, live ammunition was used; these scenes were all very impressive and photographed through night-effect filters helped stretch the imagination.

Signal Corps Communications coordinating Air-Borne Artillery fire and troop movements were filmed.

The primary purpose for making these scenes was for an introduction of the Seventh Army in the final editing of a feature story and full length motion picture on the invasion of Sicily. However, incl. #1, a summarized critique direct from Washington, D.C. on this picture material, disclosed many other interested users.

On the invasion and throughout the entire Sicilian Campaign a total of thirty-eight Signal Corps Photographers were in the theater; six officers and thirty-two enlisted men.

Thirty-two of the above photographers were attached to the various tactical units and embarked for the invasion; this gave excellent photographic coverage while at sea and on land.

Two Signal Corps photographers volunteered for photographic assignments with the 82nd Air-Borne Division. One was assigned to the 505th Paratroop Regiment, and although he had never made a parachute jump before, he was dropped with that unit behind the enemy lines the night of July 9-10, 1943. The other photographer was assigned to a glider unit.

Special Assignment Photographic personnel under direct control of Seventh Army and not attached to any major tactical units were invaluable for getting the most photographic coverage with a limited number of Signal Corps photographers, and available camera equipment. They were comparable to reserve tactical units in so far as they were constantly shifted from one combat area to another, wherever, and whenever tactical situations required additional photographic coverage; or they were available for other important activities or special events within the theater.

C O P Y

WAR DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Public Relations
WASHINGTON DC

C O P Y

31 July 1943

SUBJECT: Film Record of Invasion Rehearsal.

TO : Brig. General Robert A. McClure
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Allied Headquarters in North Africa
APO 512, c/o Postmaster, New York

1. The pictorial record of the rehearsal of the Sicily Invasion was the most perfect war coverage in the photographic medium seen during this war.

2. A letter from Pathe News in regard to this material reads as follows:

> "In our make-up last night we devoted approximately 800 feet to your recent material on 'rehearsal for Sicily Invasion'. It was magnificent film. Please convey our respects and our gratitude to all those responsible."

3. All the other newsreels used large quantities of this material. It made an impressive presentation of the thoroughness with which our soldiers are trained for an invasion and of the excellence and abundance of material with which they are equipped. There is no doubt that such pictures as these provide a firm cement for binding the home fronts and fighting fronts together.

S/
CURTIS MITCHELL
Colonel, A.U.S.
Chief, Pictorial Branch

HEADQUARTERS
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 533

In reply refer to: AG 330.13/069 SIG-O

SUBJECT: Photographs

TO : The Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758, U.S. Army.

1. The following letter addressed to this headquarters from the War Department, Adjutant General's Office dated 4 August 1943 commending the still picture coverage of the Sicilian operations is quoted for your information:

> "The prompt and efficient manner in which the spot news pictures of the Sicilian invasion were transmitted to the United States was highly commendable. Selection of photographs for transmission by Radio Telephoto was particularly good. Newspapers throughout the country gave front page space to these pictures every day during the inception of the campaign. One New York paper used thirteen Signal Corps pictures in one issue. Photographs of the invasion sent through the usual channels are arriving promptly and are meeting with an enthusiastic reception by the Press. In view of the difficulties involved in getting the films from the front, processing, printing, captioning and shipping in record time, the results are gratifying and reflect credit on the photographic personnel concerned.
>
> By order of the Secretary of War:
>
> S/ L. M. Chitwood
> Adjutant General."

2. The photographic personnel assigned and attached to your command are to be commended on the quality of the work they performed under hazardous and difficult conditions and on their energy in rushing the exposed films to this headquarters for transmission to the United States.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

SEP 15 43 AM
RECEIVED
HQ SEVENTH ARMY

S/ TROY H. BROWN, JR.
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

AG 220.6-A
HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTH ARMY, APO #758, 21 September 1943

1st Ind. GSFJr/ss

TO: Personnel, 7th Army Pictorial Service, APO #758.

I take great pleasure in adding my commendation to that of the War Department.

S/ G. S. Patton Jr.
G. S. PATTON, JR.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.


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SEVENTH ARMY
LINE ROUTE MAP
080D BM 18 AUG. 43


-LEGEND-
OPEN WIRE
SPIRAL-4
FIELD WIRE
UNDERGROUND CABLE
TP. REPEATER STATION

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USE FOR PHOTO-MAIL ONLY

WAR DEPARTMENT

Filed: AG 333.53 (2 Jul 43) OR-S

Subject: Review of Film

To: Commanding General
U. S. Army Forces
A. P. O. 512, % Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

Attn: Signal Officer

From: Army Service Forces
Adjutant General's Office
Washington, D. C.

Date: 2 July 1943

1. Official United States Army Signal Corps motion pictures exposed in your theatre and received in Washington, D. C. have been reviewed by the War Department Board of Review.

2. Critiques on these motion pictures are summarized as follows:

Shipment No.	Cameraman	Subject	Critiques
S-55 35mm B&W	Sgt. Morang	King George visits troops.	Photography and coverage good. Some good close-ups. Subject of interest for Public Relations.
S-56 35mm B&W	Alcock	King George and Correspondents.	Coverage and photography good. Here, too, some good close-up work. Good Public Relations material.
S-58 35mm B&W	Sgt. Morang	Invasion Maneuvers, Landing Practice, Reduction of Pillbox; Street Fighting Training; Glider Operations; Waterproof Vehicle Tests; Parachute Maneuvers.	A good deal of interesting and well photographed material in this 18,000 feet of film. Each subject very well covered. Parachute. Glider and Invasion subjects extremely good. These subjects being utilized by Public Relations, Ordnance, Marine Corps, Quartermaster, Military Intelligence, Administrative Services, Air Forces, Engineers, and Signal Corps.

By Order of the Secretary of War:

RECEIVED JUL 18 P.M. Signal Section A.F. H.Q.

Adjutant General

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 1000 September 15, 1942

Signal Supply During Active Operations In Sicily

Signal Supply for the troops in Sicily started on 10 July 1943, with the opening of Sub-Task Force Signal Dumps - one for each of the forces as follows:

At Vittoria for CENT Force.
At Gela for DIME Force.
At Licata for JOSS Force.
At Gela (same dump as DIME) for KOOL Force.

Assault phase Signal supplies for these Sub-Task Forces were placed in these dumps and issued under control of Sub-Task Force Signal Officer until the dumps reverted to Seventh Army control. These dumps were operated by S. and I. Section of the 206th Signal Depot Company, which were attached one each to CENT, DIME, and JOSS Forces. They were assisted by personnel of the Sub-Task Forces.

On 16, 17, and 18 July 1943, Sub-Task Forces were dissolved and all units reverted to Seventh Army control at which time all Sub-Task Force Dumps became Army Supply Points controlled by Army. On 16, 17, and 18 July 1943, the Special Engineer Brigade was given the responsibility of unloading all supplies and operating all depots and dumps, under the direction of the various supply services through G-4 Seventh Army.

For the assault phase, a seven day maintenance of Signal supplies was carried by the DIME Force. The CENT and KOOL Forces each carried twenty-one day maintenance.

About 20 July 1943 the units of II Corps had pushed on beyond Caltanissetta and were too distant from their A.S.P. at Gela. A new Signal A.S.P. was established for the units of the II Corps at Caltanissetta about this time. Also the A.S.P. at Vittoria was abandoned and all stocks moved to Gela Dump. Unloading of supplies at Vittoria stopped and there was no need for further activity in this area.

The Caltanissetta Signal A.S.P. was supplied from Gela and Licata stocks. On 27 July 1943 the Caltanissetta Signal A.S.P. was closed and moved to Petralia, nearer the unit it was serving.

On 27 July 1943 the Palermo Signal Supply Depot was opened in the captured Italian Engineer Depot. In the Italian Army the Engineers have the communication responsibility and therefore had the signal supplies. A lot of usable stock was taken over and much of it issued and used. The 814th Signal Port Service Company came in about this date and since the Engineer Shore Regiments operating the port had their own signal corps personnel, the Port Company was used to open and operate the depot.

On about 29 July 1943 the Gela dump was abandoned and all stocks moved to Petralia and Licata. The S. and I. Section of the 206th Signal Depot Company under Lt. Burns, was then moved to Palermo to help establish and operate the Base Depot.

On about 1 August 1943 the balance of the 206th Signal Depot Company arrived at Palermo and were moved to the Base Depot, Palermo, and began the operation in conjunction with the 814th Signal Port Service Company.

On 3 August 1943 the Signal A.S.P. serving II Corps units was moved forward to Nicosia. Several days later the A.S.P. and a wire dump was established at Orlando as a branch of the Nicosia Depot.

Supplies were moved forward by daily train from Licata, supplemented by truck transportation and by truck and train from Palermo.

As soon as possible after the units reverted from Sub-Task Force control to Seventh Army control, the three repair sections of the 177th Signal Repair Company were detached from the units to which they were assigned and were assigned one each to the three S. and I. sections of the 206th Signal Depot Company. These repair sections worked in and near the A.S.P.'s, but on occasions had gone out to units to check and repair their equipment.

LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS

The earliest possible information on the numbers and types of signal units available for an operation is required to permit the Signal Officer to formulate the signal plan.

A complete troop list of units is required early in the planning phase to permit the necessary specialist training and to form a basis for signal supply.

If an Army Base Section is required, its signal personnel must be assembled at the beginning of the planning phase.

Special equipment requirements must be made known as early as possible to permit the procurement thereof.

Signal operation personnel must always accompany their equipment during shipment and must assist in the loading and unloading of this equipment to assure proper handling and safeguarding of signal items.

All Signal Corps agencies of the various sections of the Air Corps must be coordinated under a single head. All Air Corps sections have important operating requirements, both for wire and radio. These requirements must be coordinated by an Air Corps Officer.

In amphibious operations, the Signal Section must be divided into two echelons, each capable of operating independently, in case one is lost during landing operations.

The Signal Section must habitually function in two echelons, one at the Tactical, and the other at the Administrative Command Post.

In a landing operation, when several beachheads are being established, several small, fast, power boats, should be made available to the Task Force Commander for liaison and messenger service between Force Headquarters and subordinate units. In the initial stages of the landing, before roads are cleared for motor messengers, these craft could be of inestimable value.

TRAINING

In any future operation involving the use of signal troops, the training of such troops must be conducted by the unit base section, under the supervision of the Army Signal Officer. This instruction must be continuous except during actual operations.

More thorough training of Signal troops is required in mine and booby trap detection and removal.

Signal Battalions need far more training and instruction in the use and maintenance of teletypewriter equipment.

Each Construction Company of the Construction Battalion or Army Signal Battalion must be primarily trained and equipped for open wire construction. Construction units for Corps and Divisions must be trained and equipped for both open and field wire construction.

Every Signal Corps combat unit should go into battle with an overstrength of junior officers and enlisted men. At the end of any campaign and prior to the start of the next, there is always a demand for experienced junior officers and non-commissioned officers. This experience can only be acquired in actual combat. It would then be possible to take a number of such officers and men from these units to provide an experienced cadre without materially wrecking the parent organization.

Cable splicers assigned to signal battalion have insufficient knowledge of their specialty.

MESSAGE CENTER

There must be a redefinition of the Adjutant Generals, mail and distribution sections, and the Signal Corps Message Center duties. Messages incoming and outgoing are unnecessarily delayed by having to pass through two offices at one headquarters before delivery to addressee.

The majority of all messages transmitted are overclassified, both as to priority and security.

Messages to be relayed to one or more headquarters must indicate the unit or units to which it is desired a copy be sent, in the address of the message, rather than in the content. Message center personnel must not be expected to search for addressees concealed within the message. This causes delays in transmission, and increases the possibility of error.

More importance must be given to message centers by all units. Uniformly the number and quality of personnel p rovided is inadequate.

Senior field officers must be included in the Army signal section to provide adequate supervision and direction of Army message centers. The message center officer is the key officer connected with the handling of all messages at any headquarters. His duties are similar to those of a traffic manager in a telegraph office. This officer must have all agencies of communications under his control, must know the capabilities and limitations of each and must know instinctively which agency should be used to transmit a message of any priority and security classification. His rank and that of the men serving under him, must be such that this most important task is one sought after rather than avoided.

There is a definite lack of sufficient clerks in the message centers of Army, Corps, and Divisions. (See recommendations for changes under appropriate tables of organization).

Maintenance specialists for code devices including the M-134 (SIGABA) and the M-209 must be included in T/O's for Army and Corps.

The Air-Ground liaison code and the division field code were not used in this operation as the converter M-209 has proven itself to be more secure and much faster to operate with less possibility of error.

RADIO

Tactical radio channels must not be used for administrative traffic during the assault landing period.

Considerably more high-powered radio channels are required by an Army headquarters than can be provided and operated under current tables.

The radio set SCR-193, mounted in a 1/4 ton, 4x4 truck, is the most useful radio set for all around use in sparsely covered and difficult terrain.

It is recommended that link-sign procedure be used only from Division headquarters downward. The units assigned to a division are not so frequently changed and there is less relay traffic; therefore, less confusion results from the use of Link-Sign Procedure. CCBF-1 and CCBP-2 should be used from Division Headquarters upward. Here the frequent changing of Divisions from one Corps to another, the larger volume of relay-traffic, and the existence of several links between the same two headquarters causes unjustifiable confusion if Link-Sign Procedure is used.

OPEN WIRE CONSTRUCTION

The principal Army wire axis should be constructed of 12 gauge, Bronze and Sharp, .104 copper wire or larger.

In both Africa and Sicily rehabilitated civilian commercial circuits were found to be unreliable for the use of carrier equipment.

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Where several agencies require separate wire channels, priorities must be established by the Army Signal Officer. The following were found to be satisfactory during this campaign:

Priority	For use by
1	Army (common use)
2	Air Corps (exclusive)
3	Army (common use)
4	Air Corps (exclusive)
5	Railroad Service (exclusive)
others	Army (common use)

When moving forward it is better to lay new wire lines than to rely on repaired enemy lines.

Some equivalent to the British Multi-Airline (MAL) construction must be provided for Army and Corps use. The time necessary to build a Rapid Pole Line (RPL) is such that this type of line has been misnamed. Experience has shown that if the materials are available it takes only a short time longer to place 20 foot poles than the 4 x 4 poles of RPL. The shorter height of the MAL could be offset by having a number of 20 foot poles slightly larger in diameter, to be used at road crossings and wherever found necessary. With equal weights of materials considerably more MAL can be built than RPL.

A standardized transposition scheme must be prescribed by the Army Signal Officer to be used by all Signal troops engaged in line rehabilitation. This scheme must be rigidly adhered to, to prevent cross talk and noise as the circuits are extended.

CABLE

Spiral-4 cable does not furnish reliable wire communications. It was found to be extremely temperamental in that an inspection of individual reels before their use would show perfect continuity with no cross talk and after carefully laying several miles it was found to develop cross talk for no apparent reason. A speedy and suitable means of testing spiral-4 without breaking the continuity has not been developed. This causes undue interruptions over both circuits, one which could possibly be used, but which is broken by the lineman testing the other. Its use in the forward area increased communication difficulties and took a considerably longer period to shoot trouble on than wire of the long range type, i.e., W-110-TC, W-110-T10, and W-143. Spiral-4 is particularly susceptible to enemy sabotage in that its size and prominence lets the saboteur know here is an important communication channel and one easily interrupted. This is not the case with the long range field wire as its size is comparable to other field wires and should one circuit of the carrier go into trouble the other could be used as a single channel with telegraph simplex. The repair or reconstruction of open wire lines was found in many instances to be more satisfactory. The value of spiral-4 cable in future field operations is considered as very questionable.

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE

In future operations involving the use of a Signal Radio Intelligence unit, those persons who are to supervise the operations of the unit must be included in the planning phase, to familiarize themselves with the proposed plan of action. Considerable information as to enemy movements, supply, and disposition would then be available prior to embarkation.

The inclusion of the Army Signal Intelligence officer in the advance group is essential in order to assure the earliest practicable movement of the Signal Radio Intelligence units to the theater.

The most valuable conclusion drawn from Signal Intelligence participation in the Sicilian Operation is that the German Army continues to pass low grade traffic over its radio channels. The interception and interpretation of this traffic will provide valuable information to G-2.

All codes and ciphers used within the Army by subordinate units must be coordinated by the Army Signal Officer. The repeated use of an individual code by a unit easily identifies that unit to an alert enemy signal intelligence service, thereby providing him with early information of the movement or relief of that unit.

TABLES OF ORGANIZATION

Practically all T/O's of Signal units within an Army require changes. In all cases, not enough personnel are provided. Details of the recommended changes will be forwarded under separate cover.

The Signal Battalions serving Army Headquarters require more personnel and more highly trained personnel than those now assigned to Corps.

Among the Army Signal units there must be included an Army Signal Battalion for each Corps assigned or attached to the Army. In addition to the above, there must be included one Construction Battalion, one Operations Battalion which must include one Radio Operations Company, two Signal Depot Companies, one Signal Repair and Maintenance Company, one Signal Photographic Company, one Signal Pigeon Platoon, one Signal Friendly Intercept (J Service) Company, one Signal Radio Intelligence and Signal Intelligence Service Detachment for Army Headquarters, and one such detachment for each Corps assigned or attached to the Army.

There is a definite need for a Signal Air Courier Company, equipped with Piper Cub or equivalent light planes, capable of landing in small fields.

There is a definite need for the Radio Intercept Platoon in the Division Signal Company.

Each Base Section assigned to an Army must have one Signal Depot Company, one Signal Service Battalion, and one Signal Port Service Company, if required by the operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That in each headquarters the staff officer approving outgoing messages also assign the priority and security classifications.

That complete troop list be procured in earliest possible phase of planning.

That special equipment requirements be determined as early as possible in the planning phase.

That all Signal Corps and communication personnel be given intensive training in mine and booby trap detection and removal.

That the operating personnel always accompany shipments of communication equipment.

That the Army General and Special Staff personnel be instructed in the functions, capabilities, and limitations of signal communications.

That all staffs be given instruction in the classification of messages, both as to precedence and security.

That a separate administrative radio net be provided during the landing operations.

That originators of messages be held responsible that addressees are listed outside the body of the message.

That subordinate units be required to use the authorized Army codes only.

There is a definite need for code practice equipment in the Army to permit training in radio operation and procedure

Facsimile equipment is needed in the Army Headquarters.

Radio-teletypewriter equipment is required at Army Headquarters.

That Base Section or SOS Signal Section personnel be available to work with the Army Signal Section during the planning phase.

That the Air Corps coordinate communication requirements for wire circuits for each of its sub-sections taking part in an operation.

That properly designed and constructed headquarters ships be provided for amphibious operations.

That Signal Corps personnel operating on a twenty-four hour basis be authorized one and one-third rations. Many Signal troops are required to operate all night, requiring an extra meal at midnight.

TABLES OF ORGANIZATION

That more Signal Construction Companies be activated to provide additional units of this type for battalions where necessary.

That a Signal Detachment, Friendly Intercept ("J" Service) be activated and provided for each Army.

That Signal Service Battalions, made up of limited service troops, be made available for the use of Base Sections, or the SOS, when required.

That Signal Air Messenger Companies be organized and one such company be assigned to each Army.

That an overstrength of fifteen percent for enlisted men and officers below the grade of captain be made available to all Signal units entering combat.

DIVISION SIGNAL COMPANY

The following changes in Tables of Organization of the Division Signal Company are recommended:

T/O should be revised to make a Signal Battalion of the Signal Company. Present company is too bulky to act efficiently as a company for adequate training, operation, and administration.

The Division Signal unit should be furnished personnel and equipment for communication to the next lower echelon below divisions to and including at least as far as Infantry and Artillery Battalions.

The Message Center Officer of divisions should have the rank of captain, and have at least two assistants in the grade of 1st or 2nd Lieutenant.

WIRE CIRCUITS

That the main Army wire circuits be constructed of heavy copper wire.

TRAINING

That immediate steps be taken to train Signal Corps Officers in Army Signal Supply.

That all cable splicers graduated from the Signal Corps schools be given a further training period of at least two weeks working as a helper to a cable splicer of the Bell Telephone or independent telephone company. Arrangements could be made with these companies operating in the vicinity of the school for such training.

That all Signal Corps and communications personnel be given intensive training in mine and booby trap detection and removal.

That originators of messages be held responsible that addressees are listed outside the body of the message.

That radio procedure outlined in CCBP-1 and CCBP-2 be used only in the Army — Corps — Division Nets.

That Link Sign Procedure be used in division and lower nets.

MODIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT

Signal Corps units should use standard, rather than special, types of trucks.

SIGNAL SUPPLY

More emphasis must be placed on the training of Signal Corps officers and enlisted men on Army supply problems. New officers assigned cannot acquire the necessary experience in less than six months. Army Signal Supply is a different specialty than routine base signal supply.

A pool of Signal Corps equipment must be maintained under the direct supervision of the Army Signal Officer. Many emergencies occur requiring the use of items held in such pools for which no time can be allowed for authorization and procurement through other channels.

Elton F. Hammond

ELTON F. HAMMOND,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Signal Officer.

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REPORT OF THE SURGEON

INDEX

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III. Hospitalization

IV. Evacuation

V. Care of Sick and Wounded

VI. Prisoner of War Casualties

VII. Preventive Medicine

VIII. Medical Supply

IX. Conclusions

X. Recommendations

ANNEXES:

1. - Report Guide Index.

2. - Station Blotter.

3. - Provisional change in Corps Medical Bn.

4. - Diagrams of medical service on D-Day and after D/6

5. - Graphs and Charts of Sick Rates.

Maps:

Hospitalization

Evacuation

Medical Supply

I PLANNING PHASE

With the announcement of the part to be played by Headquarters, I Armored Corps, Reinforced, in the planning and execution of Operation "HUSKY", the Medical Section immediately started preparation to provide for the medical support necessary for the Task Force.

Pertinent information was extracted from Reports on Sicily. Thus a clear picture of the sanitary conditions on the island, and on suitable sites for medical installations, was obtained.

Upon receipt of the list for the allocation of medical units assigned to this Force, a tentative plan was drawn up. This plan was based upon the estimated requirements of each Sub-Task Force, taking into consideration the objective, terrain, number of troops, and estimated total number of casualties.

The basic principle was to support each RCT in the Assault with a Collecting-Clearing Company of a Medical Battalion. The Sub-Task Forces were to have a Field Hospital with Surgical Teams, and an Ambulance Platoon, in the Assault.

By D/4 the Evacuation Hospitals (400 bed) were to arrive, one to each Division. Later, on call, Evacuation Hospitals (750 bed) were to arrive in the proportion of one to two Evacuation Hospitals (400 bed).

Other medical units such as Veterinary Detachments, Malarial Control Units, Station, General, and Convalescent Hospitals, Medical Laboratories, and Hospital Ships, were set up in the order of priority consistent with the anticipated demand for them in Sicily.

Medical Supply - Medical Supply played an important role in the planning for the Operation "HUSKY". Requisitions for medical supplies and equipment were made out in advance to allow time for shipment from the United States. These requisitions included maintenance supplies and extra equipment to cover losses during the Operation. Each one covered a 15-Day period, with additional items to build up to a 30-Day reserve. Advance Sections of a Medical Supply Platoon were given a high priority in order to set up an efficient and adequate source of medical supplies as early as possible.

Medical Reports and Statistics - Realizing that many medical units in the field did not have access to current Army Regulations, Circulars, and Official Letters, a pamphlet was compiled to serve as a guide for the proper preparation of the medical reports. To indicate the scope of the instructions and subjects covered in this booklet, a copy of the Index to the Report Guide is included. (See Annex No. 1).

Also revisions of two Medical Department forms were made. The 86e was revised and redesignated as the Station Blotter (See Annex No. 2). The 86f was modified to include additional pertinent data necessary in amphibious operations. Medical administrative experience gained during the African Campaign formed the basis for the revision of these two forms.

Prior to the operation each enlisted man in the Medical Section was given an intensive training course dealing specifically with casualty reports and compilation of technical medical data.

Training - A rigorous training program was instituted early in the planning phase. With the arrival of medical installations in the Mostaganem-Oran area, an intensive schedule of Amphibious training was initiated. This was carried out under the supervision of the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center at Arzew Beach. At this time the 56th Medical Battalion was divided into 3 Collecting-Clearing Companies, a Provisional Clearing Platoon being formed out of elements from the station and litter bearer platoon. Very little extra equipment was necessary for this change. The above reorganization in the corps medical battalion was affected after a thorough study of the requirements of a medical battalion during invasion operations. (See Annex No. 3).

The culmination of the medical planning was the publishing of Medical Annex No. 2 to Administrative Order No. 1.

II MEDICAL SUPPORT

Medical support proceeded according to plan with the initial landings of the Sub-Task Forces. Army medical units attached to the Sub-Task Forces, i.e., Collecting-Clearing Companies of the Corps Type Medical Battalion, and Field Hospital Platoons with Surgical Teams attached, landed during the period H/6 hours and D/2 to render additional support necessary to Divisional Medical Battalions to care for non-transportable casualties, and to aid in the beach evacuation. These units moved in close support of the combat troops, as outlined in the reports of the Sub-Task Forces, and of the individual units.

On D/2, personnel of the 11th Evacuation Hospital, consisting of 2 officers, 135 enlisted men, and 42 nurses, landed without equipment. By D/5, the remainder of the personnel and all the equipment had arrived and the hospital opened D/5 in the vicinity of Licata. Personnel and equipment of the 93rd Evacuation Hospital began to arrive on D-Day. By D/5, the majority of this personnel and equipment had arrived, and by D/6, the hospital opened 5 miles north of Gela. The 15th Evacuation Hospital was also scheduled to arrive on D/4. The personnel of this hospital did arrive on D/4, but the equipment did not begin to arrive until D/6. By D/10, sufficient equipment had arrived for the hospital to open in the vicinity of Caltanissetta.

On D/6, the Army medical units supporting the DIME and CENT Forces (54th Medical Battalion, 1 Collecting-Clearing Company of the 51st Medical Battalion, 11th Field Hospital with Surgical Teams attached, 1 Platoon Company A, 36th Ambulance Battalion, the 15th Evacuation Hospital, and the 93rd Evacuation Hospital), were attached to the II Corps. Army medical units supporting the JOSS Force, (56th Medical Battalion less 1 Collecting-Clearing Company, 1 Collecting-Clearing Company 51st Medical Battalion, 10th Field Hospital with Surgical Teams attached, and the 11th Evacuation Hospital), remained under the 3rd Infantry Division. 1 Collecting-Clearing Company of the 56th Medical Battalion reverted to Army control and was attached to the 82nd Airborne Division.

On 22 July, an advance section of the 128th Evacuation Hospital arrived at Licata. It was not until 31 July that sufficient personnel and equipment arrived, and it was on this day that the hospital opened 4 miles west of Cefalu. This hospital operated as an Army installation to support the II Corps and as a holding unit for Hospital Train transfer of casualties from the II Corps medical installations to Palermo.

On 27 July, the advance section of the 91st Evacuation Hospital, consisting of 4 officers and 59 enlisted men, received the majority of their equipment. The hospital was opened in the Policlinico Hospital, Palermo, and began to receive patients from the II Corps and 3rd Infantry Division medical installations. On 29 July, emergency personnel and equipment was provided the 91st Evacuation Hospital to care for the large number of patients received. On 30 July, the remainder of the personnel and equipment of this hospital arrived.

On 1 August, the 11th Evacuation Hospital and the 10th Field Hospital were attached to the II Corps.

On 6 August, the nurses of the 59th Evacuation Hospital landed at Palermo. On 8 August, the remainder of the personnel of the 59th Evacuation Hospital arrived Palermo, without their hospital equipment, and located at the Policlinico Hospital in Palermo, adjoining the 91st Evacuation Hospital. Sufficient equipment was obtained from the 91st Evacuation Hospital and from the Medical Supply Depot, and so they helped in the care of the large number of patients admitted to the 91st Evacuation Hospital.

On 10 August, the equipment of the 59th Evacuation Hospital arrived and the hospital opened on 12 August prepared to accept 1000 patients.

When hostilities ceased on 18 August, the hospitals were located as follows:

93rd Evacuation Hospital	-	Nicosia
15th Evacuation Hospital	-	Nicosia
59th Evacuation Hospital	-	Palermo
91st Evacuation Hospital	-	Palermo
11th Evacuation Hospital	-	Capo d'Orlando
128th Evacuation Hospital	-	Caronia
1 Platoon, 11th Field Hospital	-	Randazzo
11th Field Hospital (-1 Platoon)	-	Cesaro
1 Platoon, 10th Field Hospital	-	Barcelona
10th Field Hospital (-1 Platoon)	-	Stas Acque Dolci

The movement of the hospital installations from D-Day to the end of hostilities in Sicily is shown on the attached diagrams and map (Annexes Nos. 4 and 5).

III HOSPITALIZATION

During the active part of the campaign, it was planned to use only Army type hospitals. The fixed type hospitals were to arrive at the cessation of hostilities, when shipping would be less acute and there would be more need for that type of medical and surgical work.

The 2 Field Hospitals were placed in the Assault Group, and the Evacuation Hospitals (400 bed) were scheduled to arrive in Sicily on D/4. However, when plans were submitted by the Sub-Task Force Commanders, it was apparent that certain changes were being made in the medical plan, the most notable ones being, the deletion of the Field Hospitals from the Assault Group, and the delaying of one Evacuation Hospital (400 bed) until D/8. Since the minimum required hospital beds had been set up to accompany the Assault Phase, the necessity of having hospitals arrive early was insisted upon. As a result, the Field Hospitals, or platoons of same, sailed with the Assault. However, 1 Evacuation Hospital (400 bed) in the JOSS Force, still remained scheduled for the D/8 convoy.

The Field Hospitals operated in support of the Clearing Stations. One Field Hospital was set up most of the time as a unit, while the other functioned in three separate platoons. A study of the administration, mobility, and work performed, indicated that these hospitals operated more efficiently when utilized as separate platoons. There were only sufficient officers for the administrative work, the professional work was performed by the attached Surgical Teams.

Most of the Evacuation Hospitals did not arrive on schedule. Frequently, the personnel and the hospital equipment were on separate convoys. This was a definite handicap, as personnel without equipment became a liability rather than a help at a time when the need for hospitals was vital.

The Evacuation Hospitals (750 bed) were requested early and repeatedly. Due to limited shipping, only one arrived and opened on D/33.

Expansion was necessary as the hospitals filled to capacity. The stock of medical supplies planned for such a contingency, and the use of captured medical equipment, made this possible. All hospitals increased their capacity by 200 to 400 beds. However, this did not affect their efficiency.

To further relieve the congestion, Clearing Platoons of the Corps Type Medical Battalions were expanded to the maximum and set up in the vicinity of the Evacuation Hospitals. Thus utilized, they augmented the hospital bed capacity by 100 to 200 beds.

To eliminate long ambulance hauls, an Army Evacuation Hospital (400 bed) was established well forward at the junction of the roads leading from the Corps Evacuation Hospitals. All Corps casualties were filtered through this installation.


The Clearing Platoons were employed as holding units at Airfields, and held up to 250 patients. This facilitated air evacuation, since the transports did not arrive or depart on schedule.

It is evident, the most than can be expected of Field or Evacuation Hospitals, is that they render early definitive treatment and only to hold casualties until they become transportable. Therefore, it is necessary that additional hospitalization be provided in the Combat Zone to care for those patients returnable to duty.

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IV EVACUATION

Due to the geographical location and the type of terrain on the Island, all methods were employed for the transportation of casualties.

Ambulances played the major role. After the initial action, one Medical Battalion and an Ambulance Company reverted to Army control, in order to clear forward hospitals.

The mountainous terrain and the narrow winding roads made ambulance evacuation impossible from several of the combat units during one phase of the campaign. Litter bearers and pack mules were then used to transport the casualties. Fortunately, the rapidly changing picture required the use of this means of evacuation for only a few days.

With the stabilizing of action along the northern coast of Sicily and with the eastward advancement of the troops, Palermo became the center of evacuation. To facilitate the transporting of casualties rearward, a captured Italian Hospital Train was completely staffed, including Nurses, equipped, and set in operation. An Army Evacuation Hospital was located close to the train terminal at Cefalu on 31 July, one day prior to initial trip of the train.

Provision was made to give the patients food and drink, including a hot meal, while enroute.

The first Hospital Ship arrived on D/5. Initially, there was difficulty in obtaining Hospital Ships as requested. Later, a definite policy was established and they arrived fairly close to schedule.

Hospital CARRIERS were more adaptable than Hospital SHIPS. Due to the condition of the Ports, it was impossible for these ships to dock. Each Hospital Carrier was equipped with 6 water ambulances and was able to transport casualties quickly and easily from the beaches, in contrast to a Hospital Ship where it was necessary to secure small craft. These boats were often not available or dock space was inadequate, and thus there was some difficulty in transferring patients from shore to ship. Also unloading the casualties from small craft to the ship was slow and arduous, and would have been impossible in a rough sea. On the other hand, water ambulances were lifted to the deck of the ship by electric winches, making transfer easy.

Air Evacuation was established on D/4. As the tactical situation developed, more Airfields became available for air evacuation. Through constant liaison with the Air Evacuation Officers, who landed on D/6, it was possible to learn when airfields would be available. Upon receipt of this information, a Clearing Platoon was moved to the vicinity of the airport and set up in readiness to hold casualties. In order to spare patients the discomfort of a long ambulance ride, and to shorten the time of evacuation, airfields or landing strips were established close to the forward areas.

It was apparent in this campaign that a type of light plane with a slow landing speed, or a Helicopter, should be available for the transporting of patients from isolated areas, and also for the movement of casualties unable to stand an ambulance trip over rough roads. The Evacuation Officer should be provided with a similar plane to enable him to keep in close contact with the scattered medical installations.

Significant Dates -

Air Evacuation began:

Gela	-	14 July
Licata	-	14 July
Agrigento	-	23 July
Castelvetrano	-	24 July
Palermo	-	27 July
Termini	-	5 Aug.

Hospital Ship and Hospital Carrier Evacuation began:

Gela	-	15 July
Scoglitti	-	16 July
Licata	-	17 July
Palermo	-	29 July

(See Map-Opposite)






EVACUATION TO HOSPITAL CARRIER BY WATER AMBULANCE



INTERIOR VIEW
CAPTURED ITALIAN HOSPITAL TRAIN

TENTAGE OF SURGICAL UNIT
of a
CAPTURED ITALIAN FIELD HOSPITAL





EXTERIOR VIEW
CAPTURED ITALIAN HOSPITAL TRAIN

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AIR EVACUATION BEGAN 27 JULY

HOSPITAL SHIP EVACUATION BEGAN 29 JULY

AIR EVACUATION BEGAN 5 AUG.

HOSPITAL TRAIN SERVICE TO PALERMO BEGAN 1 AUG REGULAR SCHEDULE IN EFFECT ON 5 AUG.

LEAVE CEFALU — 1200 B
ARRIVE PALERMO — 1415 B
LEAVE PALERMO — 2000 B
ARRIVE CEFALU — 2215 B

HOSPITAL TRAIN SERVICE TO PALERMO VIA CEFALU BEGAN 16 AUG

SCHEDULE

LEAVE CEFALU — 0600 B
ARRIVE SAN POLLINA — 0630 B
LEAVE SAN POLLINA — 1100 B
ARRIVE CEFALU — 1130 B
LEAVE CEFALU — 1200 B
ARRIVE PALERMO — 1415 B
LEAVE PALERMO — 2000 B
ARRIVE CEFALU — 2215 B

HOSPITAL TRAIN SERVICE TO PALERMO VIA SAN POLLINA AND CEFALU BEGAN 18 AUG.

AIR EVACUATION BEGAN 24 JULY

AIR EVACUATION BEGAN 23 JULY

AIR EVACUATION BEGAN 14 JULY

HOSPITAL SHIP EVACUATION BEGAN 17 JULY

AIR EVACUATION BEGAN 14 JULY

HOSPITAL SHIP EVACUATION BEGAN 15 JULY

HOSPITAL SHIP EVACUATION BEGAN 16 JULY

EVACUATION

SICILY

SCALE 1:750 000

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V CARE OF SICK AND WOUNDED

During the invasion phase of the Sicilian Campaign, rapid evacuation of the casualty after preliminary treatment in the Clearing Station, was successfully executed. The non-transportable casualty was treated in the Platoon of the Field Hospital, which, with the attached Surgical Teams, was prepared to treat all types of battle casualties.

With the arrival in Sicily of the Evacuation Hospitals, a 7-day holding policy was established. The transportable casualties were sent directly to the Evacuation Hospitals by the Divisional Clearing Stations. The non-transportable casualties continued to be cared for by the Platoons of the Field Hospitals, in direct support of the Divisional Clearing Stations, until the patient's condition permitted transfer to an Evacuation Hospital. In view of the fact, that all the Evacuation Hospitals did not arrive as planned, it was found necessary to expand the hospitals to the maximum and yet keep them as mobile as possible.

The majority of the serious wounded, especially chest and abdominal wounds, received definitive treatment in the Field Hospital Platoons. The less serious wounds and injuries, most of the intracranial wounds and the majority of the sick, were treated in the Evacuation Hospitals. The calibre of the medical care given and the surgery performed was superior.

During the period D-day through 18 August, there were 20,734 hospital admissions of U. S. Army personnel. Of this total 7,414 were caused by wounds or injuries; the remaining 13,320 admissions were of patients in the disease category.

Malaria far exceeded all other admissions of any given type, 4,440 cases were reported. As proved by smear, Benign Tertian was by far the most common. A large group of cases was diagnosed as malaria unclassified on the basis of the clinical symptoms, even though negative laboratory findings were reported. Many of these cases, after the administration of adrenalin (1cc), a blood smear taken in one hour showed parasites in the peripheral blood. Coma cases were singularly infrequent, and almost all cases responded promptly to intravenous quinine therapy. Complications as a result of the Malaria therapy, other than infrequent cases of secondary anemia and haemolytic icterus, were not encountered.

The Diarrheas comprised the next largest group of admissions. The total number was 2,470. Of these, 1,837 were classified as Simple Diarrhea, and a smaller group 600 was classified as Dysentery. Those cases showing febrile reactions, dehydration, blood, pus, and macrophages in the stool, were considered as Bacillary Dysentery. The very few cases of Amebiasis were diagnosed after combined sigmoidoscopic and stool examination. Treatment was symptomatic in the simple cases. Sulfaguanadine was used in the early Bacillary and Sulfadiazine in the late Bacillary types. Cases of Amebiasis were treated with Emetine and Carbasone. Sigmoidoscopy was used whenever possible and proved of great value in differentiating Amebiasis, Bacillary Dysentery, and cases of functional and simple diarrheas.

"Fever of Unknown Origin" was a diagnosis reported in a large number of cases. Sandfly Fever, undiagnosed as such, was the disease responsible for most of these cases. Undoubtedly, cases of Malaria, sufficiently suppressed by Atabrine so as to be subclinical in type, as well as cases of Influenza and Upper Respiratory Disease, also contributed to this group.

Skin Lesions caused relatively few hospital admissions. The majority of these consisted of cases of Pyodermia and Furunculosis, and were considered due to infected insect bites and irritation of clothing in the presence of profuse perspiration. Cases of Trichophytosis and severely blistered and macerated feet were admitted and were usually due to prolonged marches, heat, sleeping with shoes on, and inability to adequately care for the feet.

Communicable Diseases were reported in 905 cases. The majority of these were cases of Acute Upper Respiratory Disease and Influenza. No particular or unusual problems were encountered.

Venereal Disease was not a problem during this campaign. There were 301 cases reported, of which 232 were Gonorrheal Urethritis. The uncomplicated cases of Gonorrhea were started on treatment and then returned to duty for continuation of treatment under the supervision of the Unit Surgeon, providing that Unit was not engaged in active combat.

Neuropsychiatric diagnosis was responsible for 702 hospital admissions. In practically all instances, the mental conflict appeared to be related either directly or indirectly to combat service and experiences. 386 of these cases displayed manifestations too severe to warrant an early return to duty and were evacuated. 42 cases remained in the hospitals as of 20 August. Some of these patients admitted with the diagnosis of Anxiety State, had an associated Malarial Parasitization. In several of these cases, Malaria therapy caused a disappearance of the various vague subjective complaints, which had originally been ascribed to the Anxiety State, but which probably represented symptoms of subclinical Malarial Fever. One may conclude that it is erroneous and even dangerous to accept a diagnosis of Mental disease at its face value in a Malarial area.

The Surgery performed was skillful. 2,308 casualties due to injury, and 5,106 battle casualties were admitted. No serious difficulties with regard to surgical work were encountered, nor were there any unusual complications or problems.

Fluroscopic and X-ray examination of all cases of injury caused by foreign bodies proved exceedingly important. It was very evident that in all the hospitals, the volume of Fluroscopic and X-ray work done was in excess to the proportion of the personnel and equipment allowed by the T/O and T/BA. It is commendable that these difficulties were overcome so that every casualty was adequately treated.

Gas Gangrene had been expected to be a greater problem than experienced in the Tunisian Campaign. However, the incidence of gas gangrene was very low. This can be attributed to two principal factors: (a). Complete debridement and removal of all foreign bodies and debris. (b). Administration of prophylactic dose of 100,000 units of Gas Gangrene Polyvalent Antitoxin in all cases where the possibility of gas gangrene was evident.

The Dental health of the Command was good and presented no problems during the Campaign.

The following is a classification of wounded admitted to hospital during the period 10 July to 18 August 1943 inclusive:

a. Wounded classified - American Troops only:

		Percent
(1) Number of wounded admitted: 5106		
(a) Serious	2010	39.3
(b) Slight	3096	60.7
Total	5106	100.0%
b. Classification of wounds:		
(1) Upper extremity	1702	25.7
(2) Lower extremity	2160	32.5
(3) Abdominal	362	5.5
(4) Chest	578	8.7
(5) Head and Neck:		
(a) Maxillo-facial	386	5.8
(b) Others	592	8.8
(6) Burns	115	1.7
(7) All others	741	11.3
Total	6636	100.0%
c. Deaths after admission to hospital:	255	
(1) All deaths were the result of wounds or injuries.		
(2) Secondary causes of death: Shock, hemorrhage, gas gangrene, and peritonitis.		
d. Patients showing infection in wounds:	169	
e. Statement as to the use of Sulfanilamide:		
(1) By mouth: Approximately 52% of patients had received sulfanilamide prior to admission.		
(2) In the wound: Approximately 90% of patients had received sulfanilamide in the wound.		
f. Patients receiving blood plasma:	954	
g. Number of patients receiving saline infusions:	1206	
h. Number of blood transfusions:	220	
i. Number of amputations:		
(1) Upper extremity:	32	
(2) Lower extremity:	27	
j. Number of psycho-neurotic cases as result of combat:	702	

The above figures are furnished for comparative purposes. Figures are incomplete, but are believed to be within 5% correct.

The following medical admissions were made during the period 10 July to 20 August, 1943, as reported by the unit weekly statistical reports:

a. American Troops:		
(1) Hospital Admissions:	20,734	
(2) Quarters Admissions:	20,828	
		41,562
b. Allied Troops:		
Hospital Admissions to U. S. Installations:		338
c. Enemy Troops:		
Hospital Admissions to U. S. Installations:		1,583
Total admissions		43,483

d. Classification of Admissions of U. S. Army Troops only:

(1) Disease:		
(a) Admitted to Hospital:	13,320	
(b) Admitted to Quarters:	14,635	
		27,955
(2) Injuries & Battle Casualties:		
(a) Admitted to Hospital: (This figure includes 5,106 wounded admitted to hospital)	7,414	
(b) Admitted to Quarters: (This figure also includes those who were wounded as result of enemy action but were not hospitalized)	6,193	
Total		13,607

The following dispositions were made during the period 10 July to 20 August inclusive:

a. Patients evacuated to North Africa: (Including Allied & Enemy)		
(1) By Air	5,967	
(2) By Water	5,391	
Total		11,358
b. Number of patients returned to duty from Hospitals in Sicily: (Includes Enemy to Stockade and Allies to Duty)		7,168

It is to be noted:

That the figures for admission to hospital and quarters did not include a large number of civilian casualties, who for humane reasons were treated. That in the initial phases all sick and wounded requiring hospitalization had to be evacuated to North Africa. That due to the rapid movement of troops, one or more medical units were necessarily closed in order to move to new sites. (That during the later phases, instructions were received from NATOUSA to hospitalize Malaria patients, who numbered several thousand, for two weeks). That there were no fixed hospital beds on the Island, and only one Evacuation Hospital (750 bed), which opened on D/33, to act as a Station Hospital.

Notwithstanding the factors enumerated above, all patients were disposed of in Sicily, excepting 11,358 who were evacuated to North Africa. This number includes Prisoner of War patients from Stockades and Italian Military Hospitals, not included in the figures shown in the admissions to Army medical installations.

(See Annex No. 5)

VI PRISONER OF WAR CASUALITIES

The Geneva Convention relating to Prisoner of War casualties was strictly adhered to in all respects. The Prisoner of War casualties in U. S. Army medical installations were treated and evacuated in the same manner as U. S. Troops. Those who could be returned to duty were sent to the Prisoner of War Stockades.

During the campaign, a number of Italian Military Hospitals, intact with their staffs and patients, were captured. Notwithstanding the large staffs, the excellent quality of the medical supplies and equipment available at these hospitals, the professional work of the Italian Medical Corps in many instances was inferior. Sanitation also was found to be very poor. However, under the supervision of the U. S. Army Medical Corps, a definite improvement was soon noted.

The patients, about 2,000, in Italian Military Hospitals scattered throughout the Island, were centralized in the two large Military Hospitals No. 1 and No. 3 in Palermo. The Italian Military Staffs cared for the patients in these institutions under the supervision of U. S. Army Medical Officers. Thus the prisoners remained among their customary surroundings and did not occupy beds in the U. S. Army medical installations.

During the later phase of the campaign, Sicilian Medical Officers and men were released to AMGOT to care for the civil population. Italian medical personnel, not needed for the Italian Military Hospitals and Prisoner of War Stockades, were evacuated to North Africa.

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Medical intelligence information, as well as captured medical equipment, drugs, biologicals, and specialized equipment, were forwarded to proper agencies in the War Department.

There were no epidemics or undue prevalence of communicable diseases among the large number of prisoners in the Prisoner of War Stockades, which often contained upwards of 30,000 prisoners.

VII PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

General: While in North Africa, prior to embarkation for Sicily, the various units were intensively indoctrinated with the vital necessity of rigidly upholding the highest sanitary standards and methods of avoiding diseases peculiar to this Island. Detailed inspections were made and correct procedures insisted upon. Particular stress was given to preventing access of flies to human feces, ingestion of only Army approved food (including milk) and water supplies, maintenance of adequate supplies for disease prevention, insect control, the regular use of atabrine suppressive malaria medication, and the giving and recording of immunizing inoculations. Many of the inoculations due in July were given in late June and early July.

Clothing and Quarters: Woolen clothing, with steel helmets and liners, and leggins, were worn and had no bad effect on health in spite of the intense heat and dust. With the rapid cooling off at night, the woolens proved desirable. Practically all the Command slept on blankets on the ground, with only a mosquito net (or additional shelter half) above. Bivouacs were changed rapidly. Buildings had to be disinfested and carefully cleaned before occupancy.

Insect Control: The chief problems arose in connection with mosquitoes, flies, sandflies, fleas, and bedbugs, with only a few lice encountered at this season. Two disinfestation platoons were planned for but did not arrive before hostilities ceased. They were not needed, however, since the hospital facilities and small improvised units served adequately. Bed nets, head nets, and gloves, repellents (with the white Skat-dimethyl phthalate - proving more effective and lasting than the yellow-indalone), and sprays (pyrethrum), were used to prevent mosquito bites during combat. Later, more lasting or breeding control methods were begun. The 20th Malarial Control Unit served efficiently in surveying, in control work, and in stimulating, and coordinating with, other agencies. The unit also proved invaluable in general insect control activities. There were enough pest mosquitoes to aid in bed net discipline against anophelines. Troops found flies waiting in hordes, even among the rather isolated huts and herds. Control measures used were as follows: Proper waste disposal, screening (wherever available), sprays and trapping. During the latter part of the campaign, the effects of sandflies became apparent. Except for the relative dryness, breeding places were ideal among ruins of bombed buildings of earthen construction. Bednets (sandfly mesh), sprays, and repellents proved helpful. Fleas and bedbugs were in practically all habitable buildings, and control measures were necessary, not only in occupied but also in the adjacent storage or waste rooms. Standard Army control methods proved adequate.

Waste Disposal: Standard Army Regulations and Instructions of FM 8-40 and 21-10 were more closely followed in this campaign than has usually been the case. Particular care was taken in disposal of human wastes in order that access of flies could be prevented. Solid kitchen wastes were buried or burned in most instances, and liquid wastes were run into soakage pits.

Water, Food, and Mess Sanitation: Water was brought ashore in quantities of one gallon for each man for five days. This arrived in Army five gallon cans. The Navy pumped ashore several thousand gallons from water storage tanks of LST's to Army Engineer canvas tanks placed on the beaches, leaving aboard only that actually needed on the return trip. The Engineer Corps then followed up the units, establishing points for distribution of chlorinated water from existing piped supplies, streams, and dug or drilled wells. As rapidly as possible, usual city supplies were re-established and that used for drinking by troops was chlorinated. The quantity and quality were satisfactory. Food consumed was C, K, Straight B, and B-5-1 (sometimes called U) rations, with hospitals getting the B-5-1, supplemented by one hot drink or soup for each meal, whenever the specially packed hospital supplement was not available. Whenever possible, the C rations were warmed, but with rapid movement of many units, this was not possible. With no refrigerated trucks or railway cars, available fresh meat had to be consumed the same day it arrived. Distribution operated smoothly, and the diet appeared adequate in all but a few isolated instances, such as when for a few days a Ranger Battalion had to depend on pack-donkey transportation. The hazards were decreased since most food was eaten from the original containers. Until adequate precautions could be instituted, very little locally acquired foodstuffs were used.

Immunizations and Atabrine Suppressive Medication:

All military personnel of this Command were immunized in accordance with MATOUSA Circular 21 (28 Feb. 1943) and changes of Circular 59 (13 April 1943). Inoculations were given against smallpox, typhoid, para-typhoid, typhus, and tetanus. For the suppression of malaria symptoms, atabrine was distributed with rations and taken from 22 April four days weekly (0.1 gram dosage), following a full meal. Quinine (2/3 gram) was taken daily by those sensitive to atabrine and all flying personnel. A few landing ships failed to provide atabrine with rations, and a few small units were without atabrine for three or four days at a time. On 12 August 1943, atabrine was ordered taken seven times a week for three weeks to further build up the concentration. Prior to this dosage, increased symptoms of malaria were precipitated by the following: change of station, upper respiratory inflammation due to exposure and dust, injuries, sandfly (and perhaps other dengue-like) fevers, and intestinal disturbances. The cases classified as "PUO" (Fever of unclassified origin), were largely malaria and/or sandfly fever. A considerable percentage of upper respiratory infections were probably precipitated by dust irritation.

VIII MEDICAL SUPPLY

Medical supplies were ample. Approximately 110 deadweight tons were landed on the beaches between D-Day and D+2. There was a 10% shipping loss of medical supplies due to enemy action.

Following the assault and follow-up shipments, convoys UGS-11 and UGS-12 arrived with medical supplies. These and initial shipments were supplemented from time to time with emergency requisitions of critical items, which were shipped from North Africa by water and air transport, depending upon the urgency of the request and the bulkiness of shipment. The first such request was for litters, to replace those lost due to lack of property exchange with Hospital Ships and Air Transports during the first week. Additional cots were requested to make possible the expansion of hospitals in Sicily.

In unpacking supplies during the early stages, it was found that a large number of boxes were only 50% filled, and stuffed with straw. Packing lists were inaccurate, 20% of the packing lists attached to the boxes did not agree with the contents.

When supplies from the UGS convoys started to arrive, a large percentage of breakage of bottles was found. The Medical Department Chests were incomplete and invariably were short the same critical items which could not be replaced from depot stocks in Sicily.

Generally, Medical Maintenance Units were satisfactory, but contained too much Cotton in proportion to other articles, and did not contain enough Tincture Opium Camphorated, Plaster of Paris Bandage, and Crinolin. The Medical Maintenance Units also contained too much "seasonal" stock which could not be used at the time of year this operation took place.

The supply points or depots were operated by two Advanced Sections of a Medical Supply Platoon. They received all medical supplies unloaded in Sicily, segregated, inventoried, and moved them to the forward areas where they were urgently needed.

After the action progressed, advanced details from these sections established supply points with approximately 15 to 20 tons of balanced medical supplies as near the combat troops as the tactical situation permitted.

During the course of the campaign, several Italian Medical Supply Dumps and Military Hospitals were captured. Some of the equipment found in these medical installations was issued to U. S. Army medical units, the remainder of supplies and equipment was turned over to AMGOT for civilian purposes. (See attached map showing location of medical supply depots and dumps).

IX CONCLUSIONS

1. That the Medical Service for this operation was successfully and efficiently rendered.
2. That there was lack of coordination in the transportation section permitting separation of hospital personnel from their equipment.
3. That the Corps Type Medical Battalion, as provisionally reorganized, having three Collecting-Clearing Companies in addition to the Headquarters, proved to be more efficient.
4. That all possible means of evacuation should be utilized to the maximum.
5. That air evacuation is the best method of moving casualties to rear areas.
6. That hospital carriers equipped with water ambulances are far superior to any other method of water evacuation from beaches.
7. That the professional work done in the hospitals was skillful and of high order, especially the splendid work done by the experienced surgical teams attached to forward medical installations (Field Hospitals).
8. That Prisoner of War casualties in captured military hospitals should remain there under supervision of U. S. Medical Corps.
9. That civilian casualties, for humane reasons, should be given first-aid but not to be admitted to military hospitals if civilian facilities are at all available.
10. That the medical supply distribution points should be located as far forward as the tactical situation permits. Captured medical supplies should be utilized to the fullest extent.
11. That the superior medical care received by casualties during this campaign was due to the untiring devotion to duty of the entire Medical Department and the splendid cooperation rendered by the Service Sections of this Headquarters, especially the Engineer and Quartermaster Sections.

X RECOMMENDATIONS

After careful study of the role played by the Medical Department in the Operation "HUSKY", the following recommendations are submitted:


1. That the Medical Plan as prepared should be issued in the form of a directive rather than a recommendation, thus preventing alterations of the plan which might seriously handicap the medical service rendered to the Operation as a whole.
2. That medical personnel, their equipment, and vehicles, should be loaded, in so far as possible, on the same ship. Under no circumstances should the personnel and equipment be shipped on separate convoys.
3. Medical units landing during the Assault Phase should be combat loaded.
4. That each medical installation have a plan for loading the minimum of personnel, equipment, and vehicles, as a Unit necessary for efficient operation in the event that shipping space is not available for the entire organization.
5. That the semi-mobile Evacuation Hospitals (400 beds) should arrive complete with personnel and equipment on D+3 or D+4, and in a proportion of one hospital to each Division. The larger Evacuation Hospitals (750 beds) should land not later than D+14 in the proportion of one to two semi-mobile Evacuation Hospitals (400 beds).
6. That the Corps Type Medical Battalion be reorganized into a Battalion Headquarters and three Collecting-Clearing Companies.
7. That in all future operations, the Field Hospital should be augmented by Surgical Teams, unless the Table of Organization is changed to provide for an increase in the number of well trained and specialized surgeons.
8. That the Army Surgeon be given authority to coordinate directly with the Navy for movement of Hospital Ships and Carriers.
9. That all Hospital Ships be equipped with water ambulances similar to those on the Hospital Carriers, if they are utilized to evacuate from beaches.
10. That Air Evacuation is the method of choice and should be utilized to the maximum.
11. That every effort should be made to establish landing fields for air evacuation as close to the combat troops as the tactical situation permits.
12. That Planes with slow landing speed, or Helicopters, should be available to evacuate casualties from isolated areas inaccessible to motor transport.
13. That a similar type plane be available at all times to the Army Surgeon in order to maintain constant liaison with the widely scattered medical units.
14. That medical supply personnel should land on early priority to assure that medical supplies landed on the beaches are quickly collected, stored, and made ready for issue.

DANIEL FRANKLIN
Colonel, M.C.
Surgeon

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2 STATION BLOTTER

STATION BLOTTER
For AID STATION, MED. DET., 26TH INF.
(Name & Location of Medical Installation)
SICILY

CONFIDENTIAL
No. of Pages Included In This Report: 6

From 0001 To 2400 Hr 15 Day JULY Mo 1943 Yr.
(Period Covered by Report)

1 NAME (last: (first: (MI)	2 Serial No.	3 Grade & Organization	4 Army (& Air Force)	5 Navy (& Air Force)	6 Allies	7 Enemy	8 Disease	9 Injury	10 Wounded	11 Gassed	12 Slightly Ill	13 Seriously Ill or Killed in Action	14 No. of Purple Heart	15 No. of Oak Leaf Cluster	16 Admissions: Direct	16 Admissions: Transfer	17 Dispositions: Duty	17 Dispositions: Evacuation	17 Dispositions: Died	17 Dispositions: Deserted	17 Dispositions: Other Dis.	18 Brief Diagnosis
UPSHER, JESS J.	32066066	S/SGT 67TH ARMD REGT	X						X			X		1567	X					X		FRACTURED RT. FEMUR
SOLOMEN, ISADOR	14980131	PVT. 142ND SIG. CO.	X				X				X					X		X				MALARIA TEMP. 103.2
LAREAUX, JOSEPH N.	-14042	SGT. ?			FR				X		X					X				X		GSW ABDOMEN
WHITE, ROBERT P.	6069439	CPL. 41ST ENG. BN.	X						X		X		1408		X		X					SUPERFICIAL FLESH WOUND L. BUTTOCK
GRUEBER, HANS	56402	PVT. ?				X			X							X				X		BOMB FRAG., RT. THIGH.
SHELL, JAMES R.	0-19764	LT. COL. 451ST C.A. (AA)	X						X		X				X							SPRAIN RT. ANKLE
KAIN, RAYMOND P.	37144510	PFC. 86TH ORD BN.	X									X	X		X				X			GSW L CHEST
RERICK, SHERMAN J.	1684222	CHIEF PETTY O USS SANTA CRUZ		X					X			X				X				X		3RD DEGREE BURNS. BOTH LEGS.

(Form must be signed by responsible Officer immediately under last entry on the final page of blotter for each day)

3 PROVISIONAL CHANGE IN CORPS MEDICAL BN.

In order to provide a more efficiently operating Corps Medical Battalion for this type of Invasion Operation, a plan was evolved for forming a third "Provisional" Clearing Platoon by utilizing the Station Section and Litter-bearer Section of the Collecting Company as follows:

Number 1 Collecting-Clearing Unit

a. Clearing Unit
Hq. Section Company D - 11 E.M. - 1 MC
1st Platoon Company D - 53 E.M. - 4 MC & 1 Dental
Litter Bearer Section Co C - 41 E.M. -
Total 105 E.M. 6 Officers

b. Collecting Unit
Hq. Section Company C - 11 E.M. - 1 MC
Ambulance Section Company C - 28 E.M. - 1 MAC
39 E.M. 2 Officers

Number 2 Collecting-Clearing Unit

a. Clearing Unit
Hq. Section Company D - 11 E.M. - 1 MC
2nd Platoon Company D - 53 E.M. - 4 MC & 1 Dental
Litter Bearer Section Company B - 41 E.M. -
Total 105 E.M. 6 Officers

b. Collecting Unit
Hq. Section Company B - 11 E.M. - 1 MC
Ambulance Section Company B - 28 E.M. - 1 MAC
Total 39 E.M. 2 Officers

Number 3 Collecting-Clearing Unit

a. Clearing Unit
Hq. Section Company A - 17 E.M. - 1 MC
Provisional Platoon (Clearing) composed of Station Sections of Companies A, B, & C. - - 2 MC Co A
- 3 MC Co B
- 45 E.M. - 3 MC Co C
Hq. Sections Co's B & C - 12 E.M.
Litter Bearer Section Co A - 41 E.M.
Total 115 E.M. 9 Officers

b. Collecting Unit
Ambulance Section Company A - 28 E.M. - 1 MAC

This regrouping was then tested in field exercises under simulated combat conditions. After careful study and observation, it was readily evident that the proposed change materially increased the efficiency and mobility of the Medical Battalion.

Such reorganization made necessary the acquiring of a minimum amount of additional equipment over and above that in Table of Basic Allowances No. 8. This included the following:

Ward Tents	- 5
Basic Surgical Instrument Set	- 1
Generator	- 1
Sphygmomanometer	- 1
Lamp, Operating	- 1
Lab Chest	- 1
Chest, Mess Ware, Patients	- 1
Litters	- 100
Blanket cases with blankets	- 4

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The transportation necessary for this organization under the new plan was satisfactorily fulfilled under Table of Organization 8-65, dated 2 April 1942.

This Medical Battalion, operating with three Collecting-Clearing Units throughout the Sicilian Campaign, admitted 5,581 patients. It was the opinion of the Officers that they were able to give more efficient and quicker service to the troops because of the fact that each of the three collecting-clearing units could operate independently and be assigned separate missions. By forming such units, medical officers in the collecting companies were utilized to the fullest capacity, which was not true in the old type Corps Medical Battalion.

The morale and efficiency of the officers and enlisted men involved in these changes were definitely improved. They were being used in their professional and technical capacities for the first time since their entrance into the Collecting Companies.

The following is a proposed new Table of Organization for a Collecting-Clearing Company of which there would be three identical companies in the battalion:

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

1.	First Sergeant	
2.	Company Clerk	- T/5
3.	Company Carpenter	- T/4
4.	Pharmacist	- T/4
5.	Laboratory Technician	- T/5
6.	Bugler	- Pfc
7.	Orderly	- Pvt
8.	Mail Orderly	- T/5

ADMISSIONS & EVACUATIONS

1.	Sergeant	
2.	Clerk	- T/5
3.	Clerk	- T/5
4.	Clerk	- Pfc
5.	Clerk	- Pfc
6.	Clerk	- Pfc
7.	Clerk	- Pfc

SURGERY

1.	S/Sergeant	-
2.	Scrub Nurse	- T/4
3.	" "	- T/4
4.	Utility Nurse	- T/5
5.	" "	- T/5
6.	Utility Men	- Pfc
7.	" "	- Pfc
8.	" "	- Pfc
9.	" "	- Pfc
10.	" "	- Pfc
11.	" "	- Pvt
12.	" "	- Pvt

MESS - 2 Kitchens
Patients & Personnel

1.	S/Sergeant	
2.	Cook	- T/4
3.	"	- T/4
4.	"	- T/5
5.	"	- T/5
6.	"	- Pfc
7.	"	- Pfc

COMPANY SUPPLY

1.	S/Sergeant	
2.	Supply Clerk	- T/5

TRANSPORTATION

1.	Motor S/Sergeant	
2.	Mechanic	- T/4
3.	"	- T/5
4.	Driver (¼-ton)	- Pfc
5.	Driver (C & R)	- T/5
6.	Driver (C & R)	- T/5
7.	" (W / C)	- Pfc
8.	" (2½-ton)	- Pfc
9.	" "	- Pfc
10.	" "	- Pfc
11.	" "	- Pfc
12.	" "	- Pfc
13.	" "	- Pfc
14.	" "	- Pfc

WARDS

1.	S/Sergeant	
2.	Wardmaster	- T/5
3.	"	- T/5
4.	"	- T/5
5.	"	- T/5
6.	"	- T/5
7.	"	- T/5
8.	Wardmen	- Pfc
9.	"	- Pfc
10.	"	- Pfc
11.	"	- Pfc
12.	"	- Pfc
13.	"	- Pfc
14.	"	- Pfc
15.	"	- Pfc
16.	"	- Pfc
17.	"	- Pfc
18.	"	- Pfc
19.	"	- Pfc
20.	"	- Pvt
21.	"	- Pvt
22.	"	- Pvt
23.	"	- Pvt

COLLECTING PLATOON

1.	Platoon Leader	- S/Sgt

A. Ambulance Section

1.	Ambulance Sergeant	
2.	Ambulance Corporal	
3.	Driver	- Pfc
4.	"	- Pfc
5.	"	- Pfc
6.	"	- Pfc
7.	"	- Pfc
8.	"	- Pfc
9.	"	- Pfc
10.	"	- Pfc
11.	Driver	- Pfc
12.	"	- Pfc
13.	"	- Pfc
14.	"	- Pfc
15.	Ambulance Orderly	- Pfc
16.	" "	- Pfc
17.	" "	- Pfc
18.	" "	- Pfc
19.	" "	- Pfc
20.	" "	- Pfc
21.	" "	- Pfc
22.	" "	- Pfc
23.	" "	- Pfc
24.	" "	- Pfc
25.	" "	- Pfc
26.	" "	- Pfc
27.	" "	- Pvt
28.	" "	- Pvt

B. Litter Section

1.	Litter Sergeant	
2.	Litter Corporal	
3.	Litter Bearer	- Pfc
4.	" "	- Pfc
5.	" "	- Pfc
6.	" "	- Pfc
7.	" "	- Pfc
8.	" "	- Pfc
9.	" "	- Pfc
10.	" "	- Pfc
11.	" "	- Pfc
12.	" "	- Pfc
13.	Litter Bearer	- Pvt
14.	" "	- Pvt
15.	" "	- Pvt
16.	" "	- Pvt
17.	" "	- Pvt
18.	" "	- Pvt
19.	" "	- Pvt
20.	" "	- Pvt
21.	" "	- Pvt
22.	" "	- Pvt
23.	" "	- Pvt
24.	" "	- Pvt
25.	" "	- Pvt
26.	" "	- Pvt
27.	" "	- Pvt
28.	Litter Bearer	- Pvt
29.	" "	- Pvt
30.	" "	- Pvt
31.	" "	- Pvt
32.	" "	- Pvt
33.	" "	- Pvt
34.	" "	- Pvt
35.	" "	- Pvt
36.	" "	- Pvt
37.	" "	- Pvt
38.	" "	- Pvt
39.	" "	- Pvt
40.	" "	- Pvt
41.	" "	- Pvt

OFFICERS

1.	Commanding Officer	- Major MC
2.	Surgery Officer	- Capt. MC
3.	" "	- 1st Lt. MC
4.	" "	- 1st Lt. MC
5.	Wards	- Capt. MC
6.	"	- 1st Lt. MC
7.	"	- 1st Lt. MC
8.	Admissions, Evacuations, & Record Officer	- 1st Lt. MC
9.	Amb. Section Officer	- 1st Lt. MAC

It is recommended that the Commanding Officer of each Collecting-Clearing Unit be of the grade of Major, MC. In Table of Organization 8-15, March 1943, for the Division Medical Battalion, the Clearing Company Commanding Officer is of the grade of Major. It is felt that the Commanding Officer of the above Collecting-Clearing Units have responsibility equal to the Commanding Officer of the Clearing Company of a Division Medical Battalion.

4 DIAGRAMS OF MEDICAL SERVICE

DIAGRAM OF MEDICAL SERVICE ON D-DAY





DIAGRAM OF MEDICAL SERVICE AFTER D/6



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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK 10 JULY TO 17 JULY 1943

DISEASES	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions	2768	1286.46	1884	5561.75	169	703.37	4821	1765.45
Disease	659	306.30	437	1290.06	153	636.78	1249	456.38
Injury	2109	980.26	1447	4271.68	16	66.59	3572	1308.06
Respiratory	29	13.47	17	50.18	7	29.13	53	19.40
Influenza	1	.46	1	2.95	3	12.48	5	1.83
Tuberculosis	-		-		-		-	
Diarrhea	27	12.54	11	32.47	3	12.48	41	15.01
Dysentery	5	2.32	19	56.08	13	54.10	37	13.54
Malaria	51	23.70	18	53.13	12	49.94	81	29.66
Fever, U.O.	57	26.49	22	64.94	22	91.56	101	36.98
Venereal Diseases	25	11.62	2	5.90	2	8.32	29	10.61
Chancroid	2	.92	-		-		2	.73
Gonorrhea	23	10.69	2	5.90	2	8.32	27	9.88
Syphilis	-		-		-		-	
MEAN STRENGTH	111.872		17.611		12.489		141.972	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK ENDING 24 JULY 1943

DISEASES	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions	1857	1154.31	1822	5948.28	1089	1321.83	4768	1740.80
Disease	1170	727.47	980	3199.50	856	1039.01	3006	1097.49
Injury	687	427.04	842	2748.98	233	282.81	1762	643.31
Respiratory	40	24.86	21	68.58	21	25.49	82	29.94
Influenza	1	.62	-		1	1.21	2	.73
Tuberculosis	1	.62	-		-		1	.37
Diarrhea	69	42.89	179	584.40	79	95.89	327	119.39
Dysentery	6	3.73	53	173.03	29	35.20	88	32.13
Malaria	80	49.73	129	421.16	45	54.62	254	92.74
Fever, U.O.	146	90.75	69	225.27	83	100.75	298	108.80
Venereal Diseases	15	9.32	7	22.85	1	1.21	23	8.40
Chancroid	5	3.11	2	6.53	-		7	2.56
Gonorrhea	8	4.97	5	16.32	1	1.21	14	5.11
Syphilis	2	1.24	-		-		2	.73
MEAN STRENGTH	83.652		15.927		42.839		142.418	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK ENDING 17 JULY 1943

DISEASES	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions								
Disease								
Injury								
Respiratory								
Influenza								
Tuberculosis								
Diarrhea								
Dysentery								
Malaria								
Fever, U.O.								
Venereal Diseases								
Chancroid								
Gonorrhea								
Syphilis								
MEAN STRENGTH								

NEGATIVE REPORT

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK ENDING 24 JULY 1943

DISEASE	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions			5	654.90	31	1378.88	36	1195.20
Disease			3	392.94	28	1245.44	31	1029.20
Injury			2	261.96	3	133.44	5	166.00
Respiratory					1	44.48	1	33.20
Influenza					1	44.48	1	33.20
Tuberculosis								
Diarrhea			1	130.98	2	88.96	3	99.60
Dysentery								
Malaria					1	44.48	1	33.20
Fever, U.O.								
Venereal Disease								
Chancroid								
Gonorrhea								
Syphilis								
MEAN STRENGTH			397		1.169		1.566	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK ENDING 31 JULY 1943

DISEASES	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions	2721	1484.58	1951	5240.77	1809	1839.03	6481	2032.44
Disease	1947	1062.28	1344	3610.25	1601	1627.58	4892	1534.13
Injury	774	422.29	607	1630.52	208	211.45	1589	498.31
Respiratory	74	40.37	65	174.60	48	48.80	187	58.64
Influenza	7	3.82	8	21.49	24	24.40	39	12.23
Tuberculosis	2	1.09	-		-		2	.63
Diarrhea	79	43.10	106	284.74	198	201.30	383	120.11
Dysentery	35	19.10	31	83.27	17	17.30	83	26.03
Malaria	87	47.47	62	166.54	203	206.40	352	110.39
Fever, U.O.	520	283.71	275	738.70	290	294.81	1085	340.25
Venereal								
Diseases	18	9.82	7	18.80	19	19.32	44	13.80
Chancroid	2	1.09	1	2.69	1	1.02	4	1.25
Gonorrhea	16	8.73	5	13.43	16	16.27	37	11.60
Syphilis	-		1	2.68	2	2.03	3	.94
MEAN STRENGTH	99,996		19,358		51,146		165,800	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK ENDING 6 AUGUST 1943

DISEASES	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions	3653	2082.94	2899	8141.14	2479	2342.41	9031	2832.12
Disease	2377	1355.36	1813	5091.81	2160	2040.98	6350	1991.36
Injury	1276	727.57	1086	3050.03	319	301.42	2681	840.76
Respiratory	46	26.23	24	67.40	11	10.39	81	25.40
Influenza	10	5.70	10	28.09	13	12.28	33	10.35
Tuberculosis	1	.57	-		-		1	.31
Diarrhea	107	61.01	83	233.11	90	85.04	280	87.81
Dysentery	63	35.92	15	42.13	29	27.40	107	33.56
Malaria	94	53.60	263	738.64	487	460.17	844	264.68
Fever, U.O.	794	452.73	325	912.76	683	645.37	1802	565.11
Venereal								
Diseases	15	8.55	8	22.47	16	15.12	39	12.23
Chancroid	-		1	2.80	1	.94	2	.63
Gonorrhea	12	6.84	7	19.66	15	14.17	34	10.66
Syphilis	3	1.71	-		-		3	.94
MEAN STRENGTH	91,182		18,515		56,091		165,788	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK ENDING 31 JULY 1943

DISEASE	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions			12	1575.72	25	1138.32	37	1250.97
Disease			7	919.17	23	1047.25	30	1014.30
Injury			5	656.55	2	91.06	7	236.67
Respiratory								
Influenza								
Tuberculosis								
Diarrhea					1	45.53	1	33.81
Dysentery								
Malaria								
Fever, U.O.								
Venereal								
Diseases			2	262.62			2	67.62
Chancroid								
Gonorrhea			2	262.62			2	67.62
Syphilis								
MEAN STRENGTH			396		1,142		1,538	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR WEEK ENDING 6 AUGUST 1943

DISEASE	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions			9	1178.83	47	779.81	56	821.63
Disease			8	1047.85	38	630.49	46	674.91
Injury			1	130.98	9	149.31	10	146.72
Respiratory					3	49.77	3	44.01
Influenza								
Tuberculosis								
Diarrhea					1	16.50	1	14.67
Dysentery								
Malaria					7	116.14	7	102.71
Fever, U.O.								
Venereal								
Diseases					1	16.59	1	14.67
Chancroid								
Gonorrhea					1	16.59	1	14.67
Syphilis								
MEAN STRENGTH			397		3,134		3,544	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK ENDING 14 AUGUST 1943

DISEASES	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions	3684	2136.72	3077	8136.20	2498	2268.18	9259	2889.73
Disease	2367	1372.86	1896	5012.10	2152	1990.33	6455	2014.59
Injury	1317	763.86	1181	3122.70	306	277.85	2804	875.13
Respiratory	47	27.26	43	113.70	58	52.66	148	46.19
Influenza	14	8.12	8	21.15	17	15.43	39	12.17
Tuberculosis	2	1.16	-		-		2	.62
Diarrhea	61	35.38	172	454.80	153	138.92	386	120.47
Dysentery	84	48.72	17	44.95	68	61.74	169	52.74
Malaria	319	185.02	669	1768.96	599	543.89	1587	495.30
Fever, U.O.	685	397.30	410	1084.12	486	441.29	1581	493.43
Venereal Diseases	13	7.54	32	84.61	28	25.42	73	22.78
Chancroid	1	.58	1	2.64	5	4.54	7	2.18
Gonorrhea	7	4.06	27	71.39	22	19.98	56	17.48
Syphilis	5	2.90	4	10.58	1	.91	10	3.12
MEAN STRENGTH	89.632		19.665		57.267		166.564	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK ENDING 20 AUGUST 1943

DISEASE	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions	2210	941.46	1535	3651.45	2953	2887.44	6698	1766.93
Disease	1671	711.84	1243	2956.84	2630	2571.61	5544	1462.51
Injury	539	229.62	292	694.60	323	315.83	1154	304.43
Respiratory	16	6.81	63	149.86	91	88.98	170	44.85
Influenza	26	11.07	4	9.51	6	5.87	36	9.49
Tuberculosis	-		-		-		-	
Diarrhea	43	18.31	116	275.94	235	229.78	394	103.94
Dysentery	31	13.20	42	99.91	42	41.07	115	30.34
Malaria	93	39.61	446	1060.94	740	723.57	1299	342.68
Fever, U.O.	473	201.49	186	442.45	598	584.72	1257	331.60
Venereal Diseases	21	8.94	14	33.30	36	35.20	71	18.73
Chancroid	3	1.27	2	4.76	15	14.67	20	5.28
Gonorrhea	14	5.96	12	28.55	20	19.56	46	12.13
Syphilis	4	1.70	-		1	.98	5	1.32
MEAN STRENGTH	122.055		21.859		53.180		197.094	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK ENDING 14 AUGUST 1943

DISEASE	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions			19	2501.16	104	1206.50	123	1311.42
Disease			18	2369.52	98	1137.80	116	1236.79
Injury			1	131.64	6	69.60	7	74.63
Respiratory					2	23.20	2	21.32
Influenza								
Tuberculosis								
Diarrhea					5	58.01	5	53.31
Dysentery					1	11.60	1	10.66
Malaria					11	127.61	11	117.28
Fever, U.O.					11	127.61	11	117.28
Venereal Diseases			2	263.28	10	116.01	12	127.94
Chancroid			2	263.28			2	21.32
Gonorrhea					10	116.01	10	106.62
Syphilis								
MEAN STRENGTH			395		4.482		4.877	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE WEEK ENDING 20 AUGUST 1943

DISEASE	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions			11	1352.24	241	3147.94	252	2974.86
Disease			11	1352.24	225	2938.95	236	2549.88
Injury					16	208.99	16	188.88
Respiratory					17	222.05	17	200.68
Influenza								
Tuberculosis								
Diarrhea					16	208.99	16	188.88
Dysentery								
Malaria			1	122.93	11	143.68	12	141.66
Fever, U.O.					29	378.79	29	342.34
Venereal Diseases					7	91.43	7	82.63
Chancroid					2	26.12	2	23.61
Gonorrhea					5	65.31	5	59.02
Syphilis								
MEAN STRENGTH			423		3.981		4.404	

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HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR II CORPS, ARMY TROOPS & DIVISIONS FOR WEEKLY PERIODS D-DAY THRU 20 AUGUST 1943

DISEASES	17 JULY 43 Cases	17 JULY 43 Rates	24 JULY 43 Cases	24 JULY 43 Rates	31 JULY 43 Cases	31 JULY 43 Rates	6 AUGUST 43 Cases	6 AUGUST 43 Rates	14 AUGUST 43 Cases	14 AUGUST 43 Rates	20 AUGUST 43 Cases	20 AUGUST 43 Rates
Admissions	4821	1747.02	4804	1734.72	6518	2025.14	9087	2805.66	9382	2845.56	6950	1793.10
Disease	1249	460.38	3037	1096.66	4922	1528.95	6396	1978.17	6571	1992.98	5780	1491.24
Injury	3572	1316.63	1767	638.06	1596	495.87	2691	830.98	2811	852.58	1170	301.86
Respiratory	53	19.54	83	29.97	187	58.10	84	25.94	150	45.50	187	48.25
Influenza	5	1.83	3	1.08	39	12.11	33	10.19	39	11.83	36	9.29
Tuberculosis	-		1	.36	2	.62	1	.31	2	.60	-	
Diarrhea	41	15.11	330	120.25	384	119.30	281	86.77	391	118.59	410	105.78
Dysentery	37	13.84	88	31.78	83	25.79	107	33.04	170	51.56	115	29.67
Malaria	81	29.86	254	91.72	352	109.36	884	272.98	1598	484.67	1311	338.23
Fever, U.O.	101	37.23	299	107.96	1085	337.10	1809	558.62	1592	482.85	1286	331.79
Venereal Diseases	29	10.69	23	8.30	46	14.30	40	12.35	85	25.78	78	20.12
Chancroid	2	.74	7	2.52	4	1.24	2	.62	9	2.73	22	5.68
Gonorrhea	27	9.95	14	5.05	39	12.12	35	10.81	66	20.12	51	13.15
Syphilis	-		2	.73	3	.93	3	.92	10	3.03	5	1.29
MEAN STRENGTH	141,072		143,984		167,338		169,332		171,441		201,498	

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
HOSPITAL & QUARTERS

CASES AND RATES PER 1000 PER ANNUM FOR THE PERIOD D-DAY THRU 20 AUGUST 1943

DISEASES	DIVISIONS Cases	DIVISIONS Rates	II CORPS Cases	II CORPS Rates	ARMY TROOPS Cases	ARMY TROOPS Rates	CONSOLIDATED Cases	CONSOLIDATED Rates
Admissions	16893	1479.83	13224	5982.54	11445	2073.83	41562	2169.54
Disease	10191	892.73	7760	3510.62	10004	1817.72	27955	1459.25
Injury	6702	587.10	5464	2471.93	1441	261.12	*13607	710.29
Respiratory	252	22.07	233	105.41	259	46.93	744	38.84
Influenza	59	5.17	31	14.02	65	11.78	155	8.09
Tuberculosis	6	.52	-		-		6	.31
Diarrhea	386	33.81	688	311.25	783	141.88	1837	95.89
Dysentery	224	19.62	177	80.07	199	36.05	600	31.32
Malaria	724	63.42	1608	727.46	2108	381.96	4440	231.77
Fever, U.O.	2675	234.33	1287	582.24	2210	400.45	**6172	322.18
Venereal Diseases	107	9.37	74	33.48	120	21.74	301	15.71
Chancroid	13	1.14	9	4.07	24	4.35	46	2.40
Gonorrhea	80	7.01	60	27.14	92	16.67	232	12.11
Syphilis	14	1.23	5	2.26	4	.73	23	1.20
MEAN STRENGTH	98,948		19,157		47,820		165,928	

* Includes Total Battle Casualties admitted to Hospital installations in Sicily during period - - - 5106

** Includes undiagnosed Malaria and Sand Fly Fever.




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
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
ADMISSION - DISPOSITION - EVACUATION




HOSPITAL AND QUARTERS CASES



HOSPITAL AND QUARTERS CASES



HOSPITAL AND QUARTERS CASES



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FOREWORD

The History of the Adjutant General's Section during the Operation HUSKY will be found to deal to a great extent with the Casualty Section, Machine Records Units and Postal Service. These were the sections most effected and are necessarily dealt with at some length. The Miscellaneous and Personnel Sections handled a huge increase in volume, but the systems normally employed were found adequate and no major changes desirable. The organization of Headquarters Seventh Army was based upon Headquarters I Armored Corps, this unit being expanded and redesignated. The chart attached and marked Annex Y indicates the organization adopted. During two amphibious operations completed by the Seventh Army, the sub-divisions as indicated were found the best adaptable to the tactical organization and its requirements.

INDEX

I - PLANNING STAGE

II - MOVEMENT BY WATER

III - BEACH OPERATIONS

IV - LAND OPERATIONS - SICILY

V - FINAL PHASE

VI - CONCLUSION

VII - RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEXES

1 - ORGANIZATION CHART - ADJUTANT GENERAL
1A - ORGANIZATION CHART - M. R. U.
1B - ADMISSION & DISPOSITION REPORT - SECTION I
1C - ADMISSION & DISPOSITION REPORT - SECTION II

I. PLANNING STAGE

1. General. The planning for the HUSKY (Sicilian) Operation within the Adjutant General's Section was of necessity vested within a small planning group termed "BIGOT - HUSKY". This allowed the three divisions of the Adjutant General's Section, Miscellaneous, Personnel, and Operations, to pursue their normal functions with the exceptions shown below.

2. Mail and Records during Planning Stage. During the early days of the planning stage of Operation HUSKY, it was necessary to set up a separate Classified Section to handle all papers dealing with the operation. This section consisted of one officer and three enlisted men of the Adjutant General's Section. Because of the requirements for utmost secrecy, it was necessary to treat all documents as registered. All incoming documents and all documents originating in the headquarters were registered and were thereafter referred to by the registry identification. The advantage of this method was that documents could be referred to in receipts, correspondence, radiograms, and telephone conversations by code registry number, rather than by subject matter, thereby affording an added measure of security and avoiding the necessity of classifying receipts. This provided a complete record of all copies showing the number and location of each copy. The system worked so efficiently that not once during the planning of the operation was any document compromised through loss or misplacement. This system was retained in effect until D-Day when the records were transferred to the Adjutant General's regular Classified Section.

3. Personnel Administrative Plan.

a. In the light of experience gained in Operation TORCH, it was apparent that a personnel administrative plan based upon and coordinated with the tactical plan was essential. Consequently a planning group consisting of three officers of the Adjutant General's Section, who by previous experience were familiar with the Operation TORCH, prepared an Administrative Plan including the following main considerations:

(1) That each sub-task force be based upon a major administrative unit.

(2) That the casualty situation was by far the largest problem to be faced.

(3) That schools for administrative personnel were necessary prior to commitment to the operation.

b. The plan in the form of a directive was issued to the troops as follows:

(1) Purpose: To secure prompt and accurate reports and returns from forward areas, and to keep tactical commanders informed as to casualties and replacements.

(2) Responsibility of Sub-Task Force Commanders: To efficiently administer all assigned and attached troops and attain the following objectives:

(a) Prompt and accurate reports of battle casualties to army headquarters.

(b) Prompt and accurate Personnel (G-1) Reports, including battlefield promotions and awards and decorations.

(c) Maintenance of personnel statistics for the use of tactical commanders.

(3) Morning Report:

(a) The Morning Report, W.D., A.G.O. Form 1, was the basic document from which the above information was obtained. Each unit engaged in the operation sent daily to the Administrative Control Section (see below) by the most expeditious means an extract of morning report. Units still on the mainland forwarded the extract directly to the Personnel Administration Center (see below).

(b) An efficient control on the submission and disposition of extracts was maintained by (1) Administrative Control Sections and (2) Personnel Administration Centers.

(4) Administrative Control Section:

(a) This section was set up in the forward echelon of each sub-task force and controlled the submission and disposition of extracts of morning reports. It maintained statistics on battle casualties and replacements.

(b) Composition: One or more officers and sufficient clerical personnel who were familiar with morning report control and compilation of statistics to insure the smooth functioning of the section.

(c) Function: Extract copies of morning reports were submitted daily to this section by all units. An M.R.U. machine prepared card index of all sub-task force personnel engaged in the operation was maintained in the Administrative Control Section of each sub-task force. Accuracy required that it be correct as of "H" Hour. Separation by units was effected and individual cards showed full name, grade, army serial number, and the military occupational specialty for enlisted men. Duty code was shown in the case of officers. When extract copies of morning reports were received reflecting casualties or other non-effectives, cards were withdrawn from the file of "effectives" and refiled in the "Casualty File". The Casualty File was sub-divided into categories by guide cards as follows:

1. Killed in Action
2. Seriously Wounded in Action
3. Slightly Wounded in Action
4. Missing in Action
5. Captured by Enemy
6. Died of Wounds
7. Interned
8. Non-Effectives - Other Causes.

Cards of personnel evacuated or died as a result of normal sickness or injury were placed in the last category. Statistical information from this file was used to furnish the command group with pertinent information regarding non-effectives from all causes.

(5) Personnel Administration Centers:

(a) These centers were established in the rear echelon of the DIME-CENT, JOSS and KOOL Sub-Task Forces. All personnel administration for assigned and attached units was handled in this center.

(b) Composition: Personnel Officers and clerks from the Regimental and Battalion Unit Personnel Sections, operating under direct jurisdiction of the Adjutants General of sub-task forces, composed this center.

(c) Functions: Extract copies of morning reports received from the Administrative Control Section were routed by the Adjutants General to the Personnel Officers concerned. Morning reports were prepared and authenticated by the Personnel Officer from information shown in the extracts. Battle Casualty Reports (WATOUSA Form 6) were prepared from completed morning reports by the company, battery, detachment, and similar organization clerks. Personnel Officers insured that all entries contained in Battle Casualty Reports agreed with the information contained in the Service Record, Classification Card, and any other pertinent records.

(6) General: Certain elements of the sub-task forces were committed without administrative personnel. Detachments such as this were attached to some organization for administration. Changes in status of personnel in this category were then reported on the Morning Report of the organization to which attached. Sub-Task Force Commanders were responsible that the attachments were effected. Rosters and index cards necessary were then furnished by the Machine Records Unit servicing the organization on call from the Sub-Task Force Commanders.

4. Administrative Planning Schools.

a. Administrative Planning Schools were conducted by the Adjutant General's Section, Seventh Army (then I Armored Corps, Reinf.), in accordance with the following general plan:

(1) PURPOSE: To review the necessary administrative functions for an operation and to coordinate administrative agency requirements for all echelons, and special emphasis on casualty reports.

(2) ATTENDANCE:

(a) From Corps Administrative Control Section: Administrative Control Section Officer and one enlisted man.

(b) From each Division Administrative Control Section: Administrative Control Officer and one enlisted man.

(c) From each Regiment, Separate Battalion and separate Company within Divisions: Personnel Officer and Personnel Sergeant Major.

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(4) From each Separate Regiment, Battalion or similar unit: Personnel Officer and Personnel Sergeant Major.

(3) SCHEDULE:

(a) First Day
0800-0810 - Welcome by Commanding General.
0810-0850 - Opening Lecture - Necessity for a Personnel Administrative Plan for an operation.
0900-0930 - Function and operation of Administrative Control Section (Assault Groups).
1000-1150 - Function of Machine Records in the Administrative Plan.
1300-1350 - Function and Operation of Personnel Administrative Center.
1400-1450 - The Revised Morning Report.
1500-1650 - Compilation of Statistics and Maintenance of Records of Casualties.
1700-1730 - Inspecting M.R.U. in actual operation.

Second Day
0800-0850 - Disposition of Effects of Deceased.
0900-0950 - Army Postal Service previous to and during an operation.
1000-1050 - G-1 Reports.
1100-1150 - Personnel Replacement Procedure.
1300-1650 - Preparation of Battle Casualty Reports.
1700-1730 - Inspecting M.R.U. in actual operation.

Third Day
0800-0850 - Graves Registration.
0900-0950 - Preparation of Revised Morning Report.
1000-1150 - Closing of Records of Casualties.
1300-1325 - Decorations.
1330-1355 - Promotions (Battlefield Especially)
1400-1450 - Prisoner of War Reports - Processing of Prisoners.
1500-1550 - Final Discussion and Question Period.
1600-1615 - Closing Remarks.
1700-1730 - Inspecting of M.R.U. in actual operation.

(b) Due to the wide geographical separation of units composing the force, a total of four separate schools were conducted at different times, utilizing the same instructors.

5. Postal.

a. The 11th Postal Regulating Station and Army Postal Units 547, 548, 549, 550, and 778 were assigned to Seventh Army by NATOUSA after July 1, 1943, to assist the Divisional and Corps APO's in the regulation of the mail.

b. The 11th Postal Regulating Station acted as the base post office for the operation prior to and subsequent to D-Day.

c. On July 1, 1943, all Base Post Offices in Africa were instructed to hold all newspapers, magazines, and parcel post mail until postal facilities could be set up in Sicily. Letter mail was delivered to units while in the staging areas by normal Army Postal Service.

6. Machine Records Unit.

a. During March 1943, while Headquarters I Armored Corps was at Rabat, French Morocco, it became apparent machine records was to play a vital part in planning the Operation HUSKY. A coordinated foundation had been built with NATOUSA which had standardized all Theater Machine Records Procedure for station, special parent unit and higher echelon coding, and for procurement of W.D., A.G.O. cards and forms, parts, accessories and personnel. In addition, dates and methods of preparation of reports for the War Department, NATOUSA and Inter-Machine Records Units Procedure had been systematized.

b. Special Reports in the Planning Stage. To more effectively render reports during the planning stage, the Machine Records Unit was kept with the forward (planning) echelon of Headquarters Seventh Army. At this time one of the most important reports was an Organizational Listing of all Nominated Units of the Force indicating station, assignment, attachment and strength. Master Organization Cards from all Machine Records Units in the North African Theater were consolidated weekly to prepare this report which gave the General and Special Staff Section of the Force information needed to plan movement of Units to and from training and embarkation points, to figure replacements and to effect communications. The report was also rerun grouped by arm of service so that proper distribution of troops of the various branches could be studied. As the tactical situation crystalized, the above reports were broken down by sub-task forces and G-4 was furnished a report by station for logistical purposes. Figures were furnished G-1 which gave totals of the sub-task forces including those units attached to base sections, and also figures minus the attached units. Thus combat strength was shown. G-1 also received daily figures on replacements, weekly gains and loss figures by organization, a daily strength return, and a weekly absent report showing personnel not available for duty, such as sick, evacuated, and not evacuated, wounded, etc.

c. In addition to the above special reports, the following routine operations were carried on:

(1) Monthly officers' rosters were prepared and forwarded to the War Department through NATOUSA.

(2) Monthly Strength Cards, W.D., A.G.O. Form 320, were cut and forwarded to the War Department through NATOUSA.

(3) Rosters of enlisted men were produced for the units assigned to I Armored Corps, Reinforced, at least once every 60 days.

(4) Locator Cards were prepared and distributed every 24 hours.

(5) Staff section rosters were prepared for various Headquarters as needed.

(6) Strength returns and station lists for the I Armored Corps, Reinforced, as differentiated from the force, were prepared weekly and distributed to the General and Special Staff Sections, Base Sections and NATOUSA.

II. MOVEMENT BY WATER

1. The Task Force (Seventh Army) Administrative Control group arrived at Sicily on D-Day with the Commander and his staff. On D plus four, the Adjutant General, his executive officer, chief clerk and two clerks moved to the combat zone to establish a small working group in preparation of the remainder of the AG Section. A beachhead having been established the MPU and Casualty Section, which should never be separated, were called for and arrived at D plus eight.

2. Postal.

a. Divisional and Corps APO's moved with the Divisions. APO 45 which came direct from the United States landed in Sicily on D-Day, but other APO's arrived from seven to ten days later. Seventh Army APO and the 11th Postal Regulating Station were scheduled to move on D plus 4, but changes in the troop priority list did not allow them to leave Biserte until D plus 10.

b. The units disembarked from LST's at Port Empedocle on July 24. There were no beach operations. Each APO brought as much mail as possible with their organizational equipment.

III. BEACH OPERATIONS

1. A definite plan of reporting casualties evacuated was adopted whereby all medical battalions and other medical installations designated for beach operations, Naval Medical Officers concerned with evacuation, Hospital Ships' Surgeons, and Divisional Clearing Stations were directed to prepare and submit a daily Admission and Disposition Report, (See Annex 1-B and Annex 1-C) all casualties. Thus casualties were accounted for on each medical installation's Disposition Report which showed the exact disposition made of the casualty, i.e., to named medical installations, from the beaches on named or numbered craft, and to named Hospital Ships or North African Ports. This plan was coordinated with the Army Surgeon and Naval authorities. This procedure enabled this headquarters to keep units advised of casualties occuring in their organizations and the dispositions made, thereby obviating the submission of reports of "Missing in Action" and securing reports of the correct status in an expeditious manner. The establishment of this system of effecting an accurate accounting of evacuees by name and diagnosis was a definite factor in preventing the normally high ratio of missing in action being reported on Battle Casualty Reports, and was secured through the cooperation and close coordination of all agencies involved.

IV. LAND OPERATIONS - SICILY

1. All personnel administration was carried on in the rear echelon. During the active period of operations, this consisted principally of battlefield promotions, replacements, and casualty reports. These latter two functions were closely related and by far the most important personnel functions. The casualty section which operated in the personnel division of the Adjutant General's Section consisted of one officer, one warrant officer and four enlisted men. For the first seven days of the campaign, this section operated from Biserte. Together with the 20th Machine Records Unit, it embarked for Sicily on the D plus 8 convoy and from then on operated from various locations in Sicily.

2. Reports of casualties from Corps and Division Headquarters and from Army troops were processed through this section. Each individual case was carded and kept in an alphabetical file. Weekly Wounded Progress Reports from hospitals, daily Admission and Disposition Reports from all medical installations under Army control, reports of evacuations from the U. S. Navy, and daily reports of burial control, reports of evacuations from the U. S. Navy, and daily reports of burial from the Graves Registration Service likewise were received. All information concerning a given individual was carded. Any information additional to or at variance with an organization's report was furnished the unit in order that it might keep an up-to-date record of the status of their personnel. In this way, many individuals reported missing in action were located, that otherwise would have been carried in this status for months.

3. Three Machine Records Units were available for the processing of Casualty Reports, one attached to II Corps, Reinforced, one to the 3d Infantry Division, Reinforced, and the third to the Seventh Army, which serviced the reserve Divisions and Army troops as well as acting as a Consolidating Unit. The first consideration dealing with casualties was the forwarding of accurate reports to the War Department through the Army and Theater Headquarters, and second, the compiling of statistical information to serve as a guide in future operations. The basic source record is the Battle Casualty Report, NATOUSA Form 6. To accomplish this the following procedure was adopted:

a. Battle Casualty Reports were prepared by the Unit Personnel Sections and forwarded in the cases of II Corps and 3d Infantry Division to their respective Headquarters, where they were assigned a control number and then forwarded on a 24 hour basis to the Machine Records Unit servicing the Corps or Reinforced Division. There the Status Card was pulled, Machine Prepared Battle Casualty Cards produced and one copy forwarded with the Battle Casualty Report to the Battle Casualty Section of Seventh Army. In the case of Army troops, the Battle Casualty Reports were forwarded direct and controlled by the Seventh Army Casualty Section.

b. Despite a considerable number of Tunisia casualties, whose cases had not been closed, and the necessity of carrying on considerable correspondence to correct current errors, the Casualty Section was able to process 800 to 1000 casualties per day and forward to the Army Machine Records Unit.

c. When units were released from the line and during lulls in combat, Unit Personnel Sections forwarded Service Records and allied papers of casualties. During the period of actual combat operations, several hundred sets of records were processed through the Casualty Section.

d. All records were checked against the Casualty File, those bearing discrepancies being returned for corrections.

e. From 10 July to 18 August when the period of active operation in Sicily had ceased, 4395 casualties, over 50% of the total of the entire campaign, has been processed thru the Casualty Section and dispatched to NATOUSA.

f. The Seventh Army Machine Records Unit, upon receipt of the Battle Casualty Reports with the accompanying Status and Battle Casualty Cards prepared the additional cards for NATOUSA and for its own retained file. The Machine Records unit cleared its file and forwarded all reports every 24 hours to Algiers.

g. Daily Casualty Listings were prepared showing individual casualties by Unit and another listing showing the same information arranged by Type of Casualty.

h. Every 24 hours a Summary was prepared showing cumulative totals for the Campaign, broken down as to Officers, Warrant Officers, Nurses, and Enlisted Men by Type of Casualty. A weekly Consolidated Listing was run alphabetically and a Supplementary Listing alphabetically by Organization.

i. A Supplemental Work Card was prepared and retained in the files of the Army Machine Records Unit from which Arm or Service Reports and other long range planning data was furnished to provide information as to the proportionate type of replacements which should be held in readiness for any future operations.

4. Postal. Mail arrived at Licata by LST's from Africa within a short time after the Postal Units arrived and this mail was immediately delivered to the troops in the field and the Divisional APO's. Letter mail was first delivered to combat troops at D plus 10. The 11th Postal Regulating Station and APO 758 moved to Palermo from Southern Sicily with the rear echelon of the Seventh Army Headquarters. These units were set up to operate as a Base Post Office. All incoming mail was handled and regulated by the 11th Postal Regulating Station. APO 758 prepared all outgoing mail for dispatch to Africa. The facilities of the main civilian post office at Palermo were made available to the Army Postal Service, furnishing excellent equipment for handling mail. Within twenty four hours after being received at Palermo from Africa, the mail was delivered to the Divisional and Corps APO's, ready for distribution to units. Separate units called at the Divisional and Corps APO's for their mail. The 547th Army Postal Unit was attached to II Corps and placed in operation at Gangi to regulate the mail to the combat Divisions. The 548th Army Postal Unit was placed in operation at Licata to handle the mail

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for troops in the southern part of the Island. Transportation of the mail to these units was furnished by separate trucking companies. After the campaign closed, the Divisions and Corps were withdrawn to the western part of the Island and they were able to furnish their own transportation to transport the mail to and from the base of postal operations at Palermo. During the entire campaign all outgoing letter mail was sent to Africa by air, and a large amount received by air. All mail was dispatched to Africa where Base Censorship was given. A base Censor was established in Palermo on D plus 60.

V. FINAL PHASE

1. With the close of the campaign, the "clean-up" of casualties proceeded rapidly. Through the check system in use, many reported previously as missing in action were located and reported to their organization. Within ten days after the close of the campaign, 7,666 casualties had been reported. This approximated 95% of all casualties suffered.

VI. CONCLUSION

1. The plans for handling casualty reports during the Sicilian Campaign were designed to insure prompt and accurate reports of casualties under battle conditions. Absolute compliance with instructions issued by this Headquarters should have resulted in only one item of unfinished business, i.e., "Missing in Action".

2. a. Considerable confusion resulted by the attempt to compare figures in the G-1 reports with actual casualty figures. An analysis of these two reports will indicate the fallacy:

G-1 Reports

* * * * *

(a) Killed:
(b) Sick, gassed and wounded:

(1) Evacuated:
(2) Not evacuated:

(c) Captured:
(d) Missing:

* * * * *

Battle Casualty Reports (AG)

(a) Killed

(b) Captured

(c) Wounded

(d) Missing in Action

b. Sub-paragraphs a should eventually check, one against the other, not however at once. The G-1 Report is intended to convey to the Commander the effective strength of his troops and cannot await an accurate check. Battle Casualty Reports are an accurate personnel accounting and accuracy rather than speed is a factor. Positive check is necessary before report is made.

c. The next times ((b) in the G-1 Report and (c) in the Battle Casualty Report) cannot be compared. The G-1 Report in conveying to the Commander the effective strength of his troops includes in this item all ailments which render a man incapacitated for duty: wounds, results of gas, sickness other than results of enemy action. It also indicates those evacuated and those not evacuated. This is necessary to the Commander in formulating future plans but is not, and is not intended to be, accurate personnel accounting. The Battle Casualty Report on the other hand reports those men wounded through action of the enemy and is an accurate personnel accounting. These two figures will never be remotely alike.

d. Item (c) in the G-1 report and item (b) in the Battle Casualty Report should eventually check. The comments under (b) above are equally applicable to this item. As reports are received through the International Red Cross, this item will increase and missing in action will decrease.

e. It is difficult to see how item (d) in both reports can ever be compared. In the case of the G-1 Report it is an immediate report soon after or while in battle and includes many afterwards found to be dead, wounded or captured. The figure in the Battle Casualty Report represents the result of a careful check of all sources of information and a resulting failure to locate the individual.

f. Daily G-1 Reports should never be totaled with the idea that the result will reflect an accurate battle casualty status.

3. The success in the battle casualty reports during the operation can be attributed to the following:

a. Education of troops in Battle Casualty Report procedure.

b. Close liaison between army and navy to insure that evacuated casualties were reported to army authorities.

c. The requirement that any type of report which will assist in locating and reporting casualties be prepared through which units concerned may be advised of casualties occurring in their organizations. Typical "check" sources are:

(1) Admission and Disposition Reports from all medical installations.

(2) Straggler reports from Provost Marshal.

(3) Graves Registration Reports of Burial.

(4) Navy Reports of evacuations.

(5) Chaplains' reports of burials at which they officiated.

(6) Wounded Progress Reports from hospitals.

4. Although not previously mentioned in this report, a source of much misinformation is unauthorized data on casualties which reaches the United States through personal mail. This is borne out by the constant stream of inquiries directed to the Theatre Commander by the War Department based upon letters received from relatives of soldiers. Unit and other censors, and especially hospital censors must be ever on the alert to delete from personal correspondence this information which not only embarasses the War Department but directly affects civilian morale.

5. The uses for Machine Records Units increases as the organization being serviced approaches and engages in combat. Regular reports take on an added significance and enjoyed a wider demand. Special reports to fit constantly and rapidly changing needs are vital to the tactical commander. These two types of reports can be more quickly, efficiently and more accurately prepared by Machine Records Units than by any other means now known.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The system employed was well adapted to the situation and should be used as a basis for future operations. Commanders, however, should realize their responsibility for administration and should not leave this wholly to personnel detailed specifically for administrative duties. In one unit where it is known that the Commander took close cognizance of this phase, the results are outstanding:

2. Censorship requirements, particularly as they pertain to information on casualties, must be more strictly enforced by everyone.

3. All administrative personnel of a TASK FORCE should be assembled in schools prior to an operation and thoroughly instructed in the administrative plan for the campaign.


4. The Machine Records Unit should be thoroughly understood and utilized to its fullest capacity, both to spare personnel in combat and to derive the maximum administrative benefit of accurate machine prepared reports.

W. G. Caldwell
W. G. CALDWELL,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

ANNEX 1

ORGANIZATION OF ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION

SEVENTH ARMY



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
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ORGANIZATION OF THE 20TH MACHINE RECORDS UNIT (MOBILE)

SEVENTH ARMY

* 1. Asst. Adj. Gen., Seventh Army
2. Intelligence officer of Unit
3. Plans & training officer of Unit.

** 1. Asst. Adj. Gen., Seventh Army
2. Adjutant of Unit.
3. Supply Officer of Unit.
4. Motor Transport Officer of Unit.



ANNEX 1A

SECRET

IAC FORM 1 ADMISSION AND DISPOSITION REPORT OF

_____
(Medical Installation)

For period ending 2359 hours _____ (day) _____ (month) _____ (Year)

SECTION I - ADMISSIONS

FULL NAME	ASN	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	DIAGNOSIS IS BRIEF**
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
16.				
17.				
18.				
19.				
20.				

ANNEX 1B

** Indicate (BC) if Battle Casualty

_____ (Signature) _____ (Grade) _____ (Title) _____ (Organization)

SECRET

_____
(Medical Installation)

SECTION II - DISPOSITIONS

_____ (Day) _____ (Month) _____ (Year)

FULL NAME	ASN	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	DIAGNOSIS	DISPOSITION
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
14.					
15.					
16.					
17.					
18.					
19.					
20.					

ANNEX 1C

* Show exact disposition. Also the evacuating craft will be identified by name or number by the Evacuation Officer.
** Indicate (BC) if Battle Casualty.

_____ (Signature) _____ (Grade) _____ (Title) _____ (Organization)

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REPORT OF THE QUARTERMASTER

I. FOREWORD

Food to give the soldier strength to fight; equipment to make him an efficient fighter; clothing and shelter to protect the soldier's health in order to keep him fighting; fuel for the vehicles that get the soldier to the place where he is needed to fight; fuel for the vehicles that keep him supplied; -all this, plus the task of keeping the soldier as comfortable as possible, to bolster his morale and make him a better fighter, was the mission of the Army Quartermaster in the Sicilian campaign.

II. PLANNING AND MOVEMENT PHASES

Planning of the Quartermaster element of the Husky Operation up to D - Day fell naturally into three parts enumerated as follows:

1. Determination of Quartermaster Troops to be engaged in the operation, their assignment and/or attachment, and their equipping and training.

2. Determination of the over all supply needs of the force as a whole for mounting the operation initially, and for subsequent maintenance.

3. Proper apportionment of the over all pool of supplies to the various elements and phases of the operation. This was one of the most complex problems ever encountered.

The above three sub-divisions of the planning activities is discussed in detail below:

TROOPS

The first step in the entire planning scheme was a determination of a Troop List. In order to make any sensible demand for Quartermaster Service troops to support the operation, final information of the total strength and composition of the force was essential. When the actual number of combat and supporting troops engaging in the operation was determined, it was necessary to determine the proper number of QM troops to successfully support them. While it is true that numerous minor changes were made in the troop list, the over-all strength remained the same. No difficulty was encountered in obtaining the assignment of the service troops requested. Since, however, most of the service troops assigned were, at the time, actually engaged, under control of the Base Sections, in work connected with the operation, it was necessary for the Quartermaster to cooperate closely with the Base Sections and refrain from asking for release of Quartermaster units until the last possible moment. Excellent cooperation from Force 141 and AFHQ was received in obtaining the service troops that were requested as absolutely necessary to the operation.

After the troops to be used were definitely decided upon, the problem of allotment of a suitable quota of Quartermaster service troops to each Sub-Task Force was encountered. Due to the nature of the operation, it was agreed that each Sub-Task Force should be self-sustaining for a period of approximately 30 days. It was not anticipated that consolidation of all beach heads would be completed as early as it actually happened. Visualization of the necessity for discharge of cargo in Syracuse necessitated the organization of an additional group of service units for that point to control and forward such cargo. All the above considerations resulted in a "splitting up" of service troops that appeared to be complicated, but in operation the arrangement proved highly successful. Final allotment of service troops to Sub-Task Forces, Army and Base Section is shown in the Troop List, elsewhere in this report.

In selecting Quartermaster troops for the operation, training of units had to be taken for granted. Those already in the Theater were engaged in the same type of work expected of them in the operation, but under different conditions. Those enroute to the Theater arrived too late to enter upon any comprehensive training program.

OVER-ALL SUPPLY

It was found essential not to wait until the Tactical Plan and the Troop Lists were final, before placing demands for certain supplies considered necessary to the success of the operation. Much time was spent before the responsibility for meeting our figured demands for supplies definitely was fixed, requiring in numerous instances vigorous defense of our estimates.

From G-3 was obtained estimates of troop strengths and compositions at various periods of the operation, which it would be the responsibility of Seventh Army to supply.

Sources of supply were determined by higher authority; (these will be covered by G-4 in more detail). Essentially, the force was to be initially equipped and supplied, until D plus 14 from North African sources.

On D plus 14, the first convoy loaded in the United States for discharge in Sicily was to put in at Sicilian Ports, then under control of Allied Forces.

SOS NATOUSA was designated as the agency with which Headquarters, I Armored Corps, would deal on supply matters. Direct communication was authorized.

Since Headquarters and the Quartermaster Section of SOS NATOUSA were in operation in Oran, it was deemed advisable to set up a planning staff in that city. Consequently 5 April, Quartermaster Class I, II and III officers and one control officer were sent to Oran and opened planning headquarters.



ABOVE — QUARTERMASTER DUMP, PRE-BROKEN DOWN RATIONS ("B" 5-in-1, "C" and "K"), AT PALERMO.

* * *

RIGHT — AIR PHOTOGRAPH OF QUARTERMASTER CLASS II AND IV DEPOT, AT PALERMO.



First step in preparing for over-all supply for the operation was to assure that the necessary supplies either were on hand or enroute to North Africa. Principal items in which shortages were anticipated were life belts, water cans and gasoline cans. Adequate supply of these were assured by cabling to the United States to get them top-loaded on convoys scheduled to arrive in North Africa prior to the beginning of the operation.

Based on an average strength of 130,000 troops for the period D to D plus 30, an over-all requisition for Class I, II, III, and IV Supplies was submitted to SOS NATOUSA. This served only as a guide to enable that agency to determine the adequacy or shortage of their stocks and to permit them to order from the United States in time to get delivery on UGS 8, 9 and 10 convoys.

Several innovations were initiated by the Quartermaster Section for this operation. Of prime importance were such items as: Assault Packs of Class II supplies; the specially packaged Hospital Supplement, to be used with emergency rations; individual gasoline stoves on the basis of one per squad for infantry divisions; a high percentage of pre-broken down rations ("B" 5-in-1), and company laundry sets.

Subsequent to the submission of over-all requirements for the period D to D plus 30, the Quartermaster computed and requisitioned for, on SOS NATOUSA, supplies for the maintenance of the force, loaded in the United States on UGS-11 and subsequent convoys to include UGS-19.

SUPPLY BY PHASES

After assuring supply of the operation in over-all quantity, it then became of first importance to take steps to see that this large pool of supplies be distributed to the right places and at the right time to supply the separate phases of the operation.

It was deemed essential that each boat and craft carrying troops to Sicily should have on it sufficient food, water and gasoline to support troops until the arrival of the next follow up, plus supply for any troops previously put ashore on the objective.

Since the assault was made by three separate Sub-Task Forces, "Cent", "Dime", and "Joss", each consisting of three or more separate groups, some lifted by craft, others by ships, mounting from all north African ports from Oran to Sousse; and additional Sub-Task Force, "Kool" was mounted as a floating reserve and the 82d Airborne Division was mounted by air from Kairouan, Tunisia, supplies in sufficient quantity to support each of these groups independently of all others, had to be set up and made available at the proper port and at the proper time, well in advance of the mountings.

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This cutting up of supplies into small lots was dependent entirely upon the tactical plan. Number and composition of troops allotted to the assault and the follow-ups determined the type and quantity of supply needed. A "happy medium" in the lift of troops and the lift of supplies had to be arrived at, since the available lift of ships and craft was, in the end, the determining factor for the whole operation.

Phased requisitions were accomplished and submitted to SOS NATOUSA, which agency then assumed the task of moving and loading the supplies called for. The entire resources of SOS NATOUSA and its base sections were then applied to the success of our mission ahead of all else. Their resourcefulness, ability, determination and energy are deserving of high praise.

III. OPERATIONAL PHASE

Planning of the operation Husky having been completed with the embarkation of troops for the assault there remained the task of supplying the fighting troops over beaches, subjected at first to enemy air and ground action and in many places over ground heavily mined. The best test of a plan is its execution. The fact that the plan for supply of the operation Husky worked, should be sufficient proof of its basic soundness. Some of the details of its execution are enlarged upon herein in chronological order.

Supply activities in the operation as a whole readily divided into two parts, namely prior and subsequent to the securing of the Port of Palermo. This natural subdivision from a time standpoint is further apparent in that the supply activity divided itself at the same time geographically into roughly northern and southern sectors of the American sphere of activity.

Control of QM supply was initially out of the hands of the Army Quartermaster in that supplies had been allotted to shipping and craft pertaining to sub-task forces, to unload over beaches under sub-task force direction and to be used as prescribed by task force commanders. Each sub-task force had its own shore Engineer regiment, trained in unloading, sorting, storing and issuing supplies of all types. These shore regiments were reinforced by QM service troops, namely railhead, gasoline supply and depot supply for assistance in handling QM supplies.

Unfortunately total lift available did not in all cases permit the bringing in of these service troops as early as was considered desirable by the Army Quartermaster.

The Quartermaster element of the assault consisted of the Army Quartermaster and two selected non-commissioned officers. (Remainder of the Quartermaster Section, seven officers and 23 enlisted men, arriving on subsequent follow-ups, in keeping with prearranged plans which called for checking with sub-task force representatives to be sure that all supplies called for were available, and to lend assistance if desired. Rear echelon office, in Bizerte, with the Quartermaster executive officer in charge, closed D plus 14.)

Landings of supplies were made at Scoglitti (near Vittoria) for 45th Division and attached troops (Cent Force); at Gela for 1st Division and attached troops (Dime Force); and at Licata for 3d Division and attached troops (Joss Force). The Kool (2d Armored Division) Force moved troops and supplies in over the established Dime beaches. Supply was initially from water's edge, later moved to points from one to five miles inland.

Losses of QM supplies in the initial landings were negligible, the principal loss being the Liberty ship K-40 with approximately one-seventh of the Kool force supply of 21 days. There was never any lack of food, gasoline and water. Some apprehension was felt at D / 6, due to the late arrival ashore of supplies of D / 4 follow up.

On July 17 the unloading and control of Dime beaches were taken over by 1st Engineer Special Brigade, followed by the same action on the 18th in the Cent Area and on the 19th in the Joss Area. It was deemed advisable to decrease unloading activity in the Cent Area, moving such supplies as were still afloat in that area to unloading points farther west, nearer the contemplated points of use. Consequently some QM cargo pertaining to the 45th Division was unloaded over Gela beaches and at Licata Port. Mixing of supplies, already apparent in the Dime-Kool Area, made it more necessary that control pass to Army thru the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.

The tactical trend was to the North by II Corps and to the West and Northwest by the Provisional Corps. Roughly these two Corps were supplied in sequence as follows:

II Corps from Gela, Caltanissetta, Petralia, Nicosia, and Cesaro.

Prov. Corps from Licata, Empedocle, Sciacca, Allesandria, later Palermo.

Times of opening and closing supply points are shown in G-4 charts. Stockage of these supply points was made by rail and motor from stocks unloaded at Gela, Licata and Porto Empedocle by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade under direction of Seventh Army.

Only at two times during the period prior to the fall of Palermo was there any basis for apprehension in supply matters. These were on D-day when the Dime beaches were in danger of being over run by German Armored elements and about D / 6 when supply level in dumps dropped to less than two days in rations.

The fall of Palermo on July 22 was opportune. Transportation was being strained to supply troops from the south coast over tortuous roads. The opening of Palermo relieved this and permitted the concentration of effort by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade on supply of II Corps in vicinity of Petralia and Nicosia.

On July 28th six coasters loaded with rations and gasoline arrived and commenced discharge in Palermo harbor. Up to that time only five ships of UGS-11, our source of supply after D / 11, had arrived off the south coast, none in Palermo. Enemy action by bombs on August 1st added a bit of apprehension, hitting one coaster and one train loaded ready for departure. Liberty ships of the UGS-11 arrived off Palermo on July 28, and followed the six coasters to discharge points. Thereafter the ration and gasoline problem was one of movement to points along the north coast from where they could be picked up by using troops. The arrival of the 9th Division in Palermo Port, crowded at best, slowed up the discharge of cargo to the point where total tonnage of rations unloaded fell below tonnage consumed. This condition was remedied on 10th August by the arrival from North Africa and discharge at San Stefano of one solid LST of rations, (200,000) mostly "B" 5-in-1; on 12th August another LST loaded with 195,000 rations, mostly "C" arrived from North Africa and discharged at Brolo.

From Brolo, rations and gasoline were shuttled to 3d Division in vicinity of Barcelona on August 16th and 17th by LTs. This movement of essential supplies at a time when they were critically needed and the road blown out hastened the close of the campaign.

Routine supply followed thereafter until the close of the campaign. On 17th August plentiful reserves of gas and rations were available to combat troops at Nicosia for 1st and 9th Divisions and II Corps, with additional reserves at Tusa and Brolo on the north coast for 3d and 45th Divisions. At no time during the operation were tactical decisions and maneuvers held up for lack of QM supply.

The above sums up in narrative form the QM supply of operation Husky. Paragraphs below make comment on specialized phases of QM activity.

Type of rations furnished front line of fighting units were "C", "K" and "B" 5-in-1. Only isolated instances, and principally in one division which brought a considerable supply with them in organic vehicles, did the straight "B" ration reach front line troops. This was not unusual since the first "B" rations to arrive in the theatre was from the five ships of UGS-11 which discharged late in July at Licata and Empedocle. A considerable quantity of "B" ration components had to come ashore



LEFT — QUARTERMASTER SEVENTH ARMY CEMETERY AT LICATA.

* * *

RIGHT — QUARTERMASTER CLASS III DUMP, CAN REFILLING AND ISSUE POINT, AT PALERMO.



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before a balanced menu could be issued. After August 1st a small percentage of rations shipped from south coast to Nicosia was "C" type. The "C" 5-in-1 ration proved its worth in this campaign. Troops almost invariably preferred it to any other type for operations in or near the front lines. The preparation in combat is largely dependent upon the presence in an organization of a considerable number of individual stoves; in this respect our force was quite fortunate. The "K" ration served a particular need in the ambitious operations of the 3d Division. "C" Rations furnished the principal diet for prisoners. Due to the lack of cooking facilities in temporary prisoner of war enclosures, issue of any other type of ration was impractical.

Bakery units arrived through Port of Palermo on 7th, 9th and 13th of August. First unit to arrive was a platoon equipped with British mobile equipment. Leaving behind a detachment of four enlisted men, who with prisoner labor immediately went to work to put in operating condition an Italian millitary bakery in Palermo, the platoon proceeded to Nicosia and the following day baked 19,000 pounds of white bread. From the second bakery organization to arrive, one platoon was immediately dispatched to San Agata to bake for the 3d Division, and one platoon to Licata to bake for shore regiments and other troops based in that vicinity. Bread was an important morale factor.

Captured in Palermo was some 80 tons of fresh frozen beef, property of the Italian army. After Army control was established in Palermo, the policy outlined by the Quartermaster and approved by the Chief of Staff was to make one complete issue to troops, issue daily to hospitals, for their patient strength, and turn the balance over to Civil Affairs. All troops ashore in Sicily, including Air Corps which shipped its mess out of Palermo by planes, received equitable distribution of this meat. Upon the arrival, of the refrigerator ship "Tivvies" on August 21, fresh meat issue schedule on the basis of 1/2 pound per man, every third day, was put into effect. Again special effort was put forth to assure equitable distribution to all units and no special allowances were granted except to hospital units for their patient strength.

The Hospital Supplement was a marked success from the start and served a long felt need in supplementing the "C", "K" and "B" 5-in-1 rations for hospital patients. The additional coffee, sugar, milk, soup, fruits and fruit juices provided therein proved to be exactly what was needed by hard-pressed hospital units for the diet of shock cases and sick and wounded unable to eat solid foods.

The Quartermaster Companies, (Laundry) arrived in Palermo on August 6 and 7. The first units ashore were dispatched to the 120th Evacuation Hospital, which was well forward. Two field hospitals were near enough to utilize the same facilities. After several days of reconnaissance for water, a detachment of two units was sent to the vicinity of Trabia to support II Corps medical installations. A complete platoon was sent to Licata. One platoon was set up in the area of the 91st Evacuation Hospital in Palermo to service both the 91st and 57th Evacuation Hospitals and remaining units of the two companies were set up in Palermo to do organizational laundry. Until the arrival of the laundry companies all hospitals had found lack of laundry facilities to be a major problem, and at the time laundry service became available they were hard pressed for clean linen.

Labor was plentiful and of good quality. Italian prisoners worked cheerfully and willingly. No attempts at sabotage were noted. Quartermaster Service Battalions performed creditably.

Graves registration activities were generally well handled. Ample Graves registration personnel was available, employed by attachment to combat divisions, later a platoon and a company headquarters coming directly under Army control. The fact that Administrative Order No. 1, included as an annex a thorough and carefully worked out directive on Graves Registration was largely responsible for creditable work on the part of combat troops in the identifying and burial of their dead and in cooperation with the Quartermaster Graves Registration companies.

One salvage collecting company arrived at Palermo 22d July. A detachment was dispatched to Prizzi immediately to bring captured German rations to Palermo, the remainder of the company putting in order the Italian Engineer Depot at Palermo, which was used as the Quartermaster salvage depot. After all captured rations at Prizzi had been brought to Palermo, detachments of the company were sent through out the Palermo area to collect and bring into the depot, miscellaneous salvage materiel. Clothing and equipment were repaired to the best of the company's ability, with its limited facilities. Metal was prepared for shipment. With only one salvage collecting company on the island it was impossible to systematically clean the battlefields and it was necessary to call upon divisions to clean up their areas and bring salvage to Class I Dumps to be shipped into Palermo.

While it was generally understood, and published in administrative plans and orders, that no Class II items would be available until after D plus 14, (arrival of UGS-11), as early as 10 days after D day, demands from combat troops were received for large quantities of socks and shoes. The 82d Airborne, 3d and 45th Divisions were supplied these items by air shipments from North Africa. Some socks from the captured depot at Santa Cateldo were issued but were found to be unsatisfactory because of heavy ribs. Socks, shoes, leggings and outer clothing wore out rapidly, the rate being much faster than anticipated. The 45th Division actually had a surplus of socks and shoes but they were not available as they were in barracks bags far to the rear of the action. It was generally agreed by division quartermasters that in any future operation the use of barrack bags should be eliminated and that enough Class II supplies to provide one complete uniform replacement per man should be carried, in bulk, on division trains.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. Quartermaster planning for the operation was basically sound. Supplies were in sufficient quantity and of correct type.

2. Quartermaster planning would have been improved had it included the requirements:

   a. That Graves Registration personnel be taken in the assault waves by Sub-Task Forces.

   b. That Sub-Task Forces eliminate the use of barracks bags, hauling Class II, in the division trains.

3. The "B" 5-in-1 ration has a definite place, with the emergency rations, "C" and "K", for use by combat troops; that it is especially practical also, in that it permits issue of a balanced "B" ration during a fast-moving campaign where there is not sufficient time to break down and ship the normal "B" ration.

4. The Hospital Supplement was a success and filled a definite need for sick and wounded prior to the issue of straight "B" rations.

5. Issue of individual gasoline stoves on the basis of one per squad in infantry divisions contributed substantially toward the health and morale of troops.

6. Quartermaster troops, operating with Base Sections, suddenly thrown into active combat operations are not on a par with combat troops from a standpoint of physical conditions.

7. More care must be taken by all commanders to prevent waste, pilfering and looting of supplies.

8. Eight officers, 1 warrant officer and 25 enlisted men is not sufficient personnel for the Quartermaster Section of Army headquarters.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Quartermaster planning for subsequent operations, of the same type, follow, substantially, the same lines as the planning for the Sicilian campaign.

2. That future plans require assault units to take attached Graves Registration personnel.

3. That future plans require elimination of the barrack bag and that Division trains carry one complete uniform replacement per man, in bulk packages.

4. That, for a similar operation, there should be no less than two Quartermaster companies, Salvage Collecting; that they should be brought in early and follow combat troops as closely as possible.

5. That in initial stock of Quartermaster Class II supply should be set up, in addition to combat maintenance stocks.

6. That a large proportion of "B" 5-in-1 rations be included in the supply plan of any future operation and that the percentage of "C" and "K" rations be reduced.

7. That the Hospital Supplement, as packed for this operation, and marked with a red cross, be adopted as standard for issue at any time the straight "B" ration is not issued.

8. That prior to any subsequent operation physical "hardening" training be instituted for all troops on routine duty with Base Sections, and that checks be made to be sure that each soldier is qualified in the use of his basic weapon.

9. That an intensive campaign of education against waste, pilferage and looting of supplies be conducted by all commanders.

10. That Quartermaster laundry units be attached to evacuation hospitals and move direct to the theater with them, or that some sort of laundry equipment be incorporated into Tables of Basic Allowances for medical units.

11. That Tables of Basic Allowances for infantry division be changed to authorize one individual gasoline stove per squad.

12. That there be no less than 14 officers, four warrant officers and 35 enlisted men in the Quartermaster Section of Army Headquarters, in order that:

   a. There may be sufficient personnel to operate both forward and rear echelons, when necessary, with at least two officers on each class of supply in the forward echelon, as insurance against interruption of efficient operations, in the event an officer should become a casualty.


   b. One officer and two qualified non-commissioned officers may be sent with each sub-task for headquarters.


Wyatt Wasson
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Quartermaster.


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REPORT OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE

Immediately following the receipt of the directive to prepare for the Sicilian operation, 22 February 1943, the office of the Staff Judge Advocate divided itself into three sections: One section dealing exclusively with military justice, military boards and commissions, and the more normal functions of a Judge Advocate office; one section concerning itself primarily with matters relating to the Hague and Geneva conventions, claims, military affairs, and legal questions which might arise in an enemy occupied territory; and the other section was devoted to Civil Affairs.

The tables of organization for a Reinforced Corps provided for a Civil Affairs Section with two officers and four enlisted men. This section was not activated until 16 June 1943, and the officers and men in the Judge Advocate Section, without extra personnel, assumed the triple functions mentioned.

As these three departments were operated separately, they are discussed separately.

JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

Steps were taken to survey all units, including divisions, then assigned or attached to this headquarters, for the purpose of determining which members were nationals of an enemy or enemy-controlled country in order that they might be transferred to a Base Section and not sent into combat. A request was made to NATOUSA to permit the immediate transfer of these men to a Base Section; which request was granted. In undertaking this survey the Judge Advocate office also surveyed all corps units to determine the number and category of aliens in order that the office might assist in the naturalization of these aliens; this was done and arrangements made for such aliens to appear before the naturalization officer. This process was extended to the new units assigned and continued until our departure from North Africa. Unfortunately, the naturalization officer did not arrive in North Africa from the States in sufficient time to permit the full accomplishment of this work.

During the month of April 1943, the corps units began to move to their respective training areas and became widely separated from headquarters making control extremely difficult. It was necessary to determine their new geographical location and group them for the purpose of expeditious military justice and administration. Small units were attached to larger ones, and officer personnel was pooled in order to obtain a sufficient number of experienced officers for court-martial purposes. Because of this, and also due to the fact that new units arriving from the States had officers who were untrained in military justice, it became necessary to instruct these officers by mail in the proper method of conducting courts-martial and also to instill into them the qualities of disciplinary leadership required in a combat area. Instructions dealing with discipline and forms of procedure before general and special courts and also a form for the record of trial, were prepared, mimeographed and distributed. In some instances, officers and enlisted men from the Judge Advocate Section were detailed to sit with and instruct inferior courts in their duties.

During the month of May particularly, many merchant seamen and other civilians came into the Corps Headquarters area and therefore became subject to the disciplinary control of the Corps Commander. In order to properly exercise this control a court was established in Mostaganem and it was instructed as to the documentary and procedural requirements necessary for the complete trial and enforcement of the sentences against merchant seamen and other civilians serving with the Army.

SURRENDER AND SECURITY. There was prepared and distributed to Sub-Task Force Commanders, instructions relating to the acceptance of local surrenders. These instructions provided inasubstance that Sub-Task Force Commanders and Commanders of subordinate units could accept the unconditional surrender of enemy forces in immediate contact with, or in the area of operation of, such commanders and that all other offers of surrender would be reported immediately to the Commanding General Force 343 without discussion with enemy commanders or authorities of the terms of such offers. These instructions also setforth for the personal guidance of Sub-Task Force Commanders, certain conditions relative to the disarming of the area, disposition of air-craft and coastal vessels, protection of communication, essential utilities and port facilities, which could be enforced, where applicable, on the acceptance of local surrenders.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

The section of the Judge Advocate office which dealt with civil affairs first devoted itself to an exhaustive study of the 1918 plan of the occupation of Germany and also reports concerning the German occupation. The mistakes made in Germany were carefully analyzed and plans evolved to avoid the same errors and pitfalls.

During this period the Civil Affairs Section of the I Armored Corps, Reinforced, had not been activated and the function of preparing an operating plan for Force 343 for the Military Government of occupied territory was assigned to the Judge Advocate Section. During the latter stage of the planning a clerical force of two additional enlisted men was constituted under the Judge Advocate and close liaison established with the ANDOT planning section of Force 141. Several trips were made to Algiers to coordinate this work with the overall ANDOT plan; likewise, conferences were held at Headquarters Force 343 between the chiefs of all general and special staff sections and ANDOT representatives from Force 141.

Based upon the general provisions of War Department FM 27-5 and the overall plan of ANDOT, a plan for Military Government of Occupied Territory was prepared for Force 343. The plan had as its objective the restoration of law and order and normal conditions among the civil population as soon as possible after occupation. It provided that the Commanding General, Force 343, subject to policies and instructions promulgated by higher authority, would have final responsibility and authority in the conduct of Military Government within his zone of operations. It likewise, provided for the delegation of similar responsibility and authority to Commanding Generals of Sub-Task Forces within their zone of operations.

Arrangements were made with ANDOT to attach civil affairs officers to Headquarters Force 343 and to the various sub-task forces for the purpose of handling civil affairs functions for occupied cities, towns and areas. Task Force Commanders were given discretionary powers as to the number of Civil Affairs officers who would accompany the initial landing forces and as to the time additional Civil Affairs officers would be sent ashore.

Recognizing that military government could not be set up until organized resistance had ceased in an invaded area, in conjunction with Staff Sections of this headquarters, detailed plans were prepared to extend their functions to supervise the policing of the civilian population, adoption of health measures and for the repair and operation of utilities essential to the military forces until such time as these functions could be turned over to civil affairs officers.

Conferences were held with the representatives of Sub-Task Force Commanders and their plans for the handling of civil affairs were coordinated with the plan of Force 141.

Prior to departure from North Africa, an effort was made to complete the trials and records of all pending summary, special and general courts-martial cases and to keep abreast of the daily influx of work so that prisoners could be disposed of prior to landing on enemy soil. Units which were not to be a part of the initial invasion forces were attached to a Base Section or other stationary unit for court-martial jurisdiction. Specific authority for this purpose was obtained from NATOUSA.

During the period of preparation for the embarkation, courts-martial were at a low ebb, indicating the extremely high morale and discipline of the troops.

MILITARY AFFAIRS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES. In planning for the operation an exhaustive study was made of the provisions of the Hague and Geneva conventions of 1907 and 1929 and of the Rules of Land Warfare published in War Department FM 27-10. The operational plans of all sections were examined to insure that the provisions of those plans conformed strictly to the principles of these conventions, treaties and rules of land warfare. This study included conditions under which competent authority might make an exception to these rules by way of legal reprisals for illegal conduct of the enemy, including enemy civilians.

PRISONERS OF WAR. Assistance was given the Provost Marshal in the preparation of a plan for the custody, handling and processing of prisoners of war and political internees. This involved application of provisions of the convention of 1929, particularly with regard to the treatment of sick and wounded prisoners of war, evacuations, compensation, type of work on which prisoners of war might be utilized, kinds of disciplinary punishment available, and the tribunals for administering such punishment, the handling of protected (Medical and Chaplain) personnel and conditions under which exchanges and repatriation should be sought. After arrival in Sicily a plan of parole was devised by this office and instructions issued together with a detailed form of parole.

PURCHASES AND PROCUREMENT. This office assisted G-4 in preparing the Purchase and Procurement plan for use in occupied territory. This included a legal determination of what constituted public property, private property, and the conditions under which such property could be utilized by our force. It included, likewise, a determination of the classes of property which could be utilized without compensation and that for which compensation must be paid and the uses of requisitions for obtaining personal property and services in appropriate cases.

CLAIMS. The matter of the payment of claims within occupied countries as provided for under the Act of January 2, 1942, as amended by the Act of April 22, 1943, was exhaustively studied and, in conjunction with Force 141 and ANDOT representatives, a plan was prepared for considering, adjusting, and making payments of death, personal injury, or property damage claims submitted by the inhabitants of the occupied territory arising from the non-combat actions of our forces. This necessitated several trips from Mostaganem to Algiers for conferences which resulted in an agreement by representatives of Force 343 and 545 as to the general principles to be followed by both the American and British forces in the consideration of such claims. Consideration was given, also, to the question of compensation to be paid to civilians (enemy inhabitants) employed directly by our forces and who are injured or killed while in the performance of such duty.

MILITARY TRIBUNALS. Since the plan of operation required the Commanding General of Force 343 to act as Military Governor, under the Commanding General of Force 141, of the territory occupied by our troops, provision was made for the appointment, staffing and procedure of military tribunals (military commissions, superior and provost courts) for the trial, if necessary, of civilian inhabitants during the combat phase of the operation and prior to the establishment of Allied Military Courts by ANDOT.

On 16 June 1943 a Chief Civil Affairs Officer and assistants were attached to this headquarters, the Civil Affairs Section was activated and the Judge Advocate relieved of these functions; he was instructed, however, to act as an advisor to the Chief of Staff on all civil functions and to coordinate the planning and operation of the Civil Affairs Section with other Staff Sections.

SUPERVISION AND LIAISON. For the purpose of coordinating these various functions and to give legal advice and interpretations to the Commanding General and Staff members of Force 343, a member of the Judge Advocate General's Department and one enlisted man accompanied the invasion forces. During the early stages of the invasion, liaison was established between the staff sections and an ANDOT representative to deal with the many new problems of requisitioning, material and workmen for the immediate construction and repair of necessary utilities and port facilities considered in plans made for the operation.

BASE ECHELON

BASE SECTION. Upon learning of the decision that Force 343 would operate its own supply system in Sicily, a table of organization was prepared for a Base Judge Advocate Section. This table provided for 1 colonel, 1 major and 4 enlisted men.

The personnel requirements for the Base Section were predicated on the assumption that at a future date, after the Island had been reduced, the Base Section would be severed from Force 343 and operate directly under NATOUSA. For this reason the table provided for a Judge Advocate set-up capable of handling without assistance from this headquarters, all the legal problems of a large Base Supply Section. The personnel of the Base Judge Advocate Section arrived in North Africa as part of the 6625th Base Area Group (Prov), on 29 June 1943, too late for orientation and instruction by this office while still in North Africa, but fully equipped to undertake the duties assigned.

After arrival in Sicily, some orientation of the Base Judge Advocate Section was accomplished through conferences with its officers and through temporary duty of some of its enlisted personnel with the Army Judge Advocate Section.

TENTH PORT OF EMBARKATION. The Tenth Port of Embarkation arrived in North Africa about the same time. This organization had with it a Judge Advocate Section of 1 Major and three enlisted men. After arrival in Sicily the Tenth Port of Embarkation was attached to the Base Section. The Port Judge Advocate Section continued to function separately, but under the supervision of the Base Judge Advocate Section.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In preparing, for an invasion, the normal functions of a Judge Advocate's office are all that the officers and enlisted men now assigned to the Section, under the T/O Reinforced Corps, can properly handle. Matters pertaining to Civil Affairs, International Law, Rules of Land Warfare and allied specialized fields are duties that, out of necessity, must be undertaken by the Section. From these duties, legal and quasi-legal questions arise in the early stages of occupation of enemy territory that require special handling-especially where the territory invaded is expected to become "friendly" enemy territory and the goodwill of the population of the territory is desired.

2. The duties and powers of the Commanding General of the invasion force and those of the Commanding General of the Allied Military Government organization such as ANDOT are not sufficiently delineated and at times overrun each other. Jurisdictional questions arise which deter expeditious handling of situations that are presented and at times may become a source of embarrassment to the Commanding General of the combat forces.

3. The language of the Rules of Land Warfare, FM 27-10, is not sufficiently clear; the manual lacks interpretation and explanatory data of the general terms of the Hague and Geneva conventions, particularly with reference to the distinction between private and public property and its use by an invading force; there is an insufficiency of material dealing with prisoners of war and ways that they may be legally utilized.

4. There is no definite policy on the rate of compensation to be paid to enemy inhabitants directly employed by the armed forces of the United States for injuries or death sustained in the performance of such duty; claims of enemy inhabitants, resulting from non-combat activities and offenses of members of the armed forces arise, with no definite policy prescribed for their receipt and processing.

5. Junior officers assigned to this theater do not have sufficient knowledge or experience in military justice and discipline. They are assigned to the theater without any significant training in Military Justice, and for the most part have never participated as a member of a court; their knowledge of the Manual for Courts-Martial is negligible. The number of known competent court reporters is limited and it is frequently necessary to delay the trials of cases until a court reporter becomes available. The lack of competent court reporters has done more to delay the trial of cases than any other factor.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. a. That the Civil Affairs Section authorized for an Army or Reinforced Corps be activated no later than the beginning of the planning phase.

b. A permanent staff officer be assigned to the Section to remain with the force as advisor to the Commanding General on Civil Affairs matters. He need not be a Civil Affairs Specialist for the particular territory invaded, but should be well grounded in the general principles applicable to the occupation of enemy territory as well as having previous military experience. AMGOT or officers of a similar organization attached to an invasion force for a special operation should function under his general supervision.

c. An additional officer be assigned to the Judge Advocate Section of an invasion force the size of a reinforced corps or army. He should be versed in International Law, the terms of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the Rules of Land Warfare. If it is impracticable to assign an officer with this background, an officer with legal experience should be assigned sufficiently far in advance so he can acquaint himself thoroughly with these fields.

d. A Judge Advocate should accompany the initial invasion force. In his capacity as legal advisor to the Commanding General, he would act as liaison between staff sections in dealing with the various legal and quasi-legal problems arising from the invasion.

2. The contents of FM 27-5, Military Government, be extended to cover allied operations. This should include a description of the system wherein an allied commander is appointed as Commander in Chief with several Task Forces or Armies operating under him in designated areas and a separate general officer is appointed to supervise Military Government activities for the entire occupied territory. The relationship between these various commanders should be delineated.

3. FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare be supplemented to include the following: interpretation and explanatory data of the terms of the Hague and Geneva conventions in the light of the policy of our government; distinctions between private and public property and their uses by an invading force; handling of prisoners of war and methods, with concrete examples, of how they can be legally utilized.

4. That the War Department determine and publish a definite policy on the question as to whether and to what extent compensation be paid to enemy inhabitants, who are directly employed by the armed forces, for injuries or death received in the performance of duty; that the War Department determine and publish a definite policy on claims of enemy inhabitants for damages occasioned by non-combat activities and offenses of members of the armed forces.

5. a. That junior officers be given some training in military justice before being sent to an overseas theater; that they be given more instruction in the disciplining of troops for offenses committed by members of their units so that cases which should be treated under the 104th Article of War not referred to court-martial.

b. That there be assembled and trained in this theater a pool of court reporters so that the trial of cases might be handled in a more expeditious manner and delay in the trial of offenders avoided.

Homer W. Jones
Colonel, J.A.G.D.,
Judge Advocate

REPORT OF THE FINANCE OFFICER

Inasmuch as the I Armored Corps was without an Administrative Finance Section until May 31, basic finance plans were made thru consultation with the Disbursing Officer of the 25th Finance Disbursing Section which was attached to the Corps.

Early plans contemplated a strength of some 225,000 troops including approximately 40,000 to be attached to Headquarter's direct control. The Divisional Finance Sections were apparently sufficient to service their personnel, with the exception of the Third Division to which was attached approximately 25,000 above normal strength. In order to compensate for the extra troops and to provide the necessary reserve which could be shifted as local concentrations caused overloads on any particular Finance Section, the 26th Finance Disbursing Section was assigned to I Armored Corps, the 30th Section to II Corps, and the 32nd to the 3rd Infantry Division. Due to anticipation of a large volume of currency exchange and excessive personnel loads, a temporary addition of five enlisted men each was authorized for each of the 25th, 26th, and 30th disbursing detachments and to the II Corps Finance Section. It was next necessary to see that all units were properly funded as a basis of two months requirements. While it was anticipated that air shipments of a sufficient quantity of special Allied Military Currency would be delivered in time to permit the making of disbursements in that medium upon arrival in Sicily, the contingency of non-arrival had to be anticipated by Yellow Seal funding.

G-2 Officers in early operations were supplied with funds in advance of departure. Since their requirements were expected to partially in gold coin, it was necessary to fund the various Disbursing Officers with sufficient amounts of this specie. It was also necessary to supply Civil Affairs Officers with sufficient funds for operation pending receipt of Allied Military Currency. The transferring of funds to Civil Affairs Officers was without precedent inasmuch as these disbursements were not to be accounted for to Finance Officers thru regular disbursement voucher forms. A plan was formulated whereby AMGOT (Allied Military Government Occupied Territory) Officers could, on approved requisition, draw the necessary funds from the nearest Disbursing Officers, who would drop the amounts from their accountability on a voucher supported by the requisition and accompanying receipt. When AMGOT received their consignment of special Allied Military Currency, the need for continuance of this procedure ceased, and arrangements were made for the return to Disbursing Officers of sums disbursed for this purpose.

Early in June advice was received from the 1st Engineer Special Brigade that their T/O provided a Disbursing unit of one officer and eight enlisted men and requested that the unit be activated. There being no finance personnel available, other than one officer, who was assigned and reported about July 4. Two trained finance enlisted men from the 25th and 26th Disbursing Sections were detached by the I Armored Corps and assigned to the Brigade with instructions that it would be necessary for the Brigade to furnish the balance of personnel and equipment. Upon arrival in Sicily it was found that the Brigade had only been able to furnish three of the additional six and that they were untrained in finance. Early in August Finance replacements arrived in Sicily and three finance trained enlisted men were assigned to the Brigade and four additional placed on detached service therewith, the additional men being required due to the fact that the Brigade with attached troops had been increased to approximately twenty thousand troops.

Information was received late in June that plans for the Base Area Group included no Finance Administrative or Disbursing facilities, and higher headquarters advised they were unable at that time to furnish such personnel. However, after arrival in Sicily, it developed that the total personnel brought to Sicily was considerably less than originally planned, and it was possible to assign the 32nd Finance Disbursing Section to the Base area, as in the meantime the additional troops attached to the 3rd Division had been detached therefrom.

Due to transportation limitations, plans did not contemplate the arrival in Sicily of either Administrative or Disbursing Finance personnel until sometime after D-1. However, limited unanticipated transportation became available, which enabled the Assistant Finance Officer, to arrive with the Advance Headquarters. It was found that in the early stages much need for Finance facilities were apparent. Funds were needed by Procuring Officers, a lack of local currency was a handicap, and Agent Officers were obliged to carry considerable sums inasmuch as no Disbursing Officers were available for making returns. Had it not been for the fact the Disbursing Officer of the 45th Division, (who arrived with the Assault Forces), was located, the entire expedition might have been without means for obtaining additional cash for the procurement of supplies and services.

Shortly after arriving in Sicily, AMGOT received a shipment of Allied Military Currency, a part of which was furnished the Seventh Army for the purpose of drawing in U. S. Currency and such French Currency as had been brought in by the troops, as well as for making current payments. The amount received proved to be inadequate for these purposes, and as further shipments of the August payments to troops would be partially in U. S. Currency, thus negating the results that had been obtained at a considerable cost in labor by the early circulation of Allied Military Currency and withdrawal from circulation of other forms of currency. The withdrawal of U. S. Currency from local circulation will have to be made again upon receipt of sufficient stocks of Allied Military Currency.

As an interesting sidelight and as a tribute to the thrift of U.S. Military personnel, it is deemed pertinent to quote the following statistics covering payments made during August 1943:

Gross Pay		13,914,887.19
Class B Allotments - War Bonds	658,962.60	
Other allotments	6,788,951.28	
Voucher Coll. (Fld. Rations)	275,896.30	7,717,810.18
Planned savings & fixed expenses		6,197,077.01
Personal Transfers	1,056,515.00	
War Bond Transfers	20,831.25	
Soldiers Deposits	655,839.46	
Rects. from Army Post Offices (Money orders sold, etc.)	2,512,169.43	4,239,655.14
Intermittant savings		1,957,421.87
Amount retained for personal expenses, etc.		14
Percentage of pay retained		

Conclusions:

1. T/Os for major units should be furnished the Finance Officer during the initial planning stages so that plans may be made for the complete organization and training of Disbursing Units well in advance of the beginning of the operations. Proposed T/Os should be referred to the Finance Officer for his advice as to the advisability of providing Finance personnel therein.

2. Plans for initial operations should provide for arrival at the operations area, not later than D+1, of some representation from the Administrative Finance Section and also a skeleton Disbursing Section.

O. F. TILLMAN,
Colonel, F.D.,
Finance Officer.

REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

The planning phase of the HUSKY operation found the Inspector General's section, First Armored Corps, Reinforced, engaged in completing its regular inspection of Army troops. This section was not involved in the planning and so continued to carry out its normal duties.

On 29 June, the Inspector General and one enlisted man proceeded to Algiers and boarded the Monrovia. The remainder of the section proceeded from Oran to the headquarters at Biserte via Algiers. During the waiting period at Biserte this personnel made inspections of neighboring units and such investigations as were directed.

The movement of the section from Africa to Sicily was staggered. One officer and one enlisted man accompanied the D day convoy. One officer and one enlisted man accompanied D plus 4 convoy. The remainder followed as space became available. The section was thus reassembled at Agrigento on 23 July 1943.

During the stay on the Monrovia the usual shipboard inspections were made, and in addition an inspection was made on D plus 1 at Gela where troops therein were observed. During the early stages of the operation due to limited transportation inspections were limited to units within walking distance or occasional trips made in the company of other officers who were able to share their vehicle. By one or the other means every effort was made to observe the conduct and action of the Army troops. Later, after transportation became available, these inspections were extended to include all possible known installations. As the advance progressed the section moved with the headquarters from Gela to Agrigento and then to Palermo where the section was located at the termination of the campaign.

It was noted that: local inhabitants often dug up covered holes in vacated areas and scattered garbage, papers, and other articles over the area; troops were inclined to pay extravagant prices for everything including haircuts and laundry work; prisoners must be carefully supervised to maintain our standards of sanitation; frequent checks are necessary to keep souvenirs off uniforms and equipment.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The advisability of having an Inspector General available to the commander at all times was proven when the day following the landing the inspector was given an investigation to conduct.

2. During battle unit commanders should not overlook the normal housekeeping duties which are so important in maintaining the health of the command.

3. All commanders should take steps to prevent:

a. Soldiers fraternizing with civilians and prisoners.

b. Burying anything of value to local inhabitants which lead the latter to uncover all covered holes in vacated areas.

c. Troops trading food and other articles or paying exorbitant prices.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That emphasis be placed at all times on the need for maintaining a high standard of sanitation, particularly in respect to digging suitable and adequate latrines at the first opportunity.

2. That officers be required to rigidly enforce military courtesy, discipline and enforcement of uniform regulations.

3. That price control be enforced immediately.

4. Care of government property should be stressed.

5. That all units be thoroughly informed as to:

a. Treatment of prisoners of war.

b. What constitutes pilferage.

C. E. LEMPKE,
Colonel, I. G. D.,
Inspector General.

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REPORT OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER

The Sicilian campaign provided a field test in which the tactical and administrative problems of the Public Relations Section were laid out as a blueprint for almost any subsequent operation. Measures taken to meet these problems offer a practical basis for the formulation of all future plans.

THE OPERATION IN BRIEF

Eighteen correspondents, four Public Relations officers and seven enlisted men landed with the 7th Army on D day, distributed among various task forces. After landing, the Section assembled and set up headquarters at Gela, operating out of the centralized point for several days.

When it became apparent that 7th Army Hq. would move to Agrigento, the Section proceeded to transfer its facilities there. Rapid progress of operations, and the attendant difficulty for correspondents to cover the fighting and return daily to Agrigento, soon made it necessary for the Section to again move; this time to Palermo.

Before the Palermo move, made two days in advance of the C.P., the Section acquired one additional officer, a mess sergeant, a cook and two drivers, along with a small amount of mess equipment. This enabled the Section to send to Palermo a forward echelon, which then advanced to Cefalu ahead of the C.P's of II Corps and the division pushing east along the coast.

Thereafter, it was found necessary to maintain a base office at Palermo and a forward camp at the front. Many more correspondents were arriving.

When II Corps moved to Nicosia, the forward camp moved with it, thus putting 120 miles, over extremely bad mountain roads, between the two elements of the section. Four more drivers, with vehicles, were obtained but, nevertheless, a severe strain was put on transport, which was required to transmit correspondents' copy from the front to Palermo, sometimes twice daily. Palermo was the transmission point from which copy was flown to Algiers. A courier system had been planned by higher headquarters, but failed to materialize.

Thought was given to consolidating the entire section at the forward camp, but practical considerations made this impossible. It was found that administration of the Section, arranging of transportation for correspondents to and from Algiers, and frequent newsworthy occurrences at Palermo made it essential to keep a Public Relations unit there.

While at Nicosia, an expedient Cub airplane service was organized to fly urgent copy from the 3rd Division, on the north coast, to II Corps. Along with copy from the south front, this was then flown to the Syracuse area, from which it was taken to Malta by the RAF for cable and radio transmission. Photographs, broadcast copy and magazine features still had to be sent back through Palermo to Algiers. When II Corps moved to the vicinity of Cesaro, liaison problems along the front, and to Palermo, became critical. The use of Cub planes, however, proved extremely successful and relieved the situation.

By the time the 3rd Division had moved up to the vicinity of Barcellona, it was apparent that the final push was to be made by that Division. Consequently the PRO forward camp was split, part remaining at II Corps and the rest, along with most of the correspondents, shifting to the 3rd Division. Correspondents and conducting officers then worked forward, using five Cub planes and one C47 on the last day to clear the story of the fall of Messina. Higher headquarters said the speed with which the Messina story was dispatched set a record for such operations.

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications are the toughest problem and at the same time the most important factor in Public Relations field operations. The Sicilian campaign--characterized by rapid movement, poor roads, few airfields and constant shortages of all types of transportation, complicated by the relatively large number of correspondents, made it a severe test. It is doubtful whether any future operation of an Army in Europe will be more difficult from a Public Relations standpoint.

During the initial landings some copy was sent back to Algiers via Tunis by boat. This copy, since no courier was available to accompany it, was slow in reaching the cablehead. The next two pouches were sent with broadcast correspondents and rade better time. From then on, copy was dispatched by 7th Army courier, hospital planes, returning correspondents and other expeditious means. None of these methods were satisfactory, some copy arriving in Algiers as much as five days late.

During the period from the landings until the movement to Nicosia instructions were given by higher headquarters to meet an RAF courier plane, supposedly landing daily at Palermo. It was never possible to contact this plane which, it was learned later, made only one trip to Palermo, on which the pilot landed and took off without making contact.

Then the Cub plane service was established, artillery observation pilots cooperating splendidly. The Cub service augmented motorcycle and 1/4-ton couriers who were in constant use throughout the campaign. Personal liaison by the Public Relations Officer and the Executive Officer was essential, even though it required them at times to drive 250 miles over rough mountain roads in a day. This liaison coordinated Cub couriers, whose landing fields shifted almost daily, and maintained contact between the Public Relations base at Palermo and the advance camp. No other means of communication functioned satisfactorily.

Despite these difficulties in transmission, the two biggest stories of the campaign were cleared in record time. The first prime story was the fall of Palermo. A party of correspondents accompanied the commanding general into the city at the surrender. Complete photographic and eye-witness coverage was provided. One correspondent was flown back to Agrigento by Cub plane, and thence to Algiers by a bomber furnished by the XII Air Support Command with the first film and news copy. At Algiers he broadcast his eye-witness account direct to the United States. Photographs were radioed and published in American newspapers the day after Palermo fell.

The Messina story was handled with even greater efficiency and speed. Correspondents wrote their stories when patrols entered Messina and the first Allied artillery opened fire on the Italian mainland. This copy, with pictures, was flown by Cub that night to Syracuse and forwarded by another plane at 0730 the next morning. A second Cub brought out stories of the occupation of Messina at 1030, the copy being routed to Malta.

At 1530 still more detailed accounts and pictures were sent, broadcasters couriering them by Cub to Palermo. With the 7th Army Commander's permission, the broadcasters were put aboard his plane at Palermo and flown to Algiers, arriving at 0015. They started broadcasting to the United States one hour later, with the result that eye-witness accounts of the Messina occupation were heard in America the same day.

Attempts were made early in the operations to send short dispatches by tactical radio from 7th Army to higher headquarters, but the press of tactical traffic burdened this channel and such transmission of news was abandoned.

The campaign made it apparent that an Army in the field could not expect to provide and maintain communication channels for press copy and film beyond the Army's area. From that point, responsibility for efficient, prompt relay would rest with higher headquarters.

Although artillery sections, in providing Cub couriers, cooperated without a single slip-up, it could hardly be expected that they would always be equally efficient. Putting planes under direct control of Public Relations would ensure reliable service in future operations.

The maintenance of constant liaison by Public Relations Officers, laterally and in depth, is absolutely essential. It also is necessary to provide motorcycle and other transport for fast couriering by road.

The notable success of communications during the latter part of the campaign was made possible largely through the efforts of one officer who spent his entire time finding means of expediting copy and meeting the tricky problems created by changing transmission conditions. It is felt that communications are so important that maximum efficiency can not be obtained in future operations unless two officers are assigned to do nothing else but keep copy moving.

Radio transmission of news copy was almost negligible and it is impractical to hope to impose upon tactical radio the additional burden. Only rarely will such transmission be as fast as air courier. If, however, radi. transmission is to be undertaken, transmitters and operators should be provided to Public Relations for this specific work. But regardless of what radio facilities are provided, fast, dependable courier service by road and air to cableheads must be available.

TRANSPORTATION

Higher Headquarters improvised and authorized a table of basic allowances for the Public Relations Section about three months before the Sicilian operation began. The same Headquarters agreed voluntarily to fill the table, to provide vehicles and mess equipment--all of which was to come from the Public Relations pool. Part of the equipment used in Tunisia was to be provided. But, about a month before the operation, information was received from the Public Relations Branch that it would be unable to provide ANY vehicles or equipment. The 7th Army had no TBA for drawing the equipment. Higher Headquarters later authorized the drawing of five 1/4-ton trucks, three motorcycles, one 3/4-ton truck and one 2 1/2-ton truck.

Such vehicles were then at a high premium and, because of the delay in their authorization, it was too late to include these vehicles in the loading schedules except by finding space for several at the last minute. G-4 supplied all the vehicles before Headquarters left Mostaganem and space was found to load two 1/4-ton trucks, the 3/4-ton and one motorcycle on the command ship. This was the only transportation the Section had when it began operating in Sicily.

Upon reaching Agrigento, the Section received another 1/4-ton and trailer from Higher Headquarters. However, the vehicle was accompanied by nine more correspondents, which made the long trek to Palermo even more difficult. The nine finally were transported across Sicily in a borrowed truck and later shuttled to the advance camp at Cefalu.

A few days later, three more 1/4-tons arrived from Africa. These were vehicles which the section had not been able to ship on the D Day convoy. This brought the total to seven, but the number of correspondents by this time was fluctuating between 26 and 30. Shortly before the campaign ended, two more 1/4-tons arrived and, with a number of correspondents leaving, pressure was relieved. In the final week, adequate transportation was available.

Enlisted men needed as vehicle drivers, mess sergeant, two cooks, a clerk, a mechanic and four basic privates for the forward camp; and a chief clerk and a clerk at the base headquarters. This calls for total personnel of six officers and 29 enlisted men.

A recommended T/O is attached.

With the exception of a clerk who arrived late, every enlisted man and officer in the Section was under fire at some time during the operation, and performed as a soldier should. All personnel was given the opportunity to spend considerable time at the front.

CORRESPONDENTS

The correspondents who covered the Seventh Army operation were an all-star group.

On the command ship were Hal Boyle of the Associated Press, who has made a name for himself since the African invasion as the hardest working and most conscientious reporter in the theater; and Alex Clifford of the London Daily Mail, a brilliant young Englishman of great journalistic eminence in his own country, who has spent three years, beginning with the Battle of France and continuing through the Balkans, Greece, Crete and the Western Desert, covering the war from the standpoint of a highly literary student.

On other ships of the D convoy were these: Jack Belden of Time and Life, who went through the Burma campaign with General Stillwell, Chris Cunningham of the United Press, veteran of the Tunisian campaign; Clinton Green of International News Service; Don Whitehead of the Associated Press; Charles Corte of Acme Newspictures, and Jack Barnet of Fox Movietone, both veteran photographers of the war in Tunisia; John Thompson of the Chicago Tribune, who jumped on the night before D day with the parachutists; and Robert Landry, Life photographer. There were also three enlisted Stars and Stripes reporters, who turned out to be excellent writers and industrious front-line soldiers.

Ashore from the Navy came six additional correspondents: H. R. Knickerbocker of the Chicago Sun, considered among the top-ranking few best war correspondents; Clark Lee of Bataan fame, working for the International News Service; Michael Chinigo of the same agency; Ernie Pyle, now probably the best-known correspondent of this war; Robert Capa, perhaps the best of all war photographers, who arrived working for the photo pool but was accredited during the campaign to Life; and 2nd Lt. James A. Burchard of Stars and Stripes, formerly a well-known member of the New York World-Telegram staff.

Later in the campaign others were added: Dick Tregaskis, of International News Service, whose book, Guadalcanal Diary, is a best seller. Fred Painton, veteran of the last war and writer for Readers Digest. Questin Reynolds, well known for his articles in Colliers, not to mention his latest best seller, Dress Rehearsal, the story of Dieppe. Demaree Bess, considered the shrewdest of all the foreign political writers, representing the Saturday Evening Post. Irving Smith, Universal Newsreel cameraman who landed at Fedala and stayed through the Tunisian campaign. Mark Watson, editor of the Baltimore Sun. Bob Wallace, photographer for Look Magazine. Mike Ackerman of Acme, dean of American news cameramen. Ivan Dmitri, famed for his color pictures in Life and Saturday Evening Post. Merrill Mueller of Newsweek and the National Broadcasting Company. Al Newman of Newsweek. Charles Daly of the Columbia Broadcasting Company. Farnsworth Fowle, also of CBC. Ralph Howard Peterson of NBC. Sam Shere of Life. John Hersey of Time and Life. Herbert Matthews of the New York Times. Homer Bigart of the New York Herald Tribune. Tom Treaner of the Los Angeles Times. Dick Mowrer of the Chicago Daily News. Seymour Korman of the Chicago Tribune. Herb White, Associated Press photographer. Jack Rice, Associated Press photographer. Tom Henry of the Washington Star. Noel Monks of the London Daily Mail. Raymond Clapper, famous columnist for Scripps-Howard newspapers.

The Public Relations Branch at Algiers reported that, in general, the correspondents were well satisfied with the conduct of public relations in Seventh Army.

Time Magazine, which in the past has been sharply critical of Army Public Relations, said in its July 26 issue, page 27:

"The historic invasion of that historic island (Sicily) was more thoroughly reported, by correspondents with the invaders, than any military operation of World War II."

And on page 58 of the same issue:

"For once, Americans had all the copy they could read about an Allied move. The copy was slow getting under way, but within 24 hours after the troops were on the beaches, it was spinning through OWI's Washington headquarters, from Sicily, from the invasion fleet, from Allied Headquarters in North Africa... The result was the best war coverage Americans had yet had."

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RECOMMENDATIONS

One of the principal faults of organization of the Public Relations Section of Seventh Army was the delay with which the section was implemented with equipment and vehicles.

The basic policy of higher headquarters for operation HUSKY was that Public Relations be centralized in that headquarters, with personnel and equipment provided to the field army from a higher headquarter's pool. This would have proven satisfactory if personnel and equipment had arrived at tactical headquarters in time to be included in loading schedules.

The answer seems to lie in the building of a strong, well-equipped organic section in the Army itself, to which higher headquarters can send supplementary personnel and equipment. This organic section should be in a continued state of preparedness on a footing, even during quiescent periods, which will enable it to be incorporated in the original loading plans, and to enter an operation organized and equipped for maximum efficiency.

There is no more reason why a Public Relations Section should be disbanded between operations than for an infantry platoon to be inactivated. Public Relations personnel must be highly specialized and is hard to find. Once procured, it should be kept intact.

Conclusions:

Transportation and communications go hand-in-hand as the two all-important essentials. Efficient operation of Public Relations requires that transportation be available for all correspondents to perform their legitimate missions. It also is necessary to have enough of a reserve to take care of maintenance, which, experience shows, will keep from 10 to 20 per cent of the Section's vehicles deadlined.

Not less than a dozen 1/4-ton trucks should be available at the very start of the operation such as the invasion of Sicily. The 3/4-ton and the 2 1/2-ton trucks are invaluable for transporting rations, mess equipment, water, baggage, etc. The motorcycles are absolutely essential for courier service.

It has been pointed out that maximum efficiency requires that two Cub planes be assigned to public Relations, primarily for use in carrying copy to transmission points, and also available in special cases to fly correspondents to critical areas.

A tabulated recommendation on transportation is attached.

OTHER EQUIPMENT

It was expected that correspondents would be based at Army Headquarters, and the Higher Headquarters would later ship equipment and personnal for a separate mess. But it was quickly seen that basing correspondents at Army Headquarters was impractical. Therefore, a mess was hurriedly organized, using borrowed and seized equipment. This was supplemented gradually until an efficient mess was assembled. Acquisition of a dozen German Army cots and a few folding cots solved the problem of billeting correspondents.

In future operations, adequate kitchen facilities should be provided at the outset and tentage should be available for inclement weather. Two CP tents and one pyramidal were used as blackout tents in Sicily for correspondents to work in at night when buildings were not available.

A proposed TBA for camp equipment is attached.

PERSONNEL

The Public Relations Section had four officers on the D day operation. They were dispersed, as experience in the Moroccan campaign had shown was best, with the sub-task forces, each conducting a team of corrrespondents, providing comprehensive couverage of the operation. In addition, the service of the Public Relations Officer of the Second Armored Division was obtained to escort a team with his headquarters. This was necessary because of the lack of other personnel.

Midway in the campaign one officer was evacuated because of malaria and two new officers reported from Higher Headquarters. One arrived, ill with malaria, and was returned at once. The other was ill for the first five days and was able to be on duty only a few days late in the campaign. The net result was that, except for about ten days, the Section operated with only four officers --too few to do a proper job.

Six officers should be the absolute minimum for efficiency in such a campaign. And this does not take into account the ever-existing possibility of illness or casualties from enemy action. But it would provide a Chief-of-Section, executive, camp commandant and transportation officer and communications officers.

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

Forward Echelon

1 Major, commandant and forward executive.
1 Captain, communications officer.
1 Lieutenant, assistant communications officer.
1 Lieutenant, relief and transportation officer.
1 Technical sergeant for first sergeant
1 Mess Sergeant
1 Motor sergeant - Mechanic
15 Drivers
3 Motorcycle riders.
2 Cooks
4 General duty enlisted men.

Base Echelon

1 Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Section.
1 Captain, base echelon executive
1 Technical Sergeant, chief clerk.
1 Technician fourth grade, stenographer and assistant clerk.

Recapitulation

1 Lieutenant Colonel	2 Technical Sergeants
1 Major	1 Staff Sergeant (Mess)
2 Captains	2 Sergeants or T/4's
2 Lieutenants	4 T/5's
	20 privates
6 Officers	29 Enlisted Men

Attached During Combat Operation

2 pilots.

PROPOSED TABLE OF TRANSPORTATION

The following table of transportation for a Public Relations operation such as the Sicilian campaign required is proposed:

	Attached
12 - 1/4 ton trucks	
1 - 2½ ton truck	2 - light planes
1 - 3/4 ton truck	
3 - motorcycles	
1 - 1/2 ton trailer	
2 - 1/4 ton trailers	
1 - small water-trailer	
1 - small air compressor	
Tools for minor maintenance	

PROPOSED TABLE FOR CAMP EQUIPMENT

20 - small wall tents
4 - pyramidal tents
2 - command post tents
2 - kitchen flies
1 - field range
3 - ground type burners
Kitchen equipment adequate to feed 60 persons in emergencies, or 50 regularly.
1 - small generator for lighting
30 - camouflage nets
50 - folding cots
30 - folding tables.

Submitted By
JOHN H. HUTCHISON
Major, Infantry
Public Relations Officer

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SERVICE OFFICER

The Special Service Section found the beginning of the planning and preparation phase to be very similar to the period preceding it. The recreation programs set up in Casablanca, Rabat, Safi, Port Lyautey, Fedala and Guercif, consisting of ten clubs and four theaters that had been opened and turned over to the American Red Cross for operation, and organized recreation and athletics and outdoor movies in the bivouac areas were continued in good effect. All divisions and units assigned to I Armored Corps had been adequately supplied with athletic equipment ("A" kits) but there was a great shortage of radio-phonograph combinations ("B" kits) which had been distributed on the basis of approximately one-third of the authorized allowance. Seventy-five large field radios, operated by storage batteries, had been secured and distributed. It was recognized that the units engaged in the Tunisian Campaign would be assigned and that normal and battle loss replacements of equipment would be necessary. A reserve supply was started to meet this requirement by setting aside one-half of all supplies received and with the excess athletic equipment of the units and divisions in the Rabat Area. Planning for future supplies was coordinated with the Special Service Sections of NATOUSA, Atlantic Base Section, Mediterranean Base Section and Eastern Base Section.

As the headquarters moved east the recreation program was enlarged in scope with the addition of programs in Oran, which had already been well set up for entertainment and facilities by the American Red Cross and at Mostaganem where Special Service operated a theater and a bathing beach. The Red Cross operated four clubs, two restaurants and three theaters in

Special Service Officers of all units were informed that it would be very improbable that supplies would be available in the quantities required and were instructed in setting up a special improvised bivouac recreation and athletic program that could be made up with items normally carried by the men in their combat packs, regular supply room items, or that could be obtained from the natural features of the bivouac area.

There was a definite need for the assignment of Special Service companies. The company consists of five officers and one hundred and nine enlisted men. Normally comprising four platoons and trained as infantry it is designed to function either as a company or as separate platoons, each capable of establishing a complete recreation center with athletic, musical, theatrical, radio, library, motion picture, canteen and exchange facilities. The company has organic transportation. The required assignment of companies would be one per division and two to Army headquarters under the supervision of the Special Service Officer for use in smaller unit bivouac areas. Although request was made for assignment of companies of this type they had not arrived in the theater prior to departure of the Section from Africa.

The Section moved from Mostaganem to Bizerte where it established and operated beach clubs, one for officers and one for enlisted men. It was instrumental in securing and opening a club and theater under the operation of the Red Cross. Conducted tours to historic Carthage were instituted. The history of the Section in Africa leaves a trail of clubs and theaters from Safi to Bizerte, with the main programs of recreation (including unit day rooms), athletics and movies installed in bivouac areas.

The Section was also assigned the task of handling Expeditionary Force Messages for the Army troops. While the messages were of the "canned" type which is not especially desireable, they did provide a rapid means for communicating with the United States.

In preparation for the water phase where troops would spend many days aboard ship division and unit Special Service Officers were provided with books, small games and playing cards to distribute for the recreation and entertainment of troops. It was considered impractical to attempt to install movie shows aboard.

The Stars and Stripes newspaper did much towards the maintenance of morale and arrangements were made to have the Algiers edition provided to troops in Sicily. The newspaper was distributed free of charge in all combat zones, and was later set up in printing plant in Palermo issuing two Sicily editions each week and a reprint of the Algiers weekly edition.

The American Red Cross played a large part in the Special Service program providing field personnel to assist the soldier in welfare problems and club personnel to operate the numerous clubs. The field personnel in Sicily consisted of forty field directors and seven hospital women. Four men were assigned to Army headquarters, four to each division and two to Corps headquarters with others assigned to various air corps groups. One woman was assigned to each of seven hospitals. The men assigned to the combat teams of the divisions came ashore with the initial assault and, during the initial phases, concentrated their efforts in supplying patients at clearing stations and evacuation hospitals with necessary comfort items. There were six women and four men engaged in club work operating a beach club and a city club in Palermo that were obtained by the Special Service Section. Nine clubmobile workers were operating three mobile clubs in the bivouac areas. Clubs were planned for Cefalu, Termini and Trapani for operation by the Red Cross and request for the necessary personnel had been forwarded.

Special Service facilities were made available to troops during the battles as far front as the reserve regiments. Outdoor movies were provided in all areas where permitted. It is estimated that the movie attendance at these shows during July was 600,000 and 1,020,000 during August.

An American Expeditionary Force radio program commenced operation over Radio Palermo on 11 August 1943 with sufficient power to reach all of the island and the Italian mainland. The program was scheduled for one hour daily, to be expanded at a later date upon arrival of equipment necessary to install a separate station.

Plans were made for each division, upon being withdrawn from the forward areas, to set up installations of bathing beaches, movies and enlisted men clubs within their respective areas.

The Special Service Section obtained a theater in Palermo and operated four shows daily showing to a total of 2000 men each day.

CONCLUSIONS:

Control over small units, especially artillery and coast artillery is lacking in Special Service activities due to the failure of the brigade T/O to provide a Special Service Officer although one is provided for a regiment.

Special Service supply during the campaign was far inadequate to meet the minimum needs of the troops.

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REPORT OF THE CHAPLAIN

Army Special Service should be set up as an operative rather than an administrative section.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the T/O of a brigade call for a full-time Special Service Officer.

That the T/O for Special Service Sections be amended as follows:

	Army	Corps	Div.	Brig.	Regt.	Bn.
Colonel	1					
Lieut. Colonel	1	1	1			
Major	1	1				
Captain	2		1	1	1	
Lieut. (1st or 2nd)			2			1
	5	2	4	1	1	1
Master Sgt.	1					
Tech. Sgt.	1	1	1			
Staff Sgt.	1			1		
Tech. 4th gr.	3	3	3		1	
Tech. 5th gr.	6	3	3	2	2	2
Private 1st cl.	2	3	3	1	1	
	14	10	10	4	4	2

That Quartermaster or courier supply channels be used for shipment of Special Service supplies.

That all units be supplies with "A" (Athletic) "B" (Recreation) Kits in accordance with authorized allowances immediately and that a sufficient supply be carried on hand at Base Sections to equip units activated in the theater and for normal and battle loss replacements.

That T/B/A be set for Special Service equipment as follows:

	Army	Corps	Div.	Brig.	Regt.	Bn.
Projector, 16 mm	6	4	2	1	1	1
Projector screens (large outdoor)	6	4	2	1	1	1
Proj. repair and rewind kits	6	4	2	1	1	1
P. A. Systems W/ record player:						
50 Watt	2	1	1			
20 Watt	2			1	1	
Films, 16 mm	50	25	25	10		
Generators, 5 KW	2	2	2	1	1	1
Radio (all wave) (Bat.-AC-DC)	4	2	1			
Truck, 2-1/2 T	2	1	1			
Truck, 3/4 T	1	1	1	1	1	
Truck, 1/4 T	2	1	1	1	1	
Trailer, 1 T	2	1	1	1		
Trailer, 1/4 T	1				1	

That one Special Service company be assigned to Army headquarters and one company to each division under the control of the Special Service Officer.

LESSONS LEARNED:

That it is impossible to control shipments of Special Service supplies unless a specific channel is set up in order to place responsibility for safe delivery. Control of shipments from Bizerte arranged by the Special Service Office by utilizing empty trucks of Quartermaster and Field Artillery units was excellent and the shipments were received in Sicily intact. Shipments which were made after the Section left Bizerte and which were loaded in bulk on LST's were difficult to handle and were received incomplete. Shipment of supplies through Quartermaster channels or under the care of a courier would provide the necessary guidance for proper arrival of the shipment at Special Service.

1. Shipments of Special Service supplies are difficult to control with limited personnel. They should flow with the normal Quartermaster supplies.

2. It is necessary to furnish guards in all shipments to prevent looting.

3. Empty vehicles of units can be utilized for shipping Special Service Supplies.

4. Increased personnel are necessary to guarantee proper distribution and safe arrival.

Kenneth E. Van Buskirk
KENNETH E. VAN BUSKIRK,
Lt. Col., Field Artillery,
Special Service Officer.

During the planning period for the Sicilian campaign, the Chaplains of this command carried on the performance of their normal duties. One of the principal problems was to procure additional chaplains to fill vacancies in various units of this command. The Chaplain's office was moved with the rear echelon to Oran, Algeria on April 29th where steps were instituted to obtain the necessary chaplains. There was a shortage of chaplains in the African theater. In making recommendations for transfer and assignment of chaplains, priority was given the existing vacancies in combat units. Effort was made to place the young and vigorous chaplains in combat units and older men in non-combatant units. Requests were also made for a chaplains pool in accordance with War Department directives to provide the services of chaplains for troops in units having none authorized by Tables of Organization. This personnel was not obtained.

Typical religious schedule of services conducted during the planning phase are illustrated by Annexes #1 and 2, for Easter Sunday, April 25, and June 6.

During the tactical operation of the campaign, in addition to performing their normal functions, the chaplains, in many cases, assisted the Graves Registration Officer by combing the battlefields for the dead and transporting them to various places for burial. A considerable portion of their time was devoted to this activity at the expense of active soldiers where they could have been more helpful in maintaining the morale of the command.

Typical schedule of services conducted during the operational phase is illustrated by Annex #3 of August 22. Summary of chaplain activities is illustrated by compilation of Monthly Report of Chaplains dated September 14, Annex #4.

One of the greatest handicaps the chaplains found for the successful performance of their duties was the lack of transportation.

Noel T. Adams
NOEL T. ADAMS,
Chaplain, Major,
Seventh Army.

ANNEXES

**** RELIGIOUS SERVICES ****
(for Easter Sunday, April 25th)
Rabat, French Morocco

CATHOLIC

St. Pierre Cathedral..... Near Chamber of Commerce Bldg.
Masses at: 0700, 0800, 0900*, 1000, 1115
* Mass by Army Chaplain

Confessions at Cathedral from 1600 to 1900 Saturday, by English-speaking curates. (First confessional boxes on left and right)

Notre-Dame Des Anges..... Aquedal, near Rue L'Ariege & Rue La Marne.
Masses at: 0800, 0900, 1000, 1115

St. Francis..... Next to Red Cross Service Center on Rue de La Marachale.
Masses at: 0730, 0830, 1000, 1100

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

1100.....Red Cross Serv. Ctr., in the wicker room to the rear of the bldg.

PROTESTANT

0700..... Easter Sunrise Service at Red Cross Service Center.

0930..... For Special Troops in I Armored Signal Area.

1100..... At Red Cross Serv. Ctr. (Conservatoire de Musique), on Rue Lasvigne, one block to the rear of Rennaissance Theater.

1430..... At 760th Tank Bn. Area.

1700..... At Red Cross Serv. Ctr.,.....Vesper Service.

LENTEN SERVICES:
CATHOLIC: At the Cathedral nightly, at 1830.
GREEK ORTHODOX: Church in Bab Tamesma Place, U.S. Army Route #1, at the end of Avenue De Temara. Each evening 1800 to 2000, and Good Friday at 1330.

JEWISH

Passover Morning Services, April 27th, will be held at the Red Cross Ctr. from 0900 to 1200.

*** RELIGIOUS SERVICES ***
(for Sunday, June 6th)

ORAN AREA

CATHOLIC: 1100 - American Red Cross, Empire Theatre
The following churches hold Mass at: 0600, 0700, 0800, 0900 and 1030:
Cathedral, Place Jeanne d'Arc, Bd. du 2nd Zouaves
St-Louis Church, near Military Hospital
St-Andre, Place Ben Daoul

Confessions: 1700 - Saturday, Chaplain's Office, 4 Bd. Clemenceau
1030 - Sunday, American Red Cross, Empire Theatre.

PROTESTANT: Services at 1100 in the Auditorium of Hqs. Bldg. (Rear Echelon)
Evening Vespers at 1900.
Devotions and Meeting of Service Men's Christian League on Tuesday evening, June 8th, at 1900.

OTHERS: 0815 - Episcopal Communion, Chaplain's Office, Ecole Pasteur.
0830 - Holy Communion(Sunday and Daily) Chaplain's Office, 4 Blvd. Clemenceau.
1000 - American Red Cross, Empire Theatre.
1000 - Methodist Church(French)-Blvd. des Chasseurs & Rue d'Arzew.

JEWISH: 0900 - Sunday - American Red Cross, Empire Theatre.
1830 - Friday - Synagogue, Bd. Jeffre and Rue Magenta.
(Above services are conducted by U.S. Army Ch.)
1900 - DAILY - Synagogue.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE: Services every evening in the Chaplain's Office, 4 Blvd. Clemenceau at 1930.

MOSTAGANEM AREA

PROTESTANT: 1030 - Sunday - Red Cross Theatre, off the Square in Mostaganem.
1300 - Sunday - Surgical Area, 40th Station Hospital.
1900 - Sunday - 40th Station Hospital Detachment Area.

CATHOLIC: Saturday - 1700 to 1900-Confessions in Church on Sq., Mostaganem.
Saturday - 1930 to 2030-Confessions in Ch. Room, 40th Sta. Hosp.
Saturday - 1700 to 1800 - SSO Office, I Armd. Corps, Ch. DeMars.

Sunday Masses

0715 - In the Surgical Area at the 40th Station Hospital.
0630, 0730, 0830*, 0900, 1030 - Church on Square in Mostaganem.
(* 0830 Mass will be said by an Army Chaplain)
Confessions will be heard before the Mass in Church.

JEWISH: Tuesday - 1900 - Surgical Area, 40th Station Hospital.
(Service conducted by an Army Ch.)

*** RELIGIOUS SERVICES ***
(22 August 1943)
Palermo, Sicily

CATHOLIC SERVICES

San Domenico Church - Via Roma (1 block east of Post Office Bldg.)
Masses at: 0700, 0845, 1000* and 1100*(*Masses by U.S. Army Chaplains)
Weekly Masses each morning at 0700 by Army Chaplain

Cathedral - Via Victor Emanuele at Archway.
Mass at: 0900 by Chaplain DeMars.

Regina Pacis Church - West side of Palermo, near 540th Engineers.
Mass at: 0900 by U.S. Army Chaplain

St. Theresa Church - Via Fillippo Parlotore & Via Dante, near 68th C.A. and 201st Ordnance Depot
Mass at: 0900; Confessions: 0800 - 0900 by U.S. Army Ch,

Other Masses by Army Chaplains:
1000 at 91st Evac. Hosp.; 1700 at 343rd Bivouac Area.

Confessions: Before all Masses held by Army Chaplains.
Also, at 0900 to 1100 and 1430 to 1800, August 21st, in Chaplain's Office (Main Hqs, 7th Army - 4th Floor)

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PROTESTANT

General Protestant Service at 1000 in Holy Cross Church, Via Rome, diagonally across the street from Grand Hotel. (Note change in location of this service).

10th Port of Embarkation: Services in Chapel at Imperia Cinema on Piazza Settimo
Holy Eucharist (Episcopal) at 0730
General Army Service (Protestant) at 0900
Vespers & Discussion Group at 1900

General Protestant Service - Chaplain J. R. Shuman.
1030 Sundays at Massimo Theater located across the street from American Red Cross Theater, opposite Opera House.

Episcopal or Church of England - Service at 0800 - Eucharist and Communion.
Place: Holy Cross Church as above. American Chaplain, celebrant.

JEWISH

Services at American Red Cross Theater, #8 Piazza Verdi
Friday evening at 1930
Sunday at 1000

COMPILATION OF MONTHLY REPORTS OF CHAPLAINS

OF SEVENTH ARMY

FOR: MONTHS OF FEBRUARY, 1943 to AUGUST, 1943, incl.

	No. of Times	Attendance
Preachings or Masses:		
Sundays	5182	442451
Weekdays	3917	132694
Confessions		50169
Communions		92922
Ministrations to Ill(Last Rites)	928	
Catechisms or Bible Classes	761	6207
Rosary Services	64	4373
Devotions	524	29582
Hospital Services	23	383
Guard House Services	20	365
Joint or Participating Services	215	59537
Services Visited by Chaplains	214	
Personal Interviews		30881
Group Discussions	1012	8060
Welfare Cases	1179	
Disciplinary Cases	153	
Hospital Visits	4594	70679
Guard House Visits	151	1294
Religious Material Distributed		36516
Lectures	352	44796
Conferences With Military Personnel	2980	5661
Officers' Meetings Attended	501	4763
All Other Contacts With Personnel		19262
Recreation and Entertainment	130	339100
Letters to Enl. Men's Families	2749	
Civilian Activities	803	25814
Services by Visiting Clergymen:		
Protestant	150	9333
Catholic	380	31443
Jewish	52	1397
*Marriages	2	
Baptisms	138	
Funerals	1258	

Religious Percentage of Entire Command:

Protestant	59.25
Catholic	32.75
Jewish	3.075
No Denomination	4.925
	100.000%

Compilation based on:

February	30	Monthly Reports of Chaplains
March	29	" " " "
April	38	" " " "
May	61	" " " "
June	107	" " " "
July	137	" " " "
August	117	" " " "
	519	Total number of Monthly Reports

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COMMANDING GENERAL

Lt. General George S. Patton Jr. 02605 U.S.A.

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL

Maj. General Geoffrey Keyes 03561 U.S.A.

CHIEF OF STAFF

Brig. General Hobart R. Gay 07323 G.S.C.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (ADMINISTRATIVE)

Colonel ROBERT E. CUMMINGS, 07512, GSC

SECRETARY OF GENERAL STAFF

Major George R. Pfann, 0469770, GSC
1st Lt William K. Goolrick, Jr. 0438144, Inf (a)
1st Lt Roy B. Maurer, 02053898, Inf

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (TACTICAL)

Colonel PAUL D. HARKINS, 017625, GSC

AIDES

Lt Col Charles R. Codman, 0448161, GSC
Capt Lloyd P. Lowman, 0450177, Inf (a)
Capt Alexander C. Stiller, 01010000, Inf
1st Lt. George F. Murnane, Jr. 01010331 Cav (c)

By authority of the War Department, Major General John P. Lucas, U.S.A., was attached to, and served with Headquarters Seventh Army throughout the campaign.

G - 1

Lt Col David D. Zink	0173601	GSC
Major Samuel A. Syme	0118804	GSC
Major Joseph A. Pelton	0329346	GSC
Major William M. Fondren	0366487	Inf
Capt Charles A. Page	0361734	Inf
Capt Frank S. Givens	0304204	Inf

G - 2

Colonel Oscar W. Koch	010854	GSC
Colonel Nicholas W. Campanole	01717	Inf (f)
Colonel Hamer P. Ford	016417	Inf (d)
Lt Col Lewis E. Perry	0253874	GSC (b)
Lt Col Alexander N. Slocum, Jr.	0227189	GSC (a)
Major Bernard S. Carter	0885628	Inf
Major Raymond G. Osborn	0345430	Cav
Major David Radam	0294250	Inf
Major Robert L. Woolfolk III	0403544	Inf (c)
Capt Alfred L. Howes	0347378	MI
Capt Ralph M. Luman	0350086	Inf
1st Lt Charles W. Bishop	0272549	MP
1st Lt James F. Clark	0449745	Inf
1st Lt Carl D. Schubach	0430490	Inf
1st Lt Marcus M. Staples	01284414	Inf
1st Lt Rudolf G. Ceeilg	01011630	MT
1st Lt Lee Feider	01283930	Inf
1st Lt George C. Bellin	01042489	CAC (c)
1st Lt Robert R. Volz	01046979	CAC (c)
2nd Lt Charles H. Brown	02046416	NMB
2nd Lt Louis S. Vanore	01304592	Inf
2nd Lt Herman H. Novack	02053897	CAC (c)
2nd Lt Carvel Busey	0415667	FA

G - 3

Colonel Halley G. Maddox	012852	GSC
Lt Col Arthur C. Goodwin, Jr.	018179	GSC
Lt Col Joe F. Surratt	019461	GSC
Lt Col James B. Wilkins	0175634	GSC
Lt Col William B. Goddard	0209216	Inf
Lt Col William O. Baxter	0173679	GSC
Major John G. Berry	0294690	Inf
Major Paul W. Philips	0343165	Inf
Capt George R. Doughtie	0399283	CE (d)
Capt George G. Huffman	0295049	Cav
Capt Clarence E. Stuart	0379607	FA
Capt Howard C. Parker	0341967	Cav (c)
Capt Haskell E. Morrow	0253451	Inf
1st Lt Robert H. Loeb	0307793	Inf
2nd Lt John Elliot	02055319	Inf
2nd Lt Chester T. Hulse	02055365	Inf

G - 4

Colonel Walter J. Muller	012224	GSC
Lt Col Ernest M. Clarke	019183	GSC
Lt Col Oliver C. Harvey	0307540	GSC
Lt Col Charles F. Tank	019350	GSC
Lt Col Edwin H. O'Neill	0492976	TC (c)(d)
Lt Col Edward B. Gallant	0257020	GSC (a)(d)
Lt Col Charles M. Mount	021849	Inf (c)(d)
Major John M. Chappel	0463586	QMC
Major Emory D. K. Jackson	0361657	QMC
Major Mabry G. Miller	0304347	Inf
Major Francis W. Biliado	0311562	Inf (c)(d)
Major Herbert L. Phyfe	0245936	TC (c)(d)

Major Wayne D. Smart	0298516	Cav (c)
Capt William J. Chalkley	0290063	Inf
Capt Oscar M. Gunderson	0920349	TC (c)
Capt Edward W. Suor	0294152	TC (c)
Capt Howard L. Oligher	0412637	Inf (c)
1st Lt Robert J. Andress	09125512	TC (c)
2nd Lt William P. Schumpert	01582114	QMC
CWO Edward W. Powell	W2103327	NMB

Transportation Section - Base Area

Colonel Fred T. Meville	07806	TC (b)(d)
Major Kirk A. Keegan	0907796	TC
Major Donald I. Pattison	0303888	Inf
Major Light B. Yost	0286323	Inf
Capt Floyd B. Boyle	0496596	TC
Capt Fred A. Dunham	0220308	TC (b)(d)
Capt Frank T. Heinemann	0421952	QMC
Capt Paschal B. Taylor	0473759	TC (b)(d)
1st Lt. John E. Binnion	01578171	QMC
1st Lt Ralph Chavkin	0455657	TC
1st Lt Edward P. Dungate	01010754	TC
CWO Keith L. Reckord	W2117101	NMB (b)(d)

G - 4 Base Area

Major Louis O. Gravely	0248412	Inf
Capt Paul R. Heck	0405420	FA
Capt Ryan N. King	0363232	Inf
Capt Edward W. Krug	0920156	CE
1st Lt Louis Berger	01575736	TC (b)

Procurement Section Base Area

Capt Bernard F. Cinkoske	0411212	QMC (b)

Automotive Section

Lt Col Robert E. Holman	0304526	Inf
Major Jack N. Nahas	028975C	SC (b)
Capt Robert A. Bieber	0352838	Cav
2nd Lt James N. Kennedy	02053800	NMB

Automotive Section Base Area

1st Lt Jesse W. Short	01287768	Inf

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ARTILLERY SECTION

Colonel J. J. B. Williams	0520?2	FA	
Colonel John M. Willems	016176	FA	(a)
Lt Col Halford R. Greenlee, Jr.	019801	CAC	(d)
Major Edward C. Spaulding	020588	FA	
Major Thomas J. Webster	021831	FA	
Major Farrand Flowers	0261493	FA	
Capt Claude L. Shepard	021931	FA	
Capt Robert E. Coffin	025234	FA	(a)
Capt Joseph V. Owens	0284984	FA	
Capt Max H. Gerard	0350723	CAC	(d)
Capt Albert Darrow	0499263	FA	
1st Lt Robert V. Myers	0409686	FA	
1st Lt Ted W. Chiles	0394115	FA	

ANTI-AIRCRAFT SECTION

Lt Col Merle R. Thompson	017534	CAC	
Major H. P. Persons	0201671	FA	(d)
Capt Samuel S. Gregory	0395753	CAC	
Capt James C. Dobbin	0397669	FA	

ANTI-TANK SECTION

Capt Ernest T. Barco, Jr.	0381566	FA	

CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION

Major Bruce T. Humphreville	0226881	CWS	
Capt James J. Heffner	0304405	CWS	
1st Lt George D. Gould	0447267	CWS	(b)
1st Lt Robert D. Myers	01035019	CWS	

ENGINEER SECTION

Colonel Garrison H. Davidson	016755	CE	
Lt Col Leonard L. Beasley	018045	CE	(b)
Lt Col John A. Chambers	0251918	CE	(b)
Lt Col Edwin C. Kiler	0308641	CE	
Major Clair F. Bowman	0245952	CE	
Major Peter F. Gaynor, Jr.	0381277	CE	
Major Ralph D. King	020115	CE	
Major Clifford O. Miles	0349463	CE	(e)
Major Montgomery L. Webster	021751	CE	
Capt Charles G. Gholson	0909235	CE	(c)
Capt Malcolm A. Head	0515551	CE	(b)
Capt. James D. Hilleke	0379221	CE	(b)
Capt Charles H. Mallon	0908447	CWS	(b)
Capt Richard L. Williams	0353781	CE	
1st Lt Decatur Brown	0885510	CE	(b)
1st Lt Henry R. Dwight	0302548	Inf	
1st Lt Winthrop H. Lee	01102349	CE	(a)
1st Lt Mark E. Reames	0281954	Inf	(b)
1st Lt Richard E. Rogers	0451973	CE	
1st Lt John L. Vaughn	0501747	CE	(b)
1st Lt Robert R. Woulfe	01573689	QMC	(b)
2nd Lt Robert Blair, Jr.	01554860	Ord	(c)
2nd Lt Harold J. Van Aken	01309122	Inf	
WO (jg) Rex Holt	WZ021096	NMB	(b)

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

Major John H. Olin	0324955	Inf	

ORDNANCE SECTION

Colonel Thomas H. Nixon	09326	Ord	
Lt Col Leonard B. Boyce	0919915	Ord	
Lt Col Harold E. Hopping	0183266	Ord	
Lt Col Nelson M. Lynde	017730	Ord	(a)(b)
Lt Col Morris W. Cousins	0228644	Ord	
Lt Col Herbert P. Schowalter	0210991	Ord	(c)
Major Albert H. Johnson	0284104	Ord	
Major William H. Connerat	0310305	Ord	(c)
Major James O. Branch	0267710	Ord	(c)
Capt John W. Brown	0346427	Inf	
Capt Lawrence J. Grunder	0261221	Inf	
Capt Joshua L. Holley, Jr.	0371032	Ord	(c)
Capt Robert E. LeRoy	0360515	Inf	
Capt Paul M. Thompson	0489923	Ord	
Capt Edward M. Dew	02054011	NMB	(c)
WO (jg) Leonard S. Coleman	WZ109693	NMB	(d)
WO (jg) Joseph Dandreto	WZ109685	NMB	
WO (jg) James M. Wood	WZ109672	NMB	

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

Lt Col Claude O. Burch	010365	Cav	
Major Raymond C. Briggs	0240174	CMP	
Major John A. McVoy	0221457	CMP	(c)
Capt Wilson H. Dunn	0302364	CMP	
Capt John M. Thistle	0170245	CMP	
Capt Dexter G. Tillroe	0290182	AC	(e)
1st Lt Austin Van Strett	0393408	CMP	(c)
1st Lt Harry P. Psomas	01208296	Inf	(c)
1st Lt John E. Whalen	01287261	Inf	(c)
1st Lt Jack R. Shackelford	01011752	Inf	(c)
1st Lt Burton A. Dye	0450435	AF	(c)
2nd Lt Salvatore L. Torrello	01585013	QMC	(c)
2nd Lt Marvin O. Thorne	01795734	CAC	(c)
2nd Lt John J. Barry	01045017	CAC	(c)

SIGNAL SECTION

Colonel Kilton F. Hammond	012291	SC	
Lt Col Norman H. Saunders	0171661	SC	
Lt Col Earl B. Williams	0244570	SC	
Major Philip Bierman	0265081	SC	
Major William F. Starr	023843	SC	
Major John L. Leidenheimer	0320979	SC	
Capt Harry W. Berry	0372159	SC	
Capt Bertram B. Dales, Jr.	0370504	SC	
Capt Everett C. Smith	0469754	SC	(a)
Capt Louis H. Spiegel	0353770	SC	
Capt William H. Waidschmidt	0326040	SC	
Capt Howard Hartog (British)			(c)
Capt F. W. Allen (British)			(c)
1st Lt Alanson B. Dunn	0455030	SC	
1st Lt Franklyn K. Smaie	01635345	SC	
1st Lt Harold C. Wafler	0315943	SC	
1st Lt Sydney Stoen	01636704	SC	(c)
1st Lt William F. Abbe	0487448	SC	(c)
2nd Lt Richard L. Blosser	02054014	SC	
2nd Lt John B. Palmer, Jr.	0485216	SC	
2nd Lt Frederick H. Parker, Jr.	02053995	SC	
WO (jg) Richard H. Tarpley	WZ126139	NMB	
WO (jg) John J. McMurray	WZ108240	NMB	

Signal Section Base Area

Capt Harold N. Logan	0388386	SC	
1st Lt Alvin L. Canepa	01633105	SC	
1st Lt Charles D. Erckman	0482838	SC	
1st Lt Richard O. Lawton	0391556	SC	
1st Lt Robert S. Porter	0305925	SC	
2nd Lt Francis J. Gallant	01634782	SC	

MEDICAL SECTION

Colonel Daniel Franklin	06270	MC	
Lt Col John W. Norton	0287167	MC	
Lt Col Norman E. Peatfield	021027	MC	
Lt Col Charles D. Odom	0480718	MC	(d)
Major Edward J. Rudley	0255374	MAC	
Major George M. Knapp	0369587	MC	(d)
Capt Murray L. Maurer	0425662	MC	
Capt Charles Raulerson	0430373	MAC	
1st Lt Erskine M. Livingstone	0502944	SNC	
2nd Lt LeRoy R. Sixberry	01541219	MAC	(c)

Medical Section Base Area

Capt Robert S. Mathews	0147733	MAC	(c)

LIAISON OFFICER

Lt Col Jesse M. Hawkins, Jr.	019225	Cav	(c)

ADJUTANT GENERAL SECTION

Lt Col William G. Caldwell	017312	AGD	
Lt Col Jack C. Gault	0244796	AGD	
Major Edward Fox	0490172	AGD	
Major Albert A. Lindquist	0240961	AGD	
Major Mervin L. Merritt	0461888	AGD	
Major Joseph Y. Rabe	0377446	AGD	
Capt George A. Miller, Jr.	0285360	Inf	
1st Lt Glenn A. Henry	01000783	AGD	
1st Lt John E. Pederson	0456057	AGD	
1st Lt Laurence M. Schoenberger	0302901	SC	
2nd Lt Howard A. Engler	02046628	AGD	
2nd Lt Howard A. Spohr	0885889	AGD	
CWO Oscar Paulsen	W2102190	NMB	
WO (jg) Dan Herbuy	WZ109676	NMB	
WO (jg) Julius Lopez	WZ109677	NMB	
WO (Philip H. Rauch	WZ109678	NMB	
WO (jg) Frederick H. Evans	WZ109691	NMB	

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Major Noel T. Adams	0286081	Ch	
Capt Edward J. DeMars	0481221	Ch	
1st Lt Earl S. Stone	0425187	Ch	

FINANCE SECTION

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Lt Col Ernest R. Brock	0902897	FD	

INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

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Major Joseph M. Whitaker	0243178	IGD	
Major John M. Arnfield	0354577	Inf	(c)
Major Daniel M. Muth	0234295	IGD	
WO (jg) Andrew Weiss	WZ109673	NMB	

JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

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Lt Col Charles A. Luckie	0335074	JAG	
Capt Wayne A. Bannister	0319703	FA	
CWO Victor L. Wegard	W2102525	NMB	(a)

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Lt Col Charles Poletti	0923774	NMB	(d)
Major Orpheus J. Bizzozero	0241414	MC	(d)
Major Russell P. Drake	0511848	NMB	(d)
Major Stephen D. Martin	0303542	CMP	(d)
Major Monroe H. Meader	0484169	CE	(d)
Major Thomas J. Michie	0476980	AC	(d)
1st Lt Maurice F. Neufeld	0918527	QMC	(d)

QUARTERMASTER SECTION

Colonel Clyde Massey	015551	QMC	
Lt Col Thomas J. Kelly	0236025	QMC	(d)
Lt Col James F. Tweedy	0274993	QMC	
Major Walter F. Frey	0302270	QMC	
Major Gordon C. Gill	0308646	QMC	
Capt Samuel E. Graham, Jr.	01576054	QMC	
Capt William D. Pratt	028079	QMC	
Capt M. J. DeKorp	0405311	QMC	(c)
1st Lt Orville R. Lindstrom	01577481	QMC	
1st Lt John E. Schegolin	0451177	QMC	(d)
2nd Lt Paul J. O'Brien	01575037	QMC	(c)
WO (jg) Adrian N. Winegarden	WZ109674	NMB	

SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION

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Major Roy A. Carr	0363125	Inf	
Major Frederick E. Graef	0318024	Inf	
Capt Arthur E. Cooley	0284411	Inf	

PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION

Major John M. Hutchison	0352232	Inf	
Capt Percy D. Eldred	0240556	Cav	(d)
1st Lt Laurence G. Hoover	01283431	Inf	(d)
1st Lt John T. Dugan	0439893	CAC	(d)
1st Lt John H. Sensenney	01010557	Inf	(d)
1st Lt Thomas J. Stahl	01286199	Inf	(d)
1st Lt John E. Whelden	01292099	Inf	(d)

COURIER OFFICERS

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1st Lt Donald V. Hackett	0460562	Inf	
2nd Lt Warren Akin	01015734	Inf	
2nd Lt Norman W. Armbruster	01299351	Inf	(d)
2nd Lt Robert L. Herriott	01311392	Inf	
2nd Lt James L. Meadows	01307564	Inf	(c)

UNASSIGNED SECTION

Lt Col James F. Hodgson	0146759	GSC	(c)
Capt Everett L. Covell	0476016	TC	(b)
2nd Lt Glenwood B. Darling	01001764	AGD	(a)

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(b) - TD or DS with some other unit
(c) - Asgd or atchd this hq during this period
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REPORT OF OPERATIONS

THE SEVENTH UNITED STATES ARMY

IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

1944-1945

THREE VOLUMES

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VOLUME I

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To the Officers and Enlisted Men of the
Seventh United States Army who gave their
lives this history is respectfully dedicated

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FOREWORD

Any effort to record a succession of many events, regardless of how closely these events may be related, can result only in a partial and incomplete history. Even though the writer adheres faithfully to the existing documents, contemporary to the events described, and eliminates errors of memory and bias on the part of individuals participating therein, gaps will be bridged. Available documents, such as plans and orders, may have been executed wholly, in part, or not at all. Plans and orders are but a means to the all important end — execution. Under stress of a rapidly moving campaign, continuous and accurate evaluation of situations must be made as they arise, and success hinges on alertness and speed in exploiting an advantage or retrieving a disadvantage. In this control and direction of execution, it is but logical to expect that much of the action is initiated and often changed by decisions and orders transmitted orally on the spur of the moment, and of which no record is practicable.

Throughout its campaign a small group of the Seventh Army Staff worked at scanning source material with the object of producing a continuous narrative. Upon leaving the Mediterranean Theater and coming under the Supreme Allied Headquarters, the narrative history was for some months subordinated to the production of small unit action reports — brief factual reports involving regiments, battalions and companies. While such reports are invaluable for study in the Service Schools, it was realized that they do not afford a substitute for narrative, at Army level, and work on the narrative history was continued.

It is not the object of this history to enhance either the reputation of the Seventh Army or of any individuals in that Army. It is being published to provide a record of the campaigns of that Army, as accurate and unbiased as possible, and not omitting inevitable mistakes and difficulties that may have occurred. Emphasis has been placed on the tactics of the campaign, supply being less thoroughly covered, although there are chapters on supply for each phase of the book. Absence of more detail regarding supply must not be inter-

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preted as a lack of appreciation of its importance. Never was a campaign so dependent on supply for success. To say that the functioning of the supply agencies, under supervision of the G-4 Section, was less than brilliant would be an error. The obstacles overcome by them, at times, seemed insurmountable but were never accepted as such.

Since an account of action can be followed accurately only by having both text and maps simultaneously visible to the reader, maps have been arranged so as to provide that convenience.

To fill in some of the gaps in the record and to prevent erroneous conjecture on the part of the reader, the following facts should be remembered:

1. In the landing on the shores of South France tactical surprise was attained as a result of careful planning, including numerous diversionary operations. Therefore the Seventh Army attained the desired goal — a landing with a minimum of opposition.

2. Rapid exploitation to the north from the beachhead was no accident. Based on the mission and experience learned in landings previous to this one, it had been determined during the planning phase that the force would exploit rapidly out of the bridgehead and up the Rhone to contact American forces landed in Normandy just as quickly as opportunity offered.

3. A policy of unremitting pressure to keep the enemy off balance was maintained throughout the campaign, even during the temporary partial stalemate in the Vosges.

4. In general offensives, the staggering of attack dates for the various components of the Army was done for the purpose of forcing and taking advantage of ill-timed shifting of enemy front line units and reserves.

5. Long range planning in anticipation of possible as well as probable contingencies and developments was the rule.

6. In the final phase beginning 15 March 1945, close liaison between the Seventh Army and the Third Army on its left resulted in harmonious cooperation and teamwork.

Arthur A. White

ARTHUR A. WHITE
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff, Seventh Army

PREFACE

This document professes to be a narrative military history, something more and something less than the usual report of operations. It is not a compendium of reports submitted by various sections and organizations of Seventh Army. The complete data of an army report, have been forwarded to higher headquarters as annexes and Staff Section Reports. The basis for this history is a selection of material from reports submitted, verified and coordinated with information obtained from other primary sources at both high and low military level.

The original manuscript, from which this document was published, is the After Action Report of the Seventh United States Army in France and Germany which is on file at the War Department. It is fully annotated with complete references to the above mentioned source materials.

It is felt that this history is as accurate as any published within the space of one or two years after the events described. It represents an effort conceived before the beginning of the operation to prepare an historical military narrative. A system of checks and balances was conscientiously employed to find the truth. Close examination of place, time, and logic give the key to many confusing situations. However, when reasonable doubt exists, an attempt is made in this text to indicate the full cycle of reports and to point only to what seems the probable conclusion.

Any text can be authentic only in so far as its sources are authentic and in so far as the persons who compile it do so with integrity. The sources for this history fall generally into two categories: one, reports submitted through the historical section by units within the army and reports of the army staff sections; two, independent research and interview sources. Full credit should be given to unit historians who accumulated the data which form the basis of this account. Their efforts to prepare historical reports of unit engagements, usually in addition to other duties, represent a prodigious achievement.

From these unit reports research writers in the historical section, selected for special abilities in writing or scholarship, prepared their text. They are the men responsible for the accuracy of selecting and recording detail and for whatever interpretation might be necessary. Fortunately the historical section had available for check and balance the work of a group known as

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combat historians. These men collected and collated information about significant engagements within a few weeks following the action by means of interview with those who participated in the engagements and by checking terrain and report at first hand. Their reports on small unit actions were valuable in the clarification of engagements, as a check against unit reports. The data of small unit actions have added detail to the narrative and have assisted in the focus of emphasis on the proper places.

The maps and charts in this history are the work of a group of cartographers who collaborated with research and editorial sub-sections in producing a visual record which would supplement and be supplemented by the text. Photographs are for the most part selected from Signal Corps files, although some special work in photography has been done by the historical section. The production group, responsible for turning the manuscript into a book, has supervised publication with a purpose in accord with that of the section: to present a serious, dignified, readable, historical account of Seventh Army operations.

The historical section, during operations, was a detachment of the 6th Information and Historical Service, attached to Seventh Army for the purpose of compiling the historical data for the Army and writing the After Action Report of the operation.

Historians sometimes doubt the validity of history published immediately in the wake of events. It is recognized that five or ten years from now a more dispassionate, more interpretative history may be prepared. However, it is felt that this history has a double value. In the first place it represents the first of secondary sources for the possible history of the future. It is an attempt to give permanence and form to a record which might otherwise be lost or buried. In the second place, this history has now an immediacy which can never be recaptured. It is hoped that this document contains a warmth and fire and a sense of presence too often lacking in history. This can only be accomplished by working in the lights and shadows of the military campaign.

W. B. Goddard

W. B. GODDARD
Lt. Col. Infantry
Historian

CHIEF OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION
Lt. Col. William B. Goddard

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T/Sgt. William H. Bancroft
S/Sgt. Robert L. Davis
S/Sgt. Howard S. Dyer

In addition to the above named personnel there were the Combat Historians and other members of the administrative section, officers and enlisted men, who constituted the rest of the Seventh Army detachment of the 6th Information and Historical Service. They, too, made a sizeable contribution to the narrative history. Then there were the photographers of the 163rd Signal Photo Company and the Army Pictorial Division and the officers and enlisted men of the 3060 Engineer Topographic Company who, by their conscientious work and special abilities, added to and aided in the clarification of the finished narrative. And most important of all were the men who carried out the combat operations of Seventh Army, whose actions are herein recorded although too often concealed in anonymity, without whom there would be nothing to write. It is impossible to give proportionate credit to all.

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COMMANDING GENERAL
SEVENTH UNITED STATES ARMY

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AND

GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS


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
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COMMANDING GENERAL, SEVENTH UNITED STATES ARMY

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MAJOR GENERAL ARTHUR A. WHITE
CHIEF OF STAFF, SEVENTH UNITED STATES ARMY

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Deputy Chief of Staff

Colonel William H. Craig
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1



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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2



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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3



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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

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AAA Officer



Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson
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Colonel Myron P. Rudolph
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Brigadier General Clyde Massey
Quartermaster Officer



Brigadier General Edward W. Smith
Ordnance Officer



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CHAPTER I

Preliminary Planning

ON 19 December 1943 Seventh Army Headquarters in Palermo received a message which interrupted a four-month period of comparative inactivity since the end of the Sicilian campaign. It was a telegram from Allied Force Headquarters: "An estimate is required as a matter of urgency as to the accommodations which you would require for your planning staffs should you be asked to undertake the planning of an operation of a similar size to *HUSKY* . . ."

Since the capture of Messina on 17 August, which terminated the campaign in Sicily, the Seventh Army had been reduced from a tactical force of six divisions to a headquarters with a skeleton force of only a few remaining service units. In Washington and London the Combined Chiefs of Staff had made plans for an all-out offensive in the Mediterranean Theater to eliminate Italy from the war. As preparations for the invasion of the Italian mainland got under way, the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions, the 82nd Airborne Division, and most of Seventh Army's service units were assigned to the Fifth Army. At the same time the focus of coming events was also centered on the invasion of northern Europe. The 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Armored Division were ordered to the United Kingdom for training as major assault units in the contemplated cross-channel invasion. What remained of the Seventh Army force bivouacked in and about the city of Palermo to continue its training and conditioning, as the headquarters went through a series of command post exercises and completed tactical and historical reports of the summer campaign.

Now an operation similar to *HUSKY*, which had hit the beaches of Sicily, was to be planned. During the last week of December


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preparations were made to move and organize the nucleous of a Seventh Army planning staff in the Ecole Normale at Bouzareah, just outside Algiers. Other units remained in Sicily and elaborate precautions were



THE ECOLE NORMALE OF BOUZAREAH IN THE CITY OF ALGIERS
now an operation similar to HUSKY which had hit the beaches of Sicily was to be planned

taken to prevent identification of the Bouzareah group with Seventh Army.

Instructions from Allied Force Headquarters to the planning staff on 29 December indicated general direction and objectives. The operation, which was to be known by the code name of *ANVIL*, would be launched with a target date during May 1944 against the south coast of France. In conjunction with the *OVERLORD* invasion of northern Europe, *ANVIL* was to establish a Mediterranean bridgehead and subsequently to exploit towards Lyon and Vichy. The forces involved were to be both American and French, although what the proportion was to be and what the total strength would amount to was as yet uncertain.


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Lieutenant General George S. Patton was relieved from command of the Seventh Army as of 1 January. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, who still retained his Fifth Army command but was also charged with planning Operation *ANVIL*. Some five months were available for plans and revisions and for the organization and training of the striking force against Southern France. For initial consideration there was an Appreciation and Outline Plan previously prepared by Allied Force Headquarters.

AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan

In accordance with instructions, the Planning Group under the command of Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson, Army Engineer, left Sicily and arrived in Algiers on 12 January to begin work. In General Clark's absence the first meeting was presided over by Brigadier General B. F. Caffey, G-3, Special Operations, AFHQ, who informed the group that the headquarters for planning Operation *ANVIL* had been designated as "Force 163". In the afternoon of the same day the various planning sections attended an orientation meeting at Allied Force Headquarters where G-2, G-3, G-4, Transportation and Air Corps discussed appropriate sections of the AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan. The discussion was brief and many questions were left unanswered.

The AFHQ Plan envisaged an operation against Southern France, early in May 1944, with a two or three division assault and a build-up to a total of ten divisions for exploitation northward. This, of course, was based on several assumptions: that the Mediterranean Theater would be burdened by no offensive operations other than the Italian campaign; that the internal security of North Africa would not be a limiting factor in the availability of American and French Divisions; that no amphibious operation would or could take place prior to the launching of *OVERLORD*.

The scale of the operation compelled the securing and early use of a major port. Toulon or Sete, to the west of the Gulf of Lions, might be temporarily used but only Marseille could be developed to

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serve as a major supply base. In this same connection, the only beaches considered suitable were those southwest of Sete or those east of Toulon. It was also necessary to secure terrain suitable for the rapid construction of air strips so that fighter cover could be shore-based as soon as possible. The beach area east of Toulon in the vicinity of Rade d'Hyeres and Cavalaire Bay seemed to meet these requirements. It was fairly near Toulon and provided an anchorage for a large number of ships; moreover, the beaches themselves offered satisfactory gradients and good exits.

The assault was conceived with the likely prospect of a two-division lift, or three if available. In either case it was felt that the islands off the coast must be neutralized by Commandos or Rangers prior to H-Hour. The use of airborne troops to help extend the bridgehead and to prevent the rapid movement of enemy reinforcements into the target area was also recommended. Finally, the AFHQ plan suggested that the D-Day assaulting forces should be American with French follow-up troops who would begin landing on D plus 3. The capture of Toulon was to be the first major French objective, followed by the securing of Marseille and a general exploitation to the north.

As a counter proposal the planning staff of Force 163 recommended that the target area be shifted east of Cape Cavalaire in order to avoid an approach between the Islands of Porquerolles, Levant, and Port Cros. The towns of St. Tropez and St. Raphael, between Toulon and Cannes, might also be effectively exploited as small ports, and the terrain west of Frejus was suitable for the rapid construction of air strips. These, clearly, were alternative prospects.

Early Decision Impossible


It was inevitable that from the very beginning planning for *ANVIL* should be handicapped by stipulations, varying assumptions and special conditions. The number of assault divisions available, the build-up force to follow, the influence of the Italian Campaign, and likely objectives in southern France once a successful landing had been made were among the baffling questions yet unanswered. They could be answered only by the course of events elsewhere.

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TENTATIVE OUTLINE PLAN ANVIL
TWO — DIVISION ASSAULT

NOTE: Plan is essentially the same as that of 25 January.

During these mid-January meetings in Algiers an amphibious operation known as *SHINGLE* was being mounted on the Italian coast in the Anzio-Nettuno area. The success of the Anzio venture would determine for some time to come the shipping and troops available for future operations. There was as yet no decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the scale of *ANVIL*, nor even an approval of the general Outline Plan. Planning, however, went ahead on the basis of a one, two, or three-division assault with a seven-division follow-up. The supply sections began the preparation of logistical requisitions so that the loading of ships in the United States would not be delayed. Initial steps were taken to arrive at a tentative troop list.

Preliminary studies on the beaches, coastal defenses, terrain inland, and the disposition of enemy troops were made by the various sub-sections. In a note, however, which appeared in the Official Diary under 17 January an explanation of the slow, limited progress was offered:

> . . . . . At this time the plans for *ANVIL* are not very concrete. There are many questions and weighty decisions that must be made before any staff can logically plan the operation. Information obtained at the Allied Force Headquarters conference is that no word had been received from the combined Chiefs of Staff as to the acceptance of the AFHQ Outline Plan nor can any decision be made at Allied Force Headquarters as to which plan to accept; that preparations should be made to accept either. Study is still being made at Allied Force Headquarters as to the withdrawal of troops from Italy for training in North Africa. Services of Supply North African Theater of Operations United States Army has already requisitioned some overall maintenance needs. However, phase requisitions and special equipment is a matter of further study.

A radiogram from Allied Force Headquarters dated 23 January instructed the planning staff to go ahead on the assumption that three American divisions would be in the assault. The following day this was changed to a one-division assault. To complicate matters further almost nothing could be done about training since no troop list had been agreed upon. The 85th Division, which had landed at Oran, was tentatively assigned to Force 163 for training. There were indications that the 85th Division would train in North Africa, and that the 3rd and 45th Divisions would be withdrawn from the Fifth Army as soon as they could be spared.

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By the end of January, General Patton had left for the United Kingdom and had taken with him several of his key staff officers. There had been no selection of French troops, no withdrawal of divisions from Italy for training, no staging areas assigned, nor any designation of a Base Section Commander. The possibility occurred to those concerned with planning that Operation *ANVIL* had been relegated to a "Command Post Exercise" status. Actually the various sections were groping for something definite on which to plan. This was true not only in Force 163 itself, but also in the Naval and Air Planning Groups.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, sent the following telegram on 8 February to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

> It is essential to have very early decision regarding *ANVIL*. Preparations for full scale *ANVIL* at or near the original target date has immediate implications on conduct of the present battle for Italy. The whole future strategy in this theater is dependent on whether we are to mount *ANVIL* on a scale of at least a two division assault. I cannot plan the campaign in Italy until I know the decision regarding *ANVIL* and the resources which will be available to me, particularly as regards shipping, assault craft, air forces and troop carrier aircraft.

At the same time General Sir Harold Alexander, British Commander of the Allied Armies in Italy, sent a message to Allied Force Headquarters further amplifying General Wilson's views. It was his opinion that the enemy was preparing to make a stand south of Rome; and, even though there was a successful linkup between the Anzio Beachhead and the main front, all forces in Italy would be needed for an offensive to capture Rome. He strongly opposed the withdrawal of any troops from Italy any time in the near future and pointed out that at the earliest *ANVIL* could not be launched until late July. Furthermore, stated General Alexander, "I do not consider that *ANVIL* with the limited resources likely to be available, would have any effect on drawing enemy forces away from *OVERLORD*." General Alexander felt that until Lyon were threatened the enemy would probably not detach any forces from northern France, and this could not be achieved until Marseille and Toulon were captured.

It was now apparent that the 3rd and 45th Divisions, which were a part of the Anzio Beachhead forces, would not be available for

immediate transfer to Force 163. Two fronts in Italy had to be supplied continuously by water. All service and supply facilities were heavily taxed. What could be available for a third operation elsewhere? The historian of the *ANVIL* summary of events soberly recorded, "The failure of the *SHINGLE* operation to develop as it was expected is having a direct effect . . . . It is very difficult to make sound decisions under such uncertain conditions."

On 10 February the Combined Chiefs of Staff announced that D-Day for *OVERLORD* would be postponed about three weeks. The shipping requirements were proving to be enormous, and the Mediterranean Theater was to arrange for the immediate return to the United Kingdom of all LSTs not vitally needed.

Two days later, in a report of progress to Allied Force Headquarters, the *ANVIL* planning staff pointed out that in order to continue their work in an orderly fashion they would need a clear directive from higher headquarters, a definite troop list, and the nomination of ports for mounting. It was apparent to the staff that "The Italian battlefield has to be relegated to holding a defensive line while *ANVIL* is mounted or *ANVIL* can only be mounted in such strength as to be another *SHINGLE* . . . ."

AFHQ's reply was that all high-level decisions came from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and until such time as answers were forthcoming planning would have to continue "on the basis of assumptions". It was assumed that there would be a two-division assault, that the two assault divisions would be American and would be mounted in the Naples area; the two follow-up divisions would be mounted from Sicily and North Africa.

As the Italian Campaign developed, higher headquarters became "loathe to risk a change in commanders of the Fifth Army either now or in the near future". The decision was General Wilson's and was concurred in by General Devers. As of 28 February General Clark was relieved of all responsibility connected with *ANVIL*. His "grave burdens" made impossible the close supervision of the *ANVIL* operation which was now becoming necessary.

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Pending the assignment of an army commander, General Garrison H. Davidson was requested to continue as the head of the planning group. As a matter of urgency he was asked to designate, at a meeting on 1 March before the assembled planning staff 48 hours hence, the area of southern France in which he believed the assault would be launched. This, of course, was to be in no way binding. The final decision would rest with the Army Commander himself.

General Davidson said that, assuming the target date of *ANVIL* would be on or after that of *OVERLORD*, on the basis of a two-division assault with an eight-division follow-up, and further assuming that sufficient shipping, air and naval support would be available, it was his opinion that the most favorable area for an assault in southern France was east of Toulon between Cape Cavalaire (Beach 259) and Agay (Beach 265). An assault in this area would provide the best opportunity for insuring a successful landing and adequate beaches over which to land supplies and follow-up forces, with nearby terrain suitable for the rapid construction of air strips.

General Patch Assumes Command

On 2 March Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch (then Major General) was appointed commander of the ground forces taking part in Operation *ANVIL*. A newcomer to the European-African Theater of Operations, General Patch was well-known for his Guadalcanal campaign in the Pacific and more recently had commanded IV Corps on training duties in the Western United States.

The change of command was smoothly accomplished. Vacancies in Force 163 Staff which had been created when General Patton went to England were filled by staff officers from General Patch's previous command, IV Corps, just arriving in North Africa. Key officers from IV Corps included Major General Arthur A. White, Chief of Staff; Colonel W. H. Craig, A. C. of S., G-1; Colonel W. W. Quinn, A. C. of S., G-2, and Brigadier General John S. Guthrie, A. C. of S., G-3. A veteran Seventh Army Officer, Colonel O. C. Harvey, continued as A. C. of S., G-4. The post of Civil Affairs Officer (later G-5) went to Colonel Harvey S. Gerry, who joined Force 163 in April.



LT. GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON WITH LT. GEN. ALEXANDER M. PATCH
". . . The Seventh Army was to take the offensive again under a new commander . . ."

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After Colonel Leo V. Warner joined the headquarters in July, 1944, as Deputy Chief of Staff, all General Staff positions remained unchanged throughout the Seventh Army's campaign into France and Germany except that of A. C. of S., G-5. Colonel Gerry was called to higher headquarters in October and was replaced by Colonel John J. Albright. Shortly thereafter Colonel Albright went to the 36th Infantry Division and on 4 December 1944, Colonel Joseph L. Canby became A. C. of S., G-5. Colonel Canby held the post during the remainder of the operation and well into the occupational period.

Two days after his appointment, General Patch was briefed on all planning which had been accomplished to date. He was able to inform his staff, as a result of conferences with high military sources while en-route to his new assignment, that in principle *ANVIL* had definitely been approved by the War Department and would enjoy a second priority in the world-wide operations of United States forces. He urged each officer to exert his best efforts for a successful completion of this major mission.

Basically, the Appreciation and Outline furnished Force 163 by AFHQ remained the governing plan. It was still envisaged, at the time General Patch assumed command, that *ANVIL* forces would invade southern France in conjunction with *OVERLORD*, establish a bridgehead, and subsequently exploit toward Lyon and Vichy. The target date was early June, although nominations of American and French components in the operation were yet undecided and would continue to depend on the progress of the battle in Italy. More imminent was the fact that an Outline Plan, coordinated with Naval and Air Task Force commanders, was to be submitted for AFHQ approval by 15 April.

Target Date Changes

Through the months to come, the original recommendations for the assault area as formulated under General Davidson were to remain intact. During March, conferences were held with the Air Corps and the Navy to discuss such matters as the employment of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, pre-D-Day bombing, the organization of the

Beach Control Board, and the work of the Beach Obstacle Board. A recommendation was made to AFHQ that provision be made for eighteen Naval Shore Fire Control parties, composed of Army and Navy personnel, to be included in Operation *ANVIL*.

In order to coordinate details, the Force 163 Headquarters from the very beginning included small Naval and Air planning staffs. Captain R. A. J. English, U. S. Navy, headed the Naval Group and Group Captain R. B. Lees, Royal Australian Air Force the planners from Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force. There were a number of British officers attached to the headquarters, both technical experts and observers. As the French came into the *ANVIL* picture, French officers reported for duty and were integrated in appropriate staff sections. The rambling white Ecole Normale in Bouzareah, high above Algiers, began to throb with its top secret activity. Many visitors drove past the rusty barbed wire and came through the tight Military Police guard.

In view of the fact that the target date for *ANVIL* was still tentatively scheduled for about 1 June, General Patch considered requesting firm decision from higher headquarters in order that Corps and Division detailed planning might begin immediately. It was essential that American assault divisions be designated immediately, that the Corps Commander and the Corps Staff be selected, and that French units be nominated. This request, however, was delayed for several days, since a major decision was expected momentarily.

On 12 April word arrived from General Wilson that the Supreme Allied Commander had decided that *ANVIL* could not now be launched before late July. The directive asking for coordinated plans to be submitted to Allied Force Headquarters by 15 April was now rescinded. Factors causing the postponement included the planning of an all out offensive in Italy, to begin about 10 May, and the withdrawal of landing craft from the Mediterranean for *OVERLORD*.

In accordance with AFHQ instructions the combined Ground, Naval, and Air Outline Plans for Operation *ANVIL* were presented on 29 April to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater,

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who arrived in Algiers accompanied by a group of senior officers including General Devers, Commanding General of NATOUSA, representatives of the Air Corps, the Navy, and the French. For some two hours in the War Room of Force 163 major outline plans were discussed. General Patch made some introductory statements; G-2 gave a brief but comprehensive estimate of the terrain, enemy capabilities, defense plans, and battle order.

The Army Outline Plan presented at this time was virtually the same as the one previously submitted for staff consideration a month before on 29 March. It called for a parachute force of at least three battalions to support the initial two-division assault. Commandos and Rangers were assigned certain special missions to neutralize the islands off the coast, block roads, and protect the assault flanks. The follow-up totaled eight divisions. The proposed target area was east of Toulon between Cape Cavalaire and the Bay of Agay. The Air Corps was to give close tactical support on D-Day and also to engage in an extensive program of pre-D-Day bombing from Spain to the Italian border. The Navy was charged with convoying, landing and supplying the assaulting forces, and cooperating with the Air Forces in reducing enemy beach defenses on D-Day.

On 5 May it was learned from the War Office in London through AFHQ that definite answers regarding questions on overall planning in the Mediterranean Theater could not be given immediately. During the same week AFHQ also announced that a new directive would shortly be issued relative to plans for a modified *ANVIL*. General Patch informed his staff that they might expect to plan several operations concurrently, any one of which might be put into action depending upon the situation.

Modifications

The target date of *ANVIL* had now been postponed until late July. Nevertheless General Patch left for the United Kingdom in order to coordinate his plans with those for *OVERLORD*. On 13 May AFHQ

issued a formal directive asking for the preparation of three separate plans which were to be coordinated with conditions known as *RANKIN A, B,* and *C*:

> *PLAN A* (Conditioned by partial German withdrawal): A two-division assault in the area east of Toulon with a target date early in August and having for its objective the capture of Toulon and Marseille and thence an exploitation northward toward Lyon and Vichy. The assumption was that the enemy would offer resistance on the beaches but would withdraw the greater part of his forces from the immediate coastal area and fight heavy delaying actions in the lower Rhone Valley.
>
> However, should the situation require it, a supplementary landing might have to be made over toward the Spanish border in the Sete area, followed by a rapid advance along the north shore of the Gulf of Lions. This plan was to be completed and ready for presentation not later than 10 June.
>
> *PLAN B* (Conditioned by complete evacuation of southern France): Assuming that the enemy was planning to evacuate all of southern France with the possible exception of a few of his satellite troops whose morale was too low for effective future employment, the object of the landing would be to harass the enemy and create confusion in his rear. If such a situation arose, the French Forces of the Interior would be called on to play a major part in carrying out sabotage and engaging in guerilla warfare to prevent German withdrawal. They were also to aid the military authority in restoring order, setting up local administration, and initiating urgent relief measures.
>
> The strength of the assault was to be the same as in *PLAN A*, but the landing was to be in the vicinity of Sete with an advance through the Carcassonne Gap on Bordeaux. The draft was to be completed and ready for presentation not later than 1 July.
>
> *PLAN C* (Conditioned by unconditional surrender and cessation of all organized resistance): If by chance the landing east of Marseille and Toulon should be unopposed, followed by a complete collapse of all enemy resistance in southern France due to a low state of morale and the breakdown of supply services, the Commanding General of the Seventh Army would be responsible for enforcing the armistice terms and restoring civil authority. It was expected that certain German troops would undoubtedly try to escape to the Rhine by any possible means, and the object of *PLAN C* was to disarm and administer enemy formations or individuals and prevent their movement or escape.

Now, in addition to the original outline plan for *ANVIL* there were three substitute plans to give maximum flexibility. On 24 May

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Plan A was presented to interested Staff Sections. The Engineers, the Navy, and the Air Corps presented their respective aspects of the problem and discussed the most desirable time of action. G-3 proposed a scheme of maneuver for the initial assault to be modified after the capture of Toulon to provide for a change in mission. A land advance toward the Carcassonne Gap and another amphibious landing in the Sete area were among the possibilities considered.

A cable from the British Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 May, agreed that *ANVIL* should be given priority over all operations in the theater outside Italy and so recommended the operation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Commanding General of NATOUSA now began again to requisition supplies on the greatest possible scale that shipping would permit, but warned the War Department that unless critical materials could be secured and shipped, the target date for late July or early August could not be met.

French Participation

One of the first indications that French military forces would participate in operation *ANVIL* was given in a G-3 memorandum 11 February 1944 from AFHQ in which "language difficulties" were discussed. Apparently an American-French staff along the lines of the American-British staff was completely impractical. A liaison section of specially selected staff officers was to be established to convey the orders of the American commander to the French formations taking part in the invasion. If political considerations made it necessary, there might be a French Deputy Commander with a small personal staff.

Clearly the French were to be brought into the *ANVIL* picture. Their role and contribution had to be calculated in the planning and in the preparations for the mounting of the operation. As a result of General Davidson's suggestion that the French High Command appoint a small headquarters or contact group capable of making decisions with respect to French subordinate units, a small planning group, headed by Colonel Jean L. Petit, was stationed at headquarters of Force 163. Colonel Petit worked closely with the American Chief of Staff, General White, and French officers were attached to staff sections.

From the very beginning the French were singleminded in their arguments in behalf of *ANVIL*. "It is inadmissable," General Charles De Gaulle contended, "for French troops at this stage of the war to be used elsewhere than in France." At times, as a matter of "prestige", the French sought, as representation for their forces, an Army under their own command. They even went so far as to suggest that all Allied forces taking part in the southern invasion might constitute a single army under French command.

To the French it was of vital importance that in a campaign for France's liberation their own forces should be under French command. They agreed, however, that though it meant placing a full French general under an American general of lower rank they would be willing for the Americans to handle all administration, supply, and the over-all



GEN. CHARLES DE GAULLE, GEN. DE LATTRE (left), AND FRENCH STAFF

... the fundamental contention as a matter of national pride and honor was for a French army under a French general on French soil ...

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tactical planning. During the uncertain periods they were "seriously perturbed" to hear that alternatives to *ANVIL* were being considered. The fundamental contention as a matter of national pride and honor was for a French army under a French general on French soil.

On 15 March General De Gaulle visited General Wilson at his headquarters in Italy to declare his full cooperation in the coming battle of France. Three important elements were involved: the regular army, the resistance groups, and the administration of French territory as soon as it was freed from the enemy. General Wilson expressed satisfaction with these offers but pointed out that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had given priority to the battle of Italy. Rome would have to be taken before the battle of France could begin. The fact that it would be difficult to use French troops during the assault phase of the landing in southern France was also pointed out; but General Wilson indicated that after a beachhead had been secured, there was no reason why French troops could not be landed to participate in the ensuing battles. General De Gaulle stated that he realized this point of view to be correct and was in thorough accord.

One month later on 15 April General N. E. Bethouart, Chief of Staff of French National Defense, called on General Wilson in Algiers to say that General De Gaulle had named General de Lattre de Tassigny to command French forces in operation *ANVIL*. General Wilson stated that he was glad to hear that a choice had been made. He intimated, however, that it would be difficult to fit a French army commander in the scheme of things at this particular time because there were already too many staffs involved in planning. General Bethouart was informed that the matter would be discussed with the Commanding General of Force 163 and a decision rendered at a later date.

Shortly after this meeting, a question arose regarding French chain of command and channels of communication with Corsica. All French forces in the Mediterranean Theater, with the exception of Italy, had been placed under the command of General de Lattre; and General De Gaulle held that the normal channel of communication between AFHQ and French units in Corsica should be through the French Commander-in-Chief only. Applying, as it did, merely to the defense of

the Island of Corsica, and not to Allied operations which happened to be mounted from there, this contention was readily agreed to by AFHQ.

For the present the question was settled. It is, however, significant to note that the problem of the French chain of command continued to come up throughout the planning phase. This involved, in the opinion of the French, military and political prestige of the highest order, and therefore could not be dismissed lightly by those charged with planning *ANVIL*.

The French Army itself now proposed a plan for the invasion of southern France. During the first week of May General de Lattre called on General Patch at headquarters of Force 163 near Algiers and presented his proposal before an assembly of officers in the War Room. The French general emphasized the importance of carrying out *ANVIL* since it would be an opportunity for the French forces themselves to make a contribution to the liberation of their country. Only a few French troops, the staff was reminded, were to be used in *OVERLORD*. The plan outlined by General de Lattre differed in several respects from the original conception of *ANVIL*, and it was turned over to G-3 for further study and comment.

The French plan assumed that there would be available sufficient lift for an assault by three infantry divisions and two armored combat commands with a follow-up by D plus 3 of two infantry divisions. This of course, far exceeded the scale of present *ANVIL* plans of a two-division assault with a follow-up of one infantry division and one armored combat command. The French proposal for a landing both to the east and to the west of Toulon involved a division of forces which would, as General Patch pointed out in a letter to General de Lattre, reduce in proportion air cover, naval fire support, and the capacity of beach groups to unload supplies and consolidate their dumps. Also, to the west of Toulon was located the heaviest concentration of enemy coastal batteries and beach defenses which would undoubtedly increase the difficulties of the assault force. Finally, even though Toulon was attacked from only one side, probably making impossible an early capture of the city, the advantages of a less extended beachhead and more favorable terrain would out-weigh other considerations.

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A satisfactory arrangement was finally worked out to bring the French Army Headquarters into the *ANVIL* picture. It was proposed that during the initial phase of the operation General de Lattre would land as Commanding General of the first French Corps ashore, with the Corps commander as his deputy. The staff would consist of officers from the Army Headquarters as well as from the Corps Headquarters. When the second French Corps arrived, the Commanding General of Army B, using his Army Staff, would assume command of both corps, thus establishing his Army Headquarters. General De Gaulle, President of the French Committee of National Liberation and Chief of the Armed Forces, gave his approval.

Meanwhile, at Force 163 Headquarters in Bouzareah, American and French staff officers went steadily forward with their plans for equipping, training and supplying the French troops for *ANVIL*.

Troops and Supplies

The misfortune of Operation *ANVIL*, in its first planning period, was simply that its hopes and prospects fell in the long shadows cast by the bitter Italian campaign on the one side and the anxious preparations for *OVERLORD* in Normandy on the other. It was hardly unexpected that all first priorities for either troops or supplies went elsewhere. Logistics were consequently confined to hypothetical propositions which had to be constantly revised. There was the reluctance to withdraw any of General Alexander's divisions from Italy until after the breakthrough and capture of Rome. Nor could troops be diverted from any other theater.

Shortly after Force 163 set up its headquarters in Algiers, a rear echelon charged with supply planning was established in Oran. Services of Supply, NATOUSA, began pressing for requisitions for an operation which had not yet been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order that there would be no delay when authorization was received. As early as 21 January there was a request from Oran for loading plans, phased requisitions for vehicles, and mounting ports and staging areas. But inasmuch as no troop list had been established, and

none of these issues had yet been decided, only general replacement items could be ordered from the United States.

In the beginning the assumption was that two or three American divisions would be in the assault, and it was presumed that they would come from Italy. In view of current operations on the Italian peninsula it seemed doubtful that any large number of troops could be trained and mounted from the Naples area without tying up ports and transportation facilities. On 26 January word was received that units tentatively assigned to *ANVIL* would train as follows; the 85th Division in North Africa and the 3rd and 45th Divisions in Italy or Sicily. The latter two divisions would begin moving out to begin training about 3 February. Events later proved this was not possible.

At the end of the first week in February there was still no definite troop assignment, no mounting nor staging areas; and though the supply section of Force 163 was functioning, it had nothing definite on which to base its requisitions. At this date no French units had been assigned, but the Liaison Section did estimate the French were about 70,000 troops short of the requirements originally set for them.

The problem of U. S. replacements was similarly unclarified and unsolved. General Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General, NATOUSA and the Deputy Theater Commander, pointed out on 18 February that replacements allocated to the Mediterranean Theater under the present shipping schedule were hardly adequate to sustain operations in Italy. Furthermore, he maintained, any ground force replacements expected to arrive in the near future could not be diverted to any *ANVIL* units.

So it was that the combined Chiefs of Staff made their decision: *ANVIL* could not be launched before D-Day of *OVERLORD*. The forces involved, as now known, would be one American Corps of three divisions and two French Corps totaling five infantry divisions and two armored divisions. For purposes of planning, the total shipping which could be made available for the operation consisted of 100 ships for preloading, 105 ships during the first thirty days, 120 ships during the second thirty days, and 53 ships during the third thirty days. The

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general rate of buildup was assumed to be on the basis of a two-division assault which might be modified.

A request that certain airborne and ranger type troops be made available to Force 163 for immediate training received the same response from AFHQ as had requests for combat divisions. It was stated that until the tactical situation in Italy had been clarified no commitments could be made. Specialized service troops, such as intelligence and translating personnel, were also difficult to obtain.

The essential *ANVIL* supply problem in the large issues of the invasion appeared to be that of smooth flow from the ships off-shore to the beach dumps, and behind that a smooth transition in the control of supplies from the Base Section to the Beach Groups. It was not considered possible to have a port available before D plus 25. In the first period, then, all supplies would come from beach dumps.

A Beach Control Planning Board was established on 21 March. All beach and engineer units were to be organized and trained directly under the control of Force 163, and not under the Base Section. Problems of organization, administration, and training were worked out with newly-designated Base Section representatives on the Control Group Planning Staff; a standard operating procedure for unloading supply ships, traffic control, maintenance of dumps, division of Army and sub-task force control, and the close coordination of all supply agencies.

Such training preparations as could be made in this early period remained as nebulous as the other aspects of *ANVIL* planning. The Amphibious Training Center, Brigadier General Henry C. Wolfe announced, was to be moved from Port Aux Poules, Algeria, to Italy. But no American troops had yet been designated for training. In fact, one regiment of the 85th Division had been relieved from Force 163 and assigned to Fifth Army. It was still impossible to state any definite date when the Ranger Force, Special Service Force, or the 509th Parachute Battalion would be available for training. When the rest of the 85th Division was ordered to proceed from North Africa to Italy to join the Fifth Army, any commitment of troops for *ANVIL* was now clearly and definitely postponed.

French units were designated on 7 April. Information was received from AFHQ that the 1st Motorized Infantry Division, 2nd Armored Division, and 9th Colonial Infantry Division had been committed to *ANVIL*, and were to be completely equipped in accordance with the policy of employing French units in combat operations as components of an American force. The 1st Armored Division and the 5th Armored Division were to be considered as "non-participating units".

By 15 April supplies requisitioned in January and early February began to arrive in the theater. Almost simultaneously SOS NATOUSA received word that the New York Port of Embarkation had cancelled all maintenance requisitions. Their instructions were that *ANVIL* was being discontinued. The Commanding General, NATOUSA now requested the War Department for a definite statement as to "whether cancellation of *ANVIL* including complete stoppage of supply action has occurred". According to the "present instructions" of SOS, "plans for *ANVIL* must continue"; and the cancellations were causing concern.

Even if an amphibious operation on the *ANVIL* scale were not to be launched until July or August, the logistics of the operation nevertheless demanded 100 cargo ships pre-loaded in mid-July and a 32,000 lift in personnel shipping. For subsequent follow-up convoys sufficient cargo shipping would have to be made available to allow 150 sailings in each of the first and second 30-day periods with 50 sailings in the third 30-day period. A personnel lift for 16,000 would also be needed in the follow-up convoys.

SOS NATOUSA had no alternative but to freeze the classes of supplies requisitioned originally for *ANVIL*. Now frozen were all Quartermaster, Engineer, Transportation, Ordnance, Medical, Signal, and Chemical Warfare items with the exception of high explosive and white phosphorous chemical mortar shells. Supplies now in the theater would be considered part of regular theater stocks and marked off against future requisitions. Shortly thereafter a message returned from the War Department to the effect that no cut in procurement was contemplated.

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It was clear some sort of major amphibious operation was being planned for the near future. Major General Thomas P. Larkin, the Commanding General of SOS NATOUSA asked for "clarification" from Operations and Plans Division, War Department in Washington and demanded that full and adequate supply planning information be given him in order to keep to a minimum last-minute requisitions of critical items. "As the situation now stands," General Patch pointed out on 31 May, supplies necessary for *ANVIL* "will not be available when required."

By June no nomination of American divisions had been definitely made. It was thought that probably the 45th, the 3rd, and the 36th or 85th Divisions would shortly be released from Italy in order to begin amphibious training. Plans were underway to move the 40th Engineer Regiment with its beach elements from North Africa to Italy in order to train with the 45th Division. The 540th Engineers were to train with the 3rd Division and the 36th Engineers with the remaining division. Likewise in the selection of service and technical maintenance troops it was desired to retain the units which had been working with combat divisions in the field in order to preserve as much as possible the element of team work.

On 11 May the all-out offensive of the Fifth and Eighth Armies got under way in Italy. The link-up of the Anzio Beachhead with the main front was followed by the capture of Rome. The release of troops from Italy for *ANVIL* had been dependent on a turn of events in the Italian campaign. On 4 June the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean agreed that three American divisions and one French Division could be released at an early date.

A firm decision, according to General Wilson, had been reached to mount an amphibious operation on the *ANVIL* scale. Headquarters of the Allied Armies in Italy was notified on 15 June to release the Headquarters of the U. S. VI Corps "at once", the 45th, 3rd, and 36th Divisions, two French Divisions and certain auxiliary combat troops, such as tank-destroyer battalions, tank battalions, and anti-aircraft units. These units were to be assigned to Force 163 for administration, planning, and training; and to SOS NATOUSA for supply.

Thus far no Base Section Commander had been nominated, although repeated requests had been made to NATOUSA for such an appointment. Finally on 26 June authority was received to activate the Coastal (later Continental) Base Section and Major General A. R. Wilson was nominated as commander. However, it was approximately a month later before General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson authorized Base Section Personnel to be put on detached service with Force 163. Throughout all supply planning, one of the fundamental conceptions was that key personnel of the Base Section should have an intimate knowledge of the Supply problem in order that they might assume full responsibility at the earliest possible date.

Decision for ANVIL

Even after assignment of troops to Force 163, it was by no means certain that *ANVIL* would go forward as planned. The possible courses of action included an amphibious operation at the head of the Adriatic as well as an assault against the south of France. In their message to General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and Eisenhower, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had simply stated that "... preparations for an amphibious operation should go forward on the greatest scale for which resources can be made available and at the earliest date".

An alternative to *ANVIL* in the form of a drive toward the Balkans had been mentioned as early as March 1944 when the Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theater proposed a cover plan in connection with *ANVIL*. General Wilson at this time explained the need for concealing preparations for a drive against Southern France in order to prevent the enemy from sending in reinforcements prior to the assault.

> By 21 May we shall know whether we are going to launch *ANVIL* or not. If we are, then *ANVIL* itself is the method by which we hope to contain German forces in southern France. The preparations for the real thing will no doubt be pretty obvious, but there should be no question of increasing the difficulties of a naturally difficult

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operation by having it both ways, that is, trying to maintain enemy forces by the cover plan as well as the real thing.

The answer is therefore that whether or not it is ultimately decided to launch *ANVIL* our cover plan should aim at disguising our intentions to attack the south of France and to build up a threat to the Balkans. If *ANVIL* is decided on, these plans should hold to the last moment, at which time the *ANVIL* preparations should be explained away by a threat to northwest Italy. If on the other hand, it is decided not to launch *ANVIL* we shall at some date after 21 May have to mount some sort of threat or feint which will be obvious to the enemy. It is important to do nothing until the latest possible date that will attract enemy forces into France.

As the Italian situation opened up, there was quite a natural desire on the part of those in command there to keep sufficient troops to press the advantage. Shortly after the fall of Rome on 4 June, General Alexander, commanding Allied Forces in Italy, prepared a new review and appreciation of the tactical situation. General Alexander expressed himself as so convinced that a continued offensive in Italy would force the enemy to draw to a maximum on his reserves. His plans for the destruction of the German Army in Italy, practicable only "... if the forces and administrative resources now at my disposal remain intact...", would, he believed, render the greatest assistance to the Normandy Invasion. Once the Pisa-Rimini line was secured, he felt that the Allies should continue the pursuit northeast through the Ljubljana Gap toward southern Hungary.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, in his turn, now felt that *ANVIL* could not be launched in time to be of use to *OVERLORD* and therefore could be eliminated. As an alternative to *ANVIL*, he recommended an advance to the Ljubljana Gap with an amphibious operation against Trieste at a later date.

Strongly disagreeing with this line of reasoning, General Eisenhower maintained that the advance on Ljubljana and Trieste suggested by General Wilson was no guarantee that an appreciable number of German divisions would be diverted from France. Such an operation, the Supreme Commander felt, would neither give an additional port which would be of direct assistance to *OVERLORD* nor would it render any positive effect until 1945.

"I therefore recommend *ANVIL*," General Eisenhower told the Combined Chiefs of Staff. "General Wilson is fully prepared to carry out *ANVIL* if the decision is made to do so. This opens up another gateway into France, which, if not the best geographical location, is the best we can hope to obtain at an early date. The possession of such a gateway I consider vital."

"In my view," General Eisenhower argued, "the resources of Great Britain and the United States will not permit us to maintain two major theaters in the European War, each with decisive missions."

General Eisenhower accordingly recommended that *ANVIL* be launched not later than 30 August and preferably by 15 August with sufficient strength to give it reasonable chances of success. In event of a negative decision, he asked that all French divisions, plus one or two



GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Southern France would be invaded. Force 163 would at last have plans, supplies, a definite assault date . . .

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American divisions previously allocated to *ANVIL*, be made available for *OVERLORD* as soon as shipping could be secured.

It was soon apparent that the combined Chiefs of Staff had taken the view that France would be the decisive Theater of operations during 1944. At a London conference attended by representatives from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and Allied Force Headquarters, concluded about 23 June, *ANVIL* received the final go-ahead signal. Southern France would be invaded.

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CHAPTER II

The Target Area and German Defense Plans

RELATIVELY free from the uncertainties which harassed some Force 163 planners during the early stages, the G-2 Section and its allied agencies progressed steadily in the task of gathering intelligence about the *ANVIL* target area. Detailed information of the Riviera Coast came in from varied sources — from air photographs, from agents, from Frenchmen who had known the area in happier days, and from Baedeker's Guide.

Algiers was then the heart of Free France, the true seat of the Comite de la Liberation, and it would be naive to state that efforts to conceal the activity at Bouzareah were entirely successful. An operation against Southern France was an obvious step, and one which would occur instinctively to every patriotic French exile. However G-2 took what security measures were possible. Persons intimate with planning were kept to the bare minimum, and the sponge-rubber relief maps in the War Room were zealously guarded. Force 163 personnel who met friends in downtown Algiers explained vaguely that they were "with AFHQ". No reference was made to Seventh Army.

Before going further — to allow fuller appreciation of the task confronting the planners for *ANVIL* — it is perhaps appropriate to describe in some detail the topography of the target area and at the same time to set down a brief resume of what G-2 was able to learn about enemy strength, capabilities and defenses in that area prior to D-day.

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Topography of the Target Area

The Mediterranean coast of France consists of three main mountain masses separated by two corridors. Along the Spanish border lie the Pyrenees, to the north of which is the Carcassonne Gap, formed by the valleys of the Garonne and Aude Rivers. Northeast of the Pyrenees is the Massif Central, which presents its steepest face to the Mediterranean. Farther east, toward the Italian-Swiss border, is the great mass of the Alps-Jura system. The latter two mountain masses are separated by the valley of the Rhone River, which is the great natural corridor from the Mediterranean coast to the Paris basin. The Rhone flows through a series of narrow valleys and broad basins, which are frequently openings into important corridors to the east. There is, for example, the valley of the Isere, leading to Grenoble, and the valley of the Durance, which separates the Provence Alps from the Dauphine Alps.

Below Avignon, the Rhone Valley widens into a broad delta which merges with the lowlands of the Carcassonne Gap to form a long stretch of marshy coast extending from the base of the Pyrenees to Marseille. The beaches in this area are suitable for large scale landings, but the delta is not a good entrance to the Rhone corridor because of the many water courses which intersect it. The general bogginess of the terrain is such as to create difficulties for both tracked and wheeled vehicles deploying off the roads. East of Marseille the coast is rugged and irregular where the mountain masses reach to the sea, leaving only narrow sand beaches and small deltaic plains. Passage into the interior is possible only through a few narrow river valleys, such as the Argens, which leads into the Durance corridor and is the best approach to the Rhone Valley from the south. It was a portion of this eastern coast, from the Baie de Cavalaire to the Rade d'Agay, which was chosen as the target area for Operation *ANVIL*.

In the target area there are three outstanding topographical features, the Massif des Maures, the Toulon-St. Raphael Corridor and the Provence Alps. The Massif is a hill mass about 35 miles long, about ten miles wide at its widest point, and rises to an average height of 1,000 to 1,500 feet. At the base of the Maures are the invasion beaches. The

corridor which lies behind the Massif is formed by the valleys of the Real Martin and Argens Rivers and varies in width from one to six miles. Farther inland are the Provence Alps, slightly higher than the coastal massif, but marked by the same steep slopes with broader valleys connected by low passes. On the east this range runs to the Alps proper, but on the west it drops off to the Durance River.

The Target area comprises a portion of the famed Riviera resort coast with a traditionally mild climate and sparse rainfall, particularly during summer. Most of the time light winds prevail, and gales or complete calms are rare. Cloud ceilings are usually unlimited, though haze over the coast occasionally limits visibility to five or six miles.

Soil in the target area varies from rocky to sandy; much bedrock at the surface makes digging a problem. Streams running from the mountain masses into the coastal area frequently dry up in summer, and even the larger rivers reach an extremely low-water state. However, during the summer occasional thunderstorms create the danger of flash floods. The original forest cover is almost entirely gone, and uncultivated areas are covered with patches of woodland, evergreen, oak, cork oak, pine, and chestnut or low scrub growth of juniper, broom, box, and myrtle, the latter frequently referred to as "maquis". Cultivated portions support olive, fig, almond, mulberry, citrus trees and vineyards, though the poor quality of the soil allows agriculture on a less extensive scale than in other parts of France.

The population is sparse in this region of Mediterranean France and is concentrated mostly in the immediate coastal strips. Because there are many Italians on the Riviera the proportion of native French is lower than in other regions of France. In the target area proper there are no large cities. The adjoining towns of St. Raphael and Frejus, having together a population of 19,000, are the largest settlements.

The road net in the target area is adequate for military operations. Two main highways cross the area; the coast road from Marseille to Nice, and the inland route from Frejus to Aix-en-Provence. There are also a number of secondary roads formerly suitable for military traffic, although many were allowed to deteriorate during the four years under

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German control. Roads which run through narrow defiles are commanded by high ground on the flanks and can thus be easily blocked. Road surfaces are generally satisfactory, but the bridges are often old and narrow. In towns many important roads become narrow and winding, permitting only one-way traffic.

The railroads, like the highways, are also limited in the coastal area of southern France. A main line passes from Italy by way of Nice and Cannes and connects with the main north-south trunk line at Marseille; lesser lines cross the immediate beach area and connect the small coast towns with the main east-west line in the interior.

Though the Mediterranean coast of France has four major and four secondary ports, only three minor ports are in the immediate assault area. These minor ports, St. Tropez, Ste. Maxime and St. Raphael, offered a means of supplementing tonnage unloaded over beaches until Toulon, Marseille, and Nice could be made available to handle 10,000-ton Liberty Ships.

Enemy Strength and Capabilities

In planning for *ANVIL*, enemy capabilities, disposition, and defense strategy were a constant influence on final decisions. By the end of July 1944 the Mediterranean Sea was almost completely cleared of German naval power. Enemy naval strength was reduced to a destroyer, a few torpedo and escort boats, and approximately ten U-boats. There is no doubt that the Germans hoped to augment their U-boat fleet by construction and repair activities at Marseille and Toulon, but Allied air attacks not only crippled production facilities but also destroyed those U-boats which were in their pens awaiting repair. In the main, German naval craft were considered to have only a nuisance value and could offer no serious interference to the invasion of southern France.

Intelligence information indicated that by the middle of 1944 the German Luftwaffe had definitely reached a state of decline. Yet its disposition on air fields throughout southern France gave it speed of movement and a certain tactical surprise. Immediately prior to D-Day,

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the most realiable estimates placed German air strength at approximately 200 airplanes either in or adjacent to the target area. It was assumed that in the event of invasion the Germans would be able to draw additional air strength from either Italy or northern Europe, if these squadrons were not already committed elsewhere.

Of the 200 planes assigned to southern France about three-fourths were especially designed for ship bombardment or reconnaissance. This functional distribution of the Luftwaffe suggests that German air strength was concerned mainly with efforts to embarrass Allied shipping in the Mediterranean and thereby impede any attempt at invasion or to discover by reconnaissance the scale and exact location of any landing in southern France.

By the middle of May 1944 increased German reconnaissance activity was observed over the Corsica-Sardinia sea lanes, while during the same period anti-shipping operations showed a marked decrease. This change in functional activity suggests that for the period immediately prior to D-Day the Luftwaffe had abandoned all hope of forestalling any invasion by attacking shipping and was now merely attempting to discover the time, the place, and the scale of the invasion.

The Allies estimated the possible air forces available to Germany in the *ANVIL* and adjacent areas to be 1,515 planes of all types. Of this total 1,085 were thought to be on French air fields in northeastern France. Southern France accounted for another 200-odd and Italy 190. The fact that there were great distances to be covered and that practically all available planes in northern Europe after 6 June were committed in Normandy or attempting to defend German factories and internal supply lines made it highly improbable that any additional planes could be spared for southern France. The most likely possibility seemed to be that 40 to 50 planes might be sent from northern Italy if the tactical situation permitted.

However, to checkmate enemy air activity during the critical period of the invasion, planning had to take into account three distinct possibilities: the sending of strong reinforcements into the assault area by withdrawing air power already committed elsewhere, the with-

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drawing immediately of most of the aircraft stationed in southern France to prevent its destruction by a superior Allied airforce, or the sending for minor reinforcements from Italy and southwest Germany for restricted use over the immediate assault area.

The presence of any large-scale reinforcements would indicate a German willingness to risk heavy air losses in order to defend what they considered as vital territory. An immediate withdrawal of the greater part of their aircraft would suggest an opposite attitude on the part of the German High Command. Minor reinforcements sent into the area would merely convey the impression that the Luftwaffe was putting up a token defense with the idea of doing what damage possible and then of withdrawing to safety.

On the basis of Allied pre-D-Day intelligence the general opinion was that enemy air activity would soon dissipate itself. On D-Day and shortly thereafter there were expected the usual anti-shipping activities and sorties against Allied ground forces in an attempt to impede the establishment of a beachhead. However, it was thought that these activities would be so costly to the Germans that after three or four days the Luftwaffe would confine itself to isolated sneak raids and strafing of Allied forward positions. Finally, even this would degenerate into routine reconnaissance patrols for purposes of intelligence.

German Troop Dispositions

The utilization of the most advantageous terrain positions was the prime consideration in German ground force defense plans. In general terms, the delta of the Rhone River is considered the focal point for lines of communication running in all directions. The route northward up the Rhone Valley has always been the principal avenue of entry from the Mediterranean into the heart of France. At Lyon this route branches into roads northwest into the Loire Valley, north to the Paris Basin, and northeast into the approaches to Belfort Gap.

Prior to D-Day the Nineteenth German Army had at its disposal for the defense of southern France, nine divisions stationed along the Mediterranean coast and at strategic points in the interior. The

precise location at which the Allies would debark if they came was unknown to the Germans, so the entire coast required complete defensive coverage. Moreover, once an Allied landing point had become known, it would be necessary to move troops quickly to repel the invasion; and at the same time certain strategic locations must be occupied to protect flanks and internal supply lines.

To satisfy these basic requirements the Nineteenth Army distributed its nine available divisions and made such defensive preparations as were possible. The 716th Infantry Division was stationed in the extreme southwest at Perpignan, for this town intercepted the coastal route from Spain to France and served as the chief strategic point for the protection of the west flank. To the north at Narbonne was the 198th Infantry Division, and in and about Montpellier the 189th Reserve Division, both of which were in position to dominate the inland route from the Mediterranean to the Garonne Valley by way of the Toulouse-Carcassonne depression. The 338th Infantry Division was centered about Arles and served to defend both the Mediterranean coast and the mouth of the Rhone River. The 244th and the 242nd Infantry Divisions were garrisoned at Marseille and at Toulon, and both were in position for the defense of their respective seaports.

On the extreme eastern segment of the French coast, in the Cannes-Nice area, was the 148th Reserve Division. It was entrusted not only with defending beaches in the sector but also with securing the area against any movement along the coast or from a landing in the Genoa area. The two remaining divisions were situated at nodal points north of the coastline. One of these, the 11th Panzer, had been located near Bordeaux; but by D-Day was in movement toward the Rhone. The other, the 157th Reserve Division, was a training division some of whose elements had been committed against the Maquis.

These nine German divisions formed the defensive pattern for the Nineteenth Army in southern France. Their composition, strength, and fire-power varied to such a degree that a brief analysis of each division is necessary to clarify the character of their subsequent performances. The 716th Infantry Division at Perpignan had undergone heavy losses in Normandy and had been sent south to refit. It was now

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reduced to about 8,000 men with an effective fire power of about 50 percent. The 198th Infantry Division had recently been shifted to France from the Russian front and upon reorganization had acquired a large percentage of Bohemians and Czechs. It had an estimated strength of 10,500 men but with a somewhat reduced fire-power. Though the 189th Reserve Division was reputed to have a strength of four infantry battalions and one artillery battalion, it was never able to get together more than a battle group consisting of portions of two regiments for the battle of southern France.

The 338th Infantry Division, composed largely of limited service personnel, had sent an equivalent of four battalions as reinforcements to the Brittany-Normandy front. Only two understrength regiments were available to throw against the Seventh Army. The 242nd and 244th Infantry Divisions defending Toulon and Marseille were at 85 percent of normal strength in personnel, which included many young men without much combat experience. The 148th and the 157th Reserve Infantry Divisions on the eastern flank were believed to be relatively powerful, at full divisional strength; but their battle experience was not known. The only genuinely mobile unit was the 11th Panzer Division, which had seen action in Russia. It was considered to be up to strength with eight infantry battalions but was short one of its tank battalions.

This defensive set-up in southern France was the result of a redistribution of forces by the German High Command after Allied landings in Normandy. Between the June invasion and August the 9th Panzer and the 271st, 272nd, and the 277th Infantry Divisions had been withdrawn from the Nineteenth Army and ordered north. To compensate for these losses the 11th Panzer, the 198th and the 716th Infantry Divisions were transferred to southern France. In addition to the 11th Panzer Division, still of considerable strength, there were only five reasonably effective infantry divisions available to the Nineteenth Army. Furthermore, the actual combat effectiveness of this defending force was weakened by the inclusion of many non-Germanic elements, who were presumed to be serving under duress. Finally, the grave shortage of motor vehicles and fuel, plus the constant threat of attack

by the French Forces of the Interior, had a profound effect on enemy morale. For example, the 157th Reserve Division, while substantially intact, had been dissipated in the mountain strongholds of the Maquis.

This lack of strength and fire-power could be remedied only by the introduction of troops and equipment from outside the immediate area of southern France. However, German committments on other fronts and lack of sufficient reserves in Germany proper made it quite unlikely that reinforcements in sufficient strength could be counted on.

It was thought that a possible German reaction to Allied landings would be a withdrawal from the immediate coastal area to the Rhone Valley with a serious attempt to defend Marseille and Toulon. Because the terrain of the beach area is such as to preclude the effective use of mobile troops, the logical plan of withdrawal would be to fall back to the Rhone Valley and take up defensive positions. The prediction of a stubborn defense at Marseille and Toulon was based on the assumption that denial to the Allies of the use of large ports would delay a rapid build-up. This delay might allow the Germans to gain sufficient time to assemble their forces for a major defensive stand in the lower Rhone Valley or to withdraw them northward to safety.

Any Allied landing between Marseille and Nice would probably encounter elements of the 148th Infantry Division along the eastern segment of the Mediterranean coast and units of the 242nd Infantry Division in and about Toulon. As soon as the focus and magnitude of the invasion became clear to the German High Command, it was assumed that defense divisions would be maneuvered to meet the initial thrust and to modify the pattern of divisional distribution to prevent isolation or encirclement of those elements not yet actively committed to combat.

The German Defense System

Between November 1942 and September 1943 southern France had been divided into German and Italian zones of defense. The line of demarcation between these zones ran east of Toulon and left the Germans responsible for defending the two principal French ports on the

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Mediterranean. After the collapse of Italy in September 1943 the Germans were faced with the problem of defending the entire French Mediterranean coast. Defenses were quickly installed to make the chain of fortifications from Spain to Italy complete.

It was known that, in the event of an Allied landing, the German High Command would immediately take the following steps: 1. Order all troops to their assembly areas. 2. Proclaim a state of siege. 3. Forbid the civilian population to circulate except certain special classes of workers and officials. 4. Requisition all able-bodied men and serviceable vehicles. 5. Guard all railroads and other communication facilities. 6. Demolish all machine shops, garages, and other installations which might be of service to the Allies. 7. Require the French to abide closely by the terms of the Armistice of 1940. In addition, trustworthy




AMERICAN BEACH DEMOLITION CLEARING MINES, BLASTING GUN POSITIONS

". . . a general policy of laying mines in strips along the coast was carried out by the Germans, and some difficulty was encountered because of mines in the early phases of the landing . . ."

Teut workers and collaborating French were to be formed into defensive detachments, and it was even reported that certain native North African prisoners of war were to be turned loose to create disorder.

A general policy of laying mines in strips along the coast was carried out by the Germans. As early as April 1944 it was reported that the construction of underwater obstacles had commenced. Offshore defense measures were used chiefly in and around the big ports, and included anti-torpedo and anti-submarine booms and nets, fire barges, and warning devices, such as hydrophones and infra-red barrages.

The enemy made the maximum use of artillery for coastal defense purposes. Batteries included railroad guns, heavy coast artillery, German field pieces, old French and Italian equipment, and even



A GERMAN 8-INCH GUN IN CONCRETE INSTALLATION

The enemy made the maximum use of artillery for coastal defense purposes

naval guns transferred from French warships scuttled in Toulon harbor. German policy in the target area was to allot coast defense respon-

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sibility to the division charged with defending that sector. Multi-purpose guns near the beaches were placed in positions so as to be fired at sea targets as well as to cover dead spaces between the more important coastal batteries. There was a system of anti-aircraft searchlights throughout the target area, and the whole coastal strip was covered by radar stations.



A GERMAN PLOTTER AND RANGEFINDER INSTALLATION LOOKING OUT TO SEA

. . . The whole coastal strip was covered by radar stations . . .

In general, local defenses along the Mediterranean coast were not deep. They were constructed around a system of strongpoints which involved concrete pillboxes and subsidiary features, such as barbed wire and mine fields. The whole system of defensive works embraced blockhouses, pillboxes, personnel shelter, and command posts, often very skillfully camouflaged as local buildings. There was also considerable improvisation; tank turrets were mounted on concrete as pillboxes or tanks were almost completely buried with only the top of the

turret and the gun exposed above ground. The system of beach defenses generally extended inland only so far as was necessary to take advantage of the terrain.

Roadblocks and antitank obstacles were prepared extensively where tank or vehicular traffic might be expected. Tank obstacles



A GERMAN CONCRETE ROADBLOCK ALONG THE ST. RAPHAEL WATERFRONT

. . . Roadblocks and anti-tank obstacles were prepared extensively where tank or vehicular traffic might be expected . . .

included walls and ditches, concrete cubes, cones, pyramids, dragon's teeth, steel rail, timbers, and antitank blockhouses. Roadblocks in the beach area were usually defended by machine guns and light artillery. In many places previously prepared obstacles were in readiness along the side of the roads to be put into use if the situation required.

From experience gained in Italy and later in Normandy it was expected that the Germans would make extensive use of mines and

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demolitions. Mines were planted in anti-personnel and antitank minefields blocking all obvious avenues of approach and in road-beds which ran from the beaches to the main lateral highways. Demolition charges were prepared for highway and railroad bridges, viaducts, dams, tunnels, and in banks along sides of roads where landslides could be started.

The Invasion Beaches

The main assault area extended approximately 45 miles along the coast from the Bay of Cavalaire to the Rade of Agay. It included 16 individual beaches numbered serially from west to east and divided into the principal divisional assault area known as Alpha, Delta, and Camel. The individual beaches varied from 500 yards to 4,500 yards in length and from ten to 50 yards in width, each landing area presenting an individual topographical problem.

On the extreme western flank along the Bay of Cavalaire and the Bay of Pampelonne are the "Alpha" beaches, 259, 260, 260-A, 261 and 261-A. Beaches 259 and 260 are backed by a narrow belt of tree-covered dunes, behind which run a highway and a narrow-gauge railroad. To the southwest are wooded slopes and the village of Cavalaire and to the east cultivated fields. Several small streams traverse the area but are such as to present no obstacle to the advance of infantry. However, because of soft sand it was assumed that preparation would be necessary to insure that wheeled vehicles could negotiate the first 50 yards from the water's edge and gain the hard ground and highway beyond.

The defenses in the Alpha area were considered moderate. There were three or four casemates, a dozen or so pillboxes, and 17 machine guns. On the high ground beyond were located eight light antiaircraft guns and at the extreme western end four batteries of fixed guns of medium caliber. Parallel to the shore line of Beach 259, about 60 yards out, were concrete pyramids covered by fire from artillery and machine guns. Barbed wire extended some 800 yards in the center of the beach and the whole area was thought to be thoroughly mined. Intelligence reports prior to D-Day indicated that there were probably two companies of 100 men each manning the defenses.

Beach 261 stretches along the Bay of Pampelonne for a distance of 4,500 yards between the rocky points of Cape Pinet and Bonne Terasse. The terrain consists of soft sand with a wooded slope in the center and flat plain on either end. The gradient is sufficient for small landing craft, such as LCIs or LCVPs, to nose up to shore; but larger craft would require pontoons for a dry landing. Enemy defenses were considered moderate and consisted of a single row of piles about 150 feet off shore, pillboxes, wire, and mine fields. There were roadblocks placed across all exits and two coastal batteries some distance to the rear. It was estimated that there was an understrength enemy battalion of 400 men defending the area.

Beaches in the "Delta" assault area, 262, 262-A, 263, 263-A, 263-B, and 263-C are in the vicinity of St. Tropez and Ste. Maxime. Those on the northern shore of the Gulf of St. Tropez are partially protected from the surf. Off shore was a single line of floats designed to support an anti-submarine net and block the channel into the harbor of St. Tropez. The north end of Beach 262 was particularly strongly defended, and there were pillboxes and casemates at the southern end as well. Between these two strongpoints the Germans had placed a double apron of barbed wire to be covered by fire and supplemented by mine fields. Behind the beach itself the terrain is flat and swampy and interspersed by small streams. This area was covered by a series of small mine fields staggered in such a way as to block all obvious exits. The main arterial highway which runs from Marseille to Nice along the northern shore of the Gulf was also heavily mined.

A few miles to the east, at the seaward end of the Gulf of St. Tropez, are two beaches near the town of Ste. Maxime. From the point of view of topography, they are similar to those at the other end of the gulf. In defenses they were perhaps less strong. One of the beaches is flanked by a seawall, and on the other the Germans had constructed an antitank wall 900 feet long and six feet thick. Its height was insufficient to hamper infantry in a scramble landing, but it had to be breached before tanks and vehicles could reach the coastal highway. A line of floats blocked the entrance into the harbor of Ste. Maxime.

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East of Ste. Maxime along the inner curve of Bougnon Bay are three small sand and shingle beaches backed by the coastal belt of dunes, which run up to the coastal road and narrow gauge railroad. Beyond this are steep wooded slopes which merge into cultivated areas when the terrain becomes more level. At Garonnette Beach 263-C is cut in two by the Garonnette River. Because of an almost vertical embankment 40 to 50 feet high, only by way of the extreme eastern end does the terrain offer an exit to the coastal road. These three beaches were considered to be lightly defended but were well mined, flanked in part by an antitank wall, and protected by wire. Pillboxes were located at strategic points, and several batteries of coastal guns covered the approaches from the sea.

The third and final group of beaches, 264, 264-A, 264-B, 265, and 265-A, made up the "Camel" assault area and extended from Point St. Aygulf to Antheor. Beaches 264 and 264-A in the Frejus-St. Raphael area were heavily defended by underwater mine fields and off-shore concrete obstacles. On all roads leading from the beach area, on imporfant streets in the two towns, and even on the coastal highway itself, there were carefully-planted mine fields, antitank ditches, and road blocks consisting of dragon's teeth and concrete pillars.

Beach 265 at the head of the Rade of Agay was considered strongly defended. It is semi-circular in shape and bounded on the west by a small boat harbor and on the east by a low, rocky point. Directly behind is the coast road and railroad, and the connecting terrain is flat and cultivated. This meant that all types of landing craft could come up to the beach, but soft sand would make preparation of a road necessary for tracked and wheeled vehicles.

There were six batteries of light coast defense guns augmented by well camouflaged pillboxes, wire, and mines so located as to take advantage of excellent defensive terrain features. The Rade of Agay a series of floats was anchored off shore to support an anti-submarine net and was reported mined to a vertical depth of from 20 to 50 fathoms. A 150-yard antitank wall in the center of the beach was protected from the sea approach by a mine field 300 yards long. Behind the wall was another mine field, and still farther back on the high ground adjacent to the highway and railroad was a third. Three highway bridges opposite the beach area had been destroyed previous to D-Day, and the railroad bridge over the Agay River prepared for demolition. A few hundred yards to the rear of the highway the Germans had installed two radar stations.

West of the Rade of Agay and facing south, Beach 264 extends from Cap Drammont, a steep red cliff, to the west. Quarried rock rises behind the sand and shingle beach. The main coastal road and railroad run close to the shore, the best exit to the road is at the extreme eastern end of the beach. At Antheor on the other side of the Rade and facing southeast is 265-A, a small beach of fine sand 100 yards long and 30 yards wide at the head of a cove with steep and rocky sides. The beach is backed by the road and a sharply rising coastline, behind which is a high viaduct carrying the main railway line. Hence it was assumed that Infantry could land without difficulty and move on to the coast road, but that for vehicles extensive preparation would be necessary. These two minor beaches, because they were considered lightly defended, were chosen for Camel assault at H-Hour.

About seven miles off the coast of the target area are the islands of Levant and Port Cros. Their strategic location made them a menace to convoys approaching the beaches, and their neutralization was considered essential. For the most part, these islands are beachless with steep cliffs dropping down to the water's edge. The interior consists of scrub-covered hills broken here and there by small patches of cultivated land. On the western end of Port Cros the enemy was reported to have a coastal battery protected by antiaircraft and machine guns. The island of Levant, which lies northeast of Port Cros, was an even greater threat because of its closer proximity to the invasion beaches and convoy route. The most significant fortifications were constructed on the northeastern tip of the island and consisted of three or four 164 mm guns, machine guns, pillboxes, and a searchlight. Four medium coast defense guns were thought to be in position on the other end of the island.

The constantly changing disposition of enemy troops made it necessary for those planning *ANVIL* to reconsider from day to day the

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tactics and the logistics of the contemplated operation. After the launching of *OVERLORD* the German High Command was forced to shift to the Normandy front certain divisions previously designated for the defense of southern France. Because replacements in personnel and equipment were difficult to obtain, the defense of the Mediterranean coast, as D-Day approached, was undoubtedly not on the scale that the Germans had originally planned.

If the assaulting forces were successful in breaking through the German coast defense system and establishing a permanent beachhead, the enemy's most logical course would be to take advantage of the defensive terrain, fight delaying actions, and attempt to withdraw his main force to safety. The possibility of a complete German collapse with the immediate cessation of hostilities or, on the other hand, a series of vigorous counterattacks supported by armor and mobile troops were the two extremes which had to be considered by those planning the invasion.


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TENTATIVE OUTLINE PLAN ANVIL
THREE-DIVISION ASSAULT

CHAPTER III

Final Planning

GENERAL Eisenhower's message of 23 June and the Combined Chiefs of Staff's decision were the turning points for *ANVIL*. The operation had been forced to compete for troops and supplies on the one hand with *OVERLORD*, the most important operation of 1944, and on the other with the Italian campaign, which until the capture of Rome absorbed the greater part of the military resources of the theater. There is no



GEN. SIR HENRY MAITLAND WILSON WITH GEN. PATCH

". . . for a long time the hopes and prospects for ANVIL had fallen in the shadows cast by the bitter Italian campaign . . ."

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doubt, however, that valuable preliminary work was accomplished during the first half of 1944. For when higher authority definitely decided that the operation against southern France would be mounted in mid-August, final planning was accomplished with remarkably little confusion and delay.

VI Corps Enters Picture

The tentative Army *ANVIL* plan was flown to VI Corps headquarters at Naples on 26 June. In a cover letter to the Commanding General, General Patch explained: "It has not as yet had the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander, and therefore is subject to change. However, it will at least give you and your staff a basis for planning . . . Please submit any changes you may wish to suggest as early as convenient and feel utterly free to comment."



LT. GEN. LUCIAN K. TRUSCOTT
". . . no Salerno . . ."

The next day a reply was returned. There were apparently many points of disagreement, and some of the *ANVIL* information General Truscott found "most disturbing". In his letter to General Patch, dated 27 June 1944, he wrote, "It has been my understanding up to this time that I am to command the actual assault . . . I think it would be highly desirable for me to be present when this plan is presented to the Supreme Allied Commander," In the first place, the proposed chain of command seemed to be creating "a grave risk". Until a beachhead was established, General Truscott felt that assault troops should be under the Assault Force Commander, and only afterwards revert to Army control. "I have no doubt that much of the difficulty that attended the Salerno landing was due to the confused command organization during the assault phase. I sincerely hope that we will not repeat that mistake . . . ."

Finally, the general warned against an over extension of the beachhead line in an effort to take in too much of the coast. Fearing a



VICE ADMIRAL ARTHUR K. HEWITT AND LT. GEN. JACOB L. DEVERS
". . . once the decision was made, final planning was accomplished with remarkably little confusion and delay . . ."

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repetition of "the Anzio error", he suggested that for a three-division front the original limits of the Blue Line should be the maximum undertaken. Any over extension would make impossible the massing of sufficient strength for the advance to the west. There were some other points of disagreement.

General Devers, then in Italy, was also concerned that steps be taken to insure that command be clearly defined during the assault phase. He sent a cable to Major General L. W. Rooks, Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, to arrange a conference with General Patch on the subject and further stating "... I have an idea that an Army Group will event-



GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL AND MAJ. GEN. JOHN O'DANIEL (3RD DIV)
the invasion of France had first priority in America's world-wide operations

ually come into this after the landing of two armies and additional troops are poured in from other sources". On 28 June General Patch, after a staff meeting, invited VI Corps planning officers to accompany their Commanding General to Force Headquarters at Algiers for a more detailed study of the problem. It was felt desirable that these matters

of disagreement be examined and clarified before the plan was submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, for his final approval.

Since there had never been any other intention than that the assault Corps commander would have untrammeled control of his troops, the apparent difficulties easily reconciled themselves upon discussion. The Seventh Army staff had, during the months which preceded final decision, of necessity gone into great detail and settled matters which — had the Corps been designated earlier — would obviously have been left to the Corps commander. But this detailed planning was necessary if the work was to go forward, and the question of command unity — one on which many bitter lessons had been learned — was not, and never became, a real issue.

The *ANVIL* Outline Plan with latest revisions was presented to General Wilson on 28 June. Lieutenant General A. H. Gammell, AFHQ Chief of Staff, sent word on 2 July that SACMED approved and suggested only that further study be given to the most effective use of the Airborne Division to determine whether it should be used in one concentrated area rather than at three scattered points as was proposed in the outline plan.

The Naples Interlude

Seventh Army Headquarters moved early in July from Algiers, North Africa, to Naples, Italy, opening at the new location on 4 July. Thenceforth the term "Force 163" was not used. In the Flambeau Building on the Naples waterfront, the headquarters enjoyed proximity to French Armee "B" and VI Corps headquarters, also in Naples, and was a half hour's motor trip from Caserta Palace, new site for Headquarters AFHQ. The Seventh Army Headquarters rear echelon, which had moved during May from Palermo, Sicily, to Mostaganeu, French North Africa, also moved to Naples.

The Naples move allowed closer supervision of training. VI Corps headquarters had already planned that the 45th Division would arrive at the Amphibious Training Center in the Naples-Salerno area

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on 24 June, the 3rd Division on 28 June and the 36th or 85th Division on 6 July. Each division was to receive about three weeks of amphibious training. The program was to culminate in a simulated landing exercise, with conditions on the coast of southern France approximated as closely as possible.

As the congestion of American, French and British troops increased along Via Roma, and as the harbor became daily more crowded with shipping, Seventh Army's staff worked late. Leading military and naval figures of the Mediterranean Theater conferred at the headquarters almost daily. Observers began to arrive. The dusty, impressive Flambeau Building -- once the home of an Italian shipping concern — shook with the clatter of typewriters. There were a few minor air raids. Anyone who looked at the harbor could see that something was in the wind.

By 8 July Seventh Army Headquarters was in possession of a directive issued by Allied Force Headquarters to Commanders of the Mediterranean Naval and Air Force and to the *DRAGOON* Ground Task Force Commander. The directive was as follows:

> 1. In accordance with the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Supreme Allied Commander directs that preparations be made to mount and launch, with a target date of Q 14, the amphibious *ANVIL* Operation which was presented in outline plan and approved by him on 28 June. The twofold mission of this operation will be:
>
> a. To establish a beachhead east of Toulon as a base for the assault and capture of Toulon;
>
> b. Thereafter to capture Marseille and exploit toward Lyon and Vichy.
>
> 2. Conduct of the operation will conform to the principles of joint command. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Theater will provide the Naval forces and will appoint a Naval Task Force Commander. The Naval Task Force Commander will assume command of the entire seaborne expedition from the time of sailing until the Ground Force is firmly established ashore, after which command of ground operations passes to the Ground Forces commander ashore. The Ground Task Force Commander, Headquarters Force 163, is hereby appointed Commander of all Ground Forces taking part in the operation. The Air Commander-in-Chief will nominate an Air Task Force Commander and will provide full air support for the operation.

> 3. Responsibility for the operations given in paragraph 1 above, will remain with SAC Mediterranean until such time as SCAEF can assume operational control. It is contemplated that this may be effected when SCAEF can also assume the supply responsibilities coincident with control. Until such time as this shift of responsibility is made, directives to Commanders concerned will emanate from this Headquarters.
>
> 4. Preparations for the operation will be made on the basis of approximately a three Division assault with an airborne lift of a strength to be decided later. Plans should be made for an ultimate build-up of at least ten divisions as rapidly as available resources will permit.
>
> 5. The Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA, will be responsible to AFHQ for mounting the operation.
>
> 6. For your information, all concerned are being advised that all available Mediterranean resources not required for Operation *ANVIL* will be used to continue offensive operations in Italy.
>
> 7. The French High Command has been advised of the target date for the launching of this operation.

The Navy, in the interest of more effective cooperation, suggested that the Sub-Task Force Commanders be assigned to and placed in contact with the divisions they were actually to work with during the operation. The Navy had no planning staff at the Corps level, and this was all the more reason for working intimately with the divisions. Throughout, Vice Admiral Hewitt, the senior naval officer, was kept in close contact with the progress in training by Headquarters Seventh Army. His representative, Captain English, had offices in the Flambeau Building and worked practically as a member of the Army staff.

Coordinating with French

The employment of French forces and French channels of command came up for final settlement during the course of several planning conferences in July. It was decided that during the early phase of the operation Headquarters Seventh Army would exercise command functions over the U. S. VI Corps and such French contingents as were ashore. Channels of command would thus be direct from Seventh Army to the French Army Commander. However, when a total of two French

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Corps had been landed, the French Army Headquarters would assume tactical command of the two corps; and Headquarters Seventh Army would assume the normal tactical and strategical functions of a Headquarters, Army Group, retaining at the same time logistical and administrative functions for the entire *ANVIL* force.

The plan to attach the 1st French Armored Combat Command to the U. S. VI Corps during the assault phase also came up for discussion and clarification. General De Gaulle had only "reluctantly consented to this employment under American command." General de Lattre expected the return of this Combat Command not later than D plus three; its full use was being counted on in the operation against Toulon. However, it was obvious that the VI Corps would need armor not only for the assault but also for its subsequent advance to the northwest, and if there were any questions of command authority or limitations on its employment this arrangement would not be satisfactory. General Truscott suggested that this matter be taken up with the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, without delay.

Combat elements of II French Corps were scheduled to arrive in the Naples area about 8 July. They were to refit and then go promptly to Taranto for loading. Since the French had only a skeleton staff of their II Corps in Italy, it was advised that the remainder be summoned from North Africa in order to supervise properly troop movement and combat loading. The French were short on replacement personnel, but it was understood that they expected to recruit locally after entry into the target area. This was a matter of serious importance for future planning inasmuch as the use of American equipment was involved.

The French High Command was requested early in July to give General Patch immediate operational control of all the Army "B" units. Certain key French Staff Officers were still a part of General Juin's command in Italy. It was urged that they be released as soon as possible so as to be available to work with General de Lattre on final French plans for the operation. Withdrawal of the whole French Expeditionary Corps from Italy was to be completed by 24 July and only a minimum of time was to be allowed for refitting.

The question of Seventh Army control over French troops was agreed to in a letter to the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, from General Bethouart, French Chief of Staff of National Defense. This letter was in part as follows:

> I have the honor to inform you that I agree that Army "B" which includes all French formations and units nominated for Operation *ANVIL* and which are under the command of General of Army de Lattre de Tassigny, be placed with effect from today, 7 July 1944, under the orders of the Commanding General, Force 163.

General Patch shortly thereafter issued a directive to General de Lattre providing that ". . . Under the direction of this headquarters, you will be responsible for the necessary outline plan, order and instructions, to include the training, equipping and mounting of your forces, passage of your force through the left of the U. S. Corps, and the capture of Toulon".



MAJ. GEN. R. T. FREDERICK
". . . planning, organizing, training . . ."

Much consideration was given to special troops to be included in the invasion forces. The Invasion Training Center was notified that the 1st Special Service Force would engage in a training program to end with a two-day final excercise between 5 and 20 July. Major General R. T. Frederick, appointed to command the Provisional Airborne Division, began temporary planning, organizing, and training near Rome pending the arrival of an Airborne Division Staff from the United States. The 2nd British Independent Parachute Brigade, which was to be incorporated into the Provisional Airborne Division, now came under the operational command of Seventh Army. On 8 July NATOUSA directed that the Seventh Army Airborne Division (Provisional) be organized and trained.

In a message to General Eisenhower on 4 July, General Wilson had shown some concern over the amount of the airborne lift to be made

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available. Since the decision had been made to increase the assault to three divisions, the boundaries of the target area would likewise be increased, and more extensive airborne operations were designed to block the movement of enemy reserves into the assault area. General Wilson asked for "not less than 384 operational aircraft in addition to those at present in the Mediterranean . . . ."

The limited availability of troops and air lift was one reason for the abandonment of two suggested airborne operations in connection with *ANVIL*. One was a proposal from Washington that a force consisting of one airborne division and three air landed infantry divisions attack about D plus ten in the vicinity of Avignon. Another was Plan *CAIMAN*, an operation urged by General de Gaulle as a means of supporting Maquis in the Massif Centrale. General Wilson stated that it would be impossible to carry out *CAIMAN*, or even a smaller operation, until *ANVIL* had been firmly lodged.

On 20 July Troop Carrier Groups allocated to *ANVIL* began to arrive at Italian bases from the United Kingdom. The Airborne Plan was studied in order to review the feasibility of securing and assembling gliders, completing training, and mounting the operation in the remaining time available. Brigadier General P. L. Williams assumed command of the Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division.

A most vital mission, that of landing prior to H-Hour in the Cape Negre area and isolating the target area on the west, had early in the planning stage been entrusted to the French Groupe de Commandos under Lieutenant Colonel Georges Bouvet. Another special force requiring consideration was the French Naval Assault Group, a demolition party which was to land on the right flank in the vicinity of Pointe des Trayas.

Questions of Tactics

A Commanders' Conference held on 12 July took up the following topics with relation to Operation *ANVIL*: air action prior to and on D-Day, assault loading, further development in the use of airborne troops, and the relation of the battle in Italy to the invasion of

southern France. Two days later Admiral Hewitt informed General Truscott of a new naval dissent to the *ANVIL* proposals. "I believe," he wrote, "that the proposal to land the second assault from LCI(L)s is unsound. It is going to run into trouble when any sort of resistance exists, as experience at Elba only too well showed. When an LCI(L) gets hit you lose about 200 soldiers. If an LCVP gets hit you lose only about 30. At Elba the initial wave in the smaller craft got in. The LCI(L)s attempting to follow could not get in . . . ." The unfortunate big-boat follow-up waves in the operation against the Mediterranean island on 17 June 1944 had been vulnerable targets for artillery fire.

Throughout the remainder of July tactical planning centered around what was to be accomplished by the pre-H-Hour air and naval bombardment and the final coordination of the various outline plans. For example, the enemy-held islands of Levant and Port Cros were a definite menace to the 3rd Division beaches on Cavalaire Bay. The Navy was insistent that these hostile shore batteries be neutralized, or else assault shipping in this area would be within easy gun range. This assignment was given to the First Special Service Force which was to land under cover of darkness on the night prior to D-Day.

The pre-D-Day bombing plan envisioned attacks on enemy lines of communications in northern Italy and southern France. The target area was to be isolated by the destruction of road and railroad bridges. At the same time, however, a general bombardment was to be kept up along the whole Mediterranean coast. The enemy was to be given the impression that the main assault might come either in the Genoa area or at Sete near the Spanish border. On D minus 1 the bombing attack was to shift to the islands of Levant and Port Cros and on D-Day to the assault area to neutralize coastal batteries and support ground operations.

The question was also raised of the advisability of postponing H-Hour from 0800 to 0900 hours. The contention was that "an effective naval bombardment could not be carried on simultaneously with that from the air." Dust and smoke would interfere with the observation of spotting planes. The Spotters might mistake bomb bursts for shell bursts and consequently confuse the control of naval fire. There were, however,

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many disadvantages to prolonging the pre-H-Hour neutralization effort. It was decided that "the 0800 H-Hour should stand", and that the air attack and naval bombardment must be concurrent.

ANVIL becomes DRAGOON

By direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, after 1 August the word *ANVIL* was no longer used. The operation would now be referred to as *DRAGOON*. So-called "Bigot" security instructions and procedure remained in force.

On the same date the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference made several important decisions regarding pre-H-Hour activities. General de Lattre had previously suggested that the forest regions in the Maures Mountains northeast of Toulon should be burned by the Air Corps prior to D-Day. The extremely dry timber, heavy underbrush and prevailing winds, he stated, constituted a great fire hazard. However, it was decided at the 1 August conference that there would be "no intentional burning of these forests". Plans were to be drawn up to cover a twenty-four hour delay in H-Hour "which might be necessitated by unfavorable weather conditions". Further details for the deceptive bombing plan of the Mediterranean area were discussed, and it was decided that Sete should have an additional attack by heavy bombers on D minus 5.

Whether the invasion force could actually make the landing without drastic interference from under-water obstacles was a question which troubled General Truscott. On 1 August he told Admiral Hewitt, "I do not believe we can justify sending an assault onto a beach until we have ascertained by actual reconnaissance that assault craft can actually reach the beach . . ."


"I believe," Admiral Hewitt replied the next day, "that the menace of underwater obstacles has been somewhat exaggerated . . ." Last minute reconnaissance would disclose, he argued, only little new information, and would "seriously risk disclosing the *exact* beaches in which we are interested". The difficulties of *OVERLORD*, which had been a special condition of the English Channel and the Normandy coast,

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FINAL PLAN ANVIL

he felt, had now become a mental hazard. The admiral believed that neither factors of bathymetry or tidal range nor the crucial element of tactical security substantiated the new fears and suggestions. "I know of no preliminary reconnaissance, other than actually running boats through the obstacles, which will *ensure* that boats can beach . . ." he wrote. In the event that LCVPs could not push through, LCTs would most certainly be used to ram any remaining obstacles in order to insure a successful landing.

During the first weeks of August, tactical planning was brought to its final conclusion. Instructions to the Commanding Generals of the U.S. VI Corps and French Army B were completed. The pre-H-Hour attack on the islands of Levant and Port Cros was changed from 0100 hours on D-Day, with vessels 26 miles off the coast at dusk to 0130 with the ships 35 miles off shore at dusk. If they came in too close enemy radar might be alerted or movement observed visually.

Final Outline Plans

Although small details were subject to change up to the very moment of sailing, the broader aspects of *ANVIL*'s tactical concept stood firm. The following paragraphs briefly sum up the final ground, naval and air plans for the operation.

"*Army Ground and Airborne Plan*": The general mission was to establish a beachhead east of Toulon as a base for the assault, to capture Toulon and then Marseille and exploit towards Lyon and Vichy. For reasons of security and convenience the various forces were given code names according to their missions.

Kodak Force consisted of VI Corps Headquarters, and its assigned units: the 3rd, 45th, and 36th Infantry Divisions, plus one French Armored Combat Command and supporting troops. Kodak's mission was to land three infantry divisions (reinforced) at H-Hour over the beaches between Cape Cavalaire and Agay. A rapid advance was to be made inland to contact the Airborne Task Force. As soon as the beaches were cleared the French Armored Combat Command would land. The beachhead was to be extended to the "Blue Line", the D plus 2 objec-

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tive, and airfield sites secured in the Argens Valley between Frejus and Le Muy. Further advances to the west and northwest would protect the right flank of the Army; after the II French Corps was established ashore, contact was to be maintained. Kodak would be prepared to release the French Armored Combat Command, the French Groupe de Commandos, and all airborne forces to Army control on Army order.

Garbo Force consisted of Detachment, Headquarters French Army B, French II Corps with the 1st French Motorized, 3rd Algerian, and 9th Colonial Infantry Divisions plus the 1st French Armored Division (less 1 Combat Command) and supporting troops. Landing over beaches in the St. Tropez-Cavalaire Area on D plus 1, it was to pass through the left of the U.S. VI Corps and capture Toulon. By D plus 9 the French 9th Colonial Division, and two attached groups of Tabors (Gourniers) were to be landed in the Le Lavandou-Hyeres area. The remainder of the 1st French Armored Division was to land by D plus 25. After the capture of Toulon the attack was to be continued against Marseille and to the northwest. Contact on the right would be maintained with U.S. VI Corps.

Rugby Force consisted of the Seventh Army Provisional Airborne Division composed of the 2nd British Independent Parachute Brigade, one Parachute RCT, two Parachute Battalions, one Infantry Glider Battalion and supporting troops. It was to land on the high ground north and east of Le Muy and on the high ground north of Grimaud. The primary mission was to prevent the movement of enemy forces into the assault area from the west and northwest. Prior to dark on D-Day, Le Muy was to be cleared of enemy forces and the area secured for subsequent glider landings. Thus, Rugby Force would assault enemy positions from the rear and assist the advance of seaborne forces by neutralizing enemy installations to the east within the range of weapons. Bridges in the Airborne Division area were to be prepared for demolition, but no bridges were to be blown except on order of the Task Force Commander. Upon contact, the Rugby Force would pass to U. S. VI Corps control and would revert to Army reserve on Army order.

Sitka Force or the 1st Special Service Force was to land under the cover of darkness prior to H-Hour and neutralize all enemy defenses

on the islands of Port Cros and Levant. It would subsequently be prepared to withdraw to the mainland and reorganize as the *Satan Force* for the capture of the Island of Porquerolles.

Romeo Force or the French Groupe de Commandos was to land under cover of darkness prior to H-Hour and destroy enemy defenses on Cape Negre. The coastal highway in the vicinity of the Cape was to be blocked and the high ground two miles to the north seized. It would protect the left flank of the assault and upon contact would come under control of the U.S. VI Corps and revert to Army reserve on Army order.

Rosie Force consisted of the French Naval Assault Group a demolition party, which was to land in the vicinity of Pointe des Trayas on the night before D-Day. Its mission was to execute demolitions on the Cannes - St. Raphael and Cannes - Frejus roads and then fall back on the Army right flank.

Naval Plan. The mission of the Eighth Fleet was to establish the Seventh Army firmly ashore and to support its advance westward for the capture of Toulon and Marseille. The Fleet was responsible for the Army build-up and maintenance on the beach until no longer required after the capture and utilization of ports. It was to be subdivided into six forces, each with a specific mission.

The Control Force was to provide naval beach control and establish and operate naval fuel facilities on shore in the assault area. Navigational markers and air beacon markers were to be established, and diversionary operations conducted. The Control Force would protect the assault convoys from hostile surface or submarine units, and would provide convoy control and escort for shipping outside the assault area.

Alpha Attack Force was to establish the 3rd U.S. Infantry Division on selected beaches in the Pampelonne-Cavalaire area beginning at H-Hour on D-Day. By D plus one it would be prepared to land advance units of French Army B. It was to receive and place five pontoon causeways on Beach 261 and five on Beach 259 and at the earliest possible opportunity unload special Air Force equipment on the Island

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of Port Cros. Its naval gun-fire would neutralize enemy batteries threatening transports, landing craft, or the beaches themselves.

Delta Attack Force was to establish the U.S. 45th Infantry Division on selected beaches in the St. Tropez-Bougnon area beginning at H-Hour on D-Day. Five pontoon causeways were to be delivered that day to Beach 261, and the port facilities of St. Tropez exploited. By D plus one the Force was to be prepared to assist Alpha Force in landing French Army "B" over selected beaches in the St. Tropez area.

Camel Attack Force was to establish the U. S. 36th Infantry Division and one Combat Command of the 1st French Armored Division on St. Raphael Antheor beaches beginning at H-Hour on D-Day. As soon as the beaches were cleared, it was to prepare to land another French Combat Command. The Force was to insure that the proper number of pontoon causeways were delivered to Beach 259 for unloading French armored equipment, insure the safety by special measures of Troop Carrier aircraft, and expedite the unloading and turn-around of Air Force LST shuttles from Corsica. Its naval gunfire was to neutralize threatening enemy batteries.

Support Force was to establish the 1st Special Service Force *(Sitka)* on the islands of Levant and Port Cros, and the French Groupe de Commandos *(Romeo)* in the vicinity of Cape Negre. Its bombardment would support the military operations, and after the initial assault phases the Force was to support the Army's westward advance and assign necessary sweeping forces.

Aircraft Carrier Force, the sixth of the Eighth Fleet's subdivisions, was to provide the maximum fighter protection, spotting aircraft, and close support missions. It was to be prepared to transfer aircraft to captured airfields, and would provide its own protection against enemy air and submarine forces.

Air Plan. The Commanding General of the XII Tactical Air Command, Brigadier General Gordon P. Saville, was designated the Air Task Force Commander and charged with all detailed air planning for operation *ANVIL*. From the point of view of time, air operations were broken down into four phases: I. Air offensive operations prior to



BRIG. GEN. GORDON P. SAVILLE
. . . detailed air planning . . .

D minus five. II. Period D minus five to 0350 hours D-Day, known as Operation *NUTMEG*. III. Period 0350 hours D-Day to H-Hour (0800 hours), known as Operation *YOKUM*. IV. Period after H-Hour, known as Operation *DUCROT*.

From the functional approach air operations were further subdivided into: (1) Offensive operations, (2) Defensive operations, (3) Air-Sea Rescue operations, (4) Tactical Reconnaissance, Artillery Reconnaissance and Naval Gunfire Spotting, and (5) Troop Carrier operations.

Air offensive operations in support of *ANVIL* actually began as far back as 28 April 1944 when heavy bombers attacked Toulon. Between then and 10 August, during the preliminary air phases of *ANVIL*, Mediterranean Allied Air Force had dropped more than 12,500 tons of bombs on southern France. Phase II (Operation *NUTMEG)* beginning on 10 August was to continue offensive Air Force responsibilities by attacking enemy coastal batteries, radar stations and harassing coastal defense troops while at the same time isolating the target area by the destruction of highway bridges across the Rhone River.

In order not to jeopardize tactical surprise this phase was to be carried out simultaneously with a cover plan which included the bombardment of identical targets between Via Reggio in Italy and Beziers near the Franco-Spanish border. The intensity of the cover plan, it was hoped, would be sufficient to conceal true Allied intentions until about 1800 the evening of D minus one.

Phase III (Operation *YOKUM)* would begin one hour after the conclusion of *NUTMEG* and last until H-Hour. Its purpose was to cause maximum destruction to enemy coastal and beach defenses utilizing all available forces. Twelve groups of escorted heavy bombers plus all available medium and fighter bombers were allocated for the attack. Fighter and medium bombers were to attack enemy coastal guns seen

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firing, while formations of heavy and medium bombers carried out attacks against the assault beaches with the object of beating down underwater obstacles and of destroying beach defenses.

Phase IV (Operation *DUCROT*) beginning after H-Hour would continue the offensive started in Phase I to interdict enemy communications. This was not only to complete destruction of bridges on the Rhone and Isere Rivers and to extend the area of isolation outwards but also to give close tactical support to ground forces by fighters and fighter-bombers.

The plan for air defensive operations provided a constant air cover, both by day and by night, of fighter and night-fighter aircraft. Escorts were also to be furnished to bombers and troop carrier planes unless specifically charged to some other command. Fighter sweeps and area cover were to be provided in accordance with the demands of the situation and the availability of fighter aircraft.

Plans for tactical reconnaissance and aircraft spotting emphasized both the rapid transmittal of information by broadcasting in "the clear", the size and location of enemy concentrations, and accurate observation and direction of naval gunfire. Naval spotting missions were also to be used for field artillery until the Army's own observers were in a position to take over the work.

The Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division was assigned the mission of lifting the Seventh Army Airborne Division consisting of both parachute and glider-borne troops. Subsequent missions were to include re-supply of airborne units and air evacuation. From home bases in Italy 32 squadrons of troop carrier planes totalling 415 aircraft were to fly to the target area in nine ship Vee of Vees for aircraft carrying paratroops and in Pair of Pairs echeloned to the right for towships with gliders. Beaufighters and Spitfires were assigned to provide air cover. The first jumps were to be made just before daylight on D-Day, and the first re-supply mission was planned for the late afternoon of the same day. For purposes of identification routes were chosen with great care and beacon ships were spotted along the route to assist in

navigation. Planes were also to show amber colored recognition lights up to 40 miles from the French coast enroute to the drop zones.

Final Supply Planning

Pre-planning accomplished by Force supply services during the long period of uncertainty which surrounded *ANVIL* constituted a firm base for consummation of necessary arrangements after a decision had finally been made to mount the operation. Definite responsibilities had been assigned.

The Commanding General, Seventh Army, was to coordinate with the Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA, for the assembly of all supplies at various ports and their movement into the combat zone. The task force commander was to be responsible for the supply of all troops assigned and attached to, or in support of his force in the initial phases. The responsibility included the movement of all supplies from ship or craft over the beaches or through such ports as were available until, on order of the Force Commander, Beach Group Control Headquarters assumed the mission on behalf of the Army. It was contemplated that the Commanding General, Base Section, would assume these responsibilities upon the arrival of the first convoy in a major port, about five days after capture of such a port. For the first 60 days supplies were to be forwarded by SOS NATOUSA, and thereafter as requested by Base Section.

The plan specified that SOS NATOUSA would assist in the movement of troops, baggage, equipment, and vehicles to ports; stow in accordance with the wishes of the sub-task force commander; and load out. The transport quartermaster would supervise stowage in conformity to Army wishes and direct debarkation. For coordination of operations, Near Shore Control Groups were established by Colonel Harvey, A. C. of S., G-4, in each of the loading-out ports to carry out the Force Commander's orders until completion of the movement.

Planning for maintenance of the operation proceeded on a phased outline, published 15 April, which constituted the guide to which the variable factors of strength in personnel, vehicles, and weapons, and availability of shipping were applied. Phased maintenance plans

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specified quantities of supplies and materials to be brought ashore as individual reserve, beach or unit reserve in the first 30 days in six convoy periods of five days each, and levels to be built up gradually and maintained. Each convoy was to bring in supplies above the calculated daily consumption rates with the result that in practically all classes of supply there would be developed a 20-day reserve in Army depots plus a ten-day operating level pending establishment of bases for stockage of theater reserves. The build-up of ammunition was to be to the theater level of ten units of fire with the unloading of the D plus 50 convoy.

Some Changes Necessary

Soundness of the planning in preparation of the phased maintenance outline was demonstrated in the relatively few changes that were necessary although the tactical plan had varied from a one-division to a three-division assault. Reduction in the shipping allocation, however, dictated a change in late June affecting the ration and gasoline receipts during the first five days ashore. Experience in other amphibious operations within the theater dictated the necessity of planning for conditions in which the inland advance would be slow. A 20 percent reduction, therefore, was ordered in the gasoline lift for the D to D plus four period; and the unit reserve of rations for the same period was reduced from ten to seven, with three added to the second ten-day period. Phased maintenance provided for the assault convoy to lift seven days' supply of motor fuel and lubricants, based on a daily consumption expectancy of six gallons per wheeled vehicle, 30 gallons per halftrack, and 60 gallons per tank, with proportionate amounts of engine oil and greases.

Revised tactical plans in June calling for a faster build-up of troops in the D to D plus four period and an assault by three instead of two divisions necessitated alteration of phased requisitions. But by 6 July the A. C. of S., G-4, was able to report that all requirements for the D to D plus 30 period had been incorporated in phased requisitions. Changes were made to reflect arrival on the far shore in the initial five-day period of a French Corps Headquarters with an armored division and a provisional airborne division, together with the three assaulting

divisions. The troop list totalled 170,115 personnel and 25,191 vehicles. Subsequent alterations corrected the totals to 155,419 personnel and 20,031 vehicles in the 30 July troop list. The build-up would put 556,833 personnel and 56,051 vehicles on the far shore by D plus 30 and 576,833 personnel and 91,341 vehicles by D plus 65.

For support of this force supply services had phased requisitions to put 277,696 tons over the beaches in the first 30 days, of which 188,339 tons were estimated to be cleared and 89,357 tons to accumulate. It was anticipated that 108,206 tons would be moved over Alpha Beach, 74,109 tons over Delta Beach, and 95,380 tons over Camel Beach.

Two Day Aerial Resupply

Formation of the First Airborne Task Force for an operation in conjunction with the seaborne assault required the creation of a resupply system by air commencing D-Day and continuing until junction was effected between the two forces. The airborne force was assembled in the vicinity of Rome; and there a Quartermaster depot supply company, trained in aerial resupply and assigned to Seventh Army, was to lay down seven days' supply. Stocks were to include weapons of all types to replace battle losses, packaged in containers of various types to be dropped from C-47 aircraft on call. It was anticipated that aerial resupply of the force would be required for at least two days.

Fluctuations in the allocation of shipping and craft precluded firm planning until definite decisions were made. Schedules were developed for lifting a three-division assault with a D-Day force of approximately 84,000 personnel and 12,000 vehicles. A follow-up lift to reach the target area by D plus four of one armored division and one combat command would bring in 33,500 additional troops. Only minor modifications of the three-division assault plan were necessary in the final allocating of shipping.

Limited availability of shipping prohibited the necessary vehicle lift by assault craft alone. Consequently, the required lift was obtained by flatting Merchant Transport stores ships with cargo and stowing of maintenance stores above the flatting to the extent permitted

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after accommodations of critical vehicles and personnel. Ships thus preloaded were distributed within the task force in conformity with the tactical plan. Cargo was limited to approximately 1,000 tons per ship, a volume which could be discharged within a five-day period and prior to arrival of the succeeding convoy.

One hundred preloaded M/T stores ships were used in the assault and immediate follow-up convoys. The remainder of the shipping maintenance plan was based on receipt of 25 M/T stores ships each five days.

For control of the supply function peculiar to an amphibious operation, the movement of equipment and supplies from ships offshore to army dumps on the beaches, the Beach Control Group method was followed in planning. Control of beach operations by Engineer beach groups would be under the sub-task force commander during the assault phase, after which it would pass to the Army. Coordination was to be accomplished by a Beach Control Group Headquarters, functioning under the Army A. C. of S., G-4, and employing the beach engineer groups which would come ashore with each assault division. It would be the operating agency needed on the beaches with personnel trained in shore operations, unloading methods, traffic control, maintenance of craft and vehicles peculiar to amphibious operations, and logistics.

With the target date less than a month away, the provision of French troops constituted a problem in the final planning phase.

French Supply Problems

Little was known initially of the French supply status or readiness for combat, and French commanders had not been briefed for the operation. Discussion with them and their supply agencies had been forbidden until late in July. Though French planning personnel was available on 22 March, complete liaison was not secured until 1 July. Lower echelons of the French elements lacked information on *ANVIL* and needed orientation on the American supply system and nomenclature. Language differences were a difficulty.

Inspections disclosed that the French were very short of supply, on the basis of their tables of equipment. On 21 July only 30 of 133 units had more than 30 percent of their authorized equipment. According to our standards, the French were not ready for combat. Except for Medical and Ordnance, however, the French considered themselves capable of providing their own support. When on 8 July Seventh Army was delegated authority to exercise normal functions of command to deal directly with French Army B on training and equipment, the resources of the Force supply services were devoted to preparing those units for participation in the operation. The French were to be equipped from stocks of supplies available to the French army through the Joint Rearmament Committee. Deficiencies would be made up from American stocks by SOS NATOUSA and charged to the French Lend-Lease account.

As the target date approached, all units were inspected for serviceability of equipment. Final shortages were filled. Loading plans were completed down to the detail of each person and each vehicle and weapon. In ports on two continents and on the island of Corsica representatives of the A. C. of S., G-4, remained to coordinate between Base Section and departing units, set priorities, assist in filling shortages, and forward emergency supplies.

Brigadier General Paul B. Kelly, Seventh Army Antiaircraft Officer, commanded the Near Shore Control Headquarters upon which responsibility for administration devolved once the Army Headquarters had embarked upon the invasion. General Kelly's headquarters was set up in down-town Naples and had the responsibility for seeing to it that post-D-Day troops and supplies were shipped in accordance with the master plan.

It was estimated that Toulon, the first port to be developed, would fall by D plus 15, would be operational by D plus 20, and would be established sufficiently as a supply base ready to function by D plus 25. The D plus 20 convoy would unload at Toulon, which would be developed ultimately to handle 10,000 tons of military supplies daily. Unloading over the beaches would be necessary for at least 20 days;

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Marseille, it was estimated, would not fall prior to D plus 40; no major river crossing would be undertaken prior to D plus 45. These were the assumptions on which plans were based.

The invading force was so composed, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean estimated, that before the capture of Toulon and with supply only over the beaches it could support itself for exploitation inland to a depth of not more than 20 miles. This was a serious limitation.

Instructions to French Resistance Groups

The planning of *ANVIL* placed no little emphasis on the possible tactical contribution of the French Forces of the Interior. The French Maquis or FFI were scattered over a wide area, but their strength and capacities for guerrilla warfare varied from locality to locality. It was thought that there were about 15,000 to 20,000 trained and armed members of the FFI with perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 more mobilized but unarmed. Two areas in particular, that between Aix-en-Provence and the Rhone River and that east of Grenoble in the high Alps, were considered to be virtually under the control of French Resistance Groups.

Maintenance of contact with the FFI, both by radio and flow of agents, had reached a high state of development and had long since proven an excellent source of intelligence regarding the target area. Most dealings with the FFI were conducted on the AFHQ level. Obviously the proper and skillful handling of the FFI potential, both before and after the invasion, was a matter of the utmost importance. The basic consideration adopted was that the action of the resistance forces must afford the maximum support to Allied operations on the continent. There was no time for romantic or sentimental gestures.

General Cochet, appointed by General De Gaulle as commander of the FFI for Operation *ANVIL*, submitted his plan to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, for approval. By means of Special Projects Operation Center under G-3, AFHQ, a list of priority targets to be attacked on and after D-Day was submitted to the

FFI late in July. The FFI were to intensify their activities in the rear of those enemy forces directly opposing *ANVIL*, with special emphasis on destruction of bridges, cutting and blocking roads and railroads, and seizing or controlling telephone and telegraph lines.

Command channels for the FFI were to be directly under the Commanding General of the Seventh Army and were to be entirely independent and apart from French Army B. General Cochet was to land with the assault force in order to take over active command on French soil as soon as possible. On 8 August, however, General De Gaulle advised that in view of transmitting orders and instructions to the FFI during the early phases of the operation it would be preferable for General Cochet to remain in Algiers which was the communications center for the French Underground. General Cochet was thus replaced by Colonel Boutand de Lavilleon as the official representative on FFI and Civil Affairs matters.

Finally, a Special Operations Group was charged with assisting the French Resistance Groups by delivering troops and supplies in areas held by the FFI. The Maquis, under this coordinated plan, would be able to render the maximum assistance to the overall military effort.

Civil Affairs

Seeking the maximum cooperation from the French civilian population and a minimum of interference with operations against the enemy, the Commanding General of Force 163 had indicated on 1 March 1944 that a Civil Affairs detachment of 200 officers and 400 enlisted men would be necessary to administer efficiently the area assigned to *ANVIL*. A civil affairs organization had been created previously and had trained near Algiers. Every effort was made to coordinate the work with the parallel organization in the United Kingdom which was preparing to administer northwestern Europe. But until 23 February no formal relationship existed between the detachment and Force 163.

The main objective of the contemplated Civil Affairs program was to relieve combat troops of such civilian administration as they might otherwise be called on to perform. The program envisaged cooperation with the appropriate staff section or military agency in the

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maintenance of public order and the restoration of the health, welfare, and internal economy of the liberated regions. The Civil Affairs detachment was charged with making available for military use all local resources and man power necessary to support the operation.

The responsibility for Civil Affairs remained, of course, with the Commanding General, but this direction was exercised through the senior Civil Affairs Officer, Colonel Gerry, who, on 24 July, received his new title as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5. Personnel of the Civil Affairs Regiment was largely American and British. French Officers were available to handle most of the liaison work with the French local government authorities. This was particularly true with regard to directing the functions of services needed for military operations.

In addition to the administrative sections there were a number of specialist branches such as civilian supply, public health, welfare, finance, refugee control, a legal department, transportation, price control, property control, monuments, fine arts, education, industry, commerce, utilities, and communications. Each specialist branch operated under a chief who might serve as a specialist staff officer with Army Headquarters. Detachment personnel were to be assigned specific territorial or functional responsibilities or might be attached for supplementary use to operational military units to meet special problems or be assigned to rear area duties. Of necessity plans for civil affairs personnel had to be kept flexible and closely integrated with the tactical situation.

Probably the most important aspect of the anticipated Civil Affairs program was that of civilian food and medical supply. The situation in southern France was understood to be critical; and it was planned to bring in three Liberty ships per convoy from D plus 10 until D plus 40 and thereafter four ships per convoy until D plus 80. All shipments were to come direct from the United States except edible oils which had been stock-piled in North Africa. Distribution was to be made by the French local authorities under the supervision of Civil Affairs Officers. In its largest aspect the function of G-5 "was to assist in furthering the national policies of the United States and the United Nations as determined by higher directives."

CHAPTER IV

Training

SINCE no units were assigned to the Seventh Army until the middle of June, 1944, — some service units did not, as a matter of fact, come under Seventh Army control until just prior to loading the assault ships, — the time available for training in preparation for the Southern France invasion was very limited. There was, however, sufficient time for the principal combat elements of each of the three American sub-task forces to undergo a three weeks refresher course in amphibious assault. The 36th and 45th received their instruction at the Invasion Training Center at Salerno, Italy. The 3rd Division went to Pozzuoli, Italy, where it underwent amphibious training under its own Division Commander.

The training program was adequate because most of the divisions, both American and French, as well as the service units, had had combat experience. The 3rd United States Infantry Division had participated in the Moroccan, Sicilian, and Italian campaigns. The 45th United States Infantry Division got its first battle experience in the Sicilian campaign. The 36th United States Infantry Division made the initial landing at Salerno in the Italian campaign and fought along with the 3rd and 45th in the breakthrough at Anzio and in the subsequent advance through Rome northward toward the Pisa-Rimini Line.

Of the immediate follow-up forces the 1st French Infantry Division and the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division had been in the line during the winter months of the Italian campaign and had taken an important part in the May breakthrough. They had then struck forward from the Cassino area to a position north of Sienna, an advance of some 190 miles. The French 9th Colonial Infantry Division, also part of the follow-up forces, had made an amphibious assault against the island of

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Elba and had overcome stubborn resistance in capturing the German garrison. The other French units had undergone a period of approximately twelve months' training in North Africa.

The service units of the newly reconstituted Seventh Army were, to a great extent, those which had worked with the divisions mentioned above in the African, Sicilian, and Italian campaign. Their training placed special emphasis on the organization of various service troops into three Shore Groups to operate the beaches in the three division assault areas until this function could be taken over by the Base Section. Using three experienced engineer regiments as miniature base sections and adding components of all branches of service and supply troops, the command trained these groups as teams.

Naval and Air Force units of the Mediterranean Theater had been actively engaging the enemy since the beginning of the invasion of North Africa. This action included participation in amphibious landings in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio. The Naval Western Task Force organized the convoys to transport the Seventh Army and trained special groups to assist in the assault and to direct naval gun fire support. The Mediterranean Allied Air Force organized and prepared the airborne task force and regrouped air strength to assist the assault.

Establishment of Training Schools

The initial success and rapid advance of the invasion of southern France can be attributed, in part, to careful and thorough amphibious training. Training was designed to prepare the forces for the actual problems of landing. The program's mission was to acquaint them with the use and care of new equipment and techniques, to coordinate the maximum usefulness of the several arms of the service, and to review the best practices of modern warfare. Every effort was made to achieve realism.

As early as 13 March 1944, the Commanding General of Force 163 recommended the creation for a joint Army-Navy Beach Obstacle Board, composed of one member from the Invasion Training Center,

two from the Navy, and three from Seventh Army Headquarters. The mission of the Board, which included Captain John Chamber, Seventh Army Engineer Section, was to investigate possible means of breaching underwater and beach obstacles, to make recommendations to corps and division commanders, and to assist in the procurement of the necessary demolitions and equipment to perform this work as efficiently as possible. A detailed study was made of Beach 264-A (St. Raphael) as a basis of training. Beach 264-A had previously been recommended by General Davidson and approved by General Patch as one possible site for an initial landing. Furthermore, this beach was considered one of the most heavily defended in the target area.

On 20 and 21 June a demonstration of equipment and techniques was conducted at Salerno. The Air Corps showed the results of hitting beach defenses with showers of small-sized aerial bombs, specially designed with fuses on sticks attached to the nose of the bomb. These bombs exploded several feet above the ground, effectively cutting wire obstacles and detonating mines. The Navy shelled beach defenses with heavy guns and sent in Apex boats, Drone boats, Reddy Foxes, and Rocket ships. The Apex boat is a small radio-controlled craft which tows, at an angle, two Drone boats. The latter are small craft filled with explosives to be detonated from the control radio of the Apex boat. Reddy Foxes are a nautical adaption of the Bangalore torpedo, consisting of a section of pipe filled with explosives floated into position over underwater obstacles, sunk, and then detonated by remote control. Rocket ships are LCTs equipped with launchers for up to 1,000 rockets, to be fired in mass at beach defenses by the crew.

Army gapping teams demonstrated the tank 'dozer-scarifier, a medium tank equipped with plow-type bulldozer blade for rooting up mines and beach obstacles. In addition there was the Churchill tank with bridge, a tank topped with a box-girder bridge ramp which might be lowered to transform the tank into the center pier of a bridge to cross antitank ditches. There were also other demonstrations with breaching charges and the T-40 rocket launcher. After each, an appraisal was made of the limitations and capabilities of the various weapons exhibited.

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In the actual course of Operation *DRAGOON*, all of the above items were used with the exception of Reddy Foxes, which though available, proved unnecessary. Their "combined efforts", it was later noted, "added to the softening process of the pre-H-Hour bombing and made the assault landing easier."

Invasion Training Center

The Invasion Training Center, commanded by Brigadier General Henry C. Wolfe, was moved from Port-aux-Poules, Algeria, to Salerno, Italy, during the spring of 1944. In compliance with an order from Allied Force Headquarters the Invasion Training Center established a school for one week's instruction in water-proofing, principally for officers from Mediterranean and Northern base sections from which *ANVIL* units were to be mounted. At the completion of the course these officers returned to their sections to conduct schools for the instruction of officers and key NCOs in Seventh Army service units. Representatives of units within Peninsular Base Section (Italy) and personnel of all divisions during their stay at the center attended the water-proofing school itself. For troops scheduled to arrive in the assault area after D-Day, weather-proofing rather than water-proofing instruction was given.

On 10 June 1944 control of the Invasion Training Center was transferred from Allied Force Headquarters to Seventh Army for closer supervision of final aspects of amphibious training. Upon release from the Fifth Army, it was originally planned that divisions comprising VI Corps were to be given training in accordance with the recommendations of the Army-Navy Beach Obstacles Board on the following schedule: 45th Division, 24 June to 14 July; 3rd Division, 28 June to 14 July; and 36th Division, 6 July to 30 July. This schedule was later modified because both the 45th Division and the 36th Division arrived in the vicinity of Salerno during the latter part of June and received training simultaneously during the first weeks of July. The 3rd Division, as aforesaid, did not train at Salerno but conducted its own school at Pozzuoli with the advice and assistance of the 1st Naval Beach Battalion

from the Invasion Training Center. Since the division had been trained for three previous invasions, North Africa, Sicily, and Anzio, the training program during the month of July at Pozzuoli was more or less a general review of amphibious techniques with the introduction and demonstration of new weapons and equipment.

The Salerno site was well selected. The memory of former experiences on this terrain created an atmosphere of grim realism and a thorough appreciation of the necessity for proper preparation. "Quite



36TH DIVISION TROOPS DEBARK 'UNDER FIRE'

". . . from the lessons previously learned there had been hardly time to forget . . ."

a contrast then and now!" wrote a member of the 171st Field Artillery Battalion. "The same beaches, the same hills, the same dust and sand; but conditions have altered the situation and, though we almost expected the whine of shells and the roar of German planes, we found a refreshing, reassuring stillness, serene and peaceful."

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The proximity of the sea was ideal for practice in loading and unloading vehicles and personnel, beach assault exercises, and swimming both for training and recreation. The nearby mountains were excellent for instruction in patrolling, wire and radio, map and compass; they were also used for hikes and general physical conditioning. Ranges were available for firing all types of weapons. Rubber models of terrain features, along with sand and clay tables, helped to make vivid the assault objectives. Combat spirit and infantry tactics were emphasized in order to weld replacements into a fighting team.

Infantry Training

The nine infantry regiments composing the 3rd, 36th and 45th Divisions were given a brief review of regular infantry warfare and specialized training in demolitions and amphibious assault. Their training period also served to refit and restore equipment lost or worn out during the Italian campaign, and to receive and absorb replacements. As much rest and recreation as could be fitted into the brief period was allowed. To soldiers long in combat this was an outstanding feature of the period.

The general schedule for demolition training consisted of a 90 minute lecture by officers preceding demonstrations by engineer troops which covered the general field of military explosives. This course introduced the types and nature of American and British explosives, fuses (safety and instantaneous), the handling of caps, the preparation of charges, the use of primacord, the nature and fusing of Bangalore torpedoes, the preparation of pole and satchel charges, and the application and effect of shaped charges. This phase was followed by another 90 minute period of practice work; under the supervision of the Engineers each soldier prepared a charge.

After basic principles of handling explosives the program continued with a lecture and demonstration of underwater obstacles, beach obstacles, and the neutralization of obstacle-defended beaches. Work was also done on special demolition charges and special equipment to be used with armor. Practical demonstrations were given in the destruction

of tetrahedrons, dragon's teeth, pillboxes with doors of wood or steel, German wire obstacles, double-apron barbed wire fences, and concertinas. Experiments were carried out with placed charges to breach antitank walls, destroy concrete cubes, or horned scullies, and to fill antitank ditches.

The men already had a grim familiarity with the use of mines in modern warfare. Problems involving both Allied and Axis antitank and antipersonnel mines, mine field patterns, marking of mine fields, methods of neutralizing mines, use of various types of mine detectors, probing and mine lifting methods employed their old experience on a more detailed level.

Boat teams were given assault training, demonstrations and "dry runs", critiques of "lessons learned". Special attention was paid to the clearance of both underwater and beach obstacles. The methods recommended by the Joint Army-Navy Beach Obstacle Board were introduced: eight-man DUKW teams from the engineers were to be used to widen and to mark gaps through underwater obstacles. Infantry boat teams which were to land in the first wave were taught to destroy beach obstacles with wire cutters, pole charges, and Bangalore torpedoes, and to assault pillboxes with demolitions and flame throwers.

In addition to specialized training, the infantry schedule included 25 mile marches, close order drill and calisthenics, extended order drill, orientation, bayonet and rifle drill, chemical warfare training, security lectures, semaphore signaling, terrain study, and sketching. Inspections were made of gas masks, weapons, equipment, identification tags, and pay books. While the troops were being trained, their equipment was brought up to standard.

Artillery Training

The artillery units of the 45th and 36th Divisions received training at the Invasion Training Center between 1 and 17 July. This training consisted primarily of the use of artillery weapons under amphibious conditions and involved the loading and unloading of 105 mm howitzers from DUKWs, firing from DUKWs both on land and

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on water, and the use of A-frames in unloading howitzers. Other phases included the firing of small arms and machine guns at aerial-towed targets, reconnaissance, and occupation of positions. Classes were held



THE LATEST DUKW IN THE FINAL DRESS REHEARSAL

. . . new techniques were introduced and old ones reviewed . . .

in security, communications, surveying, photo-interpretation, map reading, swimming, and physical conditioning.

In order to direct naval fire on particular objects that might hinder the infantry's advance before the field artillery units were in action, Naval Shore Fire Control parties were organized and trained to accompany infantry battalions. On 27 July, 19 Field Artillery lieutenants and 144 enlisted men were attached to the units of Seventh Army.

Officers and enlisted men had been drawn from a replacement depot. Under the supervision of the Seventh Army Artillery Section their training had taken place since early spring in the vicinity of Arzew,

Algeria, with the United States Navy, and at Salerno with the Invasion Training Center. Eighteen parties were organized from this personnel; and twelve additional parties were formed from divisional artillery of the 3rd, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions. A complete party of the Army Section consisted of one Field Artillery lieutenant, five enlisted men, one one-quarter ton truck, and two radios, and the Navy Section of one Naval Officer, four enlisted men, one one-quarter ton truck, one one-quarter ton trailer, and two radios. A "half party" was made up of the Army Section only. Each division had attached eight full parties and one half party; the 1st Special Service Force had three full and one half parties.

The parties were attached one to each assault battalion and by means of radio communication could bring naval fire on any point at the request of the battalion commander.

Tank Battalion Training

Personnel of tank battalions assigned to the divisions received a three weeks' course in the adaptation of tanks for use in amphibious operations. By means of the Duplex Drive device a regular medium tank was converted into an amphibious tank and special instruction was necessary to train crews to operate this equipment. For the safety of the crews it was also necessary to equip each man with the Momson Lung and teach him its proper use.

The Duplex Drive device is a system of flotation for a medium tank which consists of a canvas screen fastened to the lower hull. When it is raised and held in position by mechanical means, the tank will float. Propulsion is obtained by propellers driven from standard truck differentials mounted on the sprocket hub. Power is transmitted to the marine screws in the rear through drive shafts mounted on the side of the tank. The Momson Lung, a device used by submarine crews to escape from sunken craft, was issued to each member of the tank crew so that escape would be possible in case of damage to the flotation apparatus.

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The regular tank training problems proved more difficult than the arrangements for experimentation and practice with new devices. Efforts to secure adequate ranges for the firing of tank weapons, for example, were unsuccessful. The Shermans went into combat without ever having fired a round of 105 mm direct fire at a target.

For training with the Momson Lung a large industrial reservoir at Battipaglia, Italy, approximately 100 yards long, 50 yards wide, and 15 feet deep, was prepared by the 40th Engineer Regiment. Tankmen practiced descending into deep water. At one end of the reservoir two compartments were constructed and a tank chassis lowered into one. The crews with their Momson Lung equipment then took their normal positions in the chassis with the turret closed. Then by means of a water gate the compartment was suddenly flooded from the main reservoir; and the tankmen quickly adjusted their equipment, opened the turret, and escaped to the surface. After this operation, water was pumped from the first compartment to the second, and the training process repeated.

On the Salerno training beaches the DD amphibious tank crews were first familiarized with the handling of DUKWs in the sea. They learned the effect of waves and the wake of other vessels on DUKWs, as well as problems of landing on beaches, and became accustomed to handling of vehicle-vessels in the water. They drove DD tanks from shore into the sea, maneuvered in the waves, and then landed. This was followed by practice in launching DD tanks from LSTs several hundred yards from shore and landing the tanks on beaches. Launching was carried out in different depths of water and at various distance from the shore. Care was taken to point out to crews the vulnerability of DD tanks to mines and underwater obstacles. They were taught not to approach beaches until paths had been cleared and marked through the underwater obstacles.

Engineer Beach Group Training

Combat engineer outfits went through particularly rigorous and thorough training because of their key role in dealing with enemy defenses. They were to clear the way for the infantry's advance and

establish initial supply dumps and depots. Attached to each division there was to be an engineer regiment reorganized into a Beach Group.

The vital problem of coordinating Army and Navy action in moving troops and supplies over the invasion beaches had resulted in appointment of a Beach Control Board early in March. This board, which included Captain English of the Navy and Colonel Edwin C. Eller, Seventh Army Engineer Section, had as its mission the recommendation of a standard operating procedure for unloading of supply ships. In middle March Colonel Eller, the Beach Group Commander, established a Beach Group Control Headquarters at Ecole Normale. The time had now come to transmit these plans to those who would carry them out in combat.

The 36th Engineer Beach Group with the 3rd Division was composed of the 36th Engineer Combat Regiment with attached 1st Naval Beach Battalion, and six companies and ten platoons from various chemical, ordnance, signal, military police, and other service troops. The 540th Engineer Beach Group with the 36th Division was composed of the Engineer regiment and the 48th Engineer Battalion, the 8th Naval Beach Battalion, two Quartermaster battalions, two port battalions, one Medical battalion, and 25 separate companies, platoons, and detachments of assorted service troops. The 40th Engineer Beach Group was with the 45th Division. This included the 4th Naval Beach Battalion, two Quartermaster battalions, two port battalions, one Medical battalion, and over 40 smaller units. The composition of these Beach Groups was such that each was a base section in miniature. The chief aim of training was still the practice of engineer assault duties, but the training period was so organized as to give special training to the Beach Group as units.

The mission of Engineer Beach Groups was to assist in the passage of underwater and beach obstacles and to debark over selected beaches troops, vehicles, and supplies of their respective divisions. They were subsequently to establish and maintain the necessary depots of supplies and equipment for the tactical forces. Training centered primarily on the first task, the passage of underwater and beach obstacles.

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Of the Beach Group personnel only the Engineers, a small detail from the Chemical Warfare troops, and the Naval Beach Battalions were to participate in the initial landing. Their technical training program included extensive practice problems in demolition work; the scale was much more thorough than that given the infantry troops. The teams experimented with types of placed charges against all kinds of obstacles especially types known to be on the beaches of southern France. Underwater obstacles, beach obstacles, antitank walls and ditches were constructed and then destroyed by demolitions. Army and Navy personnel, all battle-tested men able to swim, were organized into special gapping teams.

As the selected beaches were known to be mined, emphasis was placed on mine warfare. Engineers were trained to operate the tank-'dozer and tank-scarifier, and to use rockets from launchers on M-4 tanks. Mine field detection and clearance were reviewed, especially the use of various types of mine detectors, primacord nets, and Bangalore torpedoes. Special teams were trained to lay Sommerfelt matting to expedite the movement of vehicles across sand, and others to operate tanks equipped with a boxgirder bridge for crossing antitank ditches.

One snag was the impracticability of the new type mine dectector. It was too heavy and far too sensitive. Engineers reported that the detector "picked up air pockets, roots, wood, stone, and small particles of iron and metal as well as box mines."

"The majority of engineer units of the new Seventh Army," General Davidson explained in his Engineer Historical Report, "were veterans of previous amphibious operations and had experienced many months in combat. Therefore, as the time was short, their training was limited to introduction of new methods and operation of new equipment. Instead of being trained themselves, engineer troops were used primarily to instruct the infantry, artillery, and like branches in demolitions, mine warfare, and the passage of obstacles . . . ."

All service troops received training in the use of their authorized weapons, in water-proofing and de-water-proofing vehicles, and in loading and unloading procedures. They attended lectures on

gas warfare, security, sanitation, orientation, map reading, and special subjects according to their respective duties. A physical conditioning program which included road marches, swimming, and calisthenics was followed by all troops.

Medical units practiced driving ambulances over an obstacle course, carrying litters under simulated combat conditions, and training with DUKWs for evacuation of wounded from beach to ship. Military Police were instructed in the procedure of handling beach traffic and evacuation of prisoners of war.

Chemical Warfare units carried out a three-day training program in the operation and refilling of flame-throwers. They also assisted in the instruction of all troops of Seventh Army in defense against chemical warfare. Signal Corps troops practiced active message center operations under amphibious and beach conditions. Ordnance troops gave water-proofing instruction and studied the problem of setting up depots and repair and maintenance shops immediately following the landing. Quartermaster supply and transportation units practiced unloading operations and the establishment of initial supply dumps.

All this training was supervised and regulated by the Beach Group Commanders. Almost all the service troops had had campaign experience with the divisions to which they were attached. It was "organization" rather than "training" which was stressed.

Combined Landing Exercises

When the amphibious training schedule had been completed, two of the three divisions moved from the Salerno area to new bivouac areas north of Naples. Physical conditioning and regular combat training continued and equipment was brought up to standard. As much recreation as possible was allowed.


Under the direction of VI Corps, each division participated in a realistic "dry run" assault on a division scale, with naval and air support, simulating as closely as possible with conditions expected in southern France. On 31 July the 3rd Division rehearsal, known as

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SHAMROCK, took place on the beach between Mondragone and Formia on the Bay of Gaeta. A week later the 36th Division landing exercise with full naval complement of ships was held in the same bay on the



A BANGALORE TORPEDO BLOWS OUT A BARBED WIRE BARRICADE
". . . full-scale practice assaults stressed combat realism . . ."

beaches near the mouth of the Garigliano River. This operation was known as *COWPUNCHER II*. Simultaneously the *THUNDERBIRD* operation by the 45th Division was taking place to the south on the Bay of Salerno. Since all these exercises were similar in nature, the 45th's will serve to illustrate their general scope.

The plan for *THUNDERBIRD* envisioned that at H-Hour on D-Day simultaneous daylight amphibious assaults were to be made employing three divisions abreast. After the beachhead was secure, an advance was to be made rapidly inland to contact an airborne division. The beachhead was to be expanded in order to seize high ground and airfield sites and to protect the right flank of the assault. Seizing the

"town" with a mobile striking force, troops would advance to the northwest. Throughout the operation contact was to be maintained with friendly troops to the west.

Everything was done to make the exercise simulate exact conditions of the coming invasion. On 5 August a field order arrived from the division headquarters for the exercise. Sealed overlays and maps were put aboard the ships. Embarkation took place in and near Naples from the same points which were later used in the departure for France.

The parallel was made as realistic as possible by the construction of the types of obstacles to be expected on the beaches of southern France. By the use of live ammunition, white phosphorous shells, mines with a reduced charge, naval gunfire, the laying of smoke screens and the firing of rockets at the beach from landing craft, battle conditions were made dramatic and instructive. Beach groups put in place floating piers, employed Bangalore torpedoes, laid landing mats and unloaded 105 mm howitzers from DUKWs. Demolition and mine clearance squads breached antitank obstacles and cleared mine fields. The smallest detail was handled with the same care that troops were expected to exercise on D-Day.

Airborne Training

The training program of the airborne troops, whose role Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Commanding General of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force, called one of "great historical importance", had one aim: "to mechanize each man in his job so as to insure that he would carry out his mission under the most difficult circumstances." Because the 1st Airborne Task Force was made up of units which prior to 15 July 1944 had operated entirely as separate forces, it was necessary to organize these independent elements into a tactical organization under combat team commanders. Major General Robert T. Frederick, who formerly commanded the American-Canadian Special Service Force, was placed in command of the 1st Airborne Task Force and immediately

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undertook the problems of organizing and training this newly activated unit.

A school for glider training was established near Rome. Between 20 July and 5 August nine ground units from artillery, chemical, infantry, engineer, signal, medical, and ordnance branches completed the course. The training team was provided by the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion; and instruction included the loading and lashing of equipment, two operational flights, and basic training in the technique of assembly after landing under simulated battle conditions. It was not an easy task to convert ground force troops into gliderborne units within the short time available. However, the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion instructional team had previously conducted glider training in the States; and their work was successfully accomplished.

The rehearsal training for the Airborne Task Force was divided into two phases, ground and air. The first consisted of a ground operation on terrain carefully selected to resemble the terrain which each combat team would occupy upon arrival in southern France. A schedule was prepared in keeping with the time schedule of the operation itself. All communication personnel of each combat team, with all their equipment, were engaged in this ground instruction. The air phase consisted of the actual loading and unloading of all personnel and equipment in accordance with the time schedule. Key personnel were flown in transports and in gliders over a route comparable to that of the operation itself. Rehearsals with air and naval support helped to coordinate the training of the Airborne Task Force with that of the other services.

The Special Service Force Points the Invasion

The spearhead of the invasion, the 1st Special Service Force, which was to assault the cliff-bound islands of Port Cros and Levant, had already had considerable combat experience. Originally organized from carefully selected Canadian and American personnel, it had been given varied forms of combat training, including parachute jumping, demolitions, mountain fighting, and amphibious tactics. This Force had

led the American drive into Kiska in the Aleutians, and had seen action in the Anzio Beachhead action, including the breakthrough and march on Rome.

Beginning about 5 August the Special Service Force was given intensive training under the direction of the Invasion Training Center at Santa Maria del Castelmonte, 75 miles south of Salerno. Naval Beach Marking parties and Naval Shore Fire Control parties were attached to the Force for training.

The Invasion Training Center program included organizing boat teams and infantry demolition squads, wire breaching by boat teams, the use of rockets, flame throwers, infantry weapons, the adjustment of individual equipment for debarkation, water-proofing signal equipment and weapons, and handling mines and booby traps. The Navy offered instruction in the care and use of rubber boats. Under joint Army-Navy sponsorship, classes were conducted in loading and unloading from naval vessels (APDs and LCIs), and in approaching precipitous shores with rubber boats. Practice in scaling cliffs was emphasized in day and night landing exercises against beachless shores. After each, critiques were held, and the Training Director made comments and suggestions in order to improve amphibious and other special techniques.

In addition to the Invasion Center program the Special Service Force carried out such activities as swimming instructions for non-swimmers, special methods for swimmers, route marches over hilly terrain, infiltration marches from beaches to inland objectives, compass problems, and a study of aerial photographs of the beaches.

The handling of rubber boats was emphasized in many rehearsals. These were first launched from APDs about 7,000 yards offshore where a flotilla was formed alongside the ship. Each rubber assault craft contained ten men, and as many as ten craft at a time were towed by LCVPIs to a line about 1,000 yards from shore. From that point the boats were paddled to shore and landings made. "Dry runs" against undefended shores were first attempted in daylight and then carried over into night problems. The main objective was the attainment of "complete surprise" and "rapid movement inland". It was assumed that the

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enemy would be on the alert for the assault, but would expend his main effort on defending obvious beaches. Beach Special Service Regiment therefore prepared and executed a full scale combat problem covering all phases of training, including assault landing at night on rocky beaches, cliff scaling with full combat load, preparing for counterattack, and landing supplies.

On the night of 7-8 August, in the final practice assault called Operation *BRUNO*, the troops landed on the islands of Ponza and Zannona, off the Italian coast. Terrain features and conditions closely resembled those to be encountered in the coming operation. Sheer cliffs



3RD DIVISION TROOPS IN ITALY LOAD UP FOR A PRACTICE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING

seldom has an army moved from combat to training and then into combat again with so little loss of time . . .

extended down to the water's edge; strong winds were creating hazardous surf conditions. The cliffs were scaled, and the enemy was theoretically taken by surprise from the rear. The only difficulty of the

assault occurred when the engines of one of the landing craft broke down, and General Devers had to be "rescued" in a midnight mid-sea transfer by the USS *Greene*.

The French Commandos were given an intensive training program similar to that of the Special Service Force. In an area on the Italian coast near Agropoli they participated in small craft drills and practiced landing on beachless shores. The Navy furnished an APD and LSIs for rehearsals of ship-to-shore assault by teams using rubber boats. The emphasis during the training was on night operations, trying to preserve to the utmost the element of surprise. The final full-scale practice assault took place on the night of 7—8 August on the Italian coast near Mondragone.

Although the period of training for the Seventh Army's invasion of southern France was necessarily brief, it was realistic and effective. New techniques were introduced, and old ones reviewed. Seldom has an army moved from combat to training and then into combat again with so little loss of time. The Seventh Army returned from its final dress rehearsal on 8 August and began loading into transports. In less than a week's time the troops were putting into actual practice the lessons they had learned.

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CHAPTER V

Moving to the Assault

AT the conclusion of the joint Army-Navy landing exercises, the three American assault divisions moved directly from their training areas to the Naples area for mounting. The French follow-up forces were to be loaded at Taranto, Corsica, and Oran, but only the Groupe de Commandos and a small French Naval Assault Group were to figure in the D-Day attack. The other French forces were follow-up troops and would not arrive at the target area until D plus one.

The Western Naval Task Force Commander conducted his final briefing for key commanders on 6 August. On 9 August General Lucian K. Truscott, the VI Corps Commander, briefed his staff, with Mr. James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Hewitt, the Division Commanders, the Commanders of the Naval Task Forces, General Frederick of the Airborne Task Force, and General Saville of the XII Tactical Air Command present. On 11 August General Patch conducted his final briefing at Seventh Army Headquarters, Naples. Mr. Robert P. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of War, Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, Army Service Forces Commander, Major General Thomas B. Larkin, and Brigadier General Morris W. Gilland from Services of Supply, North African Theater of Operations, General Saville, and Admiral Hewitt attended.

On the afternoon of 11 August the Chief of Staff and other Seventh Army Headquarters personnel went aboard the USS *Henrico* in the Bay of Naples. Here the Seventh Army set up its Command Post afloat. General Patch and his Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2 and G-3 and a few other key Staff Officers comprised the Advanced Seventh Army Headquarters aboard the USS *Catoctin*. So far as Seventh Army was

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concerned, the die had been cast and there was little to do aboard ship but watch the tremendous amphibious force gather itself for its long-awaited strike into southern France.

In a message of commendation issued to the officers and enlisted men of Seventh Army Headquarters aboard ship, General Patch said:

> I desire at this time to express my appreciation for the painstaking zeal, initiative and high devotion to duty displayed by all officers and men of my staff in formulating the plan for the forthcoming operation . . .
>
> I recognize the patience and perserverance demonstrated by all members of the staff in following through with the planning despite obstacles and delays resulting from factors beyond their control, and upon which the progress of the planning was dependent. I deeply appreciate the constant effort, tireless application, and attention to duty displayed by all in completing the planning phase of the operation.

Numerous Parts Involved


The various elements of Seventh Army were waiting at ports of embarkation in Italy, Corsica, and North Africa. Some units had embarked as early as 15 July. In the Naples—Salerno area were the 3rd Infantry Division, commanded by Major General John W. O'Daniel, the 36th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General John E. Dahlquist, and the 45th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William W. Eagles, together with the headquarters of VI Corps and Seventh Army. In ports on the "heel" of Italy was the French II Corps, under the command of General de Larminat, consisting of the 1st French Infantry Division, commanded by General Brosset, the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division commanded by General de Goislard de Montsabert, and attached troops. In Corsica were the 1st Special Service Force, commanded by Colonel Edwin A. Walker, and the French Groupe de Commandos, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bouvet, both of which had been moved combat loaded from the Naples area on 11 August. Near Oran, Algeria, were minor elements of the French II Corps, and General Sudre's Combat Command One of the French 1st

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Armored Division. Troopships and naval escort vessels waited in the harbors of Pozzuoli, Naples, Salerno, Taranto, Brindisi, Palermo, Malta, Oran, and Ajjaccio.

It was logical that the operation should be mounted from Allied-controlled ports nearest the selected assault area of southern France. The island of Corsica lies 100 miles southeast of the assault beaches, but its ports are insufficient to accommodate ships for a major naval operation. The greater portion of the forces forming the initial assault were marshalled near the excellent anchorages, beaches, and restored docks in the Naples area, including the harbor facilities of Cuma, Baia, Pozzuoli, Bagnoli, Nisida, Portici, Castellammare, and Salerno. This area lies some 430 miles southeast of the assault beaches. The approach corridor for the assault would be the stretch of water between the northwestern coast of Corsica and the beaches. For the subsequent build-up, all available Allied-held ports would be used.

Naval convoys which transported the forces were to follow the regularly prescribed routes or channels; these prearranged routes were to be swept of mines and efficient air protection given by regular and coordinated aerial patrols. Deviations for the purpose of deception were to be made from the formal convoy lanes, but in general there were ten arterial routes of communication between the mounting areas and the coast of southern France.

Convoy Routes

Of these ten routes, Route number one from the Naples area was the most important, since it was to be used by the main force of the assault. It proceeded from Naples in a northwesterly direction, passing through the Straits of Bonifacio, which separate the islands of Corsica and Sardinia, and thence followed the western coast of Corsica in a northerly direction until abreast of the middle of the island. Here (42° 04' Latitude, 08° 12' Longitude) the main route was joined by routes from the "heel" of Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and North Africa. This point served as a naval assembly area, from which convoys were to proceed to the invasion beaches.

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The Aircraft Carrier Force, commanded by Rear Admiral T. H. Troubridge, RN, departed from Malta on 12 August and followed convoy route number two to the assembly area off Corsica. This force consisted of seven carriers of the Royal Navy, the *Khedive*, *Emperor*, *Searcher*, *Pursuer*, *Attacker*, *Stalker*, and *Hunter*, and two from the United States Navy, the *Tulagi* and the *Kassan Bay*. Aboard each ship were 24 fighter aircraft, including Seafires, Hellcats and Wildcats, some equipped to fire rockets. Four antiaircraft cruisers ("flak ships") and 14 destroyers escorted the carriers. The Aircraft Carrier Force, in conjunction with land-based fighters from Corsica, provided air cover for the assembling convoys and later for the landing. On D-Day 150 sorties were flown by carrier-based aircraft.

To accommodate the two pre-D-Day assault forces, a special naval task force of high-speed ships was organized. This was known as the Support (Sitka-Romeo) Force and was commanded by Rear Admiral L. A. Davidson, USN. The naval complement consisted of five transport (APDS) and three medium and two small infantry landing ships, making a total of ten, escorted by the French battleship *Lorraine*, one heavy cruiser, five light cruisers, three destroyers, 16 motor torpedo boats, and 15 small craft. The Sitka Force (First Special Service Force) included 2,057 troops, and the Romeo Force (French Commandos) was approximately 1,000 strong. The former had come from Santa Maria de Castelabate and the latter from Agropoli, both in Italy. On 11 August they both transferred to Propriano near Ajjaccio, Corsica. Here they remained for two days, cleaned equipment, and were briefed with the most recent intelligence concerning their objectives.

To transport the three assault divisions the Western Task Force originally allocated 60 six-davit LSTs, to be distributed on a basis of 20 to each division. The divisions planned to lift four assault battalions apiece. Subsequently, however, the number of six-davit LSTs was reduced to 50. This necessitated a major change in the plan for lifting the assault battalions, and by command decision the 50 LSTs were re-allocated as follows: 20 for the 3rd Infantry Division, 15 for the 45th Infantry Division, and 15 for the 36th Infantry Division.

The 3rd Infantry Division was the basic element of Alpha Force, which was carried and supported by Naval Task Force No. 84, under the command of Rear Admiral F. J. Lowry, USN. This force was mounted during the second week in August from the Pozzuoli-Nisida-Naples area and was allocated 122 troopships. Three battalions were loaded on the 20 six-davit LSTs, three battalions in combat loaders, and three battalions in LCIs. The division strength, including the 36th Engineer Beach Group and attached units, amounted to 28,756 men and 3,636 vehicles. In the same convoy were 5,114 men and 907 vehicles of Seventh Army and the Air Corps loaded in ten additional transports. The build-up of Air Corps equipment and personnel continued from Corsica for some time after D-Day by means of a special LST shuttle system.

The French forces scheduled to land in the Alpha area beginning on D plus one had already mounted farther south and were proceeding to the convoy assembly point off Corsica. From the "heel" of Italy the French II Corps, 1st French Infantry Division, and 3rd Algerian Infantry Division, with attached service units, a total of over 34,000 individuals and 4,951 vehicles, moved on 50 large transports. At the same time 11 motor transports with 6,852 additional troops and 1,258 vehicles of French II Corps were enroute from Oran. The Naval escort of the Alpha Force came from Malta and included the British battleship *Ramillies*, the heavy cruiser USS *Quincy*, five light cruisers, six destroyers, and 13 smaller craft, bringing the grand total of the Force to 207 vessels, carrying 74,500 soldiers and 10,752 vehicles.

The Delta Attack Force, supported by Naval Task Force No. 85, commanded by Rear Admiral B. J. Rodgers, USN, was much smaller than the Alpha Force and was mounted simultaneously with Camel Force at the Pozzuoli-Nisida and main Naples staging areas. Army personnel included the 45th Infantry Division, the 40th Engineer Beach Group, and attached assault elements, totalling 36,654 men and 5,359 vehicles. Twenty-four large transports and 106 landing ships and craft were necessary to accommodate the force. Three of nine combat battalions of the 45th Division were loaded on the 15 six-davit LSTs, three on combat loaders, and three on LCIs. Two battleships, the USS *Texas*

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and USS *Nevada*, three light cruisers, 11 destroyers, and some 43 small craft from the base at Taranto formed the Delta naval escort, bringing the convoy to a total of 189 vessels.


Naval Task Force No. 87, commanded by Rear Admiral Lewis, USN, transported the Camel Assault Force from Italy and Combat Command Sudre of the French 1st Armored Division from Africa. In the Naples area the 36th Division, the 540th Engineer Beach Group, and attached troops, 31,355 men and 4,313 vehicles, were loaded between 10 and 12 August on 20 transports and 91 landing ships and craft. The nine combat battalions of the 36th Division were loaded in the same manner as those of the 45th Division, but special arrangements had to be made for the loading of vehicles. This was necessary because an H-Hour assault over the heavily defended Camel Red Beach (264-A) presented too great a risk, and the first LST and LCI landings were to be made on the nearby Agay Beaches. Red Beach was to be attacked by ground forces first and by naval gunfire at H plus six hours, and the loading of vehicles was planned to fit this anticipated delay.

The Camel Force was joined by one combat command of the French 1st Armored Division, composed of over 5,000 men and 1,000 vehicles. The French were mounted in five motor transports, six LSTs, and one LCI at Oran and followed convoy route number three to join the Camel convoy off Corsica. Also from Oran came the United States battleship *Arkansas*, one heavy cruiser, the USS *Tuscaloosa*, five light cruisers, and 11 destroyers to give fire support to the force.

To supervise the embarkation of all follow-up troops not included in the D-Day assault, a Seventh Army Rear Echelon, commanded as aforesaid by Brigadier General Kelly, remained at Naples. General Kelly had been designated Near Shore Control Officer and was connected by direct radio channel with the Forward Echelon, Seventh Army, on the far shore. All changes in priorities in mounting troops and supplies that were made necessary by developments on the far shore were radioed to the near shore for action. Four liaison officers with the Near Shore Control were stationed, one with Mediterranean Base Section at Oran, two with Northern Base Section in Corsica, and one at the port of

Taranto, so as to control the shipment of troops and supplies from these points.

Near Shore Control officers also served to check on the operation of the base sections, to insure that Seventh Army units carried out the mounting plan fully and on schedule. The steady, uninterrupted flow of troops and supplies according to priority changes based on the tactical situation continued until all major units of Seventh Army had been dispatched and a base of supply created in France. Through this means more than 125,000 troops, 34,000 vehicles, and 165,000 tons of cargo reached southern France between 18 and 31 August 1944.



MEN AND EQUIPMENT IN NAPLES AWAITING LANDING CRAFT FOR THE INVASION

". . . the troop list totalled 155,419 personnel and 20,031 vehicles . . ."

Moving to Rendevous

The vessels of the Alpha, Delta, and Camel Attack Forces left the Naples area on 11, 12, and 13 August, the slower vessels sailing first.

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Seventy-two hours prior to embarkation, maps in sealed packages and the Seventh Army map identification code and key in a sealed envelope had been delivered to unit S-2s. These were to be opened four hours after sailing and all assault troops carefully briefed. First the unit officers were briefed and they in turn instructed the enlisted men under their commands. By the use of charts, pictures, blackboards, and sponge rubber models showing terrain, the exact mission of each assault team was explained in detail. Prior to debarkation all watches were synchronized with ship's time.

Shoulder patches and appropriate flag brassards, both American and French, were distributed. Soldiers sat about the deck sewing on their insignia and reading the "Pocket Guide To France". Rations for the first days were issued, with each man receiving one K ration, one D ration, a small bottle of Halazone tablets to purify water, one bottle



INVASION LOADING OF LSTs IN BAGNOLI HARBOR, ITALY

Said General Patch: 'We are embarking for a decisive campaign . . . The agonized people of Europe anxiously await our coming' . . ."

of salt tablets, and two packages of cigarettes. Units were issued two rations of either C, 10-in-1, or D, plus one of D on a basis of strength. The voyage was uneventful. There was no enemy opposition by submarine, surface craft, or aircraft. The convoys sailed northward along the western coast of Italy and passed through the Straits of Bonifacio. On the evening of 14 August a message from General Patch was read over the ships' loud speakers:

> Soldiers of the Seventh Army:
>
> We are embarking for a decisive campaign in Europe. Side by side, wearing the same uniform and using the same equipment, battle experienced French and American soldiers are fighting with a single purpose and common aim - - destruction of Naziism and the German Army. The agonized people of Europe anxiously await our coming. We cannot and will not fail. We will not stop until the last vestige of German tyranny has been completely crushed. No greater honor could come to us than this opportunity to fight to the bitter end in order to restore all that is good and decent and righteous in mankind. We are an inspired Army. God be with us.

At approximately 1900 hours, 14 August 1944 off the Western coast of Corsica the *DRAGOON* convoy met in rendezvous and turned toward its objective.

Softening the Target

The strategy of Operation *DRAGOON* included plans to soften the beach defenses by concentrated bombing and to isolate the assault area by special landings prior to H-Hour. To accomplish this isolation the specially-trained American Special Service Force, the French Commandos, and the French Naval Assault Party were to land at midnight 14-15 August on the flanks of the invasion beaches. The 1st Airborne Task Force was to be dropped before dawn 15 August in the rear of the target area, thereby preventing the enemy from reinforcing his coastal defenses. The Air Force was to step up its regular offensive operations against enemy lines of communication and military installations in southern France and Italy, turning attention to the invasion as D-Day and H-Hour approached. The fire support ships of the Navy

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were to shell the beaches just prior to H-Hour. The Air Corps started the execution of the pre-invasion bombing during the first week in August.



MEN LOADING INTO GLIDERS FOR THE INVASION TAKE-OFF

". . . The 1st Airborne Task Force was to be dropped before dawn 15 August in the rear of the target area, preventing the enemy from reinforcing his coastal defenses . . ."

While the embarkation of the ground forces was in progress, the XII Tactical Air Command under General Saville was already softening the enemy for invasion. Fighter bombers from bases in Corsica and Sardinia were attacking coastal defense guns, beach defenses, lines of communication, air fields, and radar installations. Assigned air support included six groups of P-47s, three wings of R.A.F. Spitfires, one squadron of A-20s, one squadron of Beaufighters, two squadrons of tactical reconnaissance Spitfires, one squadron of P-51s, and one squadron of photographic reconnaissance aircraft.

Their offensive support of Operation *DRAGOON* was divided into four phases. Phase I, period 5 August to five days prior to D-Day;

Phase II, from D minus five to 0350 hours D-Day, known as Operation *NUTMEG;* Phase III, 0350 hours D-Day to H-Hour, known as Operation *YOKUM;* and Phase IV, the period after 0800 15 August, known as Operation *DUCROT*.

The first phase was a continuation of the regular air activities in the Mediterranean Theater, designed to assist in the future assault on southern France, but to appear to be supporting the offensive in northern Italy or in Normandy. Tactical surprise could not be jeopardized. Enemy air fields, submarine bases, and major communication lines were attacked in the Marseille-Toulouse area, the Genoa area, and in the Po Valley.

Operation *NUTMEG* opened on 10 August with attacks by P-47s on gun positions on Cape Esteral, Cape Benat, the Isle of Levant, and Carmarat. Radar installations from Marseille to Cannes were attacked with explosives dropped during the course of 410 sorties on the following day. As *NUTMEG* was essentially a cover plan, on 12 August the Strategic Air Force dispatched 139 B-17s and 94 B-24s against Sete, and a small force against gun positions at Marseille. Fighter bombers of the 87th Fighter Wing flew 384 sorties against communications, destroying bridges at Arles, Tarascon, and Avignon. Medium bombers again struck the invasion coast. On 13 August enemy airfields in the Rhone Valley and aircraft on the ground received special attention from over one hundred P-47s. As the convoys began to sail, the air assault increased accordingly. Gun positions, bridges, and communications were blasted by 626 heavy bombers escorted by 241 fighters. Four Wellington bombers scanned the convoy route for two U-boats reported at sea.

Restricted visibility interfered with the original schedule, but by 0350 on D-Day virtually the entire *NUTMEG* task had been accomplished. Effective sorties totalled 5,408, divided about evenly between the Strategic and Tactical Air Commands. Tonnage dropped totalled 6,400, of which the Strategic Force supplied 4,451. The effort cost 50 aircraft, of which 15 were heavies, four medium, two patrol bombers, and 29 fighters or fighter bombers.

During the 24 hours prior to D-Day the attention of the Air Force was directed more specifically to the invasion coast. Bombers

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ranged inland to strike fuel dumps and motor transport, radar installations, coastal watching stations, and gun positions on the coast itself. Fighter planes flew over 200 sorties to cover the assembling invasion convoys off Corsica. During the whole *NUTMEG* phase the enemy offered merely token resistance, limiting his air activities to fast reconnaissance trips to watch convoy movements. The Germans were apparently aware of the impending assault, but they were confused as to the exact area of assault.

To add to the enemy's confusion, the cover operation *FERDINAND* was carried out during the night of 14-15 August. Two naval diversion "forces", including heavy ships, sailed at 1800, 14 August to feign assault west of the selected beaches in the Ciotat area, which is between Marseille and Toulon, and to the east between Cannes and Nice. To simulate an airborne assault, five aircraft left Corsica after midnight (0115, 15 August), each carrying 5,780 pounds of parachute dummies, rifle simulators, and window (strips of paper covered with metallic paint to confuse enemy radar). This material was dropped from a height of 600 feet in a zone near Ciotat. Immediately the enemy was alerted, as the pilots reported many flashes, colored lights, and small explosions. The success of the operation was later established from prisoners taken on D-Day.

Experience in previous invasions had taught the value of concentrated air attacks on targets in the assault area. In keeping with this idea an all-out effort was made to soften the strong points of the invasion coast immediately before H-Hour. At first light on D-Day patrols of P-38s, Spitfires, Hellcats, and Wildcats from the Carrier Force, all carrying bombs, struck at the assault area. The Air Plan called for administering 1,000 pounds of explosives for each ten yards of invasion beach at H minus one hour. For this task 40 heavy bombers and 120 medium bombers were assigned to each 1,000 yards of beach. On schedule at 0650 hours, 83 B-17s, and 138 B-26s struck Alpha beaches with excellent results. Because the beach area was overcast, the attack on Delta and Camel had to be somewhat restricted for the safety of our surface forces. The strongly fortified northern portion of Camel Red Beach was bombed between 0650 and 0720 hours by 162 B-25s with

good coverage. Meanwhile fighter bombers and heavy guns of the Navy were pounding coastal batteries in the same area. Bomb loads dropped on the beaches consisted largely of small fragmentation and demolition bombs, instantaneously fused; but for gun positions large demolition bombs with short delay fusing were used. All told, in operation *YOKUM* the Mediterranean Allied Air Force dispatched 959 sorties, of which 610 were effective, and dropped 774 tons of explosive.

Operation *DUCROT* commenced at H-Hour. During the course of D-Day, 3,936 sorties were flown, the mightiest air effort ever put out in a single day in the Mediterranean. The Air Corps provided continuous cover for the invasion area and struck at the enemy's lines of communication, troop concentrations, and movements in the rear. Throughout the day fighter planes from Corsica and from carriers flew more than 500 sorties over the beach and adjacent areas.

The Naval Fire Support ships commenced long-range bombardment of prearranged targets at 0530. Until 0800 this fire was almost continuous, lifting only when bombers were over the targets. Following behind the minesweepers, ships approached the shore and laid down a "drenching" fire on beach fortifications. In all, naval guns threw over 15,900 projectiles into the beach defenses. White phosphorous shells were included and were reported very effective. The aerial bombing had ceased at 0730 to allow the smoke over the area to clear and to enable the naval gunners to fire without interference on observed targets and positions revealed by gun flashes. The shelling continued until 0750; and then it shifted to the flanks, for the hour of the major assault was at hand. Meanwhile the pre-H-Hour assault forces had landed and begun the isolation of enemy forces in the strategic area.

Final Isolation of Target Area

Plans to isolate the invasion area by commando assaults on the flanks went into operation on the night of 14-15 August. Ships of the Support Force (Naval Task Force No. 86) moved from Propriano, Corsica, at 1130, 14 August. Shortly after darkness the sharp outlines of the cliffs of Levant and Port Cros appeared in the offing.

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The troops of the Special Service Force received last minute instructions and briefing as the convoy moved into position. The islands were to be assaulted by scaling the cliffs on the seaward side.



THE BEACHLESS SHORES OF THE ISLE OF PORT CROS

". . . Commando assaults went into operation on the night of 14—15 August. Shortly after darkness the sharp outlines of the cliffs of Levant and Port Cros appeared . . . Surprise was complete . . ."

These landing sites had been selected by Colonel Walker, Commander of the Special Service Force, after study of aerial photographs and later reconnaissance from a British submarine. French officers, and others familiar with the terrain, advised that a landing over the south coast of the islands was impracticable or impossible. This situation was just what was wanted, since the Germans would probably believe likewise and make little or no effort to defend the cliffs. The troops had been especially trained for the task. After they had scaled the cliffs, they were to destroy all enemy defenses, particularly coastal guns that might threaten the invasion fleet. When relieved by French troops on the

evening of D-Day, the Special Service Force was to withdraw with its prisoners to the mainland.

Weather conditions were ideal, the sea calm, the night dark enough to cover the operation, but with sufficient star illumination to enable landing craft to identify prominent landmarks and landing areas. The transports stopped approximately 8,000 yards offshore, and debarkation into 10-man rubber assault boats began at 2300 hours. These boats were secured three to a single towline, making a total of nine towed by a single LCI to within 1,000 yards off shore. As the assault boats were being paddled toward the beach, scouts in kayaks and electric surfboats preceded them to mark the landing spots with small lights. The 1st Regiment, approximately 650 men, landed on Port Cros, and the 2nd and 3rd Regiments, about 1,300 strong, debarked at midnight on the island of Levant. Both groups included attached Naval Shore Fire Control parties. The landings were unopposed and all groups reached assembly areas without interference.

Surprise was complete. Although the enemy had been alerted for an assault on 15 August, reports from prisoners revealed that the Germans did not expect an attack up the cliffs on the seaward side of the islands. Resistance on Levant was scattered and moderate, and the enemy shortly withdrew to the port of Levant, where he put up a stiffer fight. By dawn a beach was cleared, supplies landed, and the wounded evacuated. The coastal defense battery at the eastern end of the island was found to be a cleverly camouflaged dummy. During D-Day, mopping up continued on Levant, but because of radio failure regular reports could not be sent the Force Command Post aboard the USS *Catoctin*. During the afternoon General Patch sent his aide-de-camp to Levant to investigate and report. Mr. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, accompanied him. They found only snipers and small pockets of resistance still active. By 2234 hours on D-Day all resistance on Levant ceased.

The 1st Special Service Regiment on Port Cros met little initial opposition, but the German garrison withdrew to an old fort on the west end of the island and there resisted tenaciously. This fight continued into the next day, and during the hours of darkness an enemy battery at Cap Benat shelled Port Cros. This delayed the off-loading and

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installation of radar equipment. By radio the Shore Fire Control Party directed naval fire on the fort from HMS *Ramillies*. On the morning of 17 August an attack was launched, and shortly afterward two German officers and 46 enlisted men surrendered. Their mission accomplished and the islands garrisoned by French army and navy personnel from Corsica, the Special Service troops were evacuated in LSIs to the mainland, where they assembled in the vicinity of Sylvabelle on Cavalaire Bay.

To protect and secure the left land flank of the invasion coast, Romeo Force was landed by the Naval Support Force at Cape Negre prior to H-Hour. This force of French Commandos, under Lieutenant Colonel Bouvet, landed from three LCIs shortly after midnight 14-15 August west of the Alpha beaches. Their mission was to destroy all enemy coastal defenses on the cape, to establish a road block on the coastal highway, and to seize and hold the high ground two miles to the north. Two advance light detachments were sent in small boats as an initial assault force.

The first detachment of 70 men beached from rubber assault boats at the eastern base of Cape Negre, scaled the steep banks, and took the enemy by surprise. They destroyed the gun emplacements and established a tank block in a pass on the coastal highway. This operation was successfully and quickly accomplished. The second detachment was to land in two sections on either side of Le Rayol beach, two miles east of the Cape, to surprise and knock out the pillboxes believed to exist in that area. Afterwards they were to prepare the beach for the landing of the main force from LCIs. Because of the difficulty of locating Le Rayol beach in darkness, a small reconnaissance party preceded the detachment and marked the beach with a guide light. In spite of this precaution, one section landed near Cape Negre, where it was fired upon by the enemy and suffered some casualties. The main body followed at about 0100 hours and, failing to observe the guide lights, also landed in the wrong area, this time at Le Canadel between Le Rayol and the Cape. Since time was of the utmost importance, the LCIs proceeded to land on the beach at Le Canadel. The enemy was

found to be confused and disorganized, and the landing was accomplished without a single shot being fired.

Taking advantage of the enemy's disorder, the force hastened to accomplish its mission with little interference. By morning the beaches were cleared and a junction effected to the west with the detachment holding the tank block at Cape Negre pass. During the morning the enemy reorganized and launched several violent counterattacks, but these were repulsed. The Commandos continued to advance inland, clearing the towns of Le Rayol and La Mole of Germans and mopping up all pockets of resistance in the area.

At approximately 1300 on 15 August a combat patrol from the U.S. Third Division contacted the French Commandos. This brought the force under the command of VI Corps; at 2000 hours the Commandos received orders to resume their advance westward to Le Lavandou.

To sever German communications to the east between Cannes and the right flank of the assault area, a road block was to be established on the coastal highway prior to H-Hour. A demolition party of 67 French Marines was organized, known as the *ROSIE* Force or the French Naval Assault Group. The force was to land in the vicinity of Pointe des Trayas on the night of D minus one and to block the roads from Cannes to St. Raphael and Frejus. The block was to be constructed by the demolition of trees and telegraph poles and by laying mines in critical areas. During the night of 14-15 August the party was landed from four torpedo boats in seven rubber boats on the beach south of Theoule-sur-Mer. In the darkness the Marines ran into barbed wire defenses and anti-personnel mines. The explosions and confusion alerted the enemy, who immediately opened fire with deadly effect. The party dropped their demolition equipment and attempted to withdraw. However, the operation failed completely and on the afternoon of D plus one the survivors made contact with the 36th Division. Twenty-two wounded were evacuated by the 56th Medical Battalion, and many of the rest had either been killed or captured.

To isolate the assault area completely it was necessary to cut the coastal highway on each end of the projected beachhead and to block

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enemy movement from the rear. The coastal highway was bisected at Frejus by a road leading from the interior down a defile to the coast. The 1st Airborne Task Force, known as *RUGBY* Force, was to land at various hours on D-Day beginning at 0430 near Le Muy and Le Luc to establish the necessary road blocks, to prevent enemy movement toward the beaches, and to help reduce the defenses in the Frejus area.

The Airborne Task Force was created and trained especially for the requirements of the assault on southern France. It was activated on 15 July under command of General Frederick. The Airborne Force included the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade (British), the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, the 1st Battalion, 551st Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 460th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion, the 602nd



PARATROOPERS AND A SUPPLY DROP ON LATE D DAY

". . . No air opposition was encountered, and the paratroopers had drifted down safely through the fog. On the ground the enemy was contacted immediately, but resistance was light . . ."

Glider Pack Howitzer Battalion, and glider-borne supporting troops. The supporting troops included two chemical mortar companies, an infantry antitank company, two engineer companies, a signal company, a medical collecting company, and an ordnance detachment. The total strength of the force was 9,732 men to be transported in 535 C-47s and C-53s and 465 gliders.

The provisional Troop Carrier Air Division was detailed to transport the Force. To avoid convoy routes to the target area, aerial routes were set up east of the assault corridor and marked by beacon ships. Three drop zones, O, A, and C, were chosen along the Nartuby and Argens Rivers near the towns of La Motte, Trans-en-Provence, and Le Muy. Zone A and Zone O were either flat, cultivated fields or gently rolling ground suitable for both parachute and glider operations. Zone C was a broken, rocky area, much less desirable. On D-Day there was



AMERICAN TROOPS AT A FRENCH CROSSROADS 15 AUGUST 1944

". . . Defensive lines were established at all zones, and all enemy forces were driven out, except in the village of Le Muy . . ."

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a dense fog over these zones, but most of the parachute elements dropped on or near their objectives. The 509th Battalion Combat Team dropped in Zone C about 0430 hours; the 517th Regimental Combat Team in Zone A at 0435 hours; and the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade in Zone O about 0510.

No air opposition was encountered, and the paratroopers drifted down safely through the fog. On the ground the enemy was contacted immediately; but resistance was light, primarily small arms fire. Defensive lines were established at all zones, and all enemy forces driven out, except in the village of Le Muy. Preparations were made for the arrival of the gliderborne elements.

The first glider serial landed in Zone O about 0930. During the day other serials arrived, and by late afternoon the whole *RUGBY* Force had landed. Contact with all elements within the Force was



AIRBORNE TROOPS LEAVING THEIR GLIDERS

". . . the first glider serial landed about 0930 . . . By late afternoon the whole Rugby Force had landed . . ."

established and the command post set up by 1800 hours. By the end of D-Day the villages of La Mitan, La Motte, Castron, and Les Serres had been occupied and 103 prisoners taken. A protective screen had been established over the road net connecting the invasion coast with the interior. During the day the enemy counterattacked in the vicinity of Les Arcs but was repulsed by the 517th Regimental Combat Team.

The 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade had successfully blocked the highway at Le Muy but had been unable to take the town. The capture of Le Muy was then assigned to the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion. During the early morning of 16 August an unsuccessful attack was launched against Le Muy. The airborne troops continued to attack and overcame determined resistance at about 1500 hours. During D plus one other elements of the force fanned out and consolidated their positions. Late in the afternoon of the same day contact



THE LIBERATION OF THE VILLAGE OF LA MOTTE

". . . at the close of D plus 1 the 1st Airborne Task Force had destroyed all enemy resistance in its assigned zone . . ."

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was made with reconnaissance elements of the 45th Division. At the close of D plus one the 1st Airborne Task Force had destroyed all enemy resistance in its assigned zone of responsibility and had taken 493 prisoners of war.

An unexpected achievement was the assistance given by airborne troops in the capture of St. Tropez in the 3rd Division area. About 0430 on D-Day one serial of 29 planes became confused by ground fog and dropped its load at the wrong point. Thus two full batteries and parts of two others of the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, including the Battalion Commander, landed about three miles south of St. Tropez near sizeable enemy coastal installations and in the target area of the Allied bombers and naval guns. These paratroopers weathered the bombardment by their own forces and, although considerably shaken up, suffered no casualties. They managed to assemble, put five guns in operation, and capture intact one enemy antiaircraft battery, two coastal batteries, and a garrison of 240 Germans. Part of one battery, along with elements of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, entered St. Tropez and occupied the town. When the forward troops of the 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Division, reached St. Tropez they found the paratroopers attacking the last German defenders in the town strongpoint known as the Citadel.

In the parachute and glider operations no aircraft or gliders were lost from enemy action, but many gliders were wrecked in landing, and there were at least 148 glider casualties. During the operation 987 sorties were flown, 407 gliders towed, and 9,000 airborne personnel carried, along with 221 jeeps, 213 artillery pieces, 4,938 pounds of bombs, 759,112 rounds of ammunition, 56,896 pounds of rations, and 744,831 pounds of miscellaneous materiel. On D-Day, D plus one, and D plus two over 287 tons of supplies were dropped by parachute; but because of wind conditions and lack of sufficient time to search the area thoroughly, only 40 percent was found.

The mission of the airborne operation was successfully accomplished, and prior to H-Hour the rear of the assault beaches was secured. On 16 August Major General John K. Cannon, Commanding General

of Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force, evaluated the operation as follows:

> Your troop carrier people put up a grand show yesterday. Your troop carrier units were equally responsible together with other organizations of the Tactical Air Force in making the air part of this operation so successful.



D DAY ON A ROAD IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

". . . While the transports and landing craft were approaching the beaches, the enemy in the assault area was cut off from his reinforcements . . . the mission of the airborne operation was successfully accomplished . . ."

With the exception of the operation of the French Marines at Theoule-sur-Mer all pre-H-Hour activities were successful. While the transports and landing craft were approaching the beaches, the enemy in the assault area was cut off from his reinforcements, and his defenses were pounded and seriously damaged. There was a feeling among enemy officers that they were deliberately left to their fate.

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CHAPTER VI

The VI Corps Assault

The VI Corps convoys arrived in the assault area on 15 August 1944 according to plan. To organize and accommodate such a large assembly



GENERAL VIEW OF ST. TROPEZ HARBOR

". . . the VI Corps convoys arrived in the assault area on 15 August 1944 according to plan . . ."

of ships, the sea off the assault area was divided into two zones, one for fire support ships and the other for naval transports. Following behind the minesweepers, the fire support ships moved to within two miles of

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the shore and opened fire on the beach defenses in the 45 mile area from Cape Negre on the west to the Gulf of Napoule on the east. The ships continued to fire on the beach defenses as they moved in. Behind this shield of naval armor and protecting gunfire, the transports assembled and began debarking their troops into hundreds of small landing craft. The awaiting troops watched the naval guns shell the beaches and saw the bombers drop their loads without encountering any enemy air opposition. Landing craft then made their way toward the smoking beaches in prescribed lanes between battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. As the assault craft approached shore, naval fire shifted to the flanks of the beaches.

The VI Corps Mission

The United States VI Corps, commanded by Major General Truscott, had been assigned the mission of assaulting simultaneously the beaches from Cape Cavalaire to Agay. The Corps was to establish a beachhead, and to advance rapidly inland to contact other friendly forces and secure airfield sites. The tactical plan called for employing three divisions abreast to destroy enemy beach defenses and to advance rapidly inland in order to extend the beachhead to the "Blue Line". Contact was to be made with the Airborne Task Force in the interior and other forces on either flank. The 3rd Infantry Division (Alpha Force) was assigned to the left flank, from Cape Cavalaire to the Cape of St. Tropez, including the town of St. Tropez. The 45th Division (Delta Force) was to assault the center of the invasion area, from the Cape of St. Tropez eastward to Point Alexandre, including the town of Ste. Maxime. The 36th Infantry Division (Camel Force) was to land and advance on the right flank, from Point Alexandre to the Agay Region. In the Camel area was the important Camel Red Beach, near the town of St. Raphael, and nearby was the road junction and airport at Frejus. The "Blue Line" was a tactical boundary drawn as an arc from Cape Leoube, approximately ten miles west of Cape Negre, the western flank of the assault area, cutting through Collobrieres, Le Cannet des Maures, Trans-en-Provence, and Bagnols-en-Foret to the sea at Theoule-sur-Mer, on the extreme eastern flank of the VI Corps area. This line delimited a beach-


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head approximately 45 miles long, 20 miles deep, well established on high ground and including suitable terrain for air strips. The divisions were to advance beyond the "Blue Line" on Corps order.

Alpha Force



MAJ. GEN. JOHN. W. O'DANIEL
"... to capture St. Tropez ..."

On the left flank the 3rd Infantry Division, under the command of Major General O'Daniel, was to assault Alpha Red Beach (Beach 259, on the Bay of Cavalaire) and Alpha Yellow Beach (Beach 261, on the Bay of Pampelonne), in order to overcome enemy resistance and to capture the town of St. Tropez. After the St. Tropez peninsula had been cleared, the 3rd Division was to assist the 45th Division in clearing Beach 262, then advance rapidly west and southwest along the coast to contact the French Groupe de Commandos (Romeo Force), and to reach the "Blue Line" on the extreme western flank.

From 0710 to 0745 hours on D-Day, while the bombardment was still in progress, shallow minesweepers cleared boat lanes from 1,500 yards to within 100 yards of the beaches. To clear the last 100 yards of underwater obstacles, 18 drone boats were sent forward and all but three detonated properly. One got out of control and headed back toward the fleet. It exploded soon afterwards and damaged a naval vessel. From 0750 to 0758 hours naval craft poured rockets and inshore fire into the beaches. A dense, even pattern of fire on shore was reported by the first assault wave as troops came in under cover of the barrage.

At 0800 hours the 7th Infantry Combat Team struck Alpha Red Beach and the 15th Infantry Combat Team landed on Alpha Yellow Beach. Included with each regimental combat team was a smoke detail from the 3rd Chemical Battalion, four amphibious tanks from the 756th Tank Battalion, four tank destroyers from the 601st Tank

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Destroyer Battalion, Naval Shore Fire Control Parties, and a section of the 36th Combat Engineers. Among the first to land was a specially-formed Battle Patrol of 154 men to be employed on special missions.

The 7th Infantry landed with the 3rd Battalion on the left, the 2nd Battalion on the right, and the 1st Battalion in reserve. Offshore this force had encountered rows of concrete tetrahedrons with encased tellermines. Several small landing craft were blown up, and 60 casualties resulted. The demolition crews began immediately to clear the way for other landing craft. About 2,000 yards from the beaches, amphibious tanks were launched from LCTs. Of the four at Alpha Red Beach three got ashore and supported the infantry, but the fourth was struck by a naval rocket falling short, and the tank commander was killed. Subsequently the tank was sunk near the shore by an underwater mine.

As the infantry moved over the beach, it encountered no enemy fire; but wooden box mines and wire slowed the advance. At 0825 hours the enemy came out of bomb shelters and opened fire with small arms and mortars on the right flank. However, amphibious tanks, tank destroyers, and howitzers that had landed from DUKWs were in position to meet this fire; and the 7th Infantry continued to advance inland against scattered and light opposition. The first prisoners seemed dazed and well shaken up by the preliminary bombardment.

Battle patrols had been sent out on the flanks as the remainder of the regiment moved over the beach. While the infantry silenced enemy small arms fire, the engineers were clearing lanes for vehicles through the mine fields and wire. This action progressed rapidly; at 0850 hours the violet smoke signal was given, signifying that enemy beach defenses were neutralized and that the division reserve, the 30th Regimental Combat Team, could land. Within ten minutes the 30th Infantry was landing and moving forward through the right flank of the 7th Regimental Combat Team.

Eight successive waves had now landed on schedule at Alpha Red Beach, and the beachhead was being steadily enlarged. Supported by tanks and tank destroyers, the two regimental combat teams moved

rapidly inland on both flanks. The 7th Infantry turned westward; its 3rd Battalion advanced along the coastal road and cleared the town of Cavalaire-sur-Mer. By 1330 hours 3rd Battalion troops had reached a road block in the vicinity of Cape Negre held by the French Commandos. By this time the 2nd Battalion, on the right, had advanced through the town of La Croix to its first objective, the high ground along the road two miles north of the town. When relieved by the 30th Regimental Combat Team at 1430 hours, the 2nd Battalion turned and advanced southwest toward La Mole and Highway 98, following the 1st Battalion.

The 1st Battalion had been released from reserve on the beach about noon; it advanced inland about four miles to reach Highway 98 and moved west along the highway to La Mole, passing through the town about dark. At dawn on 16 August the battalion encountered an enemy outpost. Company A began firing on hostile machine gun positions, while C Company turned into the woods south of the highway and opened up against the enemy with mortars. Resistance was quickly overcome, and the battalion proceeded to a road junction about 1,000 yards away, where the enemy was again contacted. Tanks and tank destroyers were sent forward in an effort to draw fire and thus discover the enemy positions. The Germans were apparently well dug-in on the high ground beyond the road junction. The 1st Battalion fought all day on 16 August with all its companies committed. Supporting weapons, including artillery, had to be employed before enemy resistance was broken early the following morning by the coordinated efforts of the 1st and 2nd Battalions.

After passing the 1st Battalion and the enemy road block, leading elements of the 2nd Battalion, riding on tanks and tank destroyers, were met near St. Honore by members of the French Forces of the Interior who stated that a battalion of the enemy was in position three-quarters of a mile east of the village. The infantry dismounted; tanks and tank destroyers were ordered to deploy and lead the advance toward the strongpoint. About 1600 hours on 17 August contact was made and an enemy antitank gun knocked out. One platoon of E Company aided by several members of the French Forces of the Interior,

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then advanced on the gun emplacement and captured 25 prisoners.

Meanwhile the other platoons of E Company deployed and moved up to the high ground south and east of the village. Here they encountered about 75 well-entrenched enemy. After a quick battalion reconnaissance, G Company was ordered to move around the left flank and attack enemy positions from the south. Tanks and tank destroyers fired on the hill-mass preparatory to the attack. This, coupled with E Company's threat to his rear, caused the enemy to start abandoning his prepared positions. The attack was pressed by both companies and the village occupied and the road cleared.

By dark on the evening of D-Day the 7th Regimental Combat Team held a line from the coast west of Cape Negre six miles inland to the La Mole area. Little resistance was encountered during the morning, but at 2400 hours the advance along the coastal road was brought to a standstill by an enemy strongpoint two miles west of Cape Negre. Here the 3rd Battalion encountered a road block of pillboxes protected by mines and wire, covered by three antitank guns, six or eight machine guns, and riflemen. Although tanks and tank destroyers were brought up to fire on the block and two companies succeeded in outflanking it on the north and attacking it from the rear, the enemy continued to hold.

The attacking forces were also under fire during the night from enemy coastal guns further west in the area of La Fossette and Le Lavandou. To silence these batteries, the French Commandos, now under 3rd Division control, were sent around the roadblock to clear the Cape Benat peninsula of enemy forces. The following day the Commandos captured the batteries after a stiff fight, and the Americans were able to reduce the strongpoint at Point de la Et. During this action K and L Companies bore the brunt of the fighting. K Company made a wide flanking movement and took the enemy positions from the rear. Both companies used hand grenades and rifle fire to dislodge the enemy from pillboxes and dug-in positions.

The 3rd Battalion then continued west along the coastal road against only slight opposition, by-passing the 2nd Battalion as

it moved through St. Honore and north of La Londe les Maures. The French Commandos continued to mop up isolated enemy groups on the Cape Benat peninsula and then occupied Chateau de Leoube on the evening of D plus two.



A TANK TURRET SET IN CONCRETE AND USED AS A PILLBOX
". . . Both companies used hand grenades and rifle fire to dislodge the enemy from pillboxes and dug-in positions . . ."

On the right flank of the 3rd Infantry Division the 15th Regimental Combat Team landed at H-Hour over Alpha Yellow Beach and reduced all beach defenses within 40 minutes. The 2nd Battalion, 36th Engineers, immediately started clearing the beach of mines and laying beach pontoons for LST landings, since the gradient was too shallow for ships to come up to the beach. Of the four amphibious tanks supporting the assault, three landed safely and one was swamped by landing craft. Later another was disabled on the beach by a broken track. The infantry advanced inland against light small arms fire. The 1st Battalion cleaned out an enemy strongpoint on the northern portion


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of the beach and attacked inland some 5,000 yards to seize and occupy the high ground northeast of the town of Ramatuelle. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions moved to the north and northeast and quickly seized the high ground overlooking St. Tropez. The 2nd Battalion continued



A 3RD DIVISION BABY AIRCRAFT CARRIER IMPROVISED FROM LST-906
". . . a cub observation plane reported no enemy resistance or craft in the harbor of St. Tropez . . ."

to advance to the north and destroyed an enemy strongpoint on the western edge of the town. The 3rd Battalion moved up from the east.

Previously, at 0830 hours, a cub observation plane had reported no enemy resistance or craft in the harbor of St. Tropez. Later, word was sent by the French Forces of the Interior that the town was virtually clear and the populace would be glad to receive the Americans. At 1500 hours the 3rd Battalion, having reached the outskirts of St. Tropez, found American paratroopers and French Forces of the Interior assaulting the last enemy pocket of resistance in the Citadel. K Company joined in the attack. At 1830 hours this strongpoint fell and shortly afterwards

patrols of the 15th Infantry cleared the St. Tropez peninsula of enemy troops. After nightfall the regiment assembled west of St. Tropez and marched along roads already cleared of the enemy to Collobrieres on the "Blue Line".

While the 7th Infantry was moving west from Alpha Red Beach and the 15th Infantry was clearing the St. Tropez peninsula, the 30th Infantry, after landing at H plus one and passing through the 7th, swept inland toward Cogolin and Grimaud. By forced marches and riding infantry on tanks and tank destroyers, the 30th Regimental Combat Team moved rapidly forward to occupy these towns. At 2100 hours on D-Day its patrols contacted the 157th Infantry of the 45th Division between Grimaud and Les Cadelons. The right flank of the Alpha area was now considered secure and the entire regiment was only temporarily interrupted in its advance by sniper fire and token enemy resistance. On 16 August the towns of La Garde Freinet and Les Mayons were taken, and a line was established between Gonfaron and Collobrieres on the tactical "Blue Line".

By 1200 on D-Day the assault units of the 3rd Infantry Division had reached their initial beachhead line and were advancing toward primary objectives on the "Blue Line". Meanwhile, unloading over the beaches was proceeding at a fairly satisfactory rate, although it was hampered by off-shore bars on Alpha Yellow Beach and beach mines and obstacles on Alpha Red Beach. Aided by a tank-dozer and a tank-scarifier, the engineers cleared mines from Alpha Red Beach, where explosives were thickly planted, particularly on the northern half. Naval demolition parties worked at the task of blasting out piling on Alpha Yellow Beach and tetrahedrons on Alpha Red Beach. Infantry and engineer minesweeping squads cleared exits to permit traffic in and out. Heavily mined areas extended generally no farther than 500 yards back of the beaches, and inland roads were virtually mine-free. During the morning of D-Day the beaches were occasionally shelled, but this ceased as the infantry advanced. There was no enemy air activity in the Alpha area.

Beach groups were slow to react to unexpected difficulties in unloading. Toward the end of D-Day they were reorganized in accord-

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ance with changes in plan, and unloading was somewhat accelerated. The supply plan was based on five bulk-loaded LCTs averaging 130 tons each, ten Liberty ships carrying 1,000 tons each, and nine DUKWs, each with three tons of supply, combat-loaded on Liberty ships.

Three-quarters of the supplies loaded on LCTs consisted of ammunition, since it was anticipated that the assault would require a maximum of ammunition and a minimum of gasoline. However, the immediate breakthrough and rapid advance against light resistance altered these anticipated requirements. Gasoline very quickly became a critical item.

By 1400 hours all Alpha Yellow Beach landing craft were completely unloaded and combat loaders ten percent discharged, but on Alpha Red Beach the vast number of mines had delayed operations. After several disastrous encounters with mines all unloading over Red Beach was suspended until the beach could be cleared. Initially, the landing of DUKWs was delayed half an hour by small arms and mortar fire from isolated pockets on the beach, and later the total number available was found to be insufficient for handling the quantity of tonnage necessary in the rapid advance. The failure of small craft commanders to obey signals from beach groups resulted in landings at improper spots, where deep water drowned out vehicles.

Late in the afternoon of D-Day, difficulties in the complicated line of supply, from ships to shore to troops, began to straighten out. By H plus 20 hours all small craft except five LCTs were completely discharged. However, the unloading of ocean-type ships lagged far behind schedule, because all Liberty ships arrived at the transport area late. Seven of the ten Liberty ships due at noon on D-Day arrived at noon of D plus one and three not until the forenoon of D plus two. In spite of these difficulties approximately 15,900 men, 2,150 vehicles, and 225 long tons of supplies were unloaded during D-Day over beaches in the Alpha assault area. The 36th Engineer Beach Group established depots for the various classes of supplies and equipment, opened roads between the depots and the beaches, and controlled the enormous flow of traffic which poured inland.

To conceal these operations from possible enemy observation 640 smoke pots were fired on the Alpha beaches during the first three hours after the landing. As enemy resistance quieted, the smoke detail regrouped its smoke pots to be used in case of enemy air attack.

On 16 and 17 August the unloading over the beaches proceeded more rapidly, and a steady stream of supplies came in to support the advancing troops. By 1800 hours on 17 August some 48,198 men, 6,438 vehicles, and 1,060 tons of cargo had been landed and moved over the beach. Although Alpha Green Beach (260) was cleared and opened, the exits were found to be heavily mined. After D-Day the greater part of the unloading took place over Alpha Red Beach, since mines and obstacles had been successfully cleared. Statistics at the close of D-Day showed that there had been 203 casualties on Alpha Red Beach and 61 on Alpha Yellow Beach, a total of 264. This was far below expectation, considering the initial assault and constant flow of men and material. During D-Day 1,600 prisoners were taken by the 3rd Division; of this number 60 percent were non-German.

Delta Force



MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. EAGLES
". . . to land in the center . . ."

The 45th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Eagles, was to land in the center of the VI Corps assault area at H-Hour on D-Day. The mission of the Division was to clear all the assault beaches of enemy resistance and then to advance rapidly inland to gain contact with the paratroopers at Le Muy. On the west, contact was to be established with the 3rd Infantry and on the east with the 36th Infantry Division.

This section of the coast included beaches 262, 263, 263-A, 263-B, and 263-C. Beach 262 at the head of the Gulf of St. Tropez was topographically desirable for landing operations, but the flanks were considered too heavily fortified. Beach 263 at the town of Ste. Maxime

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was ruled out for similar reasons. The three small beaches selected for the 45th Infantry Division assault were approximately one mile east of the town of Ste. Maxime and lay along a curving bay between Cape Sardineau and Point Alexandre. On the left, Beach 263-A was divided into two zones of operation known as Delta Red and Delta Green. In the center, Beach 263-B was designated Delta Yellow, while the right flank beach, 263-C, was Delta Blue. The designated zone of operations for the Division was flanked by the 3rd Infantry Division on the left and the 36th Infantry Division on the right. The area extended inland 15 to 20 miles to the "Blue Line" at Le Luc and Le Muy, where the 1st Airborne Task Force had previously been dropped.



THE INVADING FORCES WADE IN TO THE BEACH
the 45th Infantry Division landed under almost ideal amphibious conditions . . .


For four hours prior to 0800, bombers and naval guns, covered the Delta beaches with a blanket of explosives. Small minesweepers came close inshore and swept the sea lanes to within 500 yards of the

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beach. Scout boats reported no underwater obstacles off shore; thus the employment of drone boats was not necessary. At 0749 hours, as the assault boats loaded with infantry gathered off shore, the Navy fired a ten minute rocket barrage which lifted just before the first wave of troops hit shore.

The 45th Infantry Division landed under almost ideal amphibious conditions with four battalions abreast. The 3rd Battalion, 157th Infantry, landed on Red Beach; the 1st Battalion, 157th Infantry, on Green Beach; the 2nd Battalion, 180th Infantry, on Yellow Beach; and the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, on Blue Beach. The remaining battalions of the two regiments followed as the regimental reserve. By



DUKWs ESTABLISHING POSITIONS ON "YELLOW BEACH"
". . . enemy resistance was light . . . there was no serious attempt to defend . . ."

0830 hours the situation was reported: "First three waves landed . . . per schedule. Slight hindrance by mines and underwater obstacles . . . . Enemy resistance light . . . ." Pre-H-Hour bombardment had destroyed

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
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or seriously damaged enemy beach defenses; and except for scattered small arms, mortar, and artillery fire there was no serious attempt to defend the beaches.

The 1st Battalion of the 157th Infantry cleared the beach area of enemy resistance and then moved inland approximately eight miles to assemble in the vicinity of Plan de la Tour. The 2nd Battalion, having followed the 1st ashore, spent the night in an assembly area near the beach and on the morning of 16 August moved to the town of Vidauban in the vicinity of the "Blue Line".

The 3rd Battalion, after having cleared the beach area, attacked toward Ste. Maxime, its first major objective. Civilians re-



CONCRETE PILLBOX BUILT OVER WATER STORAGE TANK

". . . held up by fire from a pillbox . . ."

ported that some 500 Germans had previously moved out at 0800 hours. However, when the advance elements of the 3rd Battalion, 157th Infantry, reached the outskirts of the town during the morning, they were

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held up by fire from a pillbox on the quay and from street barricades. Field artillery and tank destroyers were brought up and sharp fighting ensued.

Upon entering Ste. Maxime from the north, I Company ran into heavy small arms and machine gun fire. For the next two hours there was fierce house-to-house fighting, during which the company made extensive use of hand grenades in clearing up small pockets of resistance. After the main resistance was overcome, one platoon was dispatched to mop up the waterfront. However, two strong points, one in the Hotel du Nord and the other in the dock area, continued to hold out. K Company then joined I Company in a coordinated attack on the hotel. This center of resistance was reduced only after stiff hand-to-hand fighting, which resulted in the capture of 70 prisoners and many enemy dead.

The 3rd Battalion then continued along the coast to Beach 262, which was promptly mopped-up. At 2100 hours it made contact with advance elements of the 3rd Division which indicated that enemy resistance along the coast between the Alpha and Delta assault areas had now been cleared. The 3rd Battalion moved on the Plan de la Tour, where it joined the 1st Battalion and spent the night.

The 180th Regimental Combat Team had as its initial mission to land on Beaches 263-B and 263-C (Delta Yellow and Delta Blue), to clear all resistance from the high ground east and northeast of 263-C, to capture the village of Villepey, and to assist the 36th Division in clearing Beach 264-A (Camel Red Beach) at the base of the Argens River Valley. It was then to move rapidly to the "Blue Line" and gain contact with the paratroopers in the vicinity of Le Muy.

At Delta Blue Beach (263-C) the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, landed without opposition and had only slight difficulty in scaling the sea wall. However, the four amphibious tanks from the 191st Tank Battalion were put out of action by mines on the beach when they attempted to land abreast before lanes had been swept. On Delta Yellow Beach only one tank was lost, since a different strategy was followed. A single tank proceeded inland across the beach, while the others fired on targets

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from the waterline until a path was cleared. Later the personnel of the immobilized tanks procured standard tanks and continued in the advance.

After securing the beach the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, advanced east and north to the high ground overlooking St. Aygulf. Elements moving along the coast road drew heavy fire from enemy strongpoints, but tanks and tank destroyers were able to neutralize these defenses. By dark of D-Day the battalion had come up to the town of St. Aygulf, and at daylight the next morning the Battalion Commander ordered an attack. B Company moved up from the south and C Company, by means of a flanking movement, seized the high ground to the north. As the attack developed, B Company encountered stiff resistance and asked for tank as well as naval gunfire support. Two tanks were knocked out by enemy action, but the combined fire power of the company and its supporting elements finally drove the enemy from his positions. While this fight was in progress, B Company moved in and occupied St. Aygulf.

The 2nd Battalion, 180th Infantry, landed on Delta Yellow Beach (263-B), the Division center. Amphibious tanks began firing as soon as their tracks touched the ground. Four enemy pillboxes on the beach were immediately destroyed, but one tank was lost when it hit a mine. The battalion moved across the beach, suffering only four or five casualties, assembled, and then moved inland to high ground. During the afternoon the 2nd Battalion was ordered to advance north to Vidauban.

At H plus one the 3rd Battalion, 180th Infantry, landed on Delta Blue Beach (263-C), following the 1st Battalion. The 3rd Battalion advanced inland from the beach toward high ground. At first no contact was made with the enemy, but observers soon located Germans in vehicles and on bicycles moving toward a hill which dominated the area overlooking the Delta beaches. A running fight with small arms and mortars developed. The enemy was driven back, losing 12 killed and 30 captured; and the hill was occupied by dark of D-Day. Patrolling continued throughout the night of 15-16 August, and at daylight the battalion continued its advance toward Roquebrune.


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General Eagles, 45th Division commander, landed at 1100 hours on D-Day. Shortly afterwards the remaining regiment, the 179th Infantry, in reserve, debarked on Delta Green Beach (263-A) and assembled in the rear of the beach area. General Truscott, VI Corps Commander, came ashore during the afternoon. Since the other two regiments were making rapid progress against light resistance, the 179th did not see action until D plus one. The division advanced inland 15 August with comparative ease and rapidity. By 2300 hours reconnaissance troops had come within two miles of Le Muy and had contacted the airborne troops.

Personnel losses of the division during D-Day give an indication as to the ease with which the landing and initial advance were made. The 157th Infantry suffered 12 casualties, with only three of this number killed. The 180th Infantry had one officer and eight enlisted men killed and one officer and 48 enlisted men wounded. The 179th saw no action and suffered no losses. The total casualties for the entire division, including attached units, were two officers and 107 enlisted men. During the same period 205 prisoners were taken.

On D plus one the enemy was unable to take any kind of firm defensive action, and the 45th Division continued to advance. Except for small pockets of resistance consisting of antitank guns and uncoordinated infantry groups, there was no opposition of any importance.

The 40th Engineer Beach Group on the Delta beaches did not encounter the difficulties that were found on the Alpha beaches. The 1st Battalion Beach Group landed with the 157th Regimental Combat Team and initially operated Delta Red and Delta Green Beaches (263-A). Obstacles erected by the enemy to impede or prevent the advance of the infantry were quickly reduced. A line of concertina wire was gapped and a sea wall three feet thick breached. By the use of Navy pontoon causeways and five motorized cranes LCTs and LCMs were continuously unloaded, and this beach provided the principal source of supply for the 45th Division until D plus four. Immediately behind the beaches, dumps for all classes of supplies were established and operated. DUKWs were utilized until regular trucks became available, both for the unloading of ships and for land transportation.

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The 3rd Battalion Beach Group, supporting the 180th Regimental Combat Team, landed on Delta Yellow Beach (263-B) and Delta Blue Beach (263-C). Here the gradient was sufficient for landing craft to come directly up the beach so that unloading could be accomplished on dry ground. Limited supplies for the immediate support of the infantry were stored in dumps behind the beaches; but, since Delta Blue Beach was small with difficult exits, it was closed on D plus one after the opening of Beach 263 on the Gulf of St. Tropez.

At H plus 11 hours the 2nd Battalion Beach Group of the 40th Engineer Regiment landed behind schedule on Alpha Yellow Beach (261). The Beach Group assisted the 36th Engineers in clearing mines and booby traps from the area and then moved inland to arrive at Beach 262 and St. Tropez. Battalion troops cleared the port of St. Tropez and opened berthing space for seven LCTs. After clearing lanes through a mine field behind Beach 262 to the west of St. Tropez, they opened berthing space for six LCMs, 19 LCIs, five LCTs, and a solid landing lane for DUKWs. This beach, now designated Delta Red Beach number 2, had the largest capacity in the area with dumps and depots conveniently located nearby.

During D-Day alone more than 33,000 troops and 3,000 vehicles were unloaded over the Delta beaches, the only hindrance being scattered mortar fire during the morning. On D plus one the enemy attempted to interfere with unloading operations, when a flight of five Ju 88s dropped antipersonnel bombs in the vicinity of Ste. Maxime. Antiaircraft units destroyed one of these raiders and drove the others off. However, some casualties were caused by the bombers.


A landing strip for artillery observation planes was rapidly constructed on the beach by the 120th Engineer Combat Battalion. Other engineer troops cleared and widened supply roads, removed mines, filled craters, blasted obstacles, and built other landing strips on the St. Tropez peninsula to make the area into a suitable base for handling supplies. By evening of D plus two these improvised ports had landed 53,360 troops and 6,818 vehicles and had handled 5,172 tons of miscellaneous supplies.

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At the close of D plus one the 45th Division had finished mopping up enemy resistance in the Delta area and had reached all points on the "Blue Line". All the Division's missions had been accomplished and 929 prisoners taken. Three officers and 229 enlisted casualties were reported. Contact with the other divisions on the flanks was being maintained, and the 1st Airborne Task Force was met in the interior. All Delta beaches were cleared and operating effectively. The Seventh Army's center was secure and the build-up progressing satisfactorily.

Camel Force



MAJ. GEN. JOHN E DAHLQUIST
securing the right flank

The 36th Infantry Division, Camel Force, commanded by Major General Dahlquist, had the initial mission of securing the right flank of the invasion beaches. The designated Camel area extended from St.Aygulf Point on the right flank of the 45th Division area along the coast line to Theoule-sur-Mer on the Gulf of Napoule. Inland it stretched 20 miles along the right bank of the Argens River, including the important road junction and town of Frejus, Puget-sur-Argens, and Le Muy; and on the right the high ground of the Esterel Forest. The coastal area included the spacious, sandy, but heavily fortified, Beach 264-A at the mouth of the Argens River. This beach was designated Camel Red Beach, and plans called for its reduction at H plus six by land assault from the rear and frontal assault by sea. Camel Green Beach (264-B) lay to the west of Cape Drammont and was considered large enough only for initial operations. Camel Yellow Beach (265) on the Rade d'Agay was also scheduled for reduction from the rear. On the extreme right flank of the invasion coast Camel Blue Beach (265-A) at an inlet near Point Antheor was small and not well suited for major landing operations.

Although the Camel assault area was considered to be strategically important because it offered a suitable entrance into the interior

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by way of the Argens River Valley, it nevertheless presented certain obstacles. The principle beach, 264-A, at the mouth of the Argens River, was considered too strongly fortified for an initial assault and therefore was not used. The other two beaches were small and could hardly be called beaches in the technical sense of the word. They consisted of narrow strips of rocky shale between the water and steep embankments.

The initial mission of the division was to assault Camel Green Beach (264-B) and Camel Blue Beach (265-A) and to make a land assault on Camel Red Beach (264-A) at Z-Hour (H plus six) from each flank. The division was then to seize Agay, St. Raphael, and Frejus and push inland to Le Muy. It was also to be responsible for protecting the right flank of the assault area by establishing a defensive line from Fayence to La Napoule in the mountainous terrain west of Cannes. On 20 August this force was to be relieved by the 1st Airborne Division. At the same time the 36th Infantry Division was to be prepared to advance on Corps order to the northwest after reaching the "Blue Line" in zone.

Because of the limited sizes of the beaches selected for the initial assault, plans called for a landing of two battalions of the 141st Regimental Combat Team abreast on Camel Green Beach and the other battalion on Camel Blue Beach. The mission of the 141st Infantry was to destroy the enemy force occupying the area around the Rade d'Agay and then move north to a line generally west through Theoule-sur-Mer. The regiment was to protect the right flank of the division until relieved by the 1st Airborne Task Force. Initially the 143rd Infantry was to land over the beaches cleared by the 141st, pass through the 141st Infantry, and continue on its mission of clearing the coast and capturing the town of St. Raphael. The 142nd Infantry Regiment was to land over beaches cleared by the 141st in the event that landings at St. Raphael were impossible.

The Camel convoy arrived in the transport zone in the early morning of 15 August. For over an hour the Navy had been shelling the beaches from battleships and cruisers. The scheduled bombing of the beaches by the Air Corps had to be partially cancelled because of

overcast weather along the coast. Shallow-draft minesweepers swept lanes to within 500 yards of Camel Green and Blue Beaches, and small boats acting as markers took up positions along these cleared lanes. Assault troops crouched low in their landing craft as boat serials formed and headed for the shore. Ahead of the first wave were rocket ships mounting tiers of rocket launchers. As these drew within firing range of the beach, they discharged their rockets in the defenses.

Advancing at full speed, the assault craft approached the beaches in the immediate wake of the rocket ships. At H-Hour the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 141st Infantry, grounded their landing craft on the rocky shale of Camel Green Beach; the troops rushed forward in the face of slight machine gun, small arms, and antiaircraft fire. At almost the same time the 1st Battalion struck Camel Blue Beach under concentrated enemy fire. The Germans directed the fire of their antitank guns upon the assault boats and made several direct hits, causing casualties.

At 0805 hours elements from the 753rd Tank Battalion with eight amphibious tanks were floated 4,000 yards offshore from Camel Green Beach. As they came under heavy fire from the beach, a German antitank gun damaged the canvas of one, flooding the engine compartment. However, the tank was close enough to shore to get in without sinking. After beaching, the other tanks moved inland to positions 600 yards from the beach. As enemy opposition had almost ceased in the area, the amphibious tanks were stripped of flotation equipment and made ready for cross-country fighting.

The 2nd Battalion, 141st Infantry, after clearing the right half of Camel Green Beach, attacked north to swing around the coastal road and make contact with the 1st Battalion, which had landed successfully on Camel Blue Beach. A road block was placed across the coastal highway, and the high ground northwest of the Rade d'Agay occupied. By 1000 hours the village of Drammont and the cape south of it had been taken. Two hours later the battalion was attacking from the southwest in the direction of the village of Agay.

During the night of 15-16 August the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry, made a slow advance along the coast road toward Theoule,

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since it was retarded by numerous pillboxes which had to be reduced. On the following day it captured Theoule-sur-Mer, moved north along the highway during the evening, destroyed road and railway bridges, and established a defensive position near La Napoule. That afternoon they had found the survivors of the French Marine demolition group (Rosie Force) and evacuated their wounded.


Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion, 141st Infantry, had cleared the left half of Camel Green Beach, destroyed all enemy strong points on the western end, and advanced down the coastal road 400 yards to establish a roadblock and occupy high ground overlooking the beach. Thus the 141st Infantry, now in strength and supported by tanks, tank destroyers, and artillery, had reduced the fortifications of the Agay area and had moved rapidly north and northeast toward its major objective; to establish and defend roadblocks, one north of Theoule-sur-Mer on the coastal highway and another west of Le Planestel, midway on the highway between Frejus and Cannes.

The 143rd Regimental Combat Team landed over Camel Green Beach in a column of battalions, 1st Battalion at 0945 hours, 2nd Battalion at 1000 hours, and 3rd Battalion at 1035 hours. The 1st Battalion moved forward to occupy high ground northwest of the beach. When relieved by the 3rd Battalion, the 1st moved toward the northwest of St. Raphael to assault the town. The 2nd Battalion moved up to attack the town from the east and with the aid of tanks and tank destroyers fought its way through a strongly fortified roadblock.

As a part of the mission of cleaning out the waterfront, E Company attacked from the rear 21 known enemy pillboxes, which were in position to fire into the harbor area. Meanwhile G and F Companies were working their way into St. Raphael from the southeast. Their attack was supported by naval gunfire and by several tanks and tank destroyers which had previously been attached to the 2nd Battalion.

The 142nd Regimental Combat Team was scheduled to make a delayed assault at Z-Hour (H plus six) over Camel Red Beach. This was to be the last and probably the most difficult assault in the entire

target area. The Navy reloaded rocket craft and prepared for a landing on the H-Hour scale. General Dahlquist had already gone ashore at 1000 hours.



COAST DEFENSE GUN AND CAMOUFLAGED BLOCKHOUSE ON CAMEL BEACH

. . . enemy pillboxes which were in position to fire into the harbor area . . .

The softening of Camel Red Beach was an important task and a heavy concentration of fire was brought to bear. At 1100 hours minesweepers moved forward to sweep lanes through the Gulf of Frejus; but as they approached the beach, they were heavily shelled and forced to retire. It was apparent that the beach needed more softening, and a flight of 93 B-24s came over the beach and dropped 187 tons of bombs. Fifteen minutes later the minesweepers started back toward the beach. At 1700 yards offshore they met a heavy artillery barrage but with difficulty managed to sweep to within 500 yards of shore. Naval fire support ships then took over and hammered the defenses with shell fire.

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Under this covering fire two demolition units with scout boats and 12 explosive drones were sent in. These also met heavy enemy fire.

Meanwhile the 142nd Infantry, in more than 100 assault craft, waited for the signal to land. At two minutes before Z-Hour the rocket ships let go their fire on the beach, but still no orders came to attack. It became apparent that something had gone wrong with the radio-controlled drone boats. Only three had exploded as planned, two grounded on the beach without exploding, one circled off the beach out of control, one exploded on the extreme left flank, two were boarded and put out of action, and one was sunk by gunfire from a destroyer when it reversed course and endangered the assembled assault boats. Two drones were never released because of the fear that they might run wild. It was now after 1400 hours, and the infantry was still waiting to come in.

The Beach Assault Commander radioed a report of the situation to Rear Admiral Lewis, commander of Task Force 87, and recommended that the assault be carried out at 1430 hours. The Admiral, however, ordered that the alternate plan of landing over Camel Green Beach be put into effect. The change in plan was relayed to the assault boats by radio and megaphone, and the fleet of small craft turned right to land the entire regiment over Camel Green Beach without loss. The above decision was made without the knowledge of General Dahlquist, who could not be reached on shore in time; but at 1740 hours he sent the following message to Admiral Lewis:

> I appreciate your prompt action in changing plan when obstacles could not be breached. Expect to take Red Beach tonight, no matter how late. Opposition irritating but not too tough so far.

The chief objective of the 142nd Regimental Combat Team was to take the town of Frejus by night of D-Day. The delay in landing plus the ten-mile march from Camel Green Beach to the Frejus area put the regiment behind schedule. Moving out from the beach after its landing at 1532 hours, the 1st Battalion took the lead and advanced along the railroad to Agay, where it turned west astride a secondary road and headed toward Frejus. Flank guards of company strength were out on either side to comb the wooded hills, while a platoon of four tanks

spearheaded the column on the road. The 2nd Battalion and 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry followed as the main body.

The march was unopposed, but two small groups of enemy were cleaned out of resort hotels along the route. At nightfall the 1st Battalion, 142nd Infantry, reached the high ground northeast of Frejus. During the night of D-Day the regiment prepared for an assault on the town.

Elements of the 143rd Regimental Combat Team were by this time engaged at St. Raphael, the 3rd Battalion attacking from the right flank and the 2nd from the left. L Company, 3rd Battalion, became engaged in a fire fight with the enemy on high ground east of St. Raphael, while Companies I and K crossed the high ground to the northeast and closed in on the town. One enemy self-propelled gun opened up on the leading company, but was knocked out by a bazooka. Patrols reported enemy troops and guns inside St. Raphael. These troops were reinforcements being marched across the town from the northwest to try to stop the advance of the 2nd Battalion along the coast. Companies I and K continued to attack and engaged the enemy with small arms fire during the night of 15-16 August.

The next morning these two companies and two from the 2nd Battalion moved through St. Raphael clearing out most of the resistance. Meanwhile L Company overcame the enemy on the hill east of the town, taking 260 prisoners. By this time contact had been established by elements of the 45th and 36th Divisions, and their connecting flanks were secure.

The 1st Battalion, 143rd Infantry, had moved northwest around St. Raphael and joined the 3rd at the road junction north of town. The two battalions moved out on D plus one to clean up Camel Red Beach and the airport; they captured several high ranking enemy officers and much materiel. Prior to this time the 2nd Battalion, supported by tanks and tank destroyers, had completed the mopping up of the St. Raphael area.

The 142nd Infantry Regiment was at the same time engaged in the battle for Frejus. During the night of D-Day the 3rd Battalion

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had passed through the 1st, moved on to Highway Seven at Camp Gallieni, and sent advance patrols into Frejus. At daylight street fighting broke out. Company L led 3rd Battalion attacks, as stubborn enemy opposition was overcome during the morning. Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion, following the 3rd, had stirred up a strongpoint of resistance at Camp Gallieni. A storm of flares, small arms fire, and mortar fire broke out from the heights. Elements of the regiment were engaged at Camp Gallieni during most of D plus one, and the 2nd Battalion pushed west to its original objectives, high ground south of Camp des Cais and the Camp itself, to secure the area northwest of Frejus. By mid-afternoon on 16 August enemy resistance in the entire Frejus area was



TROOPS OF THE 36TH DIVISION ENTERING FREJUS 16 AUGUST

". . . at daylight streetfighting broke out . . . . . By midafternoon the troops were mopping up . . ."

broken; the rest was mopping-up. The battalions, having completed their various assigned missions, assembled west of Frejus and moved to Puget.

The 3rd Battalion, 142nd Infantry, entered Puget late in the afternoon of D plus one and before nightfall had run into an enemy antitank strongpoint 1,200 yards beyond the town. During the night strong naval gunfire aided the artillery in shelling the position. An American paratrooper taken prisoner by this enemy group managed to escape during the shelling and, on reaching the American lines, reported that most of the enemy had spiked their guns and fled. On the morning of 17 August the Regimental Combat Team shuttled by battalions through Le Muy (which had been previously taken by the 509th Paratroopers) and arrived at Trans-en-Provence, the division zone on the "Blue Line".

The assault landing of the 36th Division had been successfully accomplished, although an alternate plan had been used. Casualty rates were low and the advance rapid, in spite of many doggedly defended strongpoints and roadblocks. By D plus two the division had cleared the Camel beaches and advanced to the Corps-designated "Blue Line", driving the enemy from a stretch of the coast which included the largest town and most important road junction in that target area.

Unloading operations on the Camel beaches during D-Day took place primarily on only one beach. In the initial landing on Camel Green Beach a small party from the 540th Engineer Beach Group came in with the first wave of infantry to reconnoiter the beach area. Largely because of the stony nature of the beach no mines were found, and no Sommerfelt matting was deemed necessary. Work was immediately begun on the construction of a two-lane exit on the right flank of the beach. Half an hour later, when the beach obstacle team and mine clearing detail landed, they were put to work on road construction, since there was no demolition work to be done. The engineer weapons sections assisted the infantry in reducing enemy resistance on the flanks. In spite of periodic shellings by enemy guns, the unloading of ships progressed satisfactorily. Battalion after battalion landed dry and passed over the beach.

During D-Day Camel Green Beach was perhaps the busiest place on the entire invasion coast. There were not only more troops landing in a smaller area than elsewhere, but there was also considerable air and ground resistance. At 2043 hours four enemy DO 217s

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approached the Camel area at 15,000 feet. After circling they descended to about 8,000 feet and dropped their bombs. One glider bomb destroyed an LST 600 yards offshore, resulting in 40 casualties and the loss of vehicles and ammunition.

During D-Day initial depots and supply dumps were temporarily established near Camel Green Beach. More than 2,790 vehicles and 17,390 troops were debarked. The 56th Medical Battalion, attached to the Beach Group, set up collecting, clearing, and aid stations, and evacuated 147 casualties that day. At the end of D-Day, military police had evacuated 94 prisoners to the far shore and were guarding many more in improvised pens.



EVACUATION OF WOUNDED FROM BEACH TO HOSPITAL SHIP
VIA LCVPs
". . . the beaches were soon neutralized and put into orderly, efficient operation . . ."


Unloading continued at Camel Green Beach, but it was not until D plus three that Camel Red Beach was finally cleared of mines

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and put into operation. Meanwhile Camel Green Beach continued to operate on a 24-hour basis and sent a steady flow of troops and supplies inland, at the same time evacuating prisoners and casualties to the ships. At the close of D-plus-two more than 5,000 vehicles and 30,000 troops had landed, and over 2,800 prisoners and 800 casualties had been evacuated.

The Initial Objective Achieved

The assault on the southern coast of France had been a complete success. At the close of D-Day all the combat elements of VI



OVER-RUNNING GERMAN COASTAL DEFENSES

". . . the assault on the southern coast of France was a complete success. At the close of D Day all the combat elements of VI Corps had landed, and the exploitation of a weak and confused enemy was in rapid progress . . ."

Corps had landed, and the exploitation of a weak and confused enemy was in rapid progress. By midnight 15 August 2,041 prisoners of war

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had been taken, and corps casualties had been almost negligible. The enemy could offer only scattered resistance. The German Air Force had been weak and ineffective. Enemy reinforcements never arrived in the



D DAY CASUALTIES: A GERMAN SOLDIER, A FRENCH WOMAN, A U. S. SERGEANT

". . . the assault casualties were almost negligible . . ."

beach area, and no large scale counter-attacks were launched. The three divisions advanced inland according to plan, already ahead of their time schedule.

During D-Day the Seventh Army Command Post continued operation aboard ship. At 1100 hours on 16 August General Patch, Vice Admiral Hewitt, and Admiral Lemmonier, the French Naval Commander, went ashore from the USS *Catoctin* to visit VI Corps Headquarters.

After an inspection of the Alpha area, the Seventh Army Commander returned aboard ship and conferred with General Wilson

and Admiral Cunningham. They assured him of all possible support from Theater resources. During the afternoon of D plus one General Patch conferred with Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Admiral Hewitt, and Admiral Lemmonier aboard the USS *Wakefield* and later went ashore to visit the Camel area. Accompanied by General Dahlquist, he drove through the newly-liberated towns of St. Raphael and Frejus. There were numerous demonstrations of joy by the French population.

Seventh Army Headquarters debarked during the afternoon of D plus one and established its initial command post in a resort hotel west of St. Tropez. At the first staff conference ashore, held at 1400 hours on 17 August, the Chief of Staff announced plans for changes in



AN AMERICAN PATROL MOVING THROUGH ST. RAPHAEL

". . . in many ways the operation exceeded even the most optimistic expectations . . . Three divisions were already ahead of their time schedule . . ."

shipping priorities after D plus 20, in order to bring in more rapidly new units which could assist in the full exploitation of a confused enemy. After the conference General Somervell and Mr. Patterson, Assistant

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Secretary of War, arrived at Army Headquarters and conferred with General White, the Chief of Staff.

The assault phase of the invasion was now complete. The combat battalions, marching as rapidly as possible and riding on tanks, tank destroyers, and ammunition trucks, reached their designated positions in the "Blue Line" zone. Supplies were arriving steadily;



AN ANTI-TANK WALL ON THE BEACH NEAR ST. RAPHAEL

". . . whatever plans the enemy may have had for defending the invasion coast were not effectively put into execution . . ."

Seventh Army took over supply functions from the sub-task forces, and the Beach Control Group came into being. The enemy clung to some fortified points and fought stubbornly, but the Americans crushed him and continued their advance. During the assault phase the operation had gone "according to plan", but in many ways it had exceeded even the most optimistic expectations. Whatever plans the enemy may have had for defending the invasion coast were not effectively put into execution.

Before midnight of 16-17 August telephonic instructions were issued by the Corps commander to the 3rd, 36th, and 45th Divisions to assemble various combat and service elements by 1600 hours on 17 August in the vicinity of Le Muy to form a provisional Armored Group (Task Force Butler). The time had arrived to exploit the initial advantage of the Seventh Army by a rapid movement inland.



GENERAL PATCH INSPECTING FFI MAQUIS IN ST. TROPEZ

". . . The time had arrived to exploit the initial advantage of the Seventh Army in a rapid movement inland . . ."

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
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CHAPTER VII

The Capture of Toulon and Marseille

THE rapid development of the beachhead in the Seventh Army's invasion of southern France and the scattered disposition of German troops indicated that coming operations for *DRAGOON* would be a pursuit, a race to the north up the Rhone Valley, an eventual junction with Allied forces in the Paris basin, and the entrapment of German forces pulling out of France. But before a full exploitation to the north could be realized it was essential to have the port cities of Marseille and Toulon. That was the mission assigned to the French army of General De Lattre De Tassigny with full Allied naval and air support.

French Army B

At 2000 hours on 16 August French units of the Seventh Army began landing over beaches already cleared by the American VI Corps in the St. Tropez-Cavalaire area. Army B, as the French forces were designated, was to move from its assembly area through VI Corps and advance rapidly to the west against Toulon and Marseille. It was necessary to maintain contact with VI Corps during the operation and to integrate timing as closely as possible with the American unit.

Army B was made up of two corps divided into seven divisions, two of which were armored. However, only II Corps with supporting troops would be available for early operations, since I Corps would not begin landing until D plus 20. The French II Corps had four divisions. The 1st Infantry and the 3rd Algerian Divisions came ashore on 16 August. One combat command of the 1st Armored Division came in the next day; another of its units, Combat Command Sudre, had landed on D plus 1 as an attachment to the American VI Corps. On 18 August

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the 9th Colonial Infantry Division, two groups of Tabors, and special troops began pouring over the beaches to give General De Lattre de Tassigny the major portion of his II Corps to maneuver against the enemy.

By this time most of the first echelon personnel, but only half the vehicles and heavy equipment had landed. In view of the developing situation, the Americans pushing ahead against relatively weak resistance and the slow progress of landing equipment, the French Commanding General decided to make certain modifications of pre-D-Day plans to expedite French participation in the overall Seventh Army picture. Troops were sent ahead to regroup in a forward area between La Mole and Collobrieres instead of waiting to assemble near the Cavalaire beaches.

The lay of the land between the beaches and Marseille influenced plans for attack. Wooded hills confined movement along two east-west roads. Highway 98 followed the coast from La Londe through Hyeres and Toulon to the great port city. The other axis passed through Collobrieres, Sollies-Pont, Le Camp, and Aubagne to Marseille. Various north-south roads linked these two lateral routes to permit the movement of troops from one to the other. Fortified heights north of the cities of Hyeres, Toulon, and Marseille were the main land defenses to be broken.

The enemy who had been unable to prevent the securing of a beachhead apparently could do little to contain it. However, by holding Toulon and Marseille it was possible at least to delay the exploitation of this initial success. It was expected that the German High Command would sacrifice its 242nd Division in Toulon and its 244th Division in Marseille to the last man to deny to Allied forces the use of modern deep water port facilities. Besides facing these two divisions the French command expected to meet elements of four others, including the mobile 11th Panzer Division coming from the Bordeaux-Toulouse area. The reoccupation of Toulon and Marseille would be a tremendous morale factor for the French and at the same time blast German hopes in southern France.

It remained for General De Lattre to convert strategy to tactics and for his troops to convert tactics to action. Outflanking and encirclement were the core of the tactical plan: first Hyeres, then Toulon, then Marseille. Speed and flexibility were means to the end. Army B was divided into five tactical groups. The first group, made up of the 1st Infantry Division reinforced by tank destroyer and engineer battalions, was to strike along the southern road toward Hyeres. The second group, the 3rd Algerian Division supported by tank destroyers, engineers, and Tabors of Goums, was to follow the northern road toward Toulon. The Goumiers are native troops from Morocco, organized into Goums which are similar to companies and Tabors which are similar to battalions. The third group, the 9th Colonial Infantry Division, reinforced by a tank destroyer battalion, was to support either of the first two. Elements of the 1st Armored Division and a regiment of Algerian Spahis made up the fourth group to which was assigned the mission of covering the northern flank of the assault area. A fifth group including a battalion of Senegalese riflemen, a Battalion de Choc, and the Groupe de Commandos, which was to return to Army B control on 21 August, would be employed for special missions.

Hyeres

On 19 August the 1st Infantry Division reinforced moved out of its forward assembly area along the coast road to Hyeres. As the troops approached the town, enemy fire from antitank guns within Hyeres and heavy shelling from larger caliber guns in the Maurettes Mountains brought the advance to a sudden halt. This hill mass north of Hyeres, dominated by Mt. Redon, blocked the coast road and was strongly fortified. One regimental combat team was detached from the main body and sent northward to infiltrate and encircle these positions. By 20 August Hyeres was cut off from the north and east.

To complete the isolation of the town the 9th Colonial Division had attacked the enemy from the Collobrieres approach to drive him from the north-south axis, Sollies-Pont to La Farlede. On 20 August resistance was encountered at Sollies-Pont, but the Colonials outflanked the town through woods to the north with a battalion of infantry supported by artillery and tanks. After a sharp conflict Sollies-Pont was occupied and the road south through La Farlede cleared of the enemy. Hyeres was then cut off on the northwest and effectually isolated.

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Meanwhile, the main body of the 1st Infantry Division pushed against Hyeres in a frontal assault from the east. The 4th Brigade attacked across the Gapeau River on the morning of 20 August but, after a slight penetration, was held up by heavy fire near the Golf Hotel north of the highway and on the outskirts of the city. Here the enemy had two antitank guns and three antiaircraft guns covering the eastern approaches. Infantry elements were withdrawn from the immediate area, and two battalions of 105mm and one battalion of 155mm artillery were ordered to neutralize the strongpoint.

At a point-blank range of less than 1,000 yards French artillery fired 1,000 rounds and registered more than 100 direct hits. In addition, Allied warships during the morning of 21 August fired over 200 shells into the town of Hyeres. One infantry battalion was now able to close in on the Golf Hotel. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting brought the battalion to within 50 yards of the strongpoint. At 1900 hours a bayonet charge was made in the face of heavy enemy fire and all resistance overcome. Many German dead were found and 140 prisoners taken.


As troops of the 1st Infantry Division passed through Hyeres on the Toulon road it was decided that one motorized battalion would be left behind to assist the French Forces of the Interior in mopping up isolated pockets. The rest of the division moved toward La Valette, where, with the 9th Colonial Infantry Division they could use similar technique and apply the same pressure against Toulon.

The island of Porquerolles southeast of Hyeres, and Giens, the long point of land reaching out toward the island, had been blasted by naval guns on 18, 19 and 21 August. The USS *Eberle* removed 140 Armenian prisoners from Porquerolles on 21 August and reported that a strongpoint of 150 Germans still remained. Two patrol boats guarded the island to prevent their escape. On the following day bombardment was continued. A white flag was raised on Porquerolles and at 1130 hours the USS *Omaha* accepted the surrender of the enemy garrison. Later the same day 190 Senegalese troops were landed as a detachment. The battery on Cap de l'Esterel, the eastern tip of the Giens Peninsula, remained active until 23 August when it also sent up a white flag. French troops were then landed on the peninsula against no resistance.

Toulon

The encirclement of Toulon had begun on 20 August, the day before the reduction of Hyeres. The 3rd Algerian Division and its supporting troops had left an assembly area near Collobrieres on 18 August and followed the inland route toward Marseille, by-passing to the north the town of Sollies-Pont, where the 9th Colonial Infantry Division engaged the enemy. By 19 August it had reached Meounes and split up into three groups.

The hills above Toulon rose in an arc, Mount Caumes north of the city dropping down south and a little east to Mount Faron, around



FORT de la CROIX FARON'S TYPICAL WINDING, HIGH WALLED WALKS
". . . all three heights, Caumes, Faron, and Le Coudon, had been made into heavily fortified strongpoints . . ."

which the suburbs of Toulon had crowded, stretching east and a little north to Le Coudon. The rim of the cup pushed the city against the bay. All three heights, Caumes, Faron, and Le Coudon, had been made

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into heavily fortified strongpoints. Besides these defenses north and east, St. Mandrier Peninsula south of the city bristled with guns.

The harbor defenses and the mountain strongholds were the outer ring of steel. The inner defenses of Toulon were also formidable. All approaches to the city were blocked by antitank obstacles, pillboxes, and mine fields. Defense zones had been set up with blockhouses and firing trenches well protected by wire and mines. All bridges and viaducts were prepared for demolition, and charges were placed in high earth banks to cause landslides. It was estimated that 60 heavy and 100 light guns were available to defend the city, and even guns from the sunken battleship *Province* were thought to have been moved ashore. Forts Ste. Catherine, d'Artigues, de Malbousquet, and Lamalgue among others within the city were known to be especially heavily fortified.

Near La Farlede the 9th Colonial Division had come under German artillery firing from Mt. Coudon. On 21 August the Groupe de Commandos, having returned to Army B control after the assault at Cap Negre and engagements west along the coast, and having approached against resistance by way of La Guiranne, moved forward to seize the heights of Le Coudon and destroy the enemy. Commando troops advanced toward their objective at 0800 hours and leading elements ran into small arms fire almost at once on the Coudon slopes. The ridge was fortified by five separate gun emplacements and a fort on the eastern peak. By noon one of the batteries had been overrun.

The 1st and 3rd Commandos, the assault battalions, came up against strong resistance at the Fort Est du Coudon. Close fighting continued for three hours during which time grenades and rocket guns hammered at the fort until it capitulated at 1700 hours. While the commandos were scaling the walls by rope to receive the surrender, Germans inside signaled by flare for their own artillery to begin firing. Heavy shells came in and caused several casualties among both captors and captured. After enemy firing had ceased, the commandos put a heavy mortar in position and were able to knock out two German 100 mm guns camouflaged in an orchard below.

After Mt. Faron had been taken by the Battalion de Choc on 22 August, the Groupe de Commandos moved out the following day

to mop up the area between the heights of Le Coudon and Mt. Faron. As troops made their way down the slopes, they heard firing back on the crest at Le Coudon. Apparently a group of Germans driven from La Valette by troops of the 9th Colonial Division were trying to infiltrate and recapture the fortifications. Orders were issued to hold Coudon at all costs, even at the expense of mopping up operations. The 2nd Commando Battalion was left to reinforce the 1st at the fort, while troops of the 3rd moved out on their original mission. On 24 August they drove the enemy from a series of rock quarries west of Le Coudon using mortar fire followed up by flame throwers. The defenders, fleeing toward La Valette, surrendered to the Senegalese.

In the meantime the 3rd Algerian Group north of Toulon had been subdivided into three smaller tactical groups named after their respective commanders, Linares, Bonjour, and Chapuis. Each had an average strength of about two battalions with attached reconnaissance elements. As the Algerian troops turned toward the enemy between the Meounes-Le Camp axis and the sea, the 1st Armored Division and supporting troops filled in on their north flank, pushed on toward Aix-en-Provence, and maintained liaison with the American 3rd Division.

Just west of Meounes the Linares group detached itself from the main body, turned south, and infiltrated through the Morieres Mountains to reach the village of Le Revest-les-Eaux. Here the watershed of the Morieres follows a deep gorge, the ravine of the Dardennes, which runs to the very heart of Toulon. This route was well defended by the dominating heights of Mt. Caumes to the northwest and Mt. Faron to the southeast. Colonel Linares' group, now reinforced by a Battalion de Choc, received orders from General De Monsabert, commander of the 3rd Algerian Division, to increase pressure on Toulon by reducing Faron heights.

This action was entrusted to the Battalion de Choc. The La Valette-Dardennes-Toulon road encircling Mt. Faron had already been cut by a roadblock set up near the Chateau de la Repelle; on 21 August Captain de Peretti de la Rocca had led Algerian troops against the German Chateau strongpoint and held the roadblock against two counterattacks. Mt. Caumes had been neutralized the same day by the 3rd

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Rifle Regiment of the Linares group. On 22 August the Battalion de Choc enveloped and climbed over Mt. Faron to capture the entire German garrison. Troops now filtered into Toulon through the Dardennes ravine. The enemy was surprised by this maneuver north of the city but lost no time in assembling his forces near the Poudriere (powder magazines) on the waterfront and launching violent counterattacks.

By the reduction of the three great mountain forts of Caumes, Faron, and Le Coudon the French had isolated Toulon from the north and had gained the topographical advantage of high ground looking down on the city. While this action was in progress, the 3rd Algerian Division minus the Linares group continued along the northern Marseille road through Signes and up to the nodal town of Le Camp by 20 August. Here the Germans blocked the north-south highway which led into the Toulon-Marseille coastal road. The Bonjour group was detached from the westward advance and sent to clear the roadblock. The detachment, then reinforced by a battalion of tank destroyers, pushed through Le Beausset to Ollioules in the suburbs of Toulon. The isolation of the city from the west became complete as soon as reconnaissance troops of the Bonjour group reached the sea at Bandol and placed tank destroyers across the coast road leading to Marseille.

By 23 August Toulon was actually under siege. Between 20 and 24 August the French had surrounded and isolated the city from three directions. The 9th Colonial Infantry Division and the Commandos had forced open the Sollies-Pont-La Farlede defile and occupied Le Coudon to make possible the westward advance of the 1st Infantry Division along the base of the Hyeres-La Farlede-La Valette triangle. On 23 August the 9th Colonial and the 1st Infantry Divisions ran up against the eastern gates of Toulon.

The German defenders of Toulon had received orders to fight to the last man. In spite of the hopelessness of their tactical situation the 242nd German Infantry Division resisted stubbornly and fanatically. From the four main bastions of Ste. Catherine, d'Artigues, de Malbousquet, and Lamague, within the city, the enemy directed well-aimed artillery and mortar fire against the attackers. Moreover, camouflaged blockhouses and pillboxes covered by well concealed mine fields made

infiltration tactics extremely difficult. Finally, 2,000 German sailors holding the St. Mandrier Peninsula engaged in heavy artillery duels with the French about the periphery of the city.

The complete occupation of Toulon required the combined efforts of the French Army, the XII Tactical Air Command, and the Western Naval Task Force. By land the French established a solid ring of six battalions of 155mm guns and an equal number of 105mm guns tight against Toulon. Observation posts on the heights above the city gave their fire great accuracy, and round after round crashed in on the defenders.



FORT D'ARTIQUES, TOULON

". . . round after round crashed in on the defenders . . ."

The air force had concentrated its bombing on the St. Mandrier Peninsula to knock out artillery installations and to cut off the enemy from the mainland. Beginning on 18 August bombers swarmed the Toulon area, as 91 B-26s blasted St. Mandrier. The next day 71 bombers

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returned with the same mission. On 20 August fighter-bombers continued the attack. Each carrying two 500 pound bombs, 121 P-47s hit the St. Mandrier installations, while B-26s dropped 161, 1,000 pound bombs. Enemy antiaircraft fire was accurate and intense; 28 aircraft were hit by flak and three destroyed. Good bomb patterns were achieved with possible direct hits. The next day planes sank small enemy craft in Toulon harbor. The XII Tactical Command returned to the Toulon area on 24 and 25 August to add a few final touches to the air bombardment pattern.

Meanwhile, the Western Naval Task Force gave support from the sea. On 19 August the FS *Lorraine*, USS *Nevada*, and USS *Augusta*, screened by smoke and covered by fighter planes, had fired 87 rounds on St. Mandrier and 124 rounds in Toulon with a direct hit on the French battleship *Strasbourg*. The attack was stepped up the following day; and enemy guns on St. Mandrier, at least one of the 340 mm size, shot back, firing about 60 rounds slowly and accurately at a 14 mile range. The FS *Fantasque* and FS *George Leygues* were hit by 155 mm shells, and the USS *Ericsson* was straddled. On 21 August coastal guns were less active, scoring near misses but no hits. The naval bombardment continued for eight successive days with rising intensity to the 26th of the month when cruisers closed to within five miles of the St. Mandrier fortress. All ships ceased fire at 1630 hours. Explosions and fires were observed. On 27 August a light bombardment on positions south of Toulon received no answering fire. The formal surrender of St. Mandrier the following day ended the resistance.

Through liaison shore groups, naval gun fire was also available to the advancing land forces for call on specific targets. The 1st Infantry Division moving up along the coast from Hyeres had met stubborn resistance at German pillbox positions on concentric defense lines from Le Mont des Oiseaux and San Salvador through Carqueiranne, Le Pradet, and La Garde, southeast of La Valette. The enemy defended fiercely, launching many counterattacks; and the French suffered heavy casualties. As division troops pushed on west, one battalion of the Foreign Legion besieged San Salvador for six hours on 22 August. Fire

from Allied warships was poured on the defenses. The battalion finally broke through and took seven officers and 340 enlisted men prisoner.

On the same day troops of the 9th Colonial Division were fighting at La Valette. The 6th Senegalese riflemen, led by Chef de Bataillon de Saint Germain, stormed the redoubt at La Platriere Ste. Anne and seized two pillboxes covering approaches to the town. Enemy resistance was beaten down only by constant assault.

Against the background of booming naval guns, troops of both divisions east of Toulon penetrated the city. By 1700 hours on 23 August advance elements had reached the center of Toulon. Major Victor Mirkin moved up with two tanks to the Military Arsenal in the Le Mourillon section of the city. He entered the arsenal and told the German commander that, unless he surrendered immediately, the fire of Allied warships would be brought down on the garrison. The commander capitulated, surrendering 17 officers and 800 enlisted men.

On the morning of 24 August enemy forts and strongpoints began to give up one after the other. At 0900 hours the Naval Arsenal gave up with 200 prisoners. At 1000 Fort Ste. Catherine surrendered, and at 1300 the German garrison at Fort St. Louis was ordered to spike its guns. Three other forts capitulated during the afternoon, and by dark organized resistance in the eastern part of Toulon came to an end. On this day alone the 1st Infantry Division had taken over 2,000 prisoners.

In spite of this early progress, pockets of resistance still held out in many parts of the city. The enemy held the dock area; and mopping up operations were intensified, particularly when a radio intercept indicated that the Germans had received orders to destroy all remaining port installations. Street fighting flared up at several points; it was particularly heavy in the quarters known as La Colette where the Germans were resisting from house to house.

While the last enemy strongpoints in the city were being overcome, French troops were also pushing southwest of Toulon down the Sicie Peninsula, which was studded with forts and pockets of Germans. During the day of 25 August surrender terms were discussed at many

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of the fortifications and others were stormed. By 1900 hours Fort d'Artigues, northeast of La Colette, surrendered 20 officers and 200 soldiers. The Fort de Six-Fours in the middle of the Sicie neck agreed to capitulate effective 1200 the next day. After a sharp fight Fort de Malbousquet in Toulon gave up by 2200 hours.

On 26 August, heavy artillery fire was brought down on La Mitre in the Mourillon section of Toulon. Before noon this last enemy center of resistance within the city surrendered. The Six-Fours Commandant, having blown up ammunition depots at 0900, completed the terms of capitulation, giving up about 500 prisoners. By late afternoon other defenses on the Sicie Peninsula collapsed. Only St. Mandrier remained in enemy hands.


At 1745 hours the following day General Magnan, commanding the 9th Colonial Division, stopped all artillery which had been firing counterbattery on the eight enemy gun positions still intact on St. Mandrier and requested cessation of naval fire. Negotiations were begun for the surrender of the garrison. It was agreed that capitulation would become effective at 0600 hours on 28 August. The entire garrison was taken prisoner including the commanding officer of the Toulon defenses, Admiral Ruhfus. At 1000 hours the same morning General De Lattre De Tassigny made his formal entry into Toulon. On 28 August Marseille also fell.

Marseille

The movement of French Army B against Marseille had begun as early as 20 August when the Chapuis group of the 3rd Algerian Division pushed west above Toulon. Units of the 1st Armored Division, now including Combat Command Sudre, which had been screening the French Army's northern flank and maintaining contact with the American 3rd Division in and about Brignoles and along Highway 7 toward Aix-en-Provence, also turned toward Marseille. Together the two French Divisions advanced in a single operation. The maneuver against Marseille was to be similar to that used against Hyeres and Toulon: rapid encirclement, isolation, and pressure from all sides.

The natural defenses of Marseille were not as formidable as those of Toulon. However, the Etoile Mountains ran in a chain from Aubagne to Aix and gave some protection northeast of the city. Within Marseille the heights of Notre Dame de la Garde were well manned and well fortified, and in the port area enemy artillery and mortars covered all the approaches. In the bay the islands of Ratonneau and Pomegues guarded the sea lanes with strong forts.

In addition to offshore mine fields, booms, nets, and submarine detectors, blockships were anchored at strategic places in the harbor to be sunk on short notice and thus hamper full use of port facilities. Shore



SCUTTLED SHIP BLOCKING ENTRANCE TO THE PORT OF MARSEILLES

". . . blockships were anchored, by the enemy, at strategic places in the harbor . . . to hamper full use of port facilities . . ."

defenses included heavy coastal batteries and several railroad spurs built specifically to handle railroad guns with a caliber up to 15 inches. Mines were planted along the beaches as well as on all roads leading

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inland. It was estimated that for anti-aircraft protection the city had 170 guns of all calibers supplemented by searchlights and barrage balloons.

Since Marseille did not have the same system of well integrated hill-top fortresses as did Toulon, the Germans had placed greater stress on an elaborate defense of the suburbs to block off all entries to the heart of the city. On all main roads branching out from the city's hub were roadblocks and antitank mines. At Marignane, northwest of Marseille, the most important airfield in the area was defended by several batteries of antiaircraft guns and antitank ditches. The highway north to Aix was crossed by concrete blocks and dragon's teeth flanked on either side by an antitank wall six feet thick at its base. Peypin, northeast, and Aubagne, directly east of the city, were both strongly held by roadblocks and entrenched enemy forces.

General De Monsabert, commanding the 3rd Algerian Division, shifted the forces at his disposal and moved them along the arteries leading to Marseille. With the Chapuis group were the 7th African Tank Destroyer Battalion, the Tabors of Goums, and the 1st Armored Combat Command under General Sudre. Toward the end of the morning on 21 August, Combat Command Sudre arrived at the Le Camp road junction and received orders to advance on Marseille from the east, and at the same time outflank the city to the north, by moving toward Aix. The Combat Command was to seize and hold the Aubagne-Gemenos-Coulin highway triangle.



GENERAL SUDRE
". . . advance on Marseilles . . ."

This force moved out from Le Camp, by-passed Cuges, and ran up against the strongly held enemy road blocks at Aubagne. On 22 August armored elements were left here to tie down the enemy, while infantry swung north to cross the Aubagne-Peypin axis between these two strongpoints and filter through the Etoile Mountains into Marseille. Advance troops of the 7th Algerian Rifle Regiment, after a nine-hour climb over difficult terrain without encountering the enemy,

reached the northeast suburbs of Marseille at the St. Jerome and La Rose districts.

Meanwhile, one group of Goums moved farther north through the Etoiles before swinging west to cut communications on the city's north flank. A second group of Goums had moved south of Aubagne to overrun the road system between Marseille and La Ciotat. Desperate appeals for assistance by the French Forces of the Interior already fighting within Marseille hastened the assault on the city.

By 23 August the three battalions of the 7th Algerian Regiment were closing in on Marseille from three directions: the 1st just east of the city on the Aubagne highway, the 3rd coming into the northeast from the direction of Allauch, the 2nd moving down to the north having swung through St. Savourin and the Pilon du Roi. Combat Command Sudre supported these advances and assisted in mopping up operations at Aubagne. The 2nd Combat Command of the 1st Armored Division, having broken enemy resistance on the heights of Peypin, moved up to relieve the American 3rd Division at Aix, Gardanne, and Rognac. The occupation of these cities by Allied troops had cut off the Germans from their main communication with the Rhone River Valley. Two days later, when the group of Goums north of Marseille captured Septemes and surrounding suburbs, the city was completely isolated. On 23 August Colonel Chapuis and General De Monsabert moved into Marseille and set up command posts.

The General, from his headquarters at the Hotel du Quinzieme Corps, undertook negotiations with General Schaeffer, commanding the German garrison, beginning the evening of 23 August. They did not arrive at any agreement. The 244th German Infantry Division intended to fight for the city. The enemy still held all the forts in the port area and threw heavy artillery fire against the French forces which began to enter the city from all sides.

The next day Marseille was invested by troops of the 3rd Algerian Division and Combat Command Sudre. One battalion of Algerian riflemen seized and held the Vieux Port in the center of the city. Another held the Madeleine and Blancarde districts, which effectively bisected Marseille. The third was engaged in reducing enemy

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defenses in the suburbs of Beaumont. Still the fighting continued. The Germans held firmly the fortified heights of Notre Dame de la Garde just south of the Vieux Port as well as forts along the water's edge. The enemy launched counterattacks from their positions, but were held.

On 25 August elements of the 3rd Algerian Division which had been fighting at Toulon joined the southern group of Goums; together they moved along the La Ciotat road and into the southern part of Marseille. They occupied La Seigneurerie, Ste. Marguerite, and St. Louis. They continued the attack toward Notre Dame de la Garde.

As the battle for Marseille moved into its final phase, the weight of naval and air bombardment pressed the defenders into an increasingly hopeless situation. Fighter-bombers of the XII Tactical Air Command carried out missions against the city's defenses in spite of intense flak that was thrown up. On 25, 26, and 27 August air attacks were concentrated on the islands of Pomegues and Ratonneau. On 24 August the USS *Nevada* had fired 200 rounds on Pomegues; the following day 354 rounds were thrown against the Marseille area. Mine-sweeping operations in Marseille waters were begun on 26 August with naval fire placed on the Frioules Islands and Cap Croisette south of the city.

Notre Dame de la Garde was now attacked from four directions. Two battalions of infantry plus a detachment of Goums, supported by tanks, fought their way to the summit before the German defenders hoisted a white flag and gave themselves up at 1000 hours on 26 August. The following day the area between Notre Dame de la Garde and Fort St. Nicholas to the northwest at the entrance to Vieux Port was mopped up. The fort itself, now under constant fire of French artillery, surrendered.

Scattered enemy pockets of resistance were still to be over-come in many quarters of the city. Sporadic firing continued throughout the 26th and 27th in the districts of Quatre Chemins, St. Joseph, and Le Melon in the northern part of Marseille. There were also engagements along the waterfront. The fighting near Septemes lasted for three days as Chef de Bataillon Roussel led his Goums through the alleys and gardens of La Gavotte and Moulin du Diable.

During the evening of 27 August a letter signed by General Schaeffer was delivered to General De Monsabert. The German commander requested an interview to discuss terms of surrender. At 0700 on 28 August he was brought to the Hotel du Quinzieme Corps. Particular emphasis was placed on preserving port installations which the Germans had hoped to render useless by means of large scale demolitions. Capitulation resulted not only in the liberation of the second largest city in France and the most important port on the Mediterranean, but also in the capture of the Commanding General, his



MARSEILLE

". . . the second largest city in France and the most important port on the Mediterranean . . ."

staff, and 7,000 prisoners of war. The Germans had not fought to quite the last man.

French Forces of the Interior had played an important part in the liberation of Hyeres, Toulon, and Marseille. As the army drew near,

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resistance groups took up arms and occupied certain strategic points which had been abandoned by the enemy. Other FFI, taking advantage of the German system of organized strongpoints within the outer ring of fortifications, created zones of insecurity which were a constant annoyance to the enemy. This was particularly true in Marseille at Borely Park, Viste Park, and Notre Dame de la Garde.

Since members of the FFI had made careful note of German gun positions and their fields of fire, the location of pillboxes, minefields, and antitank obstacles, they were of invaluable service in guiding patrols



HUNTING SNIPERS IN MARSEILLE

". . . French Infantrymen and FFI . . . mopped up . . . and continued to hunt out German snipers . . ."

to objectives with least loss of time and lives. Constant liaison was maintained between Army B and the resistance groups. However, when the FFI tried to come out openly and fight occupying enemy troops before the French army arrived, as was the case in Marseille, their

position became desperate and they sent out urgent appeals for aid. After the army's arrival in both Toulon and Marseille the FFI helped mop up isolated pockets of resistance and continued to hunt out German snipers and French collaborationists after the main enemy resistance had been broken.

At 1100 hours on 29 August troops taking part in the liberation of Marseille passed in review before the Commanding General of Army B. They were greeted by an enthusiastic crowd. The band of the 3rd Algerian Division played for the occasion, and the Marseillaise again rang through the city. The main body of French troops now moved north and west to cross the Rhone and follow up the Seventh Army's penetration of France.

Across the Rhone

As the siege of Marseille and Toulon came to an end, the enemy was in the midst of withdrawing his remaining forces up the Rhone Valley to prevent them from being cut off in southern France. It was thus decided that the French should pursue the retreating Germans up the west bank of the Rhone, while the American VI Corps continued its rapid advance up the east bank. Accordingly, the 1st French Infantry Division and the 1st French Armored Division moved out of the coastal area and made preparations to cross the Rhone River. Lack of sufficient gasoline coupled with the fact that the Germans had blown up all bridges over the river made this task difficult. However, by putting in temporary bridging across the Durance River and improvising a system of ferries on the Rhone, elements of French Army B were able to cross the Rhone in the vicinity of Avignon, Tarascon, and Arles by 29 August.

Crossing the Rhone continued until the end of August, and no contact was made with the enemy. Advance elements fanned out to the southwest and on the evening of the 30th occupied Nimes and Montpellier. Further reconnaissance was carried out as far as Sete, Beziers, and Narbonne without meeting any opposition. The 9th Colonial Infantry Division remained temporarily as a garrison force in the Marseille-Toulon area, while the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division

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moved northward to the vicinity of Grenoble, where it relieved elements of the American 45th Division.

Army B in a space of 15 days had accomplished its assigned mission of capturing Toulon and Marseille and of keeping up its general advance to the north and northwest. By the division of its forces into functional groups to meet the problem of topography, and by the use of armored units to exploit unforseen tactical opportunities, Toulon and Marseille were quickly isolated and captured. In the final analysis it must be kept in mind that the seemingly brilliant tactics of the French were made possible only by the combined efforts of the entire Seventh Army from the moment of its initial assault. The American VI Corps provided the French with a secure right flank on land. The XII Tactical Air Command gave a complete offensive as well as defensive air cover, and the Western Naval Task Force provided the off-shore fire which was a major factor in the final surrender of Toulon and Marseille. Assured of close support by land, sea, and air, Army B was able to destroy two full strength enemy divisions and secure two major ports in a campaign which lasted only 13 days.

CHAPTER VIII

The German Retreat from Southern France

THE initial assault by the Seventh Army and its subsequent expansion of the beachhead opened the way for a rapid exploitation inland. By D plus 2 a definite breakthrough had been accomplished, and the German Nineteenth Army was in serious danger of being cut in two.

The enemy's first line of defense followed an east-west arc, paralleling the coast from a point where Highway 7 approached the Durance River near Orgon eastward to the vicinity of Cannes. This primary line provided for a narrow zone stretching from the coast to points 15 to 20 miles inland. But by 18 August it was overrun by the advance of the 3rd Infantry Division westward along Highway 7 and by the occupation of the coastal area east of St. Raphael by the 36th Infantry Division. A secondary defensive line was established some 30 to 40 miles inland along the axis of the Durance-Verdon Rivers. Even this line was soon threatened by the rapid penetration of the 45th Infantry Division through Barjols toward the Durance River.

It soon became clear that the Germans had been caught on D-Day with the great bulk of their defensive strength far to the west of the assault beaches. Even as late as 17 August only the 338th Infantry Division of the four enemy divisions west of Marseille appears in the enemy order of battle. The three remaining divisions west of the Rhone River apparently experienced great difficulty in moving into the combat zone. Pre-D-Day bombardment had wrecked all but one bridge across the Rhone, and the shortage of trucks and motor fuel hampered any large scale movement of troops.

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The northwestward advance of the 3rd and 45th Divisions tended to isolate from the rest of the Nineteenth Army the two enemy divisions (242nd and 244th) defending Toulon and Marseille, although contact was made with elements of both shortly after D-Day. The German 148th Reserve Division, which was responsible for the defense of the coastal region from east of Toulon to the Italian border, became separated from the 242nd on the west as a result of the Allied beachhead. By 16 August it was retreating under pressure toward the Italian frontier. Elements of the enemy 157th Reserve Division attempted to move south from Grenoble toward the assault area but were turned back by Task Force Butler at Digne and Gap.

Failure of the defending forces to hold the Seventh Army at least temporarily in the immediate coastal area may be attributed largely to five major factors. The enemy, failing to solve cover plans for Operation DRAGOON, had disposed his divisions with reserves too far west. As additional troops became available they were committed in a piece-meal fashion, the result of route interdiction and motor transport shortage. Coastal units in general were weak. They were poorly equipped and lacked sufficient air support, armor, and heavy artillery; it was estimated that about half their troops were Russian, Czech, Turk, Pole, and other non-Germanic peoples. Early in the advance inland the German LXII Corps Headquarters was isolated from its command near Draguignan. Finally, defending troops were constantly harassed from the rear by the French Resistance Forces.

For the first three days after the landing, German defensive measures amounted to little more than guerilla warfare. Terrain opportunities were exploited to achieve a sort of checker-board system of isolated and uncoordinated defense with small groups attempting to install and maintain hastily built roadblocks in order to delay as long as possible the Allied advance.

Driving the Wedge

The initial momentum of the Allied assault carried the American combat units inland approximately ten miles and permitted

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an expansion of the beachhead on either flank. Because of the mountainous terrain of the coastal area, the most logical entry into the interior was by way of the Argens River Valley. It is through this depression that Highway 7 runs from Frejus west to Aix-en-Provence and northwest toward Avignon. This route very soon became an important line of communication between the beachhead and the Rhone Valley.

A VI Corps field message dated 16 August set forth the general objectives and lines of advance of the three American Divisions. The 3rd Division was to seize and hold positions along the Real Martin River until relieved by the French II Corps and was then to continue its advance along Highway 7 toward the Rhone Delta. The 45th Division, after assembly at Le Luc, was to be prepared to advance to the northwest, north of the Maures Mountains. The 36th Division was to advance eastward in the direction of Cannes; but, as soon as the beachhead was secured, was to be prepared to thrust northward along the Route Napoleon (Highway 85). This field message also provided for flank security and indicated the general direction of advance. The lack of specific objectives indicates the anticipated rapidity of the advance inland and the early absence of strong enemy resistance.

To complete VI Corps plans for exploitation inland a provisional group known as Task Force Butler was assembled at Le Muy. General Truscott, Corps Commander, had indicated that first objectives of the force would probably be a crossing of the Durance River near Manosque or St. Paul, the holding of bridges, and a drive north to Grenoble or west to Montelimar. The newly-formed provisional group consisted of a headquarters, the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, the 59th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, the 753rd Tank Battalion (less one Medium and one Light Tank Company), 2nd Battalion, 143rd Infantry, Company C, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company F, 344th Engineers, Company C, 111th Medical Battalion (plus a detachment from Clearing Company), 3426th Quartermaster Truck Company, and a detachment of the 87th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company.

The plan for Task Force Butler was actually conceived before the embarkation of assault troops from Naples. The Provisional Armored

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Group, as it was designated by VI Corps, was commanded by the Corps Deputy Commander, Brigadier General Frederick B. Butler, and made up of elements of the assault divisions and their attached units. In compliance with orders issued by the Commanding General of VI Corps, Task Force Butler moved out of its assembly area in the vicinity of Le Muy on the morning of 18 August in the direction of Riez.

The 15th and 30th Regiments of the 3rd Division moved westward along Highway 7 toward Brignoles; the 7th Infantry continued along the southern route, Highway 98, which connects St. Tropez with Toulon. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 30th Infantry came into an assembly area east of Brignoles during the night 17-18 August. At 0700 hours the following morning the attack jumped off. The 1st Battalion pushed the assault from the north side of town engaging the enemy throughout the day, the night and into the morning of the 19th. The 2nd Battalion attacked toward the south and center of Brignoles, and street fighting continued until enemy resistance was overcome during the morning of 19 August.

To prevent Toulon from being isolated from the north, the enemy fought stubbornly to hold up the advance of the 3rd Division at Brignoles. Virtually the whole 2nd Battalion of the German 757th Infantry Regiment was destroyed in this action.

The 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments now continued their rapid advance westward along the axis of Highway 7. The 7th Infantry, having completed its mission along the coast road, moved north to join the other regiments. During the 24 hours from noon on 19 August until noon on 20 August the 3rd Division, preceded by the 3rd Reconnaissance Troop, covered 30 miles by marching and by motor transport, against only slight enemy opposition. Near Aix-en-Provence leading elements of the Reconnaissance Troop ran into an enemy roadblock late in the morning of 20 August. The enemy strongpoint was made up of at least two antitank guns, two tanks, mortars, and infantry.

The enemy appeared to be preparing to make another defensive stand at Aix. Approaching the town the 30th Infantry encountered several roadblocks covered by adjusted artillery and mortar fire. After


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dark several enemy planes came over and dropped flares. The 2nd Battalion of the 30th Infantry took up a position southeast of the town while the 1st Battalion dismounted from its vehicles and moved northwest through hilly wooded country to the village of Les Logissons, north of Aix. Here it established a roadblock. Shortly afterwards the roadblock was attacked by a group of about 50 enemy bicyclists and fighting continued throughout the night of 20 August.

An all-out attack on Aix-en-Provence was ordered for 0600 the following morning and air support requested from the Seventh Army. The 1st Battalion having assembled to the northwest of Aix, attacked with two companies abreast and one company in reserve. The 2nd Battalion, having knocked out the enemy roadblock at La Galante by 1400 hours on 20 August, had moved up to occupy high ground in the southeastern suburbs of Aix. By 0600 on 21 August the 2nd Battalion was prepared to place mortar, tank destroyer, and automatic weapons fire on the town of Aix in support of the regimental attack.

The 3rd Battalion, supported by a detachment of the FFI, moved directly on the town from the northeast. The FFI Chef de Groupe drew sketches of enemy gun positions, strongpoints, and tank obstacles, and then assigned guides to each of the companies of the battalion. Companies L and K attacked abreast, met only sniper fire, and soon reached the Justice Hotel in the center of town. At 1030 hours the battalion commander was ordered to clean out the western half of Aix and contact the 1st Battalion. Apparently, the main body of the enemy had withdrawn during the previous night and had left behind only small groups to harass the Americans and delay their advance. The 2nd Battalion established a roadblock on the main route running south toward the coast, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions assembled and moved west along Highway 7.

The sector between the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions was taken over by Combat Command 1 of the 1st French Armored Division. It had landed over beaches in the St. Tropez-Ste. Maxime area and on D plus 1 moved west through Gonfaron, through Flassans, and north along Road 130 to reach Cabasse. In protecting the northern flank of the beachhead Combat Command 1 encountered heavy antiaircraft,

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artillery, and small arms fire between Cabasse and Carces. After a stiff fight on 18 August enemy resistance was wiped out, and several artillery pieces and numerous prisoners were captured. When the armored forces had reached Carces they swung southwest on Route 562 and arrived at Le Val where they regrouped.

In the center of the assault area, the 45th Division, consisting of the 157th, 179th, and 180th Infantry Regiments, moved northwest. The enemy offered little resistance until the 179th Infantry reached Barjols. This town was an important road junction controlling routes northward to the Durance River Valley. Here the Germans put up determined resistance. The 1st Battalion with Company I attached, attacked toward the town the afternoon of 18 August; but by nightfall the enemy still held positions in defense of Barjols. However, during the next afternoon Barjols was cleared and the 179th Regiment went on to Rians.

The 45th Division was now rapidly approaching the Durance River in the vicinity of St. Paul. When elements of the 157th Infantry arrived at the river they found the bridge only partially destroyed. Foot troops went over while the engineers worked with utmost speed to construct a vehicular crossing farther east. Little opposition was encountered on the north bank, as troops of the 2nd Battalion, 157th Infantry, advanced north and west to capture Mirabeau and Pertuis. On the south bank the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, moved to the west on Route 561 and ran into small arms and medium artillery fire near Peyrolles. The advance continued, however, throughout 20 August through Peyrolles and Meyrargues.

Spearheading the American advance inland was Task Force Butler, which had moved out of its assembly area at Le Muy on the morning of 18 August. The main body of the Task Force pushed along the axis Draguignan to Salernes to Riez. On the east flank reconaissance troops passing through 36th Division units on the road north of Draguignan toward Castellane met enemy resistance almost immediately. In this area the German LXII Corps Headquarters had been engaged by airborne troops and the 36th Division when elements of Task Force Butler arrived. The enemy Corps Headquarters was captured, including


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the Commanding General, Lieutenant General Ferdinand Neuling, and about 400 officers and men. The enemy, however, continued to delay the advance north. The right flank column of Task Force Butler was ordered to slide-slip to the west and join the main body, leaving 36th Division troops in positions north of Draguignan. Task Force Butler closed in at Riez during the night 18-19 August.

While this mobile column was approaching the Durance River, well forward of the main VI Corps front, two or three battalions of the German 157th Reserve Division moved down the Grenoble Corridor from the north and were approaching Digne. General Butler saw an opportunity to encircle the enemy at Digne by a flanking maneuver and a surprise attack. One reconnaissance detachment left the main column. It turned to the northeast toward Mezel and Digne and reached Chateauredon on the Route Napoleon before meeting the enemy. The German defenders of Chateauredon surrendered without a fight. A larger detachment of Task Force Butler, consisting of one company of infantry supported by medium tanks, left Oraison to follow the east bank of the Durance River to Malijai. Here enemy resistance was weak and brief, and the detachment continued eastward along the Route Napoleon to approach Digne from the west. The German garrison in Digne, blocked from the south and west on the main highway, surrendered at 2000 hours on 19 August. About 600 prisoners were taken, including Brigadier General Hans Schuberth of Feldkommandatur 792.

The main body of Task Force Butler, having moved out of Oraison, crossed the Durance River and proceeded up the west bank along Highway 96. Arriving at Sisteron late in the afternoon of 19 August, General Butler established his command post and sent reconnaissance elements to outpost the area to the north. Information was received that additional elements of the German 157th Reserve Division were moving southward from Grenoble and that an enemy force had already occupied Gap. The Provisional Armored Group awaited orders from VI Corps and assembled to the northwest of Sisteron. There the main body was joined by the two detachments which had cleared the enemy from Digne.

Since there were two alternate routes between Sisteron and

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Grenoble, a new tactical situation developed. The main column, preceded by reconnaissance forces, continued northward through Aspres to seize and hold Col de la Croix Haute, a mountain pass on Highway 75. This move blocked the western highway against German elements coming down from Grenoble. A second column swung east from Aspres and, supported by French Resistance Groups in considerable strength, attacked the town of Gap on the afternoon of 20 August. After a brief engagement the enemy surrendered 1,000 prisoners, a large ration dump, and a demolition supply dump. Thus, by blocking the Col de la Croix Haute and capturing Gap, Task Force Butler effectively checked German movement southward from Grenoble toward the beachhead.

On the VI Corps right flank the 36th Infantry Division had advanced from Frejus and St. Raphael northwest to Le Muy and had spread out eastward into the foothills of the maritime Alps. Near Le Muy the 142nd Infantry had made contact with the 1st Airborne Task Force by 17 August and moved through Trans-en-Provence to Draguignan. On the division's eastern flank the 141st Infantry spread out to take over additional road blocks established by the 143rd Infantry, which was relieved on 18 August and began movement to Draguignan, the divisional assembly area.

On 18 August Task Force Eitt, made up of two infantry companies of the 141st Regiment, moved to the north of attack Callian, three miles east of Fayence. In Callian, French partisans reinforced a garrison of paratroopers, including 15 wounded, who had been trapped and surrounded by the enemy. Fighting continued throughout 19 August. The town changed hands twice before it was finally cleared of German machine gun and small arms fire. However, there was little enemy activity along the rest of the front held by the 141st Infantry, which maintained defensive positions on the eastern flank until relieved by the 1st Airborne Task Force on 20 August. The enemy forces in this sector had become isolated from the main body of the German Nineteenth Army. They were already preoccupied with the details of their withdrawal to the Italian frontier.

The Corps right flank was secured. The 36th Infantry Division now began a general movement to the northwest. The 143rd Infantry,

preceded by tank destroyers, moved from Draguignan to Sisteron where the regiment made contact with Task Force Butler and halted temporarily to await further orders. The 142nd Infantry moved to Castellane and prepared to continue northwest; the 141st assembled in the vicinity of Draguignan.

In the first five days of invasion, beachhead forces had penetrated inland against relatively little opposition. Preliminary defensive lines established by the German forces had broken. This breach, coupled with the lack of suitably disposed reserves with which to close the gap, had two far reaching results. First, the German 148th



PURSUING THE ENEMY FROM BRIGNOLES

". . . Preliminary defensive lines established by the German forces had broken . . ."

Reserve Division was now cut off from the rest of the Nineteenth Army; and, though it continued to fight delaying actions eastward toward the Italian frontier, it was never again able to take part in a coordinated action. Second, with an exposed left flank the Nineteenth Army was

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unable to prevent an Allied exploitation inland with its attendant threat to the Rhone Valley.

By 20 August French Army B, having moved west along the coast, was now approaching Toulon and Marseille. The American 3rd Division had captured Brignoles, and moved up to Aix-en-Provence along Highway 7, forcing open this route to the Rhone Delta. The 45th Division had penetrated to the northwest to occupy Barjols in their approach to the Durance River. The 36th Division had advanced along the Argens River Valley through the Esterel chain of mountains, and had secured the right flank of the beachhead by pushing the German defenders toward the Italian frontier. Finally, Task Force Butler by occupying Digne, Sisteron, and Gap had severed German communications in the Grenoble Corridor and had opened the way for a rapid advance north to Grenoble or west to the Rhone River and Montelimar.

The Rhone Triangle

The Rhone River in its southward course towards the Mediterranean forms a triangular alluvial delta with its apex at Avignon and the two base points at Montpellier to the west and Aix-en-Provence to the east. Because of the nature of the terrain and the existing road nets, military traffic from the coastal area of southern France, both to the east and to the west of the Rhone River, must pass through the area of this triangle by way of two of the three cities. The lower Durance River Valley parallels the eastern side of the Rhone Triangle and creates a narrow corridor between two hill masses. From Aix to Avignon, Highway 7 passes through this defile which offered the enemy excellent terrain for delaying tactics to defend the eastern leg of the Rhone Triangle.

A Seventh Army field order of 19 August instructed the American VI Corps to seize and secure Aix-en-Provence. At the same time French Army B was to relieve all American troops south of Highway 7 and continue west to capture Toulon and Marseille. The capture of Aix would break the enemy's chief route of communications between the Rhone Triangle and the two Mediterranean ports. The Germans, consequently, moved several battle groups forward to block the progress

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of the 3rd Division. This strategy was executed by stubborn delaying actions fought at both Brignoles and Aix.

Prior to 15 August the German 11th Panzer Division had been stationed near Bordeaux on the Atlantic coast. As soon as the German High Command was fairly certain that the Allied attack would come against the Mediterranean coast and not the Atlantic, it ordered the 11th Panzer Division to the southeast. It was to move through the Toulouse-Carcassonne-Narbonne Corridor so as to appear in the German order of battle in southern France. On 15 and 16 August air reconnaissance revealed that the entire division, loaded on 33 trains, was moving eastward toward the Rhone. This rail movement, according to subsequent reports, was stranded by tactical bombing. Personnel and equipment were forced to detrain and make their way toward the Rhone Triangle by division transportation.

Captured enemy field orders revealed that the tactical mission of the 11th Panzer Division was two-fold. First, it was to hold the east side of the Rhone Triangle along Highway 7 against the westward advance of the American 3rd Division. This would permit the bulk of the four less mobile German Divisions to withdraw along the western leg of the triangle between Montpellier and Avignon and northward up the Rhone Valley. Second, the 11th Panzer Division was to act as an escort for German units in their retreat northward up the Rhone Valley. Between Aix-en-Provence and Avignon, the 3rd Division encountered tanks of the 11th Panzer Division working in small groups supported by infantry.

Contact with the German Panzer Division seriously suggested the threat of an armored counterattack. At noon on 21 August General Truscott issued orders to halt the main body of the 3rd Division. Only reconnaissance elements were to be sent beyond the line Le Puy-Rognac until the strength of the opposing German armor could be determined. Shortly afterwards the advance was continued beyond, but it was four days later before the 7th Infantry arrived at Avignon. For the first time since D-Day the enemy on the VI Corps left flank began destroying bridges behind them. This was an indication that the delaying mission had now been completed.

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Enemy Withdrawal Up the Rhone Valey

From Avignon to Lyon the Rhone Valley traverses a distance of 133 miles running almost straight and nearly due north. The river divides the Central Massif on the west bank from the Alps du Dauphine on the east. On the western bank water courses have created severely defiladed avenues of communication. From Avignon to Orange the Rhone forms a broad, dry, sandy, loam plain suitable for military maneuver. North of Orange the river enters a 2,400-yard-wide corridor for a distance of five miles and then broadens out again until it approaches the Donzere Gorge, where its point of minimum defilade is only a quarter of a mile wide. The valley opens up into the plain of Montelimar for a distance of some ten miles and then is again constricted by Cruas Gorge, or the "Gate of Montelimar". With exception of the 22 mile Valence Plain immediately north of the Gate of Montelimar, the Rhone Valley's northward course to Lyon is generally narrow with defiladed walls.

A highway flanks each side of the Rhone River from Avignon to Lyon. On the east bank, Highway 7 is the best constructed and the most suitable for military traffic. On the west side of the river, Highway 86 covers the same distance but passes through more mountainous country. A highway running from Nimes, through Le Puy to Lyon was available as an evacuation route for German divisions in southwest France; but this road runs through the Massif Central and follows a winding course which is over 100 miles longer than either of the other two roads.

The German High Command issued five field orders covering the period 20-24 August. These were to govern the strategy of withdrawal of the German Nineteenth Army. A few days later the orders were captured in the vicinity of Savasse.

Field Order No. 1, dated 20 August, directed all elements east of the Rhone Triangle and south of the Durance River to assemble in the vicinity of L'Isle sur la Sorgue located on Route 100. This town, protected by favorable defensive terrain, was considered a convenient zone for reorganizing various German elements split up by the rapid

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Allied advances. All marches were to be made at night. Rear guards, equipped with heavy weapons and demolitions, were to be left behind to destroy bridges and other installations of value. Finally, the individual soldier was to "fight cunningly", and at the risk of a "mobile court-martial" was enjoined against looting and from wandering about unarmed.

The second captured field order, dated 21 August, was concerned with the retention of the Rhone Triangle for purposes of covering the retreat. Phase line "C" was set up as a tentative main line of resistance to be held until at least 23 August. An armored group from the 11th Panzer Division was ordered to remain in front of the phase line in order to prevent a "surprise" penetration by the American 3rd Division from the southeast. The main line of resistance was to be defended by the German 338th Infantry Division. Decisive importance was given to the defense of the town of Orgon. Its early capture by the Americans would prevent the reorganization of the German forces taking place farther north at L'Isle sur la Sorgue.

Arles was also to be strongly defended. It was located on the main route which ran along the base of the Rhone Triangle and connected Montpellier with Aix-en-Provence; now that Toulon and Marseille had been encircled, there was increasing danger that the American 3rd Infantry Division might push on toward the Rhone along the north shore of the Etang de Berre. Allied bombing had destroyed the bridge across the Rhone River at Arles. The Germans then established a ferry shuttle service with the view of evacuating elements in the coastal zone west of the Rhone Delta. This ferry service was to be maintained at all costs until 23 August.

The third German field order, also issued on 21 August was the authority for the withdrawal northward up the Rhone Valley. The Allied bridgehead in northern France had expanded rapidly and so, threatened to completely sever German lines of communication with home bases east of the Rhine. The Nineteenth Army, therefore, was ordered to "disengage itself from the enemy" and join the southern wing of German Army Group "B" which was operating in northern and central France.

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A new phase line was set up behind which the divisions would reorganize for the retreat. The line began at Sommieres on the left side of the Rhone Triangle and continued as an arc to include Arles, Orgon, and terminated at Apt, which was considerably more extensive than the phase line delineated in the previous field order. Apparently, the German Army hoped to protect the escape route of the three divisions west of the Rhone River and to collect the disorganized elements, active in battle, to the east and southeast of the phase line. The 11th Panzer Division was ordered to assume the role of the chief maneuvering element of the retreating forces. It was to lead the withdrawal up the Rhone Valley and block all entrances to Highway 7.

The first specific objective of the retreat was the confluence of the Drome and the Rhone Rivers south of Valence. Delaying actions were to be fought whenever necessary, but the main emphasis was to be placed on keeping open the escape route. Marseille and Toulon were to be defended "to the last man . . . . according to an order of the Fuehrer."

On 23 August the German High Command issued its fourth field order which included instructions for the execution of the disengaging movement. In leading the withdrawal, the 11th Panzer Division was ordered to pull out all its elements operating in the Rhone Triangle, continue northward along Highway 7 through the Gate of Montelimar, and ward off the blocking movements of the American 36th Infantry Division and Task Force Butler to the northeast of Montelimar. The German 198th Infantry Division was to follow the 11th Panzer Division by forced marches and render assistance in breaking through the American blocking force.

The fifth captured German field order, which covered the last phase of the withdrawal from the Rhone Triangle to the Gate of Montelimar, was issued on 24 August. The protection of the rear of the column was left to the German 338th Infantry Division as far north as phase line "E" at a point where the Eygues River flows into the Rhone. Here Highway 7 leaves the plain of Orange and enters a narrow defile which gave a certain flank protection to the retreating forces. The movement of the German 338th Division suggested that the last of the slower German elements had now evacuated the lower Rhone Valley

and were endeavoring to push on past the Americans who were occupying the high ground northeast of Montelimar.

Enemy Motor and Rail Movement

Reconnaissance flights of the XII Tactical Air Command discovered the pattern of enemy traffic throughout the Rhone Valley. During the first six days after D-Day German rail and motor movement was in accordance with the tactical situation. Immediately after the Seventh Army landings enemy divisions west of the Rhone Delta began a movement eastward toward the assault beaches. In the Rhone Valley the preponderance of both motor and rail traffic was southward from Lyon. From Grenoble traffic moved south through the corridor toward the invasion coast. Immediately after D-Day the German intention seems to have been to reinforce the troops along the beachhead, or perhaps, to build up reserves in the lower Rhone Valley for a major counterthrust.

By 21 August, however, the direction-pattern of enemy traffic was reversed. There was no longer any movement from west of the Rhone toward the assault area. Both rail and motor convoys were now observed turning northward up the Rhone Valley at Avignon.

The route to Lyon along the western bank of the river was being used to capacity. This increased traffic along a less desirable military route indicated that the enemy was becoming increasingly concerned over the rapid thrust of the 3rd Infantry Division along Highway 7. Included in this northbound exodus were fuel, ammunition, and general supply trains, both motor-driven and horse-drawn, along with artillery and personnel. The enemy also made maximum use of the railroads on both sides of the Rhone River, although tactical bombing considerably hampered rail movement. Ferry services across the Rhone were kept in operation north of Avignon, and troops were transferred to the east bank whenever it was possible.

Air reconnaissance reported that each large group of motor trucks was preceded by from two to ten tanks, presumably from the 11th Panzer Division, acting as a mobile escort. The shortage of motor fuel

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was critical and many troops were observed being towed on bicycles. Several bicycles were spaced at intervals along a tow rope which was attached to a troop carrier.

The pressure applied by Task Force Butler against enemy traffic in the Gate of Montelimar was reflected farther south. On 24 August reconnaissance reports stated that south of Montelimar there was heavy movement, both road and rail, along the east and west banks of the Rhone River; but from Loriol north to Lyon movement was almost non-existent. This absence of traffic implied a complete interdiction by Task Force Butler and elements of the 36th Infantry



ENORMOUS SPAN BRIDGE DESTROYED BY THE ENEMY AT CAVAILLON
". . . Cavaillon was occupied by the 3rd Division without enemy contact . . ."

Division. Either the Rhone Valley was completely blocked, or the enemy had temporarily halted all his convoys until the 11th Panzer Division could break through and lead the slower elements out of the trap.

The northwestward thrust of the 3rd Division toward the


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Rhone River tended to accelerate German withdrawal in the direction of Lyon. The 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments actively patrolled against elements of the German 338th Infantry and 11th Panzer Divisions to the northwest of Aix. The 7th Infantry moved steadily forward along Highway 7. Reconnaissance troops, sent out as patrols on both sides of the Etang de Berre, occupied the town of Martigues, from which the enemy had withdrawn. Forward elements had reached the Rhone River at Arles by 24 August. The 3rd Infantry Division moved north across the Durance River and on the 25th occupied Avignon, Orgon, and Cavaillon without enemy contact.

Five of the eight enemy divisions operating along the coast of southern France had reached Montelimar by 27 August. Led by the 11th Panzer Division, the 198th, 716th, 189th, and 338th Infantry Divisions joined in the northbound retreat. The two remaining divisions west of the target area, the 242nd and the 244th, were hopelessly encircled in Toulon and Marseille. They ultimately surrendered to French Army B. The 148th Reserve Division in the Cannes-Nice area and the 157th Reserve Division at Grenoble sought refuge by passing through the Alps toward Italy.

The Grenoble Corridor

The principal route of communication between the coastal area of southern France and the area north of the Isere River Valley is by way of the so-called Grenoble Corridor. This natural entrance into east-central France runs almost due north from the coast and lies about midway between the Rhone River and the Italian Frontier.

The Grenoble Corridor is approached from the south by two principal highways, Route 96, which originates at Aix-en-Provence and runs northeast paralleling the Durance River, and the Route Napoleon (Highway 85), which begins at Nice and follows a northwestward course through the Provence Alps. At Valonne, Highway 96 joins the Route Napoleon and continues on through defiladed terrain to Sisteron. Here the road divides again. One branch passes through Serres and Aspres; the other passes through the town of Gap. At Pont-de-Claix the

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two roads again join and proceed on to Grenoble. Several routes connect the Grenoble Corridor with the Rhone Valley to the west and with Alpine Passes to the east. At Aspres Route 93 follows the Drome River westward to its confluence with the Rhone north of Loriol; Highway 94 is an alternate east-west route from Serres to Pont-St. Esprit, halfway between Avignon and Montelimar.

A Seventh Army field order, dated 19 August, directed that elements of the American VI Corps reconnoiter in force to Digne and Castellane, secure Sisteron and crossings over the Durance River. One division was to be on the alert for an advance to Grenoble. The field order further provided that the 1st Airborne Task Force would relieve elements of the 36th Division on the VI Corps right flank and assigned it a zone of responsibility along a general line from Fayence to La Napoule. This general defensive line originated on the coast west of Cannes and was later extended northward to include Larche Pass on the Italian frontier. The Seventh Army thus provided for the penetration of the Grenoble Corridor in depth. The Commanding General of the VI Corps had ordered Task Force Butler to spearhead the advance. This move was to be followed in close tactical support by the 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions.

As early as 20 August General Truscott, Commander of VI Corps, considered the possibility of moving Task Force Butler west to the vicinity of Montelimar. The FFI were reported to be well organized on both sides of the Rhone River and were expected to be of great assistance in any attempt to block enemy movement in the Rhone Valley. On the evening of the 20th, instructions were sent to General Butler "to put out reconnaissance forces on the road nets to the north and west, examining the possibility of advancing to the vicinity of Montelimar; to block enemy forces withdrawing up the Rhone Valley from the south; and also be prepared to continue the advance to Grenoble." At 2045 hours another message was sent from VI Corps: "You will move at first light 21 August with all possible speed to Montelimar. Block all routes of withdrawal up Rhone Valley in that vicinity. 36th Division follows you."

General Butler ordered one troop of the 117th Reconnaissance


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Squadron (reinforced) to send out patrols and to establish a roadblock north of Gap. Other elements of the troops were to push north up the Montmaur-St. Disdier road. One reconnaissance platoon and one battery of the 59th Armored Field Artillery were to remain near Col de la Croix Haute to block the road at this point and to reconnoiter toward Monestier. These forces were to remain in position until relieved by elements of the 36th Division.

On the morning of 21 August those elements of Task Force Butler which had established a roadblock on the Route Napoleon at Col Bayard north of Gap were attacked. The enemy force, estimated at two battalions, had moved southeast from La Mure during the previous night. After a short fire fight this attack was successfully repulsed. To the west on the alternate route to Grenoble, Monestier was reported cleared of the enemy, but north of Monestier fighting flared up at Vif between a small enemy force and the FFI.

The main body of Task Force Butler, preceded by reconnaissance units, moved westward from the Grenoble Corridor and followed Highway 93 along the valley of the Drome River. By dusk on 21 August reconnaissance elements had entered the Rhone Valley. Throughout this rapid advance no contact was made with the enemy until a German convoy of approximately 30 vehicles was observed moving north out of Livron. The advance troops of Task Force Butler attacked and destroyed the vehicles, killing and wounding several of the enemy. Eleven prisoners from a Russian labor battalion were taken.

Again there was no further contact with the enemy until reconnaissance patrols attempted to cut Highway 7 west of Condillac. At that point they were driven out by superior German forces. However, units of Task Force Butler pushed on to within a few miles of Montelimar where they occupied high ground overlooking the valley below. General Butler established his command post at Marsanne.

As Task Force Butler moved toward the Rhone Valley, the 36th Division crossed the Durance and continued north toward Grenoble. The 141st and 142nd Infantry Regiments, by means of shuttles, moved into Aspres and Gap and relieved elements of Task Force Butler at

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several roadblocks. The 143rd Infantry occupied Col de la Croix Haute and prepared to send troops north to Grenoble.


Throughout 22 August the 36th Division fanned out north, west, and east from the vicinity of Aspres against practically no opposition. The 3rd Battalion of the 143rd Infantry, moving rapidly north along Route 75, passed through Clelles, Monestier, Vif, and arrived at Pont de Claix. From this last town patrols entered Grenoble without opposition and occupied the city at 1400 hours on 22 August.

Almost immediately reconnaissance elements pushed on five or six miles north and northeast of Grenoble but made no contact with the enemy. The FFI were reported to be in control of all bridges north of the city, and the main route was thought to be cleared as far as Lyon. Later in the day the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry arrived in Grenoble; it had liquidated an enemy pocket at Vizille and captured 30 prisoners.

The 142nd Infantry, 36th Division, continued to hold roadblocks north and east of Gap. New blocks were established in the vicinity of Guillestre, and patrols were sent out to reconnoiter Route 94 in the direction of Briancon, where the FFI reported the assembly of a large enemy force. At the same time the 141st Regimental Combat Team, supported by the 141st and the 977th Field Artillery Battalions, was to proceed west from Aspres, in accordance with orders from the Commanding General of VI Corps, with all possible speed to reinforce Task Force Butler in the Montelimar area. Movement began at 1430 hours on 22 August, and by midnight the two field artillery battalions were in position near Marsanne, prepared to fire missions across the Rhone River.

With the capture of Barjols on 19 August the 45th Infantry Division had opened the route to the lower Durance Valley. The Germans had demolished all the bridges in the division sector, and the crossing of the Durance River was marked more by physical inconvenience than actual enemy resistance. This crossing was also hampered by the swollen waters of the river. Heavy thunder showers in the Provence Alps had caused the Durance to rise more than three feet above its normal seasonal level. Division troops, nevertheless,

crossed to the north bank and spread out in two directions along the Durance. As the 180th Infantry Regiment moved downstream toward Avignon, the 179th Infantry turned upstream toward Volonne. The 157th Infantry, in the division center, crossed the Luberon Mountains



BLASTED GERMAN ROADBLOCK
". . . Highway 100 at Apt . . ."

along Highway 543 to reach the road junction with Highway 100 at Apt. About 100 of the enemy in Apt put up a brief fire fight. The 1st Battalion of the 157th Infantry, supported by a considerable number of FFI, attacked the town from three directions. All resistance was overcome by 1520 hours on 22 August. At Apt strong roadblocks were established against elements of the 11th Panzer Division. The Germans were operating east of Avignon on Route 100 in an effort to protect the eastern side of the Rhone Triangle.

The other two regiments of the 45th Division encountered little enemy opposition. The 180th received some small arms fire in and

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about Rognes, but as they moved in to occupy the town the enemy withdrew. Only cautious and slow advances were made as two battalions were alerted to move to the vicinity of Aspres. The 179th Regiment was relieved of roadblocks along the Durance at Rians, Forcalquier, and St. Aubon and was ordered to an assembly area in the vicinity of Grenoble. Upon arrival it was attached to the 36th Division.

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CHAPTER IX

The Battle of Montelimar

THERE is no doubt that topography was destined to play an important role in the battle of Montelimar. South of the town and east of the Rhone a broad plain extends for seven miles. Here the enemy was expected to



MONTELIMAR — TAKEN FROM THE SOUTH
". . . Montelimar is a key communications center . . ."

organize and to concentrate his forces before entering the battle area proper. Montelimar is a key communications center. Highway 7 runs north and south through the town; two roads branch out to the west to

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cross the Rhone River; two others lead to the east toward Nyons and Crest. The inability of the American forces to seize and hold Montelimar during the early stages of the battle made it necessary for them to control the hill masses northeast of the town in order to prevent the Germans from moving north along Highway 7 and east along the Roubion River Plain.

Two tributaries flow into the Rhone River from the east at points almost midway between the city of Lyon and the Mediterranean. The Drome, the larger and more northerly of the two streams, empties into the Rhone some four or five miles west of the towns of Livron and Loriol. The Roubion River, the smaller and more southerly tributary, discharges into the Rhone about two and a half miles southwest of Montelimar. Fifteen or 20 miles inland from the east bank of the Rhone are the foothills of the French Pre-Alps. This area of less than 250 square miles, is bounded on the west by the Rhone River, on the north by the Drome River, on the east by the foothills of the Pre-Alps, and on the south by the Roubion River. This terrain, roughly a square, with Montelimar, Charols, Crest, and Livron at its four points, was the setting for the eight day Battle of Montelimar.

The Rhone River, western border of the quadrangle, is characterized chiefly by steep banks as it passes through the battle area. Seven miles south of Montelimar is the Donzere Gorge, two miles long and only 440 yards wide. Northward from this gorge the Rhone Valley opens up into the Plain of Montelimar. This plain is "T" shaped, extending northward along the Rhone Valley for ten miles, and eastward along the Roubion Valley for 12 miles, where it reaches the foothills of the Pre-Alps. Three miles north of Montelimar the Rhone Valley enters another defile, the Cruas Gorge or the Gate of Montelimar. As the Rhone Valley continues northward for the next ten miles, the maximum width is not over one mile. On the western side of the valley cliffs rise to a height of 1,600 feet, and on the east is the heavily forested area of the Marsanne. Here the Rhone Valley widens to admit the Drome River and to enter the southern part of the plain of Valence.

The Drome River, northern border of the battle square, creates a small alluvial valley, approximately two miles wide and originating

at Crest. During low water periods it is possible to establish fording sites along the lower reaches of the Drome River.

Three hill masses north of Montelimar are the key to the control of the town and the highways running north and east of it. The largest, but not the highest, of these hill formations is Ridge 300 (389-290: represents altitude in meters), which is about two and one half miles north and a little east of Montelimar. This ridge descends to the north rather gradually toward the village of La Coucourde. The second and smallest of the three hill masses is Hill 294, (represents altitude in meters). Oval shaped and scarcely over a half mile long through its major axis, Hill 294 is northwest of Montelimar and just southeast of Ridge 300. The highest of these hill masses north of Montelimar is Hill 430 (represents altitude in meters). Nearly circular, with a diameter of almost a mile at its base, Hill 430 lies approximately one quarter of a mile northeast of Hill 294, and less than a mile east of the northern portion of Ridge 300.

A hostile force in control of Montelimar possesses various alternatives for moving its men and equipment northward toward Lyon. It may move directly up Highway 7, or it may turn eastward at Montelimar to move through the battle quadrangle by means of several secondary routes. In any case, the enemy would be forced to cross the Drome River, since the foothills prevent any large scale military movement eastward.

In order to keep the enemy from reaching Lyon, the following was necessary: 1) Effective blocking of Highway 7. 2) Prevention of enemy movement through the battle area east of Highway 7 and west of the foothills of the Pre-Alps. 3) Complete control of the Drome River, including possession of bridges and fording sites. Highway 7 could be blocked by the installation of physical road barriers, artillery fire, or by the complementary use of both. Since the Marsanne forest parallels Highway 7 from Montelimar to Loriol, the exact location of roadblocks placed on the highway and of artillery emplaced in the Marsanne forested hills would be directed by the tactical situation.

To prevent the enemy from moving through the battle area east of Montelimar it would be necessary to control the alluvial plain

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of the lower Roubion River Valley. To keep the enemy from crossing the Roubion north into the battle square, it would be necessary to blow bridges, to defend the river line, and to hold the towns of Marsanne, Puy St. Martin, and Cleon to the north. To prevent movement east along the Roubion, the only method was to block his forces with infantry and artillery.

Preparations For Battle

As late as 20 August it had not been decided whether Task Force Butler should continue to advance north toward Grenoble, or turn west to the Rhone Valley where a new tactical situation seemed to be developing. The FFI had recommended to the Commanding General of Task Force Butler that he continue on to Grenoble, since in their opinion French Resistance Groups were already in control of the Rhone Valley. However, at a Seventh Army conference, held on 21 August, it was decided to send Task Force Butler to the west to occupy the high ground northeast of Montelimar.

When this order was issued, Task Force Butler was about 30 miles south of the city of Grenoble. Advance elements of the force left the Grenoble Corridor and moved west to Highway 93, passing through Die and Crest. These elements arrived in the battle area at 1700 hours on 21 August. The precipitous German withdrawal up the Rhone Valley had not yet begun.

Task Force Butler had moved into the battle area along its northern border, the Drome River. The main route of supply and communication with rear supply dumps was Highway 93, which ran east to the Grenoble Corridor. Contact had been made with the enemy in the Rhone Valley.

While Task Force Butler was awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from the Grenoble area, German tanks were known to be holding critical terrain features in the battle zone. These tanks apparently were also awaiting reinforcements from the south, since no willingness was shown for an open engagement. Both sides were marking time.

The rapid advance of Task Force Butler northward up the

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Grenoble Corridor had been followed by the American 36th Division. As early as 20 August the possibility of a change in the axis of advance of the 36th Division became apparent. At 1815 hours on 21 August the Commanding General of the American VI Corps issued this brief order to the 36th Division. "Re-enforce Butler with one infantry regiment and the bulk of your long-tom and M-1 battalions. Blocking the Rhone Valley is your primary mission." This order was further implemented by later directives stating that, "The 141st Infantry Regiment is to re-enforce Butler at once . . . . Speed is essential."

The 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry moved out from Aspres on 22 August on its newly assigned mission, closed in at Crest by 0230 the following morning, and moved south in preparation for an attack against Montelimar. The 1st Battalion arrived at Condillac, the new regimental command post six miles northeast of Montelimar, at 0930 hours on 23 August and went into position near the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd reached Condillac at 1300 hours and was to occupy high ground south of Livron. The 141st Regiment had gathered along the Rhone, occupying the main line of resistance from Montelimar on the south to the Drome River on the north.

General Truscott had further ordered the 36th Division to block roads on both sides of the Rhone Valley. "If humanly possible create road blocks", and he added, "you must interrupt all enemy traffic on the main north-south roads in the Rhone Valley." The mission of the 36th Division was clear and explicit. The American forces were to be built up at Montelimar in an effort to block the German retreat up the Rhone.

In preparation for coming operations, Task Force Butler had taken up defensive and flank positions to support the 141st Regiment. Flank protection was made the responsibility of the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron. It was of utmost importance that all enemy movement be canalized directly northward along Highway 7 to bring the enemy into the firing zone of the 141st Regiment, and to protect supply lines between the battle area and the Grenoble Corridor. The 117th Reconnaissance Squadron was to patrol the entire extent of the southern border of the battle quadrangle and the road running south from Crest. It was also

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necessary to protect American troops operating within the battle area from enemy thrusts from the north. German troops were known to be located in and around Valence and Lyon, and it was feared that increased American pressure exerted at Montelimar might increase German efforts from the north to keep open the escape route. The 117th Reconnaissance Squadron was therefore directed to send out vigorous patrols to the north and northwest from Livron.

With Task Force Butler had come the attached 59th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, the first artillery unit to engage in operations at Montelimar. When Task Force Butler arrived in the battle area on 21 August, the Armored Field Artillery Battalion immediately set up its batteries along the Condillac pass, between the Marsanne Forest on the north and Hill 430 on the south. By occupation of the Condillac Pass, batteries could lay effective direct fire on Highway 7 to the northwest, on the Roubion River Valley to the southeast, and indirect fire over the three hill masses toward Montelimar.

The first test of strength between the German and American forces occured on the afternoon of 23 August. The 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment had been assigned the mission of attacking from the north and northeast to take Montelimar. This attack was to be supported by a platoon of tank destroyers and a platoon of tanks, but they did not arrive. The French Maquis, who were to assist in the attack, were quickly dispersed by the Germans. The only support remaining to the 2nd Battalion was that of the 59th Armored Field Artillery Battalion set up at Condillac Pass about eight or ten miles northeast of the tactical objective. The advance of the 2nd Battalion was halted by artillery fire from Montelimar and also from Hill 300 which was strongly held by the Germans.

The first test of strength was an American defeat. The Germans were building up their forces south of Montelimar, while the Americans were rushing reinforcements westward from the Grenoble Corridor. This early failure to capture Montelimar was to alter the pattern of the eight day battle. By maintaining possession of Montelimar the Germans retained liberty of movement in two directions. They were able to continue north along Highway 7, since they still

retained control of the high ground to the north of town, and they were able to turn eastward along the Roubion River where elements of American forces were merely deployed as flank protection. On the other hand, American artillery since 21 August had begun its destructive



IMMOBILIZED VEHICLES AND RAILWAY GUN

"... American artillery since 21 August had begun its destructive work along Highway 7 ..."

work along Highway 7; and the increasing debris of wrecked equipment caused by both artillery and air operations compelled the Germans to seek alternative routes.

On 22 August the 36th Division had been directed by the VI Corps to, "move the 977th and the 141th Field Artillery Battalions to positions from which they can cover Montelimar and routes south in the Rhone Valley." By the close of 23 August the two battalions were in position northeast of Montelimar. The 141st Field Artillery Battalion moved into the Condillac Pass southeast of the positions of the 59th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. The 977th Field Artillery Battalion

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went into position northeast of the village of Marsanne. It was not until 24 August, however, that the full artillery strength of the 36th Division was massed and organized at Montelimar.

Failure to contain the enemy initially, however, later made



GERMAN WRECKAGE ALONG HIGHWAY 7

". . . increasing debris of wrecked equipment compelled the Germans to seek alternate routes . . ."

it necessary to engage him on three sides. Montelimar was not captured until the end of the battle period, although numerous assaults were made on the town. The movement of the American 3rd Division into Montelimar from the south marked the end of the battle. After the town was occupied, no additional German elements were able to move into the battle area. Those who remained consisted mostly of suicide squads attempting to delay the American advance while German units withdrew across the Drome River.

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Roubion River Line

The initial failure to capture Montelimar necessitated the building up of American defenses along the Roubion River Line. If the German elements could be denied the alternative routes leading east, they would have to pass along Highway 7 and be subjected to heavy artillery and small arms fire. At 1400 hours on 24 August the 36th Division issued its operational instructions. The main line of resistance was to follow the northern bank of the Roubion River from the southern slope of Hill 300 on the west to the foothills of the Pre-Alps on the extreme east. Defenses faced south, from which direction it was presumed that the greatest enemy pressure would be exerted. Defensive forces consisted of the 141st and the 142nd Infantry Regiments, one company of the 111th Engineer Battalion, one company of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, plus all the divisional artillery in support.

The extreme western end of the main line of resistance was to be used as a hinge-point from which the 141st Regiment was to make its thrusts in an attempt to cut Highway 7. As the line progressed eastward, it served to protect the southern entrance to the Condillac Pass. The chief military value of this pass was that it covered an approach to the village of La Coucourde in the Rhone Valley from the middle portion of the Roubion River Plain. Farther eastward, the main line of resistance passed through the village of Bonlieu, which divided the zone of responsibility between the 141st and 142nd Infantry Regiments. From Bonlieu the line continued eastward in the zone of the 142nd Regiment until it reached the Pre-Alps.

Artillery was in position along the ridge to the north of the Roubion Valley to supplement the defenses of the main line of resistance. The 141st Infantry Regiment on the right flank was supported by the 131st Field Artillery Battalion. The 59th Armored Field Artillery Battalion remained in position along the Condillac Pass; the 131st Field Artillery Battalion moved southeast of the 59th to protect the southeastern entrance of the Condillac Pass; and the 133rd Field Artillery Battalion arrived to center its emplacements around the village of Marsanne.

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The 142nd Infantry Regiment on the left flank was supported by the 132nd Field Artillery Battalion and the 93rd Field Artillery Battalion. The entire divisional main line of resistance was supported by the 977th, the 141st, and the 155th Field Artillery Battalions. The 977th and the 141st Battalions remained in their former positions, one northeast of Marsanne and the other south of the Condillac Pass. The 155th Battalion was stationed north of the 132nd Field Artillery Battalion's position so as to give supporting fire to the left flank of the divisional line.

The Operations Instructions enjoined the field artillery battalions to be, "prepared to place fire of at least one half of the artillery on roads in the Rhone Valley from Montelimar north . . . . and to cover route Bourdeaux-Crest with at least one half of the artillery." Bourdeaux is on Route 538 between Crest and Nyons. These instructions indicated that, although the primary mission of the artillery was to reinforce the main line of resistance along the Roubion, it was also to be ready to cover Highway 7 north of Montelimar with fire and to prevent any enemy penetration along the eastern border of the battle area, especially toward Crest, through which ran the divisional supply line.

Although hills to the north gave good artillery observation, the entire Roubion River Valley was excellent tank country. During this season the river was low; and the surrounding ground was firm and open, cut only here and there by hedges.

On 24 August a copy of the Operations Instructions of the 36th Division fell into the hands of the enemy. Not only were the Germans forewarned as to the steps being taken to trap them, but the attached overlay indicated that Bonlieu was the weak spot in the main line of resistance. The 36th Division was now too heavily committed to change its battle plans, and only later would it be known what use the enemy would make of his acquired information.

In front of the village of Bonlieu a composite company of the 111th Engineer Battalion was spread out along a line over 3,000 yards in length. This unit consisted of Company A, less one platoon, and one platoon from Company C with a provisional platoon from Headquarters

and Service Company. At 1600 hours on 25 August a German unit of company strength, supported by two tanks, launched an attack preceded by infiltration tactics against Bonlieu. Covered by fire from the tanks, infantry crossed the river and forced the engineers back several hundred yards. This original enemy success was followed by another assault which completely destroyed any defensive line which the engineers might hope to maintain. A battalion of German infantry, supported by six Mark VI tanks, attacked toward Marsanne and completely severed the Roubion defense line.

The 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry Regiment was ordered from near Marsanne into the gap. On the following day, 26 August, as the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Regiment moved in to close the western segment of the breakthrough, the 1st Battalion of the 142nd Regiment moved to the south-west from near Puy St. Martin to the defense of the threatened sector. Again the Germans attacked the defense line at Bonlieu. Lack of mortars, temporary absence of air support, and the unfavorable defensive terrain were largely responsible for German successes in breaking through the American lines. Large numbers of German personnel and quantities of equipment were able on 25-26 August to enter the battle square and head northward toward the Drome River.

The German breakthrough at Bonlieu had completely severed contact between the 141st Regiment on the west flank and the 142nd Regiment on the east. The composite company from the 111th Engineers had been relieved from the battered line late on 25 August. By the morning of 27 August the original main line of resistance had been restored by the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 142nd Infantry, and the Germans had been stopped from using the Roubion River Valley as an alternate route to the Drome.

Two regiments of the German 198th Infantry Division were identified in the order of battle during operations against the Roubion River line during 25-26 August. On 25 August the 326th Infantry Regiment spearheaded the attack, and the 305th Infantry Regiment followed the next day. Six Mark VI tanks were apparently attached to each regiment, and so skillfully were these tanks camouflaged that the

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American artillery observers, along the ridges north of the river, experienced great difficulty in identifying the targets. Exactly what German elements slipped through the Bonlieu gap during the rupture of the American defensive line, it is impossible to establish. Interrogation of prisoners indicated that a part of the 11th Panzer Division and portions of the 198th Infantry Division availed themselves of this opportunity to escape.

Blocking of Highway 7

The blocking of Highway 7 was one of the primary missions of the 36th Division when it arrived in the Rhone Valley from Grenoble. By a division order at 1915 hours on 22 August, the 141st Infantry Regiment was directed to set up a roadblock north of Montelimar. The 141st Regiment was unable to comply with the order, since the Germans had the area under intense artillery fire.

Efforts to establish a roadblock were not resumed until after the initial failure to capture the town of Montelimar. On the morning of 25 August Task Force Butler attempted to put in a roadblock on Highway 7 near the village of Saulce-sur-Rhone north of La Coucourde. However, because of overwhelming enemy pressure, the venture failed. Later on the same day a second attempt was made by the 141st Regiment, some two and a half miles south of Saulce-sur-Rhone. This effort was also unsuccessful.

Late on 25 August a third attempt was made by the 141st Regiment to block Highway 7 at the village of La Coucourde. This block was protected by a platoon of infantry, six tank destroyers, and three tanks. Enemy armor, supported by infantry, broke through; and the position had to be abandoned. On the following day Task Force Butler was instructed by the 36th Division to, "alert your whole force for immediate movement to counterattack, seize, and restore block on Highway 7 at La Coucourde. Attack by way of Marsanne-Condillac-Coucourde." Although Task Force Butler had moved northward through the Condillac Pass and had reached Highway 7 by 0630, the highway had not been cut by 1200 hours, 27 August. One battalion of infantry


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and one company of medium tanks, supported by two battalions of artillery, failed to stop the German thrusts of tanks and infantry.

The mission of the 133rd Field Artillery Battalion was changed and directed exclusively into the Rhone Valley in the vicinity of



IMMOBILIZED GERMAN CONVOY

"... enemy convoys had been under constant artillery fire since 21 August ..."

Condillac, adding weight to battery fire already adjusted on the highway. This marked the beginning of the artillery's tremendous destruction of the enemy who was endeavoring to escape northward along Highway 7, and, since the enemy provided so many targets, the batteries of the 133rd Field Artillery Battalion had to be separated into platoons in order to fire the maximum number of fire missions. At one period of the day the battalion was firing seven separate missions at once. Even this method was inadequate, so an individual gun was hauled to the top of a hill, to one of the company observation posts; and direct fire was brought to bear on the roads and railroad below.

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By 2130 hours on 27 August the 1st Battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment reported that a roadblock had been created by wrecked enemy vehicles, put out of action by American artillery firing from the hills east of the highway. German tanks and motor transports were attempting to by-pass the barrier of debris along Highway 7 in order to reach the Drome River. Between Montelimar and Loriol enemy convoys had been under constant artillery fire and air attack since 21 August.

There was not enough artillery ammunition available to inflict all the damage that could be done, despite the fact that ammunition trains hauled day and night. Within battalions and between battalions, ammunition was shifted from one unit to another in order to have it available for the most remunerative targets. Every available man carried shells from one gun to another, and between batteries, jeeps and weapons carriers were called into service. On 26 August the 133rd Field Artillery Battalion had scored direct hits on a train of 55 cars in the Rhone Valley. Enough damage was caused to prevent further movement of the train. Two other trains, blocked by the wreckage, became targets for other artillery battalions in position farther south. All three trains were eventually captured with their contents, which included five large railway guns.

Highway 86, on the west bank of the Rhone River, was a less desirable escape route than Highway 7 on the east bank. The road on the west bank is narrow, exceedingly curved, and clings to the steeply rising crags which in many places project almost into the river. However, as American pressure against German traffic on the east bank increased, more and more traffic had to be routed over Highway 86.

As late as 27-28 August two important bridges across the Rhone River were still being used by the Germans in their retreat toward Lyon. The location of these bridges permitted a portion of the German traffic to avoid the more direct fire of American artillery and to free itself from the necessity of having to force its way through American roadblocks on Highway 7.

One bridge was about two miles west of Montelimar. A main route led directly out of town to the bridge and across to the western

bank of the Rhone River. With the Germans still in control of Montelimar they could divert traffic to the other bank. The second bridge across the Rhone was near the mouth of the Drome, at the extreme end of the battle area. Since the bridge was out of range of American artillery and since the Drome River could be forded at many points, the Germans diverted considerable military traffic from the west bank to the east.

The harassing activities of the FFI upon German traffic moving northward along the western bank and the periodic shelling by American artillery from across the river were insufficient to do more than disrupt traffic for short periods. The failure to deny the enemy the use of the two bridges across the Rhone allowed the Germans to exploit the tactical advantage of possessing an alternative escape route.

Control of the hill masses to the north and the northeast of Montelimar was the key to the developing tactical situation. Since the supply line of the 36th Division came into the battle area from the northeast, enemy control of the hill masses represented a potential threat. Condillac Pass served not only as a route of communication between the Roubion Valley and Highway 7 at La Coucourde, but also as a base for operations against the hill masses to the southwest of the pass. The Condillac Pass was constantly threatened from the north by enemy activities along Highway 7, and from the south by armored thrusts along the Roubion River Valley. It was this lack of an adequate base from which to operate that accounted for the difficulties of securing control of the hill masses.

The 3rd Battalion of the 141st Regiment was concerned with the protection of the main regimental supply line that ran diagonally southwest from Crest. Holding a position at the south entrance of the Condillac Pass, it was under German pressure from the direction of Bonlieu and the Roubion Valley. The 2nd Battalion operated out of the Condillac Pass and directed its efforts toward attacks on the town of Montelimar to the southwest. The 1st Battalion was concerned chiefly with efforts to block Highway 7 immediately north of La Coucourde.

Each of the three battalions received constant enemy pressure during the entire period of the battle of Montelimar. The enemy's partial control of the high ground to the east of Highway 7 prevented the 141st

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Regiment from fully accomplishing its tactical mission. Enemy success in penetrating the main line of resistance placed elements of the 11th Panzer Division and the 198th Infantry Division between the extended position of the 2nd Battalion along the Roubion River and its communications base at Condillac Pass. Only after prolonged and intense fighting was the battalion able to move northward and regain contact on 25 August.

It was not until the American 3rd Division reached Montelimar from the south, on 28 August, that the 141st Regiment was actually able to complete its assigned mission. On that date the 141st Regiment seized control of the hilltops and drove to the south across the Roubion River to overcome the remaining German resistance in the area. On 28 August the village of Montelimar was occupied by American forces. The tactical situation now demanded that efforts be made to halt the enemy before he could complete crossing of the Drome River. Operations along the Drome River represented the final phase of the Battle of Montelimar.

Crossing the Drome

The Drome River was the last barrier in the German retreat northward to Lyon. The river represented an important axis of communication and supply for all American forces in the battle area. In order to protect this northern flank, the 143rd Regiment was sent from Grenoble southwest to Bourg-de-Peage, a town between 20 and 25 miles north of Crest. From this point troops could be moved quickly to the defense of Crest on the Drome.

Bonlieu was the weak link along the main line of resistance, as the Germans knew from the captured Operations Instructions, so it was assumed that Crest would be their northern objective in any drive toward the Drome River from the south. On 24 August the Commanding Officer of the 143rd Regiment was notified to, "remain at Bourg-de-Peage . . . be prepared to move on Crest on short notice." Later in the same day when the threat to Crest became more apparent, this warning was supplemented by, "you must have the bulk of your force (at least one

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infantry battalion plus all tank destroyers and artillery) in Crest by daylight, 25 August."

To increase the strength of the American defenses at Crest and along the Drome River, the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion was sent to this area. Tank destroyers went into position on both sides of the bridge across the Drome at Crest, and roadblocks were set up to the north and northeast of town. The Commanding General of the 36th Division instructed the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion to hold the roadblocks as long as possible in the event of an attack. If forced by the enemy, the entire battalion was to fall back on Crest and hold "to the last." As a last resort, the bridges across the Drome at Crest were to be destroyed.

Although the enemy made serious threats to the town of Crest, the restoration of the line at Bonlieu on 27 August tended to diminish the pressure. Throughout the entire period between 22 and 30 August the enemy did not cease to probe for crossings over the Drome. In the latter stages of the battle, efforts were shifted more and more toward the western portion of the river near the town of Loriol.

The village of Allex lies north of the Drome midway between Crest and the Rhone River. The 2nd Battalion of the 157th Infantry Regiment, which had been sent into the Montelimar battle area to reinforce the 36th Division, occupied the town of Allex by 2000 hours, 26 August. German activity to the north and west was reported. However, by 1200 hours on the following day the Germans had completely withdrawn, allowing the 2nd Battalion to establish and maintain roadblocks on three sides of the town. The Commanding General of the VI Corps ordered the 157th Regiment not to "press its advance toward Livron at the expense of making secure Crest and Allex."

By 27 August, American forces had progressed a considerable distance westward along the northern edge of the battle square, thus narrowing the German zone of escape across the Drome. At the end of the battle period, crossings were confined to a section of the river which did not extend more than six or seven miles upstream from its confluence with the Rhone.

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Closing this one remaining escape route of the German Nineteenth Army across the Drome required the use of air support to harass enemy traffic, to destroy bridges, and to demolish fording sites. As late as 25 August a main highway and railroad bridge were still being used by the Germans. On this date both bridges were knocked out by American artillery or air power. But since the Drome was fordable at most points during the month of August, the Germans utilized four fording sites in the vicinity of Highway 7. Two of these crossings were west of the railroad bridge, another between the railroad and highway bridge, and the last about 2,000 yards east of Highway 7. Enemy tanks crossed on railroad ties laid on top of crushed stone and gravel. Other heavy equipment which was unable to cross under its own power was winched over.

German fording activities were temporarily interrupted late on 27 August. On 26 August the river was at a low stage, but a thunderstorm in the mountains created a sudden flood, and for several hours all German traffic was stalled on the south bank. Immobile columns of vehicles offered increased opportunities for American artillery and air power, and a heavy toll was taken.

On 27 August the Commanding General of the Seventh Army requested that all possible air support be brought to bear against the Germans crossing the Drome. Although the German retreat from the battle zone was hurried, there existed the same degree of careful planning which had been evident throughout the previous eight days. Immediately to the north of the village of Loriol the Germans concentrated all their mobile equipment in a large assembly area. Traffic could then be diverted to the several fording sites as the tactical situation permitted. The 110th Grenadier Regiment of the German 11th Panzer Division was charged with moving equipment and personnel across the Drome River.


Since the westward advance of the American 157th Regiment at Allex constituted a threat to any German movement across the lower reaches of the river, the 110th Grenadier Regiment effectively covered German movements by offering strong resistance along roads leading west and northwest out of Allex. Later, elements of this regiment moved

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to the northwest above the village of Livron to assist in the final phases of the crossings. By daylight of 28 August the major part of the German 11th Panzer Division was able to cross the Drome and move out toward the city of Lyon.

During the period 26-28 August intensive efforts were being made by VI Corps to close off the German movement. On 28 August the 157th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Brigadier General John H. Church, was instructed to, "extend vigorous reconnaissance and follow-up action from Crest, along the north side of the Drome River, through Livron to the Rhone." On the following day, the 36th Division

LIVRON

". . . the 2nd Battalion took up positions on the high ground to the east . . . "

instructed the 142nd Regiment to, "move with all possible speed via Crest to Allex, and push west to Highway 7 to cut off the retreating enemy." Although the weight of these two American regiments was engaged in this final effort to close off Highway 7 and the Drome River

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crossing, so stubborn was the German resistance that Livron was not reached until 28 August. On this date the 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Regiment arrived northwest of the village, and the 2nd Battalion took up positions on the high ground to the east. At 1015 hours, 28 August, Livron was completely surrounded by the 142nd Regiment, and Highway 7 was at last blocked. It was now possible to cover the Drome River crossings with artillery fire, but unfortunately the great bulk of the enemy had already crossed.

On 27 and 28 August, more and more artillery was directed upon enemy movement up the Rhone Valley. The "long toms" of the 977th Field Artillery Battalion were directed upon the crossings of the Drome River near its confluence with the Rhone. In this area, between the villages of Loriol and Livron, these long range guns knocked out the railroad bridge, the highway bridge, and destroyed the ford which was being used by the Germans on the route of withdrawal. At the same time, the 133rd, the 59th, the 93rd, the 155th, and the 141st Field Artillery Battalions were firing into enemy traffic on the main highway, and on the secondary roads leading north of these river crossings.

On 28 August the artillery was shifted northward to intercept further enemy withdrawals up the Rhone north of the Drome. The 132nd Field Artillery Battalion moved to positions near Allex, to support the infantry attack on Livron and at the same time take the German transport under fire in the Rhone Valley. In order to get advantageous positions, artillery troops went into action in the infantry area where they received casualties from small arms and mortar fire. The next day these positions proved excellent ones from which to fire upon the Germans in the valley.

By that time the infantry had taken Livron, from which place the liaison officers of the 132nd Field Artillery Battalion secured good observation on the vehicle-packed roads in the valley. It was an "artilleryman's dream", since the enemy columns of armor, trucks, horse-drawn guns and carts, as well as personnel, as they came through the narrow bottleneck and forded the Drome River, were exposed to the constant pounding from American artillery. These observers fired the 132nd Field Artillery Battalion almost continuously, and also used C Battery

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of the 155th, which had moved north. It was estimated that in this location alone the 132nd Battalion caused the destruction or abandonment of 500 vehicles and 50 artillery pieces.

After numerous attempts by Task Force Butler to block Highway 7 by means of infantry attacks from the lower ridges of Hill 300 and artillery fire from the high ground in the Marsanne Forest, the final decision was to capture the town of Loriol.

Loriol is situated on the lowland formed by the confluence of the Drome with the Rhone. Artillery placed along high ground east of Loriol would command the village, Highway 7, and all the fording sites



VEHICLES CAUGHT BY ARTILLERY ON OUTSKIRTS OF MONTELIMAR

". . . It was an 'artilleryman's dream' . . . Columns of armor, trucks, horse drawn carts and guns, as well as personnel, were exposed to the constant pounding of American artillery . . ."

across the Drome. The 1st Battalion of the 143rd Regiment was to attack Loriol from the high ground east of the village. Once the town had been captured, protective roadblocks could be set up; and the main

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body of the 143rd Regiment could join up with the elements of the 141st Regiment that were still operating along Highway 7 opposite Hill 300. The 753rd Tank Battalion was to support the infantry attack. The 117th Reconnaissance Squadron would protect the eastern flank of the operation by patrolling along the southern bank of the Drome, from Loriol eastward to the town of Crest. The 93rd Armored Field Artillery and the 141st Field Artillery Battalions were in direct support of the infantry in their advance against Loriol.

The tanks of the 753rd Tank Battalion approached Loriol by moving along a wooded trail paralleling Highway 7 and bordering the




RESULTS OF AMERICAN FIRE POWER

". . . Task Force Butler had a field day firing at traffic to the west of the roads . . ."

western ridge of the Marsanne Hills. By 1530 hours, 28 August, the main body of Task Force Butler had reached the high ground east of Loriol and reported, "having a field day firing at traffic to the west of the roads. No infantry opposition to speak of." German troops in Loriol

defended the town in order to shield the retreat of the last elements making their escape northward across the Drome. However, tanks wedged in north of the town; Loriol was tactically isolated and all organized resistance collapsed on 29 August. At 0915 hours on the following day the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Regiment reached the junction of the Drome with the Rhone River. The battle area was at last securely closed, and the Battle of Montelimar came to an end.

While the 36th Division was endeavoring to block the German escape route between Montelimar and the Drome River, the American 3rd Division was pushing the enemy up from the south. With all



WRECKAGE OF GERMAN CONVOY

". . . Germans . . . were forced to pass through the fire of the blocking force . . ."

avenues of escape from the rear sealed off, the Germans, following the northward course of the Rhone Valley, were forced to pass through the fire of the blocking force.

In retreating northward the German Nineteenth Army suc-

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ceeded in maintaining a distance of from 12 to 18 miles between its own forces and the advance elements of the 3rd Division. By the evening of 27 August the 3rd Division had reached the vicinity of Montelimar from Orange. A "daylight line" was established for the final drive into Montelimar on the following day. This line extended along an east-west axis paralleling the entire southern border of the battle square and cut across Highway 7 a half mile south of the town. The three regiments of the division approached the battle zone with the 15th Regiment on the extreme west, the 30th Regiment in the center of the divisional formation, and the 7th Regiment on the extreme east flank.



ABANDONED GERMAN EQUIPMENT

". . . left behind by the enemy were destroyed vehicles, guns, and heavy equipment, which reflected the eight days of heavy fighting . . ."

The final drive into Montelimar on 28 August caught only scattered rear-guard elements. The 15th and 30th Regiments advanced straight northward across the "daylight line", while the 7th Regiment

turned westward to reach the Rhone River. By the end of the day enemy resistance in the town of Montelimar had ended, and all stragglers were picked up. The 3rd Division, in the movement from the south, had forced the German Nineteenth Army into the Montelimar battle area, but the American blocking force was not strong enough to entirely prevent the enemy from breaking out. By the end of August the Germans had succeeded in withdrawing the greater part of their personnel north of the Drome River; but left behind were destroyed vehicles, guns, and heavy equipment, which reflected the eight days of heavy fighting. The destruction of enemy equipment by American field artillery units



KNOCKED OUT ENEMY HALFTRACK

". . . Destroyed German equipment was found not only along the main highways, but also on minor routes and trails . . ."

was estimated to include between 2,000 and 3,000 vehicles, over 80 artillery pieces, and five large caliber railroad guns. Destroyed German equipment was found not only along the main highways, but also on

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minor routes and trails. The enemy had neglected no avenue of escape in his haste to cross the battle area to the north of the Drome River. Each route and assembly area seemed to have been covered at one time or another by some unit of American artillery.

Supply Difficulties

During the eight day Battle of Montelimar the supply route from the battle square to the beaches by way of the Grenoble Corridor remained tenuous and was frequently threatened by enemy action. At no time during the period was the quantity of supplies brought into the battle area sufficient to satisfy actual needs.

The 36th Division supply dump was located at Aspres, a town in the Grenoble Corridor, 165 miles by road from the D-Day landing beaches. From Aspres the supply route progressed northwest along Highway 93 to the town of Crest, a distance of 70 miles. From Crest the routes fanned out in several different directions in accordance with the tactical situation. However, the chief axis of supply was to the southwest from Crest across a diagonal into Condillac Pass, some five or six miles northeast of Montelimar. The German breakthrough at Bonlieu on 25 August necessitated the temporary switching of the supply route to Highway 94, from Serres south of Aspres west to Nyons, then northwest into the battle area. Even this highway was at times threatened by enemy penetrations, since the Germans were seeking eastward routes of escape to avoid encirclement at Montelimar. There was also some enemy activity near the roadblock set up by the 142nd Infantry Regiment on Highway 94 at Nyons.

On 25 August the Germans established a roadblock on Highway 538 south of Crest which complicated further the problem of supply routes. This was the main supply line that connected Crest with the village of Marsanne at the southern end of the Condillac Pass. For a short time all supplies had to be transported over mountain roads, until this roadblock was knocked out by American tanks.

The scarcity of supplies was due mainly to the distances over which ammunition, rations, and gasoline had to be moved. Pre-D-Day

Allied bombing had destroyed important railroad bridges along the Grenoble Corridor, so that all supplies had to be trucked from the landing beaches to the divisional dump at Aspres. From Aspres supplies were further distributed by truck to the various units in the Montelimar area. The battle area was 235 miles by road from the Riviera coast, and the supply haul required a round trip of 470 miles.

Gasoline, food, and ammunition were the critical items during the Battle of Montelimar. Priorities and rationing had to be put into effect. Top priority on gasoline was given to the tank and tank destroyer battalions. Troops were placed on "$^{2}/_{3}$ rations" for the battle period. Artillery units were forced to "pass up" excellent targets because of the ammunition shortage.

The expenditure of ammunition is a gauge of the work done by the artillery in the Battle of Montelimar from 23 to 30 August 1944. The three battalions of light artillery fired 35,775 rounds of ammunition, and the medium battalion fired 1,890 rounds, making an overall total of 37,665 rounds. However, this is not an accurate figure, because this report includes only the four organic units of the division artillery. Four other battalions were also attached to the division, and their total number of guns was more than that of the organic artillery. It can be assumed that they fired at least half the number of rounds as that of the organic artillery.

The demand for artillery ammunition always far exceeded the supply. On 26 August the 36th Division had on hand 100 rounds per gun for the 105 mm howitzers, 125 rounds per gun for the 155 mm howitzers, and 78 rounds per gun for the "long toms." The next day the pro-rata reserve was 132 rounds for each light artillery piece, 138 rounds for each medium artillery piece, and 44 rounds for each 155 mm gun. By 27 August the ammunition supply had become so low that the Commanding General of the 36th Division ordered, "If a low of 25 rounds per gun is reached, cease firing at once except in the case of a dire emergency. Shoot at remunerative targets only."

The account of the 59th Field Artillery Battalion describes the ammunition supply problem in relation to the tactical situation:

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On 22 August three German columns fanned out simultaneously toward Sauzet, Cleon, and Puy-St. Martin (towns along the Roubion River), hitting up from the south. Another came toward us at Condillac Pass from the northwest, and still another came from Crest . . . . There were numerous excellent targets of opportunity to be fired upon, but they had to be passed up because of the extremely low ammunition supply. The ammunition train could not be expected for another 48 hours; General Butler (Commanding Task Force Butler) ordered that when each gun was down to 75 rounds, no more would be fired without his permission. This was a precautionary measure against any possible enemy counterattack. As a result, ammunition was used very sparingly and then only at extremely juicy targets or those targets which could not be handled by smaller caliber weapons.

Commenting on the long supply haul, the narrative continues, "During the period from 22 August to 29 August the battalion ammunition train made four round trips to the beach at Ste. Maxime, each trip 470 miles."

The Second Attempt at Encirclement

Though the German High Command was successful in breaking through the Montelimar trap and withdrawing the greater portion of its forces north of the Drome River, there still remained another opportunity for the Americans to intercept the enemy before he could reach the Belfort Gap. The Seventh Army Field Order No. 4, 28 August, set forth the final directives for destroying the German Nineteenth Army before it could withdraw to the "West Wall." French Army B was directed to proceed northward along the west bank of the Rhone River and to assist in the capture of the city of Lyon. The American VI Corps was to advance due north on an axis Lyon-Beaune-Dijon. The joint action of the Americans and French would constitute the effective encirclement of the city of Lyon.

The General axis of advance would continue northward, since Beaune and Dijon were located almost due north of Lyon. However, Dijon was situated almost due west of the entrance to the Belfort Gap; and many German elements were expected to turn eastward upon reaching Lyon in order to take the most direct route to the Belfort Gap and the Rhine. Should the Seventh Army be successful in effecting a rapid

advance toward Dijon to join with Allied elements pushing southeast from Normandy, a large portion of the German Nineteenth Army would be "sealed off" and prevented from reaching the Rhine.

The Commanding General of the VI Corps ordered the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron to act as a screening force and to maintain contact with the retreating enemy. The 45th Division was immediately ordered to advance northwest from Grenoble to cut across the axis connecting the City of Lyon with the border of Switzerland. The 36th Division was to continue its advance northward from the Montelimar battle area toward Lyon, and the 3rd Division was to mop up the remaining enemy elements in the Montelimar area. Finally, Task Force Butler, having completed the capture of Loriol along the Drome River, was to move eastward to Crest where it was to be disbanded.

The principle maneuvering element for this shearing operation of the Seventh Army was the 179th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Division. Advance patrols of the 179th Regiment exploited rapidly to the northwest from Grenoble. By 27 August the 179th Infantry had occupied the town of Bourgoin, midway between Grenoble and Lyon. The 179th Regiment continued to advance to the north and by 21 August had arrived at Pont D'Ain, which is midway between Lyon and the Swiss border. The occupation of Pont D'Ain cut off Lyon from the northeast. Roadblocks were established on all roads radiating east from Lyon, and the direction of retreat of the German Nineteenth Army was forced farther northward.

There still remained elements of five divisions of the German Nineteenth Army; the 11th Panzer, the 189th, the 198th, the 338th, and the 716th Divisions. All were using the upper Rhone Valley as an escape route. The 716th Division and part of the 189th had avoided the Montelimar trap by moving to the north on the west side of the Rhone. The other divisions, at least in large part, had infiltrated through the American trap at Montelimar. By 27 August the bulk of the 11th Panzer Division had crossed the Drome River and was well on its way to Lyon. The slower infantry divisions, however, were still south of the city of Lyon as late as 30 August.

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Destruction of mobile equipment considerably slowed down the rate of retreat of the German divisions. On 30 August 200 enemy vehicles were observed moving across the Isere River, north of Valence in the Rhone Valley. Of this total, 75 percent were horse drawn. In his haste to clear Lyon the enemy was moving his forces by day and night; columns of traffic made a profitable target for Allied air power and the FFI. It appeared that the enemy was attempting to increase the speed of evacuation and to salvage as much personnel and equipment as possible from southern France.

In its retreat from southern France the German Nineteenth Army not only protected its withdrawal northward into Lyon but also succeeded in rounding the Swiss border to the northeast of Lyon by the clever use of armor in screening its turning movement. By using the Swiss border as a hinge and by protecting his extreme right or western flank against encirclement, the enemy was able to swing his entire column to the northeast toward the Belfort Gap and ultimately reach the Rhine.

Air Support

The XII Tactical Air Command gave direct support to the ground operations of the Seventh Army in southern France. During the two week period beginning with D-Day this aerial support was directed against three specific objectives: 1) To cause maximum destruction of enemy defenses in the assault area. 2) To isolate the battle area by destroying the remaining rail and highway bridges across the Rhone and other rivers. 3) To attack enemy troop movements.

The main objective of American aerial bombardment during the days prior to the invasion, and on invasion day itself, was the fixed defenses in southern France. As American forces moved inland, the tactical mission of air support changed. Bombing of enemy communication lines and troop movements was now given priority, since the German Nineteenth Army had retreated far beyond its own line of fixed defenses. By D-Day only one bridge across the Rhone at Avignon remained open for enemy use. Traffic southward from the City of Lyon

toward the beachhead area had also been interdicted by aerial activity. Routes from southern France eastward into Italy through the Alpine Passes or along the Riviera were severed by operations of the XII Tactical Air Command.

The German ground forces worked feverishly to restore bridges and routes of communication. By 17 August, two days after the Seventh Army had landed, the route southward from Lyon on Highway 7 had been re-opened. The railroad paralleling the Riviera coastal route into Italy was operating for one way traffic. The Rhone River bridge at Orange and the Drome River bridge at Livron were being repaired for the second time. Eleven days later, on 28 August, the Germans were able to restore partially three Rhone River bridges for limited use; but the railroad line between southern France and northwestern Italy had again been cut by American aerial bombardment.

By the beginning of the second week of American operations in southern France there was a fundamental modification in the objectives of the XII Tactical Air Command. It was realized that further wide spread destruction of rail and highway communications would be of greater disadvantage to the rapidly advancing American Seventh Army than to the retreating German Nineteenth Army. Tactical progress and the supply build-up of the Seventh Army were at times held up by bridges or stretches of road which had been destroyed a few days previously by American air power. Since the possibility of new emergency elements being brought into the battle area was remote, the XII Tactical Air Command abandoned the bombing of strategic communication lines and concerned itself with blocking future enemy escape routes or close cooperation with the ground forces in specific tactical missions. Finally, because of the rapid advance of the Seventh Army and the sabotage efforts of the FFI, aerial activity was given over exclusively to "day to day" actions as indicated by the immediate situation on the ground.

From 21 to 28 August the Tactical Air Command flew 3,299 effective sorties in southern France and dropped 1,907 tons of bombs. Of this tonnage, 851 tons were dropped on lines of communications, and 953 tons on enemy concentrations on the ground. However, from 29

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August to 4 September the Air Command flew 1,303 effective sorties and dropped only 50 tons of bombs. This reduction in sorties flown and bomb tonnage dropped reflected the shift in emphasis from so-called strategic bombing to isolated tactical bombing. The factor of distance from air bases also played an important part in the relative decline of aerial activity during the latter part of August.

The tactics employed in the battle of Montelimar made the problem of air support very complex. Direct air support consisted primarily of strafing individual groups of enemy personnel and equipment and of destroying enemy communications, such as bridges, highways, and firing sites. To achieve these ends, and as a safeguard to friendly forces, periodic bomb safety lines were established. These bomb safety lines set forth the bounds behind which American planes should not bomb or strafe because of the presence of friendly ground troops. However, there was always a time lag between a change in the tactical situation and new modifications in the bomb safety lines. Should the ground forces effect a sudden breakthrough against the enemy, as often occured, friendly troops were likely to overrun the bomb safety line. Conversely, if the enemy should suddenly penetrate the American lines, as was the case at Bonlieu on 25 August, air support for the American ground troops could not be called upon.

When the Germans broke through at Bonlieu, the Commanding General of the 36th Division requested, "Attack on column and trucks on Montelimar road at N-985584." The response was, "air will not do it because it is inside the bomb safety line and a permanent change of the bomb line must be made if they are going to do it."

The stretch of road on Highway 7 between Montelimar and Livron offered many problems to the supporting air command. American troops were operating on the highway in and around the village of La Coucourde in the attempt to establish a roadblock. Close by, sections of the road were jammed with enemy personnel and equipment. When air support was requested, the Air Corps responded that, "there is not sufficient means of identifying friendly from enemy troops."

In view of these complicating factors of coordination between air and ground forces during the battle of Montelimar, the Air Corps placed

its main emphasis on the west bank of the Rhone and on the north bank of the Drome. American ground troops were not operating in strength on either the extreme west or north side of the battle square, and it was here that the XII Tactical Air Command concentrated its activities against retreating Germans. Aircraft of the XII Tactical Air Command and carrier-based naval aircraft operating from the Mediterranean worked, however, in as close coordination with the ground forces as the situation permitted. They added to the destruction by strafing the enemy columns on Highway 7 north of Montelimar and by bombing and strafing the columns south of the town. So remunerative were the targets developed by congested traffic and jammed vehicles behind roadblocks that, during the period of this operation, pilots "were constantly reporting all their ammunition expended on closely packed enemy vehicles". Aircraft also attacked the railroad paralleling Highway 7 and the road and railroad on the west bank of the Rhone. These attacks were so successful during the week 21-28 August that headquarters, XII Tactical Air Command, reported, "the number of MT destroyed or damaged rose to 1,402, while 263 railroad cars and 30 locomotives were hit". These excellent results were attained in a period of the most adverse conditions under which air support could be given ground forces. Elements of Task Force Butler and other combat units were pressing close to Highway 7 north of Montelimar, and bomb line restrictions continually hampered air operations.

A more definite conception of the heavy toll of enemy equipment taken by aircraft during the Montelimar operation may be derived from the statement of the XII Tactical Command Air Intelligence that, "it should be recognized that it was the brilliantly conceived and executed operation of Task Force Butler in effecting the roadblock which produced one of the finest air targets ever offered the tactical units of this command". As the attack against retreating enemy forces pushed north, air support continued its relentless pressure. On 29 August the aircraft of the XII Tactical Air Command caught 227 enemy motor transport fleeing along the Montelimar-Valence road and destroyed or damaged much of the convoy.

Prior to, and for several days after D-Day, American air

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support had been based on the Island of Corsica. The minimum distance from Corsica to the invasion beaches was 140 miles; the air distance from the invasion beaches to Grenoble was 145 miles, to Lyon 195 miles. As the area of operations moved northward to Grenoble, the air distance from the Corsican bases to the site of the immediate ground operations became more than double that of D-Day. The rapid northward exploitation of the Seventh Army created a need for air bases in southern France so that air support could be more effective.

Since events had outstripped plans in southern France, temporary locations had to be selected and installations improvised so that air support could keep pace with the swiftly changing tactical situation on the ground. Within six days after the invasion six airfields were ready for operation in southern France. Some of these new airfields were nothing but fresh landing strips scraped from the vineyards. At Le Luc the airfield based two American P-47 Groups; at Sisteron four RAF Spitfire Squadrons; at Cuers three Spitfire Squadrons; at Frejus four RAF and one French Spitfire Squadron; and at Ramatuelle one FAF Spitfire Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, one American P-51 Observation Squadron, and one American P-47 Group.

It was not until September, however, that air power could be fully exploited in the operations of the Seventh Army in France. By September the rate of American advance had declined sufficiently to permit a greater degree of coordination between the air and ground forces. This also allowed for the erection of airdromes, which had a greater capacity for planes and more complete equipment for maintenance and operation. Finally, as airfields were located farther inland, more time could be spent by American air power over target areas in the Rhine Valley and in Germany proper.

Conclusions

During the 15 day period between D-Day and the end of August the German Nineteenth Army lost 57,068 men taken prisoner of war by Seventh Army units. A large number of these prisoners were taken by the French in Toulon and Marseilles. In addition to these

losses of the Nineteenth Army there were the uncounted casualties of killed and wounded. The losses for the Seventh Army for the same period totalled 2,733 killed, captured, or missing in action. This more than 20-to-1 ratio of German losses may be explained in terms of the first 15 days of operations after D-Day. The Seventh Army's rapid expansion inland coupled with the Allied breakthrough from Normandy, jeopardized the position of the German Nineteenth Army in southern France.

The German decision to pull out was made in order to forestall possible isolation and loss of routes of retreat. In the execution of this



A GROUP OF SURRENDERED NAZIS

"... The German Nineteenth Army lost 57,068 men, prisoners of war by Seventh Army units ..."

disengaging maneuver the enemy offered resistance to the Seventh Army only to make secure its avenues of escape. Rear guards were sacrificed whenever necessary. The lack of sufficient transportation caused

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thousands of stragglers to be left behind. In this dual operation of screening ahead and of blocking to the rear, large numbers of enemy personnel, particularly less desirable troops, were abandoned so that the more mobile elements would be able to withdraw. Seventh Army units sustained losses when they made contact with forward screening elements of the enemy or with rearguard groups of fanatical Germans who had been ordered to resist to the last man.

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CHAPTER X

Protecting the Eastern Flank

THE Seventh Army's rapid expansion north and northwest from the invasion beaches created an ever-lengthening eastern flank, which became an increasingly important aspect of the tactical picture. After D-Day the Allied beachhead separated the German 148th Reserve Division from the main body of the Nineteenth Army, although its presence in the Cannes-Nice area remained a threat to Allied lines of communication. It was known that the 148th Division was capable of harassing the Seventh Army's right flank by limited counterattacks, but even more serious was the possibility that the Germans might send reinforcements from northern Italy through the Alpine Passes. With the screen afforded by the 148th Reserve Division, it might be possible for the enemy to build up sufficient strength to launch a major counter-attack with the object of severing Allied supply lines and overruning beach installations.

Reported enemy motor movement southwest from Turin and west from Alessandria in the direction of the French Riviera underlined the possibility of a counterattack from the east. Between 20 and 23 August two unidentified enemy divisions were thought to be en route to southeastern France. However, the Allied High Command thought it improbable that the enemy would attempt to move significant numbers of troops through the east-west Alpine Passes. Mountainous terrain with narrow defiles and winding roads, which could be easily blocked by air power, and French resistance groups made such an undertaking too hazardous. It was more likely that the Germans considered the occupation of the Alpine Passes necessary in order to prevent any Allied

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entry into northern Italy which might jeopardize the rear of General Kesselring's forces.

Field Order No. 2, issued by Seventh Army on 19 August, took into account the situation on the right flank by providing that the 1st Airborne Task Force plus certain attached units would relieve the 36th Infantry Division by 20 August and establish a general defensive line from Fayence to La Napoule, the army's eastern flank. In addition, the 1st Airborne Task Force was to reconnoiter the general line Seranon-Grasse-Cannes. Three major subordinate units were assigned operational zones in accordance with the tactical objectives involved. The 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion was given the coastal zone and ordered to advance to the approaches of Cannes. The 1st Special Service Force, on the left flank of the 509th Parachute Battalion, was to occupy defensive positions with Grasse as its ultimate objective. The 517th Parachute Regimental Combat Team was to advance in the northern sector and seize St. Vallier. Other units of the 1st Airborne Task Force were assigned defensive or supporting missions.

The strategic role of this flank protection force was essentially defensive. Nevertheless, the nature of the terrain is such as to permit limited advances, though movement is very largely confined to roads. As one approaches the Franco-Italian border and crosses the Var River, closely-set, steep mountains rise sharply from the coast to heights of 5,000 feet and over from Nice to Switzerland. The Var Valley offers limited possibilities of deployment south of St. Martin du Var. But elsewhere along the Italian border rugged slopes and steep narrow valleys make movement off the roads difficult even for infantry. Nevertheless, the terrain is ideal for defensive warfare. Should the German 148th Reserve Division be driven into the passes along the Franco-Italian border, the protection of the eastern flank of the Seventh Army could be carried out with a minimum of forces.

Other circumstances dictated that German forces on the eastern flank be pushed back to the Italian border. The entire French nation attached special importance to an early liberation of Cannes and Nice. The reasons were more psychological than military, although harbor facilities at Nice would no doubt be useful.

Southern Sector

The southern sector extended from the Mediterranean coast to Larche Pass, a distance of about 60 miles. The airborne force on the eastern flank conducted the bulk of its operations within 15 miles of the coast, although a small mobile patrol was dispatched to the north to guard the roads approaching Larche Pass. As American troops crossed the Var River and advanced on Nice, an organization adequate for strong defense was dispatched to the Pass. Dispositions on the flank were modified to fill the 50-mile gap which had come to exist between the Larche Pass and the northern elements of the main body of the Airborne



NICE TOWARDS MONACO

". . . steep mountains rise sharply from the coast to heights of 5,000 feet and over . . ."

Task Force. Elements near the coast advanced east almost to the Italian border.

The 509th Parachute Battalion and the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, reinforced by tank destroyers and engineers, con-

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stituted a combat team to which was assigned the extreme southern sector of the eastern flank. Cannes was to be the first major objective. A few miles to the southwest of the city the enemy was well entrenched on the heights to the north and to the south of La Napoule and dominated the coastal road. Plans were made to attack La Napoule from two directions. The 1st Battalion, reinforced, of the 551st Parachute Infantry in support of the operation against Cannes was to attack toward La Napoule from Mandelieu on the north, while the 509th Parachute Battalion moved along the lower coastal road to attack from the southwest.

Early on the morning of 21 August the 509th was in position to attack. Preceded by a heavy artillery and mortar preparation against enemy positions on the heights, the battalion jumped off in two-company strength. By mid-day the first enemy fortified position had been taken. The battalion continued fighting throughout the following day in order to clear the enemy from the southern positions dominating the approaches to La Napoule.

Enemy artillery was at first quite active, but counter-battery fire from supporting Allied war vessels soon caused the Germans to withhold their fire. After high ground south of the town was taken La Napoule was quickly mopped up. This initial success was further exploited by an advance into the Siagne Plain and the approaches to Cannes. The 509th was now firmly established on the west bank of the Siagne River.

Meanwhile, the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion had fought its way over rugged country to reach the Les Termes-Mandelieu road to the north of La Napoule. This secured the northern flank of the 509th Parachute Battalion. Entry into Cannes was delayed until a suitable crossing could be constructed over the Siagne River. Engineers worked throughout the night of 23 August constructing a ford and clearing mine fields. Patrols, which had been sent across previously, returned with the information that the enemy had completely abandoned the city.

After clearing mines on the approaches to the city, the 509th Parachute Battalion entered Cannes at 1700 hours on 24 August. The

streets were lined with wildly-cheering people. Some were crying openly. Others threw flowers into passing American vehicles.

Time was of the utmost importance and the 509th Parachute Battalion moved straight through Cannes and eastward on to Antibes. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion of the 551st Parachute Infantry, which



APPROACHING CANNES

"... Entry into Cannes was delayed until a suitable crossing could be constructed over the Siagne River ..."

had followed the 509th Battalion in column across the Siagne, turned north at the outskirts of the city and followed Highway 567 to Mougins. This move secured the left flank of the southern sector and established contact with the 1st Special Service Force farther north at Grasse. Throughout 25 and 26 August the 509th Battalion sent aggressive patrols to the north of Antibes toward Biot.

Pushing northwest to the Loup River on 27 August, the 509th sent out patrols to St. Laurent du Var on the west bank of the Var River.

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Here numerous FFI, who had passed through the German lines, stated that the Var Valley had been evacuated by the enemy and that the city of Nice was clear. However, extensive minefields along the Var River made rapid progress difficult, though patrols moved some distance up the river in an effort to establish contact with the enemy.



A FRENCH MARINE POSTS "DANGER" SIGN AT ENTRANCE TO NICE

". . . extensive minefields along the Var River made rapid progress difficult . . ."

In the last days of August, Major General Robert T. Frederick, commanding the 1st Airborne Task Force, requested permission to occupy Nice: "Conditions now existing in Nice make it urgent that the city be occupied by Allied Forces as soon as possible. Unless some show of organized Allied military strength is made within the city at this time, it is feared that riots and other civilian disturbances will reach such a scale as to seriously damage American prestige in this area." The Commanding General granted permission. On 30 August the 509th Combat Team crossed the Var River and occupied the city of Nice. One

column moved north to St. Andre immediately and established contact with the 1st Special Service Force, and the other proceeded east along the coast to Beaulieu.

Entry into the State of Monaco was forbidden to Allied troops unless the principality was "known to be actually occupied by the enemy." If that were the case, it would become necessary to cross the border in order to secure the Seventh Army's eastern flank. From their position astride the St. Andre-La Turbie road, patrols from the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion reconnoitered along the French-Monaco border. No contact was made with the enemy. A telephone communication from the FFI in Monte Carlo stated that the area around the world famous gambling resort was free of the enemy. An enemy strongpoint at La Turbie, however, continued to hold out for several days despite heavy shelling from supporting Allied naval units. In a fire fight which began on 2 September, the 1st Battalion of the 551st Parachute Infantry succeeded in driving the Germans from their positions. They retreated eastward to the vicinity of St. Roche, covering their withdrawal by fighting light rear-guard actions and by an extensive use of mines to block all avenues of pursuit.

The 1st Special Service Force had been attached to the 1st Airborne Task Force on 22 August. It was assigned the central zone of the eastern flank, relieving the 2nd British Parachute Brigade, which was returned to Italy. Its first objective was the city of Grasse, which was an important road junction astride the Route Napoleon (Highway 85). The 1st and 3rd Regiments took up positions along the line of the Siagne River. The 2nd Regiment was kept in reserve.

On 23 August troops of the 1st Special Service Force began an all-out attack on Grasse, which held a strategic position with respect to the eastern flank. The 1st Regiment moved across the Siagne River and attacked the village of St. Marc. The 2nd Regiment was committed and advanced to the north through Cabris, then swung east to reach the Route Napoleon north of Grasse. St. Marc fall after a brief fire fight. At dawn on 24 August Grasse was attacked simultaneously from the north and from the southwest. Both operations were carried out successfully, and the city was occupied against relatively light resistance.

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Prisoners of war stated that the enemy had been evacuating the town for the past two days and that all artillery and heavy weapons had been withdrawn to Nice.

After the capture of Grasse the next objective was the Var River, which was in itself a natural defensive line. Intelligence reports suggested that the bulk of the enemy was withdrawing eastward over the coastal highway. Late on 24 August the 2nd Regiment of the 1st Special Service Force moved to the southeast to occupy the town of Valbonne, the center of the road net in the Grasse-Cannes-Nice triangle. The 1st Regiment, following the 2nd Regiment, drove on through Valbonne east to Biot, a small village about five miles north of Antibes. This maneuver cleared the northern flank of the 509th. A new thrust a few miles north of Valbonne secured the Route Napoleon as far as Cagnes and increased the pressure effected by the 509th against the enemy withdrawing along the coast road. Throughout 26 August the enemy launched a strong counterattack near Cagnes, but was forced to retire, leaving behind 100 battle casualties and 72 prisoners.

The remaining enemy forces in the area withdrew across the Var River. When the 1st Special Service Force arrived on the west bank, it had lost contact with the enemy. On 30 August the 1st and 3rd Regiments forded the river near Colomars, and sent out patrols to the east. The general advance continued slowly until 2 September when contact was again made with the enemy. Several strongly-held German positions were subjected to air bombardment as well as artillery fire. Patrols of the 3rd Regiment moved northeast along the Sospel Valley. By now the enemy had begun to consolidate his positions farther east in the mountains and limited his activities to defensive measures.

While the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion was approaching the city of Cannes and the 1st Special Service Force was preparing its attack against Grasse, the 517th Parachute Regimental Combat Team moved up on the left flank of the 1st Airborne Task Force. This combat team was made up of the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 460th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and the 596th Airborne Engineer Company. After the 517th RCT had relieved elements of the 36th Infantry Division in the Fayence-Callian area, one battalion crossed the

Siagne River and occupied St. Vallier, a town on the Route Napoleon, on 24 August.

The 517th RCT regrouped on the high ground east of the St. Vallier-Grasse road for a drive to the Var River. Throughout this advance enemy activity was negligible. On 29 August the main body of the 517th RCT less one company crossed the Var River and continued east over difficult terrain. Forward patrols made contact with the enemy, but except for occasional harassing artillery fire the Germans offered little resistance. By 3 September the 517th RCT had driven the enemy into the mountains near Peira Cava.



ROAD TO DIGNE

"... The 517th RCT had been assigned the responsibility of patrolling ... and of maintaining contact with elements of the American VI Corps in and about Digne ..."

On 22 August the 517th RCT had been assigned the responsibility of patrolling the road net to the west and south of Larche Pass, and of maintaining contact with elements of the American VI Corps in

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and about Digne. The reconnaissance platoon of the 695th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the 517th RCT for this purpose. Maintaining contact with the VI Corps and patrolling from the Var River to the Italian border at Larche demanded considerably more gasoline and motor vehicles than could be made available over long supply lines. However, good use was made of 1,000 gallons of gasoline and 15 vehicles which had been previously captured from the enemy by the 1st Airborne Task Force at Le Muy.

The 1st Airborne Task Force directed on 28 August that the 550 Airborne Infantry Battalion, reinforced by artillery, mortars, and tank destroyers, proceed immediately to the vicinity of Larche Pass. Allied intelligence reported that a considerable concentration of enemy troops was known to be in the area behind the pass, and it was feared that large-scale infiltration might be attempted. Since the enemy had taken up defensive positions along the Franco-Italian frontier as far as Switzerland, and since the highway through Larche Pass was sufficient to accommodate heavy traffic, the German LXXV Corps might assume an aggressive role.

A motorized patrol of 15 officers and enlisted men, in compliance with orders issued by the 1st Airborne Task Force, left Grasse on 27 August for Barcelonnette. The patrol reported that the enemy was in the process of occupying strategic passes, including Larche, in order to improve his defensive positions in the Maritime and Basses Alps. Two days later the main body of the 550th Combat Team moved to the neighborhood of Barcelonnette, where forward elements reconnoitered eastward and established temporary outposts. In this operation the French Forces of the Interior and the Inter-Allied Mission (paratroopers who had been dropped in the area weeks and even months before D-Day) were of great assistance because of their intimate knowledge of the terrain and enemy dispositions. From Barcelonnette patrols were sent out in all directions. It was soon discovered that Larche Pass was firmly held by the enemy and that the Germans were also active near Condamine and Jausiers on the highway between the pass and Barcelonnette. An air bombardment mission was requested at several

points along the Italian approaches to the Larche Pass in order to harass the enemy and complicate his supply problem.

The enemy, according to a captured field order of the German 148th Reserve Division, had anticipated the advance of the 1st Airborne Task Force and had taken steps to withdraw to the line of the Var River. This line was to be held only so long as casualties were moderate and the threat of encirclement remote, for when these conditions could no longer be satisfied the enemy expected to retire to prepared positions along the frontier. In planning the defense of the southern sector of the Allied eastern flank it was natural to assume that German countermeasures would be built around well-defended strongpoints covered by outposts and roadblocks. Along the Menton-Sospel-Breil road, the Nice-Ventimiglia highway, and at Turini Pass, the enemy had skillfully camouflaged artillery positions covering crossroads and narrow, defiladed stretches.

The German 148th Reserve Division began withdrawing from the line of the Var River on 29 August. Rear guards were left behind to yield only when pressure became great, since the main object of this delaying action was to prevent any quick Allied thrust which might be followed by the movement of artillery and heavy weapons. The Germans destroyed or damaged several fords, a highway bridge, and a railroad bridge, as they withdrew from the Var. By the end of the period the 148th Reserve Division had ceased to be a part of the German Nineteenth Army. It was subsequently incorporated into the newly formed LXXV Corps, which had the mission of defending northwest Italy against any Allied threat to the rear of German forces.

The enemy made skillful use of mines throughout this phase of withdrawal by placing them in all possible by-passes after blowing craters in the roads. Prisoner of war interrogations indicated the enemy had limited supplies, low morale, and a consequent high rate of desertion.

The crossing of the Var River and the establishment of a defensive line to the east of the Var Valley marked the opening of a new phase in the protection of the Seventh Army's eastern flank. Difficult terrain restricted maneuver and made supply problems acute. In order

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that the 1st Airborne Task Force be properly organized and equipped for mountain warfare, it was decided "to make this unit into a 'light infantry division' with strength of about 10,000, and equipped largely with ¼ ton and ¾ ton trucks". The 1st Special Service Force was to remain attached to the 1st Airborne Task Force and continue to assist the protection of the Seventh Army right flank during the month of September.

The defensive plan for the southern sector of the eastern flank was contained in Field Order No. 8, issued by the 1st Airborne Task Force on 3 September. The 1st Special Service Force was ordered to the right flank of the defense line to relieve the 509th Regimental Combat Team. By 8 September the 2nd Regiment, advancing along the coast road, had entered Menton and reached the Italian border. Here the advance stopped, for it was anticipated that the northward advance of the Fifth and Eighth Armies across the Po Valley might cause the German armies in northern Italy to seek an escape route by way of the Franco-Italian frontier.

Meanwhile, the 1st Regiment of the 1st Special Service Force moved up to occupy the high ground west of the Castillon-Menton road on the afternoon of 8 September. The 3rd Regiment, having advanced against isolated enemy resistance, established roadblocks to the east and north of Castillon. As Special Service Force troops pulled up to the Italian border, the airborne division ordered this line to be held without advancing beyond. Here the enemy counterattacked at several places, but, except for a position on high ground northeast of Menton which was temporarily lost, he was unable to dislodge holding forces from their positions.

Because of difficulties of the terrain the 1st Special Service Force was compelled to resort to patrolling, raiding, and generally improving its defensive positions. Engineers went to work improving roads so that supplies could be brought up more easily. Jeep trails had to be constructed in order to reach inaccessible outposts and gun positions, and cableways were improvised for bringing up supplies. The ever-increasing distance to dumps and supply points in the Marseille area constantly over-taxed organic transportation.

On 4 September the 517th RCT had moved to the left flank of the 1st Special Service Force, in compliance with Field Order No. 8 of the 1st Airborne Task Force. Its objective was the establishment of a defensive line on the heights east of Sospel to control the Menton-Breil-Turin highway. By 11 September all three battalions were on the line, and the 2nd Battalion began an attack against an enemy strongpoint on the approaches to Sospel. From their positions in the pass the Germans controlled the roads in the Sospel Valley. It was clearly impractical to carry out a general assault on the town of Sospel. Enemy positions in and about the town were considered strong, and artillery and mortar fire from the nearby mountains made any large scale infantry movement difficult. The 517th Regimental Combat Team made slow progress throughout most of September in the face of determined German resistance and counterattacks. German artillery continued to shell all important roads leading to the Italian border, as the enemy withdrew into mountain fastnesses.

A gap of approximately 50 miles existed between Larche Pass and the sector occupied by the 517th RCT. The reinforced 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, which had operated along the coast in the capture of Cannes and Antibes, had been shifted to the north to fill this gap under order of the 1st Airborne Task Force. Here, on the long mountain reaches of the eastern flank, the Germans had merely to cross the Tinee River to find themselves considerably west of the American line. The enemy, however, now showed no indication of becoming active offensively along the Franco-Italian border.

On 26 September the 1st Airborne Task Force passed from the control of Seventh Army to Sixth Army Group. The threat to the Seventh Army's eastern flank in the southern sector had virtually passed. The fear of a mobile thrust against over-extended Allied supply lines was now reduced to a minimum.

The Northern Sector

Originally the northern sector extended for 30 miles from the Larche Pass to Mont Genevre Pass. As the Seventh Army moved north-

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ward this distance was greatly increased. In the final phase the flank extended from Larche Pass to the Swiss border. The enemy in the northern sector was eventually forced back into the mountain passes.

As the armored spearhead of Task Force Butler drove northward toward the approaches to Grenoble, it very rapidly elongated the



APPROACHES TO GRENOBLE

"... Task Force Butler drove northward toward the approaches to Grenoble ..."

Seventh Army's right flank. Following closely behind the Task Force the 36th Division had sent its 142nd RCT north along the Route Napoleon (Highway 85) to arrive at Gap on 22 August. There the 2nd Battalion was detached and sent east to Guillestre with instructions to secure the right flank of the 36th Division.

Guillestre controlled two important roads, one running northeast to Briancon and the other southeast to Larche Pass. The battalion set up roadblocks and maintained constant vigilance to prevent enemy raiding parties from harassing the supply lines of the 36th

Division and Task Force Butler. The Germans were reported to be holding Briancon in considerable strength, and in order successfully to contain this force the 636th Reconnaissance Troop was sent east from Grenoble toward Briancon.

On 23 August the 36th Division moved to the Rhone Valley, and the 142nd Regiment was relieved by the 180th Regiment of the 45th Division. The mission of the 180th Infantry was to maintain active patrolling and reconnaissance of the road net connecting the more important Alpine passes. To cover the area adequately the 1st Battalion was stationed at Gap, the 3rd at Chorges, and the 2nd divided between Embrun and Guillestre. Shortly after the 180th Infantry took over the sector, the FFI reported that the enemy had destroyed a roadblock at Larche Pass and was advancing westward. In order to contain this threat, the 2nd Battalion sent a patrol south from Guillestre through St. Paul. While establishing a roadblock in the vicinity of St. Paul on 25 August, the 2nd Battalion patrol drew fire from a German column which had come out of Larche Pass. The fire was returned. The Germans now changed their direction of advance southward toward Barcelonnette.

In the Col de Vars, north of St. Paul, the 180th Infantry put in a roadblock defended by a platoon, reinforced by an antitank gun. Simultaneously the 117th Reconnaissance Troop was ordered to send out motorized patrols over all roads in the St. Paul-Barcelonnette area. On 26 August patrols reached the approaches of the Larche Pass. They found that the Germans had withdrawn east into the mountains, but still were firing artillery on the roads leading to Larche.

Meanwhile, a reinforced platoon was sent north from Guillestre to Briancon and discovered that the enemy had withdrawn to the vicinity of Mont Genevre Pass. The platoon, reinforced by groups of FFI, established itself in a fort to the northeast of Briancon and maintained contact with the main body of the 180th Regiment at Guillestre by means of motor patrols. One battalion was detached from the 180th Infantry and sent to reinforce the 179th Infantry in the vicinity of Grenoble, and by 27 August the remaining two battalions of the 180th Infantry were preparing to leave for the Grenoble area. The following day relief was completed when the defense of the sector was taken over

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by the Provisional Flank Protection Force, later known as Task Force Bibo.

In order to release the entire VI Corps for operations in the Rhone Valley, the Seventh Army agreed to assume full responsibility for protecting the eastern flank with other troops at the army's disposal. The decision resulted in the activation of the Provisional Flank Protection Force consisting of Troop A of the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, one company each from the 2nd, 3rd, and 83rd Chemical Battalions, two platoons of the 180th Infantry Antitank Company, and one battery of the 171st Field Artillery Battalion. The commanding officer of the force was Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Bibo, a War Department observer with the Seventh Army.

The Provisional Flank Protection Force was responsible for the zone east of Grenoble, northward, from Larche Pass to Albertville. It was to maintain contact with the 1st Airborne Task Force on its right flank by means of a small detachment stationed at Digne. On 27 and 28 August Task Force Bibo established roadblocks at St. Paul and Mont Genevre. Each was manned by a chemical mortar company supported by one antitank gun. The FFI reported that the Germans were present in considerable strength along the Maurienne Valley, between Briancon and Albertville, which pointed to a possibility of an attack on Briancon from the north.

During the morning of 28 August Company C of the 83rd Chemical Mortar Battalion, which was located outside Briancon, became engaged in a fire fight with a small enemy group. The FFI, who were then occupying Briancon, dispatched 100 men to reinforce Company C. As an enemy attack in company strength developed against Fort du Daupain, artillery in Briancon began counterbattery fire against German gun positions to the southeast of the town. Nevertheless, small enemy groups infiltrated into Fort Randoulette, Fort de Trois Tetes, and other elevated places which afforded the enemy excellent observation of Allied movement.

Intense enemy shell fire forced the 83rd Chemical Mortar Battalion and supporting artillery troops to evacuate Briancon and to take up new positions northwest of the town along Highway 91. Following

a stiff rearguard action, Americans set up a roadblock at the entrance of the highway tunnel at Lautaret Pass. The tunnel was prepared for demolition. Other roadblocks at St. Clement and St. Crepin, west and northwest of Guillestre were put in. The Commanding Officer of Task Force Bibo requested infantry reinforcements and antitank support. Shortly afterward, he was instructed by higher authority to effect the greatest possible delaying action; the 180th Regiment had been alerted to come to his assistance in the event of a German breakthrough.

It was known that Task Force Bibo would shortly be relieved by units of the French Army, and this partially accounted for the reluctance to shift any substantial reinforcements into the area. The FFI circulated a report that Briancon had been lost because of a shortage of ammunition. It is no doubt possible that the FFI itself did lack sufficient supplies for any sustained campaign. However, there is no indication that the Provisional Flank Protection Force was hindered in its own effort by any shortage of ammunition.

On 31 August American patrols re-entered Briancon and found that the enemy had withdrawn to forts around the town. Task Force Bibo made no effort to retake the town. It chose instead to strengthen its own defenses by putting in and maintaining additional roadblocks.

The enemy undertook limited reconnaissance and sent patrols from Larche Pass as far west as Barcelonnette. The main body of the enemy continued to remain behind the pass. But he retained control over the road running from Condamine to St. Paul and was thus able to hamper liaison between the 1st Airborne Task Force in the south and the Provisional Flank Protection Force in the north.

During late August and early September the enemy became active in isolated sectors along the northern half of the Franco-Italian frontier. Several elements of the German 157th Reserve Division, formerly stationed at Grenoble, were evidently using routes in this area as a means of escape into Italy. Troops of this division were identified in the Barcelonnette sector. Elements of the German 200th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division were also identified in the raid on Barcelonnette.

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According to operational order No. 24 of French Army B, dated 29 August, the 2nd French Moroccan Infantry Division was to relieve American units in the Briancon-Embrun area and to cover the right flank of the Seventh Army by holding Guillestre, and the Mont Genevre, and Galibier Passes. It was also to maintain liaison with the 1st Airborne Task Force south of Larche Pass. By 2 September elements of the 2nd French Moroccan Infantry Division arrived in the neighborhood of Briancon and began relieving the Provisional Flank Protection Force.

The French Forces on the eastern flank possessed the necessary strength and equipment to take up the offensive. The primary object of its first mission was the recapture of Briancon. The French then proposed to launch two simultaneous operations, one to link up with the 1st Airborne Task Force to the south and the other to strike for the Maurienne Valley to the north. This second maneuver was to be coordinated with a movement south and east from Albertville to clear the enemy from the approaches to the Little St. Bernard Pass and thus gain control of the relatively simple road net which covered this area. Since topography confined the enemy to the roads, the problem of controlling the area was greatly simplified.

The 2nd French Moroccan Division was to be responsible for the recapture of Briancon and the encirclement operation in the Maurienne Valley. One Groupement de Tabors Marocains (Goumiers) was to move up to Larche Pass, south of Briancon. A regimental combat team of the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division was to be diverted from its northward course and assigned the task of mopping up the sector between Albertville and the Little St. Bernard Pass. The 2nd Moroccan and the 3rd Algerian Divisions in a coordinated maneuver were to drive remaining German forces back to the Italian frontier between St. Bernard and Briancon.

This strategic line of action needed a concentration of troops. The French plan included a step-down phase in order to employ the minimum security force that would be consistent with safety. As the mopping up of isolated valleys and the occupation of frontier passes was accomplished, the security mission of the Alpine region between Lake

Geneva and Larche Pass was to be assumed by Groupements of Moroccan Tabors, reinforced by the FFI. With the approach of winter and the hampering of visibility by heavy snows and mountain storms, additional battalions of FFI were to be employed.

By 2 September the French had secured the road nets southeast and northeast of Guillestre. Two days later reconnaissance elements had reached the outskirts of Briancon. Enemy batteries at La Vachette and Mt. Janus, on high ground to the northeast of the town, went into action. But by 7 September the French had overcome all opposition in the forts surrounding Briancon and were thus able to occupy the town. The Germans retreated eastward into Mont Genevre Pass, destroying bridges and damaging roads as they went.

FFI units by 9 September had occupied Seez, the key communications center just southwest of the Little St. Bernard Pass. To the south the twin drives by the 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division on the Maurienne Valley north of Briancon were making good progress. As the Maurienne Valley was being cleared of opposition, continued contact was maintained with the enemy both at the Little St. Bernard and Mont Genevre Passes.

Since the bulk of the Germans had been driven into the high passes, elements of the 2nd French Moroccan Division, south of Briancon, were relieved by the Goums. French units were thus released for offensive operations in the passes themselves. The enemy displayed few active tendencies and concerned himself with "passive withdrawal." Apparently, the evacuation process had been practically complete before the French took over the sector. Other than the taking of Briancon and the campaign on the approaches to the Little St. Bernard Pass there was little offensive activity. By the middle of September the French had completed their preparations for an offensive into the passes. But on 15 September the control of French Army B passed from the Seventh Army to Sixth Army Group, and their activities were no longer of direct concern to the Commanding General of the Seventh Army.

In general, military operations on the Seventh Army's eastern flank must be viewed in the light of defensive strategy. A situation

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approximating equilibrium had been achieved by the end of September. Allied air superiority, coupled with the fact that the high mountains of the Alps between France and Italy provided a natural barrier, greatly minimized the danger of any large-scale counterattacks from northwestern Italy.

Except for the isolated aggressive gestures of the German LXXV Corps at Briancon and Barcelonnette, the enemy was content to withdraw into the mountain passes and await developments. On the other hand, the threat of an Allied advance into northern Italy no doubt caused certain anxiety to the enemy. The assumption that the 5th and 7th Armies would break through in Italy prompted the 1st Airborne Task Force to advance beyond the Var River and make a serious attempt to take Sospel, thereby gaining control of the important coastal highway leading from Italy. However, no Allied offensive in Italy materialized. After the French had cleaned up the area north of Larche Pass, the whole French-Italian frontier again became static.

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CHAPTER XI

Consolidation of Seventh Army Gains

AT the end of August the Seventh Army had completed the liberation of southern France and was closing in on the city of Lyon. On the eastern flank, patrols of the First Airborne Task Force reached the Italian border. On the west bank of the Rhone below Lyon units of French Army B were pushing the enemy to the north, and French reconnaissance elements were advancing along the Mediterranean coast close to the Spanish border. On the north, VI Corps troops had already crossed the Rhone River where it flows into Lyon from the high Alps to the east and were operating northeast of the city. The American Third Army was advancing east, northeast, and southeast from Paris. All German troops south of the Loire and west of the Rhone-Saone Rivers were faced with complete isolation as the two Allied armies approached each other.

By 25 August plans for the junction of the forces of *OVERLORD* and *DRAGOON* were already under way. As General George C. Marshall wrote General Eisenhower:

> It begins to look as if your forces and Wilson's may approach each other very fast and that timely action may be required by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to insure coordination which maintains the impetus of our attack without respite.
>
> Air operations may require special treatment since the Tactical Air Forces may be overlapping in a few days . . . .
>
> Will you give us your thoughts on the foregoing and where and under what circumstances you will submit the recommendations, as provided for in your Directive, concerning your assumption of command of the Southern Forces.

Thus the "Mediterranean" phase of Seventh Army operations was drawing to a close, and the "European" phase was opening.

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On 29 August General Wilson; General Devers; Air Marshall Sir John Slessor, Deputy Commander, Mediterranean Allied Air Force; Major General L. W. Rooks, Deputy Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters; and Major General John Connor, Commanding General, XII Air Force arrived at Seventh Army Headquarters. General Wilson desired to ascertain General Patch's future plans in order to coordinate them with General Eisenhower's movements and to make the necessary arrangement for the transfer, at the proper time, of his operational responsibilities to General Eisenhower.

General Patch disclosed that his tactical plan was to send VI Corps north from both Valence and Grenoble to Lyon. Thereafter, the advance would continue on the axis Lyon-Beaune-Dijon. After the capture of Lyon VI Corps was to be regrouped to operate on the line Autun-Dijon-Langres. The object was to make contact with General Patton's American Third Army. Elements of French Army B, the 1st Infantry Division, and 1st Armored Division, would maintain a strong reconnaissance force between Narbonne and Lyon on the west bank of the Rhone and would assist in the capture of Lyon. French Army B units east of the Rhone, the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division, the 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division, and the 9th Colonial Infantry Division, would advance north on the axis Sisteron-Grenoble-Bourg-Besancon and immediately relieve American VI Corps troops guarding the Alpine Passes. The First Airborne Task Force would assist French Army B in the protection of the VI Corps right flank facing the Franco-Italian frontier.

This was the plan. After the fall of Lyon the Seventh Army would be in a position to advance farther north. It would continue to push the German Nineteenth Army out of France and link itself with the eastward advance of the Third Army. French Army B and the 1st Airborne Task Force on the eastern flank would be brought together for the assumption of command by General Devers' Sixth Army Group.

General Wilson approved this tactical outline. It conformed with General Eisenhower's wishes for an American advance on the Army left flank to make contact with General Patton's Third Army, while the French advanced on the right flank to close the Italian and

Swiss borders. General Wilson proposed that operational control of VI Corps should pass from his command to that of General Eisenhower when the Corps was ready to operate north of Lyon. At that time General Dever's Advance Allied Force Headquarters would become Sixth Army Group. Although the forces then employed under Seventh Army did not seem to be large enough to warrant the activation of an army group, General Wilson thought it should take command of southern France in view of the length of communications, responsibility for port maintenance, civil affairs, and matters connected with the French Resistance Movement. Also there was the possibility that elements on the right flank of General Eisenhower's forces might either be merged with Seventh Army under Sixth Army Group or maintained through its line of communications.

The Occupation of Lyon

For the Germans, too, the "Mediterranean" phase of the war was rapidly approaching a conclusion. Captured documents and statements of prisoners of war revealed that Lyon was to be the initial assembly point for the trek northeastward for those German units fortunate enough to run the gauntlet at Montelimar. The troops were to be assembled and were to use the Lyon-Dijon highway for the continuance of the withdrawal. Screening action was initiated to the south, and bitter delaying actions were being fought at the important communications centers.

Most of the German Nineteenth Army passed through the Montelimar trap on 28 August. Battered remnants continued to withdraw up the Rhone Valley through Valence to Lyon and Dijon and turned eastward in the direction of Belfort and the Vosges. On 28 August no large movement north of Lyon was as yet evident, for the bulk of the German army was still south of the city. Despite heavy shelling, bombing, and strafing, the withdrawal along the east bank of the Rhone continued during daylight hours. The Germans fought only when forced to protect their evacuation routes from forward Allied units racing north and east to cut them off.

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On 1 September German forces pouring through the Lyon-Dijon funnel represented all that remained of the occupation forces of southern France. These included not only the units in contact with the Seventh Army, but also those German troops who had been in the Loire River-Bordeaux-Toulouse-Vichy area. Trying to reach some sort of safety in the east before being cut off by the approaching junction of the American Seventh and Third Armies were two German First Army divisions, the 16th and the 159th, and the Nineteenth Army's 716th Division evacuating on the west side of the Rhone, with which contact had not yet been established. Evacuees also included a mass of combat, supply, administrative, air force, naval, and governmental personnel. Enemy combat troops protecting this withdrawal comprised elements of the divisions that had been engaged on the Seventh Army front during the preceding two weeks.

The German 148th Reserve Division and 157th Reserve Division were retreating toward the Italian border. South of Lyon an estimated 8,730 combat effectives still actively opposed the Seventh Army. These included remnants of several divisions, such as the 11th Panzer, the 189th Reserve Division, and the 198th and 338th Infantry Divisions. But three other German divisions, the 16th, the 159th, and the 716th, were soon to appear in the order of battle. Captured German letters reflected a disintegrating morale, even a feeling of panic, among the fleeing troops. Their remaining hope was to withdraw as rapidly as possible, to join the southeastern wing of the German forces in northern France, and with them to form a defense line.

The end of August found the major elements of the Seventh Army forming a semi-circle along the line St. Etienne-Bourg-de-Peage-Voiron-Meximieux, around the rear of the retreating German columns. On the western end of the arc the newly organized French II Corps, under the command of Major General De Montsabert, was rapidly advancing west of the Rhone without enemy contact. Within this Corps the French 1st Armored Division was spearheading the attack on Lyon from the southwest. The towns of Serrieres and Firminy had already been occupied by 1 September, and the 2nd Regiment of Algerian

Spahis had passed through St. Etienne and St. Chamond and was within 20 miles of Lyon.

Farther south the French 1st Infantry Division was operating in the Nimes-Uzes area. East of the Rhone the 9th Colonial Infantry Division was still in the Marseille-Toulon area. The 3rd Algerian Infantry Division at Grenoble and the 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division at Gap, with attached armored units, were relieving the American VI Corps in the French Alps.

The divisions of the American VI Corps, pressing the Germans against the Rhone and Saone Rivers from Bourg-de-Peage and Voiron to Meximieux and Amberieu-en-Bugey, formed the center and northeastern end of the semi-circle. The 3rd Division, after mopping up in the Montelimar battle square, shifted its regiments to a new assembly area near Voiron, north of Grenoble. The 36th Division continued to pursue the retreating Germans up the Rhone Valley. The 141st Infantry cleared resistance at Valence and advanced northeast to Bourg-de-Peage, while the 142nd Infantry was advancing north from Livron up Highway 7. In the division center, elements of the 117th Reconnaissance Troops entered Vienne during the afternoon of 1 September and made contact with a German column on the Lyon road. Meanwhile the 45th Division had moved up Highway 75 from Grenoble toward Bourg-en-Bresse. Its forward elements were already in the vicinity of Meximieux and Amberieu.

Lyon was a military prize worthy of defense. It is France's third largest city, having a population of half a million. The city is a highly important industrial center and an important focal point for internal waterways, railroads, and highways serving all sections of France. Allied intelligence first believed that the Germans would defend the city at least temporarily. Because Lyon was an important point in the line of retreat, its defense would cover and secure the withdrawal. But German documents captured on 1 September revealed that there would be no defense of the city and, contrary to Allied calculation, that it would be completely evacuated as rapidly as the retreating column could move to the north. In view of the rapid advance of Allied forces

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in northern France, the Germans had apparently decided to abandon the defense of the Lyon-Dijon-Besancon triangle.

A VI Corps field order of 31 August had directed that the 36th Division advance northward on Lyon with "utmost speed." At the same time the 45th Division was to concentrate in the Meximieux area, covering the Corps' right flank and remaining in position to attack northward to seize Bourg-en-Bresse. The 3rd Division, at Voiron, was to maintain liaison with the other divisions and be prepared to assist either of them. The maneuver was designed to place the VI Corps in position to encircle and capture Lyon.

In and about Lyon the strength of the French Forces of the Interior increased as the Allies approached. There were an estimated 4,000 FFI troops in the area. The resistance group planned to seize street cars, which were in car barns on the west side of the Saone River, and use them to block the narrow streets to prevent any withdrawal of the Germans along the west side of the Saone. The FFI wished to liberate Lyon completely with their own forces. However, General De Gaulle's military representative warned against "premature action." On 30 August the FFI at Lyon was given orders to be ready to establish contact with Allied columns, which were rapidly approaching the outskirts. The enemy was to be harassed but not actively engaged. An all-out attack was to take place only in cooperation with troops of the American and French armies.

The advancing troops of VI Corps, east of the Rhone, found little to oppose their entry into the city. The Germans, harassed by the FFI, attempted only to defend a system of roadblocks east of Lyon until their troops could be pulled out. On the afternoon of 1 September the 142nd Infantry reached the hills overlooking Lyon. The enemy offered no opposition until American troops reached the flat ground before the city, and even there resistance was slight. Throughout the next day the 36th Division continued to occupy key positions east and southeast of the city, thus placing elements in position for the attack which had been planned in detail.

At 1130 hours on 2 September, General Dahlquist ordered an officer patrol to investigate French reports that Lyon had been

evacuated. Early in the afternoon the patrol reported that Lyon was clear, up to the Rhone River where the Germans were covering the approaches to the city by fire. At 1700 hours, General Butler instructed the 36th Division that it was not to enter the city of Lyon, but that officer patrols and liaison parties should be sent into the city to maintain contact with the FFI and French Army B approaching Lyon from the west. Pockets of Germans still held out between the Rhone and Saone, although the city had been virtually liberated. American troops were kept at the edge of Lyon in order that the French could claim the prestige of liberation. Then a small force, consisting of one platoon of infantry and one platoon of tanks, was placed at the mayor's disposal to "help keep order." In cooperation with the FFI this patrol neutralized the German pocket in the town's northeastern section between the two rivers.

Meanwhile, on the west bank of the Rhone, the French II Corps was moving up along two routes against practically no opposition. On 2 September reconnaissance elements reached the outskirts of the city without contacting the enemy. As the main body moved up, advance elements extended as far north as Villefranche, more than 15 miles above Lyon, and occupied high ground in that area. On 3 September the 1st French Infantry Division entered Lyon and deployed along the entire perimeter of the city west of the rivers. At the end of the day the division began to regroup to assure law and order; but this precaution was unnecessary, for all was calm.

While the French II Corps and the American 36th Division were engaged in and about Lyon, the American 45th Division was in contact with the German rear guard in the Meximieux area. The French were moving up the west bank of the Saone along Highway 6 toward Macon, Chalon-sur-Saone, and Dijon. The road junctions at Meximieux and Bourg-en-Bresse became of primary importance to the Germans for use in their withdrawal north through Besancon to the Belfort Gap. At Meximieux, on the road and rail net running northeast out of Lyon, the 11th Panzer Division was aggressively defending the flank of the retreating forces. By blowing bridges and establishing roadblocks the Germans hoped to keep the main body of the Allied forces south of the


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Rhone and Ain Rivers. However, by 30 August advance elements of the 45th Division had already crossed both rivers and set up roadblocks at Meximieux, Lagnieu, and Amberieu.



BRIDGE BLOWN BY THE GERMANS

". . . By blowing bridges and establishing roadblocks the Germans hoped to keep the main body of the Allied forces south of the Rhone and Ain Rivers . . ."

Meximieux

On 1 September the 179th Infantry was left to block the road junction at Meximieux, while the rest of the 45th Division advanced up the east bank of the Ain paralleling the retreating German units on the west bank. There was little opposition to the northern advance of the 180th Infantry, but the holding force at Meximieux faced a different situation. There the German 11th Panzer Division was fighting vigorously to drive the 179th Regiment from the town. Using tanks, self-propelled artillery, and infantry the Germans broke through a roadblock five miles southwest of Meximieux on the highway from Lyon.

Intelligence reported they would attempt to retake Meximieux and push east into the 45th Division rear in order to cover the German flank. The 179th Infantry accordingly prepared to defend the town.

Shortly after 1000 hours on 1 September the Germans attacked with about 1,000 men, backed up by tanks and self-propelled guns. These were first-line units of the 15th Panzer Regiment and the 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 11th Panzer Division. The enemy fanned out and directed his attacks against American positions along the entire front. In the center of the defense line at Meximieux were the 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry, and FFI units, together with supporting tank destroyers and artillery. As the Germans approached, the 2nd Battalion, 179th Infantry, on positions near Chalamont north of Meximieux, was ordered back to assist the 1st Battalion in its defense of the city. Throughout the day the 3rd Battalion of the 179th Regiment successfully defended both banks of the Ain River, saving an important bridge east of Meximieux, in spite of constant enemy pressure.

The Germans' first attack on Meximieux from the northwest was repulsed. Attacks from the south followed. As these attacks mounted in fury, even kitchen and headquarters personnel were sent into the line. An enemy attempt to seize the railroad station was broken up by concentrated American fire coming from the station itself. At one point German tanks broke from the cover of the woods and raced across the railroad tracks into town. Several sped down the main street but were disabled by fire from tank destroyers. American infantry then killed or captured enemy tankmen before they could disperse.

During the afternoon of 1 September eight more tanks advanced down the main highway from the direction of Lyon. Backed up by artillery, FFI troops were dispatched to the southern sector to deal with this new threat. With the coming of darkness the Germans began to withdraw, leaving behind them destroyed vehicles and many dead. The enemy had suffered 350 killed or wounded, lost 41 prisoners, and had five tanks and three self-propelled guns destroyed. American casualties were surprisingly low, even though the enemy had cut all roads and encircled the town. The 1st Battalion of the 179th Infantry, which had

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been in the thick of the action, reported only 11 casualties during the day's fighting. Though artillery and mortar fire continued throughout the night, by 0935 hours on 2 September Meximieux was declared secure.

The Race for the Belfort Gap

The rapid reduction of Lyon and the favorable conditions for continuing the pursuit of the fleeing Germans altered the original plans for a regrouping of Seventh Army according to the design of the Theater Commander. In the strictest sense the assigned mission of Seventh Army had been to land in southern France, capture Toulon and Marseille, and then exploit northward toward Lyon and Vichy. This primary mission had now been accomplished. Although Vichy had not been formally entered by Allied troops, its importance as a military objective no longer existed. Because of the favorable situation for continuing the pursuit of the German Nineteenth Army, the new mission of the Seventh Army was apparent.

Two likely escape routes from France lay open to the retreating Germans. They could advance up the Saone River Valley to Chalon-sur-Saone, then north to Dijon, and beyond to Chaumont or Epinal, and then to Nancy. This route would avoid the high Vosges Mountains to the east and would put at their disposition an excellent rail and road net. It would also be protected to some extent from the advancing American Seventh Army by both the Doubs and Saone Rivers. However, this entire route was being threatened by the eastward advance of the American Third Army toward Nancy.

A second route followed the Doubs River Valley northeast of Chalon-sur-Saone, between the Alps and the Vosges, extending northeast from Dole through Besancon and Baume-les-Dames toward Montbeliard. From there the main lines of communication pass through the Belfort Gap to Mulhouse and the Rhine. This route was more direct than that by way of Nancy, and by withdrawing along the northwest bank of the Doubs the Germans could utilize the river as an obstacle to protect their retreat from advancing units of VI Corps. Once the Germans were past Besancon, the Alps and neutral Switzerland would cover their southern

flank and the Vosges their northern. With their flanks secure, the Germans would have the choice of defending the line of the Vosges or escaping across the Rhine. It was probable that the enemy would make some use of both escape routes. Again it was the 11th Panzer Division which was designated to hold back the pursuing VI Corps troops and keep them south of the Doubs and Saone Rivers.

At approximately 0200 hours, 3 September, a special officer-courier arrived at the Seventh Army Command Post at Brignoles with an urgent message from General Truscott. The VI Corps Commander sent an estimate of the situation: The Germans were in full retreat, very much disorganized; and delaying actions at advantageous defensive positions were all that could be expected. The VI Corps, he continued, was in contact with elements of the 11th Panzer Division in the Bourg area and on the previous day had destroyed 15 enemy tanks. In view of this situation, General Truscott requested permission to continue the "relentless pursuit" of the enemy on the axis Lons-Le Saunier-Besancon-Belfort with the object of preventing his escape into Germany.

After a staff conference VI Corps was directed to continue the "hot pursuit" of the enemy northeastward to the Belfort Gap via Lons-Le Saunier and Besancon. French Army B was to complete the occupation of Lyon and thereafter to push up the northwest bank of the Saone on the line Dijon-Epinal with sufficient forces detached to protect the right flank of the Seventh Army. Later, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson also concurred, in view of the fleeing nature of the opportunity, and agreed that a regrouping of the Seventh Army in accordance with SHAEF's plans could be temporarily delayed. General Truscott lost no time in putting this directive into execution.

By 3 September the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had reached Bourg-en-Bresse and Montrevel on Highway 75. During the night units of the 11th Panzer Division, withdrawing northward after the fight at Meximieux, entered Bourg-en-Bresse and a "free-for-all" followed. Almost all of the men of Troop B, 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, were killed or captured and their equipment lost, including 20 one-quarter ton trucks, 15 armored cars, and two light tanks. Although opposed by enemy armor and a number of heavy self-propelled

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guns, Troop B had fought gallantly and succeeded in inflicting heavy losses on the Germans. The following day, the 45th Division, having destroyed enemy holding forces at Pont d'Ain, on Highway 75, and at other points southeast of the city, occupied Bourg-en-Bresse.

After the occupation of Bourg-en-Bresse, VI Corps troops temporarily lost contact with the enemy. The 45th Division spearheaded the advance through Lons-Le Saunier, Poligny, and Mouchard toward the Doubs. North of Lons-Le Saunier columns encountered numerous road obstacles. Blown bridges forced detours over muddy trails. Supply lines were extended, and transportation facilities were inadequate. Lyon was more than 70 miles to the rear; and supply depots were still on the beaches, over 250 miles away. The entire VI Corps was advancing along one main route, and traffic became so heavy that halts were necessary to gain sufficient clearance between march units.


As the Germans approached the Doubs in their retreat, they turned and made a determined effort to halt the advancing VI Corps. They apparently hoped to hold Besancon until 15 September, so that the remaining German troops in the Dijon area would be able to escape through the Belfort Gap.

Crossing the Doubs

Besancon is a fortress built by nature and improved by generations of military engineers. An industrial city of about 80,000 people, it is also a key communication and supply center. The Doubs River makes a loop around the city's industrial heart. The main approaches are solidly guarded by a huge Vauban-designed fort, La Citadelle, which in turn is supported by four minor forts: Fort Tousey on the southwest, Fort des Trois Chatels to the southeast, and on higher elevations across the river Forts Bregille and Chaudanne. These fortifications, built in the 17th century, are extremely thick-walled, surrounded by moats and utilize high ground to command all avenues of approach.

On the north bank of the river, west of the city, are Forts Rosemont and De Planoise; directly south on a steep hill stands Fort le

Fontain; due east is Fort de Montfaucon. This system of redoubts was manned by an estimated 3,000 German troops made up of stragglers and elements from training units and battle groups, which the Germans were trying to reorganize as combat units. Since enemy movement through



BESANCON

". . . Besancon is a fortress built by nature and improved by generations of military engineers . . ."

Besancon was almost continuous, the strength and composition of forces defending the city could not be accurately determined by the VI Corps as it closed in from the south.

The bulk of VI Corps on 5 September was concentrated in the area east and southeast of the city. The 3rd Division had moved up from the rear to the center of the VI Corps line and was in position to assault from the south. The 36th Division occupied the area from Mouchard and Poligny to the northwest, and had orders to protect the Corps left flank. The 45th Division was moving rapidly northeast to

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
the Doubs River at Baume-les-Dames on the corps right flank. This maneuver threatened the enemy's escape route to the Belfort Gap.

The 3rd Division closed in on Besancon and occupied high ground on three sides. On the left flank below the city the 7th Infantry Regiment seized the Doubs bridge at Avanne and held positions along the river. A battalion of the 30th Infantry crossed the swamp lands northeast of Besancon and occupied the village and fort at Montfaucon. From this elevation tanks, tank destroyers, and artillery fired at enemy vehicles withdrawing along the Belfort Road. "I never saw such confusion in my life", reported a tank destroyer commander. "Germans were flying every way, ammunition going off and flares lit the place like the Fourth of July back home." The enemy continued to withdraw from the city, but left behind delaying forces of infantry armed with machine guns and mortars.

During the night of 6-7 September a battalion of the 15th Infantry took Fort Fontain and then cleared the southern approaches to the outer defense of Besancon. With supporting fire from machine guns, tanks, mortars, tank destroyers, and artillery, infantrymen from the 30th Regiment took Fort Tousey at 1315 hours, 7 September, and Fort Trois Chatels shortly afterwards. Fifty-four Germans, including one officer, were captured; and the remainder escaped to the citadel or were killed in flight. With the supporting forts out of action, the citadel was bombarded by artillery and mortars. After the barrage lifted, infantry crossed the moat and began scaling the walls, at which time the defenders indicated their willingness to surrender. Over 200 prisoners were taken. Elements of the 30th Infantry crossed the Doubs on a temporary foot bridge and found that part of Besancon north of the citadel clear.

While the assault on the citadel was in progress, the 7th Infantry, having crossed the Doubs River at Avanne, occupied the westerr outskirts of Besancon. Fort Rosemont and Fort Chaudanne fell by frontal assault to the 2nd Battalion. The regiment moved around the city to the northeast to cut all important roads and to clean out small pockets of enemy resistance. When the 7th joined with the 30th Infantry, advancing from the center of the city, the fall of Besancon was completed.

While the 3rd Division was engaged at Besancon, the 36th Division, on the corps left flank, was probing for crossings over the Doubs near the town of Dole 30 miles to the southwest. The division engineers attempted to construct a bridge, but heavy enemy fire from the opposite



AVANNE

"... The 7th Infantry crossed the Doubs River at Avanne..."

bank stopped all progress. In order to clear the enemy from the bridge site, the 143rd Infantry swung east in motor convoy, crossed over the Doubs at the Avanne bridge, which had been held by units of the 3rd Division, and began to clear the northern bank. Northwest of Besancon small enemy pockets were cleared out, but the most important aspect of the fighting was the capture of an enemy fuel dump containing 177,500 gallons of gasoline and 4,000 gallons of alcohol. In view of the shortage of motor fuel, this find proved to be of great significance.

The 141st Infantry also crossed at Avanne on 8 September and cut the highways leading west and northwest from Besancon. Tanks

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from the 753rd Tank Battalion crossed to cover the flank and aid the infantry in extending the Doubs bridgehead. By the time the 142nd Infantry had secured both sides of a bridge site near Byans, 12 miles down the river from Besancon, work was begun on a class 40 trestle



SETTING UP 105MM HOWITZERS

". . . supported by . . . heavy artillery the infantry closed in for the assault . . ."

bridge, which after its rapid completion permitted armor and supplies to roll across into the newly-won bridgehead.

Northeast of Besancon at Baume-les-Dames the 45th Division also had crossed the Doubs. On 7 September troops of the 179th and 180th Infantry Regiments crossed the river by foot-bridge, barges, and ferry. The 2nd Battalion of the 180th Infantry entered Baume-les-Dames, but heavy enemy fire from tanks and machine guns stopped the advance and drove the battalion out. The 2nd Battalion continued to engage the enemy while the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 180th crossed both above and below the town. The completion of this movement

seriously threatened German troops in Baume-les-Dames with encirclement. Therefore they began to withdraw on 8 September to prevent capture or annihilation. Supported by tanks, tank destroyers, and heavy artillery, the infantry closed in for the assault, and Baume-les-Dames fell during the early hours of 9 September. Farther upstream, at Clerval, the crossing of the 179th Infantry had been uneventful, because a heavy artillery barrage had driven the enemy from the opposite bank.

The entire 45th Division then attacked north toward the road junction at Villersexel. After nearly a month of long road marches and speedy advances the war of rapid movement came to an end. Movement now became slower, plodding every mile through hills and wooded terrain in the face of an alert enemy. The autumn rains had started. The streams were swollen, and the ground was becoming too soft for cross-country operations with armored vehicles and tanks. The Germans had now regrouped and, taking advantage of good defensive terrain, were fighting tenaciously.

Enemy units opposing the VI Corps assault, at Besancon and at the crossing of the Doubs, were advance elements of the 159th Reserve Division, evacuated from the Bordeaux area and with which contact had not previously been made. Other German troops included remnants of the same divisions which had faced the Seventh Army since D-Day. Though thousands of prisoners had been captured and vast stretches of territory had been liberated, the German High Command had been able to withdraw a considerable portion of its forces. As General Truscott explained, the mere liberation of territory did not mean the destruction of the German armed forces, for those who escaped one day would live to fight another. On 8 September the General issued the following order to the VI Corps:

> The purpose of this operation is to destroy by killing or capturing the maximum number of enemy formations.
>
> Therefore the following should be observed:
>
> a. Make every effort to entrap enemy formations regardless of size. Long range fires, especially artillery, will merely warn and cause a change in direction.
>
> b. All units, but especially battalions and lower units, must be kept well in hand. Commanders of all ranks must avoid wide dispersion and consequent lack of control.

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c. Tanks must accompany leading infantry elements and tank destroyers must accompany leading tanks. All must be supported by artillery emplaced well forward.

d. Reconnaissance must be continuous and thorough — foot elements to a distance of five miles, motor elements to contact the enemy.

e. Contact once gained must be maintained. The enemy must not be allowed to escape.

f. Every attack must be pressed with the utmost vigor. Be vicious. Seek to kill and destroy.

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CHAPTER XII

The Junction of Dragoon and Overlord

THE Seventh Army plan for sealing off the German troops in south and central France was being set and tightened by all its main assault forces. General Truscott's VI Corps was advancing from Lyon to the Doubs. General Monsabert's French II Corps pushed along the west bank of the Rhone and Saone, covering the Army's left flank and striking for a junction with the American Third Army. The French I Corps, under General Bethouart, moved northward in the eastern sector protecting the right flank. All possible effort was to be made to keep the enemy from slipping into Germany.



GENERAL BETHOUART
"... moved northward ... protecting the right flank ..."

The Swiss and Northern Italian frontiers were held by the 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division, and contact was maintained with the 1st Airborne Task Force in the coastal area of the frontier. The mountainous territory between the Swiss border and the advancing American units of VI Corps was cleared by the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division, which had moved up from Marseille, in conjunction with the 9th Colonial Infantry Division which had moved from Toulon through Grenoble. Seventh Army moved quickly to exploit its opportunities. The junction of DRAGOON and OVERLORD would constitute a significant victory for the Allied invasion of Fortress Europe. Succesfully trapping the retreating enemy forces would practically insure the complete liberation of France.

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On the Seventh Army's left flank the French II Corps had taken Chalon-sur-Saone, more than 70 miles north of Lyon, by 6 September. In the Army's center, American VI Corps units were preparing to cross the Doubs River at Dole, Besancon, and Baume-les-Dames. On 6 September troops of the French I Corps on the Army right flank occupied Pierrefontaine, Maiche, and St. Hippolyte, directly east of Besancon and along the Swiss border. On the following day these French troops reached to the north a point only ten miles from Mount Beliard on the Doubs and less than 20 miles from Belfort.

On 8 September the German Nineteenth Army struck back. Early in the morning an enemy column, including tanks, moved south from Montbeliard toward elements of the French I Corps along the Doubs River. Two other columns of the 11th Panzer Division attacked at Glay and Blamont, northeast of St. Hippolyte. The French were driven from their forward positions, and Glay was recaptured by the Germans.

This blow brought a halt to the race for Belfort and made possible the establishment of German defensive positions before the Gap. The retreat phase of enemy operations had come to an end, and the Germans were succeeding in their efforts to establish a front by executing a vast turning movement, which would bring their forces into line with other retreating elements to the north. The security of the Belfort Gap was the key to any future defensive line in the Vosges. The 11th Panzer Division, the most effective unit of the Nineteenth Army, was assigned the mission of stopping any Allied attempt to break through to the Rhine.

The attack near Montbeliard arrested the advance of the French and thus secured the German left flank. The Nineteenth Army was now occupying an east-west line, generally following the Doubs river, but its amorphous right flank was still exposed. The 159th Reserve Division was added to the enemy's order of battle on 6 September, when elements of the division were committed to the defense of Besancon. The 716th Infantry Division was committed at Chalon-sur-Saone in an effort to hold open an escape route for the estimated 100,000 enemy troops moving toward the Rhine from southwestern France. This retreating

mass included a miscellany of battle groups varying from company to brigade strength and constantly changing in composition as the enemy attempted to reorganize his lines. Whenever possible these battle groups were assimilated into the Nineteenth Army itself.

The Nineteenth Army executed its turning movement and absorbed the stragglers from the west simultaneously. It pivoted on the anchor position established before the Belfort Gap by the 11th Panzer Division and withdrew the center and right of its line from an east-west to a north-south axis, fighting delaying actions only at threatened points.

French II Corps Advances in the West

While the American VI and French I Corps were threatening the Besancon-Belfort escape route of the Germans, the French II Corps was pursuing the retreating enemy along the other escape route from Lyon to Dijon to Nancy. This Allied advance up the west bank of the Saone protected the Seventh Army's left flank and placed the French II Corps in a position to effect liaison with the American Third Army pushing southeast from Paris. On 3 September General Patch informed Colonel Agostini, Deputy Chief of Staff of French Army B, that a task force composed of French troops would shortly advance toward the northwest and effect a junction with the OVERLORD forces. The French II Corps, consisting of the 1st French Infantry Division and the 1st French Armored Division, was admirably adapted for this operation.

On 3 September air reconnaissance reported very heavy enemy movement on the Lyon-Macon-Chalon-Dijon route. Fighter-bombers attacked some 500 horse-drawn vehicles spotted north of Chalon, destroyed over 300, damaged others, and killed many enemy personnel. The same day French II Corps took Villefranche, north of Lyon, capturing 2,400 prisoners.

A captured document revealed that three battle groups of the German 716th Infantry Division were responsible for holding open the escape route through Chalon and Chagny until the German First Army could complete its withdrawal. The 716th Infantry Division, together with elements of the First Army's 16th Infantry and 159th Reserve

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Divisions, had the mission of delaying the Allied advance west of the Saone in order to allow the greatest possible number of German forces to escape from France. Reports indicated that some 100,000 men, most of them communication and service troops, were attempting to pass through the dwindling corridor between the forces of DRAGOON and OVERLORD.

On 5 September French II Corps troops overcame resistance and occupied Chalon-sur-Saone. French artillery continued to fire on enemy elements withdrawing north toward Beaune and Dijon. General Monsabert, Commanding French II Corps, received a memorandum from the Chief of Staff, Seventh Army, notifying him that the American VI Corps was still in contact with the 11th Panzer Division but that it appeared that the majority of the reinforced German Nineteenth Army, including the new 30th SS Infantry Division, was on General Monsabert's immediate front, although in greatly reduced strength. "I trust", wrote General White, "you will have no difficulty in driving this force northward to its final extermination."



GENERAL
GOISLARD DE MONSABERT
"...continued his advance north..."

The recently formed 30th SS Infantry Division contained many Russian, Ukranian, and Polish "volunteers." Only about ten percent of its personnel was German. Internal tensions and low morale became evident when, on 14 September, one battalion of Ukranians killed all its German officers and went over to the French Maquis.

The French II Corps continued its advance north. The 1st French Armored Division led the way toward Beaune, followed by the infantry and assisted by the FFI. West of Chalon two German trains with one gun, two tanks, and 600 prisoners were captured. On 8 September an armored advance guard entered Beaune and mopped up enemy resistance. While this operation was in progress, the enemy brought up an infantry battalion by armored train and attacked the left

flank of the French rear near Chagny. The attack was unsuccessful and cost the Germans 400 killed and 30 prisoners. Fanning out, the 1st French Infantry Division outflanked Autun, some 20 miles west of Chagny, from the north and had cleared the town by the end of the day.

Troops of the French II Corps raced to meet the American XV Corps of the Third Army. Only 25 miles separated the French from Dijon, and the fall of this important city would not only cut the chief enemy escape route but also outflank the Doubs line. On 9 September French armored elements reached a point on Highway 74 almost midway between Beaune and Dijon. Here the Germans attempted to hold firm and halt the advance. Another counterattack was launched into the flank of II Corps. However, this attempt failed and cost the Germans over 300 killed and many captured. An estimated 300 vehicles and 12 guns of different calibers were destroyed.

Seventh and Third Armies Join Forces

Dijon was invested and liberated by the 1st French Armored Division on 10 September. The Germans did not attempt to defend the city, and the capital of Burgundy fell into Allied hands undamaged. On their right flank the French contacted the 117th Cavalry of VI Corps at Auxonne, north of Dole, thereby establishing a continuous army front. During the night of 10-11 September an armored reconnaissance group operating west of Dijon met a patrol from the 2nd French Armored Division of the American Third Army. The meeting at Sombernon linked the Normandy front with that of southern France. Whether the trap was now closed, however, it was difficult to say. Large enemy forces were reported to be still west of Dijon.

The following day, 11 September, French II Corps armor continued to push northeast toward Langres. The infantry established a static defense line west of Dijon and prepared for any future enemy attempt to break out of the closing trap. Reconnaissance elements pushed out to the northwest of the Dijon-Langres highway.

At 0700 hours on 12 September, reconnaissance troops of the 1st French Infantry Division linked in force with an armored regiment

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of the 2nd French Armored Division coming from Paris. Junction took place near Chatillon-sur-Seine on the road from Dijon to Troyes. Soon after the establishment of a continuous front, news arrived that German troops west of the Loire River had agreed to surrender to the American general commanding Tours. Thus the rapid advance of the American Third and Seventh Armies resulted in the capture of some 18,000 men, including three generals and one admiral. Surrendering Germans seemed to prefer capture by the Americans. However, the FFI did take over 1,000 prisoners in southwestern France, including General Mayer, former commander of the Toulouse area.



GENERAL LECLERC
"... from Normandy through Paris ..."

The 1st French Armored Division reached the southern outskirts of Langres on 12 September. Patrols reported the city free of the enemy except in the fortified citadel. Occupation of the town, however, was delayed by mines and booby traps. There was stubborn resistance at the citadel, and Langres was not completely mopped up until 1900 hours on 13 September.



GENERAL TOUZET DU VIGIER
"... from Provence through Lyon ..."

There was now a continuous front in strength from the English Channel to the Mediterranean. Less than a month after the D-Day of Operation *DRAGOON* two French armored divisions met in the heart of France. One, led by General Leclerc, had come from Normandy through Paris; and the other, under General du Vigier, had moved up from Provence through Lyon.

Inasmuch as the junction had been completed, the regrouping of the *DRAGOON* forces according to General Eisenhower's original plan, with the

Americans on the left and the French on the right, could now be accomplished. The advance of French II Corps to the north was suspended, and the Corps was directed to regroup to the east on the left of French I Corps and on the right of American VI Corps.

Villersexel

With the right flank of Seventh Army checked by the German defense of the Belfort Gap, the Army front changed from an east-west to a north-south axis, facing the Vosges Mountains. This fan-shaped realignment took place during the second week of September. The



BURNT-OUT ENEMY GUN ON OUTSKIRTS OF VESOUL
"... In the town of ... Vesoul ... the Germans made determined stands ..."

entire Army pivoted on the French I Corps, which held the extreme right flank. The 45th Division advanced north from Baume-les-Dames to Villersexel; the 3rd Division from Besancon to Vesoul; the 36th

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Division moved parallel to the 3rd on the left flank of VI Corps. The 117th Cavalry was assigned flank liaison missions.

Terrain and inclement weather operated against the Allied advance. The rolling foothills of the Vosges were admirably suited for delaying actions. Rain had softened the roads, and fog reduced possible air support. In the towns of Villersexel, Vesoul, Lure, and Luxeuil the Germans made determined stands. Their line of communications west of the Vosges was to be held open as long as possible in order to gain time to prepare the Vosges defense and complete regrouping.

After enemy resistance in Baume-les-Dames had collapsed, the 45th Division moved forward against increasing opposition. From



M-4 TANK DESTROYED BY GERMAN FIRE

". . . The enemy was employing mortars, tanks, and infantry to check any American move . . ."

Baume-les-Dames the axis of advance led north to Rougemont, Villersexel, and Lure. The enemy now began to use every possible device to

slow the Allied advance. Mines were laid, booby traps planted, and physical roadblocks constructed in profusion. The use of barbed wire and increased artillery indicated that the Germans were striving for some organized defense south of Villersexel. On the Doubs at Clerval they were employing mortars, tanks, and infantry to check any move on this pivotal position before Belfort.

At Rougemont the 180th Infantry captured quantities of valuable equipment, including nine locomotives, two dynamos, ammunition, guns, and trucks. Beyond Rougemont the enemy attempted to delay the advance with fire from machine guns, mortars, 20mm flak guns, and artillery. A flanking movement from the east combined with



SUPPLIES LEFT BY FLEEING GERMANS

". . . Infantry troops captured quantities of valuable equipment, including nine locomotives . . ."

a frontal attack broke the resistance. 100 prisoners, two guns, and numerous vehicles were taken. American infantry frustrated German

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attempts to dig in south of Villersexel by using artillery to disrupt the defenses being set up. On the western flank of the division the enemy was especially sensitive, exhibiting sharp and immediate reaction to American patrols and showing signs of becoming progressively stronger. On 12 September the Germans counterattacked but were driven back with heavy losses, though they held out tenaciously in the wooded area south of Villersexel until division artillery made their positions untenable. On 13 September, in spite of enemy armored thrusts; the 180th Infantry secured possession of Villersexel.

The 45th Division advance was now almost brought to a standstill by determined resistance all along the front from L'Isle-sur-Doubs to Villersexel. On 14 September operations were hampered by drizzling rain and poor visibility, and for two days the division front remained static. On the 16th a combined infantry-tank assault on the German-held town of Geney, just north of L'Isle-sur-Doubs, proved unsuccessful; but the enemy counterattack in the late afternoon was repulsed.

The attack on Geney was not renewed. On 16 September the 45th Division was informed that it would be relieved by the French 1st Infantry Division, which was being transferred from the Army's left flank. The 45th would then assemble north of Vesoul and upon VI Corps order resume the attack on the axis St. Loup-Bains-Epinal. After the Division moved from the right to the left flank of VI Corps, it would become the contact point with the American Third Army to the north. The general advance was not to be resumed until 20 September, pending the transfer of the French II Corps from the left flank. On 18 and 19 September the French relieved American units by moving in on the Geney-L'Isle front. The 45th Division assembled and prepared for its shift to the north to secure a bridgehead across the Moselle.

The Drive on Vesoul

While the 45th Division was covering the right flank of VI Corps and pushing from Baume-les-Dames to Villersexel, the 3rd and 36th Divisions were advancing northeast from Besancon to Vesoul. Enemy resistance had become determined and extensive. Roadblocks

were encountered on all main and secondary roads, and the troops had to make their way past demolished bridges and fallen trees protected by cleverly placed mines. The tenacity of resistance made it necessary to exploit every conceivable trail. The Ognon River, a tributary of the



BRIDGE BLOWN UP BY THE ENEMY
" . . . The troops had to make their way past demolished bridges . . ."

Saone, flows parallel with, and just to the north, of the Doubs. Bitter fighting took place north of Besancon to establish a bridgehead over the Ognon, but the Germans lacked both the necessary strength and artillery support to halt the advance more than temporarily.


At the Ognon River the 3rd Division found all bridges blown. An abandoned barge was improvised as a troop ferry, and on 9 September two companies of the 30th Infantry crossed. Some infantry forded the river in the face of heavy enemy rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire; and a blown bridge was made usable by the engineers. A mile downstream from the 3rd Division crossing, the 36th Division also crossed the river against moderate opposition.

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After crossing the Ognon the two American divisions continued to drive on Vesoul. The 3rd Division followed Highway 57, the main road from Besancon, while the 36th operated on the left, clearing towns and covering the road net to the west. By the night of 10 September



AMERICAN VEHICLE BEING FERRIED

". . . An abandoned barge was improvised as a troop ferry . . ."

the 36th Division, operating along the Dole-Vesoul Highway, had captured over 675 prisoners in this action.

A coordinated two-divisional assault on Vesoul was now planned. The 3rd Division was to attack the city from the south and southeast, while the 36th Division sent the 141st and 143rd Infantry Regiments up the two roads from Fretigney to move in from the west. Since Vesoul was the enemy's last direct road and rail hub west of Belfort, it was believed that he would defend the city strongly. The town has significant natural defenses. It is divided by a small stream and protected on the north by a high, dominating hill. For the defense of

the town the Germans had two main battle groups, one from the 189th Division and one from the 716th Division. They were supported by two or three battalions of mixed artillery and an unknown number of tanks.

German resistance at Vesoul did not materialize as expected. On 11 September the 141st and 143rd Regimental Combat Teams cleared the area west of the city and established contact with the French II Corps at Pont-sur-Saone. The 2nd Battalion, 143rd Infantry, successfully attacked positions on the hill mass north of Vesoul and cut the German escape routes. Meanwhile, the 3rd Division, advancing from Riez, had cleared the enemy from the area south of the city and extended east to cut the highway to Villersexel. There the 30th Infantry was covering the 45th Division's left flank and assisting in the reduction of Villersexel. The 15th and 7th Infantry Regiments outflanked Vesoul on the east, cutting the highways to Lure and Luxeuil. On 13 September, under pressure of a three-battalion attack, the German garrison in Vesoul surrendered without making the expected last-ditch stand. In addition to quantities of war materials, over 100 railroad cars, three of which were loaded with foodstuffs, were taken. The combined action of VI Corps units at Villersexel and Vesoul yielded over 1,300 enemy prisoners.

Luxeuil and Lure

The fall of Vesoul blocked the last direct escape route to Belfort in the VI Corps zone. However, to the northeast, Lure and Luxeuil still offered the enemy circuitous alternate routes. Junction with the 3rd Army in the Epinal area became necessary to deny the enemy those remaining roads. The German's primary consideration was to cover the organization and occupation of a defensive line being constructed in the Belfort Gap and through the Vosges. Agents reported an intensification of defense works in the Vosges, the strengthening of positions in the Belfort corridor, and a heavy movement of reinforcements. Farther to the north the enemy had bitterly resisted the Third Army's attempt to cross the Moselle.

Extrication of whatever forces remained west of Vesoul was

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a minor problem for the enemy, to be considered only if it could be effected without endangering the combat forces holding open the routes north of Vesoul. After the VI Corps capture of Vesoul, stiff resistance was encountered northeast of the town, but there was little opposition to the northwest. The Germans continued to maintain their left flank as they executed a pivoting movement toward the Vosges Mountains. The terrain, the weather, and short lines of communications assisted these defensive operations.

The VI Corps directed the 36th Division to continue the pursuit of the enemy to the northeast with Luxeuil as the main objective. Contact was to be maintained with the French II Corps along the Saone River. The 3rd Division was directed to advance on the Vesoul-Lure-Belfort axis and to occupy Lure and positions on the left flank of the Belfort Gap. As the 3rd Division completed the occupation of Vesoul, the 36th on 12 September executed the necessary regrouping to advance on Luxeuil.

The regimental combat teams of the 36th Division advanced in three columns north from Vesoul to accomplish their mission. The 143rd Infantry advanced from positions at Pont-sur-Saone, north along the Saone River, and turned east to approach Luxeuil from the west. Advancing on the division center, the 141st Infantry followed the railroad and highway due north from Vesoul and turned northeast on secondary roads. The 142nd Infantry, on the division right, advanced along the main highway from Vesoul through Saulx to Luxeuil. The movement was slow, as the heavily-wooded country and an extensive road and trail network encouraged enemy infiltration. Enemy opposition took the form of small combat groups, which were often difficult to extricate from well-prepared timber roadblocks.

By the night of 15-16 September the approach march was completed. The 143rd Infantry was holding the woods west of the city and had cut the highway to the north; the 142nd had reached the outskirts of Luxeuil from the south and southeast, cutting the highway to Lure. At 0930 hours on 16 September the 143rd entered the town from the southwest. Resistance was light, and all fighting ceased by 1100.

In the Corps center, between the 45th Division at Villersexel and the 36th at Luxeuil, the 3rd Division advanced on Lure from the

west and southwest. The 15th Infantry followed Highway 19, the main road from Vesoul to Lure, which formed the northern side of the Vesoul-Villersexel-Lure triangle. The 7th Infantry cleared the center of the triangle, moving directly to the Villersexel-Lure Highway, then turning northeast to approach Lure from the south. On the division right flank, the 30th Infantry moved southeast, cleared the area northwest of Villersexel, and advanced on Lure east of the highway. Because the area had to be cleared of snipers and roadblocks, the operation was slow. On the morning of 16 September the 3rd Division was in position to attack Lure from the west and south, and the 15th Infantry occupied Lure during



MARCHING IN WET CLOTHES

". . . The 3rd and 36th Divisions continued toward Remiremont and the Moselle . . ."

the day without serious opposition. However, as at Vesoul and Luxeuil, a large portion of the Germans made good their escape to the northeast.

After the fall of Luxeuil and Lure, the 36th and 3rd Divisions continued to attack toward Remiremont and the Moselle. The 7th In-

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fantry, 3rd Division, established roadblocks east of Lure on the Belfort road, while the remainder of the Division pushed north on the right flank of the 36th. Resistance similar to that encountered during the preceding week was met. Nevertheless, on 16-17 September, the Germans were pushed back another five to seven miles. But the VI Corps forward line was still more than 15 miles from the Moselle, when the advance had to be halted while awaiting the relief of the 45th Division by French II Corps and the regrouping of the Corps front. Until the advance was resumed, the divisions were to maintain an aggressive defense. Intensive artillery preparations preceded the vigorous patrols sent out. Every



AMERICAN PATROL SEEKING OUT THE ENEMY

". . . Every effort was being made to maintain contact with the enemy . . ."

effort was being made to maintain contact with the enemy and simulate an advance; all key positions found unoccupied were to be occupied, and all actions were to be directed toward keeping the enemy off balance and making him believe attack was imminent.

Transfer of Command

After the failure to capture Belfort early in September, the VI Corps pursuit had gradually slowed down and changed into a mopping-up operation. Any considerable advance in strength had to be postponed until adequate lines of communication were established. During this temporary lull Seventh Army forces were regrouped according to General Eisenhower's desire, and command of the DRAGOON forces was transferred from the North African to the European Theater of Operations.

Headquarters Sixth Army Group, originally designated as Advance Detachment, Allied Force Headquarters, under the command of General Devers, had been activated on 1 August 1944. After the visit of General Wilson on 4 September General Devers flew to the forward Command Post of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to confer with General Eisenhower. General Eisenhower expressed high praise and approval of the planning and execution of Operation DRAGOON and cited reasons why Sixth Army Group should shortly take over command in southern France. September 15 was mentioned as the probable date of assumption of operational control of DRAGOON.

General Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, notified General Eisenhower on 4 September that:

> I had thought that SHAEF would assume operational control of Seventh Army on the resumption of the pursuit north from Lyons. However, I am convinced that this should not operate to delay operations. Therefore, I propose to keep operational control of these operations until the establishment of signal communications make it possible for SHAEF to take over this responsibility. In the interim, I invite SHAEF to communicate his wishes to me direct and I shall be guided by his desire insofar as possible.

As the junction of the two forces approached, General Eisenhower instructed the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, on 7 September, as follows:

> It is important that a point of junction be fixed between Third and Seventh Armies. Desire therefore that you send your representatives or direct Patton to send his representatives to *concert* measures with

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Patch and decide upon a mutually agreed course of action. Decisions reached should be reported in on *agreed* cable to Wilson and this headquarters.

On that same day General Devers returned from his conference with General Eisenhower and visited the Seventh Army Command Post at Grenoble, where he acquainted General Patch with the agreements reached with General Wilson and General Eisenhower. General A. R. Wilson, Base Section Commander, also visited the Command Post to discuss the responsibility for rear areas. It was decided that at 0001 hours, 10 September 1944, the Coastal Base Section would be redesignated Continental Base Section and would assume control of the area south of a line Moulins-Macon-Bourg-Geneva.

The initial contact between the two forces occurred on 11 September. Between 11 and 15 September representatives of Sixth Army Group Staff, using a C-53 transport plane and a fighter escort of four P-51's, visited Allied Force Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations, at Caserta, Italy; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Advance Command Post at Gronville, France; European Theater of Operations in Paris; and Twelfth Army Group Headquarters at Versailles. These visits were for the coordination of mutual problems which would result from operational control of Sixth Army Group by one command, while logistical support was being furnished by another. Prior to these conferences, information as to the current employment and plans of Seventh Army was furnished G-3, Sixth Army Group, by Seventh Army.

On 11 September General White, Chief of Staff, Seventh Army, accompanied by the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Colonel W. W. Quinn, and G-3, Colonel John W. Guthrie, departed for Paris by air to coordinate plans for the meeting of Seventh and Third Armies. The junction in force took place two days later. On the afternoon of 13 September a conference, attended by representatives of French Army B and American VI Corps, was held at the Seventh Army Command Post. Details were worked out for the regrouping of the French on the right flank of VI Corps. Since VI Corps was at Vesoul, the road net north of the Doubs was open for the transfer. On 14 September Seventh Army



GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS

"... At 0001 hours, 15 September 1944 Sixth Army Group became operational ..."

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issued Field Order No. 5, setting forth in detail the procedure for regrouping French Army B.

As directed by General Wilson, at 0001 hours, 15 September 1944, Sixth Army Group became operational. The command included all Allied ground and service forces in the DRAGOON area with the exception of base section units. At the same time the responsibility for Operation DRAGOON passed from Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Caserta and the Mediterranean scene were now history. Seventh Army had linked the two fronts.

On the afternoon of 15 September General Patch flew to Lyon to confer with General Devers. At a meeting the next day it was announced that Sixth Army Group would not actually take over control immediately, since General Devers intended to wait until Seventh Army's activities had been coordinated with those of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and until projected operations had received approval of that headquarters. Seventh Army continued to exercise operational control over French Army B until further notice and continued to direct handling of logistical support of the operation. However, Sixth Army Group relieved Seventh Army of the responsibility for civil affairs in southern France. The transfer was gradual. General Devers made it clear that Sixth Army Group would interfere as little as possible and cooperate in every way.

A conference held at Lyon on 19 September between representatives of the Twelfth Army Group, Sixth Army Group, Third American Army, and Seventh American Army, discussed plans for the future operations of the Allied forces in eastern France. No agreement was reached as to the boundaries between the two Army Groups; General Devers' Sixth Army Group zone remained too wide for the forces available. The same day French Army B was redesignated First French Army and passed to Sixth Army Group control. The French Operational Mission departed from Seventh Army Headquarters on 21 September to be attached to Sixth Army Group. Seventh Army, reduced in size to one corps of three infantry divisions and with 35 days of continuous battle and progress behind it, prepared to cross the Moselle River.

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CHAPTER XIII

The Moselle

DURING the latter part of September the tactical plans of the Seventh Army were changed to meet a new situation. For the first time since D-Day the Allied advance met an organized foe, entrenched in prepared defensive positions forming an established line. The enemy supply lines were shortened; his ranks had been reinforced; and he occupied positions on terrain that was favorable for defensive action.

German defensive operations were expected to take advantage of the terrain along four major phase lines: 1) Delaying action at advantageous positions between the Doubs and Moselle Rivers. This action had already been carried out with sufficient success to make the subsequent strategy possible. 2) A defense of the western approaches to the Vosges. 3) A defense of the reverse slope of the Vosges overlooking the Rhine, and 4) defense of the eastern bank of the Rhine River itself. As the Rhine was the last natural barrier before Germany, the enemy was expected to make maximum use of the defense in depth afforded by the Vosges Mountains.

The Vosges Mountains are divided into two chains: the High Vosges and the Low Vosges, with the Saverne Gap separating the two. North of the Saverne Gap are the Low Vosges with steep, heavily forested hills; and south of the Gap are the High Vosges, a northeast-southwest range which forms a major obstacle to the Plain of Alsace and the Rhine River. At the southern end of the High Vosges is the Belfort Gap, the main avenue of approach to the Plain of Alsace. Epinal, on the Moselle River, is a pivotal communications center and the largest town in the High Vosges region, having a peacetime population of 27,408. Two major routes from Epinal pass through the Vosges, one through

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
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St. Die and the Saales Pass to Strasbourg and the Rhine, the other through Gerardmer and the Schlucht Pass to Colmar and the Alsace Plain.

For the VI Corps to reach the Vosges it was necessary to cross the Moselle. At Epinal the Moselle River, 80 feet wide with 20 foot vertical walls on each side, presented a formidable obstacle. Above and below Epinal, the river, less an obstacle, was in some places even fordable. Between Remiremont and Le Thillot the width averaged 50 feet and the depth, except in pools, only a few feet. The bottom, composed of rock and gravel, was usually firm. Along many sections the banks were not



AMERICAN RIVER GUARDS

". . . At Epinal the Moselle River, 80 feet wide with 20 foot vertical walls on each side, presented a formidable obstacle . . ."

more than three feet high, and the terrain flat and fairly solid except in places softened by recent rains. The enemy was expected to take advantage of the Moselle as a natural obstacle behind which to establish some kind of defense line.

On 1 September one report stated, "There is evidence of German resistance along the Belfort-Vosges line. All barracks in Alsace and Baden completely filled with troops. Strong concentrations of artillery in Epinal and other garrisons in northeastern France." A week later it was reported that "work on fortifications had been under way for several days in great haste along the whole crest of the Vosges. Antitank guns, automatic weapons, cases of hand grenades, munitions, and food supplies are brought to aid the important points in the Vosges." On 19 September VI Corps G-2 warned that the "Vosges Mountains will make an excellent position from which to defend and it is doubtful that the enemy will evacuate without being forced to do so." The southern part of the enemy's long line from the North Sea to the Swiss border had the natural defenses of the Vosges backed by the Siegfried Line. It was calculated that fewer German divisions would be required for defense of the sector between the Swiss border and Strasbourg than would be needed on an equivalent sector farther north. The German Nineteenth Army was still opposite the American Seventh Army.

Seventh Army completed regrouping on 20 September. During the preceding two days forces of the First French Army had relieved the American units in the Villersexel area. The 45th Division now moved into a line facing the Moselle River opposite Epinal. This position, between the 36th Division and the XV Corps of the American Third Army, constituted the Seventh Army's left flank. The Seventh Army now occupied a zone approximately 12 miles wide separated on the northeast from the Third Army by the towns of Darney, Epinal, and Rambervillers, and on the southeast from the First French Army by Lure, Melisey, and Le Thillot. Patrol and reconnaissance actions during the aggressive defense period indicated that the Germans were withdrawing beyond the Moselle. The towns of Plombieres-Les-Bains and Xertigny had been evacuated by the enemy, and on 20 September the units of the VI Corps were in position to resume the assault.

At 1900 hours on 20 September General Truscott issued orders outlining the Corps plan of advance. The Moselle was to be crossed in order to obtain the key communication centers in the Vosges which would open a passage to the Alsatian Plain and the Rhine. The 45th

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Division, on the left, was to seize Epinal and secure a crossing in that vicinity, then advance northeast to seize Rambervillers and Baccarat, eventually to force open the Saverne Gap. The 36th Division, in the center, was to cross the Moselle in the Eloyes area and advance without delay to seize St. Die near the Saales Pass. On the right flank, the 3rd Division was to secure crossings over the Moselle in the Rupt area and advance to seize Gerardmer near the Schlucht Pass. The 45th Division was to maintain liaison with the Third Army and the 3rd Division was to maintain liaison with the French First Army, both to protect the Corps flanks. Upon arrival on the line Rambervillers-St. Die, the VI Corps was to continue its advance with its weight on the axis Baccarat-Sarrebourg through the Saverne Gap to Strasbourg. The enemy, dug in northeast of the Moselle and in the Vosges, was prepared to oppose this maneuver; and two months passed before the final mission was accomplished.

The 36th Division Crosses at Eloyes

In the center of the VI Corps zone the 36th Division was scheduled to make the first crossing of the Moselle in the vicinity of Remiremont. Civilians reported a ford just south of Eloyes, five miles north of Remiremont. This ford had a rocky bottom, with water only waist deep, a slow current, and with a wooded bank to cover the approach of vehicles. General Dahlquist ordered a reconnaissance made all along the river. The division plan was to send the 141st Infantry Regiment to locate the ford, to secure a crossing, and to move north toward Eloyes followed by the 143rd Infantry. The 142nd Regiment was to advance through the Forest of Humont and take the town of Remiremont, on the west bank of the river. As early as 18 September river crossing equipment was being brought forward, and by the night of 20 September 65 assault boats had arrived in the 141st Regimental area and 25 DUKWs were en route. An armored treadway and infantry support bridge materials were assembled, and the division was ready for the crossing.

The 141st Infantry began the reconnaissance in force of the proposed crossing area during the afternoon of 20 September. The 2nd

Battalion reconnoitered the northern salient of the river near Eloyes, the 1st Battalion the center area opposite the reported ford, and the 3rd Battalion employed diversionary missions to distract the enemy. Shortly after 1400 hours Colonel Clyde E. Steele, Commander of the 141st Infantry, reported to General Dahlquist that chances were good for a crossing near Eloyes since no enemy activity was apparent at Longuet, about midway between Remiremont and Eloyes, and there was excellent observation available from the high ground 1,000 yards southwest of Eloyes. The Division Commander ordered the 141st Regiment to cross that night and secure Eloyes and the high ground around it. The 143rd



AMERICAN TANK CROSSING MOSELLE

". . . This ford had a rocky botom, with water only waist deep, a slow current, and with a wooded bank to cover the approach of vehicles . . ."

Regiment was to then pass through the 141st as soon as a bridgehead was secured.

The troops were guided through the dense wood between Raon-aux-Bois and the Moselle by the 60-year old Mayor of Raon-aux-Bois,

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Monsieur R. M. Gribelin, a retired French Naval officer. He had often visited his daughter in Eloyes and to save a mile he would make his way through the forest. He was one of the few men who could successfully locate a route away from the roads and known trails where the Germans might discover the attempted river crossing. The night was cloudy and it rained intermittently, which added to the difficulties of guiding the troops. At 0030 hours on 21 September the 131st and 155th Field Artillery Battalions commenced firing on enemy positions across the river, and at 0500 hours radio silence was broken to determine the location of the 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry. The 1st and 3rd Battalions were headed for the ford site, and as dawn approached, all operations were obscured by fog in the river valley.

Shortly after 0700 hours the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry, crossed the river and began advancing northward along the east bank. The leading elements encountered no opposition but the enemy soon became alerted and slowed down the advance with concentrated small arms fire. At 0914 hours, 21 September, the 1st Battalion called for additional mortar and grenade ammunition. The 3rd Battalion was still on the west side of the river.

At 0944 hours the Division Commander arrived at the fording site and ordered the 3rd Battalion to cross immediately. The engineers were ordered to get assault boats to the fording sites to carry ammunition to the 1st Battalion, and to bring back the wounded.

Leading two platoons of I Company, the 3rd Battalion Commander attempted to cross south of the 1st Battalion's fording site at a point where both sides of the river were devoid of cover for several hundred yards. The Germans waited in prepared machine gun positions on a densely wooded hill east of the river and allowed the first platoon to cross and start up the slope. Then they opened fire, killing or capturing all the platoon. The second platoon managed to escape with heavy casualties. The Battalion Commander was reported missing, and his S-3 killed in this action. As a consequence, the 3rd Battalion moved north to the fording site used by the 1st Battalion, and General Dahlquist ordered Colonel Steele to take personel command of the Battalion, to cross and expand the bridgehead. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion had

cleared that part of Eloyes west of the river, but all three bridges had been blown. Here the current was swift, and all sites were covered by enemy small arms fire. The battalion was to remain in position and engage the enemy across the river, while the 143rd Infantry crossed below at the original ford site to attack Eloyes from the southeast.

The 143rd Infantry had moved from Luxeuil to Raon-aux-Bois to exploit the crossing over the Moselle by the 141st. At 1515 hours on 21 September, troops of the 143rd Regimental Combat Team began to cross the river in a column of battalions. They were opposed by scattered small arms fire. Having crossed the river, the 3rd Battalion moved east



BLOWN BRIDGE AT ELOYES

All three bridges had been blown up by the Germans

of Eloyes and before nightfall had seized the Hill 783 (altitude in meters) overlooking the town. The 1st Battalion attacked its objective, Hill 605 (altitude in meters), southeast of Eloyes, while under enemy artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. The Germans, approximately one bat-

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
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talion in strength, engaged the American infantrymen in a fierce fire fight during the night of 21-22 September from a series of strongpoints along the axis Eloyes-Hill 605. The enemy shelled American positions, and fog made it impossible to locate the enemy guns. During the same night a company of Germans had infiltrated from Hill 605 into the 1st Battalion's positions, and at dawn of the 22nd bitter hand to hand fighting raged until the Germans were cleared out.

By this time Company A of the 111th Engineer Battalion had completed an infantry support bridge at the ford site. The first vehicles began crossing the Moselle. Cannon Company, 143rd Infantry, one of



VEHICLES CROSSING THE MOSELLE

"...Company A of the 111th Engineer Battalion had completed an infantry support bridge..."

the first to cross, moved up in close support of the 1st Battalion and laid direct fire on the enemy troops before Eloyes and on Hill 605. During the afternoon of 22 September the 143rd Regiment attacked the town;

after five hours of hand to hand fighting the town was cleared of most of the enemy.

While the 141st and 143rd Regiments were securing the bridgehead over the Moselle for the 36th Division, the 142nd occupied Remiremont, west of the river. It had moved from Luxeuil through Fougerolles and Plombieres and had sent the 3rd Battalion ahead to reduce the fort west of the town while the 1st and 2nd Battalions closed in from the south.

On 20 September the 3rd Battalion, followed a covered approach along the Forest of Humont, encountered and reduced a roadblock over 100 yards in depth. The road to Remiremont ran through a defile and the enemy occupied the northern ridge in the vicinity of an old fort overlooking the routes into town. One company was ordered to clear the enemy out with a flanking movement to the left. No fire was received from the fort, but the area around it was well covered. When it was reached, the fort was found unmanned. Company L gained the high ground overlooking Remiremont and, although hemmed in by fire from three sides, effectively supported the slow, steady advance of the battalion into town. Artillery and mortar fire was directed from this high ground on enemy vehicles attempting to escape across the bridge north of town.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions were advancing from the south. The 2nd Battalion reduced two roadblocks and then followed a secondary road through a deep defile. Steep slopes covered with woods and dense underbrush rose on each side. The heavy forest prohibited the effective use of artillery and mortars, separated the advancing infantry files, and encouraged enemy infiltration. In the confusion of a daylight attack by the enemy on the morning of 21 September, part of E Company was lost; and F Company was forced southeast into the 1st Battalion area. The 1st Battalion, in the Forest of Herival, south of Remiremont, had encountered and passed 16 roadblocks. By nightfall of the 21st, the 1st and 2nd Battalions were in position to assault the town. The 3rd Bat-Battalion, harassed by sniper fire, had taken a small portion of western Remiremont. By morning of 23 September the Germans had withdrawn,

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except for rear guard elements; and the 142nd Infantry had neutralized an anchor of the enemy's organized defense line overlooking the Moselle.

At 0645 hours on 22 September the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 141st Infantry, had been withdrawn from their positions at Eloyes and were directed to move south to assist the 142nd Infantry in trapping and liquidating the Germans around Remiremont from the east side of the Moselle. The 2nd Battalion of the 141st Regiment remained in its positions in the western part of Eloyes. At 0800 hours it was attached to the 143rd Infantry on division order. The 143rd Infantry, reinforced, finished mopping up in Eloyes during the day of 22 September. The



MOVING UP TO THE ATTACK

"... The 141st Infantry was directed to move south to assist the 142nd Infantry ..."

next morning it was ordered to move up a secondary road north from Eloyes to seize and clear Docelles, a reported focal point of enemy strength. While the 143rd Infantry was engaged in clearing Eloyes on

22 September, the 141st Infantry, less its 2nd Battalion, moved south along the eastern bank of the Moselle.

After occupying hills east of the Moselle and overlooking Remiremont the 141st Infantry secured a bridge site and cut the eastern escape route of Germans still fighting in the town. A patrol was sent across to contact the 142nd Regiment, now busy cleaning out the town of Remiremont opposite the bridge site. Street fighting continued in Remiremont during the morning of 23 September, as the German rear guard elements withdrew and fought delaying actions. By noon enemy resistance was broken and sniper fire had ceased. The 36th Engineer



BAILEY BRIDGE SPANNING MOSELLE AT REMIREMONT

"... The 36th Engineer Regiment immediately began construction of a Bailey bridge which was completed the following morning ..."

Regiment immediately began construction of a Bailey bridge, which was completed the following morning. Without waiting for the completion of the Remiremont bridge, the 142nd Infantry sent the 1st and 2nd Bat-

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
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talions across a temporary ponton bridge. Recent rains had swollen the river and approaches on both sides were so deeply rutted and mired that it was impassable for traffic heavier than one-quarter ton vehicles.

By 24 September the 36th Division had succeeded in crossing



ENGINEERS WORKING ON PONTOON BRIDGE

"A heavy pontoon bridge constructed at Jarmenil insured communications for heavy traffic irrespective of weather conditions . . ."

the Moselle and in establishing a firm bridgehead from Remiremont north to Jarmenil, about two miles northwest of Eloyes. The Bailey bridge at Remiremont and a heavy ponton bridge constructed at Jarmenil insured communication for heavy traffic irrespective of weather conditions. The division advance and build-up continued while the remainder of VI Corps crossed at locations above and below.

The 45th Division Crosses at Igney and Arches

To the north of the 36th Division, the 45th Division was making its own advance to cross the Moselle and to secure a bridgehead.

By 19 September relief of the 45th Division had been completed and its sector on the approaches to Belfort had passed to the control of the 1st French Infantry Division. The 45th Division moved north to its new zone, southwest of Epinal, and prepared to resume the attack. Plans called for the 157th Infantry Regiment to cross on the left between Epinal and Chatel-sur-Moselle, the 180th in the center at Epinal, and the 179th on the right at Arches. One company of the 120th Engineer Combat Battalion, the division engineers, was placed in support of each Regiment. VI Corps also furnished additional engineer support. The 2nd Battalion, 36th Engineer Combat Regiment, with two bridge trains, was attached to the division. One train consisted of 130 feet of Bailey bridge loaded on DUKWs, five units of infantry assault bridge, and eight 10-man rubber assault boats; the other train, of 240 feet of treadway bridge. Both trains were in a preliminary assembly area at Bains-les-Bains by nightfall of 21 September. The engineers were then in position to support the infantry crossings.

The 157th Regiment was to be on the northern flank of the division, occupying a key position between the Third and Seventh Armies. On 19 and 20 September the regiment shuttled approximately 80 miles, moving through Bains-les-Bains to the vicinity of Darnieulles, northwest of Epinal. Patrols were sent along the river to find undamaged bridges or fordable points. Fortunately, a bridge built by the American XV Corps at Chatel was available, altough it was inside the Third Army sector. The night of 21-22 September the 1st Battalion, with two platoons of tanks, one platoon of cannon company, and one platoon of 57mm antitank guns attached, shuttled across the Chatel bridge, detrucked, and assembled at Vaxoncourt, almost two miles southeast of Chatel.

The 3rd Battalion, 157th Infantry, was to clear the town of Thaon, midway between Chatel and Epinal, then cross the Moselle in the vicinity of Igney. After several enemy roadblocks had been overcome and Thaon had been heavily shelled, patrols moved into the town during the night of 21-22 September. The battalion waded the Moselle at a point near Igney; armored and artillery support crossed at the Chatel bridge and rejoined the unit on the east side of the river. Attacking

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south, the Americans caught the enemy off guard, and in a two-hour fire fight before dark on 22 September drove him back with heavy casualties. The men of the 3rd Battalion dug in for the night. The 2nd Battalion, meanwhile, had crossed the river at Chatel and attacked southeast toward Domevre, where it was held up through 24 September by determined enemy resistance.

To expand the bridgehead, the 1st Battalion, 157th Infantry, on 23 September, pressed southeast up the Moselle Valley toward Hill 375 (altitude in meters) near the town of Girmont and at this point received intense fire. Tree bursts took their toll as the infantry attempted to clear the woods on the slopes of Hill 375. On 24 September resistance from the hill still prevented entrance into Girmont. During the afternoon Company B forced its way up the height and broke the German resistance. Groups of Germans attempted to cross the northwest slope of the hill from Girmont and were promptly pinned to the ground by heavy fire. The 3rd Battalion gained important ground in a strategic position on the west side of the town. Fighting back only spasmodically, the Germans retreated in disorder, and suffered heavy casualties when they attempted to race across the open ground. Two companies, aided by armor, pushed in toward Girmont against intense fire. The town was entered at 1500 hours and by nightfall resistance had been cleared.

After the 157th Infantry had reached Igney on 22 September the engineers made reconnaissance for crossing sites. As tactical considerations did not require vehicular bridges, only ford sites were considered. After 3rd Battalion armor had crossed at Chatel and worked back to the foot troops who had waded the river at Igney, enemy pressure on the far bank lessened and construction could now proceed. Company A, 120th Engineers, on the morning of 22 September, developed a ford at Igney, capable of carrying all regimental vehicles.

While the 157th Infantry Regiment pushed its way across the Moselle at Igney and fought against the enemy north of Epinal, the 179th Regiment forced its passage of the river at Arches, some five miles southeast of Epinal. Preliminary reconnaissance along the river on 20 September, revealed that the Germans had blown all bridges across the Moselle between Epinal and Arches. On 21 September patrols of the

179th Infantry continued to reconnoiter possible crossings of the river, as battalions came into position between Arches and St. Laurent, some four miles to the northwest. During the afternoon supporting engineers brought up assault boats and bridging materials. Patrols moving along



ASSAULT BOAT CROSSING THE MOSELLE

". . . The 157th Infantry pushed its way across the Moselle at Igney and fought against the enemy north of Epinal . . ."

the western bank of the Moselle encountered intermittent small arms fire from across the river.

At 0400 hours on 22 September Company L attempted a crossing near Arches but was withdrawn under intense mortar fire. The advance patrol suffered 27 casualties. Company I got one assault boat across unopposed, but the swift current greatly handicapped transportation of troops. However, by 0615 hours all men of Company I had reached the eastern bank near Archettes and were moving toward high ground. Troops of Company L followed and secured the town of Archettes.

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The 2nd Battalion followed the 3rd across the river, running into some small arms fire. By 1330 hours the engineers had completed a bridge at Arches. The Regimental Commander crossed the river and established his command post in Archettes. During the night, 22-23 September, the 1st Battalion, less Company A which was still in contact with the enemy near St. Laurent, crossed the Moselle and was immediately dispatched to hold down the right rear. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced abreast toward Mossoux, two miles northeast of Archettes. At 0630 hours on 23 September the 2nd and 3rd Battalions jumped off, while behind them organic transportation and supplies poured across the river. Enemy artillery fire was checked by counter-battery action, as the 3rd Battalion entered Mossoux and the 2nd Battalion cut the road leading northwest from the town. Mine fields, booby traps, and trees felled across the roads slowed the regimental advance.

On 24 September the 179th Infantry continued to make limited progress while consolidating the bridgehead behind the front. Although fire fights occurred, enemy infantry to the north and northwest of Mossoux generally chose to withdraw when engaged by advancing troops. To the north the 157th Infantry was making similar progress against the enemy at Girmont. Between the 157th and the 179th Regiments the 180th Infantry was engaged in the battle for Epinal.

The Battle of Epinal

The 180th Regiment, 45th Division, had been given the mission of attacking the town of Epinal. Epinal is the hub of a large network of communications, roads, and military defenses and is divided by the Moselle River, which flows between sharply cut and steep banks. For a month prior to 20 September the Germans had been strengthening the surrounding forts at Epinal, and for the last five days they had had French civilians digging trenches. Three battalions of infantry, reinforced by artillery, mortars, and antiaircraft guns, defended the town. All approaches were heavily mined and booby-trapped and were supported by strong roadblocks covered by machine gun and automatic rifle fire city streets and the banks of the river in the vicinity of the

town were mined; two railroad over-passes had been destroyed. FFI and civilian reports stated that all bridges in Epinal were blown, with the exception of one large bridge in the center of the city and a smaller one to the south.

On 20 September the 180th Infantry regrouped southwest of Epinal and prepared to assault the town. The attack on Epinal was planned so that the 2nd Battalion would approach from the left flank near the village of Golbey and the 3rd Battalion from the right. During the afternoon of 21 September, the 3rd Battalion encountered heavy enemy automatic fire while clearing road blocks, mines, and wire entanglements along the main approaches about a mile west of the town. Tanks of the 191st Tank Battalion in support of the 3rd Battalion leveled road blocks and succeeded in taking high ground overlooking Epinal. The 2nd Battalion, moving to the north of the 3rd, encountered similar defenses. The battalions held their positions during the night through heavy concentrations of enemy artillery, tank, and rocket fire. The activity of the Germans began to change from continued withdrawal to defense in positions.

On 22 September the 180th Infantry was engaged in clearing the west side of the town. Its patrols clashed with the enemy, and the fighting took place from house to house. Many mines and roadblocks were cleared. Tanks of the 191st Tank Battalion assisted in the attack and were placed in firing position along the west bank of the river.

The infantrymen meanwhile continued to fight their way toward the river. At 1320 hours the 180th Infantry reported to the 45th Division that "we are sending a couple of girls (FFI agents) back to your place. They have a lot of information. They report there are two bridges in town . . . . The girls came over one of them. They have a map of the town that shows all the road blocks and all the mined areas. They report enemy dug in for 500 yards . . . . That has been substantiated. We can see them and are firing on them . . . . They report the place is heavily mined and there are considerable numbers of roadblocks all around the town. There is about half a regiment on both the east and west sides of the town; a majority on the east side of the town in the woods . . . ."

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
At 1500 hours on 22 September the Germans appeared to be pulling out of Epinal on roads leading eastward. American artillery started shelling traffic observed moving along these escape routes. An hour later, shortly after 1600, the report was confirmed that the Germans had pulled out most of their troops west of the river, and had blown the last two remaining bridges. The Americans pushed forward to ascertain what holding forces remained. That night the engineers made a reconnaissance for a crossing, but enemy small arms and mortar fire from both sides of the river interfered with the operation. Although all bridges had been destroyed, a Bailey bridge could be rapidly constructed at one of two possible sites in town.

On 23 September, in the face of heavy small arms, mortar, and tank fire that continued all day, the 180th forced three river crossings. The first was made in the vicinity of Golbey, just north of Epinal. Here all three rifle companies of the 2nd Battalion crossed the river and advanced toward Jeuxey, killing and capturing many of the enemy. South of the first crossing other troops of the 3rd Battalion forded the river in spite of heavy tank fire directed against them from the eastern bank and moved into houses and buildings to clear out isolated groups of the enemy. All crossings were covered by machine guns placed on the west bank and riflemen were installed in buildings close to the river to pin down the enemy.

After the first wave of infantry had crossed, the engineers put a ferry into operation to transport additional troops and supplies and to evacuate the wounded. Three attempts to put in a foot-bridge were unsuccessful because of the swiftness of the current. Finally on the night of 23-24 September two foot-bridges were established over the debris of blown highway bridges. By 0500 hours on 24 September, Company F, 36th Engineers, had moved up a bridge train and started construction of a 140-foot, Class 40, Bailey bridge. The bridge was completed by 1600 hours; and tanks, tank destroyers, and vehicles crossed to support the infantry's advance.

While the construction of the Bailey bridge was in progress, the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, crossed at first light of 24 September and passed through elements of the 2nd Battalion to press the attack to

the northeast. It reached Jeuxey and there gained control of the heights overlooking the river. On 25 September the 2nd Battalion moved north toward the expanding zone of the 157th Infantry on the division left flank and patrol contact was made; the 3rd Battalion completed clearing



140 FT. BAILEY BRIDGE ACROSS THE MOSELLE AT EPINAL

". . . The bridge was completed by 1600 hours; and tanks, tank destroyers, and vehicles crossed to support the infantry's advance . . ."

Epinal of isolated Germans and secured all the prominent heights southeast of the town, making union with the 179th Infantry on the division right.

The capture of Epinal gave Seventh Army the control of the key communications center in the Vosges. In the town were found 15 locomotives and a large number of cars. Dumps of ammunition, maps, and military supplies were also taken. Epinal was important to the Seventh Army as a base for future operations in the Vosges. General Truscott personally congratulated the 180th Infantry Regiment on the success of its operation.

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The 3rd Division Crosses at Rupt

On the right flank of VI Corps, the 3rd Division encountered the most difficult terrain and determined opposition and was last to cross the Moselle. The routes from the division positions at Faucogney and Melisey to the river at Rupt-sur-Moselle and Le Thillot led through heavily forested hill masses peculiarly adapted to defensive and delaying operations. The slowness of the French advance exposed the division right flank and retarded its progress. In the 3rd Division zone the approach to the Moselle, and not the river itself, was the chief obstacle.

At daybreak on 20 September the 3rd Division resumed the attack northeast toward the Moselle with the 7th and 30th Regimental Combat Teams moving generally northeast from the Melisey-Faucogney line. The 15th Infantry remained in reserve with one battalion in the process of being relieved by the 1st French Infantry Division on the right. By midmorning the advance had slowed down, having met stubborn resistance from the heights at the village of Melay, three and a half miles north of Melisey. This mountain village lay near the French zone and on the right flank of the Americans, in fact almost in their rear, necessitating its capture before the advance could continue. The enemy was operating largely in isolated groups and was taking full advantage of the thick woods and mountains. Roadblocks were constructed of logs and covered by 30 or 40 infantrymen armed with machine pistols, machine guns, and antitank guns. By 1130 hours the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry, was at the outskirts of Melay but was stopped by cross fire of machine guns and rifles. In order to envelop Melay from the north, the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, moved out from Faucogney and attacked southeast to secure La Mer, a hamlet one mile north of Melay. Continuous rains made the poor mountain roads impassable for armor. During the afternoon artillery shelled enemy defenses heavily and in return received devastating flanking fire from heights north of Melisey, still not yet cleared by the French. At dark the village was taken after a bitter house-to-house fight.

Throughout 21 September the 30th Infantry continued to attack. The width of the front, coupled with extensive enemy defenses,

precluded anything but minor advances. The 3rd Battalion was receiving fire from three sides, and its progress was measured in yards. Small groups of enemy infantry and automatic weapons teams infiltrated into forward positions by crawling and creeping through the woods. At a



MOVING TO THE FRONT

". . . The attack was launched north and west of the main road out of Faucogney . . ."

given signal they attacked, and such attacks increased in size and tempo until they came about every half hour. Enemy artillery was particularly active, and tree bursts caused many casualties.

The 7th Infantry, on the division left flank, launched its attack north and west of the main road out of Faucogney and advanced steadily until it occupied the forest heights overlooking the Moselle (Hill 753, altitude in meters). At 1800 hours on 21 September the 3rd Battalion in the lead reported, "The fighting in the woods is pretty tough. The undergrowth makes movement difficult. The battalion has been having quite a fire fight." The woods were dense and the troops advanced

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
by crawling toward unseen enemy positions. The Germans occupied prepared positions in the clearings and semi-open places, generally well camouflaged with branches and small logs. In the early morning of 23 September the 7th Infantry succeeded in driving back the Germans and in reaching the Moselle across from Rupt.

The 30th Infantry, after the fight at Melay, attacked toward the Moselle along the southeastern side of the highway from Faucogney to Rupt. During 22 September intense and violent fighting took place along the route, especially in the vicinity of the village of Evouhey, where the enemy was well dug in. Roads in the regimental zone were blocked and mined. The next day the 3rd Battalion was ordered to turn east and seize high ground overlooking Le Thillot on the Moselle, while the 1st Battalion continued to clear Evouhey, and the 2nd Battalion attacked Esmoulieres, a German strongpoint south of Evouhey and in the division rear right flank.

By the end of 23 September the 7th Infantry was in position to cross the river and attack the town of Rupt. About midnight one platoon of Company B found a bridge intact. The troops crossed the river and began to fight off enemy attempts to blow the bridge, which had already been prepared with 19 boxes of TNT. Other companies quickly followed, and by 0500 hours an extensive bridgehead had been firmly established. By midmorning all units of the regiment had crossed the Moselle. On 24 September the 1st Battalion cleared Rupt of snipers and occupied the heights to the east of town (Hill 867, altitude in meters). Other elements of the regiment advanced south from the bridgehead to reach La Roche against considerable resistance and north to seize a second bridge at Maxonchamp.

The 30th Infantry attack, meanwhile had made slow progress against increasing resistance, in bad weather, with poor visibility, and over rugged terrain. On 25 September 30th Infantry troops were two miles south of Rupt, held up by German defenses at Le Chene, on the road running along the west bank of the Moselle. The highway was almost completely blocked with heavily-mined fallen trees. The enemy from well defended positions met the 30th Infantry's advance with fire

from small arms, mortars, self-propelled, and 20 mm flak guns. The Americans were forced to make their way forward through pouring rain and dense woods. Le Chene was taken at 1620 hours, and the regimental objectives on the hill overlooking Le Thillot were secured before noon.



A BRIDGE INTACT

". . . The troops crossed the river and began to fight off enemy attempts to blow the bridge, which had already been prepared with 19 boxes of TNT . . ."

26 September. The area was then turned over to the French, and the 30th Infantry was ordered to move by motor to Remiremont, in the 36th Division sector, and to cross to the east bank.

The Drive Into The Vosges Passes

In the last week of September VI Corps had successfully crossed the Moselle. The east bank within the Seventh Army zone was being cleared of the enemy; and bridges at Epinal, Arches, Jarmenil,

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Eloyes, Remiremont, Maxonchamp, and Rupt were in operation. Prisoners stated that initial orders had been to withdraw to Germany but that these were later changed and units were ordered to hold for 20 days, because fortifications near the German border would not be finished until then. The Germans had fought stubbornly to hold the Moselle line and now continued to contest every foot of the advance toward the passes through the Vosges.

The 36th Division, with three regiments abreast, advanced from its Eloyes-Remiremont bridgehead northeast toward its objective, St. Die. The 141st Infantry on the right was to clear a reported enemy concentration at St. Ame, four miles east of Remiremont. The advance over muddy secondary roads was painfully slow; only ¼ ton vehicles could be used to bring up supplies and ammunition and evacuate the wounded. On the night of 24-25 September, following a concentrated artillery barrage, the 1st Battalion of the 141st Infantry penetrated the town, and captured the German commander, his staff, and 185 men. The next day this area was taken over by the 3rd Division; and the 141st Regiment moved to support the 143rd, attacking toward Bruyeres.

On 28 September General Truscott ordered the 36th Division to advance on Bruyeres, the 141st Infantry operating to the right of the Jarmenil-Bruyeres road, the 143rd moving up the ridge to the left of the road while the 142nd was to finish clearing the Forest of Fossard and the village of Tendon on the division right flank.

The 142nd had already reached the vicinity of Tendon on 24 September. Strong enemy forces were found prepared to defend the town and the Hill 827 (altitude in meters) southeast of it; an estimated 400 to 600 Germans were in the area. The only supply route across the hill mass between Eloyes and Tendon was a single, little-used, cart trail, which was impassable for armor or heavy vehicles. On 25 September the regiment maneuvered to close in on Tendon but met a severe enemy counterattack. Artillery support was called for to forestall a possible breakthrough, and companies from the division reserve were quickly brought up to the threatened area. Fighting continued throughout the day. At nightfall the Americans withdrew to more favorable defensive

positions in order to close the line, which was being constantly threatened by German infiltration.

The 142nd Infantry, now reinforced, reorganized on a three-battalion front and put its supply line in order. The new arrangements proved effective. The 2nd Battalion entered Tendon against stiff resistance on the 27th. The enemy, attempting to escape in the direction of Le Tholy, launched a sudden attack on the 1st Battalion center, east of Tendon, and laid down a heavy artillery barrage on the 3rd Battalion. Desperate fighting followed, as depleted companies attempted to maintain an established line in the thickly-wooded hills. The enemy hid out in pockets or infiltrated back into areas previously cleared. By 29 September the heights east of Tendon (Hill 827) were finally cleared of the enemy at a cost of 80 casualties in the 1st Battalion. The 142nd Regiment had thus secured its objective and continued fighting to hold it. The next day the enemy, supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire, again vainly counterattacked the hill positions. The fighting during the week had been costly. Many companies, weakened by casualties and fatigue, were down to platoon strength.

On the left flank of the 36th Division the 143rd Infantry, supported by elements of the 141st, drove northeast along the Bruyeres highway. The Germans threw in many artillery concentrations and in this open terrain employed mines extensively. By the end of the month the village of Docelles, Xamontarupt, Faucompierre, and St. Jean du Marche had been taken and a continuous line established with the 179th Infantry, 45th Division, on the left and the 142nd Infantry on the right. The 36th Division was still over four miles from Bruyeres but in favorable position for the attack.

The route of the 45th Division to Rambervillers from Epinal led through more open country, and its advance met with greater success. Striking from their crossing areas, the regimental combat teams followed Highway 46 from Epinal, and cleared the road net and villages east of the 36th Division area. Action consisted chiefly of reducing roadblocks and of the occupation of towns.

The 157th Infantry attacked northeast from its position near Thaon, driving the enemy from Domevre, and then swung to the

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southeast to within striking distance of Sercoeur. On 26 September the regiment occupied Sercoeur and pressed again on to the northeast to take Padoux, five miles from Rambervillers. A drizzling rain hampered operations on the 27th; but the advance continued, and on the following day troops of the regiment were within a mile of the objective. Patrols entered Rambervillers on the morning of 29 September but were withdrawn in the afternoon while French armor from the XV Corps attacked from the northwest. At dawn on 30 September after a 15 minute artillery barrage, the 157th entered Rambervillers and met only spasmodic resistance. The town was secured, and by nightfall defensive positions were set up.

Advancing from Epinal the 180th Infantry, in the 45th Division center, likewise made good progress over favorable terrain. The Germans were withdrawing and no serious opposition was encountered. By 26 September the regiment had reached Girecourt, and Gugnecourt about seven miles south of Rambervillers. The 2nd Battalion took Girecourt with little opposition and pushed on to secure Destord, two miles north. Company E cleared Gugnecourt, taking 64 prisoners; but a counterattack during the night forced it to withdraw. The next day the Americans attacked again and retook the town.

The 1st Battalion, 180th Regiment, attacked from Destord northeast toward Ste. Helene. The 2nd Battalion turned southeast from Destord toward Pierrepont, which was captured in the afternoon of 28 September. On 28 September the 180th Infantry took 213 prisoners, the largest total during any single day of the month. The regiment was then ordered to assist the 179th Infantry in the attack on Grandvillers, a major road junction on the highways connecting Epinal and Rambervillers with Bruyeres.

The 179th Infantry, operating south of the 180th and in conjunction with the 36th Division on the right, had advanced through the forest of Epinal, east of the city, by 25 September. Progress was impeded by increasingly thick woods, mine fields, and booby-trapped roadblocks. However, after three days fighting, the regiment had taken several villages on the approaches to Grandvillers and had advanced through Memenil. Nevertheless, resistance became increasingly severe

as the infantry approached Grandvillers. During the afternoon of 28 September the 2nd Battalion, with tanks in support, assaulted Vimenil and reached the outskirts of Grandvillers by nightfall. The following day the advance was checked by heavy enemy fire from along the Grandvillers road. However, the advance of the 180th Infantry from Pierrepont into the enemy's rear forced him to divide his forces.

On 30 September the 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry, attacked the enemy in Grandvillers and engaged in fierce street fighting. By 0745 hours the western end of the town was secured and 30 prisoners taken. Throughout the day the battalion continued the attack, and by 1925 hours Grandvillers had been completely occupied.

The 3rd Division, after securing the bridgehead at Rupt, released to the French the southern sector of its front at Le Thillot and on 27 September shifted its attack north to the highway from Remiremont through Le Tholy to Gerardmer. To attack directly from Rupt to Gerardmer was not feasible, as the high wooded hills of the Forest of Longegoutte presented a major natural obstacle. On 27 September the 30th Infantry was motorized and moved north to Remiremont where the 15th Infantry, released from reserve, was relieving the 141st Infantry, 36th Division, in the St. Ame area. The 7th Infantry continued to expand the Rupt bridgehead, sending the 3rd Battalion north along the Moselle toward Remiremont. The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, pushed northeast through the forest toward the village of Thiefosse, while the 2nd Battalion continued up the Moselle to capture Ferdrupt and there await relief by the French II Corps.

On the high ground just east of the Moselle the Germans now occupied a definite defense line. Their withdrawals ceased; and they held on tenaciously, counterattacking frequently. The enemy resorted to jungle tactics on the 3rd Division front in the heavily-wooded terrain between the Moselle and Moselotte Rivers, and frequently infiltrated behind the American lines to ambush supply trains. It was planned to establish well-organized positions northeast of St. Ame, covering the road to Le Tholy. In this area the Germans, bringing up reinforcements, resisted fiercely, counterattacking and infiltrating to retake lost ground

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At 0600 hours on 26 September, the 15th Infantry attacked northeast from St. Ame. The 1st Battalion seized a bridge east of the town before the Germans could detonate the prepared charges and destroy it. The next day the 2nd and 3rd Battalions pushed northeast on the road to Le Tholy. Enemy groups, by-passed in the wooded areas on either side of the highway, continually threatened supply lines and slowed down the advance. The point of the advance withstood two counterattacks during the hours of darkness, while other enemy groups infiltrated in the rear near St. Ame. The striking force of the regiment was reduced by the necessity of defending the flanks in strength. By nightfall of 28 September the infantry had reached positions two miles north of St. Ame.

On 29 September the 30th Infantry joined the 15th in the attack. German infantry, supported by tanks, held strong defensive positions in front of Le Tholy. They were ordered to hold to the end, and it was reported that this order was enforced by SS troops at their rear. Heavy small arms, mortar, and artillery fire limited the American advance to yards. At the close of the month the 3rd Division was still attacking a strong enemy line before Le Tholy, meanwhile blocking to the south towards Le Thillot on the French front.

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CHAPTER XIV

Problems of Rapid Advance

SPEED of the inland penetration of DRAGOON forces created logistical problems which strained all services of supply. Assault convoys were loaded out on the premise of a hard, slow campaign with priority given to infantry combat and supporting units. On the third day of the campaign supply chiefs initiated plans for changes in shipping priorities to assist in exploitation of weakened German resistance. Phasing of units to arrive after D plus 20 was adjusted to bring in services to support a war of rapid movement. General Patch received from General Devers the assurance of all possible aid in pushing the advance and, as the initial augmentation of forces to accomplish this aim, the promise of an additional six Quartermaster truck companies.

Transportation and Supply for the Beachhead

On D-Day the unloading of assault forces and supplies adhered to the planned schedule, but by D plus 1 it was evident that a shortage of gasoline and rations was imminent. In anticipation of heavy fighting on or near the beaches, a layer of ammunition had been placed over the cargo; and it was necessary to lay this aside to expedite the beaching of gasoline and rations. The VI Corps revised priority on unloading, to which schedule the Army Commander subscribed when beach control passed on 17 August from sub-task force commanders to Beach Control Groups. DUKW's and LCT's were diverted to unloading gasoline from an MT ship which had been brought in with 50,000 gallons aboard.

Diversion of efforts to meet the demand of rapidly moving troops disrupted planning schedules. Huge piles of mixed ammunition accumulated on the beaches, as labor was largely employed in with-

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drawing specific items needed at the time. A shortage of chains and hoisting frames handicapped unloading, and men were unable to handle the cargo as rapidly as desired. In order to land a maximum number of combat troops with vehicles and equipment in the first days of the invasion, the numbers of supporting service troops had been held to a minimum. It also proved difficult to obtain civilian labor. The problem of labor was partially solved by the creation of pools of workers by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Aggregate tonnage discharge over the beaches met expectations during the initial phase, although there was some delay in beaching D-Day supplies. In the period from 0800 15 August to 1800 17 August, 119,060 personnel, 15,717 vehicles, and 6,232 tons of cargo had been moved from ship to shore. In the succeeding 24 hours cargo discharge was boosted to 7,113 tons along with 4,929 vehicles and 17,032 personnel. The problem was not one of beach capacity at this time, but of a selective demand occasioned by operations which had departed from the plan.

Tasks confronting the Army supply services in beach operations were reflected within the assault divisions, which faced the added difficulties of rapid extension of supply lines and tactical demands for transport of combat troops. The 3rd Division encountered a D-Day delay in the beaching and unloading of supply craft which, together with the allocation of ammunition, had created a critical gasoline shortage by D plus 1. Reasons for the narrowness of the margin by which the assault divisions were able to support their operations were given by the 3rd Division G-4: 1) insufficient gasoline had been loaded under Army maintenance plan; 2) unloading of supplies for the first three days fell far behind schedule; 3) the Beach Group was slowed down by the necessity of unloading and handling thousands of tons of ammunition which were not expended for the operation; and 4) the distances from the beach supply points to the combat units became far greater than that on which the assault scale transportation was based.

Four days after landing, forward elements had pushed past Sisteron, more than 100 miles from the beaches. Gasoline continued to be the most critical item of supply. Gasoline dumps captured at Draguignan, Le Muy, and later at Digne were exploited to continue the

advance and overcome shortages within the units. The three American divisions were consuming approximately 100,000 gallons a day, when the Army Quartermaster reported on 21 August that only 11,000 gallons remained in the three beach dumps. Immediately the Seventh Army gave top priority to the unloading of gasoline and rations and tightened fuel consumption restrictions, which had been instituted at the outset.

Division supply problems increased during the Battle of Montelimar, when a growing demand for ammunition was added to the over-burdened transportation facilities. There was no shortage of ammunition in the beach dumps; but the haul was a round trip of more than 400 miles from the divisions, each of which had given over trucks, along with the VI Corps, to motorize Task Force Butler.

Expenditures of ammunition had been exceedingly light during the pursuit. As the 36th Division, however, with Task Force Butler then under its command, assembled for the Battle of Montelimar, it was without sufficient transportation to complete the assembly, provide adequate rations and motor fuel, and re-supply the artillery units with ammunition. Organic transport of the division, augmented by the advanced issue of trucks phased in for loss replacements, was further supplemented by VI Corps, which created a 30-truck ammunition train from the 3rd Division. Twenty trucks were to haul 105mm howitzer and ten trucks 155mm howitzer ammunition in preparation for concentrated fire on enemy convoys in the Rhone Valley. The combined effort enabled the artillery units to fire an average of 96.2 rounds of 105 mm howitzer ammunition per weapon per day in a two-day period with an average of 99 weapons in action. This was a peak expenditure in the first month and a half of the campaign of southern France. With an average of 30 pieces firing daily, the 155mm howitzer units sent 34 rounds per weapon into the target area, while a battalion of 155mm guns, with eight pieces in action, averaged 37.4 rounds per gun. By comparison, during the 17 days of action in August, average expenditures per weapon per day were 30 rounds of 105mm howitzer, eight rounds of 155mm howitzer, and 6.5 rounds of 155mm gun.

The initial crisis on artillery ammunition had been overcome, but the shortage of gasoline persisted in forward areas. To alleviate the

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situation Seventh Army employed trucks of newly arriving units to convoy motor fuel forward. On 25 August VI Corps estimated gasoline requirements as: 36th Division, 50,000 gallons; 45th Division, 35,000 gallons; 3rd Division, 25,000 gallons, and Corps troops, 10,000 gallons. Daily journals of the units reflected temporary periods in which the gasoline supply was exhausted. At Digne 26,000 gallons of gasoline, captured on 24 August, relieved shortages for the 36th Division when it was closing in at Montelimar.

Rail Rehabilitation

Forward elements of the Army were more than 200 miles inland and spread from Montelimar eastward through Grenoble to Briancon on the Franco-Italian border, when completion of a rail link between Frejus and St. Maximin enabled the Army Quartermaster to open the initial forward supply dump on 24 August. Gasoline, rations, and ammunition were stocked at St. Maximin a town on Highway 7 between Brignoles and Aix.

Completion of the Frejus-St. Maximin rail line opened the first section of the Army supply route, to be used until the ports of Marseille and Toulon could be put into operation. This was the first step in the rail rehabilitation program expedited to meet requirements of lengthening supply lines. By D plus 15 the Seventh Army held Lyon. Arrival of units and material for reconstruction of the French rail network had been phased, however, on the premise that Lyon would be a D plus 150 objective. While reconstruction and operation of the railroads was a responsibility of the Military Railway Service, late phasing required Army engineers to perform most of the initial repair, especially that of bridging.

Major scale rail operation had not been contemplated, until a rail terminal such as Marseille had been captured. Railroad troops had been phased in sufficient quantity only for minor rehabilitation. Two railway battalions had been scheduled to arrive coincident with the capture of the ports, with the Railway Grand Division arriving in echelons. Tactical developments prompted the Transportation Section

on D plus 2 to request the shipment of rail units advanced by approximately 30 days.

So precipitous was the German retreat that time and means were denied for destruction of railway trackage as completely as the enemy had effected in Italy, and air reconnaissance indicated available rolling stock exceeded early estimates. Allied air attacks on enemy trains had created blocks, one of which was 18 miles long and made up of such heavy equipment that it was necessary to lay a new track for the by-pass. Principle enemy damage consisted of bridge demolitions.

Initial rail operations were on a 15-mile, narrow-gauge line between St. Tropez and Cogolin, with five wagons and a Diesel passenger unit on D plus 2. Service from Frejus to St. Maximin, completed on D plus 9 utilized a main coastal line, exploitation of which had been planned. Three hundred tons of gasoline, rations, and ammunition were loaded on the first train for St. Maximin, while a similar train departed the same day for Draguignan, on a branch line from Les Arcs. By 27 August track repair permitted the shift of loading from Frejus to St. Raphael, where a better equipped station was available, and daily tonnage was lifted to 900 tons.

First extended westward to Aix-en-Provence, rails were then rehabilitated northward to Meyrargues on the Durance River, where the first major break was encountered. Freight was moved by a combination of rail and motor shuttling, with rail transportation from Camel Beach to Meyrargues and truck transportation for about 70 miles from there to Sisteron, the southern terminal of a small capacity line to Grenoble which had been rehabilitated by VI Corps. The gradient of the Sisteron-Grenoble line limited its capacity to 125 tons per train with five to nine trains operating daily. Initial operation beginning 24 August of a portion of the line, from St. Julien just north of Aspres to Grenoble, was an enterprise of the 45th Division which enabled it to free a substantial number of trucks for the 370 mile roundtrip to the Army dump at St. Maximin. In five days the division moved 2,100 tons of freight and 4,700 personnel over its line.

As troops of the Seventh Army advanced they secured additional rolling stock and locomotives. By 3 September the Army had

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available 1,300 wagons and 100 engines, although many were in poor condition. Coal was limited and of low quality. A week later rail service was extended from Grenoble via Chambery and Culoz to Amberieu, where track demolitions had tied up more than 250 German wagons along with 6,000 tons of coal. Failure of the enemy to destroy a power plant permitted the Chambery-Culoz portion of the line to be operated with electric power.

The task of rail reconstruction fell to the Army engineers who, on 30 August, were confronted with tactical operations of the D plus 60 anticipated phase, while bridge equipment was arriving for the D plus 14 phase. Improvisation was necessary as heavy fixed and floating equipment was not scheduled to arrive in quantity until D plus 25. Except for portable military bridging construction, materials were obtained from local sources. Stocks of structural material steel were moved to bridge sites from Marseille before complete surrender of the German garrison in that city, while facilities of steel fabricating shops in Grenoble, machine shops in Ornans, lumber mills in the Jura and Doubs areas, oxygen and acetylene from a manufacturer in Chalon, and wire rope from a concern in Bourg en Bresse were utilized.

On D plus 19 supplies were delivered to forward areas both by direct truck shipment from the beaches to Grenoble, and by the rail shuttle from Camel Beach to Meyrargues, truck to Sisteron, and rail to Grenoble. For operation of the rail lines, rail units were being brought in 15 to 30 days earlier than originally planned. By D plus 45 railroads were in operation up the Rhone Valley, from Marseille via Lyon, Dijon, Dole, and Besancon to Vesoul and St. Loup. By 2 October freight was moving by train at the rate of 550 tons 500 miles a day, the equivalent of 275,000 ton-miles per day.

During this period bridges were built partly by innovation and partly by exploitation of material at hand. The 343rd Engineer (General Service) Regiment reconstructed a bridge near Aix-en-Provence by using the 104-foot traversing base of a 270mm German gun to span two 51-foot gaps. Emplacing the gun carriage as if it were a Bailey bridge after repair of the masonry piers, the 343rd Regiment

completed the task in four days; and the first train crossed on 29 August. A new application of the Bailey bridge was employed by the same unit to restore a span over the Durance River near Meyrargues. To close the gap of 170 feet a pier was constructed at midpoint and a Bailey deck panel was projected. Although it had not been used previously over so long a clear span, calculation proved that such a support would bear the required load capacity. The bridge was reopened at 1200 hours, 17 September.

Next in priority to restoration of the Grenoble route was reestablishment of the doubletrack line from Marseille to Lyon; the greatest difficulties were three bridge demolitions over the Durance River at Avignon, over the Drome at Livron, and over the Isere north of Valence. The 343rd Engineer Regiment completed the construction of the bridges in 15, four, and nine days, respectively, the last by 20 September, ahead of the target date of 1 October set by Sixth Army Group. The early completion of the bridges insured supply by rail ahead of expectations.

Concurrently with the completion of the route to Lyon, other units were engaged in repairs northward. Seventeen days after the area had been cleared, the 540th Engineer Regiment opened the last blocks on a through route from Marseille to Bourg with the spanning of the Ain River at two points near Pont d'Ain. Farther north the 344th Engineer (General Service) Regiment, by 5 October had constructed the longest continuous railroad bridge in the northward push, a 460-foot Bailey deck bridge over the Doubs River at Dole.

Opening of rail lines enabled the Seventh Army supply services to set up advance dumps and to reduce distances combat units were required to transport supplies. On 25 August the Quartermaster had opened a dump at Sisteron, using rail and truck shuttle; but truck transportation was falling behind commitments and the railhead at St. Maximin was low on gasoline. Opportune arrival of two coasters with 6,000,000 gallons and operation of bulk gasoline installations at Camel Beach alleviated the shortage on 28 August. The problem became one of transportation. The lack of a bridge at Meyargues denied a continuous

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rail line to Genoble and motor transport was overtaxed by the demands. The situation was becoming more critical daily.

Transportation and Supply Above Montelimar

To meet the urgent demand for transportation of troops for the pursuit without withdrawing trucks from the long supply haul, VI Corps organized on 3 September three provisional truck companies from organic units. Corps artillery units contributed a share of the vehicles, as did the 36th and 45th Divisions, which organized the provisional groups. On 9 September corps artillery warned that resupply of ammunition was a serious problem because of the distances involved and one which could not be met against organized resistance, which induced General Truscott to radio General Patch: "Present advance is resulting in excessive distances for units to travel to get ammunition. One division has a round trip haul of over 400 miles to ammunition dump at Bourgoin. Urgently request that advance ammunition dump be set up at least as far north as Lons le Saunier." Army agreed to open an ammunition supply point by 13 September in the vicinity of Mouchard, which was about 30 miles north of Lons Le Saunier. Its establishment did not solve the problem for the corps, however; and on 14 September a battalion of corps artillery was made inactive so that its transportation could be used for ammunition hauls.

As elements had prepared for the push to capture Lyon, the distances between combat units and sources of supply became even more extended. Transportation for the rapid inland movement had engulfed the fuel, trucks, and driving personnel provided by planners who had not looked forward to such a pattern of progress. At the beginning of September VI Corps computed distances as great as 213 miles between the 45th Division Command Post at Amberieu and the Army's gasoline and ration railhead and ammunition supply point at St. Maximin; 165 miles from the 3rd Division Command Post at Voiron; and 158 miles from the 36th Division Command Post at Bonchert. Advance of Army dumps permitted by extension of railroads provided relief from time to

time during September, but the continuing progress of the three infantry divisions resulted in recurring lengthy gaps.

Opening of dumps stocked with food, fuel, and ammunition on 2 September at Bourgoin, La Tour de Pin, and Montelimar reduced distances to divisional Command Posts to 24, 30 and 83 miles for the 3rd, 45th, and 36th Divisions, respectively; but on 10 September, with Army food and fuel dumps at Amberieu, the divisions were at Devecer, Baume les Dames, and Velefaux, 118, 128, and 135 miles beyond, and Corps headquarters, at Besancon, was 111 miles distant. Establishment of an ammunition supply point on 12 September at Arbois whittled the transportation haul 72, 60, and 75 miles for the three divisions which were then at Mollans, Cubrial, and Luxeuil. Three days later the source of ammunition was the closest it had been since departure of the divisions from the beaches: three miles for the 36th Division, four and one half miles for the 3rd Division, and eight miles for the 45th Division. But the haul for gasoline and rations was not as short, for the dumps at Poligny were on 21 September, 87 miles from the 3rd Division at Faugogney, 95 miles from the 45th Division at Bains Les Bains, and 102 miles from the 36th Division at Hadol.

Development and extension of rail lines coincident with the increasingly static tactical situation began to ease the acute shortage in transportation near the end of September with the rail link operative from Marseille through Lyon and Dijon to Vesoul operative by 28 September. It was not until later that rail lines were able to carry the approximately 5,000 tons of supplies and equipment needed daily by the Army. During the period from D-Day there had not been an adequate number of transportation units available to the Army, which in turn had imposed additional burdens on lower echelons. Although rail shipments had met minimum daily requirements, extended supply lines had resulted in dangerously low levels with reserves almost depleted.

Approach of winter weather necessitated a speeding up of delivery of clothing items to forward dumps. To accomplish this, B-24 aircraft of the XII Tactical Command flew 50 tons of Quartermaster Class II supplies into Dole and Dijon; but all articles except 30,000 pairs of socks were found to be Class X (unserviceable) upon arrival. On 28

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September VI Corps reported, however, that sufficient winter underwear was en route by rail to equip each man with one set and that issue of the third blanket per man had commenced. But the Army's plan for supply of winter clothing to the troops was jeopardized by unloading at Marseille falling behind schedule. Furthermore, the Army's supply services were confronted with assumption of supply responsibility for the XV Corps, which had a strength of 50,000.

Although distances involved were not as great as with the American divisions, the French Army, for whose supply the Seventh Army was responsible initially, likewise was encountering difficulties. On 10 September the French Army was receiving three trains each day for shipments to Aix and Avignon, from which supplies were trucked to Mison and Laragne for trans-shipment by rail to the French dumps. Seventh Army established ammunition supply points to support the French on 21 August at Fuget Ville, on 24 August at La Bauque, on 9 September at La Baumette, and on 11 September at Lons le Saunier, through which an average of 300 tons daily was being handled. Truckheads for Quartermaster Class I and III supplies (Rations and Fuel) were opened 1 September at Avignon and 6 September at Mison and St. Andre la Gaz, the latter stocking only rations. The railhead had been opened 24 August at La Barque. An engineer supply truckhead was established 1 September at Avignon.

Although Seventh Army was relieved 15 September of operational control and direction of the First French Army upon assumption of command by the Sixth Army Group, supply responsibility continued to 26 September, when base section began its functions in the supply plan for support of both armies. Technical and physical difficulties combined, however, to prevent complete separation until late in October. At the end of September the French Army described its supply situation as critical with heavy engagements on its entire front, which prompted the Seventh Army Chief of Staff to authorize aid through an equitable allocation of available supplies between the two armies. Receipts by rail were falling below daily requirements and for a short period, pending the time train schedules could be rearranged, the Seventh Army allocated the French 65,000 gallons of gasoline, 53,000

rations, and 279 tons of ammunition daily. Inadequacy of supply prevented the Seventh Army from granting the total requests of the French in certain types of ammunition, principally light artillery, mortar, light machine gun, and automatic rifle shells.

Signal Operations

Fast moving warfare provides abundant problems for all forces involved, but the strain on communications is perhaps the most noticeable. Just prior to D-Day, two radio tests were held by all headquarters ships at specific times during the day and night to determine the efficiency of the radio installations and what, if any, frequencies were unworkable. Every radio set that went into Operation DRAGOON was tuned to a proper frequency, and fortunately conditions were ideal for radio communication during the early part of the campaign.

Landing with the assault units were the signal supply personnel of the 207th Signal Depot Company and the 177th Signal Repair Company. Also with the initial assault groups were the signal operations personnel of the 71st, 72nd, and 74th Signal Special Companies to handle communications for the three division beach groups. One detachment of the depot and repair companies kept each of the three American assault divisions supplied with signal equipment during the early stages of the operation and maintained these functions on the beaches throughout August.

From the outset of the campaign a shortage of transportation made signal operations difficult. Gaps existing between the echelons of command widened, rendering the usual modes of high speed construction of wire, Rapid Pole Line, and Multi-Air-Line so inadequate that they were not used. Instead, wire construction personnel of two battalions rehabilitated 1,716 miles of Postes, Telegraphes, and Telephones open wire lines and placed 152 miles of Spiral-4 on messenger. From the beaches north to Brignoles the lines were badly damaged, requiring almost complete rehabilitation; but northward from that point the open wire was in fair condition and breaks were mended quickly. Delay in arrival of signal units with special purpose vehicles for wire construction

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handicapped development of wire communications during the early, fast-moving phase of the campaign.

The month of September brought the Seventh Army its severest communication difficulties, but limited Seventh Army signal personnel surmounted these problems and established several records in doing so. Great distances between echelons of the Seventh Army and its subordinate units made wire communication a tremendous problem until the end of September, when base section and army group personnel began to take over some of the many rear lines and the tactical advance began to slow down. The long distances involved in the first half of the month were ideal for radio, since the sky wave could be used almost exclusively to all commands. On 6 September the shortest radio circuit was 88 miles — to Army B; on 14 September, it was 43 miles — also to Army B; and on 20 September, just after the Command Post moved to Vesoul, it had narrowed down to 15 miles — to VI Corps. Even at Vesoul, however, the majority of radio circuits covered distances of more than 100 miles.

The speed of the advance and the growth of communications is forcibly portrayed by the Seventh Army Line Route Maps, Communications, Traffic, Circuit and Radio Diagrams for D-Day to 1 October when the Command Post was established at Epinal and the situation became semi-stabilized.

Highway Repairs

Concurrently with the strenuous program of bridge reconstructions to reopen rail lines, maintenance of other means of transportation was essential. Roads in southern France form a dense and comprehensive network, generally well constructed, but weakened by bridges, some of which were limited by civilian authorities to loads of five tons or less. From tactical and supply standpoints, the most important of the highways were the Route Napoleon, Highway 85, extending from the beaches to Caste Dane, Digne, Sisteron, Gap, and Grenoble and Highway 7 which followed the left bank of the Rhone, passing through Montelimar, Valence, and Lyon. Although the enemy's rapid

withdrawal denied him the opportunity for demolitions as extensive as could be accomplished in a slower retreat, conversely the problem of highway maintenance by the Engineer Corps increased with mileages involved.

Corps and divisional engineers accomplished repairs to highways and bridges, although there was little new road construction. Engineer units were largely concerned with mine sweeping, removal of roadblocks, clearing of debris, and filling of bomb, shell, and demolition holes.

Prior to the end of September, however, the Army engineers had constructed 88 highway bridges, of which 19 were considered major work projects, in addition to the erection of 28 Bailey bridges. Construction of timber bridges to replace Bailey bridges was expedited because of the shortage of tactical bridging material.

Ports and Bases

Steps to shift from beach to port operations followed the fall of Toulon and Marseille on 26 August, 27 days ahead of the planning time-table used by Army engineers. It had been contemplated that Toulon would be the first sizeable port to fall to Allied control, but the sweep of the French made both ports available at approximately the same time. A choice of ports to rehabilitate was presented.

Marseille, largest port of France and of the Mediterranean, was the southern terminus of the Rhone-Saone corridor, with rail connections inland through Grenoble and Lyon, and canal connections with the Rhone. Its artificial harbor was secure in all weather, and its facilities, with 85,000 feet of quays and 98 projecting wharves largely served by rail, could in peacetime handle 20,000 deadweight long tons daily. Toulon, 31 miles southeast, had a peacetime capacity of less than that of Marseille; and preliminary reconnaissance disclosed that, contrary to expectations, it had been damaged more severely than Marseille. German demolition units had destroyed the naval base and other installations, while shore bombardment by Allied naval vessels and bombing by the Air Corps had increased the magnitude of destruction. It was


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estimated that upon development Toulon would have a capacity of but ten berths for Liberty ships; Marseille, strategically better located, could be developed to berth eight Liberties by 8 September and ten by 25 September along with accomodations for a total of 25 other ships.




SCUTTLED SHIPS IN TOULON HARBOR

"... It was estimated that upon development, Toulon would have a capacity of but ten berths . . ."

Three days after the fall of the two ports, the Chief of Staff conferred with Engineer officers, Naval officers, and Coastal Base Section officers on reconstruction of the facilities. Decision was made to concentrate all salvage personnel and equipment available on repair of the port of Marseille under supervision of Army engineers, while Seabees would develop Toulon harbor under a plan of operation to be furnished by the Continental Base Section. On the same day the Naval Commander of the Western Naval Task Force stated in a dispatch to General Patch that "Experience in this theatre has shown that beach

maintenance after mid-September is inadequate and that it is essential to have protected ports available to insure adequate facilities to supply advancing armies", and outlined his plan to accomplish that goal.

Joint operations of Army and Naval forces immediately began



BLASTING A PASSAGE-WAY THROUGH TO MARSEILLES HARBOR

"... The northern end of the port was completely blocked by sunken ships . . ."

rehabilitation of the great port which had been damaged extensively. The northern end of the port was completely blocked by sunken ships, while anchorage in the southern end was suitable for restoration as a lighter landing. The inner harbor was sown with magnetic and acoustic mines and all types of explosives were buried in the port area. Jetties, quays, berth spaces, and cranes were mined and booby-trapped after blasting had wrecked them. Thousands of mines lay in the channel beyond the outer mole, undetonated by the enemy for lack of time.

Representatives of base section coordinated with Army in rehabilitation of the port, as had been the procedure since the early

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stages after the landing to facilitate the transfer of line of communication functions to base. The original plan was for base section to assume control of the first major port ten days after its fall from the Seventh Army. Three days after the fall of the ports, responsibilities were



HARBOR OF MARSEILLE

"... jetties, quays, berth spaces, and cranes were mined and booby trapped after blasting had wrecked them ..."

divided with the engineer base section assuming the duties of engineer work in Marseille and Toulon except for port repair, which was a function of the Seventh Army Engineer. Eight engineer units available for port work were divided. The Army Engineer representative prepared to direct unloading of the three port repair shiploads of personnel and materiel, which had been loaded out to land on call after D plus 10, and subsequent rehabilitation of the port.

Construction was immediately started on the "hards" for landing LCTs and ramps for landing lighters and DUKWs. Unloading

by lighters proceeded in the southern end of the port while clearing of the inner port was in progress. The task of clearing Marseille harbor was assigned to the 1051st Port Construction and Repair Group, which had performed the same mission at Naples. The 36th Engineer Combat Regiment had the job of "delousing" the inner harbor and reconstruction of the berths to be ready by the time the Navy cleared a passage through the blockships. That part of the Marseille area known as Avant Port Joliette was declared by the Navy to be clear of mines as of 1800 hours, 3 September; and port ships began to discharge there.

Bassins, Marechal, Petain, and Mirabeau were opened 15 September, at which time two and one-half Liberty berths alongside Mole H, and nine holding berths in Avant Port Sud were already available. Bassins, President Wilson, and de Pinede were to be cleared by 18 September, on which day Liberty ships were unloading at ten dock berths and operations were three days ahead of the original Navy estimates. Five days later Admiral Hewitt radioed General Patch that on or about 25 September the port of Marseille would have a discharge capacity of 12,500 tons daily.

By 25 September when Camel Beach was closed, the Navy reported that there were 16 alongside and 23 offshore berths in use at Marseille, three at Port de Bouc, and seven and one-half at Toulon. There had been unloaded at Marseille 50,569 personnel, 6,711 vehicles, 99,171 tons of dry cargo, and 10,000 barrels. At Toulon aggregate discharges to 25 September were 5,085 personnel, 2,628 vehicles, 24,252 tons of dry cargo, and 76,130 barrels. Through Port de Bouc there had been discharged 30,795 tons of dry cargo and 239,600 barrels. The Navy reported that on D plus 40 there had been brought ashore over beach and through ports 324,069 personnel, 68,419 vehicles, 490,237 tons of dry cargo, and 325,730 barrels of wet cargo in support of DRAGOON.

On 8 September transfer of control from Army to Base Section of line of communication functions was arranged, relieving all engineer regiments of Army except one battalion from each of the 36th and 40th Engineer Combat Regiments as soon as the three ships of the port repair convoy had been unloaded. Headquarters of Coastal Base Section had opened 1 September in Marseille with limited functions, and Base

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Section Engineers assumed responsibility for normal engineer duties in the base zone on 10 September. The transfer of Army responsibility to the Base Section was completed by D plus 26. Near Shore Control Headquarters at Naples terminated its activities, and the ports operated directly with SOS NATOUSA and other lines of communication agencies. By the end of the month the Continental Base Section opened at Dijon, and Delta Base Section replaced it at Marseille.

Summary of the Period

As the period of rapid advance came to a close, at the end of September, combat troops were faced with new conditions. Continuous pursuit over long distances changed to difficult and plodding progress, and the weather became cold and rainy. The old stone houses, the mountains ,the rain reminded many a veteran of the previous winter in Italy. The "champagne" war was over. Troops of the services of supply had given full support to the advance, working under difficult conditions brought about by plans which lagged far behind operations.

On 27 September General Truscott issued a memorandum to all officers and men of the VI Corps, summarizing the accomplishments of Operation DRAGOON:

> Seven weeks ago the VI Corps landed on the beaches in Southern France. In these seven weeks, ably supported by Naval and Air Forces and by our French Allies and French Forces of the Interior, you have cleared the enemy beach defenses, you have encircled and isolated the ports of Toulon and Marseille, and facilitated their capture by our French Allies. You have cleared the Durance Valley, encircling and destroying a large portion of the German Nineteenth Army; you have opened the Rhone River Valley. You have pursued the fleeing remnants of the once proud German Army almost to the border of Germany itself. Your pursuit has covered almost 500 miles from the beaches. It has involved hard fighting against a desperate enemy. It has involved two major river crossings. You have encountered and overcome every obstacle that German ingenuity could devise. You have been required, with less than organic transportation, to move yourself and your weapons over hundreds of miles, distances that few would have considered possible.
>
> Your operations have been of great assistance to the Allied Armies in Northern France and a vital factor in clearing Southwestern, Southern, and Eastern France of enemy forces.
>
> This campaign will stand as a monument to the training, fighting spirit, boldness, aggressiveness, determination, and willingness to undergo hardship, of the American soldier and the leadership of American officers of all ranks. To all officers and men I express my sincere appreciation for your hard and untiring efforts and my deep admiration for your accomplishments during this period.
>
> Our task is not yet done. Hard fighting remains. The enemy, reorganized and reinforced, is on the border of his own country. Difficult and rugged terrain confronts us. Rain, cold, and snow will increase the difficulty of our operation. However, I face the future with complete confidence that, surmounting every obstacle and taking every objective in your accustomed manner, you will destroy the enemy before you, and will be a vital factor in the final defeat of the enemies of our country.

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166	681.607	Jul/43-May/45			15th Army Gp. Intell. Summaries	U	
879	682.01-1	Feb-Aug/43			7th Army Sicilian Campaign	U	
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